Findings Of Fact This case concerns what is called a "turnkey lease." The program was developed by the State of Florida in 1971. It encompasses a situation whereby agencies seeking space for their operation may, after a specific need is determined that cannot be filled by existing adequate space, solicit competitive bids from developers for the provision of land and the construction of a building there sufficient to meet the agency's needs, for lease specifically to the agency requesting it. The Bureau of Property Management within DGS was given the initial responsibility to develop the guidelines, promulgate the rules, and seek statutory authority for such a program. The Bureau's current role is to work with agencies requesting this program. The agency certifies the need to the Bureau, in addition to the fact that there is no available existing space present. The Bureau then determines agency needs and gives the agency the authority to solicit the bids for the turnkey project. Once the bids have been solicited and the preproposal conferences have been held, the bids are then received, evaluated, and a recommendation for an award is forwarded by the agency to the Department of General Services. DGS reviews the supporting documents required by the provisions of the Florida Administrative Code and either concurs or does not concur in the recommendation. If DGS concurs, the submitting agency is notified and is permitted to then secure the lease. Once the lease has been entered into, it is then sent back to DGS for review and approval, as to the conditions, and thereafter the plans and specifications for the building are also referred to DGS for review and approval as to the quality and adequacy of the plans and specifications and code compliance. Section 255.249 and Section 255.25, Florida Statutes, sets forth the requirement for soliciting and awarding bids for lease space in an amount in excess of 2500 square feet. This provision requires that an award of this nature be made to the lowest and best bidder, and DGS subscribes to that standard in evaluating and determining whether or not it will concur with an agency's recommendation. In the instant case, DHRS advertised for bids for the construction of office space in Palatka, Florida for its District III facilities. Before seeking to solicit bids, District III staff conducted a search for other possible existing space within a five mile radius of the downtown area and located no adequate facilities. Thereafter, a certification of need was processed for a solicitation of proposals and approval was granted by DGS to follow through with the solicitation. A preproposal conference was advertised and held on October 14, 1983 and after review by those present at the conference, bid opening date was set for November 22, 1983. Thirty-two bid packages were distributed and twelve bidders submitted proposals. The public bid opening was held as scheduled at 2:00 P.M. on November 22, 1983, in Palatka, Florida by Robert E. Litza, Facilities Service Coordinator for DHRS District III. Of the bids submitted by the twelve bidders, the lowest bid was rejected because of the failure of the bidder to comply with the requirements of the bid package. Of the remaining eleven bids, the four lowest were evaluated with the understanding that additional high bids would be evaluated if the four lowest were found to be unacceptable. Among the four bids considered were bids of Chuck Bundschu, Inc.; Kenneth McGunn, the Intervenor (Mr. McGunn submitted five price schedules for his bid and of these only one was considered); Elizabethan Development, Inc.; and TSU. A recommendation by the evaluation committee which met at DHRS District III that Intervenor's bid be selected was forwarded to DGS in Tallahassee through the Director of DHRS's General Services in Tallahassee on December 22, 1983. The terms of the successful bid and the reasons for its being considered lowest and best are discussed below. The successful bid for the lease in question, lease number 590:8030, was, upon completion of the committee's evaluation, also evaluated by Mrs. Goodman in the Bureau of Property Management of DGS. She also considered the McGunn bid as the lowest and best of the eleven non-disqualified bids. In that regard, not only Mr. McGunn's bid but all of the twelve bids received were considered and reviewed not only at the local level but at DHRS and DGS Headquarters as well. In her evaluation of the proposal and the bids, Mrs. Goodman considered the documentation submitted by DHRS. This included a letter of recommendation supported by a synopsis of all proposals, the advertisements for bids, and any information pertinent to the site selection process. The letter from DHRS dated December 22, 1983, which recommended award of the lease to Mr. McGunn, included Mr. Litza's December 21, 1983 analysis and recommendation letter which, itself, was attached to McGunn's primary bid documents. Her analysis did not include a prior award recommendation and analysis from Mr. Litza, dated December 8, 1983. It also did not include the site plan, the floor plan for the proposed building, or a survey of the site, but these areas are considered to be within the discretion of the leasing agency. Their absence is not considered to be particularly significant. In her analysis, Mrs. Goodman found that Petitioner's bid was also responsive. However, comparing it with Mr. McGunn's bid, she and her staff found that the latter was the lowest bid submitted. The determing factor in her decision was cost. In determining that McGunn's bid was the lowest as to cost of all bids, Mrs. Goodman compared the average rate per square foot per year for each. This did not take into consideration proration of costs per year, but strictly the average over the fifteen years of the term of the lease (10 year basic plus 5 year option) . According to Mrs. Goodman, this same method of calculating cost has been used in every lease involving a turnkey situation and in fact in every lease since 1958 - as long as she has been with DGS. This particular method, admittedly, is not set forth in any rule promulgated by DGS. However, the agencies are instructed by DGS to advertise and bidders to bid on an average square foot basis, the basis utilized by Mrs. Goodman and her staff in analyzing the bids submitted. In that regard, the request for proposals does not, itself, indicate how the calculation of lowest cost would be made by DHRS and DGS but it does tell prospective bidders what information to submit. This procedure has been followed exclusively in situations like this for many years and many of the bidders have bid before using this same system. While Mrs. Goodman is not certain whether TSU has ever bid before, using this system, she does not consider it to be unfair because all bidders are considered on the same footing in an evaluation. They are notified of what information to submit and if they do so, their information will be considered along with all other bidders. Further, anyone who inquires as to the basis for evaluation will be given a straight and complete answer as to the method to be used. In the instant case, DHRS followed procedure for solicitation and evaluation utilized in the past and DGS followed its own policy in evaluating the submissions. In short, the primary consideration for DGS is the price factor and all other factors are considered to be within the expertise of the requesting agency. In Mrs. Goodman's opinion, based on the fact that she worked with the Florida Legislature on the development of the controlling statute, and helped develop the existing rule within DGS, that was the intent of the Legislature. Consequently since the statute requires award to the lowest and best bidder, it can be said that in this case the term "lowest" falls within the purview of both DHRS and DGS but "best" is solely within the purview of DHRS. Therefore, utilizing the lowest and best criteria and accepting the fact that the lowest bid may not be the best bid, the determination of "non-best" should be based on the reasonable "end objective" of the agency and need not be based on a criterion which is set forth in the bid proposal. In other words, it is not necessary for the agency to set forth the manner of evaluation it will use or the factors it will consider, according to Mrs. Goodman. With regard to the bid and evaluation committee process, Mr. Litza, the facilities manager for DHRS in Gainesville, was involved in putting together the bid package along with Mr. George Smith from Tallahassee, Litza's predecessor in the job in Gainesville. He worked with Mr. Smith in order to take advantage of Smith's experience in evaluating bids for leases. So far as he knew, the bid package contained minimum standards for all parts of the bid, and the package was, in fact, approved by officials in Tallahassee before being released. While no particular factors were identified to prospective bidders as being significant, Mr. Litza did conduct a bid conference for them prior to the date the bid was due and was available to answer any questions that prospective bidders might have. He did not receive any questions regarding the significance of any particular factor from any bidder. The bids were advertised and when received, were opened and read properly in accordance with the terms of the solicitation. When the bids were received and opened, it was seen that Mr. McGunn had submitted five different bids for the same project. Litza had not been confronted with this situation before and asked Mr. Smith what to do about it. Mr. Smith's reply was to put all five McGunn bids in with the rest and extract the lowest five of all bids. When this was done, Mr. McGunn was shown to have submitted two of the lowest five bids. In determining which were the lowest five bids, Mr. Litza utilized the average cost per square foot formula utilizing therein the entire 15,772 square feet authorized for the project. Once the five lowest bids were determined, Mr. Litza selected an evaluation committee made up of local Palatka DHRS supervisors except for the fiscal member, Mr. Foust, Mrs. Shinholster, Litza's secretary and Litza himself. He gave each of the members a score sheet with point values for each area. Each member filled out the form independently. Though he gave very little briefing to the evaluation committee, he admits that he did, in advance, tell each member that Mr. McGunn was the lowest bidder and should be awarded the highest points for criteria number 1, which related to cost. There were several irregularities in Mr. Litza's processing of the evaluation committee's results. For example, on the evaluation of the file conducted by member Sheryl Dollar, regarding criteria number 2, which relates to the conformity of space offered to the specific requirements contained in the invitation to bid (with a weight of 25 points), Mr. Litza admitted he lowered Mrs. Dollar's point award in that area from 35 to 25 without first checking with her to insure that his action would meet with her approval. While this is irregular, it is of little or no consequence since - the maximum number of points that could be given for that particular item was 25 and Mr. Litza's actions did not reduce that member's award to less than the maximum allowable. He contends that his action was based on what he considered to be a mistake on her part. In another apparent irregularity, Mr. Litza prepared a recommendation letter based on his and the other committee members' evaluation of the files to DHRS Headquarters in Tallahassee on December 8, 1983. In that letter, be indicated that McGunn would provide gas heat for the proposed building for free. Though McGunn had not specifically stated this, he implied it from the energy features paragraph in the Intervenor's bid. On the other hand, the bid by TSU contained an express comment offering to pay the utility charges. This specific provision was overlooked and omitted from the evaluation and report to Tallahassee by Litza, who contends that this omission was merely an oversight. There are other discrepancies as well. In his testimony, Mr. Litza indicated Mr. McGunn proposed to build one building but his letter of December 8th and that of December 21, 1984, both reflect two buildings. Here again, Mr. Litza explains this as the result of his being confused. Nonetheless, this erroneous information was referred to Mrs. Goodman at DGS. This is significant in that at the evaluation committee meeting, when the forms were given out, several of the members expressed a preference for a two-building complex. After the award, Mr. Litza secured agreement from McGunn to build two buildings. Mr. Litza admits that much of this was done in an attempt to insure that McGunn, as the low bidder, got the award. Mr. Litza equated the lowest bid with the best and had Petitioner been the low bidder, he contends he would have done the same thing. In most areas, he would not, however, have given Petitioner's four-building concept a high score because of the increased heat and air requirements of four buildings. Mr. Litza also downgraded Petitioner on that bid criteria which relates to the proximity of offered space to the clients to be served because Petitioner's site, he contends, was too close to the clients to be served. In this case, a housing project for low income families which make up much of the clientele to be served by DHRS, was located across the street from the proposed site offered by the Petitioner. Mr. Litza contends that he was thinking of the potential damage to the building because of increased activity by virtue of the facility being so close. There were other questionable areas in Mr. Litza's testimony. For example, he testified that though Petitioner provided 15 more parking spaces than Intervenor, this would result in mud being tracked in from the adjacent dirt road 200 feet away in greater quantities than in Intervenor's proposal. He also considered positively that the Intervenor's proposed site was closer to a restaurant than that of the Petitioner. Though it was recommended by DHRS Headquarters in Tallahassee that only two of the committee members be from the Palatka office, Mr. Litza disregarded that advice because, he contends, there was a morale factor in that office and the people assigned there wanted to have a part in this decision. Because of this, he allowed Ms. Stouffenberg to put five extra members of her staff on the committee. Nonetheless, the evaluation committee serves only in an advisory capacity. Its recommendation is no more than an advisory opinion. The ultimate decision as to which of the bidders should be awarded the contract is made at DHRS Headquarters in Tallahassee. Ms. Shinholster, a Clerk IV in the DHRS Gainesville office, who works as a secretary to Mr. Litza and several others, was advised she would be on the committee for the evaluation at the same time she was given the bid file. She did not get an opportunity to meet with other committee members to talk about the standards to be used, nor was she given any standards by which to evaluate the files. All she was told by Mr. Litza was that McGunn was the lowest bidder. She cannot explain how she accorded points on her evaluation sheets except that she gave the low bidder the highest number of points. Mr. George Smith, a Senior Analyst with DHRS in Tallahassee, relied on Mr. Litza's input when he made his recommendation to his superiors that the award should be made to McGunn. He also formulated his own opinion, based on his own analysis of the bids. He resolved any dispute regarding cost in favor of Mr. McGunn on the basis of the average rental, and regarding space, in favor of McGunn on the basis of the number of buildings. Dr. Perry, an economist with the University of North Florida, testified to the Federal Government's policy regarding the desirability of using the present value of money methodology and the determination of an acceptable discount rate or index in calculating the actual cost of the bids. Both experts, Dr. Perry and Dr. Scott, who testified for DGS, agree that the present value methodology is valid and presents a more accurate analysis of cost than the average rental cost methodology which does not utilize this theory. The major difference between the two was primarily in the percentage to be utilized in applying the discount rate. Whereas Dr. Perry adopted the Federal policy and suggested a 10 percent discount rate, Dr. Scott testified that a more viable percentage rate in November, 1983, at the time the award was to be made, would have been 3.3 percent. If the 10 percent rate were used, then the Petitioner's bid would be the lowest of all submitted. On the other hand, if the 3.3 percent rate were used, Intervenor's bid would be the lowest. If a different discount rate, that of 5.7 percent were to he used, the bid of Elizabethan Development Corporation would be low. It is at about the 6 percent point and above that Petitioner's bid becomes the lowest. Nonetheless, the State has not adopted the present value of money theory and the policy followed by the State is not to consider that methodology in analyzing costs. State policy is to use only the average rental methodology. There are no written instructions (rules) on evaluating bids for leases of this nature. Oral instructions given by DGS to each agency are that the average rate per square foot is to be computed using, if the square footage is constant, for each year of the lease, the basic square footage requested, multiplied by the rental rate proposed for each year of the basic lease, divided by the number of years. If the square footage is not constant in every year of the lease, evaluators are directed to apply the rate per square foot proposed in each year to the square footage to be utilized in that year, total up the annual rentals, total up the square footage involved, and divide to arrive at the average rate per square foot per year. Utilizing one or the other of those two methods in evaluating both the McGunn and the TSU bids, it becomes clear that the McGunn bid results in an average of $8.86 cost per square foot per year and the TSU bid an average of $9.58 per square foot per year. Recalculation of DHRS' evaluation by DGS showed the DHRS' figures as stated above were correctly arrived at. This procedure is followed on all turnkey and non-turnkey leases in the State of Florida. The reason the State uses this process instead of the present value of money process is because it is easy. DGS statistics indicate that most landlords in the approximately $32,000,000 worth of leases presently existing with the State are "Mom and Pop" landlords. These people are not normally trained lease evaluators. By using the straight average rental rate method, there are no arbitrary variables. It has always worked because people can understand it and all agencies which lease property in the State of Florida follow this procedure. Also, this procedure does not require computer-based calculations, and it does not require economists to work with it. Both latter reasons are amplifications of the first. In Mrs. Goodman's estimation, if the present value of money system were to be adopted, her division would have to hire at least two $30,000 per year economists and buy an in-house computer to operate the system. This additional cost, she believes, would far outweigh the paper savings to be realized by utilizing the present value of money system. As of the hearing date, considering all the factors, in Mrs. Goodman's opinion, DGS would nonetheless still recommend Mr. McGunn's bid as the lowest and best bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that DHRS lease Number 590:8030 be awarded to Kenneth R. McGunn. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of September, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald E. Holmes, Esquire William E. Townsend, Jr., Esquire Post Office Drawer D Palatka, Florida 32078-0019 James A. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire District III Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32609 Stephen J. Kubik, Esquire Department of General Services Room 452, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Allen Poll, Esquire 112 South Main Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Linda C. McGurn, Esquire 1717 Northeast 9th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32301 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1321 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald W. Thomas, Executive Director Department of General Services 115 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On or about July 7, 1967, Raymond M. Tonks leased certain property located in Dade County, Florida, from E. L. Phillips, Jr. and Ruth P. Phillips. A copy of the lease executed by the Phillipses as Lessors, and Tonks as Lessee, was received in evidence at the hearing as Petitioner's Exhibit 2. The property is described in the lease. The term of the lease was a period of five years, commencing from the date, of execution. The Lease Agreement contained an option to purchase which could be exercised by the Lessee at any time during the term of the lease. On or about July 25, 1972, the Phillipses and Tonks entered into a Lease Extension Agreement, which extended the terms of the previous lease agreement through July 9, 1975. A copy of this agreement was received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 3. The Lease Extension Agreement explicitly included the option to purchase. On or about May 6, 1975, Tonks and the Petitioner entered into an agreement which they styled "Assignment of Lease". A copy of this agreement was received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Through the Assignment of Lease, Tonks assigned all of his interest in the earlier lease and Lease Extension Agreements to the Petitioner. Tonks explicitly warranted in the agreement that the option to purchase could be exercised by the Petitioner. The term of the lease in the Lease Extension had approximately two months to run at the time that Tonks and Petitioner entered into the agreement. Petitioner paid $275,000 for the interests that it received from Tonks. See: Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Tonks took a promissory note for a substantial portion of the purchase price. See: Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Petitioner placed no documentary stamp tax or documentary surtax stamps on the Assignment of Lease. Petitioner executed the option to purchase shortly after it received the Assignment of Lease from Tonks. The sale transaction between the Petitioner and the Philipses was closed on August 8, 1975. See Petitioner's Exhibit 6 and 7. The Respondent took the position that the documentary stamp tax and surtax stamps should have been placed on the "Assignment of Lease" so, as to reflect a $275,000 consideration. Accordingly the Respondent issued a Proposed Notice of Assessment of Tax and Penalty to the Petitioner on October 23, 1975. The proposed assessment included a penalty in the amount of the total taxes which Respondent contended were due. By letter dated December 11, 1975 from a representative of the Respondent to counsel for the Petitioner, the Respondent stated that the assessment was made against the assignment of lease and not against the option to purchase contained within the lease. Petitioner filed this action in order to contest the validity of the assessment. Petitioner contends that the consideration paid to Tonks was for the option to purchase, rather than for the assignment of lease. Respondent contends that the largest possible consideration that could be attributed to the assignment of lease is the amount of rent that would have been due under the lease for the unexpired term of the lease.
The Issue Whether or not Respondent's real estate license should be disciplined, because, as alleged, Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises and pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction; failed to place a trust deposit with her employing broker and operated as a broker while licensed as a salesman in violation of Subsections 475.25(1)(b), and (k), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact During times material hereto, Respondent, Barbara B. Wise, was a licensed real estate salesman in Florida, having been issued license number 0484022. The last license issued Respondent was as a salesman, c/o Grover Goheen Realty, Inc., at 414 Twelfth Avenue, North, St. Petersburg, Florida. During October 1988, Respondent, while licensed and operating as a salesman in the employ of her broker, Goheen Realty, Inc., solicited and obtained a lease listing agreement from Michael Riggins. As a result of that listing, Marsha Tenny contacted Respondent and requested assistance in obtaining a seasonal lease for the period January 1989 through April 30, 1989. Ms. Tenny made Respondent aware of her needs respecting a lease property to include wheelchair access as her husband was wheelchair bound. As a result of visiting approximately three available units, Respondent secured a seasonal lease from Michael Riggins for Marsha Tenny. The lease agreement for the Tenny's was the first rental listing that Respondent had obtained and it suffices to say that she was a novice in the area of securing lease agreements. Likewise, her employing broker did very little volume in rentals as her broker was of the opinion that the net commissions were not sufficient to defray the time and effort involved for several reasons including the limited availability of rental properties. As a result, her broker was unable to provide guidance. Pursuant to the aforementioned lease agreement, Respondent named several options by which Marsha Tenny could secure the apartment to include sending a personal check to her and after negotiating it she would in turn pay the rental fees directly to the landlord. Other options included Ms. Tenny sending separate checks to the landlord for the apartment and a check for the commission fees to her employing broker or she could deal directly with the landlord and remit a separate check to her employing broker for fees. Ms. Tenny elected to send a money order in the amount of $1,500.00 to Respondent. After she negotiated the check she received from Marsha Tenny, Respondent retained her commissions and did not pay her broker the pro-rata share that the broker was entitled to. Respondent did not inform her broker of the Riggins/Tenny lease agreement when she received the deposit from the Tennys on or about October 23, 1988. Respondent negotiated the Tenny's deposit check by depositing same into her personal account and drew a check in the amount of $1,100.00 as the rental deposit and remitted it to Mr. Riggins on October 2.1, 1988. Respondent retained the $400.00 balance as her fee. Respondent tendered her employing broker its portion of the commission fees ($174.00) on February 24, 1989. During early February 1989, the Tennys expressed dissatisfaction with the apartment and demanded a refund from Respondent. Respondent wrote the Tennys a letter of apology and submitted a money order to Marsha Tenny in the amount of $50.00 on February 3, 1989. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4.) As stated, Respondent was inexperienced with the rental business in Pinellas County. She was at the time undergoing other family problems, including tending to a sister in Orange County, Florida, who was very ill. At the time, Respondent commuted from Pinellas County to Orange County several times per week to visit with and assist her sister. Additionally, Respondent's office was being relocated and the staff was having to relay messages to her through her husband and other salesman employed with her broker. In addition to sending the Tennys a money order in the amount of $50.00, Respondent agreed to repay the Tennys the entire remaining balance of the finders fee that she received from the Riggins/Tenny leasing agreement as soon as she was financially able to do so. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent be issued a written reprimand and placed on probation for a period of one (1) year. During the probationary period, Respondent shall enroll in an approved post-licensure course and shall satisfactorily complete the same prior to termination of probation. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1990. Steven W. Johnson, Esquire DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Barbara B. Wise 1059 42nd Avenue, N.E. St. Petersburg, Florida 33703 Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Kenneth E. Easley, Esq. Division of Real Estate Department of Prof. Reg. 400 West Robinson Street 1940 North Monroe Street Post Office Box 1900 Suite 60 Orlando, Florida 32802 Tallahassee, FL 32399
The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether the Respondent Wayne E. Belton violated Section s. 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), by inserting an option provision into a lease agreement without the specific authorization of the tenants and subsequent to the tenants signing the original agreement. At the hearing, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-10 were offered and admitted into evidence. Leslie and Glenn Strickland, the tenants and complainants, testified on behalf of the Petitioner. Wayne Belton testified on his own behalf. Proposed Recommended Orders have been submitted by the parties. Those findings not incorporated in this Recommended Order were not considered relevant to the issues, were not supported by competent and substantial evidence or were considered immaterial to the results reached.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Wayne E. Belton is a licensed real estate broker with his principal place of business at 337 Northeast Second Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. On or about November 23, 1979, the Respondent prepared a one-year rental agreement or lease for property located at 2717 Southwest Sixth Street, Delray Beach, Florida, which was owned by Mrs. Margaret Finlay. Mr. and Mrs. Glenn Strickland executed the agreement as the tenants. The lease was prepared pursuant to an open listing by the owner for either sale or lease. When the Stricklands signed the original agreement it did not contain any provision concerning purchasing the property in the future through an option agreement. Although the Stricklands had discussed an option agreement with the Respondent, they did not specifically agree to an option agreement which required the deposit of additional monies in escrow which would not be refunded if the option were not exercised. The owner of the property, Mrs. Finlay, was primarily interested in selling the property and demanded that Respondent obtain a binding option from the Stricklands. When faced with the conflicting demands of the tenants and the owner, the Respondent inserted an option provision in the lease agreement after the Stricklands had signed the original lease which did not contain such a provision. When the Stricklands failed to deliver the $1,500 option money required by the option provision, Mrs. Finlay, through her attorney, threatened to take legal action against the Respondent. In response to the owner's demand, the Respondent through his attorney, demanded that the Stricklands pay $1,500 for the option pursuant to the lease agreement. When the Stricklands received the demand letter from Respondent's counsel, they contacted an attorney who eventually settled the matter. The Stricklands were required to expend $138.00 in attorney's fees to correct the problem caused by the Respondent. The Respondent admitted inserting the option provision into the lease agreement after the Stricklands executed it, but denied acting with any intent to alter the agreement contrary to what he believed the parties intended. Rather, the Respondent believed that he was remedying his original omission to conform to what he believed the parties had orally agreed to.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent Wayne E. Belton violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) and imposing a reprimand and an administrative fine. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Stephen G. Melcer, Esquire Suite 500 First Bank Building 551 Southeast Eighth Street Delray Beach, Florida 33444 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, the Department of Children and Families, properly rejected all bids received on an Invitation to Bid on Proposed Lease No. 590:2622.
Findings Of Fact The Existing Lease and the Decision to Look for New Space. District 7 of the Respondent, the Department of Children and Families (at all times relevant to this proceeding, the Department of Children and Families was known as the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services)(hereinafter referred to as the “District”), leases approximately 26,955 spare feet of office space located in Palm Bay, Brevard County, Florida. The space is used as a client service center. Pursuant to the District’s current lease, the lease will expire on April 30, 1997. The current lease (hereinafter referred to as the “Existing Lease”) was still in effect at the time of the formal hearing of this matter. The Existing Lease also provides for a five-year renewal. For the first two years of the renewal period, the Existing Lease provides for a rental rate of $11.50 per square foot. For the third and fourth years of the renewal the rate is $11.75 and for the last year, $12.00. In June of 1995, the District submitted a Letter of Agency Staffing (hereinafter referred to as a “LAS”) and a Request for Prior Approval of Space Need (hereinafter referred to as a “RSN”), to the Department of Management Services. Pursuant to the LAS and RSN, the District sought approval from the Department of Management Services to seek a new lease of 26,872 square feet of office space in Palm Bay. The reasons given for seeking approval of a new lease set out in the RSN were as follows: New Service Center in Brevard County(Palm Bay Area). The existing lease is up! 4/30/97. The current space does not adequately provide for : (1) Secured storage, visitation areas, and case file storage. The June of 1995, RSN was approved. The District, however, did not immediately seek the approved space. The evidence failed to prove why. In July of 1996 the District submitted another Request for Space Need (hereinafter referred to as the “Second RSN”). The same amount of space was sought and the same justification for seeking new space was described in the Second RSN. The Second RSN was approved by the Department of Management Services on or about July 8, 1996. The RSN and the Second RSN were prepared by Jim Birch. Mr. Birch is the District’s Facilities Services Manager. The reason for seeking a new lease set out in the RSN and the Second RSN was provided to Mr. Birch by Bill Rawlings and Philip Penley. Mr. Penley is the District’s Sub-District Administrator for Brevard County. Mr. Rawlings is the Program Administrator for Brevard County. The Existing Lease was first entered into in 1977. The amount of space leased has increased over the years and is located in more than one building. Mr. Penley decided to request approval to seek new space in the hopes that the client service center in Palm Bay could be moved under one roof and in the hopes that more ideal space could be obtained. The representation in the RSN and the Second RSN that the existing space “does not adequately provide for: (1) Secured storage, visitation areas, and case file storage” is misleading and incorrect. The programs located in the existing space in Palm Bay can, in fact, be carried out without relocating. The Invitation to Bid. The District released an Invitation to Bid (hereinafter referred to as the “ITB”), between July 16 and July 19, 1996. The ITB provided that the “Project Contact Person” was Mr. Birch. The ITB sought bids on proposed lease number 590:2622, for approximately 26,872 square feet of office space in an existing building. The ITB sought office space in Palm Bay. The building was to be used as the District’s client service center. The term of the lease was to be ten years with five one-year optional renewal periods. The ITB scheduled a pre-bid meeting for August 8, 1996. Attendance at the meeting was not mandatory. The ITB specified, however, that “information and explanations provided at this meeting must be complied with by the bidder ” A representative of Petitioner, Executive Ventures (hereinafter referred to as “Executive”), attended the pre-bid meeting on August 8, 1996. During that meeting, the lessor under the Existing Lease asked questions about the renewal terms of the Existing Lease. Executive’s representative informed Executive of the discussions soon after the meeting. Executive was, therefore, aware of the existence of the Existing Lease and the fact that it could be renewed prior to submitting a bid in response to the ITB. The ITB provided that bids could be submitted at any time up to 10:00 a.m., September 12, 1996. Bids were to be opened at the close of the bidding period. The ITB provided that all bids received were to be evaluated first for technical responsiveness. Nonresponsive bids were to be withdrawn from further consideration. Responsive bids were to be presented to a bid evaluation committee “for comparison and formulation of a recommendation for award.” The ITB informed potential bidders that the District reserved the right to reject all bids received in response to the ITB. The first page of the ITB provides that “[t]he Florida Department of [Children and Families] reserves the right to reject any and all bids and award to the bid judged to be in the best interest of the state.” At page A1-5-8 of the ITB the following is provided concerning the rejection of bids: ITB. REJECTION OF BIDS 1. The department reserves the right to reject any and all bids when such rejection is in the interest of the State of Florida. Such rejection shall not be arbitrary, but be based on strong justification which shall be communicated to each rejected bidder by certified mail. [Emphasis in original]. . . . . Bids Submitted in Response to the ITB. A total of four bids were submitted in response to the The bids were opened on September 12, 1996. A bid tabulation sheet was prepared by Mr. Birch. The annual rental rates per square foot for the ten years of the lease were included on the tabulation as required by the ITB. Pursuant to the ITB, no other information was provided at the time the bids were opened and tabulated Executive submitted one of the four bids. Executive’s bid consisted of 90 to 100 pages. Executive expended a good deal of effort and incurred expenses in the amount of approximately $17,000.00 in preparing its bid. The suggestion that Executive incurred unnecessary expenses is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The rental rates per square foot bid by Executive for the term of the proposed leased are as follows: Year Rate 1 $14.56 2 15.00 3 15.53 4 16.08 5 16.73 6 17.40 7 18.10 8 19.01 9 19.96 10 20.96 The District’s Decision to Reject All Bids. Mr. Birch had expected to receive rental rate bids in the range of $12.00 to $13.00. Mr. Birch’s expectation was based upon what he had been told to expect by John Stewart and Mr. Penley. Mr. Stewart is the District’s General Service Manager. Upon tabulating the bids, Mr. Birch discovered that the bids were higher than expected. He realized that the bids were $3.00 per square foot higher than the Existing Lease. Mr. Birch contacted Mr. Stewart and informed him of the difference in rates. Mr. Stewart informed Mr. Penley of the rates that had been bid. Mr. Penley informed Mr. Stewart that the bid rates were too high. Mr. Stewart then informed Sid McAlister, the Deputy District Administrator, and Paul Sneed. Mr. McAlister and Mr. Sneed told Mr. Stewart that the rates bid were excessive. Mr. Stewart subsequently directed Mr. Birch to notify the bidders that all bids were being rejected. Had the bids received in response to the ITB been accepted, the District would have been required to pay an additional approximately $80,000.00 in rent during the first year of the lease. The amount of rent required in the second year would be in excess of $80,000.00. The decision to reject all bids was based upon a realization of the impact the rates contained in the bids would have on the District’s budget if the lowest bid were accepted in relation to the impact on the District’s budget of the rates of the Existing Lease. The District realized that the increase in rent would have a substantial negative impact on its budget. It was also suggested that the impact on the District’s budget as a result of the newly enacted Federal “Welfare Reform Act” was also considered. In particular, the impact of the Welfare Reform Act’s “Work and Gaining Economic Self Sufficiency” or “WAGES” program was considered. The Welfare Reform Act and, consequently WAGES, was signed into law in August of 1996. WAGES was effective October 1, 1996. Among other things, WAGES establishes time limits for the District’s clients' receipt of cash benefits. It also results in the integration of programs of the District and the Department of Labor. This integration of programs will have impacts on the District’s space needs, staffing levels and the ability to pay rental rates in the future. Mr. Penley was aware of WAGES. It was suggested that at the time the ITB was issued little was known about the impact on the District that WAGES would have and that it was not until the bids were received that Mr. Penley had sufficient information concerning WAGES to be concerned about the impact of WAGES on the District’s budget. The weight of the evidence in this case failed to prove that when the decision of the District to reject all bids was made that the decision was based upon WAGES. While the impact of WAGES was of greater concern at the time of the formal hearing, the evidence failed to prove that the District’s concern about WAGES as explained at the formal hearing was taken into account at the time the bids were rejected. Notice of the District’s Decision to Reject All Bids. On September 13, 1996, the day after the bids were opened, the District sent a letter to Executive and the other bidders informing them of the decision to reject all bids: This is to give notice that in the best interest of the State of Florida and the Department of [Children and Families], that any and all bids are hereby rejected. The letter was signed by Mr. Birch. The letter informing Executive of the decision was sent by certified mail. “Strong justification” for the rejection was not “communicated to each rejected bidder by certified mail.” After receiving the September 13, 1996 rejection letter, Executive was informed during a telephone call with Mr. Birch that all bids had been rejected due to excessive rental rates and budgetary constraints. The District failed to comply with the requirement of the ITB that it inform bidders by certified mail of the reason why it rejected all bids. The appropriate remedy for this error, however, would not be to require that the District now evaluate the bids. The appropriate remedy for the error would be to require that the District send out a corrected notice by certified mail containing the explanation of the reasons for rejecting the bids required by the ITB. This remedy would only be appropriate, however, if Executive had sought such a remedy AND the evidence had proved that Executive had been prejudiced by the failure to provide the explanation of the District’s justification for rejecting all bids contemplated by the ITB. Evidence to support such a finding was not presented. In fact, the evidence proved that Executive was not prejudiced by the District’s error. Executive was given additional information concerning the bid rejection during a telephone conversation and it had an opportunity to explore the reasons for the rejection through discovery prior to the formal hearing of this case. Executive, therefore, had the opportunity to determine the specific justification for the rejection in preparation for the hearing on this matter. Zone Rates. The Department of Management Services establishes maximum rental rates which agencies can agree to pay without obtaining approval of the Department of Management Services. The rates are established for geographic zones on what is referred to as a “Zone Rate Schedule”. Zone Rate Schedules may be obtained from the Department of Management Services or other agencies by potential bidders. At all times relevant to this proceeding Executive was aware of the Zone Rate Schedule applicable to Palm Bay. Rental rates which do not exceed the zone rate by more than 10% may be accepted by an agency without further approval from the Department of Management Services. Any rate in excess of 10% over the zone rate must be approved by the Department of Management Services before an agency may accept it. The rental rates submitted by Executive in response to the ITB exceeded the zone rate but not by more than 10%. Individuals involved with the District’s decision in this matter either were not aware of the Zone Rate Schedule or gave it no consideration in deciding to reject all bids. The evidence also failed to prove that agreeing to pay a rate included on a Zone Rate Schedule for which approval from the Department of Management Services need not be obtained is necessarily in the “best interest of the state”. Additionally, the evidence failed to prove that the District did not have a reasonable basis for rejecting all bids despite the fact that the rates bid by Executive were within the Zone Rate Schedule plus 10%. Executive’s Challenge. Executive filed a Protest dated September 25, 1996, challenging as arbitrary the Department’s decision to reject all bids. In its Protest Executive alleged the following “facts” in support of its argument that the District’s rejection of all bids was arbitrary: The District failed to “communicate to each rejected bidder any justification whatsoever for rejecting any and all bids.” The District had decided to “reject any and all bids if the bid rental per square foot exceeded the rental they were paying under their present Lease, since such Lease had an option to renew for an additional five years. The present Lease renewal failed to comply with the requirements and specifications set forth in the Invitation to Bid.” The District, “at all times, knew that if such bids exceeded the square foot rental of the present Lease, that they intended to reject all bids and renew the existing Lease, although the existing Lease failed to meet the bid specifications.” The District “violated the competitive bidding procedure by failing to include in their Invitation to Bid a provision that any bid exceeding a specific dollar amount per square foot would be rejected in favor of the existing Lease. ” Although the evidence proved the first fact cited in finding of fact 51, that fact does not support a conclusion that the District’s decision was arbitrary. As to the other facts alleged by Executive in its Protest cited in finding of fact 53, the evidence simply failed to prove those alleged facts. At hearing, Executive presented the testimony of Mary Goodman, a consultant and former Chief of the Bureau of Property Management, Department of Management Services. Ms. Goodman was accepted as an expert witness. Ms. Goodman opined that the District’s actions in this matter were arbitrary. Ms. Goodman’s opinion was based in part on her conclusion that the submittal of the RSN and the Second RSN constituted a “determination by the Department to not renew the existing lease.” The evidence failed to support this contention. Executive has failed to cite any provision of Florida law which supports this contention. Ms. Goodman also based her opinion on the assumption that the District had established a rental rate cap which it failed to inform prospective bidders of. The evidence failed to support this assumption. Ms. Goodman also based her opinion on the fact that the bid submitted by Executive was within the Zone Rate Schedule for the area. The evidence in this case failed to prove that the fact that the bids were within 10% of the Zone Rate Schedule rates means that the decision to reject bids that would have cost the District approximately $80,000.00 the first year in additional rent was arbitrary because the rental bids did not require approval of the Department of Management Services. Executive has cited no provision of Florida law that requires agencies to accept bids simple because they do not require approval from the Department of Management Services. Ms. Goodman also based her opinion on her conclusion that the District should have known of its budgetary constraints before issuance of the ITB. Ms. Goodman, however, acknowledged that she knew nothing specifically about the District’s budget. Finally, Ms. Goodman based her opinion on the District’s failure to provide the notice of the District’s reason for rejecting the bids required by the ITB. As discussed, supra, the evidence failed to support this conclusion. The evidence failed to prove that Executive filed the action for an improper purpose.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Children and Families dismissing the Protest filed by Executive Ventures. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Walter Smith, Esquire SMITH, GRIMSLEY, BAUMAN, PINKERTON, PETERMANN, SAXER, WELLS Post Office Box 2379 Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32549 Eric D. Dunlap Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Children and Families 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard A. Doran General Counsel Department of Children & Families Building 2 Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children & Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact At some time prior to August 2, 1984, DOT issued bid blanks for a mini- contract for State Project No: 76020-3515, for work consisting of cleaning and guniting a concrete box culvert located on State Road 19, in Putnam County, Florida, approximately one mile south of the Cross Florida Barge Canal. The bid package, signed by C. A. Benedict, District Engineer, for the DOT, specifically reserved the right to reject any and all bids. The bid package broke the work down into three item numbers. The first was mobilization and called for one pricing unit. The second item called for maintenance of traffic at the work site and called for one pricing unit as well. The third area called for restoration of spalled areas (gunite) and called for approximately 437 cubic feet to be priced. In this regard, the plans furnished with the bid package and the bid package itself, in at least three separate locations, called for the bid as to the last item to be priced and paid for on a unit price basis. Petitioner submitted the lowest bid of seven bidders. It was determined to be faulty, however, in that though it properly priced the first two items, it failed to submit a unit price for the third item per unit, submitting instead a total price for the third item based on the entire cubic footage. Petitioner's bid indicated 437 cubic feet priced at a total of $17,832.00. Simple arithmetic permits a division which results in a unit price for each of the 437 cubic feet of $40,805. This last unit price, however, is not reflected on the bid submitted by Petitioner. Petitioner's bid is the only bid of the seven submitted which did not contain a unit price for each of the units in the third item. EDS has been in business since 1980. It performed one previous contract for DOT and is familiar with DOT's rules regarding bidding. It had ample opportunity to examine the plans and the bid blank before submitting its bid and admits that the unit price, though required, was omitted. Petitioner contends, however, that the omission is not a material variance and can be waived by Respondent. Respondent contends, on the other hand, that the failure to list the unit price in the third item is material. This determination is based on the fact that since the bid package calls for payment on a unit basis, the odd one- half cent per unit does not permit even money payment and requires rounding off. Even with this being true, the maximum difference would be one- half cent to be rounded off either upwards or downwards. At some point after opening, at least one of the unsuccessful bidders found out that Petitioner's bid failed to technically conform to the terms of the bid blank and at this point the second lowest bidder, Vann's Sandblasting, whose bid was $4,000.00 higher than that of Petitioner, and who had done several contracts for Respondent in the past, indicated that if petitioner's bid were not rejected, he would file a protest. The one-half cent variance, itself, is not material. Considering all factors, however, the failure to state the unit price may, under certain circumstances, be.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED THAT Petitioner, EXPLOSIVE AND DIVING SERVICES, INC., be awarded the contract for State project No 76020-3515. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of February, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Gail S. Wood, President Explosive and Diving Services, Inc. Post Office Box 200 Clarksville, Florida 32430 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a dealer in heavy construction equipment and has been since its incorporation on August 1, 1946. Among petitioner's competitors are Dewind Machinery Company, Florida Equipment Company of Jacksonville, Florida- Georgia Tractor Company, Inc., Great Southern Equipment Company, Inc., Pilot Equipment Company, Inc., Ring Power Corporation and Joseph L. Rozier Machinery Company. Like its competitors, petitioner frequently leases equipment to its customers, giving them an option to purchase, rather than selling them the equipment outright. Petitioner's exhibit No. 1 reflects one such transaction. On April 19, 1973, petitioner quoted Houdaille Duval Wright Company (Houdaille) a purchase price of twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000.00) plus sale's tax, and monthly rent of fourteen hundred dollars ($1,400.00) plus sales tax on a diesel powered, self-propelled vibratory roller. After negotiations between petitioner and Houdaille, the purchase price dropped to seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000.00), but the monthly rental remained unchanged. Houdaille agreed to lease the vibratory roller from petitioner on these terms. With respect to its option to purchase, Houdaille specified that: 100 percent of all rentals to apply towards purchase price of $17,000.00 less 10 percent discount on remaining outstanding balance at time of purchase. Interest to accrue at a rate 7 1/2 percent simple. Houdaille made lease payments for nine months, totaling twelve thousand six hundred dollars ($12,600.00), before electing to exercise its option to purchase. In calculating the amount of money Houdaille was to pay to close out the transaction, petitioner began by treating the payments Houdaille had made under the lease as if they had been payments made in repayment of a loan, outstanding for the period of the lease, in the amount of seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000.00), at 7 1/2 percent per annum. Petitioner allocated portions of each lease payment to principal and to interest, calculated on the declining principal balance, aggregating eleven thousand nine hundred ten dollars and fifty-four cents ($11,910.54) to principal, and six hundred eighty-nine dollars and fourty-six cents ($689.46) to interest. Petitioner then calculated the 10 percent discount by multiplying one tenth times the difference between the original price ($17,000.00) and the amount aggregated to principal ($11,910.54), which yielded five hundred eight dollars and ninety-five cents ($508.95). This figure was subtracted from the original contract price ($17,000.00) to ascertain the' discounted price ($16,491.05) against which the lease payments were credited in their entirety ($12,600.00), yielding the figure three thousand eight hundred ninety-one dollars and five cents ($3,891.05), on which petitioner calculated 4 percent sales tax. In addition, petitioner required Houdaille, in exercising its option to purchase, to pay six hundred eighty-nine dollars and forty-six cents ($689.46), the aggregate amount of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. In every respect pertinent to the dispute between petitioner and respondent, this transaction between petitioner and Houdaille is typical of the transactions on which contested portions of the tax assessments were based. The same is true of petitioner's lease and sale of a truck crane to Poston Bridge & Iron, Inc. (Poston), the transaction reflected in exhibit No. 2 (although petitioner's agreement with Poston did not involve a discount.) The terms of the lease purchase agreement, as stated on respondent's exhibit No. 2, were: Option Price $124,855.00 with 100 percent of paid rentals to apply to purchase price less interest at 8.5 percent simple. After making lease payments totalling twenty-six thousand dollars ($26,000.00), Poston exercised its option to purchase. At this point the lease payments were recast as installment sales payments, portions being allocated to principal and interest accordingly. Respondent collected sales tax on the amount of money Poston paid in exchange for title, after electing to purchase, less the aggregate amount of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. Petitioner has been entering into lease purchase agreements of this kind with various customers since 1946 or 1947, and, when customers exercised purchase options, petitioner ordinarily calculated sales tax in the manner it employed in connection with the sale of the vibratory roller to Houdaille, and the truck crane to Poston. In at least one instance, however, petitioner calculated sales tax as 4 percent of all the money a customer, Misener Marine Construction, Inc., paid when exercising its option to purchase a truck crane, including portions of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. On the lease payments themselves, petitioner regularly collected 4 percent sales tax which it regularly remitted to respondent. For federal income tax purposes, petitioner treated payments from customers under a lease purchase agreement as lease payments for every tax year in which the option to purchase was not exercised. For the tax year in which the option to purchase was exercised, the lease payments were treated as payments under an installment sale contract, for federal income tax purposes. When respondent audited petitioner's rentals for the period May 1, 1970, to April 30, 1973, and earlier when respondent performed a general audit of petitioner's books for the period July 1, 1959, to February 28, 1962, no mention was mace of petitioner's sales tax treatment of lease purchase agreements under which lessees had exercised purchase options. Before the audit which eventuated in the assessments now in controversy, however, the auditors were given a copy of a letter from L. N. Hansen to Thomas D. Aitken dated December 9, 1974. Mr. Hansen was formerly director of respondent's sales and use tax division. In the fall of 1974, he was one of a group or "board" of respondent's employees who considered questions arising under the tax laws and formulated policy for respondent. His letter to Mr. Aitken, which came in evidence as, petitioner's exhibit No. 5, was written on behalf of respondent after its substance was discussed at a meeting of respondent's policy group. It pertains to lease purchase agreements entered into by Joseph L. Rozier Machinery Co. (Rozier). Mr. Hansen's letter stated that Rozier was "not correct in reducing the taxable sales price by the rental payments and thereafter adding an interest charge which, if it was incurred at all, was incurred prior to the time of sale." Petitioner's exhibit No. 5, p. 1. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stucky's of Eastman, Georgia vs. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which appears as an appendix to the order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent abandon the uncollected portions of its deficiency assessments. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 4-8, and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 2 is irrelevant insofar as it differs from petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, and for that reason has not been adopted where it differs from petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3 has not been adopted because it is not relevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 9 has not been adopted because what motivated respondent's employees is not relevant and because it was not proven what would have happened "[b]ut for the Hansen letter." Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 11 and 12 have not been adopted because they are irrelevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 13 has not been adopted as such because it is actually a proposed conclusion of law. The first paragraph of respondent's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, except that exercise of the purchase option may be said to relate back to the beginning of the contract. Significantly, respondent proposes as a finding of fact that the "amount termed 'Interest' . . . is payable for the use of the money during the rental/lease period." Paragraphs two through seven, nine and ten of respondent's proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. The eighth paragraph of respondent's proposed findings of fact has not been adopted; it is actually a proposed conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Daniel S. Dearing, Esquire Post Office Box 1118 424 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ms. Patricia S. Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission’s (“Respondent” or “FWC”) determination that Tallahassee Corporate Center, LLC (“Petitioner” or “TCC”), submitted a nonresponsive reply to FWC’s Invitation to Negotiate (“ITN”) No. 770-0235 is contrary to the Commission’s governing statutes, the agency’s rules or policies, or the solicitation specifications; and, if so, whether it was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on exhibits admitted into evidence, testimony offered by witnesses, and admitted facts set forth in the pre-hearing stipulation. ITN No. 770-0235 and Background FWC is a state agency that seeks office space to be occupied by personnel from six of FWC’s divisions. FWC currently leases office space from TCC, which expires in October 2019. On July 19, 2017, FWC issued ITN No. 770-0235, seeking vendors that could provide 53,000 square feet of office space for lease. FWC anticipates occupying the space by November 1, 2019. Between August 15, 2017, and November 2, 2017, FWC issued four addenda to the ITN, which contained amendments, modifications, and explanations to the ITN. There were no bidders that challenged the terms, conditions, or specifications contained in the ITN or its amendments. TCC and NLH were two of the potential lessors that submitted replies in response to the ITN. FWC seeks to lease either a building that already exists or a non-existing building to be constructed in the future. The ITN describes the proposals requested as follows: Competitive proposals may be submitted for consideration under this Invitation to Negotiate (ITN) for the lease of office space in either an existing building or a non- existing (build-to-suit/turnkey) building. NOTE: All buildings must comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as stated in Attachment A, Agency Specifications, Section 6.D., page 32. OPTION 1 - an ‘existing’ building: To be considered an ‘existing’ building, the facility offered must be enclosed with a roof system and exterior walls must be in place at the time of the submittal of the Reply. OPTION 2 - a ‘non-existing’ building: Offeror agrees to construct a building as a ‘build-to-suit’ (turnkey) for lease to FWC. Each applicant that submitted a proposal in response to the ITN was required to meet the specification in Attachment A of the ITN. The ITN provides as follows: FWC is seeking detailed and competitive proposals to provide built-out office facilities and related infrastructure for the occupancy by FWC. As relates to any space that is required to be built-out pursuant to this Invitation to Negotiate in accordance with this Invitation to Negotiate, see Attachment ‘A’ which includes the FWC Specifications detailing the build-out requirements. The specifications in Attachment A provided the basic requirements for the potential leased space such that proposals offering existing or non-existing building may be compared and evaluated together. The ITN included certain provisions to clarify the rights contemplated by the ITN, and included the following disclaimer: This ITN is an invitation to negotiate and is for discussion purposes only. It is not an offer, contract or agreement of any kind. Neither FWC nor the Offeror/Lessor shall have any legal rights or obligations whatsoever between them and neither shall take any action or fail to take any action in reliance upon any part of these discussions until the proposed transaction and a definitive written lease agreement is approved in writing by FWC. This ITN shall not be considered an offer to lease. The terms of any transaction, if consummated, shall not be final nor binding on either party until a Lease Agreement is executed by all parties. This ITN may be modified or withdrawn by FWC at any time. The ITN also included a provision expressly reserving FWC’s “right to negotiate with all responsive and responsible Offerors, serially or concurrently, to determine the best-suited solution.” The term “Offeror” was defined by the ITN to mean “the individual submitting a Reply to this Invitation to Negotiate, such person being the owner of the proposed facility or an individual duly authorized to bind the owner of the facility.” This reservation of rights placed interested lessors on notice that only responsive lessors could be invited to negotiations. While TCC and NLH were two of the potential lessors that submitted replies in response to the ITN, the bidders submitted different proposals. TCC submitted a proposal for an existing building, and NLH submitted a proposal for a non- existing building. During an initial review of all replies, FWC determined TCC’s reply to be nonresponsive based on TCC’s response to ITN section IV.G (Tenant Improvements) and a statement titled “Additional Response” that TCC submitted with its reply. As a result, FWC did not evaluate or score TCC’s reply. After TCC’s reply was declared nonresponsive, there were no further negotiations with TCC regarding the ITN. NLH’s reply passed the initial responsiveness review and was then evaluated and scored by FWC. FWC ultimately issued an intended award of the contract to NLH after conducting negotiations. Tenant-Improvement Cap The ITN prohibited vendors from proposing conditional or contingent lease rates that included a tenant-improvement cap, or allowance. A tenant-improvement cap reflects the maximum amount the landlord is willing to spend to make improvements to leased space. Mr. Hakimi asserted that the tenant-improvement cap would be an incentive to FWC to enter a lease. However, the tenant-improvement cap would also place a limit on improvements. According to ITN section IV.E, any reply offering a lease rate with a tenant-improvement cap would be deemed nonresponsive: FULL SERVICE (GROSS) RENTAL RATE The Offeror shall provide FWC with a Full Service (gross) lease structure. Therefore, the lease rate must include base rent, taxes, all operating expenses (including, but not limited to, janitorial services and supplies, utilities, water, insurance, interior and exterior maintenance, recycling services, garbage disposal, pest control, security system installation and maintenance, and any amortization of required tenant improvements to the proposed space). There shall be no pass through of additional expenses . . . . Offerors must provide their best, firm lease rates. Lease rates that are contingent, involve a basic rate plus “cap” or “range” for such things as tenant improvements will be deemed nonresponsive. The ITN also provided, in section IV.G, that any current lessor must meet all ITN requirements, including those set forth in ITN Attachment A: TENANT IMPROVEMENTS The State requires a “turn-key” build-out by the Landlord. Therefore, Offeror shall assume all cost risks associated with delivery in accordance with the required specifications detailed in this ITN, including Attachment A (see pages 28-45). Additionally, replies for space which is currently under lease with, or occupancy by, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission does not exclude the Offeror from meeting the requirements specified in this ITN document. Offeror agrees to provide “turn-key” build-out/improvements in accordance with the specifications detailed in this ITN. (use an X to mark one of the following): YES or NO TCC responded “NO” to the statement “Offeror agrees to provide ‘turn-key’ build-out/improvements in accordance with the specifications detailed in this ITN.” Additional Response Not only did TCC include a barred tenant-improvement cap, but TCC also attached an addendum to its proposal, which provided the following: The reality is that as the current Landlord, it would be impossible to ask FFWCC to move out of its existing office space in order to meet the requested Agency Specifications in Attachment A. If this condition makes our response to the Invitation to Negotiate (ITN) “non-responsive”, we stand willing to continue further negotiations with FFWCC. There was no provision in the ITN for additional responses outside what was requested in the ITN. More importantly, the addendum indicated TCC could not comply with the ITN, unless certain conditions were met. Mr. Hakimi confirmed the effect of what was written in the addendum when he testified that TCC is unable to meet Attachment A’s specifications because it presently has a tenant in place (i.e., FWC) that prevents it from constructing the building improvements necessary to comply with ITN Attachment A. Proof of Ownership of Property The ITN also provided that to be responsive, each lessor was required to submit certain documentation demonstrating the lessor’s control of the property proposed for the leased space: Replies must completely and accurately respond to all requested information, including the following: (A) Control of Property (Applicable for Replies for Existing and/or Non- Existing Buildings). For a Reply to be responsive, it must be submitted by one of the entities listed below, and the proposal must include supporting documentation proving control of the property proposed. This requirement applies to: The real property (land); The proposed building(s) (or structure(s); The proposed parking area(s). Control of parking includes the area(s) of ingress and egress to both the real property and the building(s). The owner of record of the facility(s) and parking area(s) – Submit a copy of the deed(s) evidencing clear title to the property proposed. The authorized agent, broker or legal representative of the owner(s) – Submit a copy of the Special Power of Attorney authorizing submission of the proposal. The Special Power of Attorney form was attached to the ITN as Attachment K. TCC’s certification was executed by TCC president, Lyda Hakimi. However, TCC did not execute Attachment K or include an executed power of attorney to demonstrate that TCC has control of the property. The evidence offered at hearing of the property’s ownership contained in TCC’s reply was a deed showing DRA CRT Tallahassee Center, LLC to be the property owner. Respondent argued that although TCC owns DRA CRT Tallahassee Center, LLC, the two are different legal entities. Because these were two different legal entities, TCC was required to provide a copy of Attachment K to its response to be deemed responsive. Broker Commission The ITN required lessors to agree to execute a broker- commission agreement, which was attached to the ITN as Attachment J: Offeror understands FWC is utilizing the services of a Tenant Broker representative for this lease space requirement and the successful Offeror shall execute a Commission Agreement, in coordination with FWC’s Tenant Broker representative, within fifteen (15) business days of notification of Award. Offeror agrees and acknowledges that a Tenant Broker Commission Agreement is a requirement and the successful Offeror shall be required to execute a Commission Agreement as described above. (use an X to mark one of the following): YES or NO The ITN included a schedule for the commission rate based on the total aggregate gross base rent that could be paid ranging from 2.50 percent to 3.50 percent. TCC conditioned its reply by agreeing to pay a two-percent broker commission, which is inconsistent with the commission schedule. By offering a lower commission rate, TCC could save money. TCC would then have a competitive advantage over other bidders. TCC’S Bid was Nonresponsive Based upon the foregoing, TCC’s bid submission added a tenant-improvement cap, failed to comply with the broker commission rate, failed to provide supporting documents to demonstrate proof of property ownership, and added additional conditions regarding compliance with the ITN requirements. The information requested and terms of the ITN were required for TCC’s bid to be responsive. TCC did not file a challenge to the specifications or any of the requirements of the ITN. It is now too late for such a challenge. TCC’s inclusion of a tenant-improvement allowance limits the amount that would pay for improvements. The lower broker commission increases the profit advantage for TCC more than for other bidders, which would be an unfair advantage over other bidders. TCC’s failure to comply with the terms of the ITN and failure to provide the required attachment to show proof of ownership were not minor irregularities, which FWC could waive. Therefore, FWC properly determined that TCC’s bid submission was nonresponsive. Standing TCC submitted a bid proposal that did not conform to the requirements of the ITN and it seeks relief that includes setting aside FWC’s rejection of its proposal. Therefore, TCC has standing to bring this protest. If it is determined that TCC was nonresponsive, NLH has standing to the extent the procurement process could be deemed contrary to competition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission enter a final order dismissing Tallahassee Corporate Center, LLC’s Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 2018.
