Findings Of Fact The Respondent holds Real Estate Salesman's License No. 0355517 issued by the Board of Real Estate. Petitioner is employed as a real estate salesman at Norma Star Realty, Key Largo, Florida. During October, 1980, the Respondent applied for licensure as a real estate salesman with the Board of Real Estate. His application was approved, and the Respondent was admitted to the examination, which he passed. The Board of Real Estate issued a real estate salesman's license to the Respondent during December, 1980. In applying for licensure, the Respondent filled out the Board of Real Estate's standard application form. Paragraph 6 of the form sets out the following inquiry: Have you ever been arrested for, or charged with, the commission of an offense against the laws of any municipality, state or nation including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations) without regard to whether convicted, sentenced, pardoned or paroled? The Respondent answered "No" to this inquiry. The Respondent has been arrested on several occasions. On July 29, 1964, he was arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, on a charge of sodomy. On August 6, 1964, he was arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, on a charge of rape. On May 22, 1966, he was arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, on the charge of notorious cohabitation. On January 31, 1969, he was arrested in Miami, Florida, on the charge of board bill fraud. All of these charges were ultimately dismissed. The Respondent was neither tried nor convicted in connection with any of the charges. The Respondent had been licensed as a real estate salesman in the State of Michigan. While in Michigan, he retained counsel, now deceased, who advised him that all of the Las Vegas arrests had been expunged from the Respondent's record, and that the Respondent could respond in the negative to inquiries as to whether he had ever been arrested.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Real Estate, dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent, Michael Timothy McKee. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold W. Braxton, Esquire 45 S.W. 36th Court Miami, Florida 33135 Arthur L. Miller, Esquire 9101 S.W. 66th Terrace Miami, Florida 33173 Mr. Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact On or about July 29, 1987, Petitioner filed with Respondent an Application for Licensure as a Real Estate Salesman. The application revealed that Petitioner had been charged with attempted sexual battery, as to which adjudication had been withheld, and Petitioner had received five years' probation. The application also disclosed that he had served 17 days in Orange County Jail for possession of marijuana. Pursuant to order dated June 3, 1981, in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR 80206, Petitioner, having entered a plea of no contest to attempted sexual battery on his 15 year old stepdaughter, was placed on five years' probation for this second degree felony as to which adjudication of guilt was withheld. Pursuant to judgment entered on February 27, 1984, in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. 80-206, Petitioner, having been found to have violated his probation, was adjudicated guilty of the above-referenced count of attempted sexual battery in violation of Sections 777.04 and 794.011(4)(e), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to order of disposition in Orange County Court Case No. M083- 4486, Petitioner, having entered a plea of no contest to possession of cannabis, was fined $100 plus court costs for this misdemeanor as to which adjudication of guilt was withheld. Petitioner testified further that, in connection with this incident, he entered a plea of guilty to attempt to evade arrest. Petitioner testified that he was generally of good character and a solid citizen apart from the criminal record disclosed on the application and court records produced at the hearing. However, he offered no corroborative evidence in this regard, nor specific examples of his behavior from which good character could be inferred.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Peter Thomas Roman. By application dated April 28, 1988, he sought licensure as a real estate salesman. By letter dated October 24, 1988, counsel for Respondent informed Petitioner of Respondent's intent to deny licensure to Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's 1985 arrest and subsequent plea in 1986 to a charge of grand theft, as well as Petitioner's suspension from membership in the Florida Bar. Question number six of the application completed by Petitioner requires a "yes" or "no" answer to the question: "Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? Petitioner responded to question number six by disclosing his entry of a plea of nolo contendere in the circuit court for Pinellas County, Florida, on December 29, 1986, to a charge of grand theft. Petitioner related that the incident alleged had taken place in November of 1979. Petitioner further stated that the sentencing court had withheld formal adjudication of guilt and had placed Petitioner on probation. Petitioner, a licensed attorney at the time of the alleged incident, was disbarred from the practice of law by the Supreme Court of the State of Florida in an opinion issued on June 2, 1988. The Fla. Bar v. Peter T. Roman, 526 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1988). Petitioner's disbarment was based on the same acts which resulted in the grand theft charge. In addition, the Supreme Court found that "[t]his case involves not only theft, but fraud on the court which strikes at the very heart of a lawyer's ethical responsibility." Fla. Bar v. Roman, p. 62. The essential facts of the grand theft charges against Petitioner were that Petitioner falsified the name of an heir in an estate where Petitioner was serving as the personal representative. Funds paid from the estate to the falsified heir were converted by Petitioner to his own use. These matters occurred between January 1978 and January 1980. Petitioner was charged with grand theft in June of 1985. He pled no contest to that charge in 1986. Thereafter adjudication of guilt was withheld and he was sentenced to five years probation a $220 fine and nine months in the Pinellas County Jail. Since the incident which is the basis for the grand theft charges filed against Petitioner, he has not been involved in any incidents or episodes of misconduct. Petitioner has been offered a job as a sales person with a local real estate firm if he is permitted to hold a real estate license. Testimony of character witnesses offered by Petitioner establishes their belief that his reputation in the community is good, despite the one criminal incident in his past, and that they believe neither the public or investors would be endangered by the granting of licensure to the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5432 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-9. Adopted in substance. Unnecessary to result. Adopted in substance. Unnecessary to result. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-8. Adopted in substance. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary to result. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary to result. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. Roman, Esquire 2340 Main Street, Suite L Dunedin, Florida 34698 Lawrence Gendzier, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Room 212 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Real Estate Legal Services 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified as a correctional officer by the Criminal Justice standards and Training Commission on February 17, 1988, and was issued certificate No. 03-87-502-08. On October 3, 1988, Metro-Dade Police Officer Jay Rogers was on duty and was dispatched to the Kendall Town and Country Mall to assist the Mall's security officers in clearing the parking lot after a night club closed. Officer Rogers walked up to a group of people, including the Respondent and asked them to finish saying good-bye and leave the parking lot. Officer Rogers then backed off and gave the remaining people in the lot about ten to fifteen minutes to finish saying good-bye. Officer Rogers again approached the group which included the Respondent, and asked that they leave. At that point, the Respondent replied to the officer's request with words to the effect of, "You wait, you can't make us leave, I'm looking for my keys." Officer Rogers asked the Respondent to find her keys, do whatever she needed to do, finish saying good-bye, and to please leave. The Respondent replied with words to the effect of, "I'll leave when I'm ready," and, "You're not telling me what to do." At about this point in the communication between Officer Rogers and the Respondent, an unidentified male approached the Respondent and said words to the effect of, "Come on, let's leave, the officer told us to leave, let's get out of here." The Respondent pushed the unidentified male away, and he got into a vehicle and left. Officer Rogers again asked the Respondent to leave. At some point in the interchange the Respondent replied, "What are you going to do, arrest me?" Eventually, Officer Rogers told the Respondent to leave or she would be arrested for trespassing after warning. The Respondent continued to say that she was not leaving. Officer Rogers thereupon advised the Respondent that she was under arrest for trespassing after warning and removed his handcuffs from his belt. At this point the Respondent became belligerent and hostile and told Officer Rogers, "You're not arresting me," and, "You'd better call for a lot of police, I'm not leaving." Officer Rogers requested backup units at this time. At about the same time, a man named Randall Rymes attempted to intervene between Officer Rogers and the Respondent. Officer Rogers told Mr. Rymes to leave and not interfere with the arrest. Mr. Rymes moved away and got into a two-door, black Isuzu automobile. As Officer Rogers attempted to place the handcuffs on the Respondent, she pulled her arm away and twisted her body. Officer Rogers continued with his efforts to arrest the Respondent and grabbed her left arm while asking her not to resist or struggle. The Respondent again pulled her left arm away and then struck Officer Rogers in the neck with her right fist. With Officer Rogers holding onto her arm, the Respondent pulled the officer towards the black Isuzu occupied by Mr. Rymes. Mr. Rymes drove the car beside the Respondent, opened the passenger door, and yelled to Respondent to get into the car. Mr. Rymes also grabbed the Respondent and attempted to help pull her into the car. At that point the Respondent kicked Officer Rogers in the left knee and as Officer Rogers continued to try to put the handcuffs on, the Respondent got partially into the car. Thereupon, Mr. Rymes started driving away with Officer Rogers running beside the automobile still holding onto the Respondent. Officer Rogers finally had to let go to avoid the risk of further injury. The vehicle driven by Mr. Rymes continued for several hundred feet until it was blocked by a vehicle driven by another law enforcement officer. Officer Rogers ran to the automobile driven by Mr. Rymes, removed the Respondent from the car, handcuffed her, and placed her in a police vehicle. Although Respondent had been drinking alcoholic beverages, she was not intoxicated at the time of the events described above. The Respondent has never been arrested or charged with a crime other than in the incident described above. /1
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a final order in this case concluding that the Respondent is in violation of Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Rule 11B-27.0011(4), Florida Administrative Code, and imposing a penalty of probationary status for one year conditioned on the Respondent not engaging in any conduct during the probationary period which constitutes failure to maintain good moral character within the meaning of Rule 11B-27.0011(4), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 1st day of May 1990. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st of day of May 1990.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1997), by pleading or having been found guilty of a crime which involves moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. (All Chapter and Section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation and discipline of real estate licensees in the state. Respondent is licensed in the state as a real estate broker pursuant to license no. 0414405. The last license issued is inactive. On December 15, 1997, Respondent entered into a plea of guilty to aggravated assault and leaving the scene of an accident with injuries. Both crimes are third-degree felonies under Sections 784.02(1) and 316.027(1)(a), respectively. The court adjudicated Respondent guilty and sentenced Respondent to two years of community control to be followed by two years probation. Both sentences ran concurrently. The court also imposed miscellaneous fines in the cumulative amount of $255 and ordered Respondent to pay probation costs. On January 13, 1998, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner voluntarily disclosing his plea and conviction. Respondent has no prior disciplinary history. Both convictions involve a single incident which occurred on November 23, 1996, at the Draft House, 1615 Lee Road, Orlando, Florida, a bar in Orange County, Florida. Respondent touched the female owner of the bar on her buttocks. The owner's son took offense to the incident. When Respondent left the bar, the owner's son followed Respondent to Respondent's car in the parking lot. The owner's son hit Respondent in the nose with his fist. Respondent got into his car. The owner's son smashed the windshield of Respondent's car with a steel bar. Respondent left the scene to call for help. When Respondent drove away, Respondent's car struck the owner's son. Respondent did not remain at the scene because he feared for his own safety. Respondent stopped a few blocks away and called 911. The extent of injuries of the person struck by Respondent's car was not established at the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(f), and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura McCarthy, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Richard F. Ronnick 4271 Biltmore Road Orlando, Florida 32804-2201 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner timely filed a complaint of discrimination in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Prior to November 28, 2007, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent. On November 26, 2008, the Petitioner sent a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ) to the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). The TAQ was submitted via facsimile transmission and was not signed. The Petitioner believed she was complying with the directives of the FCHR website and that follow-up assistance (from the FCHR) would not be required. The Petitioner did not understand that a signature was required, notwithstanding the place for same (along with a date) on page 2 of the TAQ. The Petitioner maintains that the FCHR website instructions were unclear and that she erroneously relied on the directions that did not specify she was required to sign the TAQ. The Petitioner filed a signed Charge of Discrimination with the FCHR on January 14, 2009. On February 5, 2009, the Petitioner received a "Notice of Receipt of Complaint" from the FCHR. At the same time, a copy of the complaint was furnished to the Respondent, who was then, presumably, put on notice of the Petitioner's charge. The FCHR did not advise the Petitioner that the TAQ had to be signed. In the course of its review of the instant charge, the FCHR entered a determination of "untimely." Per the FCHR's assessment, the charge of discrimination was filed more than 365 days from the last incident or act of discrimination. Thereafter, the Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against the Respondent. The Commission then forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Levitt, Esquire Allen, North & Blue 1477 West Fairbanks Avenue, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32789 Marie C. Perez 517 29th Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent took the examination for real estate salesman and was licensed December 16, 1982. His license was last renewed in December 1984 (exhibit 1 and Price testimony). At all times relevant hereto he was licensed by Respondent as a real estate salesman. By judgment dated-May 10, 1985, Buford D. Price was convicted of murder in the third degree, possession of cocaine, and possession of narcotic paraphernalia. Respondent was sentenced to seven (7) years imprisonment on the murder charge, imposition of sentence was withheld on the narcotic charges and he was placed on probation for five (5) years to run consecutively to the imprisonment. Respondent expects to be released from prison by June 1988 although his current release date is June 8, 1989. For the past three months he has been working outside prison on the highways and in communities. Prior to his arrest and incarceration Respondent worked principally for property management companies and Pulte Homes. As owners of the property leased or sold their salesmen do not need a real estate license to sell or lease such property only.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Petitioner was discriminated against in employment by Respondent in retaliation for Petitioner's efforts in behalf of minority employees of Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Petitioner, Priscilla M. Young, was a licensed practical nurse employed by Respondent, BAT Management Foundation, Inc. (BAT), at its Orlando Health Care Center (OHCC), as a floor nurse responsible for the care of approximately 60 residents during the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift. Her immediate supervisor was Joan Renee’ Banton. Petitioner began working at OHCC as an LPN in 1992. In 1987 she had been convicted of a felony, aggravated battery, in circuit court and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 30 months. After serving 8 of the 30 months, she was released without probation. At that time, she went to nursing school and was subsequently licensed in Florida as a practical nurse. At no time did she ever conceal her conviction from either the nursing school or licensing authorities. Petitioner was hired at Winter Park Memorial Hospital after graduating from nursing school and becoming licensed. At that facility she worked for both Joan Renee’ Banton and Sue O’Brien. During this period, Ms. O’Brien left Winter Park Memorial to take a position with BAT at its OHCC facility. Somewhat later, Petitioner saw an advertisement by BAT in the newspaper and applied for employment there. She claims Ms. O’Brien, who was at that time director of nursing was happy to see her when she arrived to fill out the application. Petitioner was interviewed for employment at OHCC by Ms. Stanley, who was the unit manager of the north wing at the facility. The employment application form contained a question which asked the applicant if she "had ever been convicted of a felony or, within the last five years of a misdemeanor, which resulted in imprisonment." Petitioner claims she was not sure how to interpret the verbiage and asked Ms. Stanley. Ms. Stanley also was not sure, so they discussed it with Ms. O’Brien. Based on their discussion, the determination was made that Petitioner did not have to list her felony conviction because it had occurred more than five years prior to the application. This was an incorrect decision because clearly the application requires listing a felony conviction regardless of when it happened, but requires listing of only those misdemeanor convictions which occurred within the last five years prior to application. Nonetheless, Petitioner was hired. During the course of her employment with OHCC, Petitioner had no disciplinary problems. Both Ms. Stanley and Ms. Banton deny having had any problems with her or her work. Petitioner contends that at least twice during the term of her employment, however, she complained to Ms. Banton about Banton’s use of the term, "you people" in reference to the aides and orderlies who worked for her, all of whom were minority of some nature: African American, Hispanic, or Asian. Ms. Banton cannot recall Petitioner’s having ever complained to her about that, and she denies having ever used that term. She claims that if she ever did refer to the employees as a group, it would have been phrased more as "you guys," or something like that. Considering the evidence of record, however, it is found that Ms. Banton probably did use the term "you people" and that Petitioner did complain about that usage to Ms. Banton. According to Ms. Banton, shortly after Petitioner was hired, all people who had knowledge of her conviction had left employment with OHCC. Ms. Stanley had taken employment elsewhere. Ms. Banton also left employment with OHCC in August 1994 because of rumors involving management problems with which she did not want to be involved. Somewhere between two and three weeks after leaving OHCC, however, Ms. Banton received a call from Mr. Allen, the owner of the company, asking her to come back to OHCC as Director of Nursing to replace Ms. O’Brien whom he intended to discharge. She agreed, and when she assumed her new role, she quickly received a phone call from Mr. Allen. In this telephone call, Mr. Allen asked if Petitioner was employed at OHCC. When Banton replied that she was, Allen reportedly revealed he had received a background check on Petitioner which indicated she had a felony conviction. According to Banton, Allen, who did not want any felons working in his nursing homes, directed Banton to check Petitioner’s background to see if the conviction had been noted on her application. She did, and when she reported to Allen that it had not been listed, he directed Banton by telephone to fire the Petitioner. Ms. Banton did what she had been directed to do. Petitioner contends that Banton’s attitude at the time of discharge was cavalier. Ms. Banton admits that at the time she had the discussion with Mr. Allen, she knew that Petitioner had served time in prison, but did not know why. She also claims that she did not know that Petitioner had discussed the conviction with Stanley and O’Brien and had been advised not to list it. Petitioner’s termination from employment with OHCC was based on her failure to disclose her felony conviction. Petitioner claims the termination was based on her speaking out for the other nursing assistants, all of whom were minority, when they were accused of incompetence. Ms. Banton, however, cites instances where when she would come in at night to check on how things were going, she would find pillows and chairs scattered around as if people were sleeping on their shift. She discussed this with Petitioner and admits the discussions were sometimes loud, but she never took any disciplinary action against Petitioner or wrote her up for this. Banton absolutely denies having ever disciplined any employee in public, always taking an employee to a private area to take corrective action. Petitioner is adamant in her contention that the fundamental basis for her discharge from employment with OHCC is retaliation for her standing up for the minority nursing assistants who were accused of incompetence. She firmly believes that her failure to list her felony conviction was seized upon as a pretext upon which to support the unlawful basis for her discharge. She cites that both Banton and O’Brien knew of her conviction and the fact that she had served time, when they all were employed at Winter Park Memorial, and that though it was not listed on her application for employment with OHCC, O’Brien knew about it at the time of her hiring, and Banton knew about it when she, Banton, subsequently came to work at OHCC. Coincidentally, Petitioner claims to have been instrumental in Banton’s obtaining employment at OHCC.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Pricilla Young, was not subjected to racial discrimination or retaliation because of her advocacy on behalf of minority employees; that her discharge from employment with Respondent, BAT Management Foundation, Inc., d/b/a Orlando Health Care Center was based on a determination by Mr. Allen, the owner thereof, that her prior felony conviction disqualified her from employment at the facility; and that she is not entitled to back pay, expenses, or compensatory damages as a result thereof. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 2000 COPIES FURNISHED: Priscilla M. Young 312 Lime Avenue Orlando, Florida 32805 Jefferson M. Braswell, Esquire Scruggs & Carmichael, P.A. One Southeast First Avenue Post Office Box 23109 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact On or about September 25, 2010, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination against Respondent with the FCHR. Pursuant to the FCHR's procedure, an investigation of the matter was completed, that resulted in a Notice of Determination: No Cause. Essentially, the FCHR found that based upon the allegations raised by Petitioner there was no reasonable cause to believe an unlawful employment practice occurred. Thereafter, Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination, and to seek relief against Respondent for the alleged violation. The FCHR forwarded the matter to DOAH for formal proceedings. DOAH issued a Notice of Hearing on April 15, 2011, that was provided to all parties at their addresses of record. It is presumed, the parties received notice of the hearing date, time, and location. In fact, counsel for both parties did appear. Prior to the hearing, the parties engaged in discovery and Petitioner participated in a deposition on or about May 24, 2011. It is undisputed that Petitioner knew or should have known of the hearing date, time, and place.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 W. John Gadd, Esquire The Law Offices of W. John Gadd 2727 Ulmerton Road, Suite 250 Clearwater, Florida 33762 Glenn Michael Rissman, Esquire Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler, Alhadeff & Sitterman, PA 200 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 2100 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent should deny an application for a real estate broker's license on the grounds that the applicant pled nolo contendere to a crime involving moral turpitude, within the meaning of Subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2004), was adjudicated guilty of the crime, and has not been rehabilitated.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing real estate brokers and sales persons in the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent has licensed Petitioner as a real estate sales person since July 1, 1996. Petitioner has also been licensed in the state as a mortgage broker since September 1, 1993. On June 25, 2004, Petitioner applied for a license as a real estate broker. On December 1, 2004, Respondent issued a Notice of Denial. The Notice of Denial proposes to deny the license application on specific grounds. The Notice limits the grounds for denial to those included in the following statement: The Florida Real Estate Commission has determined that the Applicant has been adjudicated guilty of crimes relating to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate, and crimes of moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. Specifically it has found that the applicant . . . has been convicted of or found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere to: Contributing To The Delinquency of A Minor, 2001 During the hearing, Respondent stipulated that it does not seek denial of the application on the grounds that the alleged crimes relate to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate or to fraudulent or dishonest dealing. Respondent relies solely on allegations that Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the misdemeanor charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor; that the crime involved moral turpitude; and that Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and has not been rehabilitated.1 It is undisputed that Petitioner pled nolo contendere in 2001 to a first-degree misdemeanor in the Circuit Court of Charlotte County, Florida, for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The factual allegations in the criminal proceeding were that Petitioner solicited a 13-year-old female (minor female) to pose topless or nude on August 2, 2001, when Petitioner was approximately 38 years old. It is undisputed that the minor female did not pose for Petitioner. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty and withheld sentencing. Petitioner paid $353 in costs, served 75 hours of community service, and successfully completed probation of 12 months. The Notice of Denial does not allege that Petitioner actually committed the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Nor does the applicable statute require proof that Petitioner committed the acts alleged in the criminal proceeding as a prerequisite for denial in this proceeding.2 It is legally unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner is guilty of the crime to which he pled nolo contendere. The entry of the plea, by itself, is a sufficient statutory ground for the proposed denial. The plea does not operate statutorily as conclusive evidence that Petitioner committed the crime to which he pled nolo contendere.3 No finding is made in this proceeding that Petitioner either did or did not solicit the minor female. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty, and this Recommended Order refers to the solicitation as the adjudicated solicitation. The threshold factual issue in this proceeding is whether the adjudicated solicitation involved moral turpitude. If so, it must be determined whether there is a rational connection between the moral turpitude and Petitioner's fitness to engage in the real estate business. If the requisite connection exists, it must be determined whether Petitioner has been rehabilitated and is not a "danger to the public." The adjudicated solicitation involved an act of moral turpitude. Solicitation of a 13-year-old female to pose topless or nude was a substantial deviation from the standard of conduct acceptable in the community, violated the duties owed to society, and was an inherently base or depraved act.4 The base or depraved nature of the adjudicated solicitation did not arise from a desire for monetary gain, as the motive typically is in other crimes, such as grand theft or the intent to sell controlled substances, that have been held to involve moral turpitude.5 Rather, the base or depraved nature of the adjudicated solicitation arose from an attempt to coerce the involuntary compliance of a minor female by exploiting her vulnerability; exploiting a financial relationship over which Petitioner enjoyed financial control; and exploiting a quasi- familial relationship in which Petitioner was imbued with the advantage of an authority figure.6 A person of common understanding would have known there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such conduct would encourage delinquency and that disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from an appropriate standard of conduct. At age 13, the minor female was nowhere near the 18 years of age required for legal majority. That vulnerability was accentuated during the adjudicated solicitation by Petitioner's age of 38. The minor female was also financially dependent on Petitioner for income as the family babysitter. Petitioner enjoyed the advantage of financial control of that relationship and possessed the power to terminate the relationship. Petitioner also enjoyed the benefit of an authority figure in a quasi-familial relationship. The minor female is the daughter of the brother of Petitioner's wife. The minor female is not legally the niece of Petitioner because the brother never married the mother of the minor female. The minor female is also a long-time friend of Petitioner's daughter. There is no direct evidence of actual intent to exploit the vulnerability of the minor female and any existing relationship. However, Petitioner should have known that the minor female was in a position of vulnerability and that the adjudicated solicitation necessarily exploited her vulnerability and the advantages he enjoyed in their relationship. A person of common understanding would have known there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the solicitation would tend to cause or encourage delinquency. The risk was of such a nature and degree that Petitioner's adjudicated disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from the appropriate standard of conduct.7 The moral turpitude evidenced by the adjudicated solicitation in 2001 is not rationally connected to the applicant's fitness to engage in the real estate business. Respondent admits that the adjudicated solicitation is not related to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate and does not involve fraudulent or dishonest dealing. It is undisputed that the adjudicated solicitation did not impugn Petitioner's fitness to engage in the real estate business. From July 1, 1996, through the date of hearing, Petitioner has functioned as a licensed real estate sales person with no harm to the public before or after the adjudicated solicitation. Petitioner disclosed the adjudicated solicitation to Respondent sometime after June 25, 2004. Respondent did not prevent Petitioner from engaging in the real estate business as a sales person. Respondent cited no evidence or authority to support a finding or conclusion that the misdemeanor disqualifies Petitioner from performing the functions of a real estate broker, but does not disqualify Petitioner from performing the duties and responsibilities of a real estate sales person. As a mortgage broker, Petitioner maintains trust accounts and transfers client deposits to third parties, including surveyors and credit reporting agencies. The absence of a rational connection to the applicant's fitness to practice real estate imbues the allegation of moral turpitude with the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the license application.8 The potential for selective enforcement should be avoided. The issue of whether Petitioner has been rehabilitated is moot in the absence of a rational connection between an act of moral turpitude and the fitness to engage in the real estate business. If it were determined that a rational connection existed between the adjudicated solicitation in 2001 and the fitness of Petitioner to engage in the real estate business, Petitioner has been rehabilitated.9 Petitioner paid the required court costs, served the community service, and completed his probation. Petitioner is a father of three children, has been married for more than 16 years, is a licensed real estate sales person, a licensed mortgage broker, and has not exhibited a pattern or practice of violations before or after the incident on August 2, 2001. Rather, the incident in 2001 stands alone as the only blemish on an otherwise flawless professional record as a real estate agent and a mortgage broker. The issuance of a broker's license to Petitioner does not frustrate legislative intent. The issuance of a license does not expose the public to a dishonest real estate broker that engages in fraudulent practices. The crime for which Petitioner was adjudicated guilty does not impugn the honesty of Petitioner or his ability to deal fairly with the public in the real estate business.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting the license application. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2005. 1/ Transcript at pages 44-45. 2/ The last sentence in Subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), states that the court record of conviction is prima facie evidence of guilt. However, the statutory language preceding the last sentence does not expressly require proof of guilt as a prerequisite for denial. The last sentence appears to be a vestige from former statutory language that required a plea of nolo contendere to be treated as a conviction. The legislature deleted the former statutory language from the current statute, but, so far, has not deleted the remaining vestige of the former statute. The issue is discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. If proof of guilt were a statutory prerequisite for denial, evidence Petitioner submitted to overcome the prima facie showing of guilt or to mitigate the prima facie showing of guilt is neither credible nor persuasive to the trier of fact. The relevant evidence consists of Petitioner's own testimony and hearsay statements that the testimony attributes to the minor female, members of her family, and others. The hearsay did not supplement or explain competent and substantial evidence within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003). 3/ Cf. McNair v. Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, 518 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)(plea is not statutorily evaluated as conclusive evidence of the commission of wrongdoing but is, by itself, statutorily sufficient for disciplinary action). This issue is discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. 4/ Neither party cited an applicable statute or rule that defines moral turpitude. Judicial decisions generally hold that moral turpitude involves: . . . the idea of inherent baseness or depravity in the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or by man to society. (citations omitted) It has also been defined as anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals. . . . State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth et al., 108 Fla. 607, 146 So. 660, 611 (Fla. 1933). 5/ Judicial decisions finding moral turpitude in the exploitation of others for monetary gain are discussed in the Conclusions of Law. 6/ Judicial decisions discussing exploitation of vulnerable persons in professional relationships are discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. 7/ Culpable knowledge is an element in the judicial definition of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. State v. Shamrani, 370 So. 2d 1, 2 n.3 (Fla. 1979); Kito v. State, 888 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). 8/ By analogy, the Florida Supreme Court has held that a rational connection to an applicant's fitness to practice law must be applied to the requirement for good moral character or the requirement could become "a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to practice law." Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458-459 (Fla. 1978). 9/ Counsel for Respondent questioned Petitioner in an unsuccessful attempt to show that Petitioner currently lacks veracity and is therefore dishonest. Counsel stipulated that the grounds for denial do not include dishonesty or fraudulent practices. The attempt to show current dishonesty is relevant only to the issue of rehabilitation. See Transcript at pages 36-51. 10/ The agency action in McNair was mandatory but is discretionary in this proceeding. The substantially affected party in McNair pled nolo contendere to a felony while Petitioner entered a similar plea to a misdemeanor. However, those factual distinctions are not material to the absence in the applicable statute of the former statutory infirmity that spawned the requirement of proof of guilt in Ayala and Son. 11/ Unlike the facts in the instant case, the holding in some of the cited cases are arguably ambiguous in that the allegations recite all of the grounds in the applicable statute, and it is not clear in every case whether the decision is restricted to allegations of moral turpitude. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Rockhill Edwards, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 419 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Guy Sanchez, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
