Findings Of Fact Respondent agency, FDOT, filed a Circuit Court eminent domain action to condemn certain property in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida for the purpose of constructing, reconstructing and maintaining a state transportation facility for the use of the general public, including, but not limited to, rights-of-way, borrow pits, drainage ditches, drainage easements, construction easements and service roads. There is no dispute that this is a federally-funded project. The condemned property included a taking in limited access rights and a temporary construction easement from a larger parcel of commercially developed property, called "Plaza 10", owned by a group of individuals and controlled by William Grow as managing partner. Plaza 10 is located on the northwest corner of Raymond Diehl Road and Capital Circle NE. Petitioners, Furniture Showcase Inc. and Chrysalis Decorative Fabrics, had leased space in buildings located at Plaza 10 where each had profitably operated their respective businesses for at least nine years. An Order of Taking was entered in the eminent domain action on April 27, 1992, and title transferred to the Respondent within twenty days thereof when the sum of $10,000 was deposited in the court registry for the benefit of William Grow and his partners. Petitioners received nothing thereby. There is no dispute that there was a partial acquisition by FDOT of the property upon which Petitioners' respective businesses were located. Petitioners attended several public meetings pertaining to the proposed construction. Plaza 10 had two driveways providing ingress and egress for Plaza 10 onto Raymond Diehl Road, and FDOT's plans included closure of the westernmost driveway. However, Petitioners became aware of the extent of the proposed project and its potential impact on their businesses at a mediation meeting with FDOT held in December 1992 in connection with the eminent domain action. Petitioners could have renewed their leases upon favorable terms at Plaza 10, but on December 28, 1992, Furniture Showcase Inc. notified Plaza 10 that it would not renew its lease. Chrysalis notified Plaza 10 on December 29, 1992 that it would not renew its lease. Both Petitioners gave anticipated loss of business and profitability as their reasons for leaving Plaza 10. Petitioners moved their businesses from their prior location at Plaza 10 in February of 1993, prior to the commencement of any construction, but after surveying had begun. Construction was delayed because FDOT took bids three times and only settled on a contractor sometime in late 1993 or early 1994, at which time construction finally began. Both of Plaza 10's original driveways to Raymond Diehl Road remained open and in use as of the 1994 formal hearing herein. The City of Tallahassee and Leon County posed no impediments to Petitioners continuing in business at Plaza 10, whether or not a driveway is eventually closed. Petitioners filed claims in Circuit Court for business damages arising out of the anticipated loss of business and profitability arising from the loss of previously existing access rights to the lease-hold interest in Plaza 10. The result of this Circuit Court suit are not in evidence. Chrysalis relocated to Betton Place in February 1993, where it continues to conduct business. Furniture Showcase Inc. has moved its remaining business goods to the home of its principals and no longer conducts business, asserting at formal hearing herein that it has yet to find a profitable site for its business. Furniture Showcase Inc. sold solid wood and up-scaled upholstered furniture and was located in Plaza 10 for nine-and-a half years. In the whole of that time, it primarily received its shipments of furniture in full-sized WB- 50 tractor-trailer trucks or "semis," through the western driveway, which FDOT plans to close off. In reaching the decision to vacate Plaza 10 in 1993, Furniture Showcase Inc. concluded that it could no longer operate its business successfully at that location due to the inability to receive its freight, reduction in access, and the concern of its customers in accessing the site. Chrysalis Decorative Fabrics sold furniture, carpeting, decorative fabrics, wallpaper, and interior design items. It was located at Plaza 10 for nine years. It also received freight which was delivered by full-sized tractor- trailer trucks. The operation of its business is dependent upon receiving such deliveries, including but not limited to room-size carpets and fabric in 54 inch long/15 inch diameter rolls. When ordering its merchandise, Chrysalis Decorative Fabrics has no control over how the merchandise will be shipped and delivered by its suppliers or what type of vehicle the suppliers will employ. Usually, its suppliers also utilize "semis". At Plaza 10, these trucks also always used the western driveway. Chrysalis' principal, Arlene Wingate, did an informal poll of her clientele and suppliers and concluded she would lose business due to implementation of the FDOT design plan. Nevins Smith, P.E., was accepted as an expert witness in site planning and civil engineering. He opined, without refutation, that a retail establishment which constitutes a "destination-type" business on the site of Plaza 10 and relies on truck traffic could not stay in business. Businesses fall into two major classifications: "destination-type" and "convenience-type." Both these Petitioners fall in the "destination-type" classification because they attract and cater-to persons who select them before driving to them. Their clientele seek them out intentionally, as opposed to selecting them on the spur of the moment as one might suddenly turn into a "Seven-Eleven" for a bag of potato chips when hunger strikes. A roadside "convenience store" like "Seven-Eleven" is a prototype of a "convenience-type" business. "Destination type" businesses are not aided by increased traffic speed and flow and require as many routes in and out of their establishments as possible so that customers can comfortably and safely come and go from many directions. Mr. Smith also demonstrated effectively that the FDOT plans eliminated all but four of twenty-five customer entrance and egress route options for Petitioners' clientele. By a Final Judgment on Counterclaim entered May 5, 1994, the Circuit Court of Leon County determined in the eminent domain action that the landowners had "lost 84 percent of the accessibility enjoyed prior to the FDOT project and after construction of the project, [the] property is accessible only by a tedious and circuitous route to reach the premises which is patently unsuitable. The FDOT project converts the portion of Raymond Diehl Road abutting the Plaza 10 property from a land service road into a limited access facility. The construction of the unbroken median in front of the subject property extending from Capital Circle N.E. to the intersection of the Cabot Lodge entrance and Raymond Diehl Road constitutes a limited access fence for the specific protection of Interstate 10 (State Road 8) traffic utilizing Raymond Diehl as a limited access ramp. As a result of the condemnation of Plaza 10 and the proposed project, the extended construction of an interstate limited access fence will result in the closure of the westerly driveway connection. The proposed limited access fence will run along the west side of the property from the northwest end of the existing interstate fence, turning east along the south side of the property to a point beyond the existing westerly driveway, thereby closing the driveway connection. There exists no access to Plaza 10 from Capital Circle or the northern or western boundaries of the property. The only access to the property that will exist after completion of the construction project is the single easterly driveway connection. Unrefuted expert testimony established that the intersection of Capital Circle NE and Raymond Diehl Road (SE corner of Plaza 10) is the entrance to a high-speed Interstate 10 on-ramp. The radius of this turn lane allows cars to negotiate the turn onto Raymond Diehl at approximately 25-30 m.p.h. and to accelerate in front of the subject property. The unrefuted testimony of Nevins Smith, P.E., and the Petitioners establishes that the reduction in accessibility to the property will result in a loss of customers, adversely affecting the ability of the Petitioners to operate their business profitably. In addition to the overall reduction in accessibility of customers to the site, the closing of the westerly driveway will also substantially or completely impair the ability of Petitioners' businesses to receive freight deliveries. Full-sized WB-50 "semis" (tractor-trailer trucks) historically have been able to enter the property only through the westerly driveway because the site of the easterly driveway connection and the on-site space available prohibits the necessary turning motion. Petitioners testified without refutation that, based upon their years of experience and expertise in their respective businesses, the combination of the loss of customer access and inability to receive their individualized types of inventory caused them to conclude that continuing at the Plaza 10 location would be committing their businesses to an economic death.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a Final Order be entered finding that the Petitioners, Furniture Showcase, Inc. and Chrysalis Decorative Fabrics, were required to move their businesses from the Plaza 10 site as a direct result of the partial acquisition of real property from the site of the project; that this necessitated move qualifies both Petitioners as "displaced persons" under the applicable law; and that appropriate measures shall be undertaken to establish the amount and reasonableness of Petitioners' respective claims for relocation expenses. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of October, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 93-1252 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioners' PFOF: 1-9 Accepted and adopted. 10-12 Accepted, except that unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material was eliminated. 13-19 Accepted as minimally modified to remove conclusions of law and mere legal argument. 20 Covered in preliminary matters and conclusions of law. Respondent's PFOF: Respondents' proposed findings of fact begin with #6. Paragraphs 1-5 are preliminary matters not requiring a ruling pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. 6-9 Accepted. 10 Rejected upon the greater weight of the evidence; covered within the Recommended Order. 11-15 Accepted. Rejected upon the greater weight of the evidence. See all Findings of Fact related to elimination of the western driveway and impairment of the eastern driveway. Rejected as out of context and immaterial. Although there was considerable testimony on safety factors, safety vel non was not a dispositive issue. Accepted. 19-20 Accepted but utilized only so far as relevant. 21 Accepted. 22-23 Covered under preliminary matters. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Accepted but immaterial. Accepted. Rejected as a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 John H. Beck, Esquire BECK, SPALLY & BARRIOS 1026 E. Park Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450
The Issue Whether Petitioner's bid on State Job No. 86075-3459 was non-responsive and Respondent's award of the bid to the next lowest responsible bidder was arbitrary, illegal or dishonest.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner timely submitted its bid on State Job No. 86075-3459 and this bid was the lowest received by DOT on this project. The DBE requirement on this bid was 11%. This means each bidder had to show on its submittal that at least 11% of the project cost would go to a minority business subcontractor. With its bid submittal, on the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) Utilization Summary (Form 275-020-003 Minority Prog. 11/87), Petitioner listed as DBE subcontractors Reliable Trucking, Inc. with $100,000 as the dollar amount for DBE goal and $280,000 for Community Asphalt Corporation. (Exhibit 1.) These two figures exceeded the 11% minimum DBE requirement. Community Asphalt Corporation had been a certified DBE subcontractor in early 1990 but in May 1990 its certification expired and was not renewed. Accordingly, at the time of the bid opening, Community Asphalt was not listed on the list of certified DBE subcontractors DOT provided to bidders with the bid forms to complete for this project. Petitioner had initially shown only Reliable Trucking, Inc. on Exhibit 1 with $400,000 as the dollar amount for the DBE goal. Reliable Trucking is a certified DBE. Petitioner received a late quote from Community Asphalt and just before submitting its bid added Community Asphalt to its DBE Utilization Summary, interlining the $400,000 amount for Reliable Trucking and changed this amount to $100,000. Although Petitioner still intended to use Reliable Trucking for work on this project in excess of $400,000 its policy, which was here followed, is to show on its DBE Utilization Summary submitted with its bid only a small percentage over the required minimum. Therefore, when Community Asphalt was added as a DBE subcontractor, the dollar amount to Reliable Trucking was reduced. Petitioner's employee who added Community Asphalt to the DBE Utilization Summary checked to see that Community Asphalt was a certified DBE but, unfortunately, looked at the list of certified DBE subcontractors furnished by DOT for an earlier bid--not the current list. The current list which had been supplied to Petitioner did not list Community Asphalt as a certified DBE. When the bids received were first checked by the DOT employee who reviews bids to see that DBE requirements are met, she approved the bid but set it aside for further check. Later, after realizing Community Asphalt was not on the approved list of DBE's she disapproved the bid and it proceeded to the Good Faith Efforts Committee for review. Petitioner submitted no documentation of any good faith efforts to comply with the DBE requirements. This is understandable as Petitioner thought when the bid was submitted that Community Asphalt was a certified DBE and its bid complied with the DBE requirements. In reviewing and accepting bids for DOT projects, Respondent relies entirely on the documentation submitted with the bid and does not allow bidders to supplement the bid after opening.
Recommendation It is recommended that the protest of Bergeron Land Development, Inc. to the rejection of its bid submitted on State Job No. 86075-3459 be dismissed with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. KEN N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1990. APPENDIX Respondent's proposed findings are generally accepted, except for: Rejected. The DBE forms submitted by Petitioner, as corrected by Petitioner before submittal, showed Reliable Trucking, Inc., a certified DBE, to receive only $100,000 in subcontracts, far less than the 11% DBE participation required. Rejected. Whether Reliable Trucking had a firm contract with Petitioner to provide in excess of $400,000 subcontracting work on this project is immaterial if the DBE utilization form submitted with the bid fails to show the DBE utilization goal is attained or documentation of good faith efforts are not included. Rejected that the mistake by Petitioner was a non-material mistake. Bids have to be accepted as received. Rejected. Rejected. Rejected. Accepted as an accurate quote of Rule 14-78.003,Florida Administrative Code. The legal conclusion that the ruledoes not require evidence of good faith efforts be included withthe bid submitted is rejected. The conclusion of law that Respondent violated its own rule is rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: John H. Beck, Esquire 1026 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul J. Martin, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 John Radey, Esquire Post Office Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Room 562 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The threshold issue in this case is whether the decisions giving rise to the dispute, which concern the allocation and disbursement of funds appropriated to Respondent by the legislature and thus involve the preparation or modification of the agency's budget, are subject to quasi-judicial adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act. If the Division of Administrative Hearings were possessed of subject matter jurisdiction, then the issues would be whether Respondent is estopped from implementing its intended decisions to "de- obligate" itself from preliminary commitments to provide low- interest loans to several projects approved for funding under the Community Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program; and whether such intended decisions would constitute breaches of contract or otherwise be erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or abuses of the agency's discretion.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Pasco CWHIP Partners, LLC ("Pasco Partners"); Legacy Pointe, Inc. ("Legacy"); Villa Capri, Inc. ("Villa Capri"); Prime Homebuilders ("Prime"); and MDG Capital Corporation ("MDG") (collectively, "Petitioners"), are Florida corporations authorized to do business in Florida. Each is a developer whose business activities include building affordable housing. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation ("FHFC") is a public corporation organized under Chapter 420, Florida Statutes, to implement and administer various affordable housing programs, including the Community Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program ("CWHIP"). The Florida Legislature created CWHIP in 2006 to subsidize the cost of housing for lower income workers performing "essential services." Under CWHIP, FHFC is authorized to lend up to $5 million to a developer for the construction or rehabilitation of housing in an eligible area for essential services personnel. Because construction costs for workforce housing developments typically exceed $5 million, developers usually must obtain additional funding from sources other than CWHIP to cover their remaining development costs. In 2007, the legislature appropriated $62.4 million for CWHIP and authorized FHFC to allocate these funds on a competitive basis to "public-private" partnerships seeking to build affordable housing for essential services personnel.1 On December 31, 2007, FHFC began soliciting applications for participation in CWHIP. Petitioners submitted their respective applications to FHFC on or around January 29, 2008. FHFC reviewed the applications and graded each of them on a point scale under which a maximum of 200 points per application were available; preliminary scores and comments were released on March 4, 2008. FHFC thereafter provided applicants the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their applications and thereby improve their scores. Petitioners submitted revised applications on or around April 18, 2008. FHFC evaluated the revised applications and determined each applicant's final score. The applications were then ranked, from highest to lowest score. The top-ranked applicant was first in line to be offered the chance to take out a CWHIP loan, followed by the others in descending order to the extent of available funds. Applicants who ranked below the cut-off for potential funding were placed on a wait list. If, as sometimes happens, an applicant in line for funding were to withdraw from CWHIP or fail for some other reason to complete the process leading to the disbursement of loan proceeds, the highest-ranked applicant on the wait list would "move up" to the "funded list." FHFC issued the final scores and ranking of applicants in early May 2006. Petitioners each had a project that made the cut for potential CWHIP funding.2 Some developers challenged the scoring of applications, and the ensuing administrative proceedings slowed the award process. This administrative litigation ended on or around November 6, 2008, after the parties agreed upon a settlement of the dispute. On or about November 12, 2008, FHFC issued preliminary commitment letters offering low-interest CWHIP loans to Pasco Partners, Legacy, Villa Capri, Prime (for its Village at Portofino Meadows project), and MDG. Each preliminary commitment was contingent upon: Borrower and Development meeting all requirements of Rule Chapter 67-58, FAC, and all other applicable state and FHFC requirements; and A positive credit underwriting recommendation; and Final approval of the credit underwriting report by the Florida Housing Board of Directors. These commitment letters constituted the necessary approval for each of the Petitioners to move forward in credit underwriting, which is the process whereby underwriters whom FHFC retains under contract verify the accuracy of the information contained in an applicant's application and examine such materials as market studies, engineering reports, business records, and pro forma financial statements to determine the project's likelihood of success. Once a credit underwriter completes his analysis of an applicant's project, the underwriter submits a draft report and recommendation to FHFC, which, in turn, forwards a copy of the draft report and recommendation to the applicant. Both the applicant and FHFC then have an opportunity to submit comments regarding the draft report and recommendation to the credit underwriter. After that, the credit underwriter revises the draft if he is so inclined and issues a final report and recommendation to FHFC. Upon receipt of the credit underwriter's final report and recommendation, FHFC forwards the document to its Board of Directors for approval. Of the approximately 1,200 projects that have undergone credit underwriting for the purpose of receiving funding through FHFC, all but a few have received a favorable recommendation from the underwriter and ultimately been approved for funding. Occasionally a developer will withdraw its application if problems arise during underwriting, but even this is, historically speaking, a relatively uncommon outcome. Thus, upon receiving their respective preliminary commitment letters, Petitioners could reasonably anticipate, based on FHFC's past performance, that their projects, in the end, would receive CWHIP financing, notwithstanding the contingencies that remained to be satisfied. There is no persuasive evidence, however, that FHFC promised Petitioners, as they allege, either that the credit underwriting process would never be interrupted, or that CWHIP financing would necessarily be available for those developers whose projects successfully completed underwriting. While Petitioners, respectively, expended money and time as credit underwriting proceeded, the reasonable inference, which the undersigned draws, is that they incurred such costs, not in reliance upon any false promises or material misrepresentations allegedly made by FHFC, but rather because a favorable credit underwriting recommendation was a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of being awarded a firm loan commitment. On January 15, 2009, the Florida Legislature, meeting in Special Session, enacted legislation designed to close a revenue shortfall in the budget for the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Among the cuts that the legislature made to balance the budget was the following: The unexpended balance of funds appropriated by the Legislature to the Florida Housing Finance Corporation in the amount of $190,000,000 shall be returned to the State treasury for deposit into the General Revenue Fund before June 1, 2009. In order to implement this section, and to the maximum extent feasible, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation shall first reduce unexpended funds allocated by the corporation that increase new housing construction. 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 2009-1 § 47. Because the legislature chose not to make targeted cuts affecting specific programs, it fell to FHFC would to decide which individual projects would lose funding, and which would not. The legislative mandate created a constant-sum situation concerning FHFC's budget, meaning that, regardless of how FHFC decided to reallocate the funds which remained at its disposal, all of the cuts to individual programs needed to total $190 million in the aggregate. Thus, deeper cuts to Program A would leave more money for other programs, while sparing Program B would require greater losses for other programs. In light of this situation, FHFC could not make a decision regarding one program, such as CWHIP, without considering the effect of that decision on all the other programs in FHFC's portfolio: a cut (or not) here affected what could be done there. The legislative de-appropriation of funds then in FHFC's hands required, in short, that FHFC modify its entire budget to account for the loss. To enable FHFC to return $190 million to the state treasury, the legislature directed that FHFC adopt emergency rules pursuant to the following grant of authority: In order to ensure that the funds transferred by [special appropriations legislation] are available, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation shall adopt emergency rules pursuant to s. 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Legislature finds that emergency rules adopted pursuant to this section meet the health, safety, and welfare requirements of s. 120.54(4), Florida Statutes. The Legislature finds that such emergency rulemaking power is necessitated by the immediate danger to the preservation of the rights and welfare of the people and is immediately necessary in order to implement the action of the Legislature to address the revenue shortfall of the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Therefore, in adopting such emergency rules, the corporation need not publish the facts, reasons, and findings required by s. 120.54(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes. Emergency rules adopted under this section are exempt from s. 120.54(4)(c), Florida Statutes, and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 2009-2 § 12. The governor signed the special appropriations bills into law on January 27, 2009. At that time, FHFC began the process of promulgating emergency rules. FHFC also informed its underwriters that FHFC's board would not consider any credit underwriting reports at its March 2009 board meeting. Although FHFC did not instruct the underwriters to stop evaluating Petitioners' projects, the looming reductions in allocations, coupled with the board's decision to suspend the review of credit reports, effectively (and not surprisingly) brought credit underwriting to a standstill. Petitioners contend that FHFC deliberately intervened in the credit underwriting process for the purpose of preventing Petitioners from satisfying the conditions of their preliminary commitment letters, so that their projects, lacking firm loan commitments, would be low-hanging fruit when the time came for picking the deals that would not receive funding due to FHFC's obligation to return $190 million to the state treasury. The evidence, however, does not support a finding to this effect. The decision of FHFC's board to postpone the review of new credit underwriting reports while emergency rules for drastically reducing allocations were being drafted was not intended, the undersigned infers, to prejudice Petitioners, but to preserve the status quo ante pending the modification of FHFC's budget in accordance with the legislative mandate. Indeed, given that FHFC faced the imminent prospect of involuntarily relinquishing approximately 40 percent of the funds then available for allocation to the various programs under FHFC's jurisdiction, it would have been imprudent to proceed at full speed with credit underwriting for projects in the pipeline, as if nothing had changed. At its March 13, 2009, meeting, FHFC's board adopted Emergency Rules 67ER09-1 through 67ER09-5, Florida Administrative Code (the "Emergency Rules"), whose stated purpose was "to establish procedures by which [FHFC would] de- obligate the unexpended balance of funds [previously] appropriated by the Legislature " As used in the Emergency Rules, the term "unexpended" referred, among other things, to funds previously awarded that, "as of January 27, 2009, [had] not been previously withdrawn or de-obligated . . . and [for which] the Applicant [did] not have a Valid Firm Commitment and loan closing [had] not yet occurred." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-2(29). The term "Valid Firm Commitment" was defined in the Emergency Rules to mean: a commitment issued by the [FHFC] to an Applicant following the Board's approval of the credit underwriting report for the Applicant's proposed Development which has been accepted by the Applicant and subsequent to such acceptance there have been no material, adverse changes in the financing, condition, structure or ownership of the Applicant or the proposed Development, or in any information provided to the [FHFC] or its Credit Underwriter with respect to the Applicant or the proposed Development. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-2(33). There is no dispute concerning that fact that, as of January 27, 2009, none of the Petitioners had received a valid firm commitment or closed a loan transaction. There is, accordingly, no dispute regarding the fact that the funds which FHFC had committed preliminarily to lend Petitioners in connection with their respective developments constituted "unexpended" funds under the pertinent (and undisputed) provisions of the Emergency Rules, which were quoted above. In the Emergency Rules, FHFC set forth its decisions regarding the reallocation of funds at its disposal. Pertinent to this case are the following provisions: To facilitate the transfer and return of the appropriated funding, as required by [the special appropriations bills], the [FHFC] shall: * * * Return $190,000,000 to the Treasury of the State of Florida, as required by [law]. . . . The [FHFC] shall de-obligate Unexpended Funding from the following Corporation programs, in the following order, until such dollar amount is reached: All Developments awarded CWHIP Program funding, except for [a few projects not at issue here.] * * * See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-3. On April 24, 2009, FHFC gave written notice to each of the Petitioners that FHFC was "de-obligating" itself from the preliminary commitments that had been made concerning their respective CWHIP developments. On or about June 1, 2009, FHFC returned the de- appropriated funds, a sum of $190 million, to the state treasury. As a result of the required modification of FHFC's budget, 47 deals lost funding, including 16 CWHIP developments to which $83.6 million had been preliminarily committed for new housing construction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FHFC enter a Final Order dismissing these consolidated cases for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2010.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Toledo Realty, Inc. (TRI), was a corporation registered as a real estate broker having been issued license number 0133053 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division or petitioner). Respondent, Ramiro J. Alfert, holds real estate broker license number 0223005 also issued by petitioner. Alfert, who has been a broker for eleven years, was licensed and operating as a qualifying broker and officer for TRI when the events herein occurred. The firm is located at 7175 Southwest 8th Street, Suite 210, Miami, Florida. Approximately three years ago, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) began foreclosing on a number of residential properties on which the owners had defaulted. Wishing to dispose of these repossessed properties in an expedited manner, FNMA selected at random a number of brokers in the Miami area who were given exclusive listings and agreed to advertise the properties, and take such other steps as were necessary to make a quick sale. Futrell Realty (Futrell) in Kendall, Florida was one such broker, and it had the exclusive listing on the two properties relevant to this proceeding. According to established FNMA procedure, a broker who obtained an offer on a FNMA property was obliged to send the original contract to the listing broker who then mailed it to FNMA area headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. Marie J. Pardo was a salesperson for TRI, having worked there for almost six years. Pardo represented two potential buyers, Lazara Rouco and Artemia Delgado, an unmarried couple, who were interested in purchasing a FNMA property at 794 Southwest 97th Court Circle, Miami. On March 19, 1986, Pardo prepared a purchase/sales contract on behalf of Rouco and Delgado in which the couple offered to buy the property for $65,000. A $4,000 deposit was given by Rouco to Pardo and then placed in TRI's trust account. In accordance with established procedure, the original contract was sent to Futrell which forwarded it by express mail to FNMA in Atlanta. Four days after the contract was executed, Pardo was advised by Rouco that she and her boyfriend had separated, and she could no longer afford such an expensive house. But by now, the offer had been accepted by FNMA, and Rouco's $4,000 deposit was at risk. In an effort to save Rouco's deposit, Pardo, with FNMA's approval, secured another buyer for the property, and had Rouco assign the contract to the new buyer. The house was thereafter sold by FNMA to the new purchaser on an undisclosed date. Pardo did not advise Alfert or other TRI personnel that this action had been taken. Knowing that Rouco still wished to buy a home, but one that was less expensive, Pardo obtained Rouco's agreement for TRI to retain the $4,000 deposit pending efforts to find another property. In June or July, Pardo located another FNMA property at 100 Southwest 110th Avenue, unit 138, Miami. Because Pardo considered Rouco to be a credit risk, Pardo decided to have Rouco prequalify for a loan before a formal contract was submitted to FNMA. Accordingly, Pardo obtained (presumably from TRI files) another FNMA contract executed on June 10, 1986, by three buyers (Julio Ugarto, and Patricia and Ernesto Duarte) on a different FNMA property. She made a copy of that contract, scratched out the existing names, address and price, and inserted a new price ($47,500), address and Rouco's name. The altered contract was dated July 10, 1986. Although Pardo showed Alfert a copy of the contract that day, he did not notice anything unusual about it, and sent a letter to the mortgage company confirming that TRI had an escrow deposit of $4,000. Pardo stated she did not disclose the alterations to Alfert since she feared being fired if respondents learned of her actions. Pardo sent a copy of the altered contract to a mortgage broker friend to see if Rouco could qualify for a loan. Before she heard from the lender, Pardo left Miami in early September for a three-week vacation in the Dominican Republic. She asked another salesman with whom she shared a desk, Carlos Cachaldora, to hold the contract while she was gone. Cachaldora was a long-time employee of TRI, having worked there for some twelve or thirteen years. The two had worked as "partners" for four years with Pardo securing the client and Cachaldora doing the follow-up work. Although Pardo told Carlos about the alterations, Carlos did not advise Alfert or any other TRI employee of Pardo's actions. At hearing, Paido stated she did not know who sent the altered contract to FNMA but "believes" it was Carlos. However, Carlos denied mailing the contract to FNMA, and testified he received it in early September. Since the evidence shows that FNMA received the contract prior to September, it is found that Pardo mailed the contract to FNMA in July or August without advising Futrell or respondents. By fortuitous circumstances FNMA happened to receive from Futrell a validly executed contract on the same property at 100 Southwest 110th Avenue. This contract and the altered July 10 contract were sent to the FNMA attorney in Miami for review in preparing the closing documents. When FNMA's attorney began checking the documents, she noted there were some discrepancies in the two contracts and brought this to the attention of FNMA. Thereafter, a FNMA area supervisor in Atlanta, Paul Buechele, compared the July 10 contract with the other contract and noted that the names on the contracts did not match, that the July 10 contract had the initials of a FNMA employee who no longer worked at FNMA, and that he did not have the original July 10 contract in his files. Buechele telephoned Alfert on Friday, September 5 and briefly told him he had a "problem," and followed up with a letter the same day advising that FNMA "(had) no record of this sales contract," and for Alfert to express mail the original within 48 hours or else FNMA would "consider any such contract null and void." Although Buechele suspected the second contract might be an altered document or a forgery, he did not tell this to Alfert. During their conversation, Alfert looked in the office file, but could not find the original contract. He then advised Buechele that he would have to check with the salesman involved with the sale and get back in touch after he learned what had happened. There were no further communications between the two. The following Monday, Alfert met with Cachaldora who told Alfert he thought the original copy had been sent to FNMA and it must have been misplaced. Alfert was not overly concerned since it was not unusual for the selling broker to have only a copy of a contract in its files, particularly since the listing broker is given the original on FNMA transactions. At no time did Carlos advise Alfert that the July 10 contract was an alteration of the June 10 contract. Carlos telephoned Buechele the same day and advised him TRI had a copy, but no original, of the contract, and it was being express mailed that day to FNMA in Atlanta. On September 11, 1986, Rouco wrote TRI a letter requesting the immediate return of her $4,000 deposit because she had just been advised she could not qualify for a loan. Alfert mailed her a refund check the same day. He gave no further thought to the matter since he felt the contract at that point was "terminated." This was because Rouco had requested a return of her deposit, and more than forty-eight hours had passed since receiving Buechele's letter. On December 2, 1986, a Division investigator visited Alfert to discuss the July 10 contract. His visit was prompted by a complaint from Buechele about the altered contract. For the first time, Alfert learned what Pardo had done. Alfert immediately sent her written notice that she was fired. He also advised the Division that she was no longer an employee of TRI. Cachaldora, who had worked for TRI for some twelve years, also left TRI a few months later, albeit voluntarily. He was not fired because Alfert considered Pardo, and not Cachaldora, to be the guilty party. TRI is a relatively large realty office having three brokers and approximately seventy-five salesmen. Alfert holds the position of manager and has biweekly meetings with sales personnel to go over office procedures and to discuss sales. According to office procedure, Alfert is, whenever practicable, supposed to review all contracts before they are presented or mailed. This advice was conveyed to Pardo and Cachaldora but they did not follow office procedure. Except for the activities of Pardo and Cachaldora, there is no evidence that any other employee was involved in the Rouco matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondents be found not guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), as alleged in the administrative complaint. DONE AND ORDERED this 7th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a registered residential contractor, having been issued license number RR 0032366. On March 29, 1979, Respondent, doing business as Bert Kinast Construction Co., entered into a contract with Gary and Harriet Nelson to construct a residence for the sum of $65,122. On April 15, 1979, Respondent signed an affidavit stating that all bills for materials and labor performed as of that date for the construction of the Nelson residence had been paid. Respondent signed the affidavit for the express purpose of obtaining a draw payment for construction performed and, as a result of the affidavit, did receive a draw payment of $9,765.30. At the time Respondent signed the affidavit, Panama Machinery & Supply Co. was owed $193.98 for material furnished to Respondent for the construction of the Nelson residence. On June 4, 1979, Respondent signed an affidavit stating that all bills for materials and labor performed as of that date for the construction of the Nelson residence had been paid. Respondent signed the affidavit for the purpose of receiving a draw payment for construction performed and, as a result of the affidavit, did receive a draw payment of $22,792.70. At the time Respondent signed the affidavit, he owed Panama Machinery & Supply Co. $1,249.94. During August, 1979, Respondent signed an affidavit stating that all bills for materials and labor performed for the construction of the Nelson residence had been paid. At the time Respondent signed the affidavit, certain materialman and subcontractors who furnished labor and material for the Nelson construction project were not paid, to wit: Panama Machinery & Supply Co., Coastal Insulation, West Florida Natural Gas Company, Culligan Water Services, Inc., Dixie Window Co. and Rachel's Lighting & Home Accessories. Respondent violated Section 1115.7 of the 1979 Edition of the Standard Building Code by not providing adequate head room in the stairwell at the Nelson residence. On or about August 3, 1979, Respondent entered into a contract with John C. and Barbara L. McHaffie to construct a residence for the sum of $105,475. On or about October 11, 1979, Respondent endorsed an instrument, specifically a check, acknowledging that all bills for labor and materials furnished for the McHaffie residence had been paid in full. Respondent endorsed the check to obtain payment for construction he had performed to that date. At the time Respondent signed the check containing that acknowledgment, certain material-men and subcontractors were unpaid, to wit: Buckley's Plumbing, Moore Concrete Products, William Smith and Panama Machinery & Supply Co. On or about November 20, 1979, Respondent endorsed an instrument, specifically a check, acknowledging that all bills for labor and materials furnished for the McHaffie residence had been paid in full. Also on November 20, 1979, Respondent signed an affidavit entitled "Partial Release of Lien on Progress Payment," stating that all bills for labor and materials furnished for the construction of the McHaffie residence were paid in full. Respondent endorsed the check and signed the affidavit in order to obtain a construction draw and did, as a result, obtain the construction draw for labor and materials used in the construction of the McHaffie residence. At the time that Respondent endorsed the check and signed the affidavit, certain materialmen and subcontractors were not paid, to wit: Parker Heating & Cooling, Culligan Water Services, Inc. , Moore Concrete Products, Overhead Door Company of Panama City, Inc., Coastal Insulation, Panama Machinery & Supply Co., G & H Building Materials and William Smith. Respondent received $50,937.50 which was to be used by Respondent to pay for materials and/or labor provided by various materialmen and/or subcontractors for the construction of the McHaffie residence. Certain materialmen and/or subcontractors were not paid from the monies received by Respondent for that purpose, to wit: Parker Heating & Cooling, Culligan Water Services, Inc., Buckley's Plumbing, Moore Concrete Products, Overhead Door Company of Panama City, Inc., Coastal Insulation, Hodges Lumber, Panama Machinery & Supply Co., G & H Building Materials and William Smith. On August 17, 1979, Respondent obtained permit number 5260 from Bay County, Florida, to perform the McHaffie construction. Respondent represented on the application for the above-referenced permit that his estimate of the building costs for the McHaffie residence was $57,250. Since the contract for the McHaffie residence was for $105,475, the price of the building permit would have been nearly $160 more since Bay County charges $3 permit cost per every $1,000 construction cost. During his construction of the McHaffie residence, Respondent violated Sections 1603 and 1706.8(1) of the 1979 Edition of the Standard Building Code in that the concrete floor in some areas was less than three and a half inches thick and caulking or flashing was not installed around the sliding glass doors. On or about November 25, 1981, Respondent was convicted of passing a worthless check, in violation of Section 832.05, Florida Statutes. Respondent's worthless check was given by Respondent to West Building Materials on or about March 25, 1981, as payment for building materials.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding the Respondent guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint, suspending Respondent's license as a registered residential contractor; for a period of three years, imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,000 and placing Respondent on probation for three years upon reinstatement of his license, with the terms and conditions thereof to be set by the Board. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 8th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: John O. Williams, Esquire J. K. Linnan, Executive Director 547 North Monroe Street, Construction Industry Licensing Suite 204 Board Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Mr. Berthold Kinast 1244 Airport Road Panama City, Florida 32401 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, E. J. Strickland Construction, Inc. (Petitioner), submitted to Respondent, Department of Transportation (Department), a bid on State Project No. 75030- 3518. Petitioner's was the lowest bid received by the Department. Petitioner's bid failed to meet the D.B.E. goals on State Project No. 75030-3518. The D.B.E. goal was 12 percent; under Petitioner's bid, only .04 percent of the contract would be performed by economically disadvantaged business enterprises. The only effort Petitioner made to secure bids of certified D.B.E. contractors to incorporate in its bid to the Department was to run a legal advertisement in the Orlando Sentinel on January 18, 19 and 20, 1986. The Department was scheduled to open all bids on January 22, 1986. Petitioner documented only the advertisements and the fact that it incorporated the only response to the advertisements in its bid in an effort to demonstrate good faith effort to meet the D.B.E. goals. 2/ There is no evidence that Petitioner acted with specific discriminatory intent in preparing its bid on State Project No. 75030-3518. Petitioner proved that it acted in this case precisely as it acted in the only other Department job on which it bid. In that case, Petitioner ordered from the Department plans and specifications and was sent plans, specifications and a bid package and was placed on the Department's list of prospective bidders. In accordance with the custom in the industry, the Florida Transportation Builders Association (FTBA) obtained from the Department the list of prospective bidders as of ten days before the bid letting date and distributed the list to its members. In accordance with the custom in the industry, several DBE and WBE contractors contacted Petitioner, verified that Petitioner was bidding on the project and submitted proposals for inclusion in Petitioner's bid. In that way, Petitioner received enough response from certified DBE and WBE contractors to meet the DBE and WBE goals on the job. In this case, in accordance with the Department's normal practice, the Department only sent Petitioner plans and specifications in response to Petitioner's December 30, 1985 request for plans and specifications. Also, since Petitioner did not specifically request a bid package, the Department did not include Petitioner on its list of prospective bidders. For that reason, no FTBA members, including the certified DBE contractor who bid on Petitioner's previous job with the Department, received notice that Petitioner was a prospective bidder on State Project No. 75030-3518. Had Petitioner been included on the FTBA list, Petitioner probably would have received enough response from certified DBE contractors to meet the DBE goals on this job, too. All four of the other bidders on State Project No. 75030-3518 met the DBE goals. One of them relied entirely on the FTBA list to notify prospective certified DBE contractors. One of them -- including the next lowest bidder, Cone Constructors, Inc. -- also sent a written request for a proposal to Pary, Inc., the same certified DBE contractor who previously had contracted with Petitioner on a Department job that was still ongoing. Another of the bidders on State Project No. 75030-3518 telephoned Pary, Inc., and asked for a proposal. Petitioner is not a member of the FTBA and did not inquire whether it was listed as a prospective bidder on the FTBA list. Petitioner did not make any effort to use the Department's DBE directory to directly contact certified DBE contractors concerning the job. Petitioner did not even contact Pary, Inc., to request a bid although Pary, Inc., was working for Petitioner at the time and had not responded to Petitioner concerning State Project No. 75030-3518. Petitioner's small effort to meet the DBE goals on State Project No. 75030-3518 did not rise to the level of good faith efforts. The evidence that Petitioner acted in this case precisely as it acted in the only other Department job on which it bid does not prove that Petitioner made a good faith effort in this case. To the contrary, it proved only that Petitioner was lucky to meet the DBE goals on the prior contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Transportation, dismiss the bid protest of Petitioner, E. J. Strickland Construction, Inc., and award the contract in State Project No. 75030-3518 to the lowest responsive bidder, Cone Constructors, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1986.
The Issue The issues are whether the specifications in two requests for architectural and construction management services violate Subsection 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), for the reasons alleged in two written protests.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a general contractor/construction management firm in the State of Florida. The firm maintains its principal office in Tampa, Florida, and provides construction management services throughout the state. The state previously certified Petitioner as a certified minority business enterprise (MBE), and that certification remains current. Mr. Paul Curtis is the president and chief executive officer (CEO) of Petitioner, a majority shareholder, and an African-American. Petitioner's president and CEO is licensed by the state as a general contractor, underground utilities and excavation contractor, pollutant storage systems and specialty contractor, and specialty structures contractor. However, Petitioner does not employ any person qualified to provide architectural services. Respondent is a local school district of the state. Respondent is responsible for the construction, renovation, management, and operation of the public schools in Hillsborough County, Florida. Respondent routinely obtains the services of architects, engineers, and other professionals through competitive procurement in accordance with Section 287.055, Florida Statutes (2003), the Consultants' Competitive Negotiation Act (CCNA). On December 30, 2003, Respondent posted on its website, a request for proposals (RFP) for architectural and construction management services. On January 20, 2004, Respondent posted a second RFP for architectural and construction services. The two RFPs seek architectural services and construction management services incident to the construction or expansion of approximately 12 public schools (the project). The proposed budget for the project is approximately $66.37 million. Respondent seeks to complete the projects to comply with minimum class-size requirements recently imposed by the state. Petitioner did not submit responses to either RFP at issue in this proceeding. Rather, Petitioner protested the specifications in each RFP. On January 5 and 20, 2004, Petitioner timely served Respondent with respective notices of intent to protest each RFP. On January 15 and February 2, 2004, Petitioner timely served Respondent with a formal written protest of each RFP. Petitioner alleges that each RFP is deficient for identical reasons. First, the RFPs allegedly violate the requirement in Subsection 120.57(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), to notify potential bidders that failure to protest the specifications in each RFP within the statutorily prescribed time, waives their right to protest either RFP (the statutory notice). Second, the RFPs allegedly fail to adequately disclose selection criteria used to select a successful applicant. Third, the RFPs allegedly violate MBE guidelines in Subsection 287.055(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2003). Fourth, the evaluation criteria are allegedly confusing or ambiguous and make it impossible to determine the basis upon which Respondent awards points. Finally, Respondent allegedly failed to consider the recent volume of work of each applicant in violation of Subsections 287.055(3)(d) and (4)(b), Florida Statutes (2003). Neither RFP includes the statutory notice. Subsection 120.57(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), requires Respondent to provide the statutory notice in any notice of decision or intended decision (notice of decision). Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-110.002(2)(a) defines a notice of decision to include the RFPs. Subsection 120.57(3), Florida Statutes (2003), requires Respondent to "use the uniform rules of procedure" prescribed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-110.002. Each RFP is a notice of decision that omits the required statutory notice in violation of Subsection 120.57(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent's violation of Subsection 120.57(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), did not result in any injury in fact to Petitioner. Petitioner received actual notice of each RFP and timely protested each RFP. Respondent issued the RFPs and partially evaluated the responses to them in accordance with a procedure prescribed in a publication that the parties identified in the record as Chapter 7.00 of the School Board Policies and Procedures Manual (the Policy Manual). In general, the Policy Manual requires a Professional Services Selection Committee (the Committee) to conduct at least two rounds of evaluation before Respondent can select a successful applicant. During the first round, each member of the Committee evaluates each application in accordance with the evaluation criteria prescribed in a Project Information Packet incorporated by reference in the RFP and made available to each applicant. Each Committee member assigns a point total for each response (a score). The Committee then designates a threshold score that an applicant must attain in order to advance to the second round of evaluation that involves face-to-face interviews. The Committee prepares a list of those applicants that attain scores sufficient to advance to the second round of evaluation. The parties identified as the "short list," the list of applicants that qualify for the second round of evaluation. In practice, the short list usually includes more than three applicants thereby necessitating a third round of interviews. Once the Committee prepares the short list, Respondent issues a second notice of decision within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent sends the notice to all applicants that submitted a response to an RFP. The second notice of decision informs each applicant of the applicant's score and identifies those applicants selected to advance to the second round of evaluation. The second notice of decision includes the statutory notice required in Subsection 120.57(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). The deadline for submitting applications in response to the first RFP was January 16, 2004. By January 15, 2004, Respondent had received approximately 30 applications from architects and approximately 30 applications from construction managers. By January 15, 2004, the Committee had evaluated the responses it had received and determined a short list. Respondent had notified the applicants of their respective scores and identified those applicants selected for interviews in the second round of evaluations. When Petitioner filed a written protest of the first RFP, Respondent suspended further evaluations of the applicants pursuant to Subsection 120.57(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent notified bidders of the short list prior to the deadline for filing responses to the RFPs on January 16, 2004. The written protests do not challenge Respondent's issuance of an apparently premature notice of decision. Petitioner submitted no relevant findings of fact or conclusions of law in its PRO concerning Respondent's practice. Nor did the PRO cite to any evidence of record to support a finding concerning Respondent's practice. The deadline for submitting applications in response to the second RFP was February 6, 2004. Petitioner filed a written protest on February 2, 2004. Respondent stopped accepting applications in response to the second RFP in accordance with Subsection 120.57(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2003). The specifications for each RFP adequately disclose selection criteria to prospective applicants, including criteria to be used for interviews during the second round of evaluation. Petitioner's PRO includes no findings of fact or conclusions of law relevant to this issue. Nor does the PRO cite to any evidence of record that supports a finding concerning the issue. The two RFPs disclose selection criteria to prospective applicants in the same manner. Each RFP includes the following statement: Any applicant interested in providing either architectural or construction management services shall make application by submission of materials prescribed in the Project Information Packet. The Project Information Packet, additional project information, and the weights associated with each qualification and evaluation criteria can be obtained by contacting the Planning & construction Office at (813)272-4112 or via the Internet. . . . Each RFP contains a separate Internet address. Respondent published the foregoing statement in three area newspapers and on Respondent's official website. Petitioner received notice of the RFPs on the official website. The Project Information Packets include a list of the members of the Committee, a summary of Respondent's procedures for acquiring professional services, a two-page chart of the evaluation criteria, and a selection activity schedule. Respondent made the Project Information Packets available to prospective applicants in hard copy and electronically on Respondent's official web site. The Project Information Packets adequately identify and describe evaluation criteria and the weight assigned to each criterion, including those to be used during interviews. The evaluation criteria are not confusing or ambiguous. The language used to describe the criteria does not make it impossible for prospective applicants to determine the basis upon which the Committee will award points. Petitioner's PRO includes no findings of fact or conclusions of law relevant to this issue. Nor does the PRO cite to any evidence of record to support a finding that the criteria are confusing or ambiguous. DOAH previously approved Respondent's selection criteria. In RHC & Associates, Inc. v. Hillsborough County School Board, DOAH Case No. 02-3138RP (October 11, 2002), ALJ T. K. Wetherell, II, concluded that the Policy Manual is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. In RHC & Associates, Inc. v. Hillsborough County School Board, DOAH Case No. 02-4668BID (January 3, 2003), ALJ Wetherell concluded that the specification factors and weight assigned to each, comply with the CCNA and are not otherwise arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition. After the decisions in the two RHC cases, Respondent slightly adjusted the weights given to certain criteria in order to increase minority and small business participation. Respondent made the adjustments after consulting with the NAACP. In relevant part, Respondent increased the weight given for an applicant's resume from 20 to 25 points. Respondent increased the weight given for recent volume of business with Respondent from 5 to 10 points. Respondent decreased the weight given for Project/Applicant Correlation from 25 to 15 points. The changes to the weights assigned to certain evaluation criteria after the two RHC cases comply with the CCNA, are not confusing or ambiguous, and do not make it impossible for prospective applicants to determine the basis for awarding points. The specifications for each RFP do not violate MBE guidelines in Subsection 287.055(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2003). Petitioner's PRO includes two proposed findings relevant to this issue. The two proposed findings are correct, but not material. Respondent has no practice or procedure in place to certify prospective applicants as MBEs. Rather, Respondent registers an applicant as an MBE if the applicant has been certified as an MBE by another agency. Both public and private agencies, sometimes for a fee to private consultants, certify MBE firms. The National Minority Association certifies companies as MBEs for a fee. Subsections 287.055(3)(d) and (4)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), contain no express requirement for Respondent to independently certify applicants as MBEs. The former provision requires Respondent to evaluate whether an applicant is a certified MBE. The latter provision requires Respondent to determine whether an applicant is qualified based on prescribed factors that include certification as an MBE. Petitioner cites no legal precedent that authorizes the ALJ to construe either statutory provision to require Respondent to independently certify applicants for either RFP. Petitioner cites no other legal authority to support its allegation that Respondent must independently certify applicants as MBEs. Respondent's policy of accepting MBE certifications by other agencies and private companies is reasonable. Independent certification would be redundant and a waste of taxpayer resources. Respondent relies on a company identified in the record as Morrison & Associates to conduct background checks on every applicant claiming to be certified as an MBE. In addition, Respondent's Office of Supplier Diversity maintains certification information for new contractors and subcontractors. The Office of Supplier Diversity confirmed for the Committee that each applicant claiming to be an MBE was in fact certified as an MBE. The Committee awards each applicant with an MBE certification the maximum number of points in that category. If Petitioner were to have submitted an application for either RFP, the Committee would have awarded Petitioner the maximum number of points available for MBE certification. Respondent properly determined the volume of work of each applicant in accordance with Subsections 287.055(3)(d) and (4)(b), Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent defines the phrase "recent volume of work" to mean the dollar amount of work performed for Respondent as a construction manager or architect within five years of the date of determination. Respondent awards the maximum number of points to applicants who have not performed any work for Respondent in the previous five years. Respondent determines recent volume of work based on information that does not include work performed by subcontractors. Petitioner has performed work for Respondent in the past, but only as a subcontractor. Petitioner last performed work for Respondent approximately seven years ago. If Petitioner were to have submitted an application for either RFP, the Committee would have awarded Petitioner the maximum number of points for recent volume of work. The information that the Committee would have reviewed would not have identified the work previously performed by Petitioner as a subcontractor. Moreover, the work was performed more than five years ago. Petitioner is a nonprevailing adverse party within the meaning of Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2003). Petitioner failed to change the outcome of Respondent's proposed use of the RFPs to obtain construction and architectural services for the project. Petitioner did not participate in the proceeding for an improper purpose. The issue of whether Respondent must include the statutory notice in the RFP specifications is a justiciable issue of law. Petitioner's participation in this proceeding was not for a frivolous purpose. Respondent is the prevailing party in this proceeding. Respondent did not submit evidence concerning the amount of attorney's fees and costs that Respondent incurred to defend the written protests or the reasonableness of those fees and costs.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Respondent issue a Final Order dismissing the two protests. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Crosby Few, Esquire Few & Ayala 501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1401 Tampa, Florida 33602 Arnold D. Levine, Esquire Levine, Hirsch, Segall, Mackenzie & Friedsman, P.A. 100 South Ashley Drive, Suite 1600 Tampa, Florida 33602 Thomas Martin Gonzalez, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez 501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1400 Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33602 Dr. Earl J. Lennard, Superintendent Hillsborough County School Board Post Office Box 3408 Tampa, Florida 33601-3408 Honorable Jim Horne, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue in this case is whether, in making an award of a lease for office space, the Respondent acted according to the requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact In February, 1993, the Department of Labor and Employment Security ("Department") issued a Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal No. 540:0969 ("RFP") seeking to lease approximately 18,684 square feet of office space in Jacksonville, Florida, for a period of six years. The space was to house the Office of Disability Determinations ("ODD"), which processes disability claims and determines whether claimants are eligible for Social Security and Supplemental Income benefits. The office has minimal contact with the general public. The RFP provided that all bids were subject to conditions stated within the RFP. Bids not in compliance with RFP conditions were subject to rejection. RFP Article D, General Provisions, Paragraph 8 provides as follows: The Department reserves the right to reject any and all bid proposals for reasons which shall include but not be limited to the agency's budgetary constraints; waive any minor informality or technicality in bids' to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and in the best interest of the state, and if necessary, to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive proposals. A pre-bid conference was conducted by the Department on February 16, 1993. Representatives from the vendors involved in this proceeding attended the conference. Bids were opened on March 5, 1993. The Department received five responses, three of which were deemed to be responsive and which were evaluated. The remaining two responses were determined to be nonresponsive and were not evaluated. On or about March 10, 1993, based on the evaluations, the Department proposed to award the bid to Koger Properties, Inc. On or about March 17, 1993, the Department notified the vendors of the intended award. The Petitioners filed timely notices protesting the intended award. TOWNCENTRE PROPOSAL Paragraph 13 sets forth conditions to which a bidder must agree in order to be awarded a bid. Subsection "a" of the paragraph states, "[i]f successful, bidder agrees to enter into a lease agreement on the Department of General Services Standard Lease Agreement Form BCM 4054 (Attachment F - Do not complete)." The copy of the Department of General Services Standard Lease Agreement Form which was included in the RFP was a poorly reproduced copy. Article III of the Lease Agreement Form provides as follows: III HEATING, AIR CONDITIONING AND JANITOR SERVICES 1.a. The Lessor agrees to furnish to the Lessee heating and air conditioning equipment and maint(illegible) in satisfactory operating condition at all times for the leased premises during the term of the lease at the (illegible) of the Lessor. b. The Lessor agrees to maintain thermostats in the demised premises at 68 degrees Fahrenhe(illegible) the heating season and 78 degrees Fahrenheit during the cooling season; and certifies that boilers the(illegible) been calibrated to permit the most efficient operation. The Lessor agrees to furnish janitorial services and all necessary janitorial supplies for the leased (illegible) during the term of the lease at the expense of the Lessor. All services required above shall be provided during the Lessee's normal working hours, whic(illegible)marily from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday excluding state holidays. Also attached to the RFP was a copy of an addendum to the lease, also poorly reproduced. The addendum provides as follows: Article III, Paragraph III Addendum for Full Service Lease The lessor and lessee mutually agree that the described prem(illegible) leased in this lease agreement shall be available to the department (lessee) for its exclusive use twenty four (24) (illegible) per day, seven (7) days per week during the lease term. T(illegible) space to be leased by the department will be fully occupied during normal working hours from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Mo(illegible) through Friday, excluding holidays, Saturdays and Sundays, (illegible) may be fully or partially occupied during all other periods (illegible) time as necessary and required at the full discretion of th(illegible) department. Accordingly, services to be provided by the le(illegible) under the terms of the lease agreement, including electrici(illegible) other utilities, will be provided during all hours of occup(illegible) at no additional cost to the department (lessee). Although the copy of the lease agreement and addendum included in the RFP were poorly reproduced, it is clear that the addendum modifies the paragraph of the lease agreement related to provision of heating, air conditioning and janitorial services to require that HVAC services be provided throughout the premises during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. The proposal submitted by Towncentre included an "Attachment Z" which states as follows: The following represent exceptions and/or clarifications to the terms of the Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal Form ("RFP") for the referenced Lease. Except as noted herein, Bidder shall comply fully with the terms of the RFP..." Item #7 of Attachment Z states as follows: The Building in which the space is offered is serviced by central heating, ventilating and air conditioning; therefore, no separate thermostats will be provided in the space other than in the computer room. However, the required temperature standards will be maintained and satisfied. The computer room HVAC shall be available 24 hours a day. Otherwise, after-hours HVAC is billed at $80 per hour. Attachment Z also included additional exceptions to the provisions of the RFP. Contrary to the requirements set forth in the addendum attached to the lease form included in the RFP, the Towncentre proposal included additional charges for after hours uses. The Department determined that the Towncentre proposal was nonresponsive and disqualified the proposal from further consideration. Because the Towncentre proposal includes HVAC charges which are specifically prohibited under the terms of the RFP, the Towncentre proposal is nonresponsive to the RFP. Towncentre asserts that other sections of the RFP indicate that, within the leased premises, only the computer room is required to be heated or cooled on a continuous basis. Vendors had an adequate opportunity to direct questions regarding the RFP to Department officials. There is no evidence that Towncentre sought clarification from the Department related to this matter prior to submitting the bid proposal. In the notification to Towncentre that the bid had been determined to be nonresponsive to the RFP, the Department identified the other exceptions as additional reasons for the determination of nonresponsiveness. At hearing Towncentre introduced no evidence related to the remaining items included within Attachment Z. BRYAN SIMPSON JR. FOR P.V. ASSOCIATES The Simpson bid was deemed to be responsive and was evaluated. The evaluations were performed by three Department employees, Dorea Sowinski, Albert Cherry, and Tom Mahar. On March 9, 1993, the evaluators visited the physical locations of the three responsive bids. (Although the bid had been declared nonresponsive, they also visited the Towncentre site, apparently as a courtesy.) The Simpson space is located in downtown Jacksonville. After completion of the site visits, the evaluators separately and independently completed their evaluation sheets. The evaluators awarded a total of 262 points to Koger Properties and 248 points to Simpson. Page 7 of the RFP sets forth the evaluation criteria which were considered in awarding evaluation points. The RFP stated as follows: The successful bid will be the one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated below: Rental, using Present Value methodology for basic term of lease (See D, General Provisions Items 3 and 4) applying the present value discount rate of 5.6 per cent. (Weighing: 35) Conformance of and susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization and to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid. (Weighing: 20) The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the Departmental operations planned for the requested space. (Weighing: 20) Offers providing contiguous space within preferred boundaries. (Weighing 5) Frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation within one block of the offered space. (Weighing 15) Availability of adequate dining facilities within one mile of the offered space. (Weighing: 2) Proximity of offered space to the clients served by the Department at this facility. (Weighing: 3) Proximity of offered space to other Department activities as well as other public services. (Weighing: 0) TOTAL POINTS: 100 Simpson asserts that the evaluators acted improperly in awarding points in categories 3, 5, 6 and 7. Category 3 relates to the effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the Departmental operations planned for the requested space. Although Simpson asserts that category 3 is vague and ambiguous, there was no objection to the category prior to the submission of the bid responses and the announcement of the proposed lease award. Each evaluator could award up to 20 points in this category for a total of 60 available points. Koger was awarded 55 points. Simpson received 27 points. As to individual evaluators awards, Tom Mahar awarded Simpson five points, Albert Cherry awarded Simpson ten points, and Dorea Sowinski awarded Simpson 12 points. Based on the written memo dated March 10, 1993, identifying the reasons for the recommended bid award, two of the three evaluators considered the Koger space to be located in a safer area than the Simpson facility, and, at least in part, based their point awards on this factor. The two evaluators cite minimal anecdotal information in support of their opinions. The evaluators undertook no investigation related to safety issues and there are no facts to support their opinions. Their award of points for "environmental factors" is arbitrary. Category 5 relates to the frequency and availability of public transportation within one block of the offered space. Each evaluator could award up to 15 points in this category for a total of 45 available points. Both Koger and Simpson received the maximum 45 points. RFP Page Two, question 8 provides as follows: Public Transportation availability: BIDDER RESPONSE: (Check appropriate box) Taxi , Bus , Frequency of service closest bus stop . Both Koger and Simpson indicate service by taxi and bus. The Koger proposal indicates a frequency of service as "8 BUSES" and the closest bus stop as "IN FRONT OF BUILDING ON WOODCOCK DRIVE." Simpson indicates a frequency of service as "15 minutes" and the closest bus stop as "front of building." The Department asserts that the Koger level of transportation access, albeit less than that serving the Simpson site, is satisfactory and therefore entitled to an award of all points available. Simpson asserts that the greater availability of public transportation to the Simpson site should result, under the terms of the evaluation criteria, in Simpson receiving more points than the Koger site for this category. The evaluation criteria clearly requires consideration of both the frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation. Simpson asserts that in considering the transportation category, the evaluators should have reviewed local public transportation schedules. Review of such schedules establishes that the Simpson site is served more frequently by public bus transportation than is the Koger site, and further establishes that the number of bus routes directly serving the Simpson property far exceeds the routes serving the Koger site. Simpson did not include the schedules in the RFP response. The Simpson site is also located nearby the downtown public transportation transfer station at which point many, perhaps all, local bus routes connect. Simpson did not denote the location of the transfer station in the RFP response While the evaluation committee is not required to consider the bus schedules in reviewing bid proposals, the evaluation committee failed to consider the substantially greater frequency and availability of public transportation to the Simpson site relative to the Koger site, as set forth in the respective RFPs. The Department's position is contrary to the specific criteria identified in the RFP. The award of equivalent points for transportation access to both Simpson and Koger is unsupported by fact or logic and is arbitrary. Category 6 relates to the availability of adequate dining facilities within one mile of the offered space. Each evaluator could award up to two points in this category for a total of six available. Koger was awarded six points. Simpson received one point. When the evaluators rated the adequacy of dining facilities, they considered only those dining facilities which were located within two blocks of the offered space. Such is contrary to the clear terms of the RFP. The Department offered no rationale for the decision to amend the RFP criteria after submission of the proposals. The Simpson RFP response states only that there are adequate dining facilities within walking distance of the offered facility. The Koger response states that there are "three (3) sandwich shops within walking distance in the Koger center and other numerous restaurants within one (1) mile." As to individual evaluators awards, Tom Mahar awarded Simpson one point, while both Albert Cherry and Dorea Sowinski awarded Simpson zero points. Mahar's award was based on his opinion, again based on alleged safety concerns, that employees would be hesitant to walk to nearby restaurants and that driving and parking presented a problem in the downtown location. Cherry voiced a similar opinion. As to alleged safety concerns, Mahar and Cherry again based their opinions on minimal anecdotal information, supported by neither fact nor logic. Neither evaluator undertook any factual analysis of the safety issues relative to the proposed site. Their award of points for this category is arbitrary. On the other hand, Sowinski did not see any restaurants close to the Simpson site during the site visit. In excess of 40 restaurants are located within one mile of the Simpson site. The restaurants provide a variety of dining options both as to expense and fare. Sowinski's failure to observe restaurants located across the street from the Simpson site is, although difficult to understand, apparently a simple mistake on her part. Category 7 relates to the proximity of offered space to the clients served by the Department at this facility. Each evaluator could award up to three points in this category for a total of nine available. Simpson offered no evidence that the determination of points awarded for category 7 was inappropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a Final Order DISMISSING the protest filed by Towncentre Venture, and WITHDRAWING the proposed award of lease contract based on the Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal No. 540:0969. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 28th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO CASES NO. 93-2015BID and 93-2106BID The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner Towncentre Venture Towncentre Venture's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 4. Rejected, second sentence is irrelevant. 5-7. Rejected, irrelevant. Taken as a whole, the RFP indicates that HVAC services are to be provided throughout the leased premises during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. The evidence fails to establish that the vendors were confused about the terms of the RFP. There were apparently no related questions addressed to Department personnel during the pre-bid conference or at any time subsequent to the conference and prior to the bid opening. 10. Rejected. Not supported by the document cited which does not identify the attachment by letter. 13. Rejected, irrelevant. The standard form lease included in the RFP was a sample document. None of the blank spaces were completed. 16. Rejected, irrelevant. The attendees at the conference were provided an opportunity to inquire as to all matters. There were apparently no questions asked related to the RFP's requirement that HVAC services be provided throughout the facility during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. 17-18, 20-21. Rejected, irrelevant. The terms of the RFP are clear. 19. Rejected, irrelevant. The terms of the addendum for full service lease clearly indicate that such HVAC services were to be provided at no additional charge, not just in the computer room, but throughout the entire leased facility. 22. Rejected. The Towncentre bid was nonresponsive to the terms of the RFP. Petitioner Bryan Simpson, Jr., for P. V. Associates P. V. Associates' proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of the evidence which establishes that the RFP was issued seeking space for the Jacksonville Office of Disability Determinations. 4, 23, 24. Rejected, unnecessary. Respondent Department of Labor and Employment Security The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 17. Rejected. The decision to award equivalent points for public transportation access fails to reflect the substantially greater access provided to the Simpson site and is arbitrary. 20-21. Rejected, not supported by greater weight of evidence which establishes no evidence that safety concerns were based on a reasonable evaluation of facts. There are no facts to support the conclusion that the Simpson location if less safe than the Koger site. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Gooding, Acting Secretary Suite 303, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Thomas M. Jenks, Esquire Pappas and Metcalf, P.A. 1 Independent Drive, Suite 3301 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Nathan D. Goldman, Esquire Marcia Maria Morales, Esquire 200 Laura Street Post Office Box 240 Jacksonville, Florida 33202 Edward Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
