Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary' evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: DHRS administers the Program which is jointly funded by the state and federal government under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The Program is voluntary and is subject to both state and federal laws, rules and regulations. The Program does not reimburse providers such as Dr. Clement for all services rendered. Only those services which are determined to be medically necessary or which the state has determined it wishes to provide are covered by the Program. The services to be rendered and the fees to be paid for those services are set forth in the policy manuals and fee schedules which are given the provider when he enrolls in the Program. Under the Program, the provider files claims in accordance with the policies set forth in the manual. Those claims are computer processed and it is assumed that the provider is submitting the claims in accordance with the policies. The computer system is not programmed to reject all erroneous claims. Therefore, the provider is automatically reimbursed based upon claims submitted. The Program operates on the honor system and must "pay and chase" providers who submit improper claims. Under the Program the state is required to protect the integrity of the Program by reviewing providers for possible fraud and abuse. The Program utilizes a Surveillance Utilization and Review System (SURS) which compares a provider's Medicaid practice with that of his peers. This system takes the provider's computer generated claims history and compares it both quantitatively and qualitatively with the average practice of his peers. When a potential problem is detected, the provider's practice is further reviewed to determine if fraud or abuse has occurred. On November 4, 1983, Dr. Clement signed a provider agreement with DHRS and operated under this provider agreement at all times material to this proceeding. In signing this provider agreement, Dr. Clement agreed to "submit requests for payment in accordance with program policies" and to, "abide by the provisions of the Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations. In billing under the Program, Dr. Clement is expected to provide services in accordance with generally accepted practices of his profession of dentistry. Those services for which a provider may submit claims are set forth in the Children's Dental Services Manual (HRSM 230-22), a copy of which was provided to Dr. Clement when he entered the Program. In addition to the manual, Dr. Clement was provided with an EDS Billing Handbook which explained the mechanics of submitting a claim. HRSM 230-22 is merely a compilation of procedures for which the Program will reimburse the provider along with the reimbursement rate for each procedure. The manual utilizes procedures and codes utilized by the American Dental Association, is prepared with technical assistance of dental consultants, and is reviewed by various dental associations. The manual is designed for use by dental providers who are knowledgeable in the field of dentistry and are utilizing generally accepted principles of dentistry. In 1985 a SURS Level I Review report, comparing Dr. Clement with his peer group of general dentists providing services to children, indicated possible inappropriate billing of the Program. Because of the nature and extent of the billing problems, Dr. Clement's case was referred to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) of the State of Florida's Auditor General's Office for possible criminal prosecution. DHRS took no further action pending the criminal investigation. Criminal charges were subsequently filed against Dr. Clement as a result of the MFCU investigation and Dr. Clement's case was referred back to the Medicaid Office of Program Integrity for review of nine possible areas of program policy violations which were not part of the criminal prosecution. The Program thereupon conducted its own investigation into possible abuse by Dr. Clement. Using the preliminary investigation done by an HRS dental consultant who reviewed Dr. Clement's practice for MFCU, and the original Level I Review report, a DHRS investigator reviewed ad hoc computer reports of claims submitted by Dr. Clement for specific dental procedures. Based upon the computer analysis of claims submitted, as well as the advice of the dental consultant, the Program identified nine areas of Dr. Clement's practice of Medicaid billing which were not in compliance with Medicaid billing procedures or generally accepted standards of dental practice. On sixty-six occasions, Dr. Clement submitted claims and was paid for procedures such as examinations, prophylaxis and fluoride treatment at intervals of less than six months. HRSM 230-22 recommends that such procedures be performed no more frequently than once every six months, and this recommendation is recognized under generally accepted standards of dentistry. This recommendation is applicable to both private pay patients and Medicaid patients who are generally indigent. Although such treatment may be necessary on occasions at shorter intervals, Dr. Clement offered no evidence to justify the frequency or the necessity of providing such procedures at intervals of less than the recommended six months. On two hundred and eighty six occasions, Dr. Clement improperly filed claims and received payment for consultations. HRSM 230-22 only allows claims for consultations by a dental specialist (oral surgeon, periodontist, endodontist, or prosthodontist). Dr. Clement is not a dental specialist and should not have submitted claims for such procedures. The manual's definition and interpretation of the appropriate billing procedure for consultation services is in accordance with the generally accepted practice of dentistry. On ninety four occasions, Dr. Clement submitted claims and received payment for behavior management and nitrous oxide on the same visit. HRSM 230- 22 only allows claims for behavior management where nitrous oxide is not used. There was no evidence to show that both behavior management and nitrous oxide on the same visit was necessary. On seven occasions, Dr. Clement submitted claims and received payment for extracting more than one first tooth in a given quadrant. HRSM 230-22 provides a fee of $10.00 for the extraction of the first tooth in a given quadrant which is billed on a claim as procedure D7110 whereas each additional tooth extracted in the same quadrant at the same time is reimbursed at the rate of $7.00 and billed on a claim as procedure D7120. The fee for the removal of the first tooth in a given quadrant is higher than the fee for each succeeding tooth in the same quadrant because anesthesia for the first tooth does not have be administered for each succeeding tooth in the same quadrant. Dr. Clement received payment for 117 alveolectomies (a reshaping of the bone) performed on 52 children which is an excessive number. Alveolectomies should only be performed in extreme cases where, without an alveolectomy, the insertion of dentures or partials would be impossible. It is standard dental practice to perform an alveolectomy only where a denture is supplied. Performing an alveolectomy on a child is not a common practice. There was no evidence that Dr. Clement performed the alveolectomies in preparation of insertion of partials or dentures. Dr. Clement filed an excessive number of claims for pulp caps. A pulp cap is a protective material utilized when the pulp of the tooth is exposed (direct pulp cap) or nearly exposed (indirect pulp cap). HRSM 230-22 differentiates a pulp cap from a medicated base. A pulp cap is reimbursable as a separate claim, the medicated base is not. Dr. Clement claimed and received payment for pulp caps 68.7 percent of the time in conjunction with a tooth restoration. There was credible evidence to show that in the generally accepted practice of dentistry, pulp caps are used no more than 5 percent of the time in a tooth restoration. Dr. Clement billed for pulp caps whenever he applied a medicated base, even though the pulp was not exposed or nearly exposed. On one hundred occasions Dr. Clement improperly filed claims and received payment for palliative (emergency) treatment at the same time that he filed a claim and was paid for regular dental treatment. Palliative treatment is used to relieve pain and discomfort on an emergency basis when time and circumstances contra-indicate a more definitive treatment and additional services. In the general accepted practice of dentistry, palliative treatment is used as a temporary measure to assist the patient until such time as regular treatment can be provided. Palliative treatment and any other treatment are mutually exclusive and normally would not be given on the same day. On those occasion where Dr. Clement filed claims and received payment for both palliative treatment and regular treatment on the same day, there is insufficient evidence to show that this treatment was within the generally accepted practice of dentistry. On sixteen occasions Dr. clement improperly filed claims and was paid for prophylaxis, periodontal scaling, and gingival curettage all on the same date of service. Prophylaxis is the standard cleaning of the teeth. Periodontal scaling is a more advanced procedure of cleaning wherein larger deposits of caclculus are removed by scraping. Gingival curretage is a more drastic procedures wherein pockets which have formed between the gum and the teeth are scraped out. While all three procedures are different, they overlap somewhat and it is not a generally accepted practice of dentistry to perform more than one of these procedures at any given time. There was no evidence presented to show that performing all three procedures on the same date was necessary or was within the generally accepted practice of dentistry. Dr. Clement filed an excessive number of claims for gingival curretage. Dr. Clement claimed and received payment for gingival curretage on 14 percent of his patients under the age of 17. In the generally accepted practice of dentistry, the use of gingival curretage on children will not normally exceed 1 percent to 3 percent for ages 10 and under or 3 percent to 6 percent over the age of 10. Although Dr. Clement urged that these claims for gingival curretage had been given prior approval, the evidence showed that the prior approval had been given based on information furnished by Dr. Clement and the dental consultant giving the prior approval did so on that information on a case by case basis and did not know of the excessive use of gingival curretage by Dr. Clement. Based on the nine areas cited for inappropriate billing, there is substantial competent evidence to show that Dr. Clement was not following generally accepted standards of dental practice.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order finding that Dr. Clement has abused the Florida Medicaid Program and terminating Dr. Clement from participation in the Florida Medicaid Program. Respectfully submitted and entered this 7th day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3023 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 as clarified. 21. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 17 but clarified. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. 9 The first sentence adopted in Finding of Fact 19. The balance is rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore E. Mack, Esquire 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Harold E. Regan, Esquire 308 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether certain provisions of the Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan, as adopted in Rule 59G-6.010, Florida Administrative Code, which are relied upon by the AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION to apply a fair rental value system of property reimbursement to Petitioner are invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1995). Petitioner also asserts a state and federal constitutional equal protection challenge to the existing rule provisions. (Petitioner’s constitutional issues are preserved, but are not determined in this proceeding.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, CONSULTING MANAGEMENT AND EDUCATION, INC., d/b/a GULF COAST NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER (CME), is the licensed operator of a 103-bed nursing home in Clearwater, Florida, which is presently known as GULF COAST NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER (GULF COAST). CME participates in the Florida Medicaid Program as an enrolled provider. Respondent, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (AHCA), is the agency of the State of Florida authorized to implement and administer the Florida Medicaid Program, and is the successor agency to the former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, pursuant to Chapter 93-129, Laws of Florida. Stipulated Facts Prior to 1993, the GULF COAST nursing home facility was known as COUNTRY PLACE OF CLEARWATER (COUNTRY PLACE), and was owned and operated by the Clearwater Limited Partnership, a limited partnership which is not related to CME. In 1993 CME agreed to purchase, and did in fact purchase, COUNTRY PLACE from the Clearwater Limited Partnership. Simultaneous with the purchase of COUNTRY PLACE, CME entered into a Sale/Leaseback Agreement with LTC Properties, Inc., a Maryland real estate investment trust which engages in the financing of nursing homes. The Purchase and Sale Agreement between Clearwater Limited Partnership and CME was contingent upon the Sale/Leaseback Agreement and the proposed Lease between CME and LTC Properties, Inc. On September 1, 1993, CME simultaneously as a part of the same transaction purchased COUNTRY PLACE, conveyed the facility to LTC Properties, Inc., and leased the facility back from LTC Properties, Inc. As required, CME had notified AHCA of the proposed transaction. AHCA determined that the transaction included a change of ownership and, by lease, a change of provider. CME complied with AHCA's requirements and became the licensed operator and Medicaid provider for COUNTRY PLACE. Thereafter, CME changed the name of the facility to GULF COAST. After CME acquired the facility and became the licensed operator and Medicaid provider, AHCA continued to reimburse CME the same per diem reimbursement which had been paid to the previous provider (plus certain inflation factors) until CME filed its initial cost report, as required for new rate setting. In the normal course of business, CME in 1995 filed its initial Medicaid cost report after an initial period of actual operation by CME. Upon review of the cost report, AHCA contended that the cost report was inaccurate and engaged in certain "cost settlement" adjustments. During this review, AHCA took the position that CME's property reimbursement should be based on FRVS methodologies rather than "cost" due to the lease. In November of 1995, CME received from AHCA various documents which recalculated all components of Petitioner's Medicaid reimbursement rates for all periods subsequent to CME's acquisition of the facility. In effect, AHCA placed CME on FRVS property reimbursement. The practical effect of AHCA's action was to reduce CME's property reimbursement both retroactively and prospectively. The retroactive application would result in a liability of CME to AHCA, due to a claimed overpayment by AHCA. The prospective application would (and has) resulted in a reduction of revenues. CME is substantially affected by AHCA's proposed action and by Sections I.B., III.G.2.d.(1), V.E.1.h., and V.E.4. of the Florida Medicaid Plan. Additional Findings of Fact The Florida Medicaid Plan establishes methodologies for reimbursement of a nursing home's operating costs and patient care costs, as well as property costs. The dispute in this matter relates only to reimbursement of property costs. CME as the operator of the GULF COAST nursing home facility is entitled to reimbursement of property costs in accordance with the Florida Medicaid Plan. CME as the operator of the GULF COAST facility entered into a Florida Medicaid Program Provider Agreement, agreeing to abide by the provisions of the Florida Medicaid Plan. The Sale/Leaseback Agreement entered into by CME and LTC Properties Inc. (LTC) specifically provides for a distinct sale of the nursing home facility to LTC. LTC holds record fee title to GULF COAST. LTC, a Maryland corporation, is not related to CME, a Colorado corporation. The Florida Medicaid Plan is intended to provide reimbursement for reasonable costs incurred by economically and efficiently operated facilities. The Florida Medicaid Plan pays a single per diem rate for all levels of nursing care. After a nursing home facility's first year of operation, a cost settling process is conducted with AHCA which results in a final cost report. The final cost report serves as a baseline for reimbursement over the following years. Subsequent to the first year of operation, a facility files its cost report annually. AHCA normally adjusts a facility's reimbursement rate twice a year based upon the factors provided for in the Florida Medicaid Plan. The rate-setting process takes a provider through Section II of the Plan relating to cost finding and audits resulting in cost adjustments. CME submitted the appropriate cost reports after its first year of operation of the GULF COAST facility. Section III of the Florida Medicaid Plan specifies the areas of allowable costs. Under the Allowable Costs Section III.G.2.d.(1) in the Florida Title XIX Plan, a facility with a lease executed on or after October 1, 1985, shall be reimbursed for lease costs and other property costs under the Fair Rental Value System (FRVS). AHCA has treated all leases the same under FRVS since that time. AHCA does not distinguish between types of leases under the FRVS method. The method for the FRVS calculation is provided in Section V.E.1.a-g of the Florida Medicaid Plan. A “hold harmless” exception to application of the FRVS method is provided for at Section V.E.1.h of the Florida Medicaid Plan, and Section V.E.4 of the Plan provides that new owners shall receive the prior owner’s cost-based method when the prior owner was not on FRVS under the hold harmless provision. As a lessee and not the holder of record fee title to the facility, neither of those provisions apply to CME. At the time CME acquired the facility, there was an indication that the Sale/Leaseback transaction with LTC was between related parties, so that until the 1995 cost settlement, CME was receiving the prior owner’s cost-based property method of reimbursement. When AHCA determined that the Sale/Leaseback transaction between CME and LTC was not between related parties, AHCA set CME’s property reimbursement component under FRVS as a lessee. Property reimbursement based on the FRVS methodology does not depend on actual period property costs. Under the FRVS methodology, all leases after October 1985 are treated the same. For purposes of reimbursement, AHCA does not recognize any distinction between various types of leases. For accounting reporting purposes, the Sale/Leaseback transaction between CME and LTD is treated as a capital lease, or “virtual purchase” of the facility. This accounting treatment, however, is limited to a reporting function, with the underlying theory being merely that of providing a financing mechanism. Record fee ownership remains with LTC. CME, as the lease holder, may not encumber title to the facility. The Florida Medicaid Plan does not distinguish between a sale/leaseback transaction and other types of lease arrangements. Sections IV.D., V.E.1.h., and V.E.4., the “hold harmless” and “change of ownership” provisions which allow a new owner to receive the prior owner’s method of reimbursement if FRVS would produce a loss for the new owner, are limited within the Plan’s organizational context, and within the context of the Plan, to owner/operators of facilities, and grandfathered lessee/operators. These provisions do not apply to leases executed after October 1, 1985. Capital leases are an accounting construct for reporting purposes, which is inapplicable when the Florida Medicaid Plan specifically addresses this issue. The Florida Medicaid Plan specifically addresses the treatment of leases entered into after October 1985 and provides that reimbursement will be made pursuant to the FRVS method. The Florida Medicaid Plan is the result of lengthy workshops and negotiations between the agency and the nursing home industry. The Florida Medicaid Plan complies with federal regulations.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner) is entitled to recover certain Medicaid payments made to Cape Memorial Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Cape Coral Hospital (Respondent).
Findings Of Fact Title XIX of the Social Security Act establishes Medicaid as a collaborative federal-state program in which the state receives federal funding (also known as “federal financial participation” or “FFP") for services provided to Medicaid- eligible recipients in accordance with federal law. The Florida statutes and rules relevant to this proceeding essentially incorporate federal Medicaid standards. The Petitioner is the state agency charged with administering the Medicaid provisions relevant to this proceeding. Section 409.902, Florida Statutes (2015)1/, states that the Petitioner is the “single state agency authorized to make payments” under the Medicaid program. The referenced statute limits such payments to “services included in the program” and only on “behalf of eligible individuals.” The Respondent is enrolled in the Florida Medicaid Program as a Medicaid Hospital Provider. The Respondent's participation in the Florida Medicaid Program is subject to the terms of a Medicaid Provider Agreement. The Respondent's Medicaid Provider Agreement requires compliance with all state and federal laws governing the Medicaid program, including the state and federal laws limiting Medicaid payments for services provided to undocumented aliens. Eligibility for Medicaid services is restricted to United States citizens, and to specified non-citizens who have been lawfully admitted into the United States. Pursuant to section 409.902(2)(b), Medicaid funds cannot be used to provide medical services to individuals who do not meet the statutory eligibility criteria "unless the services are necessary to treat an emergency medical condition" or are for pregnant women. The cited statute further provides that such services are “authorized only to the extent provided under federal law.” The relevant federal law (42 U.S.C. section 1396b(v)(3)) defines an "emergency medical condition" as: medical condition (including emergency labor and delivery) manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in-(A) placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy, (B) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (C) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. The Florida definition of “emergency medical condition” set forth at section 409.901(10)(a) mirrors the federal definition. Pursuant to section 409.904(4), the Petitioner can make payments to a Medicaid provider on behalf of "a low-income person who meets all other requirements for Medicaid eligibility except citizenship and who is in need of emergency medical services" for “the period of the emergency, in accordance with federal regulations." The Florida Medicaid program requirements relevant to this proceeding were identified in the Florida Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.160(2),), and in the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook (incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-5.020.) The applicable Florida Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook provided as follows: The Medicaid Hospital Services Program reimburses for emergency services provided to aliens who meet all Medicaid eligibility requirements except for citizenship or alien status. Eligibility can be authorized only for the duration of the emergency. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic services after the emergency has been alleviated. Similar provisions were contained in the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook. Section 409.913 requires that the Petitioner monitor the activities of Medicaid providers and to “recover overpayments.” The Petitioner’s Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (BMPI) routinely conducts audits to monitor Medicaid providers. Section 409.913(1)(e) defines “overpayment” to include “any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake.” The BMPI conducted a review of the Respondent's claims for services rendered to undocumented aliens during the period January 1 through December 31, 2006. The Respondent provided all documentation requested by the Petitioner necessary to review the claims addressed herein. As to each claim, the designated reviewing physician made a determination, based on the medical records, as to whether the claim was related to an emergency medical condition, and, if so, when the emergency medical condition was alleviated. Based on the evidence, and on the testimony of the physicians identified herein, the determinations of the physicians are fully credited as to the existence of emergency medical conditions and as to when such conditions were alleviated. CLAIM #1 Dr. Thomas Wells reviewed Claim #1, which involved a length of stay from March 31 through April 10, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Wells determined that an emergency medical condition existed on March 31, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of April 6, 2006. CLAIM #3 Dr. Michael Phillips reviewed Claim #3, which involved a length of stay from May 27 through June 12, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Phillips determined that an emergency medical condition existed on May 27, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of May 28, 2006. CLAIM #4 Dr. Michael Phillips reviewed Claim #4, which involved a length of stay from January 15 through January 20, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Phillips determined that an emergency medical condition existed on January 15, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of January 17, 2006. CLAIM #5 Dr. Michael Phillips reviewed Claim #5, which involved a length of stay from March 4 through April 10, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Phillips determined that an emergency medical condition existed on March 4, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of March 7, 2006. CLAIM #6 Dr. Steve Beiser reviewed Claim #6, which involved a length of stay from June 15 through June 18, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Beiser determined that an emergency medical condition existed on June 15, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of June 16, 2006. CLAIM #7 Dr. Thomas Wells reviewed Claim #7, which involved a length of stay from June 15 through July 6, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Wells determined that the emergency medical condition existed on June 15, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of June 28, 2006.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding a Medicaid overpayment of $57,350.67 related to the six claims identified herein. Pursuant to section 409.913(23), Florida Statutes, the Petitioner is entitled to recover certain investigative, legal, and expert witness costs. Jurisdiction is retained to determine the amount of appropriate costs if the parties are unable to agree. Within 30 days after entry of the final order, either party may file a request for a hearing on the amount. Failure to request a hearing within 30 days after entry of the final order shall be deemed to indicate that the issue of costs has been resolved. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2016.
The Issue Whether Emergency Rule 10CER89-21 and an amendment of Rule 10C-7.0482, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact The Parties and The Petitioners' Standing. The Petitioners, Hillhaven, United, Diversicare, HCRA, Americare and Waverly, are providers of long-term care services to elderly and disabled persons including Medicaid recipients. (S.F. 1). Petitioners have standing to raise their respective claims in this matter. (S.F. 38). The Department is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department is responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. (S.F. 3). The Federal Medicaid Program. General. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. 1396-1396s, and commonly referred to as the Medicaid Act, is a cooperative federal-state program. Under the Medicaid program, the federal government provides matching funds to states to help them provide their needy residents with necessary medical services. (S.F. 1). State Participation in the Program. State participation in the Medicaid program is not mandatory. A state which opts to participate, however, must submit to the Health Care Financing Administration (hereinafter referred to as "HCFA") of the Department of Health and Human Services (hereinafter referred to as "HHS") a "state plan for medical assistance" which meets all relevant federal requirements. 42 U.S.C. 1396a. (S.F. 2). Once HCFA approves a state's plan, that state is entitled to federal financial participation (hereinafter referred to as "FFP"), which means that HHS pays the state a certain percentage of amounts expended under the plan. 42 U.S.C. 1396b. The state must then administer the program in accordance with federal law, regulations and the approved state plan. 42 U.S.C. 1396c. (S.F. 2). Each state that participates in the Medicaid program must designate an agency to implement the Medicaid program in that state. 42 U.S.C. 1396(a)(5) and 42 C.F.R. 431.10. The state agency designated is not allowed to delegate its authority to administer or supervise the state plan. 42 C.F.R. 431.10(e). Amendment of a State Medicaid Plan. The mechanism for amending a state's Medicaid plan is set forth in 42 C.F.R. 447.256(c) and 430.20. (S.F. 10). In pertinent part, 42 C.F.R. 447.256(c), provides: A state plan amendment that is approved will become effective no earlier than the first day of the calendar quarter in which an approvable amendment is submitted in accordance with [42 C.F.R.] 430.20 and 447.253. In pertinent part, 42 C.F.R. 20(b)(2), provides that "[f]or a plan amendment that changes the State's payment method and standards, the [effective date] rules of [42 C.F.R.] 447.256 apply." The requirements for public notice of a proposed amendment to a state's Medicaid plan are set forth in 42 C.F.R. 447.205. (S.F. 11). The notice, pursuant to 42 C.F.R. 447.205(c), must include: Describe the proposed change in methods and standards; Give an estimate of any expected increase or decrease in annual aggregate expenditures; Explain why the agency is changing its methods and standards; Identify a local agency in each county (such as the social services agency or health department) where copies of the proposed changes are available for public review; Give an address where written comments may be sent and reviewed by the public; and If there are public hearings, give the location, date and time for hearings or tell how this information may be obtained. One of the requirements for federal approval of an amendment to a state plan is the requirement that the state provide payment rates in compliance with the "Boren Amendment", 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(13), and make findings and submit assurances to HCFA that: The Medicaid agency pays for . . . long-term care facility services through the use of rates that are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs that must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated providers to provide services in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards. 42 C.F.R. 447.253(b)(1). The Medicaid Program in Florida. Florida's Participation. Florida participates in the Medicaid program pursuant to Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Florida Medicaid Plan"). (S.F. 3). The Department is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Plan. The Florida Medicaid Plan authorizes payments for nursing home services provided to eligible individuals in accordance with Medicaid regulations. (S.F. 3). Adoption and Approval of a Medicaid Plan. The Florida Medicaid Plan as revised January 1, 1988, was submitted by the Department to HCFA in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 1396A. The Department provided assurances to HCFA that Medicaid reimbursement rates under the January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan were reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities. See 42 U.S.C. 1396(a)(13)(A). (S.F. 4). HCFA approved the January 1, 1988, Florida Medicaid Plan effective January 1, 1988. (S.F. 4). The Florida Medicaid Plan. Under the January 1, 1988, Florida Medicaid Plan, long-term care providers such as the Petitioners are reimbursed under a prospective reimbursement methodology. Rates are set in advance of the rate semester based on historical cost data trended forward for inflation with no retroactive adjustment to account for actual costs for a cost reporting period (as opposed to actual reimbursement for the same period). (S.F. 5). Florida long-term care providers are divided into four classes based on geographic location and size. (S.F. 5). Each provider's rate consists of four components: (1) the property cost component; (2) the operating cost component; (3) the patient care cost component; and (4) a return on equity or use allowance. (S.F. 5). Reimbursement ceilings for patient care and operating cost components are established for each of the four classes. Ceilings are effective semiannually on January 1 and July 1. A statewide ceiling for the property cost component applies to providers who are reimbursed on the basis of depreciation and interest. Section 4B of the January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan. (S.F. 6). Providers that do not receive depreciation and interest for their property costs are reimbursed under the Fair Rental Value Systems (hereinafter referred to as "FRVS"). Under FRVS, reimbursement is based on the acquisition costs of a capital asset including capital additions and improvements subsequent to acquisition. These acquisition costs are indexed forward to October 1, 1985 by a portion of the rate of increase in the Dodge Construction Index. Id. Subsection V.E.I.a. (S.F. 7). The January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan also requires that the FRVS component of a provider's rate be adjusted semiannually using the change in the Dodge Index for the most recent six month period published prior to the rate semester. Id. Subsection V.E.I.a. The January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan requires semiannual inflationary adjustments, to become effective on July 1 and January 1 of each year. (S.F. 8). The January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan established Petitioners' Medicaid rates during the period January 1, 1988 through December 31, 1989. (S.F. 9). The Legislature's Appropriation of Funds for Medicaid. The appropriation for Florida's fiscal year 1989-1990 from the Florida Legislature included funds to reimburse Medicaid long-term care facility providers for the fiscal year July 1, 1989 through June 30, 1990 in accordance with the January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan. (S.F. 12). Florida's Budget Cuts and The Department's Response. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1990, Florida experienced a shortfall in general revenue collections, and then-Governor Bob Martinez certified that a deficit would occur in the Florida state budget. (S.F. 13). In order to deal with the budget deficit, the Department was asked to provide cost containment alternatives to the Administration Commission (consisting of the Governor and the cabinet) which the Department did. (S.F. 13). Among the alternatives recommended by the Department was an amendment to the current Florida Medicaid Plan which would maintain Medicaid reimbursement rates for long-term care facilities at their December 31, 1989 level. This alternative was advocated by the Department as the most appropriate and fair of all the alternatives presented by the Department. (S.F. 13). In effect, the Department suggested that the Florida Medicaid Plan be amended to eliminate those provisions of the Florida Medicaid Plan providing for semiannual adjustments to the Medicaid reimbursement rate. Exhibit 2 is a true, correct and complete copy of an Impact Statement prepared by the Department and submitted to the Administration Commission concerning the proposed rate freeze that was accepted by the Administration Commission. This document was not submitted to HCFA. (S.F. 13). In the Impact Statement provided to the Administration Commission on November 21, 1989, the Department concluded that Florida nursing homes would receive 4% less than their anticipated costs due to the proposed freeze: Nursing Home Care ($13,131,931 GR) - This proposal will not allow nursing home per diem rates to increase based on their projected cost increases. The Medicaid Program will be reimbursing nursing homes 4.0% less than their anticipated costs. This price level reduction will impact on 489 participating nursing homes. There is no basis upon which to project the impact this will have on our clients [sic] ability to access those services of the quality of care received. This was the only analysis conducted by the Department prior to January 1, 1990, of Florida nursing home anticipated costs compared to the rates nursing homes would receive under the proposed rate freeze. On November 21, 1989, the Administration Commission, under the procedure outlined in Section 216.221, Florida Statutes, accepted the Department's proposal effective December 1, 1989 and reduced the Department's budget accordingly. (S.F. 13). The budget reductions ordered by the Administration Commission were taken from the Department's general revenue appropriation effective January 1, 1990, through mandatory reserves, or a holdback, of appropriations. The impact on the Department was that it had less authority to spend funds. The rate freeze approved by the Administration Commission allowed changes in rates due to licensure rating changes pursuant to Section V.D. of the January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan. (S.F. 13). A letter from the Department to nursing home administrators in Florida, including the Petitioners, dated January 29, 1990, was sent to Florida facilities affected by the rate freeze. The Department stated in the January 29, 1990, letter (exhibit 5), that the rate freeze would remain in effect until monies were appropriated by the Florida Legislature to recalculate new rates and ceilings. (S.F. 17). Promulgation of Rules Implementing the Rate Freeze. In order to effectuate the freeze, the Department caused to be published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on December 22, 1989, notice of Emergency Rule 10CER89-21 (10C-7.0482) (hereinafter referred to as the "Emergency Rule"). See exhibit 3. (S.F. 14). The Emergency Rule amended the Department's rules by providing that Florida Medicaid reimbursement would be in accordance with the January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan as revised January 1, 1990. See exhibit 4. (S.F. 14). The January 1, 1990 modifications to the January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan were attached to the notice of the Emergency Rule and were incorporated therein. (S.F. 14). The effect of the Emergency Rule was to eliminate the provisions of the January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan providing for recalculation of reimbursement rates, which recalculation would have included an inflationary adjustment, for the Petitioners' per diem Medicaid rates for the period beginning January 1, 1990. The Emergency Rule had the effect of maintaining the Petitioners' per diem Medicaid rates at the level in effect on December 31, 1989, excluding changes based on licensure rating reclassifications. The Emergency Rule did not limit the rate freeze to the period prior to June 30, 1990, and did not specify the date or approximate date on which the rate freeze would end. (S.F. 14). Emergency rules, however, are only effective for ninety days in Florida. Although the public notice of the Emergency Rule did not specify the anticipated increase or decrease in annual expenditures, notice of the general impact of the Emergency Rule was provided. On February 2, 1990, the Department caused to be published in the Florida Administrative Weekly notice of an amendment to Rule 10C-7.0482, Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Permanent Rule"). See exhibit 6. (S.F. 15). The Permanent Rule eliminated the recalculation of reimbursement rates, which recalculation would have included an inflationary adjustment for Petitioners' per diem Medicaid rates for the period beginning January 1, 1990. The Permanent Rule maintained the Petitioners' per diem Medicaid rates at the level in effect on December 31, 1989, excluding changes based on licensure rating reclassifications. (S.F. 15). The Permanent Rule did not limit the rate freeze to the period prior to June 30, 1990 or specify the date or approximate date on which the rate freeze would end. The "purpose and effect" section of the Permanent Rule stated that the rate freeze would be in effect until sufficient funds were appropriated by the Legislature to recalculate rates and ceilings for Medicaid providers. (S.F. 15). By letter date March 15, 1990 (exhibit 8), a "Notice of Change" was filed by the Department with the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. The Notice of Change modified the effective date of the Permanent Rule from March 22, 1990 to March 26, 1990. The Notice of Change was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on March 23, 1990. Exhibit 27. (S.F. 19). No other public notices, or emergency or permanent rules, were published by the Department subsequent to February 2, 1990, which would have affected the Petitioners' Medicaid rates for the period January 1, 1990 through June 30, 1990. (S.F. 16). There are no documents which indicate that the Department enacted the Emergency Rule or the Permanent Rule for reasons other than those stated in the public notices for the Emergency Rule and the Permanent Rule and the January 29, 1990, letter. (S.F. 18). The Department enacted the Emergency and Permanent Rules solely due to the budgetary cuts ordered by the Administration Commission. The preamble to the Emergency Rule stated "[b]ased on a recent decision made by the Governor and Florida Cabinet, Medicaid rates were frozen at the December 31, 1989 levels for all providers of these institutions." The preamble to the Emergency Rule also stated that "a shortfall in general revenue requires the state to reduce or eliminate payment for needed services to medicaid recipients." Neither the preamble to the Emergency Rule nor the Permanent Rule indicated that Florida nursing homes had received excess reimbursement in relation to their costs under the 1988 Medicaid Plan. There was, however, no Florida law which required any other reason for the Emergency Rule or the Permanent Rule be provided by the Department. In a previous filing in this matter, the Department stated: "[i]n response to a shortfall in general revenue collections. . . , the Administration Commission (composed of the Governor and the cabinet) ordered the Department to "freeze" rates at the December 31, 1989 level. The amendment was made effective by [the Emergency Rule and the Permanent Rule]." See also Florida Nursing Home Association v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 12 FALR at 667 ("The Emergency Rule simply carries out the reductions ordered by the Administration Commission on November 21, 1989"). On January 29, 1990, Gary J. Clarke, Assistant Secretary for Medicaid of the Department, wrote to Nursing Home Administrators, including Petitioners, and stated that the rate freeze was enacted due to a decision made by the Administration Commission: Due to a projected general revenue deficit of $280 million for the State of Florida for fiscal year ending June 30, 1990, the Administration Commission met on November 21, 1989, to determine the appropriate budget reductions for all state programs. In order to reduce the Medicaid budget for its portion of the [DHRS] required reductions, yet avoid gross disruption of services, the Commission required that Medicaid reimbursement rates and ceilings for nursing home providers be frozen at their December 31, 1989 levels, beginning with the new rate Semester on January 1, 1990. . . There are no documents which include a representation contrary to the above quoted portion of the January 29, 1990 letter that the Department enacted the Emergency Rule or Permanent Rule for reasons other than the budgetary cuts ordered by the Administration Commission. The January 29, 1990 letter from the Department also indicated that the length of the rate freeze was indefinite: This policy shall remain in effect until such time that monies are appropriated by the Florida legislature to recalculate new rates and ceilings. Impact of the Emergency Rule and Permanent Rule on the Petitioners. The Petitioners received an inflationary adjustment in their Medicaid per diem rates on July 1, 1989 in accordance with the terms of the January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan. The Petitioners did not receive an inflationary adjustment in their per diem rates which would have been due on January 1, 1990 under the January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan for the period January 1, 1990 through June 30, 1990. Instead, Petitioners' rates calculated effective January 1, 1990 used the same cost reports and inflation adjustment that had already been included in their July 1, 1989 rates. (S.F. 36). The fact that the Petitioners did not receive an inflationary adjustment in their per diem rates for the period January 1, 1990 through June 30, 1990, was because the Emergency Rule and the Permanent Rule eliminated the rate increase provisions of the January 1, 1988 Florida Medicaid Plan. Notification to HCFA of the Rate Freeze. On March 30, 1990, HCFA received a letter dated March 22, 1990, from the Secretary of the Department submitting for consideration "a Title XIX state plan amendment to our state plan." (S.F. 20). The Secretary of the Department stated the following in the letter: This amendment TN 90-8 revises the plan by freezing the reimbursement rates and ceilings of all nursing home providers at the rates of reimbursement for services rendered on December 31, 1989. . . . . The assurances required by 42 CFR 447.253 and proof of public notice are attached. Exhibit 9. Attached to the Secretary's March 22, 1990, letter was a letter dated March 29, 1990, which along with State Plan Amendment Transmittal Number ("TN") 90-08 and proof of public notice, constituted all the documentation submitted by the Department to HCFA prior to July 1, 1990 concerning the rate freeze. (S.F. 20). TN 90-08, as submitted by the Department to HCFA on March 29, 1990, proposed to modify the Florida Medicaid Plan, as the Department had provided for in the Emergency Rule and the Permanent Rule, to eliminate the recalculation of rates, which recalculation would have included an inflationary adjustment for Petitioners' per diem Medicaid rates for the period beginning January 1, 1990. TN 90-08 proposed to maintain the Petitioners' per diem Medicaid rates at the level in effect on December 31, 1989, excluding changes based on licensure rating reclassifications. TN 90-08, as submitted on March 29, 1990, did 12not limit the rate freeze to the period prior to June 30, 1990. (S.F. 21). In the March 29, 1990 letter to HCFA, the Department referenced a telephone survey in which it had compared Florida Medicaid per diem rates to the per diem rates paid to long-term care facilities along the state borders between Florida and Georgia, and Florida and Alabama, under the Georgia and Alabama Medicaid programs. The Department estimated that this telephone survey was performed during the time period December, 1989 through February, 1990. In conducting the Georgia and Alabama telephone survey, the Department did not determine whether Georgia's or Alabama's long-term care facilities per diem rates were reasonable and adequate to cover the costs of efficiently and economically operating Georgia or Alabama facilities, and the Department did not determine whether Georgia or Alabama Medicaid programs covered the same or similar costs as the Florida Medicaid program. A copy of the survey materials was submitted as exhibit 10. Exhibit 10 was not provided to HCFA. (S.F. 22). In the March 29, 1990 letter, the Department referenced an analysis in which it stated that it had compared the increase in an inflationary index from 1989 to 1990 to the increase in the Medicaid rates paid to Florida long-term care facilities from 1989 to 1990. This analysis was performed during the period January, February, or March 1990. These materials were not submitted to HCFA. (S.F.23). The Georgia and Alabama telephone survey, the inflation analysis, and that portion of the data in Exhibit 15 generated prior to March 29, 1990 by the Department relating to Florida long-term care facility historical costs and prospective per diem rates were the only reports, surveys, analyses or studies performed by the Department (as of March 29, 1990) to support its assurances to HCFA that its rates for the period beginning January 1, 1990 were reasonable and adequate to cover the costs of efficiently and economically operated facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity with applicable state and federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards. (S.F.23). TN 90-08 was submitted to HCFA during the calendar quarter to which the Florida Medicaid Plan amendment was to be effective. TN 90-08 was reviewed by HCFA and a memorandum dated April 30, 1990, was written and circulated within HCFA concerning the proposed amendment. The memorandum indicates what the proposed amendment proposes, states that the review was conducted in accordance with Federal requirements and lists the assurances the State had given. The memorandum concludes, however, that "[a]fter review of the State's assurances and related information, HCFA does not yet have a reasonable basis upon which to accept the State's assurance that the proposed rates meet the 'reasonable and adequate' statutory standard of section 1902(a)(13)(A) of the Social Security Act " By letter dated May 9, 1990, HCFA notified the Department that: . . . we find that we cannot approve [the Plan amendment] as submitted. We are exercising our rights under section 1915(f) of the Social Security Act to request additional information and clarification as discussed below: . . . . Although HCFA did not deny or reject the Florida Medicaid Plan amendment submitted by the Department in the May 9, 1990, letter, HCFA did indicate that it could not approve the proposed amendment as submitted. It was recognized in the May 9, 1990, HCFA letter, as it was in the April 30, 1990, memorandum that a state may use budgetary considerations as one factor in establishing the rates to be paid providers as long as the rates are reasonable and adequate. It was also recognized in the May 9, 1990, HCFA letter that "the fact that rates in surrounding States are comparable to Florida's rates provides no justification whatsoever that its rates are reasonable and adequate. Rather, the HRS must compare its proposed rates with the costs that Florida facilities must incur in providing care and services." In the May 9, 1990, HCFA letter it is noted that the Department noted in its March 29, 1990, letter that rates are to be recalculated for the period beginning July 1, 1990, but that inconsistent language is included elsewhere in its proposal. Therefore, HCFA recommended that the Plan amendment be revised to limit the freeze to the six month period beginning January 1, 1990. The May 9, 1990, HCFA letter indicates that processing of the amendment would cease until the additional information and clarification were provided to HCFA. It is readily apparent from HCFA's April 30, 1990, memorandum and its letter of May 9, 1990, that HCFA was well aware of the requirements for amending a state Medicaid plan and the requirements that states must meet in setting Medicaid rates. The April 30, 1990, memorandum and the May 9, 1990, letter indicate that the original proposal submitted by the Department did not meet those requirements without further information being provided. HCFA did not, however, reject the Department's proposal or make any determination as to whether the proposed freeze was appropriate. HCFA merely indicated that more information was necessary and gave the Department an opportunity to provide it. On May 20, 1991, the Department submitted a letter to HCFA in response to the May 9, 1990, HCFA letter limiting the rate freeze to the six month period prior to July 1, 1990, and submitted a revised TN 90-08 to HCFA which included this change. Exhibit 18. (S.F. 30). In the May 20, 1991, Department letter the Department also referenced a second inflationary analysis. This inflationary analysis was performed by the Department in March or April, 1991. The inflationary analysis along with data generated by the Department relating to Florida long-term care facility historical costs and prospective per diem rates (exhibit 15) were the only reports, surveys, analyses or studies performed by the Department to support its May 20, 1991 assurances to HCFA that its rates for the period beginning January 1, 1990 were reasonable and adequate to cover the costs of efficiently and economically operated facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards. Exhibit 19 is a true, correct and complete copy of the written materials prepared by the Department in performing the inflationary analysis referenced in the May 20, 1991 letter. These documents were not submitted to HCFA. (S.F. 31). HCFA'S Approval of the Plan Amendment. By letter dated July 2, 1991, HCFA notified the Department that the Florida Medicaid Plan amendment TN 90-08 was approved with an effective date of March 26, 1990. By letter dated September 16, 1991, the Department advised HCFA that, as stated in the March 29, 1990, letter, the originally requested effective date of March 26, 1990, was an inadvertent error. It was pointed out that the correct effective date was January 1, 1990. By letter dated October 3, 1991, HCFA notified the Department that HCFA had approved the amendment to the Florida Medicaid Plan effective January 1, 1990. Elimination of the Rate Freeze. Effective July 1, 1990 the Florida Medicaid Plan was amended to remove the language of the Emergency Rule and Permanent Rule added effective January 1, 1990 which froze rates to their December 31, 1989 level. (S.F. 37). On August 7, 1991, HCFA approved the subsequent amendment, TN 90-13, with an effective date of July 1, 1990. This subsequent Florida Medicaid Plan amendment calculated the July 1, 1990 long-term care facility Medicaid reimbursement rates using the same inflation adjustment which would have been used on July 1, 1990 had the January 1, 1990 amendment never been implemented. No reimbursement relative to the January 1, 1990 amendment, however, was made retroactively to long-term care facilities for the period January 1, 1990 through June 30, 1990. (S.F. 37).
The Issue Whether Respondent was overpaid $237,802.50 for services that in whole, or in part, are not covered by Medicaid because the services were performed by rendering providers who did not have the requisite education or work experience to meet the eligibility requirements in the Behavior Analysis Services Coverage Handbook (“BA Handbook”) to perform the services or for whom documentation was insufficient to determine eligibility; and, if so, the amount of the overpayment to be repaid, the amount of any fine to be imposed against Respondent, and the amount of any investigative, legal, and expert witness costs to be assessed against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact This case involves a Medicaid audit by AHCA of Respondent, which relates to dates of service from November 1, 2017, through December 31, 2018 ("audit period"). During the audit period, Respondent was an enrolled Medicaid provider and had a valid Medicaid provider agreement with AHCA, Medicaid Provider No. 017421300. As an enrolled Medicaid provider, Respondent was subject to the duly- enacted federal and state statutes, regulations, rules, policy guidelines, and Medicaid handbooks incorporated by reference into rule, which were in effect during the audit period. AHCA is designated as the single state agency authorized to make payments for medical assistance and related services under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. This program of medical assistance is designated the "Medicaid Program." See § 409.902, Fla. Stat. AHCA has the responsibility for overseeing and administering the Medicaid Program for the State of Florida, pursuant to section 409.913, Florida Statutes. AHCA’s Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI), pursuant to its statutory authority, conducted an audit of Respondent of paid Medicaid claims for services to Medicaid recipients. Medicaid claims are paid under what is known as a “pay and chase” system. Claims are quickly paid under the presumption the provider is billing in accordance with Medicaid law and rules. When paid claims are later audited and AHCA finds non-compliant claims, the payments are deemed overpayments and AHCA requests reimbursement. Section 409.913 allows MPI to audit for fraud and abuse. Abuse includes “[p]rovider practices that are inconsistent with generally accepted business…practices and that result in an unnecessary cost to the Medicaid program….” See § 409.913(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. All Florida Medicaid providers are required to maintain, for at least five years, “contemporaneous documentation of entitlement to payment, including employment eligibility, compliance with all Medicaid Rules, regulations, handbooks and policies.” This includes business records, Medicaid-related records and medical records. See § 409.913(7)(e) and (f), Fla. Stat. A provider’s failure to document, in accordance with Medicaid handbooks and the Provider Enrollment Agreement, whether its rendering providers met the criteria to provide services, as stated in the promulgated handbook, is inconsistent with generally accepted business practices. Behavior analysis services are “highly structured interventions, strategies, and approaches provided to decrease maladaptive behaviors and increase or reinforce appropriate behavior for persons with mental health disorders, and developmental or intellectual disabilities.”1 Medicaid coverage for these services is limited to children under the age of 21. Behavior analysis 1 See Section 1.0 “Introduction” of Florida Medicaid Behavior Analysis Services Coverage Policy (October 2017); Fla. Admin. Code R. 59G-4.125. recipients are a vulnerable population, consisting of individuals that have mental health disorders, and intellectual and developmental disabilities, including, but not limited to, autism and Down Syndrome. They often have severe deficits in their abilities to complete self-care tasks and communicate their wants and needs. These clients are at a heightened risk of abuse, neglect, and exploitation because of their developmental disabilities and inability to self-preserve. For these reasons, persons entrusted to provided critical services must meet the minimum qualifications. To provide appropriate services to this vulnerable population, BAs are required to meet the criteria set forth in Section 3.2 of the BA Handbook, incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.125, “Behavior Analysis Services,” as amended, October 29, 2017. The BA Handbook requires a BA to have “a bachelor’s degree from an accredited university or college in a related human service field” and an agreement to become a Registered Behavior Technician (“RBT”) by 1/1/19; or, alternatively: (1) be at least 18 years old; (2) have a high school diploma; (3) have “at least two years of experience providing direct services to recipients with mental health disorders, developmental or intellectual disabilities”; and (4) have at least “20 hours of documented in-service trainings in the treatment of mental health, developmental or intellectual disabilities, recipient rights, crisis management strategies and confidentiality.” AHCA’S AUDIT This audit was opened in follow-up to AHCA’s statewide review of behavior analysis services. The assessment of these services revealed rampant fraud and abuse within the behavior analysis program including more than twice as many providers as recipients, providers billing unbelievable hours (such as more than 24 hours per day), and unsubstantiated qualifications, meaning that patients were receiving BA services from unqualified providers. Based on information obtained in the statewide behavior analysis review, AHCA issued a moratorium regarding new enrollments in Southeast Florida and chose a number of providers for audits. Respondent was selected for audit. Petitioner audited Respondent's records related to paid claims from November 1, 2017, through December 31, 2018. This audit period was selected because an updated Behavior Analysis Handbook was promulgated and became effective October 29, 2017.2 AHCA’s review of Respondent's records consisted of identifying the rendering providers for whom Respondent provided insufficient or no documentation to support their qualifications to render behavior analysis services. The parties stipulated that none of the rendering providers at issue had both a bachelor’s degree “in a related human services field” and had obtained their RBT by January 1, 2019. Respondent and AHCA also stipulated that the records for each rendering provider indicate they were at least 18 years old and had obtained at least a high school diploma or its equivalent. The only questions that remained was did the BA provider have the requisite two years of experience with the target population and did they have 20 hours or more of the required applicable in-service training. During the Audit Period, Respondent submitted claims for services rendered by 169 rendering providers, for which Medicaid paid Respondent a total of $3,999,828.65. Based on the audit, Petitioner initially determined Respondent had been overpaid in the amount of $1,060,590.41. AHCA issued a Preliminary Audit Report (“PAR”) dated March 25, 2019, notifying Respondent of the rendering providers deemed not qualified and the amount 2 During the MPI audit period, Respondent was placed under pre-payment review by a different section of AHCA. Respondent stopped billing during the audit period and its Medicaid provider number was terminated without cause in October 2018. As such, although the audit period was from November 1, 2017, through December 31, 2018, the last claims reviewed in the audit were for date of service March 28, 2018, as that was the date of the last paid claim. of the overpayment associated with each. Respondent was given the opportunity to pay the PAR amount or submit additional records. In response to the PAR, Respondent submitted additional records. Based on the those additional records, AHCA issued a FAR dated July 19, 2019, alleging Respondent was overpaid $905,838.36 for BA services it billed for 41 BA rendering providers who did not meet the criteria specified in the BA Handbook. In addition, the FAR informed Respondent that AHCA was seeking to impose a sanction of $2,500.00 pursuant to rule 59G-9.070(7)(c), and costs of $1,280.00 pursuant to section 409.913(23)(a). In sum, Petitioner asserted in the FAR that Respondent owed a total of $909,618.36. Kathy Herold is a Senior Pharmacist with AHCA’s MPI unit. In that capacity she assists with MPI audits. She compiles and analyzes data; applies appropriate rules, regulations, policies, and procedures to oversee the activities of Florida Medicaid providers to detect fraudulent or abusive behavior and minimize the neglect of recipients; recovers overpayments; imposes sanctions; and makes referrals as appropriate to the Florida Attorney General’s Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, the Florida Department of Health, and the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation. She has over seventeen years’ experience in administrative investigations. She is a Certified Fraud Examiner. Ms. Herold re-reviewed the records provided by Respondent to determine whether the rendering providers for whom behavior analysis services were billed met the qualifications. AHCA did not place any limitations on how Respondent documented the qualifications of its rendering providers. AHCA’s only concern was whether the criteria were met. During the audit, and through the discovery process, Respondent supplied AHCA with copies of employment applications, resumes, letters of recommendation, and training certificates of the BAs in question. At the time of the final hearing, the qualifications of only 14 BAs remained in dispute and the amount sought in overpayment was calculated by AHCA as $237,802.50. Based on the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence, AHCA demonstrated that the audit was properly conducted. RENDERING PROVIDERS AT ISSUE Eduardo Rodriguez The resume for Eduardo Rodriguez lists work with Abreu Quality (“Abreu”) from 2017 to “present.” It does not indicate a job title or reference any work with the target population in that job. There is no contact information that would have allowed Respondent the opportunity to verify the alleged work experience. The resume also lists “Private Case” work with a child with disabilities from 2010-2014 and 2016-2017. There is no contact information that would have allowed Respondent the opportunity to verify the alleged work experience. The application for Mr. Rodriguez, dated December 27, 2017, Mr. Rodriguez lists BA work with Abreu from February 2017 to “present” (December 27, 2017). While that listing (unlike the resume) contains contact information that would have allowed Respondent the opportunity to verify the alleged work experience, that work, even if verified, did not meet the requisite work experience as it was at most ten months. The application also lists two BA jobs for “Private Case.” There is no information provided that would have allowed Respondent the opportunity to verify the alleged work experience met the requisite work experience or the target population requirements. One private job was from 2010-2014 and the other was from 2016-2017 The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contained a letter of recommendation by Felicia Noval. That letter makes no reference to work with the target population. There is no indication who Ms. Noval is or how she knows Mr. Rodriguez. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contained a letter of recommendation by Jose Chao. However, that letter contains no indication of work with the target population. There is no indication of who Mr. Chao is or how he knows Mr. Rodriguez. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contained a background screening requested by Respondent. The background screening indicates that Mr. Rodriguez was not eligible to work with the target population until April 2017. Because Respondent requested the screening, it knew or should have known that Mr. Rodriguez did not have the requisite work experience. Based on conflicting information as to when Mr. Rodriguez worked at Abreu, Ms. Herold reviewed documentation submitted by Abreu to AHCA. This documentation indicates that Mr. Rodriguez only worked for them from May 18, 2017, to June 17, 2017. The documents submitted by Respondent to AHCA for Mr. Rodriguez contained training certificates for both the 20-hour BA course and the 40- hour RBT course. Mr. Rodriguez began working for Respondent on February 8, 2018. The last paid claim for Mr. Rodriguez was March 23, 2018. Based on the documentation provided by Respondent, Mr. Rodriguez did not have documented requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period, or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period. Despite Respondent having documentation that Mr. Rodriguez satisfied the training requirement, payments made by AHCA to Respondent for services billed for him are an overpayment because he did not have the requisite work experience or there is insufficient documentation that he had the requisite work experience. Fanny Vargas The application for Fanny Vargas, dated March 1, 2017, lists work as a BA/AHH for Children’s Home Services (“CHS”) from 2015-2017. There is no indication of how long Ms. Vargas performed each function. There is no indication of work with the target population in the job as an AHH. There is insufficient information to determine how long Ms. Vargas worked for CHS. The application did not provide sufficient information regarding whether Ms. Vargas had the requisite work experience. The resume for Ms. Vargas only lists BA work with CHS from 2015- “still working” (presumably March 1, 2017, the date of the application). There is still insufficient information on the resume to determine when Ms. Vargas began at CHS or if Ms. Vargas worked at CHS for over two years. The resume also lists “private service” for children with special needs from 2012- 2015. The “private service” job was not listed on the application. There is no contact information listed on the resume for the “private service” job that would have allowed anyone to verify it. The resume did not provide sufficient information regarding whether Ms. Vargas had the requisite work experience. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent indicate Ms. Vargas was not screened as a Medicaid Provider until January 14, 2017. She was enrolled as a Medicaid provider on April 4, 2017, effective January 9, 2017. She could not have provided services to the target population with CHS before then. The date of service for the last paid claim for Ms. Vargas is December 31, 2017. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Ms. Vargas had the requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period or by the end of the audit period, or that she satisfied the training requirement. Javier Collazo Veloz The application for Javier Collazo Veloz, dated May 4, 2017, lists work as Private Practice BA in Miami for Melissa Catano, from “08/01/2016–” (presumably May 4, 2017) and BA work for Fe y Alegria in Ecuador from March 9, 2015–April 3, 2016. Combined, those jobs do not satisfy the requisite work experience. The resume for Mr. Collazo Veloz only lists work as a BA for Fe y Alegria. However, on the resume the dates of employment are listed as July 1, 2013–July 1, 2015. Those dates conflict with the information Mr. Collazo Veloz listed on his application. Based on the conflict regarding the work with Fe y Alegria, Ms. Herold attempted to verify it. She located a website for Fe y Alegria, but the website makes no mention of work with the target population. The last paid claim for Mr. Collazo Veloz was February 16, 2018. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Mr. Collazo Veloz had the documented requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period, or that he satisfied the training requirement. Jorge N. Bernal The application for Jorge N. Bernal, dated March 29, 2017, lists work as an x-ray technician from April 15, 2015, to July 17, 2015. There is no indication of work with the target population and the nature of that work would not contribute to the requisite work experience. Overlapping with the x-ray technician job, Mr. Bernal also lists he was a teacher at Jesus Para Todos from December 1, 2012, to March 15, 2016. The resume makes no mention of work with the target population associated with that job and there is no contact information on the application that Respondent could have used to verify the alleged work experience. The resume for Mr. Bernal only lists the teacher job at Jesus Para Todos, but there is no contact information to verify the employment. The resume indicates that job involved work with the target population. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contained numerous documents indicating Mr. Bernal was born June 16, 1993. That means that Mr. Bernal was purportedly “teaching” when he was only 17. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent also contained an honor roll certificate which indicates that Mr. Bernal was attending college while purportedly “teaching.” The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent post-PAR contained a letter of reference from International Ministry of Jesus for All (“Jesus Para Todos”) dated March 19, 2019. That letter does not clearly corroborate that Mr. Bernal was teaching there. The letter from Jesus Para Todos indicated it was a church, not a school. The letter further indicates that Mr. Bernal “was able to serve to the kid’s ministry and youth groups, teaching kids and youth and serving in our community, and participate in helping special need kids in our church.” Mr. Bernal began work for Respondent on November 7, 2017. The last paid claim for Mr. Bernal is February 17, 2018. Thus, not only could the letter from Jesus Para Todos not have been used to verify work in the hiring process, it also was not created until after the audit period and almost one year after the end of Mr. Bernal’s employment with Respondent. Given the conflicting information regarding Jesus Para Todos, Ms. Herold attempted to verify the facility. She discovered there was no online presence for the facility, and it was not listed in the State’s database of private schools or licensed daycares. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Mr. Bernal had the requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period, or that he satisfied the training requirement. Leyanis Morffi The application for Leyanis Morffi, dated June 30, 2017, lists two cashier jobs. The nature of that work would not contribute to the requisite work experience. The application also lists work as a paid childcare worker at Smiles Childcare from October 2014 to November 2016. However, there is no mention of work with the target population at that job. The resume for Ms. Morffi lists the same work experience that was listed on the application. Again, there is no reference to work with the target population at the childcare job. The resume further indicates that Ms. Morffi “specializes in homes for the elderly and youth detention facilities.” However, there is no listing of that type of work on the application or resume. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contained a background screening requested by Respondent. The screening indicates that Ms. Morffi was not eligible to work with the target population until February 2017. Because Respondent requested the screening, it knew or should have known that Ms. Morffi did not have the requisite work experience. Documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contained a letter of reference dated September 5, 2017, from Lazaro Noel Suarez. That letter is dated post-hire and was provided to AHCA post-PAR. It references one year of BA work. However, it provides no specific dates or date range, and contains no contact information that could be used to verify the information. Neither the application nor the resume indicates any BA work prior to Respondent to which this letter could correlate. Documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contained a letter of reference dated July 30, 2017, from Doris Jimenez. That letter is dated post- hire and was provided to AHCA post-PAR. It makes no reference to work with the target population. It makes no mention of the relationship between Ms. Morffi and Ms. Jimenez. The letter does not indicate where the work was performed. Documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contain a letter of reference dated April 5, 2018. The author is unknown as the signature is illegible. That letter is dated post-hire and was provided to AHCA post-PAR. It references work at Smiles Childcare from October 2014 to May 2017. While the letter mentions work with the target population, there is no way to determine who wrote the letter or the author’s relationship to Ms. Morffi. The letter contains no contact information that could be used to verify the information. The dates of service in the letter conflict with the dates of service listed by Ms. Morffi in her application and resume. The letter indicates that Ms. Morffi was a volunteer, while her application indicates she earned $10.00 per hour. While volunteer work would count toward requisite work experience, the conflicting information undermines the credibility of both this letter and the information provided by Ms. Morffi. Based on the conflicting information regarding Smiles Childcare, Ms. Herold attempted to verify the information. Smiles Childcare had no internet website and was not listed by the State as a childcare facility. The last paid claim for Ms. Morffi is March 16, 2018. Not only could the April 5, 2018, letter not have been used to verify work in the hiring process, it also was not created until after the audit period and over two weeks after the end of Ms. Morffi’s employment with Respondent. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Ms. Morffi had the documented requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period, or that she satisfied the training requirement. Luigui Melendez Tijerino The application for Luigui Melendez Tijerino, dated January 30, 2017, lists overlapping work as a Pharmacy Tech at Walmart from June 2012 to “present” (presumably the date of the application) and as a food prepper at Wendy’s from October 2013 to June 2014. There is no indication of work with the target population and the nature of those jobs would not contribute to the requisite work experience. Overlapping with the Pharmacy technician job, Mr. Melendez Tijerino also listed BA work with ABA Pro Support Services (“ABA Pro Support”) from May 2015 to January 31, 2017. The resume for Mr. Melendez Tijerino lists the same jobs as indicated on the application and also lists work as a server at “The Chelsea” from April 2011 to September 2013. There is no indication of work with the target population and the nature of that job would not contribute to the requisite work experience. Documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contain a background screening requested by Respondent. The screening indicates that Mr. Melendez Tijerino was not eligible to work with the target population until October 2016. Because Respondent requested the screening, it knew or should have known that Mr. Melendez Tijerino did not have the requisite work experience. Documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contain an undated letter of reference from Xochilt Povsic.3 That letter was provided to AHCA post-PAR. That letter references work with the target population, but it does not mention any dates that would allow anyone to determine if it satisfied the requisite work experience. The letter does not mention where the BA services were allegedly performed, and the only indication of BA work on Mr. Melendez Tijerino’s application and resume was at ABA Pro Support. Based on the conflicting information regarding work at ABA Pro Support, Ms. Herold looked further into the matter. In response to the letter sent to ABA Pro Support for the BA statewide review, ABA Pro Support advised that Mr. Melendez Tijerino was never an employee. That information was provided to AHCA on January 12, 2018. 3 Ms. Povsic is another rendering provider at issue in the audit. Ms. Povsic may be or may have been related to Mr. Melendez Tijerino as the documents submitted by Respondent for her indicate she used to be called Xochilt Tijerino. Documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contain a letter of reference dated September 23, 2016, from Walmart, that was provided to AHCA post-PAR. That letter does not reference work with the target population and the nature of the job would not contribute to the requisite work experience. Mr. Melendez Tijerino began working for Respondent on November 1, 2017. The last paid claim for Mr. Melendez Tijerino was January 27, 2018. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Mr. Melendez Tijerino had the requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period, or that he satisfied the training requirement. Maria Oduber The application for Maria Oduber, dated November 29, 2017, lists “young care worker” with “Loyal Resource/CHS” from August 2015 to March 2017. There is no mention of work with the target population associated with that job. Overlapping with that job, the application lists work as client support with HOPWA Housing from March 2010 to January 2017. The application also lists work as an ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) teacher at Greystone Elementary School and as a theater teacher in “Caracas.” There is no indication of work with the target population and the nature of those jobs would not contribute to the requisite work experience. The resume for Ms. Oduber listed the same jobs as listed on the application. There was still no mention of work with the target population for any of those jobs. Ms. Oduber began working for Respondent on January 2, 2018. The last paid claim for Ms. Oduber was March 17, 2018. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Ms. Oduber had the requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period, or that she satisfied the training requirement. Mey Weiss Rodriquez The application for Mey Weiss Rodriguez is dated October 4, 2017, on the front and October 10, 2017, on the back. The application lists work as an assistant at Eliseo Reyes School in “S. Spiritus, Cuba,” from September 2010 to December 2014. There is no mention of work with the target population associated with the job. The application also lists work at Provincial Veterinary Laboratory from August 1997 to August 2010. There is no indication of work with the target population and the nature of that job would not contribute to the requisite work experience. The resume submitted for Ms. Weiss Rodriguez lists the same work on the application, but with less specific information regarding dates, and no information regarding location or contact information. Contrary to the application, work with the target population is listed for Eliseo Reyes School. The resume also claims that Ms. Weiss Rodriguez is an RBT even though Respondent stipulated that none of the rendering providers at issue obtained an RBT by January 1, 2019. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contained a letter of recommendation dated October 4, 2017, from Carmen Yebra. The letter was provided to AHCA post-PAR and makes no mention of work with the target population. Due to the conflict regarding whether there was work with the target population, and the fact there was no documentation of independent verification of that matter, Ms. Herold attempted to verify the work experience. No search engine provided a listing for Eliseo Reyes School and Google Maps, while providing detailed information on Sancti Spiritus, Cuba, indicated the address listed on the application does not exist. The last paid claim for Ms. Weiss Rodriguez was March 17, 2018. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Ms. Weiss Rodriguez had the requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period, or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period, or that she satisfied the training requirement. Sorelys Ferros On her application dated March 14, 2017, Sorelys Ferros lists work as an RBT with MHB Consultants Group (“MHB”) beginning in December 2015 with no end date listed. However, Respondent stipulated that none of the rendering providers at issue obtained an RBT by January 1, 2019. The resume for Ms. Ferros lists the job at MHB and also lists work at Respondent from March 2017 to present. On her resume, Ms. Ferros also indicates that she obtained her RBT certification in December 2015. However, as indicated above, Respondent stipulated that none of the rendering providers at issue obtained an RBT by January 1, 2019. Documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contain a background screening requested by Respondent. The screening indicates that Ms. Ferros was not eligible to work with the target population until June 2016. As such, she could not have obtained her RBT certification by December 2015. Because Respondent requested the screening, it knew or should have known that Ms. Ferros did not have the requisite work experience and that she was not actually an RBT. The last paid claim for Ms. Ferros was February 2, 2018. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Ms. Ferros had the requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period, or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period, or that she satisfied the training requirement. Teresita Rodriguez The application for Teresita Rodriguez, dated August 10, 2017, lists two jobs as an HHA-BA,4 one with Gifted Health Group, Inc. (“Gifted”), from January 2010 to February 2014, and the other with Nory’s Home Services, Inc. (“Nory’s”), from February 2014 to April 2015. There is no indication of how long Ms. Rodriguez worked in the capacity of an HHA versus as a BA at either job. There is no indication of work with the target population in the HHA job at Gifted or Nory’s. The application also listed work as an HHA at Homecare for Neighborhood Home Health (“Neighborhood”) from April 2015 to “actual” (presumably, the date of the application, August 10, 2017). There is no mention of work with the target population in the job with Neighborhood. The resume for Ms. Rodriguez, lists the same jobs listed on the application; however, the work with Neighborhood is listed on the resume as HHA-BA, and not HHA Homecare. The resume provides more description for each job, and only the job at Gifted describes work with the target population. Documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contain a background screening requested by Respondent. The screening indicates that Ms. Rodriguez was not eligible to work with the target population until September 2015. Based on the screening, Ms. Rodriguez could not have worked with the target population at Nory’s, Neighborhood, or Gifted before then. Because Respondent requested the screening, it knew or should have known that Ms. Rodriguez did not have the requisite work experience. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contained an undated letter of reference from Josie Vallejo. That letter does not reference any work with the target population but specifically mentions work with Ms. Vallejo’s mother, a senior, although it does not provide any dates. The letter mentioned that Ms. Vallejo had been a friend of Ms. Rodriguez for six years. 4 Presumably, “HHA” as used in applications and on resumes of rendering providers stands for Home Health Aide. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contain an undated letter of reference from Danitza Montero. The letter from Ms. Montero states Ms. Rodriguez cared for Ms. Montero’s son, but does not indicate the son was a member of the target population. Ms. Rodriguez began working for Respondent on December 26, 2017. There is no documentation indicating that Ms. Rodriguez worked for Gifted past August 10, 2017. The last paid claim for Ms. Rodriguez was March 17, 2018. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Ms. Rodriguez had the requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period, or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period, or that she satisfied the training requirement. Xochilt Povsic The application for Xochilt Povsic, dated January 31, 2017, states she worked as a membership coordinator for Sam’s Club, and a dietary aide at Bentley Commons at Paragon Village in New Jersey. There is no indication of work with the target population at either job, and the nature of those jobs would not contribute to the requisite work experience. Overlapping the dietary aide job, on her application Ms. Povsic also indicates work as a BA at two private practice/personal care jobs. Ms. Povsic states she worked for Maria Mora from August 2013 to June 2015 and that she worked for Miriam Ponzano from September 2014 to December 2015. The resume for Ms. Povsic listed the same jobs and dates as listed on the application and also listed another dietary aide job with Fellowship Village in New Jersey. The resume contains descriptions of the type of work performed at each job. There is no mention of work with the target population at either dietary aide job or in the job at Sam’s Club, and those jobs would not be of the type to contribute to the requisite work experience. The work for Ms. Mora was described by Ms. Povsic as providing BA services from August 2013 to June 2015 to a “3-4 [year old child]” with autism, ADHD, and behavior disorders. The work for Ms. Ponzano was described by Ms. Povsic as providing BA services from September 2014 to December 2015 to twin boys, “1-2 years old” with behavior disorders and ADHD. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contained a letter from Miriam Ponzano that is not dated and was provided to AHCA post-PAR. While Ms. Ponzano confirms that Ms. Povsic cared for her boys, there is no indication that the children were part of the target population or that any work performed contributed to the requisite work experience. In addition, the dates of service listed by Ms. Ponzano conflict with the dates listed by Ms. Povsic. Ms. Ponzano indicated the Ms. Povsic cared for her sons from November 2015 to March 2016, not September 2014 to December 2015, as had been asserted by Ms. Povsic on her application and resume. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent also contained a letter from Maria Mora, that is not dated, and was provided to AHCA post- PAR. Ms. Mora did not confirm that Ms. Povsic had cared for her 3 to 4-year- old son with autism, ADHD, and behavior disorders, as Ms. Povsic had indicated. Rather, Ms. Mora’s letter indicates that Ms. Povsic was her caretaker, performing personal tasks such as picking up medicines and buying groceries. Ms. Mora does not indicate that she is part of the target population and the services listed are not of the type to contribute to the requisite work experience. In addition, the dates of service listed by Ms. Mora conflict with the dates listed by Ms. Povsic. Ms. Mora indicates that Ms. Povsic cared for her during the winter of 2014 to 2015 (even mentioning that Ms. Povsic shoveled snow for her), not August 2013 to June 2015, as had been indicated by Ms. Povsic on her application and resume. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contained a letter from Maydelis Cruz. The letter is not dated and was provided to AHCA post- PAR. Ms. Cruz indicates she has known Ms. Povsic for 20 years. Ms. Cruz indicates that Ms. Povsic assisted with her son, who has Down Syndrome, from November 2011 to March 2013. Ms. Povsic would only have been 17 years old at that time. The last paid claim for Ms. Povsic was March 17, 2018. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Xochilt Povsic had the requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period, or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period, or that she satisfied the training requirement. Yaima Alvarez The application for Yaima Alvarez, dated August 10, 2017, listed two overlapping HHA jobs: “Faith,” from July 2016 to “present” (presumably August 10, 2017, the date of the application); and Home Health Solutions, from June 2017 to present (August 10, 2017). There is no indication of work with the target population for either job. The resume for Ms. Alvarez lists no work experience, but has listings under “Professional Affiliations” that appear to be a work history. Faith Health Care, Inc., is listed with dates that correspond to the listing for Faith on the application. There is no mention of a job title or work with the target population regarding Faith Health Care, Inc. Solutions Group, Inc., is also listed under “Professional Affiliations.” As with Faith Health Care, Inc., there is no mention of her job title or work with the target population. That listing does not appear to be the same job that is listed as Home Health Solutions on the resume as the dates do not correspond. There is no indication of work with the target population for Faith Health Care, Inc., or Solutions Group, Inc. There is also a listing for “L.G. (R.B.T. patient).” However, as indicated before, Respondent stipulated that none of the rendering providers at issue obtained an RBT by January 1, 2019. Ms. Alvarez began working for Respondent on December 12, 2017. The last paid claim for Ms. Alvarez was February 8, 2018. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Ms. Alvarez had the requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period, or that she satisfied the training requirement. Yudisley Garces The application for Yudisley Garces, dated April 20, 2017, lists overlapping CNA (Certified Nursing Assistant) jobs. One was with AAA Home Health Service (“AAA”) from June 2014 to today (April 20, 2017) and the other is with Alma Care, Inc. (“Alma Care”), from August 2015 to “today” (presumably the date of the application, April 20, 2017). There is no indication of work with the target population for either job. The resume for Ms. Garces only lists the job for AAA. However, the dates listed on the resume for that job (beginning June 2014) conflict with the dates listed on the application (beginning February 2014). There is no indication of work with the target population associated with that job. The resume also listed two jobs (one at a hospital in Cuba and the other at a hospital in Venezuela) performing puncture aspiration biopsies and cervical cancer diagnoses. There is no mention of work with the target population at either of those hospital jobs, and those jobs would not be of the type to contribute to the requisite work experience. The last paid claim for Ms. Garces was March 17, 2018. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Ms. Garces had the requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period, or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period, or that she satisfied the training requirement. Zerelys Lauzerique The resume for Zerelys Lauzerique lists work with “Lenin & Daughter” and Ignite Christian Academy (“Ignite”). There is no indication of work with the target population regarding the job at Ignite. It also lists work as a fitness coach with Beach Body, as a Youth Pastor at Cross Church, and as an Assistant Director at Flames of Fire Bible School (“Flames of Fire”), that is not listed on the application. The Beach Body work overlaps the BA work with Lenin & Daughter. There is no indication of working with the target population associated with the jobs at Beach Body, Cross Church, or Flames of Fire, and those jobs would not be of the type to contribute to the requisite work experience. The application for Ms. Lauzerique, dated December 4, 2017, lists work as a BA with Lenin & Daughter from December 2016 to “current” (presumably the date of the application, December 4, 2017) and as a Teacher Assistant with Ignite from August 2014 to August 2015. There is no mention of work with the target population regarding the job at Ignite. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent contained a letter of reference dated December 5, 2016, from Melanie Reyes, a “close friend.” The letter from Ms. Reyes does not indicate any work with the target population and instead pertains to Ms. Lauzerique’s work at Beach Body. The documents submitted to AHCA by Respondent also contained a letter of reference dated December 2016 from Reverend Abram Gomez of Cross Church. The letter indicates that he worked with Ms. Lauzerique for two years, but does not indicate any work with the target population. Ms. Lauzerique began working for Respondent on December 11, 2017. The last paid claim for Ms. Lauzerique was January 6, 2018. The documents submitted by Respondent to AHCA for Ms. Lauzerique contained training certificates for both the 20-hour BA course and the 40-hour RBT course. The documents provided by Respondent to AHCA during the audit and during litigation did not substantiate that Ms. Lauzerique had the requisite work experience at the time of hire, at the beginning of the audit period, or by the end of the last paid claim in the audit period. Respondent's Response The owner of Hour Bliss, Inc., Mr. Perez-Delgado, testified on behalf of Respondent. He is a Board-Certified Behavior Analyst, has a master’s certification in addiction, and is a Licensed Mental Health Counselor. Mr. Perez-Delgado testified that Respondent served populations in Miami that no other company would because of the crime. Mr. Perez-Delgado said that when he enrolled Respondent as a BA provider, many of the rendering providers he hired had worked at other companies where he had also worked, and because of this, he believed they met the qualifications required to serve as BAs. Mr. Perez-Delgado testified that he provided records he thought were relevant to the Medicaid investigation beginning in August 2017, and again in January 2018 and April 2019. If there had been a problem, he would have liked AHCA to institute a corrective action plan. However, he alleges the next communication from AHCA was terminating his Medicaid provider number without cause. Later, he received notice of the audit. Much of the testimony from Mr. Perez-Delgado concerned events that occurred prior to the audit beginning in November 2018, and the issuance of the PAR and FAR in 2019. These events are obviously related to the pre-payment review or other matters with AHCA, and not the audit. Mr. Perez-Delgado testified that several of his rendering providers were parents of children with autism or ADHD. Accordingly, they had more than the requisite experience with the target population. However, he did not document that in the files provided to the Agency. Nor did he timely provide records demonstrating that these same workers met the training requirement. Mr. Perez-Delgado offered no information regarding how or whether he verified prior work experience of these BAs in question. ULTIMATE FINDINGS OF FACT In this case, AHCA presented credible, persuasive evidence establishing that the audit giving rise to this proceeding was properly conducted. AHCA obtained and reviewed records from Respondent, issued a PAR, reviewed additional records submitted after the PAR, issued the FAR, and even then continued to review records and consider evidenced that, by giving Respondent the benefit of the doubt whenever possible, further reduced the overpayment. In this audit, AHCA examined the records provided by Respondent to determine if it maintained business records and Medicaid-related records establishing that its rendering providers met the qualifications set forth in the BA Handbook. The BA Handbook required no special documentation. Respondent, as are all providers who contract to provide Medicaid services, was required to keep contemporaneous records regarding entitlement to payment, including employment eligibility, and compliance with all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies. Respondent failed to provide AHCA with documentation that its rendering providers met the qualifications set forth in the BA Handbook. Of the 14 BA providers in dispute, 12 lacked any documentation of the requisite work experience with the target population and meeting the training requirement. Only two BAs, Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Lazerique, met the training requirements, but did not meet the required work experience with the target population.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order incorporating the terms of this Recommended Order as follows: AHCA overpaid Respondent the sum of $237,802.50 for BA services and Respondent must reimburse the Agency for those payments. AHCA is entitled to an administrative sanction in the amount of $2,500.00. AHCA, as the prevailing party in this proceeding, is entitled to recover, from Respondent, costs including all investigative, legal, and expert witness costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Julio Cesar Perez-Delgado Hour Bliss, Inc. Apartment 406 888 Brickell Key Drive Miami, Florida 33131 (eServed) Susan Sapoznikoff, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Kimberly Murray, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Stefan Grow, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Mary C. Mayhew, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Shena L. Grantham, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Room 3407B 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Thomas M. Hoeler, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed)
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner must reimburse Respondent for overpayments totaling $2,851.19 which Petitioner received from the Florida Medicaid Program during the period May 24, 1999 through January 26, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, the Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Agency is responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. See Chapter 409, Florida Statutes. Among other responsibilities, the Agency is authorized "to recover overpayments . . . as appropriate . . . ." Section 409.913, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Meji, Inc., d/b/a 7th Avenue Pharmacy (hereinafter referred to as "Meji"), was, at all times pertinent to this case, a duly authorized Medicaid provider, having entered into a Medicaid Provider Agreement with the Agency. Meji was assigned Medicaid Provider Number 0165076-00. Meji is also a licensed pharmacy in Florida, having been issued license number PH0016158. As a Medicaid provider, Meji is authorized to dispense drugs and supplies to Medicaid recipients, for which Meji is entitled to reimbursement from the Medicaid Program. In return, Meji has agreed to comply with all governing statutes, rules, and policies, including policies set forth in the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drug Services Coverage Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook, incorporated by reference into Rule 59G- 4.250(2), Florida Administrative Code. On March 20, 2001, an audit was performed of payments from the Medicaid Program to Meji. On January 24, 2002, a Provisional Agency Audit Report was issued finding that Meji had received $40,062.52 in overpayments from the Medicaid Program and offering Meji an opportunity to respond to the Agency's provisional determination. When Meji failed to respond to the Provisional Agency Audit Report, the Agency issued a Final Agency Audit Report informing Meji that the Agency intended to seek reimbursement of the $40,062.52 in overpayments Meji had received for services provided during the period May 24, 1999 through January 26, 2001. The Final Agency Audit Report was issued March 8, 2002. Meji requested a hearing to contest the Agency's determination and provided documentation not previously provided to the Agency. On March 19, 2003, after reviewing the newly provided documentation, the Agency issued an Amended Final Agency Audit Report in which the Agency informed Meji that it had received overpayments of $2,851.19. In response to this notice, Meji requested a formal administrative hearing by letter dated March 20, 2003. The amount of the overpayments which the Agency seeks to recoup in this proceeding was determined by taking a statistically valid random sample of Meji's submitted Medicaid claims submitted during the audit period. The amount of the overpayments found in the random sample was then extended to the total of Meji's claims for the audit period based upon generally accepted statistical formulas and methods. By failing to respond to the Agency's Request for Admissions, Meji is deemed to have admitted the validity of the statistical formula utilized by the Agency. The Amended Final Agency Audit Report, along with the supporting work papers, were offered and accepted in evidence in this case. The Amended Final Agency Audit Report, in an attached Pharmacy Audit-Final Report, sets out the manner in which the overpayments were calculated. Those calculations are further described in proposed finding of fact P.(1) through (6) of the Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order and Incorporated Closing Argument. Those findings are hereby accepted and incorporated into this Recommended Order by reference. The Amended Final Agency Audit Report and supporting work papers admitted in evidence in this case show that Meji received overpayments in the amount of $2,851.19. No evidence to the contrary was offered by Meji. The Agency incurred costs during the investigation of this matter. The amount of those costs was not known at the time the final hearing was conducted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order requiring Meji's to repay the Agency the principal amount of $2,851.19 plus interest as provided in Section 409.913, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Debora A. Fridie, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sola Gafaru, President Meji, Inc. 14812 Northwest 7th Avenue Miami, Florida 33168 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3116 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308
