The Issue The ultimate issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent should award a contract in accordance with an invitation to bid to the Petitioner, to some other bidder, or reject all bids and reissue an invitation. Petitioner contends that it was the low bidder in response to the invitation; that its bid was responsive; and to the extent that it was not responsive, any defects were of a minor sort which should be waived. Petitioner contends that the Respondent has previously waived irregularities such as existed in the Petitioner's bid and should therefore waive them in this case. The Respondent contends that the Petitioner's bid was not responsive, that the irregularities in Petitioner's bid are not minor, that any mistakes the Respondent has made in past acquisitions should not be repeated, and that the contract should be awarded to another company.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent issued an invitation to bid for a project known as the "Animal Science/Dairy Science Building" at the University of Florida. The project was given No. BR-108 by the Respondent. Petitioner was the lowest bidder in response to the invitation. The next lowest bidder, Charles R. Perry Construction Company, submitted a bid approximately $37,000 higher than Petitioner's bid. Perry has not filed any formal protest nor intervened in this proceeding. Petitioner is a responsible contractor and has in the past entered into construction contracts with the Respondent. Petitioner's bid was rejected by the Respondent. The Petitioner protested the rejection of its bid in a timely manner. Paragraph "B-15" of the bid specifications provides in pertinent part, as follows: In order that the Owner may be assured that only qualified and competent sub- contractors will be employed on the project, each Bidder shall submit with his Proposal a list of the subcontractors who would perform the work for each Divi- sion of the Specifications as indicated by the "List of Subcontractors" form contained in these Specifications... only one subcontractor shall be listed for each phase of the work. * * * No change shall be made in the list of subcontractors, before or after the award of a contract, unless agreed to in writing by the Owner. Section "B" of the invitation for bid provided space for the bidder to list the name and address of subcontractors for the roofing, masonry, plumbing, mechanical, electrical, meat processing equipment, and controls and instrumentation phases of the project. In Section "B" of its bid, Petitioner listed two subcontractors for the plumbing, mechanical, and controls and instrumentation phases of the project. Listing two subcontractors does not comport with the bid specification requiring that only one subcontractor be listed for each phase. Petitioner listed two subcontractors because one of the subcontractors submitted a proposal to Petitioner only fifteen minutes prior to the time when the bid had to be submitted, and Petitioner was unsure of whether the last-minute proposal included all of the work that the Petitioner anticipated would be required. In addition, Petitioner felt that one of the subcontractors may not have been acceptable to the Respondent. The requirement that bidders list only one subcontractor for each phase of a project helps to discourage "bid shopping." Bid shopping is a practice whereby a contractor who receives a bid from a subcontractor approaches another subcontractor with that bid and encourages the other subcontractor to reduce its price. If the other subcontractor responds, this reduced price can be taken back to the original subcontractor. The original subcontractor is then confronted with the choices of either lowering its bid or losing the project. Bid shopping that occurs after a bid has been accepted by the owner does not benefit the owner. It benefits only the bidder, who is able to reduce its costs and therefore increase its profit. Requiring that one subcontractor be listed for each phase cannot serve to completely eliminate bid shopping. A contractor could still bid shop by listing itself as the subcontractor, then after winning the contract shop between several subcontractors. A contractor could also bid shop by changing subcontractors after the bid award. In either case, however, the contractor would need to secure the approval of the owner. The practice is thus discouraged. If a bidder lists two subcontractors for a phase of the project, that bidder would have an advantage over those who listed only one subcontractor. Listing two subcontractors enables the bidder to make a choice as to the best subcontract bid at a time later than the choice is made by bidders who list only one subcontractor. In addition, listing two subcontractors makes it easier for the bidder to engage in bid shopping, which would be more difficult for bidders who listed only one subcontractor. Paragraph "B-24" of the bid specifications for this project provides in pertinent part: The Contract will be awarded . . . to the lowest qualified bidder pro- vided his bid is reasonable and it is in the best interest of the Owner to accept it. * * * The Owner reserves the right to waive any informality in bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the Owner. The listing of two subcontractors for phases of the project is not a mere informality in the bid. It is directly contrary to Paragraph "B-15" of the bid specifications. It would not be in the interest of the owner to accept a bid in which two subcontractors are listed for phases of the project. The integrity of the acquisition process would be damaged by allowing such a deviation because a bidder who listed two subcontractors would have gained an advantage over bidders who complied with the bid specifications. It is not in the best interest of the Respondent to waive the defect in the Petitioner's bid. On at least two prior occasions, the Respondent awarded contracts to bidders who listed more than one subcontractor per phase of the work. One of these projects was for a gymnasium at Florida Atlantic University (Project No. BR-603). Another was for a window replacement project at Florida State University (Project No. BR-342). In at least three other projects, the Respondent awarded contracts where the bidder failed to list the name of any subcontractor for one or more phases of the work. These were for the cancer center at the University of South Florida (Project No. BR-569), the student housing facility at the University of South Florida (Project No. BR-576), and an expansion project at Florida A & M University (Project No. BR-343). The bid specifications for all of these projects were not offered into evidence; however, the Respondent had utilized the same specifications as required in this project at all pertinent times. Failing to list any subcontractor for a phase of a project constitutes approximately the same defect in a bid response as listing two subcontractors. It provides even greater opportunities for bid shopping and an advantage to the bidder over those who list subcontractors as required by the specifications. In several other projects, it appears that the Respondent has awarded contracts to bidders whose bids contained defects of the same magnitude, but a different sort than the listing of two subcontractors. It does not appear that the Respondent has awarded contracts where bidders have listed more than one subcontractor, no subcontractor, or otherwise violated bid specifications because of any policy or because of any expressed waiver of the defect. Rather, it appears that the Respondent has not adequately policed bids to determine responsiveness to the bid specifications. This is especially true with respect to the listing of subcontractors. It appears that no one on the Respondent's staff took the responsibility to consider whether one subcontractor was listed for each phase of a project as required in the specifications. The only policy that the Respondent established was a policy of being too lax in examining bids. The Petitioner did not list two subcontractors for various phases of this project because of any reliance on past conduct of the Respondent. Petitioner's agent overlooked the bid requirements in Preparing its bid response. In prior bids submitted by the Petitioner in response to bid invitations issued by Respondent, Petitioner listed only one subcontractor, as required. Generally, unless it is otherwise required, Petitioner prefers to list two subcontractors because of the flexibility it provides to the owner and to Petitioner. Petitioner was not aware that Respondent had previously awarded contracts to bidders who listed more than one subcontractor for a phase of the work when it submitted its bid in this instance.
The Issue These proceedings arose as the result of a bid solicita- tion issued by Respondent, Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), whereby DOAH sought the lease of office space. DOAH disqualified two proposals submitted by Petitioner, Parkway- Oakland General Partnership (Parkway), and proposed to award the lease to Intervenor, American National Bank of Florida (American Bank). Parkway protested the disqualification of its proposals and the intended award. The Koger Company (Koger) also protested the intended award, but filed a voluntary dismissal prior to the final hearing in Case No. 88-3357BID. By separate order, this Hearing Officer has entered an order closing her file on Case No. 88-3357BID. The disputed issues are described as follows by the parties in their prehearing stipulation and at final hearing: 1. Whether Parkway bid an existing, dry and measurable building. 2. Whether American Bank bid an existing dry and measurable building. 3. Whether DOAH acted arbitrarily and capriciously by disqualifying Parkway's proposals and by evaluating American Bank's proposal. At final hearing, Parkway called Jack B. Tobin, Tony Benton, William M. Baldwin, and Al Rudolph as witnesses. Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 3 were received into evidence. DOAH called Linda C. Spears, Mary V. Goodman, and Stephen F. Dean as witnesses. DOAH's Exhibits 1 through 2 were received into evidence and portions of the deposition of Marilyn Lawrence were read into the record. . American Bank called Donald L. Feather as a witness, The transcript of the hearing was filed on August ll, 1988, and the parties were to file Proposed recommended orders within ten days of the filing of the transcript. The parties’ Proposals have been addressed in the appendix to this recommended order.
Findings Of Fact Based on stipulations of the Parties, on the exhibits received in evidence and ‘on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: 1. DOAH issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for over 2,000 square Feet of office space in Tallahassee, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2) ‘The RFP was prepared using the Department of General Services! (DGS) guidelines (TR 89) and DGS Porm BPM 4136, which is a solicitation format Prepared by DGS for use by all State agencies. (TR 123 and Rule 13M-1.015(3)(e)) 2. Parkway submitted three bid Proposals, two of which were disqualified by DOAH. American Bank submitted a proposal which was determined by the evaluation committee to be the lowest and best proposal. (Prehearing Stipulation) 3. One of the disqualified Proposals submitted by Parkway was known as the "Option Proposal." In this arrangement, DOAH was to continue occupying the space it was currently leasing until October, 1988 at which time, DOAH would move into Building "B" located at 2001 Old St. Augustine Road. (TR 18, 19, 86, and Pet. Exhibit 1) - 4. The other disqualified Proposal submitted by Parkway was known as the "Park Proposal." The Park Proposal was for 2001 Old St. Augustine Road, where two buildings called Building "a" and Building "B" were being constructed. Both buildings were identical in size, shape and total construction. (TR 28) ‘The Park Proposal submitted by Parkway contains two Photographs and four drawings. (Pet. Ex, 2) One of the Photographs depicts Building "A." (TR 34) Three of the four drawings relate to Building "B" and one of the drawings relates. to Building "A" and related site development. The Proposal never clearly identified a specific building at 2001 Old St. Augustine Road as being the building bid. However, during the evaluation committee's site visit at 2001 Old st, Augustine Road, a representative of the Parkway indicated Building "B" was the building proposed for lease by DOAH. (TR 98) 5. American Bank submitted a Proposal for the space located in a former bowling alley on Apalachee Parkway. This space is herein referred to as the old bowling alley. (TR 60) 6. Form BPM 4136, which is the bid solicitation document, contains the following requirement: The proposed space must be in an existing building. To be considered as existing, the space must be dry and capable of being physically measured to deter-— mine net rentable square footage at the time of bid Submittal. Renovations to bring the facility into compliance with all applicable Federal, State and local codes and regulations and/or to meet the desired arrangements are permitted, it (sic) carried out in accordance with prescribed Procedures. (Emphasis in original.) 7. DGS interprets the requirement of an existing building to mean that the building must be enclosed with flooring, a roof, and walls and that exterior doors and windows must be in Place or the building must be such that the exterior is enclosed so that it is dry in adverse weather. Additionally, the building must be capable of being measured by pulling a tape inside the building to determine the net rentable Square footage. (TR 116) The purpose of having the dry and measurable criteria is to distinguish between an existing building and one that is to be built or that is Partially complete. (TR 119) 8. On May 13, 1988, the date of the bid submittal, Building "B" was not an existing building. (Prehearing Stipulation) Building "A" had a roof, a Slab, and walls, which comprised 50 percent of the vertical Plane from the slab to the roof. The windows and exterior doors in Building "A" had not been installed on May 13, 1988, (TR 40-42, 96-97, 147) Building "a" had a four foot overhang but the testimony of Mr. Tobin that the Overhang prevented rain from entering the building is not credible, given the large amount of window space which was not enclosed. (TR 51) 9. On May 13, 1988, the old bowling alley had walls, a slab, and portions of the exterior walls were boarded over, possibly in the location of existing windows or window openings. (TR 63, 109, 133, 134) The roof did have a hole, which was approximately three feet in length and allowed water to leak into the building. (TR 118, 119) The interior of the old bowling alley was capable of being measured. (TR 67, 119) The old bowling alley is an existing building. (TR 118-119) 10. After the bid solicitation document was issued, representatives of the Parkway met with staff of DOAH, (TR 27, 91) A DOAH staff member advised Parkway representatives that Parkway could "bid the park," but it had to bid an existing building which was dry and measurable. (TR 46, 80, 93, 138, 139) ll. At the prebid conference, DOAH representatives advised a Prospective bidder, in the Presence of a Parkway representative, that in order for a building. to be considered for the contract, it must be existing and dry and measurable at the time the bids were submitted. (TR 94, 95) 12. At the time Parkway submitted its proposals, neither Building "A" nor Building "B" was an existing building as defined by the bid solicitation document. 13, At the time Parkway submitted its proposals, Parkway was negotiating with a Private company for the lease of Building "A" (TR 77,27) and Parkway entered into a lease for Building "A" with the Private company on dune 13, 1988. (TR 43, 45) Thus, even if Building "A" had -been an existing building at the time the bids were Submitted, it is not available for lease to DOAH. (TR 45)
Conclusions CASE NO. CASE NO. 88-3357BID 88-3358BID On September 1, 1988, the Hearing Officer who conducted a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, in the above-styled case submitted her Recommended Order to the undersigned and all parties of record. A copy of the Recommended Order is attached as Exhibit A. In ays accordance with Rule 28-5.404, all parties were allowed twenty days in which to. file..exceptions..to.. the. Recommended Order. °.To date, none of the parties have submitted exceptions. The Recommended Order came before me as agency head for final agency action.” Having considered the Recommended Order, the exhibits admitted into evidence at final hearing and the transcript of the final hearing conducted on August 1, 1988, it is ORDERED that.the Recommended Order, attached as Exhibit A, is adopted as the final order of the agency. Accordingly, the protest filed by Parkway-Oakland General Partnership in Case No. 88-3358BID is dismissed and Lease No. 510:0049 is awarded to American National Bank of Florida. DONE AND ORDERED this o%/~& day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. | Lh aap A ssi SHARYN SMITH Director Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this Qist day of September, 1988.
Recommendation SEE NVDATION Based on the foregoing, it recommended that the Division of Administrative Hearings enter a final order dismissing Case No. 88-3358BID ang awarding Lease No. 510:0049 to American National Bank of Florida. st : RECOMMENDED this /*~ day of September, 1988, in buce BK ghhad SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Office of General Counsel Department of General Services Room 452, Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0955 (904)487-1082 Tallahassee, Florida. Filed with the Clerk of the Department of General Services this /od day of September, 1988 Copies furnished to: Kim Cecile Rice Lobrano & Kincaid, P.A. Suite 810, 121 Forsyth Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 William A. Bald, Esquire Dale & Bald 2900 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Robert D. Newell, Jr. Newell and Stahl, P.A. 817 North Gadsden Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6313 Mark Rubin, Esquire 777 Arthur Godfrey Road Suite 320 Miami Beach, Florida 33140 10 APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 68-3358B1D The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case, ’ Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Parkway-Oakland General Partnership Proposed Finding of Fact No. 1 is incorporated in Finding of Fact Nos. 1 and 2. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 2 is incorporated in Finding of Fact Nos. 2, 3, and 4. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 3 is incorporated in Finding of Pact No. 8 and is covered in the Introduction and Issues, Proposed Finding of Fact Wo. 4 is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. . Proposed Finding of Fact No. 5 is covered in the Introduction and Issues. The first sentence in Proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 is subordinate and unnecessary. The remainder of the proposed finding of fact is rejected as not supported by the record as a whole, as conclusionary, and as mere recital of testimony. . The first sentence in Proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 8. The remainder of the proposed finding of fact is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. The portion of Proposed Finding of Fact No. 8 which indicates that windows were not installed at the time of the bid submittal and that the building had a four foot overhang is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 8. The remainder of the proposed finding of fact is rejected as mere recitation of testimony, conclusionary, speculative and not supported by the record as a whole. The first two sentences of Proposed Finding of Fact No. 9 are cumulative in part and subordinate and unnecessary to the facts aB found. ll 10. ll. 12, 13. 14, 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 2i. 22. 23. 24. In Proposed Finding of Fact No. 10, the fact that the building proposed by American Bank had a hole in the roof is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 9. The remainder of the Proposed finding of fact is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 11 is cumulative. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 12 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 10. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 13 is rejected as not supported by the record as a whole. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 14 is rejected as not supported by the record as a whole. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 15 is subordinate and unnecessary as to the facts as found. The first paragraph in Proposed Finding of Fact No. 16 is mere recitation of testimony, subordinate, and unnecessary. The last paragraph is rejected as conclusionary and not supported by the record as a whole. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 17 is rejected as conclusionary and not supported by the record as a whole. Ms. Goodman's testimony did not contradict the testimony of Ms. Spears. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 18 is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. . Proposed Finding of Fact No. 19 is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 20 is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 21 is mere recitation of testimony, subordinate, and unnecessary to the facts as found. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 22 is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. . Proposed Finding of Fact No. 23 is subordinate and unneccessary to the facts as found. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 24 is cumulative and mere recitation of testimony. To the extent that the testimony indicates that Building "A" was not an existing building that is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 12. 12 25. 10. Ti. 12. 13. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 25 is subordinate and unneccessay to the facts as found. Specific Rulings on Joint Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted By DOAH and American Bank Proposed Finding of Pact No. 1 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. l. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 2 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 6. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 3 is incorporated in Finding of Pact Nos. 2, 3, and 4. To the extent not subordinate and unnecessary, Proposed Finding of Pact No. 4 is incorporated in Finding of Fact - Nos. 4 and 8. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 5 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 8. . Proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 is subordinate and unnecessary. To the extent not subordinate and unnecessary, Proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 8 is subordinate and unnecessary. To the extent not subordinate and unnecessary, Proposed Finding of Fact No. 9 ig incorporated in Finding of Fact No. To the extent not subordinate and unnecessary, Proposed Finding of Fact No. 10 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 13. Proposed Finding of Fact Nos. 11, 12, and 13 are subordinate and unnecessary. . To the extent not subordinate and unnecessary, Proposed Finding of Fact No. 14 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 4. : Proposed Finding of Fact No. 15 is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. 13 Proposed Finding of Pact No. unnecessary. Proposed Finding of Fact No. unnecessary. Proposed Finding of Fact No. in Finding of Fact No. 7 Proposed Finding of Fact No. in Finding of Fact No. 9. Proposed Finding of Fact No. in Finding of Fact No. 9 To the extent not subordinat Finding of Fact No. Proposed Finding of Fact No. unnecessary. Proposed Finding of Fact No. in Finding of Fact No. 10, Proposed Finding of Fact No. in Finding of Fact No. 10. Proposed Finding of Fact No. of Fact Nos. 10 and 1l. 16 17 18 19 20 is is is is is subordinate and subordinate and modified and incorporated modified and incorporated modified and incorporated e and unnecessary, Proposed 21 is incorporated in Finding of Fact 22 is subordinate and 23 is is is modified and incorporated modified and incorporated incorporated in Finding oye STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS THE KOGER COMPANY, Petitioner, “Vs. DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, Respondent, and AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA, Intervenor. PARKWAY-—OAKLAND GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, Petitioner, vs. DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, Respondent, and AMERICAN NATIONAL” BANK OF ~ FLORIDA, Intervenor. ew
Other Judicial Opinions A...PARTY .WHO..IS.. ADVERSELY AFFECTED. BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH PROCEEDINGS ARE COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF. ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND A SECOND COPY, ACCOMPANIED BY FILING FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, OR WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE PARTY RESIDES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO REVIEWED. Copies furnished: Kim Cecile Rice, Esquire LOBRANO & KINCAID, P.A. Suite 810, 121 Forsyth Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 William A. Bald, Esquire DALE & BALD 2900 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Robert D. Newell, dr., Esquire NEWELL AND STAHL, P.A. 817 North Gadsden Street __ Se Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6313 Mark Rubin, Esquire 777 Arthur Godfrey Road Suite 320 Miami Beach, Florida 33140 Susan B. Kirkland, Esquire Office of General Counsel Department of General Services Room 452, Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0955
Findings Of Fact Respondent, through its Invitation to Bid (ITB) No. 123-395-98-C Rebid, seeks to award a 12-month contract for, the purchase of electronic data processing cards. Bids were opened on November 10, 1981, at which time Petitioner was the apparent low bidder. However, Respondent disqualified Petitioner's bid because Data Specialties Mart did not have a corporate charter number and had no manufacturing capability on the bid opening date. S. F. Holdings, Inc., is a Florida corporation, Charter No. 637983. Data Specialties Mart is a division of this corporation and has been assigned Vendor No. 00417 by Respondent. Confusion over Petitioner's identity arose from the section on Respondent's ITB where the vendor name is to be entered. Petitioner placed the name "Data Specialties Mart, Inc.," (non-existent as a corporation) in this block. Petitioner did, however, enter the S. F. Holdings, Inc., charter number and the Data Specialties Mart vendor number in adjacent blocks. A letter attached to the bid describes Data Specialties Mart as a marketing division of S. F. Holdings, Inc. Although this letter did not have as its purpose correction of the above error, it did provide the clarification Respondent should have sought. Furthermore, this relatively minor discrepancy could have been resolved through contact with the Petitioner. Petitioner stated by letter dated November 9, 1981, (attached to its bid) that "The cards will be produced through our Lakeland, Florida manufacturing facilities (formally [sic] known as National Electronics Computing Supplies, Inc.)." Respondent investigated the claimed ownership and determined that Petitioner did not possess the manufacturing facility on the bid opening date, November 10, 1981, as represented. Petitioner's president, who signed the letter, believed he would acquire the facility at a November 16, 1981, bankruptcy proceeding and thus claimed the facility for bid purposes. Although Petitioner did acquire the factory as anticipated, it possessed no manufacturing capability on the bid opening date.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order dismissing the petition. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Dean Bunch, Esquire Ervin, Varn, Jacobs, Odom and Kitchen Post Office Box 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William P. Beck, Esquire Department of General Services 457 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas R. Brown, Executive Director Department of General Services Room 115, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact By Invitation to Bid for Lease NO. 590:1944, Respondent invited lease proposals for approximately 15,206 square feet of office space "located within the following boundaries: On the North, Aloma Avenue/Fairbanks Avenue the East, Semoran Boulevard the South, Colonial Drive, and on the West, Mills Avenue." The geographic area includes as many as 100 office buildings, although the invitation only generated three bids. The Invitation to Bid announced a Pre-Bid Conference on December 22, 1987. Interested parties were directed to contact Linda N. Treml, whose telephone number was provided, for "bid specifications and information regarding the space." The Invitation to Bid stated that "[a]ny questions concerning this project are to be directed to [Ms. Treml]" and "prospective bidders are encouraged to consult with [Ms. Treml] beforehand in an attempt to enable as correct a bid submittal as possible." The Invitation to Bid required that certain attachments accompany the bid proposal and referred the prospective bidder to paragraph 9 of the Bid submittal Form. The required attachments included a scaled floorplan "showing present configurations with measurements," net rentable square footage calculations using floorplan measurements, and a preliminary site layout. The Invitation to Bid stated that Respondent reserved the right to waive any minor informalities or technicality and seek clarification" of bids received, when such is in the best interest of the state. Responding to Respondent's newspaper advertisement and direct-mail solicitation for bids, James W. Boyle, who is a real estate broker active in leasing and property management, requested from Ms. Treml an Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form. Mr. Boyle regularly reviews announcements of forthcoming leasing activity by state agencies. If he is aware of a building that appears to meet the agency's requirements, he contacts the building's owner or manager and informs him or her that he may have a prospective tenant. After receiving the bid materials for Lease No. 590:1944, Mr. Boyle contacted Kathryn Doyle, who is the leasing manager of Petitioner, and learned that Petitioner could accommodate Respondent's space needs for the term sought in the Lakeview 436 office building. Mr. Boyle assisted Ms. Doyle in the preparation of the Bid Submittal Form for Petitioner. In his first conversation with Ms. Doyle, Mr. Boyle ascertained that Petitioner's building carried a Semoran Boulevard street address and in fact had direct access to Semoran Boulevard. Petitioner's building lies on the east side of Semoran Boulevard, which serves as the eastern boundary of the geographic area described in the Invitation to Bid. Three bids were submitted in response to the subject Invitation to Bid. When they were opened, Ms. Treml and her supervisor, George A. Smith, determined that bids of Petitioner and a third party were nonresponsive because their office buildings were outside the geographic area specified in the Invitation to Bid. These bids were not considered further. Mr. Boyle had previously represented the owners of the FARE building several months earlier in a bid for Lease No. 590:1895. The Invitation to Bid in that case, which was issued by Respondent and named Ms. Treml as the contact person, provided that the proposed office space must be located within the following boundaries: Beginning at the intersection of US 17-92 and Colonial Drive, then west on Colonial Drive to the intersection of Edgewater Drive, then north on Edgewater Drive to the intersection of Kennedy Blvd. . ., then east on Kennedy Blvd. . . . to the intersection of US 17-92, then south on US 17- 92 to the point of beginning." Although Mr. Boyle's client was not awarded Lease NO. 590:1895 for reasons not relevant here, his client's bid, as well as the bid of another unsuccessful bidder owning a building on the east side of the highway serving as the east boundary of the geographic area, were considered responsive and thus within the specified geographic area. Ms. Treml interpreted the boundary description in Lease NO. 590:1944 differently from the boundary description in Lease NO. 590:1895. The description for Lease NO. 590:1895 defined the boundaries by "beginning" at a certain intersection, then proceeding "on" a highway, and so on. The description for Lease NO. 590:1944 defined the boundaries by identifying landmarks "on the north," then the "east," and so on. At the time of assisting in the preparation of Petitioner's bid, Mr. Boyle was also aware of an Invitation to Bid issued by Respondent for Lease NO. 590:1875. In this case, Respondent specified office space "in the following area of Brevard County, Florida: Beginning at the intersection of U.S. Highway 1 and State Road 50, then West on SR-50 to the intersection of 1-95, then North on 1-95 to the intersection of SR-406 . . . then East on SR-406 to the intersection of U.S. 1, then South on U.S. 1 to the point of beginning." In the case of Lease NO. 590:1875, the bid contact person, Lynn Mobley, issued a clarification letter stating that any building located on either side of the boundary road with an address on the boundary road would be considered to be within the boundary. Ms. Mobley and her supervisor, Ernest Wilson, who are Respondent's District 7 Facilities Services Assistant Manager and Manager, respectively, have consistently advised potential bidders that a building located on a boundary highway is included in the geographic area even though it would be outside the area if the dividing line were the centerline of the highway. Mary Goodman, Chief, Bureau of Property Management of the Department of General Services, testified that, in the course of her review of leasing activities by various state agencies, she has historically guided agencies that, if a building abuts a boundary highway but is not, strictly speaking, within it, the agency "could waive that as a minor technicality and consider it a responsive bid." Neither Mr. Boyle, Ms. Doyle, or any other representative of Petitioner spoke to Ms. Goodman prior to submitting the subject bid proposal. Ms. Treml customarily waives minor irregularities in bid submittals. However, she does not treat the location of a building outside the geographic area as a minor irregularity. To do so would be unfair to owners of other buildings outside the geographic area who took the geographic description at its face value and never submitted bids. Ms. Doyle received the bid materials from Mr. Boyle after the Pre-Bid Conference had taken place. However, Mr. Boyle elected not to attend the Pre- Bid Conference at which Ms. Treml explained, among other things, her interpretation of the specific geographic area. He chose not to attend because he felt that he would not learn anything relevant at the conference, which was attended by a representative of Intervenor. Neither Mr. Boyle, Ms. Doyle, or any other representative of Petitioner contacted Ms. Treml prior to submitting Petitioner's bid. Mr. Boyle, whose compensation in this case is entirely contingent upon a successful bid, estimates that he spent about 20 hours working on Petitioner's bid. Ms. Doyle estimates that she spent about 40 hours working on the bid. Petitioner also spent $800 in obtaining an "as-built" drawing of the space that accompanied its proposal. By letter dated February 22, 1988, Respondent notified the bidders of its decision to award the lease contract to Intervenor. Petitioner filed a notice of intent to protest the award by letter dated February 24, 1988. Ms. Treml met Mr. Boyle and Ms. Doyle on March 1, 1988, and cited the location of Petitioner's building as the only reason for the determination of nonresponsiveness. The attempt at mediation having failed, Petitioner filed a formal written protest of the award by letter dated March 3, 1988. Petitioner attached to its bid proposal an "as-built" drawing. Although drawn to scale, the drawing did not bear the measurements of the then- present interior tenant improvements, mostly walls, nor did it disclose on its face any calculations showing how the rentable area was computed from the gross area. These omissions were due to Mr. Boyle's advice to Ms. Doyle that such information would be unnecessary in this case. The omissions from Petitioner's "as-built" drawing were rendered less critical by the fact that Respondent would have the right under the lease to require the landlord, at its expense, to remove the present improvements and re- configure the space to Respondent's demands. However, one purpose of the floorplan is to show where the space is located within the building. Another purpose is to verify the rentable area calculation by showing the measurements of items, such as restrooms, that should not be included in the rentable area for which Respondent is charged rent. The drawing is supposed to show the rentable area computation. Additionally, even though Respondent could insist on a total renovation of the premises, Respondent might wish to evaluate whether it could use a portion of the existing space in order to reduce the possibility of construction delays. George A. Smith, the Senior Management Analyst for Respondent who reviewed Ms. Treml's determination of nonresponsiveness prior to the award of the subject lease, testified that the deficiencies in Petitioner's "as-built" drawing were not a "minor irregularity."
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence submitted and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact. In 1986 DHRS determined the need for a facility in Miami Beach in which to administer various programs, including but not limited to, economic services, food stamps, aged and elderly services and medicaid. In December of 1986 DHRS extended an invitation to bid (Lease No. 590:1802) to individuals or companies interested in providing the type of facility needed in Miami Beach. The Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form for DHRS Lease No. 590:1802 stated that DHRS was seeking approximately 19,198 net rentable square feet of office space to lease within the City of Miami Beach. DHRS desired a ten year lease with a three year option, occupancy by November 1, 1987. January 20, 1987 was established as the bid closing date. The Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form provided in relevant part as follows: Requirements for Bidders to Submit Bids. Control of Property - To submit a responsive bid a prospective lessor must meet one of the following qualifications: Be the owner of record of the facility. Be the lessee of the space to be proposed and present with bid, a copy of lease with documentation of authorization to sublease the facility. * * * (d) Submit documentation of an option to lease the facility with an authori- zation to inturn, sublease. * * * Existing Tenants If the offered space or any portion there- of will be covered by an active lease(s) at the stated availability date, written documentation by the tenant indicating acknowledgment of the bid and ability to vacate premises by the proposed date must be included with the proposal. * * * 14. Parking For this facility the department has determined that a minimum of 120 parking spaces are required to meet its needs. This parking is to be under the control of the bidder, off street, suitably paved and lined. * * * A minimum of 6 spaces of the 120 re- quired must meet the requirements of the Standards for Special Facilities for Physically Disabled, Chapter 13D-1, Florida Administrative Code. 28. Miscellaneous Requirements * * * (8) Bidders must have appropriate and pertinent zoning approval by bid opening date and this must be documented by the City of Miami Beach and such proof must be included as part of the bid submittal form. * * * Attachments Required to be Submitted with Bid Submittal for Existing Building * * * Floor Plan Site Layout * * * Documentation showing bidder as controller of property, if not owner of record. * * * Documented zoning approval from City of Miami Beach. * * * Definition of Terms * * * Existing Building - To be considered as existing, the entire space being bid must be dry and capable of being physically measured to determine net rentable square footage... * * * Evaluation of Bids 1. Bids received are first evaluated to determine technical responsiveness. This includes submittal on bid submittal form, inclusion of required information and date, bid signed and notarized. Non-responsive bids will be withdrawn from further con- sideration. * * * In response to the invitation to bid, four bidders, Procacci, Causeway, Alton Road and Rae Lin Realty (Rae Lin) timely submitted bids to DHRS. After bid openings, DHRS reviewed each bid and prepared an initial comparative synopsis. Upon initial review DHRS determined that Alton Road submitted the only responsive bid. Thereafter, DHRS allowed the three other bidders the opportunity to clarify certain "questionable" parts of their bids in an effort to determine if the bids were in fact non-responsive. After an evaluation of the bid proposals plus the information gathered in the "clarification process," DHRS concluded that the bids of Procacci, Causeway and Rae Lin were non-responsive and that the only responsive bid was that of Alton Road. Procacci's bid was found non-responsive due to an insufficient amount of net square footage and lack of control of parking spaces. Thirteen of the parking spaces offered by Procacci were municipal parking spaces with annual reservations. DHRS allowed Procacci the opportunity to re-measure and possibly re-adjust the square footage submitted in its bid. DHRS also allowed Procacci the opportunity to clarify its control over the municipal parking spaces. Procacci was unable to demonstrate that it could provide the minimum square footage required and could not provide any assurance or documentation that the City of Miami Beach would guarantee the municipal spaces for the full 10 year term of the lease. Procacci's proposal was non-responsive to the invitation to bid. Causeway's bid was found non-responsive because of lack of sufficient net square footage. Causeway was allowed the opportunity to submit floor plans adjusting and clarifying the net square footage contained in its proposal but failed to demonstrate that its proposal would provide the square footage required. Causeway's proposal was non-responsive to the invitation to bid. Rae Lin's bid was found non-responsive because of failure to submit the required zoning approval documentation for the existing building with its bid. Rae Lin was not allowed to clarify this aspect of its bid because zoning approval documentation for the existing building was required to be submitted by the bid opening date. Rae Lin's proposal was non- responsive to the invitation to bid. Alton Road's bid was responsive on its face at the time of bid opening. However, during the initial evaluation process, it was brought to the attention of DHRS that Alton Road might not have actual control over some of its proposed parking spaces. Alton Road was allowed the opportunity to clarify its ability to provide the parking spaces proposed in its bid package. Alton Road was able to demonstrate that it had control over at least 120 parking spaces as called for in the invitation to bid. DHRS found Alton Road's bid responsive in all other respects and gave notice to all bidders of its intent to award the lease to Alton Road, the lowest responsive bidder. Procacci and Causeway submitted timely formal written protests contending that Alton Road's bid is non-responsive. PARKING Alton Road's proposed facility was acquired pursuant to a lease with Potamkin Chevrolet, owner of the property. The lease between Alton Road and Potamkin guaranteed to Alton Road a minimum of one hundred and twenty parking spaces and, if necessary, exclusive right to other parking spaces on property in the proximate vicinity. After bid opening, DHRS was informed by Causeway that two of the parking spaces which Alton Road included in its bid proposal were leased by Potamkin to Causeway and not to Alton Road. During the clarification/evaluation process, Alton Road disputed Causeway's claim and also demonstrated that it's proposal could provide at least 120 parking spaces even if the two parking spaces in question were excluded. In addition, Potamkin owned much of the adjacent property and was bound by its lease with Alton Road to provide 120 exclusive parking spaces. The lease specifically provided that exclusive right to additional parking spaces on property located in the proximate vicinity would be provided if necessary. A portion of Alton Road's proposed parking spaces were being leased by Potamkin to an existing tenant, Miami Beach Wrecker and Towing Services, Inc., at the time of the bid submission. However, there was no evidence that any portion of the property offered by Alton Road would be covered by an active lease of Miami Beach Wrecker or any other tenant on the required availability date of November 1, 1987. The bid submittal form requires that at least six (6) of the one hundred and twenty parking spaces comply with the requirements of the Standards for Special Facilities for the Physically Disabled, Chapter 13D-I, Florida Administrative Code. A complete reading of the bid submittal form in light of Chapter 13D-I, Florida Administrative Code indicates that the invitation to bid contemplated that renovations would be necessary to comply with the handicapped parking specifications and that there was no requirement that the renovations or modifications be completed at the time of bid submission. Alton Road's bid proposal provided for the required six (6) physically handicapped parking spaces. A complete reading of the bid submittal form indicates that bidders were required to include zoning approval for the existing building with their packages but were not required to submit documentation regarding parking space zoning. This interpretation of the bid submittal form's requirements is further supported by the fact that none of the four bidders included documentation as to parking space zoning with their bid proposals and there was no evidence that such a requirement was ever applied to other DHRS bid projects. In its bid proposal, Alton Road submitted one hundred and twenty parking spaces under its control, off-street, suitably paved and lined as required in the invitation to bid. CONTROL OF THE PROPERTY Alton Road's proposed facility was acquired pursuant to a lease between Alton Road and Potamkin Chevrolet. The lease contains a 19 page addendum. Both the lease and addendum are signed by the vice-president of finance of Potamkin Chevrolet. The lease and addendum were executed on January 17, 1987. All signatures on the final page of the addendum are witnessed. The lease specifically states that the addendum is "attached hereto" and "made a part hereof." The bid submitted by Alton Road was responsive to the Invitation to Bid for DHRS Lease Number 590:1802.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services project lease number 590:1802 be awarded to Alton Road Six Corporation. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of July, 1987 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1849BID & 87-1850BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner (Procacci) Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 7 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 10. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as misleading and not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and/or misleading. 15. Rejected as a recitation of testimony/evidence and/or misleading. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and/or misleading. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and/or subordinate. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Rejected as misleading and/or subordinate. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as misleading, subordinate and/or not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence and/or misleading. Although Procacci was not afforded the opportunity to substitute other parking for the thirteen (13) municipal parking spaces included in its proposal, Procacci was provided the opportunity to demonstrate to DHRS that the municipal parking spaces would be guaranteed by the City of Miami Beach for the entire term of the lease. This, Procacci failed to do. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner (Causeway) (a) Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rulings on Joint Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondents and Intervenor Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 7 and 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 7, 8 and 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 7 and 8. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3 and 15. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3 and 15. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 15, matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 12. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 18. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3 and 36. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3 and 36. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9 and 19. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. COPIES FURNISHED: M. Carmen Dominguez, Esquire Robert Rich 401 North West Second Avenue Causeway Properties, Inc. Suite 790 160 Sunny Isles Blvd. Miami, Florida 33128 North Miami, Florida 33160 Louisa P. Maurer Pedro Munilla, Esquire Acting Administrator 1401 South West First Street HRS District XI Suite 210 401 North West Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33135 Room 939 Miami, Florida 33128 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Thomas Hinners Department of Health Procacci Real Estate and Rehabilitative Services Management Co. Ltd. 1323 Winewood Blvd. 3200 North Federal Highway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Suite 221-A Boca Raton, Florida 33431 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Pablo I. Lopez Department of Health and Facilities Service Mgr. Rehabilitative Services Suite 950 1323 Winewood Blvd. 401 North West Second Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Miami, Florida 33138 Sam Power Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Findings based on stipulation The School Board of Broward County, Florida, ["Board"] issued bid number 94-307D [Lease of School Board Owned Parking Lot - Term Contract] on the 22nd day of November, 1993. Three bidders responded to the invitation to bid. They were: Bliss Parking, Inc., a Florida Corporation ("Bliss"); Fort Lauderdale Transportation, Inc., d/b/a USA Parking Systems ("USA"); and Carl A. Borge. An initial review of the tabulations of the bids indicated that Bliss and USA had submitted the identical percentage of shared revenue to the Board in their respective bids. After the review of the bids, Board staff posted a recommendation to award the bid to USA. [See the "remarks" portion of Exhibit B.] A bid protest was filed by Bliss because of the "remarks" portion of Exhibit B. After a review of Bliss' bid protest, Board staff amended its recommendation to reject all bids because of the issues raised in Bliss' protest. After Board staff notified all bidders of this amended recommendation, USA filed a notice and formal protest. The Board, at its meeting on March 1, 1994, heard the presentation of USA and Board staff. The Board, after deliberating the matter, deferred the item until the meeting of March 15, 1994, wherein seven Board members would be present. At the March 15, 1994, Board meeting, by a vote of 4 to 3, the Board granted USA's protest and awarded the bid to USA whom the Board had determined was the highest bidder meeting bid specifications. All bidders were notified of the Board's action and on the 16th day of March 1994 Bliss timely filed its notice of protest and its formal written protest. Bliss appeared with counsel before the Board on the 5th day of April 1994. After considering arguments of counsel for Bliss and reviewing the material in Agenda Item H-1 and in consideration of its previous actions, it voted to reject Bliss' protest seeking the rejection of all bids received and re-bidding of the item. Bliss subsequently requested a formal hearing under Chapter 120.57, Florida Statutes. Findings based on evidence adduced at hearing The General Conditions portion of the Invitation To Bid includes the following provision: INTERPRETATIONS: Any questions concerning conditions and specifications must be submitted in writing and received by the Department of Purchasing no later than five (5) working days prior to the original bid opening date. If necessary, an Addendum will be issued. A related provision in the Special Conditions portion of the Invitation To Bid reads as follows: 21. INFORMATION: Any questions by prospective bidders concerning this Invitation to Bid should be addressed to Mrs. Sharon Swan, Purchasing Agent, Purchasing Department, (305) 765-6086 who is authorized only to direct the attention of prospective bidders to various portions of the Bid so they may read and interpret such for themselves. Neither Mrs. Swan nor any employee of the SBBC is authorized to interpret any portion of the Bid or give information as to the requirements of the Bid in addition to that contained in the written Bid Document. Questions should be submitted in accordance with General Condition #7. Interpretations of the Bid or additional information as to its requirements, where necessary, shall be communicated to bidders only by written addendum. The Special Conditions portion of the subject Invitation To Bid includes the following provisions: REFERENCES: A minimum of three (3) references must be provided by completing page 14 of the bid. Failure to provide references with the bid or within five (5) days of request by the Purchasing Department will be reason for disqualification of bid submitted. All references will be called. SBBC reserves the right to reject bid based on information provided by references. Page 14 of the Invitation To Bid has three sections, each of which reads as follows: COMPANY NAME: STREET ADDRESS: CITY: STATE: ZIP: TELEPHONE NUMBER: CONTACT PERSON'S NAME: NUMBER OF PARKING SPACES: LENGTH OF CONTRACT: At page 12 of the Invitation To Bid, the following note appears under the Bid Summary Sheet portion of the document: "NOTE: Calculation of high bidder shall be the bidder offering the highest percent of shared revenue meeting all specifications and conditions of this bid." The Special Conditions portion of the Invitation To Bid also contains a procedure for resolving tie bids, which reads as follows, in pertinent part: TIE BID PROCEDURES: When identical prices are received from two or more vendors and all other factors are equal, priority for award shall be given to vendors in the following sequence: A business that certifies that it has implemented a drug free work place program shall be given preference in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 287.087, Florida Statutes; The Broward County Certified Minority/ Women Business Enterprise vendor; The Palm Beach or Dade County Certified Minority/Women Business Enterprise vendor; The Florida Certified Minority/Women Business Enterprise vendor; The Broward County vendor, other than a Minority/Women Business Enterprise vendor: The Palm Beach or Dade County vendor, other than a Minority/Women Business Enterprise vendor; The Florida vendor, other than a Minority/Women Business Enterprise vendor. If application of the above criteria does not indicate a priority for award, the award will be decided by a coin toss. The coin toss shall be held publicly in the Purchasing Department; the tie low bid vendors invited to be present as witnesses. The Petitioner filled out all three sections on page 14 of the Invitation To Bid and submitted that page with its bid. The three references listed by the Petitioner were companies for whom the Petitioner provided parking services or parking facilities, but none of the three references listed by the Petitioner was a land owner from whom the Petitioner leased land for the operation of a parking facility. Mr. Arthur Smith Hanby is the Director of Purchasing for the School Board of Broward County. In that capacity he is in charge of the bidding process for the School Board. Specifically, he was in charge of the bidding process for the subject project. In the course of evaluating the bids on the subject project, the evaluation committee reached the conclusion that there was a problem with the bid submitted by the Petitioner with respect to the references listed in the Petitioner's bid. In the original bid tabulation and recommendation posted on January 4, 1994, the recommendation was that the contract be awarded to the Intervenor, whose bid amount tied with the Petitioner's bid amount. 4/ The reasons for the recommendation were described as follows in the "remarks" portion of the tabulation and recommendation form: REJECT BID FROM BLISS PARKING, INC. REFERENCES WERE GIVEN ON PAGE 14 OF BID. ALL REFERENCES WERE CALLED. BASED UPON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THESE REFERENCES AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL CONDITION #10, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE BID FROM BLISS PARKING, INC. BE REJECTED. EVALUATION OF THIS BID CEASED AT THIS TIME. THERE MAY BE ADDITIONAL REASONS WHY THIS BID COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED. The sole reason for the rejection of the Petitioner's bid was that the references listed by the Petitioner were not the types of references the evaluation committee wanted to receive. The evaluation committee wanted references from entities who, like the School Board, were land owners who had leased land to a parking lot operator. The evaluation committee was of the opinion that references from other sources would not adequately protect the interests of the School Board. There is nothing in the Invitation To Bid that addresses the issue of who should be listed as references. Specifically, there is nothing in the Invitation To Bid requiring that references be submitted from land owners who had leased land to a parking lot operator. At the time of the issuance of the subject Invitation To Bid, the Petitioner was operating the subject parking lot for the School Board. There were no material differences in the bids submitted by the Petitioner and the Intervenor other than the differences in the types of references they listed. The Petitioner's references who were contacted did not provide any adverse information about the Petitioner. The evaluation committee spoke to two of the references listed by the Petitioner, but did not speak to the third listed reference. The third reference listed by the Petitioner was a court reporting firm located across the street from the location of the subject parking lot. The evaluation committee did not speak to anyone at the court reporting office because the telephone number listed for that reference was not a working number. The evaluation committee made an unsuccessful attempt to locate the telephone number of the court reporting firm in the telephone book.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order in this case concluding that the Petitioner's bid is responsive to the Invitation To Bid and that the School Board then take one of the courses of action described in paragraph 26, above. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June 1994 at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June 1994.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the bid of Kimball International Marketing, Inc., and Corporate Interiors, Inc., (Petitioners) is the lowest responsible bid which was received by the Pinellas County School Board (Respondent) for systems furniture (partitions) for the New District Administration Building, or in the alternative, whether all bids should be rejected as urged by The Harter Group (Intervenor).
Findings Of Fact On or about February 27, 1990, the Respondent sought competitive bids for systems furniture (partitions) for the New District Administration Building. In response thereto, Respondent timely received three bids, including those of the Petitioners and Intervenor, and one no bid. The bid opening occurred on April 17, 1990, and neither Petitioners nor Intervenor were determined to be the lowest responsible bidder. However, the Petitioners' bid was lower than that of the bidder to whom the Respondent proposes to award this contract. Petitioners' bid was $932,502.39, Intervenor's bid was highest at $1,101,509.90, and the bid of lowest responsible bidder, Haworth, Inc., was $1,072,286.50. The first reason given by Respondent for its determination that Petitioners' bid was not responsive to the bid specifications is that it did not include an amount for sales tax. Intervenor also did not include sales tax in its bid, but Haworth, Inc., which was determined by Respondent to be the lowest responsible bidder, did include sales tax. However, there was no dispute at hearing that the Respondent does not pay sales tax on transactions involving the acquisition of furnishings for the Pinellas County School System, and that Section 9.2.2 of the bid specifications erroneously stated that this contract would not be exempt from sales tax. The second reason given by Respondent for rejecting Petitioners' bid was that it omitted a required page from the approved form which was to be used to list those items in the bid proposal that were not in strict compliance with the Respondent's specifications. Petitioners admit that the required page numbered 00310-7 was not included in their bid, but maintain that it was not necessary to include this exact page since all items in their bid do meet specifications, and since a statement to this effect was included elsewhere in the bid. The lowest responsible bidder, as determined by the Respondent, did include this required page with a statement thereon that "all items comply". Intervenor also included this page listing 11 items in its bid which differed from the specifications. The purpose of this required page is to allow the Respondent to have a uniform, clearly identifiable place in each bid proposal where it can look to determine if the items in that bid meet specifications, without having to check every page of each bid. The third reason given by Respondent for rejecting Petitioners' bid was that it included numerous pages of unit costs which were not called for in the specifications, without any explanation as to their meaning or the purpose for which they were included in the bid. Section 4.1.1 of the bid specifications, found at page 00100-11, makes it clear that no bid form other than that which is set forth in the specifications will be accepted, and specifically states that bidders are not even to retype the form on their letterhead, but are to simply fill-in a copy made from the form in the specifications. The Petitioners admit that their bid includes additional, unexplained information that was not called for in the specifications. A final reason given by Respondent at hearing for rejecting Petitioners' bid was that it was accompanied by a bid bond, required by Section 4.2.4 of the specifications, in the name of Kimball International Marketing, Inc., while the public entity crime affidavit, required by Section 2.1.5, was subscribed to by Corporate Interiors, Inc. Petitioners' bid did not include a resolution or other evidence of authority that Corporate Interiors, Inc., had authority to submit a public entity crime affidavit on behalf of Kimball International Marketing, Inc., or that the affidavit submitted was valid as to Kimball. Thus, while Petitioners maintain that their bid was jointly filed on behalf of the manufacturer, Kimball, and the vendor, Corporate Interiors, their bid includes a bond from the manufacturer only, and a crime affidavit from the vendor only. Section 1.8 of the specifications, found at page 00100-2, specifies that the bidder is the person or entity that submits a bid. Petitioners urge that theirs is a joint bid, but they have failed to submit a joint bond or affidavit. Section 5.2.1 of the specifications allows the Respondent to reject any bid which fails to include a required security, or other required data. The bid which was determined by the Respondent to be the lowest responsible bid contains no technical flaws, errors or omissions, and the proposal meets all specifications for this project. The Respondent properly posted notice of its intent to award this contract to Haworth, Inc., the lowest responsible bidder. Under Section 5.3.1 of its bid instructions, the Respondent has the right to waive "any informality or irregularity in any Bid or Bids received and to accept the Bid or Bids which, in (its) judgment, is in (its) own best interest." Respondent chose not to waive any of the irregularities in the Petitioners' bid. This decision was made, in part, because of Respondent's previous experience with Petitioners in their installation of similar systems for Respondent at the Walter Pownall Service Centers in which there had been problems involving service during installation, coordination of the installation work, and verification that invoices received from Corporate Interiors did not exceed the bid base price, and that all items being paid had actually been received.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioners' and Intervenor's protests of its intent to award a contract for systems furniture (partitions) for the New District Administration Building to Haworth, Inc., as the lowest responsible bidder. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-2863BID Petitioner and Intervenor filed letters, but no proposed findings of fact upon which rulings could be made. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 3. 3. Adopted in Findings 4-6. 4. Adopted in Finding 6. 5. Adopted in Findings 4-6. 6. Adopted in Finding 6. 7. Adopted in Findings 6, 8. 8. Adopted in Finding 1. 9. Adopted in Findings 2, 3. 10-12. Adopted in Finding 6. 13. Adopted in Finding 4. 14. Adopted in Finding 3. 15. Adopted in Finding 5. 16-17. Adopted in Finding 7. 18. Adopted in Finding 1. 19. Adopted in Finding 8. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen D. Zimmerman, President Corporate Interiors, Inc. 1090 Kapp Drive Clearwater, FL 34625 Bruce P. Taylor, Esquire P. O. Box 4688 Clearwater, FL 34618-4688 Sue Olinger 1284 West Fairbanks Avenue Winter Park, FL 32789 Dr. Scott N. Rose Superintendent P. O. Box 4688 Clearwater, FL 34618
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Department of Corrections, by advertisement in a Jackson County, Florida newspaper on March 27, March 30 and April 6, 1988, sought bids for the provision of office space for the Department's offices in Marianna. The bid specifications, including, as pertinent hereto; minimum square footage, a requirement that Energy Performance Index calculations and certification thereof by an architect or engineer be shown, and the requirement that all parking spaces be on site, was made available to potential bidders on March 28. A pre-proposal conference of potential bidders was held on March 31 to explain and clarify the specifications. Bids were submitted by the two Petitioners, and the bids were opened on April 14, 1988. On or about April 19 or 20, Wendell Beall and Robert Sandall evaluated the bid proposals and made a preliminary determination that the Rainbow bid was non-responsive in three areas. It was determined that the required square footage depicted on the Rainbow bid was inadequate; the parking provision was inadequate in that not enough "on-site" spaces were shown on the bid; and the Energy Performance Index calculations and certification by an architect or engineer was not supplied. On April 21, 1988, the lease committee, chaired by Thomas Young, met and reviewed both bid packages submitted by the Petitioners and affirmed Mr. Beall and Mr. Sandall's findings, with the result that the agency decided to award the contract to Brooks. The bid specifications required a minimum of 12,756 net square feet of rentable office space. Only 11,862 square feet could be identified as net rentable square footage on the Rainbow bid's floor plan, as calculated in compliance with the "standard method of space measurement." This square footage calculation was consistent with the actual measurements of the building made by Mr. Beall himself. The Brooks' bid depicted an adequate amount of square footage in compliance with the specifications. Mr. Beall calculated the net rentable interior square footage by utilizing the standard method of space measurement provided for in the rules of the Department of General Services and, after deducting nonusable, nonrentable space under that standard, rule mandated method, he arrived at the net rentable office space figure of 11,862 square feet. Rainbow at no time has presented any conflicting measurement or alleged any specific errors in Mr. Beall's calculations. Item A-10 of the bid specifications requires a floor plan to be submitted showing the present configurations of the building, with measurements that equate to the required net rentable square footage. This means that the minimum square footage must be shown in the floor plan attached and submitted with the bid specifications, even if the building may contain more square footage. The Department supplied a specific number of offices of various sizes and a required configuration no floor plan in order to depict work units that should be constructed and/or arranged together, as part of the specifications in the Invitation to Bid documents. The purpose of this agency floor plan was to give potential bidders a guide to calculate the cost of remodeling existing space to meet the agency's needs so that those potential bidders could amortize that cost as part of the rental amount involved. Therefore, the proposed floor plan included in a bidder's package should not vary substantially from the final plan used to actually remodel the leased space in accordance with the agency's requirements. Accordingly, the only submittal of plans which is permissible subsequent to the bid opening, as contemplated by the bid specifications, are the final plans developed by a successful bidder in consultation with the agency after the bid award. No floor plan may be unilaterally submitted by a bidder after the bid opening since that would constitute an illegal amendment of the bid. Only a floor plan done in consultation with the agency in order to make final adjustments so that all office space and other related space will comply with the agency's precise requirements may be done after the bid is actually awarded, and this must be based upon the floor plan originally submitted in the bid itself in conformance with the bid specifications regarding office layout, square footage and the like. The Rainbow bid simply contained an inadequate amount of square footage necessary to be a responsive bid in this regard. An additional bid specification at issue concerns the requirement of 77 exclusive use, on-site parking spaces. The Rainbow bid only made provision for 27 on-site exclusive parking spaces, with the remaining 50 spaces of the required 77 being off the proposed building site, approximately 155 feet away, without sidewalk access to the proposed office building. The Brooks' bid incorporated all required parking spaces on the site, as required by the specifications. The Rainbow bid was non-responsive concerning the parking space specification as well. Mr. Beall prepared the bidding documents as Budget Manager for the Department of Corrections' Region I. He was the person designated in the bidding documents to answer any questions requiring clarification by prospective bidders before bids were prepared and submitted. Mr. Beall established that the intent of the agency with regard to this parking space requirement was to require all 77 parking spaces to be on-site. No bidder or prospective bidder asked any questions of Mr. Beall concerning this specification prior to the submittal of any of the bids. Mr. Brooks, however, did consult with Mr. Beall on the question of the Energy Performance Index specification item before he submitted his bid. Mr. Brooks is a former physics and advanced mathematics teacher with some 20 years experience in construction. He has been a licensed general contractor and master builder for residential, commercial and industrial types of construction for 11 years. He typically designs and draws his own plans, including those submitted with the bid at issue. He spent approximately 100 hours of his time on preparation of this bid. Mr. Brooks had previously been awarded a rid by the Department of Corrections on which he simply invalid the item concerning the Energy Performance Index (EPI) specification. That item was found to be responsive by the Department, and the bid was awarded to Mr. Brooks. On a subsequent bid on a different job, Mr. Brooks again merely initialed the EPI specification, which he intended to mean that he would perform the job at issue such that the EPI requirements would be met. He was not awarded the bid on that particular job, but upon his informally notifying the Department of Corrections that he might protest the decision to award the bid to a different bidder, the Department personnel advised him that they might choose to raise the issue of his responsiveness to the EPI specification in that situation. With this history in mind, Mr. Brooks, before submitting his bid, contacted Mr. Beall to inquire as to what would be considered an appropriate response to the EPI specification on the bidding documents. The EPI has been calculated by Mr. Brooks on numerous projects in the past, and he is capable of calculating it as to this project. He found, however, that it would be impossible to calculate a precise and accurate EPI specification response, because he would not have the final floor plan from which to calculate it, with all the information that would give him concerning room configurations, size, location and size of windows, size and type of heating and air-conditioning equipment and many other factors. Mr. Brooks could, however, give his certification that the energy performance requirement would be met, once the final plans were completed in conjunction with discussion with the agency after award of the bid, which comports with standard agency policy and practice. Because he was concerned that any energy performance calculations he might supply would not necessarily be accurate in the final analysis, in relation to the final "to be constructed" plans, Mr. Brooks contacted Mr. Beall to obtain his guidance about what would be considered a proper response to this specification item. Mr. Beall advised him that a letter certifying that he would comply with the specification as to this issue would be an appropriate alternative to simply initialing the specification. The same opinion was also voiced at the lease committee meeting. Mr. Beall's advice to Mr. Brooks in this regard was based upon advice given him by Mr. Edwin Johnson of the Department of General Services and was based upon past agency policy concerning treatment of this issue on previous bids considered by the lease committee. Previous bids had indeed been accepted in the form submitted by Mr. Brooks and had not been found to be nonresponsive as to the EPI issue. Thus, Mr. Brooks, in addition to initialing the specification concerning the EPI, also supplied the referenced letter certifying that he would comply with that specification and agency requirement. Rainbow, on the other hand, merely initialed that item in the specification and bidding document. Thus, the Brooks' bid is the more responsive on the issue of the EPI than the Rainbow bid. The bid award to Brooks was posted on May 2, and on May 4, Rainbow filed a Notice of Protest of she award which was received by the Department, timely on May 5. Shortly after that date, counsel for Rainbow requested that the Department's representatives and counsel meet with him and Mr. Jett, his client, of Rainbow Properties, to discuss the agency's award to Brooks and rejection of Rainbow's bid. On May 10, 1988, the Department's regional representatives and its counsel met with Mr. Jett of Rainbow Properties and his attorney, Mr. Barley. Mr. Jett used this opportunity to explain how he felt that the Rainbow bid had complied with the bid specifications in the three specific areas discussed above. The Department's counsel explained on that occasion that the bid could not be amended after opening and posting of the bids. Mr. Jett's bid had only shown 11,862 square feet identifiable as rentable space in the floor plan submitted with the bid, although 12,756 square feet were required by the bid specifications. Additionally, as discussed above, of the 77 required on-site parking spaces, only 27 were provided on site with 50 of them being off site, with Rainbow not establishing that it had ownership or right of control to the off site spaces. Additionally, as discussed above, there was the problem of no calculations or assurances being provided regarding the EPI specification, it merely having been initialed in Rainbow's bid submittal. At the May 10 meeting, Mr. Jett was given the opportunity to explain how his bid complied with the specifications at issue and to discuss how he felt the Department had misinterpreted his response or made an error in measuring or calculating the square footage available in his building. He provided no alternative calculations or measurements of the building, however, which would depict more than the 11,862 square feet measured by the Department's staff or which would show that measurement was incorrect. He was reminded that the only possible information he could legally provide the agency after the opening of bids was in the nature of minor clarification concerning how he had calculated the square footage. He was instructed that he could not revise his plans in order to establish that more square footage was available because that would be an illegal amendment of his bid after the bids were open and posted. At the May 10 meeting Mr. Jett also maintained that the Department had allowed for other than on site parking; however, but the bidding document or Invitation to Bid only contained one blank, and only one subsection on the bidding form, for the bidders to indicate 77 spaces designated as on site spaces. Mr. Jett maintained that since the Department had provided option "(A)" under this on-site parking specification item, that he was therefore free to add other options. Using that logic, however, it would also appear that he could have submitted a bid depicting spaces literally on the other side of town and still had a responsive bid. That clearly is not the correct interpretation of that specification. He also maintained that the EPI was impossible to calculate at the time of bidding, in view of the fact that final plans were not available to support the ultimate calculation. In any event, at the conclusion of this meeting, Department personnel informed Mr. Jett and his counsel that would inform him of its decision within a few days. The Department did not inform Mr. Jett that he would be permitted to amend his bid after obtaining professional help and redrawing his blueprint in an effort to show that the minimum square footage was available. Indeed, Rainbow and Mr. Jett did obtain the services of an architect and drew a new floor plan which it offered as PR-1 at the hearing. If the floor plan originally attached to Rainbow's bid, consisting of Exhibit PR-2 in evidence, is compared with the blueprint submitted by the architect after the meeting with the Department representatives on May 10, it can be discerned that the blueprint is not a mere refinement or clarification of the initial floor plan, but rather that major modifications have been made to the initial floor plan submitted with the bid. These consist of walls which have been moved, small rooms in some areas which have been eliminated, restrooms which have been deleted and an existing spiral staircase area which was eliminated, and a hallway enclosed, in order to add additional rentable square footage where new offices could be added. Thus, this blueprint offered at hearing was not a mere refinement or clarification of the original floor plan submitted with the Rainbow bid, but rather sufficiently different from original floor plan as to constitute a material amendment or modification to the bid. It therefore cannot be considered. The floor plan submitted with the bid was nonconforming to the bid specifications as to the square footage item and Rainbow cannot be permitted to rectify and correct that with the architect's new blueprint and floor plan offered at the time of the hearing. 1/ In short, insufficient square footage was depicted and that is not a minor waivable irregularity. Soon after this May 10 meeting, the Department changed its position, decided that both bids were not responsive and rejected them. Its alleged basis for doing so was that the Brooks bid was nonresponsive as to the energy performance index criteria and that the Rainbow bid was nonresponsive as to that criteria, as well as to those concerning minimum square footage and on-site parking availability; the same as the original grounds for rejecting Rainbow's bid. Timely formal protests of that second agency action were filed by both Brooks and Rainbow. In that connection, Rainbow's formal written protest of the original award to Brooks, which was announced and noticed on May 2, 1988, was untimely. The formal written protest must be filed within ten days of the notice of protest. Rainbow's original notice of protest was filed with the agency on May 5 and the formal written protest was not filed until May 17. Rainbow, in conjunction with its filing, filed a motion for leave to late-file the formal protest with the agency on the basis that it had mistakenly filed the formal protest with the Division of Administrative Hearings. That petition was filed with the Division on May 16th. The deadline for filing the formal protest was May 15th. Petitioner Rainbow, however, did not learn of the second intended agency action until May 16th, however, and may have been somewhat misled about the necessity of filing its formal protest by May 15th because of the informal discussion of May 10th. It is also true, however, that the informal meeting was improper, as discussed herein and was called at the behest of Rainbow without assurance that the filing time was tolled.
Recommendation In consideration of the above findings of fact and evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefor RECOMMENDED that the petition of Rainbow Properties, a Florida general partnership, should be denied and dismissed for the reasons found and concluded above, and that the petition of C. Leon Brooks be GRANTED and that the subject bid be awarded to C. Leon Brooks. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1988.
Findings Of Fact Facts based on stipulation These proceedings concern Petitioner's Bid Protest in connection with that certain project known as Chiller Installation, Glades Campus, Project NO. 9237, PBCC No. 6812. Petitioner has taken all steps necessary to perfect its bid protest in a timely manner and has standing to bring this bid protest. Petitioner and Respondent met and were unsuccessful in an attempt to resolve the bid protest as required by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. M. K. Mechanical, Inc., a Florida corporation, is a State of Florida Certified Mechanical Contractor and as such was a "Qualified Bidder." The original specifications for the subject project contained few electrical specifications and were silent as to how an electrical contractor was to be licensed. The bid was due on Tuesday, January 12, 1993, at 2:00 p.m. On Friday, January 8, 1993, at 3:42 p.m., via facsimile transmission, M. K. Mechanical, Inc., received supplementary electrical specifications, thirty (30) pages in length. Contained in these supplementary specifications, for the first time, was a requirement that the electrical subcontractor had to be "locally" licensed. M. K. Mechanical, Inc.'s, primary place of business is in Edgewater, Volusia County, Florida. M. K. Mechanical, Inc.'s, submitted bid was proper in all respects other than an electrical subcontractor's name was not given, instead "to be determined" was inserted. M. K. Mechanical, Inc., submitted the lowest bid. Electrical subcontractor is a "major" subcontractor on this project. The sole basis for the decision by Respondent that Petitioner's bid was "non-responsive" was the failure to list an electrical subcontractor. Additional facts regarding bid specifications The bid specifications include the requirement that bidders list all "major subcontractors" and that the category of "major subcontractors" includes electrical subcontractors. Section 5.2.1 of the Contract Documents within the Bid Specifications provides as follows: Unless otherwise required by the Contract Documents or the Bidding Documents the Contractor at the bid opening shall furnish to the Owner and Architect Form 00420, a written list of the major Subcontractors; Site Utilities, Structural Concrete, Masonry, Structural Steel & Steel Joists, Plumbing, HVAC, Electrical and Roofing, who he proposes to use on this work.
Recommendation On the basis of all the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Palm Beach Community College enter a Final Order in this case denying the protest of the Petitioner, M. K. Mechanical, Inc., and awarding the contract in Project No. 9237, PBCC No. 6812 to the Intervenor, Hill York Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Sid C. Peterson, Jr., Esquire DeLoach & Peterson, P.A. Post Office Box 428 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 33170 James M. Adams, Esquire Gibson & Adams, P.A. Post Office Box 1629 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 Herbert L. Dell, President Hill York Corporation Post Office Box 350155 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33335 The District Board of Trustees Palm Beach Community College 4200 Congress Avenue Administration Building Lake Worth, Florida 33461 Attention: Mr. Dick Jones
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's bid was responsive to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' Invitation to Bid 590:2248 for lease space in Lake County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issued its Invitation to Bid (ITB) No. 590:2248 for lease space in Lake County, Florida. The ITB contained bidder specifications, evaluation criteria and documentation requirements. Petitioner Kevin T. Roberts submitted a bid within the time limits of the ITB. Petitioner Roberts attended a pre-bid conference conducted by HRS. In its ITB, HRS reserved the right to reject any and all bids. The ITB required that the bid must show control of the property by the owner of record, a lease with documentation, an option to purchase with documentation, or an option to lease with authority to sublease with documentation. The ITB required that the successful bidder enter into a lease with HRS on the lease form attached to the ITB as Attachment E (Joint Exhibit 1). This lease form required exclusive-use parking spaces. The ITB required a minimum of 300 parking spaces. Petitioner was present at the pre-bid conference where the exclusive nature of parking spaces required by the bid was discussed. Petitioner's bid contains 30 exclusive-use parking spaces. The site plan of the Lake Hills Shopping Center submitted with Roberts' bid shows a total of 378 parking spaces for the entire shopping center. Approximately one-half of the space in the center is included in the bid proposal. The available parking spaces are insufficient to meet the minimum requirements of the ITB. The shopping center involved in the bid proposal has approximately 40,000 square feet of lease space which was not included in the bid proposal. Diamondhead Partnership is a partnership under the laws of the State of Florida, and Kevin T. Roberts and Thomas E. Smith are the general partners of the partnership. Diamondhead Partnership holds an option to lease and authority to sublease 45,000 square feet of the commercial space located in the Lake Hills Shopping Center. Kevin T. Roberts submitted a bid proposal in his individual name for 45,000 square feet of commercial space located in the Lake Hills Shopping Center in Eustis, Lake County, Florida. The documentation to show control of the property filed by Roberts with his bid contained a copy of Diamondhead Partnership's lease option. Thomas E. Smith, the other general partner in Diamondhead Partnership, submitted a bid proposal in his individual name for the same 45,000 square feet of commercial space located in the Lake Hills Shopping Center in Eustis, Lake County, Florida, and relied on the same copy of Diamondhead Partnership's lease option. Kevin T. Roberts does not have control of the property that is the subject of his bid proposal. The ITB requires that the name of the entity submitting the bid be identified and, if a partnership, that the name of the partnership be typed or stamped on the bid. Further, Roberts used his personal social security number on his bid and not the partnership's tax ID number. The ITB requires the social security number or tax ID number of the entity submitting the bid. Diamondhead Partnership, the entity with control of the property, did not file a bid in this case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order rejecting the bid of Kevin T. Roberts as nonresponsive to ITB 590:2248. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 3-17(2-16); and 19(19) Proposed findings of fact 2 and 18 are irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Frances S. Childers, Assistant Counsel HRS District 3 Legal Office 1000 N.E. 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32609 Joe A. McClain, Attorney at Law McClain, Dwyer & Sestak, P.A. Post Office Box 4 402 East Church Avenue Dade City, FL 33526 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Linda K. Harris Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
