The Issue Whether Respondent acted as a yacht broker in Florida without holding a yacht broker's license issued by petitioner?
Findings Of Fact Respondent, presently retired, was formerly employed with Sun Yacht Charters located in Camden, Maine. He has never been licensed by the State of Florida as a yacht and ship salesperson or broker. Respondent attended the 57th Annual Miami International Boat Show and Strictly Sail (boat show) held February 12-18, 1998. Respondent was in attendance at the Sun Yacht Charters Exhibit Booth, a booth in the Strictly Sail portion of the boat show. Investigators and other Petitioner employees regularly attend this specific boat show in order to find unlicensed activity, such as selling and brokering of regulated yachts by persons not holding valid salesperson or broker’s licenses. On February 13, 1998, Petitioner investigators James Courchaine and Peter Renje attended the boat show. They carried fictitious business cards with false names and the designation "Yacht Consultant" on the cards. Courchaine’s fictitious name was James K. Ramson. Renje’s card bore the name Pete Benson. While walking through the Strictly Sail portion of the show, the investigators saw the booth for Sun Yacht Charters and Respondent. Respondent’s name tag read "Pat Raum." Outside the tent, the two investigators checked their list of licenses and did not find Pat Raum’s name listed. Although a license is not required in the sailboat portion of the show, Courchaine, posing as James K. Ramson, went back into the show and introduced himself to Respondent, handing him the fictitious business card with the name James K. Ramson, Yacht Consultant, displayed on it. Courchaine, a/k/a Ramson, inquired of Respondent that he was looking for a boat for a client for an outright purchase for a client. Courchaine asked if there were any boats for sale through Sun Yacht Charters. Respondent replied that sometimes people in their charter program wanted to sell a boat and that Sun Yacht Charters would sell it for them. He gave Courchaine his business card identifying himself as Pat Raum, Director of Yacht Sales for Sun Yacht Charters. The business address on the card was Camden, Maine. Respondent also gave Courchaine a specifications sheet on the Southern Belle, destined to come out of the charter program in April of 1998. The specifications sheet listed an asking price of $9,000 for the boat. From conversations he had with Petitioner's employees at a previous time when he discussed obtaining a Florida license, Respondent understood that Florida law did not permit him to sell or purchase yachts in Florida as an owner's agent. On February 17, 1998, following contact with Sun Yacht’s Camden office, Courchaine learned that Respondent was still in Florida. Courchaine contacted Respondent and asked for a contract. Believing that he was dealing with a licensed Florida Yacht broker, Respondent agreed to what he thought was an appropriate arrangement between himself and Courchaine whereby the sale of the Southern Belle would involve a 30/70 split on the commission from the sale. Respondent later confirmed to Courchaine in a fax message that same day that Courchaine, a/k/a Ramson, would get three percent of the sales commission. Also, he included in the fax to Courchaine a blank Yacht Purchase and Sale agreement. It was Respondent’s understanding that in the event of a sale, the matter would have to be handled by Courchaine a/k/a Ramson, or another Florida broker, that he, Respondent could not act as a broker in Florida.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the notice to show cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathryn E. Price, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Pat Raum Post Office Box 302 Kennebunkport, Maine 04046 Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Section of General Regulation has violated Section 120.535 F.S. by adoption of a policy which meets the definition of a "rule" under Section 120.52(16) F.S., without complying with the rulemaking procedures established by Section 120.54 F.S.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner originally applied and was licensed as a yacht and ship salesman in June, 1992. To be a salesman, one must be associated with a licensed broker who prominently displays the salesman's license. On April 15, 1994, Petitioner contacted Respondent agency by telephone to discuss renewal of his salesman's license issued June 3, 1992 and due to expire under its own terms on June 3, 1994. At that time, Kathy Forrester told Petitioner that his file reflected that his license had been "cancelled" effective March 10, 1993 due to a letter received on or about March 1, 1993 from Petitioner's employing broker, Frank Stanzel. Mr. Stanzel's letter showed that he was relocating his business from Miami to Ft. Lauderdale and that he wanted his two salesmen's licenses transferred to the new location. He enclosed with his letter the two salesmen's licenses for agency action, as required by agency rules. Mr. Stanzel further reported that Petitioner had left his employ on October 19, 1992, taking his license with him, so Mr. Stanzel could not return Petitioner's license to the agency. On March 22, 1993, five months after Mr. Stanzel heard the last of Petitioner and approximately three weeks after he notified the agency of Petitioner's leaving his employ, Mr. Stanzel's broker's license expired. Under the terms of the agency rules, Mr. Stanzel was required to apply for a new license. He applied. His broker's license was not renewed retroactively, and his new license became effective August 30, 1993. For approximately five months, from March 22, 1993 to August 30, 1993, Mr. Stanzel was not a licensed Florida broker. Neither Mr. Stanzel nor the Respondent agency notified Petitioner of this fact nor did anyone notify Petitioner at that time that his salesman's license was deemed "cancelled" during the broker's lapse. After finding out for the first time on April 15, 1994 that the agency presumed his salesman's license "cancelled" by Mr. Stanzel's notification that Petitioner had taken his salesman's license and left Mr. Stanzel's employ, Petitioner and his father prevailed upon Mr. Stanzel to execute an affidavit dated May 19, 1994 to the effect that Mr. Stanzel had misunderstood, now believed Petitioner had been diligently working at yacht sales after October 19, 1992, and wanted Petitioner's salesman's license reinstated. The affidavit was submitted to the agency. Although Ms. Forrester had misgivings about the affidavit, the agency reinstated Petitioner's salesman's license effective April 29, 1994, after receiving the affidavit (TR 25-28). The reinstated license still had the original expiration date of June 3, 1994. The agency did not reinstate Petitioner's salesman's license retroactive to October 19, 1992 when Petitioner went into construction work fulltime, to the date of Mr. Stanzel's original broker's license expiration, or to the date of Mr. Stanzel's new broker's license. Petitioner accepted his salesman's license as reinstated. Petitioner did not renew his salesman's license on June 3, 1994, so it expired by its own terms. On July 21, 1994, Petitioner filed an application to be licensed as a yacht and ship broker, together with the required bond, fee, and fingerprints. On August 2, 1994, Peter Butler, Head of the Section of Yacht and Ship Brokers, wrote Petitioner a deficiency notice, explaining that the agency regarded Petitioner's salesman's license "cancelled" during the lapse of his employing broker's license. The agency has no rule which specifically states that when an employing broker's license expires, his salesmen's licenses are automatically cancelled. The language employed in the deficiency notice was, "any salesman licenses held by [the employing broker] were considered cancelled (sic) for that period of time [the period while the employing broker's license was expired/lapsed] because they did not have an actively licensed broker holding their license." [Bracketed material added for clarity.] This language is the focus of this proceeding. The deficiency notice did not refer to the prior "cancellation" of Petitioner's salesman's license based on Mr. Stanzel's March 1, 1993 notice that Petitioner had left his employ effective October 19, 1992. The deficiency notice cited Section 326.004(8) F.S. [1993] which provides: Licensing.- (8) A person may not be licensed as a broker unless he has been a salesman for at least 2 consecutive years, and may not be licensed as a broker after October 1, 1990, unless he has been licensed as a salesman for at least 2 consecutive years. Bob Badger, an agency investigator, submitted a report to Mr. Butler dated September 1, 1994 expressing his opinion that even with Mr. Stanzel's after-the-fact affidavit, Petitioner's salesman's license would have been interrupted by the fact that he had no licensed broker holding his salesman's license during Mr. Stanzel's broker's license lapse of five months. He further concluded that Petitioner's salesman's license was "suspended" for a short period for not renewing his salesman's license bond. After review of the investigation report, on September 19, 1994, the agency issued its Intent to Reject Petitioner's broker's application pursuant to Rule 61B-60.002(6) F.A.C. alluding to the deficiency notice and citing Section 326.004(8) F.S., for Petitioner's failure to complete two consecutive years as a salesman. Section 326.004(14)(a) and (b) F.S. and rules enacted thereunder clearly place on the broker the responsibility of maintaining and displaying the broker's and salesmen's licenses as well as providing for a suspension of a salesman's license when a broker is no longer associated with the selling entity. Typically, salesmen turn in their licenses through the original broker for cancellation by the agency and receive new ones when they move from one broker's oversight to another's. Salesmen who are employed by one broker also switch their salesman's licenses to another active broker whenever the first broker disassociates from a yacht sales company and moves to another company, quits, retires, or lets his broker's license lapse. Due to the common dynamics of the employment situation whereby salesmen are under the active supervision of their employing broker in the company office, they usually know immediately when a broker's license is in jeopardy or the broker is not on the scene and supervising them. This knowledge is facilitated by the statutes and rules requiring that all licenses be prominently displayed in the business location. Anybody can look at anybody else's license on the office wall and tell when it is due to expire. If licensees are in compliance with the statutes and rules, no active salesman has to rely on notification from the agency with regard to the status of his own or his broker's license. In the present case, Petitioner removed himself from all contact with Mr. Stanzel as of October 19, 1992. Therefore, he did not know what was occurring in the office or with any licenses. All agency witnesses testified substantially to the effect that since they have been employed with the agency and so far as they could determine since its inception, agency personnel have relied on Sections 326.002(3), 326.004(8), 326.004(14)(a) and (b) F.S. and Rules 61B-60.005 and 61B-60.008(1)(b) and (c) F.A.C. to preclude licensing someone who has not been actively supervised by a Florida licensed employing broker for two consecutive years. More specifically, agency personnel have always applied Sections 326.004(14)(a) and (b) to place on the broker the responsibility of maintaining and displaying the broker's and salesman's licenses as well as providing for a suspension of the salesman's license when his broker is no longer associated with the sales entity. The agency has always interpreted the word "broker" as used in Chapter 326 F.S. and Chapter 61B-60 F.A.C. to mean "Florida licensed broker." See also, Section 326.002(1) and 326.004(1) F.S. and Rule 61B-60.001(1)(g) F.A.C. These interpretations are in accord with the clear language of the applicable statutes and rules. Petitioner unsuccessfully attempted to show that he had received treatment different than others similarly situated.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Heidt Neil "Cap" Fendig, Jr., and his corporate alter ego, Go Fish, Inc., do business under the name Golden Isles Charter Company. Aside from operating the marina he leases on St. Simons Island, Georgia, Mr. Fendig hires out as a captain (for $175 a day), arranges charters, and acts as a yacht broker in Georgia. When Kirby J. Bourgeois acquired the Westwind, a 55-foot "Ocean Super Sportfisherman," the man to whom the boat had previously belonged recommended respondent to Mr. Bourgeois, an Oklahoman who knew little about boats, as somebody who could assist him. When Messrs. Fendig and Bourgeois met on October 5 or 6, 1990, respondent agreed to register the Westwind in the name of a corporation (Mandela Corp.) Mr. Bourgeois specified, and to equip the boat in accordance with Coast Guard requirements. Later he took Mr. Bourgeois out on "training trips." For each of these services, respondent prepared invoices which Mr. Bourgeois paid in due course. Around Thanksgiving of 1990, Mr. Fendig acted as the Westwind's captain on a cruise Mr. Bourgeois took to the Bahamas. They left the boat docked in Marsh Harbor. In January of 1991, Mr. Bourgeois told Mr. Fendig on the telephone that he wanted to sell the Westwind. At that time, if not before, Mr. Fendig mailed Mr. Bourgeois a packet of information about selling boats, which included a form yacht brokerage agreement. Instead of signing the yacht brokerage agreement, Mr. Bourgeois decided to show the Westwind at the Third Annual Brokerage Yacht Show in Miami Beach, one of the alternatives Mr. Fendig had suggested. Mr. Fendig, who had once inquired of petitioner DBR about obtaining a Florida yacht broker's license, and been told he was ineligible because he lived and worked out of state, advised Mr. Bourgeois that he was not licensed in Florida and could not act as a yacht broker in Florida. From conversations he had with petitioner's employees at the time he discussed obtaining a Florida license, Mr. Fendig understood that Florida law permitted him to accompany and assist yacht owners in the sale or purchase of yachts in Florida so long as he did not buy or sell as an owner's agent. Mr. Fendig agreed to bring the Westwind over from Marsh Harbor for the show, which began on February 14, 1991, a Thursday. On January 23 or 24, 1991, respondent sent Mr. Bourgeois a facsimile transmission, described as confirmation of a telephone conversation, in which he wrote: "As per your instructions, I will transport the boat to the Miami show and look for your arrival in Miami at [sic] sometime during the show." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Although Mr. Bourgeois had informed respondent "that he would not be able to be there the first day" (T.24), Mr. Fendig arrived before the show began. He also filled out a form application and a contract for exhibit space, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, which, together with the application fee, had reached Yachting Provisions, Inc. in Ft. Lauderdale, on February 1, 1991. Mr. Bourgeois, whose name did not appear on the application and contract, later reimbursed him the fee. Reportedly delayed by a snowstorm, Mr. Bourgeois did not reach Miami before Saturday evening. Until Mr. Bourgeois arrived, Mr. Fendig stayed with the boat, moored at slip 221 on Collins Avenue. Available to anybody who visited the Westwind while he was on board were copies of his business card, which included the words "YACHT SALES-YACHT MANAGEMENT." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Also available to show goers (including those to whom respondent never spoke) were one page fliers describing the Westwind and concluding: "Asking $350,000 Looking for serious offers contact H. N. "Cap" Fendig, Golden Isles Yacht Sales & Charter Co. 912 638-7717 St. Simons Island, Ga." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. Respondent had asked his brother to make up this flier. Like other paid captains, respondent told anybody who inquired the owner's asking price. When, on the first day of the boat show, investigators in petitioner's employ posed as potential buyers, Mr. Fendig told them they would have to speak to the owner, who would be arriving later in the show. He told "everybody that, if they wanted to make an offer, the owner was coming and they could drop by later in the show and . . . talk to him." T. 36. While at the boat show, Mr. Fendig slept on the boat, which was an economic benefit for him, at the same time it afforded the vessel a measure of security, which was an economic benefit for the owner. Mr. Bourgeois paid him for bringing the boat to Miami Beach, but not for the time he spent there. He had wanted to go to the boat show for his own purposes, in any event. The yacht show closed on Monday without the Westwind's changing hands. Mr. Bourgeois still owned the Westwind on March 11, 1991, when he signed a yacht brokerage agreement with respondent Fendig. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Before that time Mr. Fendig had no agreement for or expectation of any compensation on account either of the Westwind's sale or of his efforts to accomplish a sale (other than bringing the boat to Miami, for which he received a fixed amount.)
Recommendation It is, accordingly recommended that petitioner dismiss the notice to show cause. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-3108 Petitioner's proposed findings of facts Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, he was off and on the boat during the last two days. Before Mr. Bourgeois' arrival, it had been necessary to stay with the boat for security reasons. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, the proof did not show that anybody asked the owner's name, address or phone number. Respondent testified he did not distribute this information because it "wasn't necessary, because the owner was going to be there." T.36. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 10, the taking of evidence had closed and respondent was making legal argument. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 15, respondent (who appeared pro se) answered a speculative question about what "could" happen. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 H. N. "Cap" Fendig 205 Marina Drive St. Simons Island, GA 31522 Henry M. Solares, Director Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Donald D. Conn, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000
The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed yacht broker, committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994, and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been a licensed Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent resides in and has his principal place of business in Martin County, Florida. Respondent's corporation, Rampage of Stuart, Inc., has been licensed by Petitioner at all times pertinent to this proceeding. The parties stipulated that Respondent's corporation was, at times pertinent to this proceeding, doing business as Stuart Cay Marina, a fictitious name that had not been registered with the Petitioner. The parties stipulated that Respondent was guilty of violating the provisions of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994. The parties also stipulated that the appropriate penalty for this violation is an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00. James Withers began working for Respondent at Stuart Cay Marina in January 1994. At the time he began working at Stuart Cay Marina, Mr. Withers was not licensed under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Respondent knew or should have known that Mr. Withers was not licensed when he first became employed at Stuart Cay Marina. On January 27, 1994, Mr. Withers attended an educational seminar sponsored by Petitioner where the attendees received instruction as to the requirements for licensure as a salesman or a broker under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. The successful applicant must submit a completed application form, a completed fingerprint card, the proper application fee, and a surety bond. The Petitioner's processing of the application includes having the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) run a fingerprint check on the applicant. The attendees of the educational seminar were told that the application fee had increased from $538.00 to $539.00 as of December 20, 1993, due to a $1.00 increase in the fee charged by the FBI to process fingerprint cards. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers could not act as a salesman until after his license had been issued. In late January 1994, Mr. Withers applied for licensure as a salesman pursuant to the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Because the application form used by Mr. Withers reflected the old application fee, Mr. Withers submitted a check in the amount of $538.00 with his application and fingerprint card. There was no evidence as to where Mr. Withers had obtained this application form. Mr. Wither's application package was received by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office on February 4, 1994. The check for the application was deposited and the application forwarded for further processing. On February 7, 1995, Mr. Withers was advised by mail that his application was deficient since the application fee was short by $1.00. This letter, from the Petitioner's Yacht and Ship Section, advised Mr. Withers that the $1.00 was needed to continue the application process. Mr. Withers forwarded his $1.00 check, dated February 9, 1994, to the Petitioner to correct this deficiency. This check was received and deposited by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office, which is located in the John's Building in Tallahassee, on February 17, 1994. The Finance and Accounting Office released the application package for further processing on February 18, 1994. From the Finance and Accounting Office, the application package went to the Division Director's Office located in the Warren Building in Tallahassee. From that office the application package was sent to the Yacht and Ship Section located in the Bloxham Building in Tallahassee, where it was received February 21, 1994. Licenses are not completely processed until after the Yacht and Ship Section receives notification that the entire application fee has been paid. Processing of Mr. Withers' application was completed by the Yacht and Ship Section and his license was issued on February 21, 1994. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers had not received his license from the Petitioner as of February 18, 1994. 1/ There was no evidence that either man had reason to believe as of February 18, 1994, that the license had been issued and was being forwarded by mail. Both men correctly believed that Mr. Withers had substantially complied with the licensure requirements as of February 18, 1994, and that the license would be issued at some juncture since the only deficiency had been corrected. Mr. Withers represented Respondent at the Sixth Annual Miami Brokerage Yacht Show on February 18, 1994, where he acted as a salesman within the meaning of the Yacht and Ship Brokers's Act. Respondent permitted Mr. Withers to use his company name at this show. On Friday, February 18, 1994, James Courchaine and Peter Butler, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, located Mr. Withers at the boat show and inquired as to whether he was licensed. Mr. Withers told them that he had completed his application package and was merely waiting to receive his license in the mail. Mr. Butler thereafter called his office in Tallahassee and learned that Mr. Withers' check for $1.00 may have been received, but that the application had not been received by the Yacht and Ship Section and that the license had not been issued. Mr. Butler informed Mr. Withers that the earliest his license could be issued was Monday, February 21, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings and conclusions contained herein, that imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, and that imposes an additional administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.06(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January 1996.
Findings Of Fact Peter P. Sedler, at all times material to the complaint, has been licensed as a real estate broker, holding license 0079017. He was last licensed as a broker c/o Marshall & Sedler, Inc., 7771 St. Andrews, Lake Worth, Florida 33467. Marshall & Sedler, Inc., at all times relevant to the complaint, had been registered as a Florida real estate broker, holding license 0250511, its last licensed address was 7771 St. Andrews, Lake Worth, Florida 33467. Peter P. Sedler was the qualifying broker and officer for Marshall & Sedler, Inc. On about July 3, 1987, Tom Teixeira was employed as a salesman by Cartier Realty, of 11852 42nd Road North, Royal Palm Beach, Florida. Cartier Realty had solicited, through a direct mailing, listings for property in the Royal Palm Beach area. Ms. Mary Myers, an older woman of about 70 years of age, responded to the advertisement, and gave Mr. Teixeira an open listing for real property which she owned. While Mr. Teixeira placed a Cartier Realty "For Sale" sign on the property, the sign was somehow removed shortly thereafter, and no party dealing with Ms. Myers during the months of July, August and September of 1987 would have been placed on notice that Cartier Realty had any listing on the property. Mr. Sedler had nothing to do with the disappearance of the sign. Ms. Myers had originally acquired the property from her daughter. Long before Ms. Myers gave a listing to Cartier Realty, William Kemp and his wife Gina DiPace Kemp had told Ms. Myers that they were interested in purchasing the property, which is adjacent to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Kemp. When Mr. and Mrs. Kemp first contacted Ms. Myers, she had wanted to keep the property, in the belief that she might eventually convey it back to her daughter. Mr. Teixeira brought to Ms. Myers an offer from David R. and Maureen C. Rose to purchase the land for $11,900. Ms. Myers did not accept that offer, but the Roses accepted Ms. Myers' counteroffer on July 24, 1987, to sell it for $12,300. The sale was contingent upon the buyers obtaining financing; they applied for a loan, and ordered both an appraisal and a survey. The closing was to be held by September 1, 1987. (Contract, paragraph VI.) The closing date passed, without the buyers obtaining the necessary financing, so the contract was no longer effective. On about September 8, 1987, Mr. Teixeira attempted to contact Ms. Myers. He had obtained no written extension of the contract but hoped the sale might yet close. Ms. Myers told Teixeira that she was still willing to sell the property to Mr. and Mrs. Rose. In the meantime, Mr. and Mrs. Kemp became aware that Ms. Myers wanted to sell the property, because they noticed Mr. and Mrs. Rose coming to look at the land, and had engaged them in conversation. Ms. Kemp then contacted Ms. Myers to remind her that they were still willing to purchase the property, and also to say that they would offer more than the current offer on the property. On about September 11, 1987, Ms. Kemp contacted Cartier Realty to say that she also wished to make an offer on the Myers' lot. For a reason which was never adequately explained at the hearing, Teixeira, who should have been working on behalf of the seller, refused to take the offer, even though it was for a higher price. After this rebuff by Teixeira, Ms. Kemp contacted Marshall & Sedler, Inc., in order to try to find a broker who would convey their offer to Ms. Myers and spoke with Patricia Marshall, Ms. Marshall referred her to her partner, Peter Sedler. The Kemps told Sedler that Ms. Myers had told them that she had received a $9,000 offer on the lot. Why Ms. Myers told the Kemps that the Rose offer was $9,000 is not clear, for the actual offer had been $12,300, but Sedler did not know this. There was no listing of the lot in the local board of realtors multiple listing service book, and Mr. Sedler found the address of Ms. Myers through the public records. Mr. Sedler knew from his conversations with Ms. Kemp that Cartier Realty had some involvement with an offer on the property. He called Cartier Realty and tried to speak with the broker handling the matter. He spoke with a man named Tom, who he thought was a brother of the owner of Cartier Realty, Pete Cartier. Mr. Sedler actually talked with Tom Teixeira. Sedler believed he was dealt with rudely by Teixeira, who had hung up on him. Sedler then called Pete Cartier directly to find out whether there was an outstanding contract on the property, and Cartier told Sedler that he would call Sedler back. When Cartier called Sedler, Cartier warned Sedler that he should stay out of the deal. Mr. Sedler became suspicious about Cartier Realty's failure to bring a higher offer to the attention of the seller, and on September 16, 1987, filed a complaint against Tom Cartier with the Lake Worth Board of Realtors. Mr. Sedler then traveled to Pompano Beach to meet with Ms. Myers at her home, and brought with him a contract for sale and purchase of the property, already signed by the Kemps and dated September 14, 1987. While at the door, Ms. Myers asked Peter Sedler if he was "Tom." Ms. Myers knew that she had been dealing with a "Tom" at Cartier Realty, but all her dealings were on the phone, and she did not know what Tom Teixeira looked like. Sedler replied "Yes, but you can call me Pete." Sedler merely intended the comment as humor. At that time Sedler gave Ms. Myers his pink business card and specifically identified himself as Pete Sedler of Marshall & Sedler, Inc. Mr. Sedler asked Ms. Myers if she had any paperwork, such as the prior contract for the sale of the lot which had expired on September 1, 1987, but she did not. While Sedler was with Ms. Myers, she agreed to sell the property to the Kemps for $12,500 and signed the Kemp contract. The Kemps had put the purchase price of $12,500 into the Marshall & Sedler escrow account. Three days later, on September 18, 1987, Mr. Sedler, in the company of his wife Bonnie, presented a post-dated check to Ms. Myers in the amount of $11,020, the net amount due to Ms. Myers for the lot, based on the purchase price of $12,500. When they met this second time he introduced himself again as Pete Sedler and offered Ms. Myers his card for a second time. The post-dated check was conditioned by an endorsement making it good upon a determination that the title to the lot was good. A quit claim deed to Mr. and Mrs. Kemp was executed by Ms. Myers and witnessed by Bonnie Sedler. The post-dated check was given to Ms. Myers because she was about to leave on vacation. The check was given as a sort of security for good title, in return for the quit claim deed which closed the transaction. Mr. Sedler had structured the transaction in this way because he was concerned that someone at Cartier Realty might also attempt to purchase the property from Ms. Myers on behalf of one of their clients. At that time, Mr. Sedler held the reasonable belief that no other party had a subsisting contract to purchase the property from Ms. Myers. Sedler had no reason to believe the Roses would or could pay more for the property than the Kemps offered. Ms. Myers knew that Tom Teixeira from the Cartier realty firm represented a distinct business entity from Marshall & Sedler or Pete Sedler. After a title search showed that Ms. Myers had clear title to the property, the check which Mr. Sedler had given to Ms. Myers on September 18, 1987, with the restrictive endorsement was replaced. Later Mr. and Mrs. Rose tried to close their purchase, but found they could not. Ms. Myers had failed to inform them of the sale she made to the Kemps through Mr. Sedler. Mr. Teixeira, in retribution, filed an ethics complaint about Mr. Sedler with the West Palm Beach Board of Realtors.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint against Peter P. Sedler and Marshall & Sedler, Inc., be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 14th day of March, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-6183 Rulings on findings proposed by the Department: 1. Rejected as unnecessary. 2 and 3. Adopted in Finding 1. 4 - 6. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 3. Implicit in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 6. Implicit in Finding 6. This does not mean that the contract subsisted, however. Rejected. Ms. Myers was willing to sell the property to Mr. and Mrs. Rose after the contract expired, but she was not under any obligation to do so. Adopted in Finding 7. Rejected, because there was no pending contract. Teixeira never obtained a written extension of the closing date and Ms. Myers was free to sell elsewhere. Rejected. No one could have truthfully told Sedler there was a pending contract. None existed. Rejected, because Mr. Sedler had no reason to believe that there was a subsisting contract for the sale of the property; there was none. Admission number 20 is not to the contrary. Adopted in Findings 10 and 11. Rejected. See, Findings 9 and 10. Rejected as unpersuasive. Rejected as cumulative to Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 14. Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Frank W. Weathers, Esquire Frank W. Weathers, P.A. Post Office Box 3967 Lantana, Florida 33465-3967 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent's license should be revoked as set forth in the Notice of Intent to Revoke License.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating yacht salesmen and brokers. Such authority includes the discipline of yacht salesman as set forth in Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent has been licensed as a yacht salesman in the State of Florida. Respondent first applied for licensure in June of 1994. This license request was granted and Respondent was issued a license for the two-year period 1994-1996. In June of 1996, Respondent applied to renew the license. This license request was also granted and Respondent was issued a yacht salesman's license for the period 1996-1998. On or about April 28, 1997, Respondent was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, a federal violation, and a felony. As a result, Respondent was sentenced and incarcerated. In July of 1998, Respondent applied to the Department to renew the yacht salesman's license. Based upon the information submitted to Petitioner at the time he sought renewal, the Department had no direct information of the felony conviction. In telephone conversations with the Department staff, Respondent did not disclose he had been incarcerated, was living in a halfway house as part of his sentence, and was a convicted felon. In August of 1998, a third party advised the Department that Respondent had the felony conviction. Thereafter, upon such notice, Petitioner took action to seek revocation of Respondent's license. The license renewal for 1998 filed by Respondent was executed on July 7, 1998. Technically, his license expired on June 14, 1998, but he was afforded a grace period within which to process the renewal. To this end the Department attempted to accommodate the renewal applicant. On the license renewal card Respondent submitted conflicting answers. To question (3) which read: Have you been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere, since initial licensure? Respondent answered "Y." To question (4) which read: Has any judgment or decree of a court been entered against you or is there now pending any case in this or any other state, in which you were charged with any fraudulent or dishonest dealing? Respondent answered "N." An undated letter from Respondent accompanied the renewal card which referred to a prior correspondence with the Department of June 6, 1996, as the explanation for question (4). As to question (3), the letter stated: "a conviction was made on 4/28/98 in the U.S. District Court Southern Florida." Respondent's answer to question (4) was false. Moreover, the manner in which Respondent answered the two questions did not disclose that Respondent had been convicted of a felony or conspiracy to commit wire fraud. More telling of Respondent's attempt to mislead the Department, however, is his failure to disclose any of the foregoing circumstances during telephone conversations with staff seeking to assist him to renew the license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order revoking Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip Nowick, Director Florida Land Sales, Condos, Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Scott K. Edmonds, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Tracy J. Sumner, Esquire Tracy J. Sumner, P.A. 1330 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Whether Respondent Garrison's license as a real estate broker and Respondent Arbree's license as a broker-salesman should be suspended or revoked, or the licensees otherwise disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 475, F.S., as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, dated December 22, 1980. This proceeding commenced with the filing of an Administrative Complaint by the Department of Professional Regulation on December 22, 1980 alleging that Respondents Gary D. Garrison and Joseph M. Arbree had violated Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes in connection with a 1977 real estate transaction wherein Respondents allegedly failed to disclose to the seller that purchaser Respondent Arbree was a licensed broker-salesman and that Respondent Garrison had, or would have a financial interest in the property upon its purchase. The Respondents requested an administrative hearing on the charge and filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that Petitioner lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the cause in that there had been no lawful compliance with the provisions of Section establishment of any fiduciary relationship between the Respondents and the seller of the property in question, and that Petitioner had not complied with the motion was reserved until argument was presented at the final hearing. At that time, the motion was denied for reasons which will be set forth in the Petitioner forwarded the Request for Hearings to this Division on July 1, 1981 and hearing was set for September 17, 1981. On August 27, 1981, Petitioner Oklahoma on September 9, 1981. Respondent filed objections to the said notice, together with a Motion For Protective Order, claiming that the notice period was depositions outside the State for use at trial. Respondent sought either to have the notice "stricken" or that a protective order be entered to require deposition or, alternatively, that the deposition testimony not be allowed in evidence at final hearing. The motion was denied by the Hearing Officer on At final hearing on September 17, 1981, Petitioner announced that the deposition of McNickle, an indispensable witness, had not yet been received. deposition as a late-filed exhibit, a continuance was granted until November 23, 1981, to permit receipt of the deposition and to afford Respondents an its taking in Oklahoma. Although the parties were afforded the opportunity to file Proposed herein, no post-hearing submissions have been filed.
Findings Of Fact times material to the complaint was registered as a real estate salesman with Investment Equity Corporation, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. Respondent Joseph he was associated with Investment Equity Corporation during the times material to the allegations in the Complaint. (Testimony of Respondents) acre unimproved lots in a development called Palm Beach Country Estates located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The purchase price of each lot was telephoned Respondent Garrison and they thereafter had several telephone conversations which led to the sale of the three lots to Respondent Arbree. The found that Respondent Garrison's version is more credible. In the initial conversation, McNickle advised Garrison of his ownership of the three lots and to inspect the lots and advise him as to the distance to electrical power, the type of roads adjacent to the lots, and whether the lots were corner lots. and that he was interested in trying to get his money back from the company. There was no mention of the value of the lots or of listing the property for sale. Garrison inspected the lots and, in a subsequent telephone conversation with McNickle, informed him that the nearest electrical power was approximately 1-3/4 miles from the lot locations, that they were on a dirt road, and that none were corner lots. He also informed him that the lots were approximately fifty percent under water during the rainy season. During this conversation, Garrison told McNickle that he had an "associate" with Investment Equity who sometimes purchased such lots. McNickle asked him to see if he could obtain an offer on the lots. Garrison then asked Respondent Arbree if he desired to purchase the lots, and the latter agreed if he could obtain financing for the purchase. Arbree asked Garrison if there was a listing on the property and Garrison told him that there was not. The reason for this inquiry was that Arbree had in the past frequently made personal purchases of real estate and had disclosed his status as a real estate salesman on such contracts when the property was listed with a broker. A question had arisen in his office as to when licensed real estate personnel should disclose their status to sellers when buying on their own account. Arbree had resolved this question in his mind some time previously by telephoning the legal office of the Florida Real Estate Commission and receiving information from someone there that it was not necessary to make such disclosure if the property was not listed with a real estate office. (Testimony of Respondents, McNickle (Deposition-Petitioner's Exhibit 3), Petitioner's Exhibit 4-1, Respondents' Exhibits 1-4) On February 28, 1977, Respondent Arbree executed a deposit receipt contract whereby he agreed to pay McNickle $15,000.00 for the three lots. The contract originally provided for a $500.00 deposit evidenced by Arbree's promissory note to be held in trust by the Investment Equity Corporation, but this was later deleted by the parties at the request of McNickle, and a $500.00 check as deposit was placed in the Investment Equity Corporation Trust Account on March 10, 1977. The check was drawn on the account of J. V. Company and signed by both Respondents. J. V. Company was simply a bank account established by Arbree and Garrison sometime prior to the McNickle transaction to serve as a depository for funds which were generated through sales for their private account. Both signatures were required for issuance of checks. Originally, the funds in the account were exclusively those of Arbree and these were the funds used for the deposit and subsequent mortgage payments to McNickle. (Testimony of Respondents, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 4-5, 4-9, 5) The deposit receipt contract was executed by Melvin F. McNickle and his wife on March 10, 1977. The contract provided that "The buyer hereby recognizes Investment Equity Corporation by separate agreement as the broker in this transaction". This provision made reference to the fact that in cases where associates of Investment Equity Corporation purchased property in their own name which was not listed with the firm, the firm broker did not require payment of any commission. On the other hand, if an associate sold his own property, whether or not listed with Investment Equity Corporation, office policy required that he pay the firm a three percent commission for overhead, escrow maintenance, and the like. The commission was payable directly to the company and not shared with any of the associates. McNickle did not enter into a listing contract with the firm nor did he pay a real estate commission on the sale. The real estate transaction closed on August 1, 1977. Warranty deeds, dated July 26, 1977, for each of the three lots were issued by McNickle to Arbree. (Testimony of Respondents, Brown, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 4-3, 4-4, 4- 5) Garden lots and is familiar with the selling price places the top value on choice lots of $8,000.00 in 1977, and $4,000.00 to $5,000.00 if fill was Shortly after Arbree had contracted with McNickle for the sale of the lots, Arbree told Garrison that if the lots could be resold at a profit, he McNickle contract had been entered into, another associate at Investment Equity Corporation told Garrison that he had a prospect looking for vacant land, and prospect, Carl Doty, was contacted by Garrison and, on March 17, 1977, a contract for sale and purchase was entered into between Arbree and Doty for the Investment Equity Corporation as the broker and agreed to pay a commission of three percent of the gross sales price to the firm. This was in accordance with minimum commission for processing a sale of property owned by the associate. Garrison did not receive a commission on the sale, but did receive one half of Arbree. Warranty deeds were issued to Doty by Arbree on August 24, 1977. The proceeds of the sale were placed in the J. V. Company bank account. (Testimony This case was originally docketed in the Florida Real Estate Commission in September, 1978, but was not investigated until December, 1979. A prior to comply with the notice provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. (Testimony of Stephens) Petitioner's proposed disciplinary action against both Respondents is predicated upon their alleged failure to disclose to the seller of the lots in Petitioner, and that Respondent Garrison had or would have a financial interest in the said property upon its purchase. The said nondisclosure is alleged to trick or device, breach of trust", and that thereby each Respondent "has aided, assisted or conspired with another in furtherance thereof, all in violation of subsequently reenacted and renumbered (Subsection 475.25(1)(b), F.S. (1981)), the provisions of the cited ground for disciplinary action have remained the penalties. The evidence in this case falls short of the standard required under (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), i.e., that in a proceeding which "may result in the loss of a valuable business or professional license, the critical matters at issue must Here, the fact that the real property in question was not the subject of a listing contract with Respondents' firm, Investment Equity Corporation, raises commission was paid to Respondent Garrison or to the firm by the seller, nor was any expected. Respondents and their broker treated the transaction as a private Respondents misled McNickle in any respect. Garrison made it clear at the outset that Arbree was his associate in the firm and was acting in his own behalf. The circumstances demonstrate that Garrison was acting as a gratuitous "middle man" for the benefit of both parties. The offer of Arbree, which was accepted by McNickle, was not unreasonable in the light of the location of the lots and other relevant considerations bearing on market value. The evidence shows that the McNickle lots were purchased solely with Arbree's funds, even though the checks issued for the deposit and several mortgage payments were drawn on the "J. V. Company" account which had been used in a limited fashion in the past by both Respondents in real estate ventures. No competent evidence was presented to show that Respondent Garrison had acquired a financial interest in the Arbree-McNickle transaction. On the contrary, the evidence establishes that subsequent purchaser Doty was made known to Garrison as a prospective purchaser of the lots only after the purchase contract between Arbree and McNickle had been executed, and that Respondents had not agreed to split any profits in a resale until that time. It is undoubtedly true that if Investment Equity Corporation had had a broker-principal fiduciary relationship with McNickle, the duties resulting therefrom would have also been imposed upon Garrison as a salesman, and he would have been obliged to disclose to McNickle the circumstances concerning his subsequent interest in the resale to Doty. This was not the case, however, and no such duty can be found in the light of the existing circumstances. Although it is recognized that a registrant can violate Subsection 475.25(1)(a), F.S. (1977) for dishonest conduct in a business transaction for his own account, as well as for such conduct in which his only interest is as a broker (or salesman) Sellars v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 380 So.2d, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), the evidence here is insufficient to so characterize Respondents' conduct. It is therefore concluded that Petitioner has failed to establish that Respondents violated Section 475.25(1)(a), F.S. as alleged. Although the foregoing conclusion renders it unnecessary to deal with Respondents' various claims concerning Petitioner's failure to accord them procedural rights in the prehearing process, it is considered that the amendment to Section 120.60(6), F.S. by Chapter 81-180, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1981, renders any defense based on the prior Section 120.60(6)(1979) no longer available. Additionally, Respondents' contentions that this proceeding is barred by the statute of limitations applicable to criminal prosecutions or by statutory laches are not well founded. Finally, Respondents did not establish any failure of Petitioner to comply with the applicable provisions of Chapter 455, Florida Statutes, in processing this case.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Board of Real Estate dismiss the allegations against Respondents Gary D. Garrison and Joseph M. Arbree. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1982. Harold M. Braxton, Esquire 45 Southwest 36th Court Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 611 North Pine Hills Road Orlando, Florida 32808 Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Executive Director Florida Board of Real Estate Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue On February 28, 1996, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Petitioner) issued a Notice To Show Cause to Robert O'Brien (O'Brien) alleging that O'Brien violated Section 326.006(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. Specifically, O'Brien was charged with allowing an unlicensed person to attempt to sell a 52' Hatteras known as "Watermellon" on behalf of O'Brien Yacht Sales. The issue is whether this violation occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate. On May 15, 1996, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Petitioner) issued an Amended Notice To Show Cause to David Sandmann (Sandmann) alleging that Sandmann violated Section 326.004(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Sandmann was charged with offering or negotiating to sell a 52' Hatteras, known as "Watermellon". The issue is whether this violation occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTIONS TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT Petitioner filed an exception to the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15. Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes, states that: The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence. A thorough review of the record has been made. The Division adopts and incorporates by reference the first sentence of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15. Petitioner's exceptions to the remainder of Finding of Fact number 15 are accepted because the remainder of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15 is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The second sentence, "The conflict as to whether Respondent Sandmann's acts, considered collectively, establish that he was attempting to sell the boat is resolved by finding that he was not attempting to sell the boat." is rejected because, the Petitioner presented testimony which proved that Sandmann: offered "to help" the Division investigators when they approached the boat. (T. 20, 38-39). gave the Division investigators a business card with his name and O'Brien Yacht Sales, Inc. written on it. (T. 19, 38-19, 52)( P's Exh. 2) gave the Division investigators a spec sheet containing information about the boat. (T. 21, 32, 39, 52). (P's Exh. 3). told the Division investigators that the price of the boat was negotiable. (T 22, 29-30, 39-40, 52). told the Division investigators that the commission would be paid by the seller. (T 21, 22, 29-30, 32, 34, 40, 43) had a copy of a blank sales contract faxed to him (from O'Brien Yacht Sales, Inc.) at the boat show. (T. 22- 23, 41, 52) Also at Recommended Order, page 5, paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12. Additionally, there was no competent substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact that Respondent Sandmann was not offering or negotiating to sell the boat, because these actions were uncontroverted. Respondent Sandmann never denied that he was offering or negotiating to sell the boat. Furthermore, the sentence in question is not a Finding of Fact, but rather a Conclusion of Law. The Administrative Law Judge's characterization of this as a Finding of Fact, does not make it so. In Hernicz v. State Dept. of Professional Reg., 390 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), facts were undisputed that a nurse practitioner had done certain acts, and when the Board concluded that the actions were a violation of the statute, the court held that that amounted to a Conclusion of Law and not a Finding of Fact. The "facts" were the individual actions that were taken by the Respondent, whether these acts violated the statute was a Conclusion of Law. As stated above, the acts, themselves, in this case were neither denied nor disputed. The second sentence in Finding of Fact number 15 is stricken in its entirety. The third sentence in Finding of Fact number 15 states that "[I]t is clear that Respondent Sandmann was at no time acting as an employee of Mr. Mellon or Respondent O'Brien or with the expectation of receiving compensation for his acts". The "expectation of receiving compensation" was the argument relied on by the Respondents at hearing as their defense to participating in the boat show. Because "compensation" is an integral part of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, its interpretation should be left to the expertise of the agency. It is a well settled principle that the interpretation of a statute by the agency responsible for its enforcement is entitled to great weight, and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Department of Environmental Regulation v. Goldring, 477 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1985); Shell Harbor Grou, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 487 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The Division believes that "compensation" can be other than a monetary commission, as claimed by Respondents. "Compensation" can be "perks" such as transportation or use of a house or yacht, or something intangible, such as friendship and affection. The existence of a quid pro quo is what is looked for. Furthermore, from a thorough reading of the record, it was proven by substantial competent evidence that a commission was anticipated being paid, because Petitioner's investigators were told that "the commission would be paid by the seller". (T 21, 22, 29-30, 32, 34, 40, 43). Possibly, no monetary commission was paid to Sandmann, because the yacht did not sell. Regardless, the Division finds that the friendship between Mr. Mellon and Sandmann was adequate compensation under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. The third sentence of Finding of Fact number 15 is stricken in its entirety. The fourth sentence, "Respondent Sandmann was at the Boat Show and on the `Watermellon' solely as a friend of Mr. Mellon, the owner", is also rejected. The Division does not dispute the long standing friendship of Respondent Sandmann and Mr. Mellon, however being someone's "friend", does not exempt them from Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. There was uncontroverted testimony that Respondent Sandmann was offering or negotiating to sell the boat. That is all that is necessary for him to be within the jurisdiction of the Division, and require him to have a license. Although his friendship could be his motivation or compensation for being on the yacht, his actions, while there, show that he was offering or negotiating to sell the "Watermellon". The fourth sentence of Finding of Fact Number 15 is stricken in its entirety. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner filed an Exception to Conclusion of Law number 23 contained in the Recommended Order. This conclusion stated that the Petitioner had failed to meet its burden as to Sandmann because it failed to establish that he was attempting to sell the yacht, and, if the case against Sandmann failed, then the case against O'Brien failed. The Division rejects this Conclusion of Law because it believes that Petitioner proved by substantial competent evidence that Sandmann was offering or negotiating to sell the "Watermellon", and that friendship is adequate compensation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida that administers and enforces the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent O'Brien has been licensed as a Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent O'Brien owns and operates O'Brien Yacht Sales. Respondent O'Brien resides in and has his principal place of business in Palm Beach County, Florida. Mr. Sandmann is a resident of Essex, Connecticut. He has never been licensed as a yacht salesman or as a yacht broker. Mr. Sandmann makes his livelihood as the owner of a dog collar manufacturing business. Henry Mellon, the boat's owner, held a salesman's license issued by Petitioner that expired in August 1994. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Mellon was not licensed by the Petitioner. Respondent Sandmann, Respondent O'Brien, and Mr. Mellon have been close friends for many years. Mr. Mellon formerly worked for O'Brien Yacht Sales. Mr. Mellon and Respondent Sandmann are old friends from college. The Fort Lauderdale International Boat Show permitted only new yachts or brokered yachts. Individuals were not supposed to sell boats in this show. Respondent O'Brien was aware of this restriction. In October 1995, Respondent O'Brien had the boat "Watermellon" displayed and listed for sale at the 36th Annual Fort Lauderdale International Boat Show. The asking price for the sale of the Watermellon was $425,000. Mr. Mellon is neither an officer or a director of O'Brien Yacht Sales. Mr. Mellon signed a form styled "Application and Contract for Exhibit Space" so that the Watermellon could be exhibited at the boat show and on this application represented that he was a vice president of O'Brien Yacht Sales. Neither Respondent O'Brien or his company paid to put the Watermellon in the Boat Show and neither expected to receive any commission from the sale of the Watermellon. Respondent O'Brien was acting out of friendship with Mr. Mellon. 1/ On October 27, 1995, Peter Butler and Robert Badger, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, attended the Boat Show and went to the Watermellon. They observed a sign on the back of the boat that advised that the boat was being offered by O'Brien Yacht Sales and gave its telephone number. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger approached the boat and asked a person, later identified as Respondent Sandmann, whether Respondent O'Brien was aboard. Respondent Sandmann told Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger that Respondent O'Brien was not aboard, asked if he could help them, and gave them a business card with his name and the name of O'Brien Yacht Sales on it. No licensed salesman was on board at this time, but Mr. Mellon, the owner of the boat, was aboard. 2/ Respondent Sandmann gave Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger a copy of a printed sheet containing basic information about the Watermellon. This sheet, referred to as a spec sheet, contained errors that Respondent Sandmann verbally corrected when he gave them the sheet. In response to questions, Respondent Sandmann told Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger that the price of the boat was negotiable and that the commission would be paid by the seller. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger asked Respondent Sandmann if they could see a copy of the contract that a buyer would need to sign if he purchased the boat. In response, Respondent Sandmann contacted the O'Brien Yacht Sales office and had someone fax to him a copy of the contract used by O'Brien. Respondent Sandmann then gave the form contract to Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger. The business card given by Respondent Sandmann to Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger was printed in 1994 when Respondent Sandmann, who is fluent in French, Spanish, and Italian, accompanied Mr. Mellon to a boat show in Europe. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger did not inquire as to the amount of the commission that would have been paid by the seller of the Watermellon because Petitioner does not regulate commissions. None of Respondent Sandmann's acts, when considered individually, required a license from the Petitioner. 3/ The conflict as to whether Respondent Sandmann's acts, considered collectively, establish that he was attempting to sell the boat is resolved by finding that he was not attempting to sell the boat. It is clear that Respondent Sandmann was at no time acting as an employee of Mr. Mellon or Respondent O'Brien or with the expectation of receiving compensation for his acts. Respondent Sandmann was at the Boat Show and on the Watermellon solely as a friend of Mr. Mellon, the owner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order as to these consolidated cases that dismisses the charges filed against these respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a private yacht club located on Lots 5-11 inclusive, Block D, Bayside No. 6, Unit A, 830 South Bayway Boulevard, Clearwater, Florida. Founded some five years ago, the club provides a wide array of boating and social functions for its membership. It sits on the north side of Bayway Boulevard and is approximately 50 feet east of Clearwater Pass Avenue. The property is rectangular shaped and has dimensions of approximately 420 feet by 120 feet. The widest portion of the property fronts Clearwater Harbor to the north and Bayway Boulevard on the south. The yacht club is situated within an area currently zoned by the City as CTF-28 (high density commercial-tourist). This District provides for a complete range of motel-hotel developments with a major emphasis on tourism. The primary permitted uses and structures within the CTF-28 District are combination hotel, motel, apartment and business buildings, apartment houses, townhouse developments and restaurants. A number of special exceptions to the permitted uses are authorized within a CTF-28 District. These include, inter alia, three types of marina facilities, namely, Type A (pleasure craft docking), Type B (launching ramp site, commercial) and Type C (private marina). The City has never classified Petitioner under any of these categories. Upon obtaining a Type C classification, a property owner may engage in 12 separate uses of the property as a matter of right, and a thirteenth upon obtaining specific Board approval. These include: (a) sales and service facilities, (b) boat slips (excluding covered boat slips or dry storage unless specific Board approval is obtained), (c) boat handling equipment, (d) boat and gear storage, (e) launching facilities, (f) fuel station, (g) lockers and sanitary facilities, (h) restaurant facilities (not advertised), (i) club house, (j) motel or boatel, (k) recreational facilities (not commercial), (l) park or picnic area, and (m) automobile parking. Petitioner now engages in all permitted activities except items (a), and (j). It does not wish to engage in the latter three uses even if the application is granted. All activities presently conducted are done so in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance. On the east side of Petitioner's property is a multi-story restaurant and lounge while to the west lies a 4-story condominium complex (Bayside 17). Directly across Bayway Boulevard and to the south are two high-rise condominium complexes, one of which is still under construction. Boat docking facilities are located on the waterfront throughout the area, including that of Petitioner and adjacent property owners. The area may be generally described as a combination of high density residential and commercial buildings and structures catering to the tourist or part-time resident. The proposed reclassification is compatible with the surrounding properties and the character of the land. Its uses fit within the general scheme of zoning for a CTF-28 District, and are consistent with the Land Use Plan. The chief concern of the adjacent property owners who testified is a fear that reclassification of the property will diminish the view of the water now enjoyed across the clear space on the west side of Petitioner's property. However, since no change in the use of the property will be made by virtue of reclassification, the existing view should not be impaired.
