The Issue Should Respondent's license as a real estate broker be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency charged with the responsibility of investigating and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, issued license number 0152815 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Robert L. Purlee and Doris A. Purlee (Purlees) conveyed certain real property located at Unit 1303-A, Jamestown Condominiums, within Pinellas County, Florida, to Ralph F. Marotte and Eve K. Marotte (Marottes), on June 18, 1993, for an agreed upon sum of $15,000, with installments due over a period of 120 months, at the rate of $181,99 per month, beginning July 15, 1993. Since there was no express language in the deed to express a contrary intent, the conveyance to the Marottes created an estate by the entirety which was not available to answer for the individual debts of either of the tenants. The Marottes executed a mortgage and ad promissory note creating a lien against the property in favor of the Purlees, to secure the timely payment of the sum owed by the Marottes. At the time the Marottes purchased the property in question from the Purlees, there were no other liens or encumbrances against the property. At the time the deed was recorded, there was two personal judgments filed of record against Ralph F. Marotte, individually, but no personal judgments filed of record against Ralph F. Marotte and Eve K. Marotte, jointly or as husband and wife, or Eve K. Marotte, individually. Since no copies of these judgments, certified or otherwise, were introduced as evidence, and David Eaton appeared to be confused about these judgments, this finding is based on the testimony of Eve K. Marotte which I find credible. On November 10, 1993, the Marottes authored and caused to be delivered to the Purlees a letter which provides in pertinent part: We are unable to financially own this unit, therefore, we wish to deed it back to you and your wife, and record it in the courthouse. Rather than go thru foreclosure proceedings and lawyer’s fees etc., thought the simplest best way for both of us is to just return the property back to you both, and have the tenant send her rent payment directly to you. We have prepared the deed - and after it is recorded - have the courthouse send it to you directly. (Emphasis Supplied) * * * On December 8, 1993, the Marottes authored and caused to be delivered to the Purlees a letter which provides in pertinent part: Attached is a copy of the Quit Claim Deed - which is being recorded and will be mailed to you directly. (Emphasis Supplied) * * * On January 6, 1994, the Marottes authored and caused to be delivered to the Purlees a letter which provides in pertinent part: We went to the courthouse to record the deed, and realized that we did not take the mortgage off, so we are enclosing a satisfaction of mortgage, so that we can turn the property back to you- and you will then own it free and clear as you did before. As soon as we received this paper from you, will turn over everything, to you, that is, keys, etc. (Inventory remains the same). (Emphasis Supplied) * * * From the notation on the quit claim deed it appears that the Marottes attempted to record the deed at the courthouse but changed their mind as indicated in the letter. The Purlees executed the satisfaction of mortgage and posted it with the United States Postal Service for delivery to the Marottes. Subsequently, the Purlees discussed the matter with their attorney, David A. Eaton, who advised the Purlees to have the satisfaction of mortgage retrieved from the postal service. This was accomplished, and the Marottes did not receive the satisfaction of mortgage. Therefore, the Marottes did not record the quit claim deed transferring title back to the Purlees. Based on the testimony of Eve K. Marotte which I find credible, Eve K. Marotte continued in her effort to deed the property back to the Purlees, and even discussed the possibility of satisfying the personal judgments against Ralph F. Marotte in the process. In fact, Respondent even arranged for the sale of the property but that did not prove fruitful either. At the time the Marottes attempted to deed the property back to the Purlees, the Marottes did not advise the Purlees of the personal judgments against Ralph F. Marotte, individually. Since the conveyance of the property to the Marottes created an estate by the entirety, the property would not have been subject to any judgments against Ralph F. Marotte, individually upon the Marottes deeding the property back to the Purlees. There was no intent on the part of the Respondent to “saddle” the Purlees with Ralph F. Marotte’s personal judgments. Likewise, there was no intent on the part of Respondent to mislead or misrepresent the circumstances surrounding the attempt to “deed back” the property or to induce the Purlees to execute a satisfaction of mortgage so that the Marottes could record such satisfaction or mortgage without recording the quit claim deed and thereby have the property free and clear of the mortgage. Although the Marottes did make some of the mortgage payments, they did not make all of the payments as contemplated by the mortgage and promissory note. Their failure to make mortgage payments was due to their financial condition and not that the Marottes were intentionally attempting to deprive the Purlees of the property without paying for the property. The Marottes collected some rent from the property but apparently did not apply this money toward the mortgage payment. However, there was no evidence, other than the requirement of making the mortgage payments, that the Marottes were required to pay the rent over to the Purlees. On or about November 6. 1995, the Purlees filed a complaint with the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in and for Pinellas County, against the Marottes alleging, inter alia, that Respondent committed fraud and dishonest dealing in a real estate transaction. On a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Purlees, the court entered a Final Judgment Against Licensed Real Estate Broker, Eve K. Marotte, for Monetary Damages Arising Out of Fraudulent Conduct in a Real Estate Brokerage Transaction on March 1, 1996. Additionally, the court entered a Final Judgment Against Eve K. Marotte and Ralph F. Marotte for the total sum of $95, 454.95 which included $22, 284.54 in actual damages, $66,853.62 in trouble damages pursuant to Section 772.11, Florida Statutes, $5,250.00 in attorney’s fees, and $1,066.79 in taxable costs. Because of this judgment and other financial and personal circumstances surrounding the Respondent’s life at that time, the Respondent filed for bankruptcy which eventually “wiped out” this judgment. Subsequently, the Purlees filed a separate proceeding for foreclosure of the mortgage, and obtained title to the property by foreclosure sale on or about August 1997. Between the time of the initiation of the foreclosure proceeding and gaining title to the property, the Purlees had a receiver appointed to receive the rent on the property. Although David Eaton testified that the Marottes failed to turn over rents during this period, there is insufficient evidence to show that the Marottes received any rent during this period or that the property was rented at all times during this period. Clearly, after engaging an attorney and obtaining the large judgment, the Purlees were not interested in taking the property back without the judgment being satisfied. Likewise, it is equally clear that Respondent was not financially able to pay the judgment. Respondent did not intentionally or otherwise misrepresent the facts in order to induce the Purlees to accept the deed back and release her from her obligation, or act in a fraudulent manner in order to convince the Purlees to release Respondent from her obligation, or act dishonestly in her dealings with the Purlees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing both Count I and Count II of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Geofrrey T. Kirk, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801 Eve K. Marotte, pro se 2616 46th Terrace North St. Petersburg, Florida 33714
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate sales person under license number 0466167. Respondent's real estate license was invalid during the dates at issue in this proceeding. The license expired on September 30, 1993, and was activated on February 1, 1994. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a voluntary inactive sales person at 171C Springwood Boulevard, Longwood, Florida. On October 28, 1993, Mr. Frank Canty, terminated Respondent from employment at Frank G. Canty Realty ("Canty"). Mr. Canty notified Respondent of the termination by telephone on or about the same day and immediately filed the form required to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission (the "Commission") of Respondent's change in status. 2/ Mr. Robert Sirianni and Respondent are long time friends. Mr. Sirianni is the broker and owner for Bay Hill Realty, Inc ("Bay Hill"). Mr. Sirianni hired Respondent as a real estate sales person for Bay Hill on November 22, 1993. Mr. Sirianni signed the completed form required to notify the Commission that Respondent had placed his license with Bay Hill. Mr. Sirianni gave the completed form to Respondent to hand deliver to the Commission. However, Respondent failed to deliver the form to the Commission. On November 22, 1993, Respondent showed a condominium to prospective buyers. Respondent represented that he was an employee of Canty. Respondent delivered a written offer of $36,000 to Watson Realty Corporation ("Watson"), the listing office. Respondent used his Canty business card in the transaction. A representative of Watson contacted Mr. Canty to discuss some problems in the transaction. Mr. Canty informed the representative that Respondent was terminated from Canty on October 28, 1993. Watson caused a new contract to be executed between the buyers and sellers showing Watson Realty as the listing and selling office. The transaction closed on the new contract. On December 13, 1993, Mr. Sirianni faxed a memorandum to Watson claiming the sales commission purportedly earned by Respondent. Mr. Sirianni withdrew the demand after learning of the facts and circumstances surrounding the matter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order: finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.42(1)(b); authorizing the issuance of a written reprimand; placing Respondent on probation for one year; and imposing a fine of $1,000 to be paid in accordance with this Recommended Order. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May 1995.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner and, if so, whether Respondent's real estate license should be suspended, revoked, or otherwise disciplined.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes; Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes; and the rules adopted pursuant thereto. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Jared A. White T/A Jerry White Realty was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0187087 pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker with an address of 231 Skiff Pt. 7, Clearwater, Florida 34630. TITLE TO THE PROPERTY The matters at issue began with Respondent's retention as a real estate broker to bid at a foreclosure auction for a beachfront house and lot at 235 Howard Drive in Belleair Beach, Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent was hired to submit the bid on behalf of Dr. Moshe Kedan and/or his wife, Ella Kedan. Prior to the auction on August 17, 1995, Respondent had no contact with the Kedans. Kathy MacKinnon of Viewpoint International Realty in Clearwater was Respondent’s point of contact with the Kedans. It was Ms. MacKinnon who obtained Respondent's services to bid on behalf of the Kedans, and Ms. MacKinnon who negotiated with Dr. Kedan as to the financial arrangements for both the bid and any ensuing commissions for Respondent. Neither Ms. MacKinnon nor Dr. Kedan was called as a witness in this case. Respondent attended the foreclosure auction and tendered the winning bid on the property. Respondent bid in his own name. Respondent testified that he had bid at several similar sales in the past, and his practice was to bid in the name of the person who would hold title to the property. Respondent did not follow his usual practice here because Ms. MacKinnon failed to instruct him as to whether the property would be titled in the name of Dr. Kedan, Mrs. Kedan, or one of their corporations. Ms. MacKinnon told Respondent she would know on August 18 how the property was to be titled. Respondent's testimony regarding the initial titling of the property is supported by a handwritten note faxed by Ms. MacKinnon to Dr. Kedan on August 17, shortly after the auction. Ms. MacKinnon's note provides instructions regarding payment of the purchase price, indicating that the money must be submitted to the Clerk of the Court no later than 10:30 a.m. on the morning of August 18. The note specifically asks, "Also, whose name do you want the house in?" Respondent testified that on August 18, he went to Atlanta on business, with the understanding that Ms. MacKinnon would handle the payments to the Clerk of the Court and the titling of the property on that date. This testimony is consistent with the handwritten note in which Ms. MacKinnon indicates that she will take the Kedans' checks to the court. The record evidence shows that the payments were made to the Clerk of the Court and that title insurance on the property was timely issued. However, the title and the title insurance policy listed Respondent as owner of the property. Respondent was unaware the property had been titled in his name until he received the certificate of title in the mail, approximately two weeks after the auction. Upon receiving the incorrect certificate of title, he went to the title company and signed a quitclaim deed, effective August 17, 1995, in favor of Ella Kedan. Respondent testified that he had learned from Ms. MacKinnon that the property would be titled in Ella Kedan’s name at sometime during the two-week period after the auction. The quitclaim deed was not notarized until October 9, 1995, and was not recorded until October 10, 1995. However, the face of the deed states that it was made on August 17, 1995. It is plain that the signature line of the notary statement on the quitclaim deed has been altered from August 17, 1995 to October 9, 1995. Respondent had no knowledge of how the quitclaim deed came to be altered. Respondent also had no clear recollection as to why he dated the quitclaim deed August 17, 1995, in light of his testimony that he signed it approximately two weeks after that date. A reasonable inference is that Respondent so dated the quitclaim deed to clarify that Mrs. Kedan's ownership of the property commenced on August 17, the date on which Respondent submitted the winning bid. Respondent also had no knowledge of why the title company failed to record the quitclaim deed at the time he signed it. He testified that on or about October 9, 1995, he checked the Pinellas County computer tax records and discovered that he was still the owner of record. At that time, he returned to the title company to make sure the quitclaim deed was recorded the next day. Petitioner offered no testimonial evidence regarding the events surrounding the titling of the property. Respondent's uncontradicted testimony is credible, consistent with the documentary evidence, and thus credited as an accurate and truthful statement of the events in question. THE CONTRACT FOR REPAIRS Shortly after the auction, Respondent began discussing with Dr. Kedan the possibility of Respondent’s performing repairs on the just-purchased property. Because Dr. Kedan did not testify in this proceeding, findings as to the substance of the negotiations between Respondent and Dr. Kedan must be based on the testimony of Respondent, to the extent that testimony is credible and consistent with the documentary evidence. Respondent testified that Ms. MacKinnon approached him after the auction and asked him if he would be interested in fixing up the house for the Kedans. Respondent testified that he was agreeable to contracting for the work because his carpenter was between jobs and could use the money. Respondent thus met with Dr. Kedan at the doctor’s office to discuss the repairs. Dr. Kedan explained to Respondent that his ultimate plan was to demolish the existing house on the property and to build a more elaborate residence. Dr. Kedan wanted to rent out the house for five years before tearing it down, and wanted Respondent to affect such repairs as would make the house rentable for that five-year period. Respondent testified that Dr. Kedan expressly told him he did not want to spend a lot of money on the repairs. Respondent quoted Dr. Kedan a price of $20,000.00, which was the price it would take to pay for the repairs, with no profit built in for Respondent. Respondent testified that he sought no profit on this job. He had made a substantial commission on the purchase of the property, and anticipated doing business with Dr. Kedan in the future, and thus agreed to perform this particular job more or less as a “favor” to Dr. Kedan. After this meeting with Dr. Kedan, Respondent walked through the house with Irene Eastwood, the Kedans’ property manager. Ms. Eastwood testified that she and Respondent went from room to room, and she made notes on what should be done, with Respondent either concurring or disagreeing. Ms. Eastwood typed the notes into the form of a contract and presented it to Respondent the next day. On September 21, 1995, Respondent signed the contract as drafted by Ms. Eastwood. There was conflicting testimony as to whether Respondent represented himself as a licensed contractor in the negotiations preceding the contract. Respondent testified that he never told Dr. Kedan that he was a contractor, and that he affirmatively told Ms. Eastwood that he was not a contractor. Ms. Eastwood testified that she assumed Respondent was a licensed contractor because Dr. Kedan would not have hired a nonlicensed person to perform the contracted work. She denied that Respondent ever told her that he was not a licensed contractor. The weight of the evidence supports Respondent to the extent it is accepted that Respondent never expressly represented himself as a licensed contractor to either Dr. Kedan or Ms. Eastwood. However, the weight of the evidence does not support Respondent’s claim that he expressly told either Dr. Kedan or Ms. Eastwood that he was not a licensed contractor. Respondent’s subcontractors commenced work immediately upon the signing of the contract. Ms. Eastwood was in charge of working with Respondent to remodel the house, and she visited the site every day, often two or three times. She only saw Respondent on the site once during the last week of September, and not at all during the month of October. She did observe painters and a maintenance man regularly at work on the property during this period. Respondent concurred that he was seldom on the property, but testified that this was pursuant to his agreement with Dr. Kedan that he would generally oversee the work on the property. Respondent testified that he was on the property as often as he felt necessary to perform his oversight duties. Ms. Eastwood testified as to her general dissatisfaction with the quality of the work that was being performed on the property and the qualifications of those performing the work. She conveyed those concerns to the Kedans. Respondent testified that he did not initially obtain any permits to perform the work on the house, believing that permits would not be necessary for the job. On or about October 11, 1995, officials from the City of Belleair Beach shut down Respondent’s job on the Kedans’ property for lack of a construction permit. Respondent made inquiries with the City as to how to obtain the needed permit. City officials told Respondent that a permit could be granted to either a licensed contractor, or to the owner of the property if such property is not for sale or lease. Respondent checked the City’s records and discovered that, despite the fact that he had signed a quitclaim deed on August 17, he was still shown as the owner of the property. Respondent then proceeded to sign a permit application as the homeowner, and obtained a construction permit on October 11, 1995. Respondent testified that because the City’s records showed him as the record owner of the property, he committed no fraud in obtaining a construction permit as the homeowner. This testimony cannot be credited. Whatever the City’s records showed on October 11, 1995, Respondent well knew he was not the true owner of this property. Respondent cannot be credited both with having taken good faith steps to correct the mistaken titling of the property and with later obtaining in good faith a construction permit as the record owner of the property. Respondent testified that in obtaining the construction permit under false pretenses, his main concern was to keep the job going and to finish it in a timely fashion. He testified that there was no financial advantage to him in having the property in his name: he was making no profit on the job, and actually lost money because he had to pay for another title policy in the name of the Kedans. While there may have been no immediate financial advantage to Respondent, he was clearly motivated by the prospect of future profits in projects with Dr. Kedan. The City’s closing down this project jeopardized Respondent’s anticipated continuing relationship with Dr. Kedan, and Respondent took the improper step of obtaining a construction permit as the property owner to maintain that relationship. The Kedans ultimately dismissed Respondent from the job. A claim of lien was filed against the property by the painter hired by Respondent, and the cabinet maker sent the Kedans a lawyer’s letter threatening to file a claim of lien. Mrs. Kedan testified that she paid off both the painter and the cabinetmaker in full. Ms. Eastwood estimated that the Kedans ultimately had to pay an additional $20,000 to $50,000 to complete the repairs to the house, some of which included correctional actions for the improper repairs performed by Respondent’s workers. ALLEGED PRIOR DISCIPLINE Respondent has been the subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding by the Florida Real Estate Commission. In that prior proceeding, the Division of Real Estate's Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent was guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b) and (1)(k), Florida Statutes. On September 25, 1995, Respondent and the Division of Real Estate entered into a Stipulation disposing of the Administrative Complaint. Under the terms of the Stipulation, Respondent agreed to pay a fine of $1,000, and be subject to one year of probation, during which he would complete 30 hours of post-license education for brokers. The Stipulation expressly stated that Respondent neither admitted nor denied the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint. The Florida Real Estate Commission entered a Final Order approving the Stipulation on November 14, 1995. Respondent's broker license was suspended by the Florida Real Estate Commission on January 24, 1996. The cause for this suspension was Respondent's failure timely to pay the $1,000 fine imposed by the Stipulation. Respondent paid the fine on February 19, 1996, and late renewed his license on April 24, 1997. In the instant proceeding, Respondent testified that by entering into the Stipulation, he had no intention of pleading guilty to any of the allegations, and that he would never have entered into the Stipulation had he known it would be construed in any way as a guilty plea.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts One and Three of the administrative complaint, and finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count Two of the administrative complaint, and suspending Respondent’s real estate license for a period of three years and fining Respondent a sum of $1,000. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey T. Kirk, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 John Bozmoski, Jr., Esquire 600 Bypass Drive, Suite 215 Clearwater, Florida 34624-5075 Jared White White Realty 231 Skiff Point, Suite Seven Clearwater, Florida 34630 Henry M. Solares Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
Recommendation It is recommended that the Administrative Complaint as filed against James E. Annen, for purposes of revocation or suspension of his real estate brokers license no. 0001875 be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 J. C. Adderly, Esquire Adderly, Aloia & Dudley Post Office Box 535 Cape Coral, Florida 33904
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 0200291. He was licensed as a real estate salesman in the employ of broker John Wesley Bridwell at all times material to these proceedings. In early 1982, Respondent came into possession of bank checks totaling $1,275 belonging to his employing broker John Bridwell and which appeared to carry the signature of Bridwell as payor. Respondent deposited these checks in various bank accounts opened and maintained by Respondent. Respondent knew the checks were stolen at the time be deposited the checks into his bank accounts. On August 11, 1982, Respondent was arrested by the Seminole County Sheriff's Department, Sanford, Florida, on the charge of depositing stolen checks with intent to defraud. Respondent confessed to this charge, and on April 15, 1983, adjudication was withheld in the Circuit Court, Seminoles County, Florida, Case No. 32-1250 CFA. Respondent was sentenced to thirty days confinement followed by ten weekends of confinement in the Seminole County Jail, ordered to make restitution of the $1,275, pay fines exceeding $1,500, and perform 200 hours of community service work.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty as charged in the three counts of the Administrative Complaint, and revoking his real estate license. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Brian D. Rist 3181 Harbado's Ct. Apopka, Florida 32803 Harold Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a registered real estate salesman in Florida, and was so licensed at all times pertinent to this proceeding. On January 17, 1974, Mr. and Mrs. Harvey Kaliff contracted with Respondent to lease, with option to buy, a house located at 5220 Southwest 6th Street in Plantation, Florida. The Kaliffs made a $3,000 deposit and contracted to pay $450 per month rent. The period of the lease was March 1, 1974, through September 30, 1975. The purchase price specified by the option was $63,900. In early 1976, Respondent told the Kaliffs that she needed some money out of the house and that they should obtain a mortgage loan. By this time, the Kaliffs knew Respondent was the owner of the property. Initially, they believed a Mr. and Mrs. Norman owned the house. There was no evidence that the Normans did not initially own the house or that Respondent otherwise misrepresented her status to the Kaliffs. The Kaliffs believed that their $3,000 deposit plus rent payments would be treated as a down payment on a new contract executed February 15, 1976. The new contract (Ex.4) specified a total price of $65,000, consisting of a $13,000 down payment and $52,000 to be obtained on the mortgage loan. The Kaliffs signed the mortgage loan agreement with the Hollywood Federal Savings and Loan on April 21, 1976. There were no discussions with the lender as to whether or not the $13,000 down payment had been made, nor was there any evidence of misrepresentation to the lender. The Kaliffs claimed they had a verbal agreement with Respondent that their approximately two years of rent payments plus the $3,000 original deposit would satisfy the $13,000 down payment on the 1976 contract. Respondent apparently disclaimed such verbal agreement. Subsequently, she brought a civil suit against the Kaliffs and obtained a judgment for $13,000 plus interest and costs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Dorothy B. Maze 7404 N. W. 5th Street Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33317 Harold Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent Richard B. Watson holds a license issued by petitioner and has since 1976. He holds license No. 0163723, and has, at all pertinent times, worked as a broker-salesman for Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc., 126- 128 Eglin Parkway Southeast in Fort Walton Beach, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On June 13, 1983, Lloyd H. Waldorff executed an employment contract under which Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc. was to have the exclusive right to sell the 25 units Waldorff Properties of Ft. Walton proposed to build as "phase two" of its La Mar West Townhouse Project in Mary Ester, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Nobody signed the written agreement on behalf of the broker, but Mr. Waldorff's testimony that Ms. Caldwell or somebody in the agency "accepted" it was uncontradicted, and fully consonant with the other evidence adduced. Mr. Waldorff or his organization needed agreements from prospective buyers to purchase units when built, in order to induce a lender to lend money for construction of phase two. One Saturday, probably in mid-July of 1983, Ms. Caldwell presented him with 18 such agreements. It seemed peculiar to Mr. Waldorff, getting 18 purchase agreements at once; and he was also struck by the number of Californians and other non- Floridians among the putative purchasers. But he had nevertheless signed the agreements himself before Ms. Caldwell gave them to Mr. Watson for attestation; and he later furnished all of the purchase agreements to Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Panama City in support of an eventually successful application for a $1,100,000.00 construction loan. (T.90) Mr. Waldorff signed the purchase agreements in a back room within the Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc. offices. At hearing he remembered that a woman was present. He did not recall respondent's being there. Seventeen of the 18 agreements furnished the lender were purportedly signed by persons to whose signatures, except in one instance, respondent Watson attested. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. On 16 of the 17 purchase agreements on which he signed as a witness to putative purchasers' signatures, respondent also signed as a witness to Mr. Waldorff's signature in a blank provided under the heading "signed in the presence of:". Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Respondent was aware at the time that Mr. Waldorff, whom he considers a friend, needed such agreements in order to obtain financing. As time for closing on the purchase agreements approached, Mr. Waldorff testified, he became suspicious, and asked Ms. Caldwell to see her escrow account statements, but she put him off. Eventually he asked her if the purchase agreements were "bogus," and she answered by nodding affirmatively. It was at this point, Mr. Waldorff said, that he notified the lending institution of their falsity, and asked for an extension of time in which to repay the construction loan. But the weight of the evidence established that the purchase agreements were shams from their inception and that Mr. Waldorff knew it before he obtained the loans. On September 9, 1985, Paul R. Bratton, III, an investigator for DPR, asked Mr. Watson about the purchase, agreements on which he had witnessed purported parties' signatures. In this interview, Mr. Watson said, with respect to some of the contracts which he had signed as a witness, "that he did not see the buyers or the sellers sign the contract." (T.63) In a deposition he gave in the course of related civil litigation, respondent Watson testified that it was "(p)retty much," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, p.10, "standard procedure" for him to witness signatures which he had not seen being affixed. In response to the question, "Does that mean also you wouldn't know whether these people exist in real life or not?", Mr. Watson answered, "It could be. ..." Id. as 15. Mr. Waldorff told Mr. Watson he was going to use the 18 purchase agreements, all but one of which respondent had signed as a witness, to secure a construction loan even though they were "bogus." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. This conversation antedated the loan closing. Id.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is licensed by the Department of Professional Regulation as a real estate salesman having been issued license number 0142776, effective August 27, 1984. Linda J. Nuccitelli is his registered employer. John Nuccitelli was respondent's former registered employer. In February, 1983, a final order was entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission which revoked the broker's license of John L. Nuccitelli. The final order was appealed, and the District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, stayed the order of Real Estate Commission pending disposition of the appeal. The appellate court ultimately affirmed the order of the Real Estate Commission, and the court's mandate was issued on March 16, 1984. On April 1, 1984, respondent's license was renewed by the Department of Professional Regulation even though John Nuccitelli was named as his employer. The respondent was notified of the revocation of John Nuccitelli's license and automatic cancellation of respondent's license as a salesman, by letter from the Florida Real Estate Commission dated June 21, 1984. Prior to receipt of that letter neither the respondent nor John L. Nuccitelli were aware that the appeal process has been completed and the final order revoking Mr. Nuccitelli's broker's license had become effective. On April 16, 1984, the respondent submitted to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), on behalf of Israel Branton, an offer to purchase certain property located at 4746 Miramar Road. The offer was set forth on a standard form entitled "Offer to Purchase and Broker's Tender." The form has a space for the signature of the broker and also has a space for the name and address of the broker. The offer to purchase designated "Anchor Realty REALTOR John Nuccitelli" as broker. Respondent signed his name in the space designated "Signature of Broker". The offer was accepted, and a HUD Standard Retail Sales Contract was executed. At the bottom of the contract is a certification to be signed by the broker. Typed in above the line stating "Name of Broker and Phone No" is "Anchor Realty REALTOR John Nuccitelli 305-422-0747." The line below states "By", and is signed "Louis Boatman, Jr. associate." On the Forfeiture of Earnest Money Deposit form, also submitted to HUD in connection with the transaction, respondent's signature is located on the line provided for the signature of the selling broker. A sales/broker's commission of $1,623.00 was paid to Anchor Realty as a result of this sale. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3) On April 27, 1984, respondent submitted to HUD on behalf of Israel Branton an offer to purchase property located at 5019 Columbia Street, Orlando. As in the transaction above, "Anchor Realty REALTOR John Nuccitelli" is named as the broker and respondent signed his name in the space provided for the signature of the broker. The certificate at the bottom of the Standard Retail Sales Contract was executed in the same manner it was on the contract for the property on Miramar, indicating "Anchor Realty REALTOR John Nuccitelli" as broker and signed by "Louis Boatman, Jr. Associate." On the Forfeiture of Earnest Money Deposit form submitted to HUD in connection with the transaction, respondent's signature was located on the line provided for the signature of the selling broker. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4). Israel Branton had known the respondent several years and was aware that respondent was a salesman and not a broker. Judy Sellers of Lawyers' Title Insurance Corporation, who handled the closing on the Miramar property, was aware that respondent was a salesman and John Nuccitelli was the broker for Anchor Realty. John Nuccitelli had given respondent authorization, as his agent, to sign all documents submitted to HUD on his behalf. Mr. Nuccitelli was aware that respondent was a very competent salesman with a thorough understanding of HUD paperwork and procedures. Due to the time restraints involved with HUD sales, respondent sometimes worked until midnight preparing the paperwork that had to be delivered to Tampa the next morning. To avoid having to get up before 5 a.m. to sign the documents himself, Mr. Nuccitelli told the respondent to sign: the documents for him. However, Mr. Nuccitelli was always fully informed about the transactions The Department of Housing and Urban Development has no objection to a salesman signing on behalf of a broker as long as the broker has authorized the salesman to do so. On August 2, 1984, respondent submitted to HUD, on his own behalf, an offer to purchase property located at 4777 Pleasant Valley, Orlando. Mr. Schroeder, Chief of the Loan Management and Property Disposition Branch of HUD, Tampa Office, rejected the offer noting on the document that the "OFFER MUST BE SUBMITTED BY A LISCENSED (sic) Broker." Mr. Schroeder had been informed shortly before August 2, 1984, that Mr. Nuccitelli's broker's license had been revoked and that the people who worked for him at Anchor Realty were not legally licensed. The Offer to Purchase had been signed by respondent as applicant and as broker, and it named "Anchor Realty REALTOR" as broker. Respondent indicated Anchor Realty as broker because respondent was still with Anchor Realty, and he filled out the form as he always had. However, he had not been authorized by Linda Nuccitelli to sign as the broker. Linda Nuccitelli became the licensed broker of Anchor Realty in August of 1984. Respondent did not represent to anyone that he was a broker. He never concealed the fact that he was a real estate salesman. He signed the HUD forms in the places for the broker's signature because John Nuccitelli told him that he could do so. At the same time, respondent clearly named "Anchor Realty REALTOR John Nuccitelli" as the broker. Mr. Schroeder, the HUD official who signed the contracts, was aware that John Nuccitelli was the broker. Mr. Schroeder indicated that HUD officials don't look at the signature on a form too closely but rely instead on the name that is typed in the appropriate space to determine the broker. The evidence presented established that respondent did not intend to deceive or mislead anyone and that in fact, no one was deceived or misled. Respondent has held a real estate license for about 15 or 16 years and has never had a disciplinary action filed against him until the instant complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Counts I and III of the Administrative Complaint be dismissed, that respondent be found to have violated section 475.42(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and that respondent be fined $500 pursuant to section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of February, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Richard J; R. Parkinson, Esquire 602 East Central Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings On Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Accepted in Finding of Fact 1. Accepted in Finding of Fact 2, except last half of last sentence which is a legal conclusion. Accepted as modified in Finding of Fact 4. Accepted as modified in Finding of Fact 5. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant and not supported by the evidence. Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Respondent signed on behalf of the broker, and clearly signed by respondent as "associate." Accepted in Finding of Fact 9. Accepted in Finding of Fact 3. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted By Respondent 1. Accepted in Findings of Fact 1, 2 and 3. 2. Accepted in Findings of Fact 4 and 7. 3. Accepted in Findings of Fact 5 and 7. 4. Accepted in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. 5. Accepted in Finding of Fact 9. 6. Accepted in Finding of Fact 6. 7. Accepted in Finding of Fact 2.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, Frederick L. Lundeen, is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction by misrepresenting that money he borrowed from a one Julie Couch would be used for the purchase of a lot but, instead, he utilized the money in connection with the purchase of a house for use by his family and for payment of other vacation and travel expenses and refuses to repay the loan, in a manner violative of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.3
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent, Frederick L. Lundeen, is a licensed real estate salesman and holds license number 0329068. On or about July 13, 1984, Respondent solicited and obtained $3,500 cash from Julie S. Couch (Couch) for the stated purpose of assisting Respondent in purchasing a lot on behalf of Keith and Beverly Rayburn, friends of the Couches. In connection therewith, Respondent executed and delivered to Couch a mortgage note dated July 13, 1984, to secure the $3,500 loan via certain real property owned by Respondent.4 Pursuant to the terms of the note executed by Respondent and given to Mrs. Couch, Respondent was to repay Couch the principal of $3,500 plus $1,000 interest due on or before July 27, 1984. On July 30, 1984, Respondent attempted to repay part of the loan via check dated July 30, 1984 drawn in the amount of $1,000. Respondent's check was returned unpaid by the Drawers Bank with the notification "insufficient funds." (Petitioner's Exhibits 3 and 4) Thereafter, Respondent advised Mrs. Couch that the money was used to pay for his moving, vacation and other relocation costs for his family. Keith Rayburn attempted to buy property from the Respondent which was owned by Southern Standards Corporation. At no time during the attempted purchase by Keith Rayburn did Respondent offer to loan him money to purchase a lot from Southern Standards Corporation. Respondent executed and drafted the terms of the note which was given to Julie Couch which memorialized the loan from Mrs. Couch to Respondent. In this regard, Respondent contends that Julie Couch's ex-husband suggested the terms and the rate of interest which he inserted into the note which memorialized the loan from Julie Couch. On the other hand, Julie Couch testified that it was Respondent who suggested the terms and the interest which he provided with the executed note given her. Based on all of the evidence introduced herein including the fact that Respondent misrepresented the purpose for which the money would be utilized, and his failure to call Gary Couch as a witness to substantiate his claim that it was he, Gary Couch, who suggested the terms under which the loan would be made, the testimony of Julie Couch in this regard is credited.5 Respondent has repaid approximately $1,250 of the $3,500 loan from Julie Couch. Respondent, based on advice of his counsel, refuses to repay any further amounts on this loan contending that the interest rates were usurious and, further, that the State, in the person of Petitioner, is attempting to use its "strongarm tactics" to exact money from Respondent which is a usurious transaction. Respondent also contends that because the interest rate charged by Mrs. Couch was in excess of 45 percent per annum, Mrs. Couch committed a third degree felony. As previously stated, the weight of the evidence reveals that it was Respondent who drafted the note and provided the terms for repayment. It is also clear that Respondent misrepresented to Mrs. Couch the purpose for which he would utilize the money that he borrowed from her. It is therefore concluded that by such acts Respondent engaged in acts of misrepresentation, false pretenses, trick and dishonest dealing in a business transaction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the license of Respondent, Frederick L. Lundeen, be suspended for a period of one (1) year and that he be fined $1,000. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida.6 JAMES E. BRADWELL , Hearing officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488- 9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October 1985.
Findings Of Fact Craig J. Kruse, Respondent, has held real estate broker's license number 0049367 at all times relevant to this proceeding. Fred Chamberlain and JaNell Eisler were licensed real estate salesmen in Respondent's employ (Kruse Realty) at all times relevant. On December 1, 1978, through the efforts of Chamberlain, Respondent obtained an exclusive right of sale listing agreement from Jack Piediscalzi on a tract located in rural Okaloosa County. The property was thereafter divided into nineteen lots and offered to the public for sale. A Mr. and Mrs. Lyons contacted Respondent's brokerage office on November 17, 1979, seeking to purchase a lot for residential construction. They were assisted by JaNell Eisler, who subsequently arranged the sale of a lot in the Piediscalzi tract. Prior to entering the contract, the Lyons had qualified for Farmers Home Administration (FHA) financing, and advised Eisler that any property they purchased must meet FHA requirements. Eisler assured them that the Piediscalzi property was FHA qualified, and, on this representation, the Lyons purchased the property. The Lyons then attempted to obtain their FHA loan but were informed that the property did not qualify as it failed to meet the FHA requirement that it be located on a public road. The property was further objectionable from the FHA standpoint as it was not in compliance with the Okaloosa County subdivision ordinance. The Lyons immediately contacted Kruse Realty regarding these problems. Respondent thereafter attempted to obtain subdivision approval from Okaloosa County but was unsuccessful, primarily because the road fronting the lots was too narrow to be accepted as a public road. The Lyons then sought to rescind the contract and recover their purchase money. However, Eisler had not placed a contingency clause in the contract, and Piediscalzi rejected the Lyons' request, contending that he had relied on Respondent to take care of the details of sale and was not responsible for any misunderstanding. Respondent eventually returned sales commissions and offered to reimburse any closing expenses to the Lyons. However, Respondent was not willing to purchase the property or otherwise compensate the Lyons for their losses. Respondent and Eisler erroneously believed the property qualified for FHA financing because of building activity thee had observed in the area and the statements of other salesmen, but made no inquiry to the FHA. Based on his discussion with the Okaloosa County attorney, Respondent believed the Piediscalzi tract would meet building and zoning requirements as they were then being enforced. Respondent did not, however, make an independent determination that the property was in compliance prior to the Lyons transaction.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of misrepresentation and culpable negligence in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) , as charged in the Administrative Complaint. It is further RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be fined $1,000 for said violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Riley Davis, Esquire 320 Barnett Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert E. Lee, Esquire Post Office Box 1447 Ft. Walton Beach, Florida 32549
