Findings Of Fact In March 1987 DHRS published a Request for Proposal (RFP) for a Comprehensive Manpower Employment Service Programs for Refugees and Entrants (Exhibit 5) which established a time frame for bidders to submit proposals to provide services for the year beginning July 1; 1987 and ending June 30, 1988; established criteria for the services to be provided; and contained all information necessary for a bidder to submit an acceptable bid. Pursuant to this RFP, Hillsborough County, Lutheran Ministries of Florida, Inc., and Catholic Social Services submitted proposals to provide the services authorized by federal statute to be provided to refugees and entrants predominantly from Cuba/Haiti and Indochina. Pursuant to this RFP; bidders are required to submit a plan which identifies the services to be provided and a line item budget of anticipated allowable costs that will be incurred in the delivery of the services. Each bid is to be reviewed by at least three HRS employees familiar with the objectives and requirements of this social services program using the rating sheet as shown in an appendix to the RFP. The raters grades are totalled, and the contract is to be awarded to the bidder whose proposal is determined, through the evaluation process, to be most advantageous to the State, taking into consideration program and organizational capability, previous experience and understanding of the project (Exhibit 5 p. 25) Five qualified raters evaluated the proposals submitted by the bidders. The totals of the grades given by these raters, four of whom testified in these proceedings, was 603 for Petitioner and 1360 for Lutheran Ministries, thereby indicating the bid by Lutheran Ministries to be far superior to the bid by Hillsborough County. For the past three years, Lutheran Ministries has held the contract to provide services to refugees and entrants while Hillsborough has held the contract, also from HRS, to operate a program intended to mitigate the impact on counties affected by the large influx of Cubans and Haitians entering this country at the time of the Mariel boat lift and after. The former funds are social services funds and the latter are designated Targeted Funds. Although both funds are operated out of the same DHRS office, they are distinct and separate appropriated funds. The 1986 Legislature failed to provide Targeted Funds for the year beginning January 1, 1988. Accordingly, there will be no Targeted Funds awarded to Hillsborough County to use after December 31, 1987. Apparently to preserve the jobs to carry out assistance to various aliens, Hillsborough County submitted its bid to provide services to refugees similar to the services it has been providing to immigrees. Petitioner's bid provided for payment of salaries totaling $40,197 for six months, travel costs for six months and specialized transportation costs for six months. Petitioner apparently intended to use the anticipated funds, if its bid was accepted, to continue the staff employed in carrying out the mission to be accomplished with Targeted Funds for the six months between January 1, 1988 and June 30, 1988, with their salaries for the first six months (July - December 1987) paid from Targeted Funds. Having submitted a bid which clearly shows only six month funding for personnel and certain travel costs, Petitioner's contention that the raters misinterpreted the proposed program year is without merit. Although the bid proposal showed it was for the period July 1 1987 to June 30, 1988, the cost for one year's operation was not shown and Petitioner's bid was properly downgraded for this reason. That Petitioner's proposal was intended as a substitution and/or continuation of the Refugees/Entrants Employment Services (REES) program which it had administered for the past three years is shown in their proposal (Exhibit 2 p. 7) that "Effective July 1; 1987; the REES program will increase its level of services by adding 0JT and day care to its comprehensive employment." It shows targeted assistance dollars funding comprehensive employment and transportation for the first six months of the program year through December 31, 1987. Such language rightfully led the raters to question what type services would be provided to the refugees under Petitioner's proposal. Petitioner's contention that bid proposals were not rated on their individual merit, but rather were compared to each other, not only is unsupported by any evidence but also every rater who testified stated that no comparison of bids was made. The remarks on the rating sheets which were relied upon by Petitioner to support this contention disclose another failure by Petitioner to comply with the RFP. The RFP (Exhibit 5) provided under Part IV General Information (p. 13) that specific questions regarding the RFP and its provisions should be addressed to Millie Coten and that an original and nine copies of the proposal are required. The Hillsborough County audit which was required as a part of the proposal comprised some 80 or 90 pages, which was nearly half of the proposal submitted. In order to eliminate the cost of reproducing 10 copies of this audit, Jimmy Keel, director, Department of Public Assistance for Hillsborough County, called Michael Simmons, district budget officer for HRS Tampa office to see if they had to include audits in all of these copies. Simmons told Keel that since there would be only five raters, if the audit was included in five copies of the bid, that would be acceptable. Simmons was not the contact officer in the RFP to answer questions regarding the RFP and no evidence was presented that he had such authority. This discrepancy in complying with the RFP came to light during a meeting of the raters when it was discovered that at least two of them did not have a complete bid from Petitioner. Petitioner's contention that it was rated on criteria not contained in the RFP is allegedly supported by raters' comment on the rating sheets that the salaries for those running the program proposed by Petitioner are too high. For the four positions proposed by Petitioner to run the program, the annualized salary is in excess of $80,000. The cost of providing the proposed services for one year is expected to be less than $80,000. In looking at proposed salaries in such bids, the raters use salaries paid HRS employees for similar duties and responsibilities as well as common sense. The fact that some such standard is used to determine the appropriateness of salaries in bids received should surprise no one. It is well understood by people bidding on HRS service projects that such a salary comparison is made to determine the appropriateness of salaries to be paid by contractors providing the contracted for service. The contention by Petitioner that it was rated on criteria not contained in the RFP is without merit. Petitioner's next contention that raters were not familiar with all of the definitions and requirements of the RFP was supported by no credible evidence. The four raters who testified all stated unequivocally that they fully understood the definitions and requirements of the RFP. The second allegation to support this position involved the fact that as a governmental agency Hillsborough County does not have a board of directors and articles of incorporation and because of this did not receive maximum points on their rating item. This position is not supported by the evidence. The grades of less than maximum on those items were changed to give Petitioner the maximum grade score before the totals were added. Finally, Petitioner's contention that the raters were confused by, and misunderstood the contents of, Petitioner's proposal yet failed to contact Petitioner for clarification not only is not supported by any credible evidence, but also ignores the RFP requirement (Part V p. 20) that: It is the responsibility of the applicant to develop the proposal as clearly and succinctly as possible in order to avoid misinterpretation of the information presented. Proposals will be reviewed and evaluated solely on the basis of the information contained therein. No evidence was submitted by Petitioner to show that even if Petitioner had been incorrectly rated on some of the rating sheets, a change in those ratings would have brought Petitioner's total score, and hence rating, up to that attained by Lutheran Ministries so as to make Petitioner the successful bidder.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner abandoned her position of employment in the career service system of the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Helen L. Chappell, a career service employee of Respondent with the Polk County Public Health Unit at all times pertinent to these proceedings. Petitioner worked sporadically in Respondent's employment during the month of March, 1989. She was credited with a total of 28 hours of work during that month. Respondent's records reflect that Petitioner did not actually work any hours in the months of April or May, 1989. On May 5, 1989, Respondent received notification from personnel of the Division of Risk Management of the Department of Insurance that Petitioner, a recipient of workers compensation benefits, had reached maximum medical recovery from a previous injury. Shortly thereafter, the Division provided Respondent with a copy of a medical report documenting the extent of Petitioner's recovery. The medical report, while noting Petitioner's recovery, also restricted her employment activities to preclude activities involving "a lot of head and shoulder movement." By certified letter dated May 11, 1989, the acting administrative director of the Polk County Health Unit informed Petitioner of the receipt of the medical report and the medical restrictions contained in the report. Further, the letter set forth Respondent's position that such restrictions would not interfere with Petitioner's performance of her duties as a clerk specialist. The letter concluded by directing Petitioner to return to work immediately to avoid the presumption that she had abandoned her position of employment with Respondent. The letter's certified mail return receipt reflects that Petitioner received the letter on May 15, 1989. In the course of a telephone conversation with the acting administrative director on May 25, 1989, Petitioner was informed that she must return to work no later than June 2, 1989. Petitioner did not return to work on June 2, 1989, or at any time thereafter. On June 15, 1989, the acting administrative director notified Petitioner by certified mail that Petitioner was presumed to have abandoned her career service employment position with Respondent as a result of the failure to report to work within three days of the June 2, 1989 deadline. The certified mail return receipt documents delivery of the letter on June 20, 1989. On August 1, 1986, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of a copy of Respondent's employee handbook. Employees are placed on notice by contents of the handbook that any employee who is absent without authorization for three consecutive workdays may be considered to have abandoned his or her employment position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Administration concluding that Petitioner abandoned her position in the career service due to her failure to report to work, or request leave for the period June 2-June 15, 1989. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-4183 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. None submitted. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-5. Adopted in substance. Rejected, unnecessary. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Farley, Esquire HRS District 6 Legal Office 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Fifth Floor, Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33514 Helen L. Chappell Post Office Box 109 Lake Wales, Florida 33859 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 438 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Aletta L. Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 438 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of a handicap, in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a residential program for young, homeless women who are pregnant or have infants. Respondent is required by applicable state law to maintain minimum staffing requirements or expose its license to disciplinary action. Respondent employed Petitioner as a residential staff assistant (RSA) from sometime in August 2002 until February 2, 2004. Petitioner worked five days a week during shift hours that varied during her employment. As an RSA, Petitioner's duties included assisting residents with care for their babies, babysitting, assisting residents with meal planning and budgeting, writing staff notes for parent and child, driving residents to and from medical appointments, and otherwise "assist mother and child in anyway." With the exception of excessive absences discussed hereinafter, it is undisputed that Petitioner was able to perform the essential functions of her job and did so satisfactorily to Respondent. Sometime in May 2003, Petitioner suffered a back injury while riding a horse. Petitioner suffered a herniated disc located at L5-S1. After the injury, Petitioner experienced right-side pain and sought treatment initially from chiropractic therapy and acupuncture. However, Petitioner's symptoms persisted. Petitioner sought medical treatment sometime prior to July 2003. An MRI conducted on July 21, 2003, diagnosed the herniated disc, and Petitioner subsequently underwent surgery on September 11, 2003, identified in the record as a laminectomy. By a physician's note on a prescription pad dated October 29, 2003, the treating physician authorized Petitioner to return to work on November 2, 2003. The physician's note did not prescribe any limitations for Petitioner. Petitioner returned to work on the prescribed date. On November 10, 2003, a director for Respondent required Petitioner and a co-worker to close the security gate to the facility. The electric motor for the gate was not functioning, and the two co-workers had to close a heavy security gate by manually pulling until the facility was secure. By a physician's note on a prescription pad dated November 14, 2003, the treating physician prescribed "light duty" for Petitioner. The light-duty restrictions were limited to "no pulling." A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Respondent required Petitioner to perform any "pulling" after November 10, 2003. Petitioner's back condition is an impairment within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 12112, et seq. (ADA), and the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, et seq., Florida Statutes (2003) (FCRA). After surgery, Petitioner continued to experience pain in her right side and, due to inactivity, gained approximately 100 pounds. Petitioner's resulting impairment has limited her ability to work by impairing her ability to sit for long periods, pull, lift, bend to retrieve files from lower file drawers, and drive. Petitioner's impairment is permanent. The surgery did not eliminate Petitioner's impairment, and Petitioner is relegated to physical therapy and pain medication as the sole medical treatment for her condition. After more than two years of such treatment, Petitioner's impairment persists. Petitioner's impairment did not prevent her from satisfactorily performing her job duties other than attendance. Disputed requests for accommodations in the form of a particular chair that was comfortable for Petitioner and in the form of the location of files in higher drawers for easier access by Petitioner were not necessary for Petitioner to perform the essential functions of her job. It is undisputed that Petitioner satisfactorily performed her job duties without those accommodations. Petitioner's impairment caused her to be absent from work six of 20 workdays between November 2 and 30, 2003, and nine of 52 workdays between December 4, 2003, and February 2, 2004. The first six absences were excessive pursuant to Respondent's written Policy HR 103. In addition, Petitioner did not provide a supervisor with prior notice or cause of absences. However, each absence was required for Petitioner to either attend physical therapy or for Petitioner to recover from physical therapy. After the first absence, Respondent knew the causes of the absences. On December 3, 2003, Petitioner and Respondent executed a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) in which Petitioner agreed there would be no further unscheduled absences. Respondent agreed to reduce the time required in HR 103 for prior notice from eight to six hours. After executing the CAP, Petitioner had nine unscheduled absences during approximately 52 workdays between December 3, 2003, and February 2, 2004. Petitioner was unable to call in to her supervisors because of problems with telephones and voicemails, including those at the facility and cellular telephones maintained by supervisors. However, Petitioner knew of the telephone problem and knew her therapy schedule. A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner requested Respondent either to utilize an alternative method of communication or to arrange her work schedule to accommodate Petitioner's therapy schedule. On January 30, 2003, Respondent notified Petitioner that Respondent was changing Petitioner's employment status to "on-call" because Petitioner was unable to satisfy the attendance requirements of an RSA. Petitioner refused to accept the change in status due to the uncertainties of pay and the loss of benefits. On February 2, 2004, Respondent terminated Petitioner from her employment. Petitioner's impairment is neither a "disability" nor a "handicap" within the meaning of the ADA and FCRA, respectively. The impairment did not substantially limit Petitioner's ability to perform the major life activity of working. Petitioner's impairment did not prevent her from satisfactorily performing her job duties other than attendance. A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner's impairment precludes her from either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. Petitioner showed that she has made a reasonable effort to secure other employment without success. However, a preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner's impairment is the cause of her inability to obtain employment. The Social Security Administration denied Petitioner's disability claim. The agency found that Petitioner has received treatment for her impairment and that the impairment does affect her ability to work. However, the agency found that Petitioner is "still capable of performing" the duties of an RSA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of a disability or handicap. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Phyllis J. Towzey, Esquire Law Office of Phyllis J. Towzey, P.A. The Kress Building, Suite 401 475 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Theresa A. Deeb, Esquire Deeb & Brainard, P.A. 5999 Central Avenue, Suite 202 St. Petersburg, Florida 33710
The Issue Whether Glen Markee can return to suitable gainful employment without further training and education.
Findings Of Fact Glen Markee, a 44-year-old male, was employed as a roofer by Sam Damm Roofing, Inc. in Port Richey, commencing in November 1992. Mr. Markee’s duties included lifting bundles of shingles weighing up to 90 pounds, tearing off roofing, and lifting tar kits weighing 100 pounds. On April 6, 1999, he sustained a right shoulder and cervical injury while lifting shingles and ripping out roof. The accident was accepted as compensable. Mr. Markee received medical treatment, and was eventually referred to Dr. Harold Colbassani, a neurosurgeon. Following an MRI, Dr. Colbassani diagnosed a right-sided disc herniation. Due to Mr. Markee’s apprehensions about surgery, a conservative course of treatment was attempted, including epidural injections and physical therapy. The conservative treatment proved ineffective, and Mr. Markee underwent a cervical diskectomy and fusion on January 27, 2000. Dr. Colbassani certified Mr. Markee at maximum medical improvement on July 5, 2000, with an impairment rating of seven percent. His restrictions include no lifting over 50 pounds, occasional lifting of 21 to 50 pounds, no repetitive bending, crouching, or stooping, and no reaching above shoulder level. After being certified at maximum medical improvement, Mr. Markee sought further treatment from a pain management physician, starting in October 2000 and continuing to the time of the hearing. Petitioner claims that this continuing treatment indicates that Mr. Markee has not reached maximum medical improvement and thus that his application for re- employment services was premature. Glen Ellis, a vocational consultant with Respondent and an expert in the field of vocational rehabilitation, evaluation and training, testified that Mr. Markee’s seeking pain relief would not necessarily mean that he had not reached maximum medical improvement for purposes of retraining. Mr. Ellis testified that if an employee is medically stable and in need of no further active treatment for the injury itself, the Division may go forward with a retraining program. Examples of medical instability cited by Mr. Ellis were the need for further surgery, incapacitation for significant periods of time, or taking medications which prevent the employee from driving or attending class. None of these problems applied to Mr. Markee’s seeking treatment for his chronic pain. Thus, Mr. Markee was medically stable for purposes of retraining. Mr. Markee did not return to work after his injury. He never formally approached Sam Damm Roofing about coming back to work, though he did have an informal conversation with the owner of the company, Sam Damm. Mr. Damm told Mr. Markee that he had no work for him consistent with his medical limitations. Mr. Markee is a high school graduate. His prior work experience was almost exclusively as a roofer. He has also done some carpentry and briefly worked as a factory laborer. Section 440.491, Florida Statutes, creates the re- employment services program and authorizes all recommended programs and expenditures to injured employees. The ultimate goal of that statute in regard to an injured worker is to return the worker to suitable gainful employment. "Suitable gainful employment" is defined to mean "employment or self-employment that is reasonably attainable in light of the employee's age, education, work history, transferable skills, previous occupation, and injury, and which offers an opportunity to restore the individual as soon as practicable and as nearly as possible to his or her average weekly earnings at the time of injury." Section 440.491(1)(g), Florida Statutes. At the time the Division approved Mr. Markee for retraining services, the general salary criterion established by rule was to restore the employee to at least 80 percent of his or her average weekly wages at the time of injury. Rule 38F-55.001(16), Florida Administrative Code (defined "underemployment" as employment in which the post-injury average weekly wage is less than 80 percent of his or her pre- injury average weekly wage). The Division has established a process to determine whether an individual merits re-employment services. The process begins with orientation. The employee is given a DWC- 23, which is the application for re-employment services. The employee is requested to sign the DWC-23 and to have the employer sign a section of the form that says it has no job available either modified or accommodated for the employee at this time. Shortly after orientation, the Division requests medical records from the carrier to determine the employee's restrictions. Once all the paperwork is received, one of the Division nurses reviews the medical records from the claimant's physician, the maximum medical improvement date, and permanent restrictions, work history, and education. The Division performs a transferable skills analysis, evaluating the claimant's educational background, hobbies, and interests to determine the best way to return the injured employee to work. In the effort to return the employee to suitable gainful employment, the Division considers three options. First, the Division determines whether there are any direct placement options for the employee with another employer. If this is not feasible, the next option is on-the-job training. If that is not a viable choice, the file goes to an independent evaluator to determine what, if any, retraining options are available to the employee. Once an injured worker is approved for retraining and education, the insurance carrier is obligated to pay temporary total rehabilitation benefits for at least 26 weeks, with an option to provide an additional 26 weeks for a maximum of 52 weeks of benefits while the injured employee is in retraining. Rehabilitation temporary total disability benefits are calculated by taking 66 2/3 percent of the claimant's average weekly wages 13 weeks prior to the claimant's date of accident. Mr. Markee followed the prescribed orientation steps with Mr. Ellis of the Division. Mr. Ellis then referred him to Nancy Drwal, a vocational evaluator who was accepted as an expert in vocational rehabilitation, training and evaluation. Mr. Ellis provided Ms. Drwal with background information describing Mr. Markee's accident, work history, medical restrictions and other relevant medical information. Ms. Drwal met with Mr. Markee on March 9, 2001, and gave Mr. Markee six tests over the course of five hours. The tests were designed to assess his intellectual, achievement, and aptitude levels. Among the tests Ms. Drwal administered was a transferable skills analysis to identify jobs that would be compatible with Mr. Markee's work history, education, capabilities, and functional limitations. This analysis revealed no transferable occupations for Mr. Markee. Ms. Drwal continued to search for some appropriate occupation short of retraining, because Mr. Markee was anxious to work and hesitant to enter a training program. Ms. Drwal testified that Mr. Markee's reluctance to enter a training program was not unusual for a person who has been out of school for 20 years and is not academically inclined. Despite the results of the transferable skills analysis, Ms. Drwal looked at the local markets for an appropriate job for Mr. Markee. Mr. Markee expressed an interest in locksmithing. Ms. Drwal contacted every locksmith in Pasco County, but could find none that were hiring or interested in on-the-job training for Mr. Markee. Ms. Drwal looked into security guard positions, because that occupation easily accommodates physical restrictions, but could not find a position close to Mr. Markee's average weekly wage of $530.65 per week, or $14.26 per hour. The security guard openings paid between $5.75 and $7.00 per hour, far short of 80 percent of Mr. Markee's pre-injury average weekly wage. Mr. Markee expressed an interest in working with animals. Ms. Drwal looked into positions with zoos and animal sanctuaries. These employers either had no positions, had experience requirements that Mr. Markee could not meet, or paid significantly less than his pre-injury average weekly wage. Ms. Drwal concluded that Mr. Markee would require retraining. She first suggested computer training, but upon investigation Mr. Markee found the scholastic requirements overwhelming. Ms. Drwal then suggested medical assistant school as more within the range of Mr. Markee's academic abilities and interests. Mr. Markee investigated the program and told Ms. Drwal that he thought he could do it. Ms. Drwal conducted a labor market survey to make sure there would be medical assistant jobs in the local market when Mr. Markee completed his training. In a labor market survey, Ms. Drwal contacts employers to ascertain that positions are available at the time of the survey, or that the employer has hired within the past six months and anticipates hiring again in the next six months. Ms. Drwal contacted five employers and determined that there would be jobs available and that the average starting salary was $10 per hour, ranging as high as $12 per hour. She determined that the job availability and salary made this an acceptable training program for Mr. Markee. Ms. Drwal determined that the duties of a medical assistant fell within Mr. Markee's medical restrictions. Medical assistants perform patient preparation, take vital signs, weigh patients, draw blood, and enter some patient information into the office computer. The job does not involve lifting. Ms. Drwal determined that Mr. Markee was a "very motivated" person and would be able to complete the program. The medical assistant school is not academically intense. The student must learn medical terminology, but the program lasts only 31 weeks and involves a hands-on internship at a doctor's office. Mr. Markee was approved for retraining in the medical assistant program at the Central Florida Institute in Palm Harbor. He commenced the program in April 2001. He has been a straight "A" student and at the time of the hearing was completing a 35-hour per week internship at the New Port Richey Medical Center. Based on Mr. Markee's transferable skills analysis, previous work history, previous educational background, and the results of testing done by the independent evaluator, the best way to return him to suitable gainful employment is through retraining. Petitioner failed to show that retraining Mr. Markee through the medical assistant program will not return him to suitable gainful employment. The record gives no indication that Petitioner ever informed the Division indicating whether it had suitable employment within Mr. Markee's restrictions. Mr. Markee's restrictions prevent him from returning to the occupation of a roofer. Mr. Markee appeared to have the capability to obtain a job. However, the Division's goal, as mandated by statute, is to assist him to obtain employment at or near his pre- injury average weekly earnings of $530.65.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the relief requested by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. __________________________________ LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Janet Poluse, Esquire Matusek, McKnight, Poluse and Cangro, P.A. Post Office Box 7729 St. Petersburg, Florida 33734-7729 Elana Jones, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Hartman Building, Suite 307 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 John H. Thompson, IV, Esquire John H. Thompson, IV, P.A. Post Office Box 13188 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733-3188 Mary B. Hooks, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Hartman Building, Suite 307 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Elizabeth Teegen, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Hartman Building, Suite 307 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, The Hope Center, Inc. (Hope Center), is a nonprofit corporation which operates a retardation facility at 666 S.W. 4th Street, Miami, Florida. At all times relevant hereto, petitioner was a participant in the Developmental Services Program (Program) administered by respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). Under this Program, Hope Center provided a full array of living and therapeutic services to HRS retarded clients, including long term residential care services (LTRC) pursuant to a contract executed by Hope Center and HRS. The contract specifies a rate of reimbursement for all services provided by Hope Center. Under the above agreements Hope Center is reimbursed a monthly rate per client for LTRC services provided to retarded clients at its facility. To claim reimbursement, Hope Center must submit a monthly invoice to HRS on HRS Form 3029. It did so during the two fiscal years ended September 30, 1983, and was reimbursed for the amounts reflected on the forms. In 1984, HRS performed an audit of Hope Center's records. This ultimately resulted in the issuance of an audit report on October 17, 1984. The report found that Hope Center had collected fees from its HRS clients for services already paid for by HRS, and had failed to reflect these fees as third party payments on Form 3029. If they had been reported as suggested in the report, Hope Center's reimbursement would have been reduced during the applicable twenty-four month period by $62,631.00. That same date, HRS issued proposed agency action demanding repayment of that amount. The proposed agency action precipitated the instant proceeding. Hope Center, which was once known as Mary Black Knight School, has been operating since 1955 in the Miami area. It began accepting retarded clients long before the State began its assistance program, and when HRS first entered the field in the 1970s, Hope Center willingly accepted HRS clients, some without any reimbursement. Hope Center presently accepts both HRS clients and private pay clients. During the audit period, Hope Center was serving approximately eighty HRS clients. When Hope Center accepted private pay clients exclusively, such clients either paid their own fees or had their expenses covered by donations raised from the general public. In addition, many years ago a parent offered Hope Center's executive director, Judy Holland, a voluntary donation to help defray a part of her child's expenses. Holland called this donation a "tuition" payment, and from then on used either that term or "contribution" to describe any donations received from the families of clients. Over the years a policy evolved whereby, at the end of the enrollment process, Hope Center began requesting donations (or tuition payments) from parents of new clients enrolling at the school. After advising the parents of the cost of care, the parents were then asked to consider the matter, and suggest an amount that they could afford each month. The donations were not mandatory, and the child was always accepted at the school regardless of the parent's decision. No financial statements were taken from the parents, and once a parent pledged to make a monthly donation, the parent was not subject to formal collection procedures or legal action, or the child dismissed, if payments were not made as promised. However, the school acknowledges that it made written requests to the parent if payments lagged and on at least one occasion Holland was urged by her board of directors to obtain some proof of income from the parents, presumably to verify whether the donation suggested by the parents, or lack thereof, was reasonable and justified. When Hope Center began accepting state clients, the practice of receiving "tuition" payments (now "contributions") continued where those parents could afford to do so. Again, they were voluntary, and had no bearing on whether a client received treatment. During the audit period in question, such payments were made by the families of nineteen HRS clients and represented approximately 20 percent of Hope Center's operating budget. One such client requested HRS to waive its HRS fee because of financial difficulties caused in part by having to also make a tuition payment to Hope Center. Her appeal was denied on the ground she was not obliged to pay tuition to Hope Center. The parent later voluntarily withdrew her son from Hope Center for both personal and financial reasons. On August 24, 1982, Holland wrote a letter to all parents in an effort to clarify the distinction between social security or supplemental income checks and tuition payments. The letter has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 11. It was prompted because some parents were sending Hope Center their government checks and designating a portion of the check as the tuition payment. The letter pointed out that HRS required the entire social security or supplemental income check to be turned over to HRS. It also advised the parents that because "Hope Center receives no portion of this money, we must insist on payment of your tuition as well. If this will present a hardships a copy of your income tax statement will be required so that an appropriate sliding scale can be determined." Only one such tax return was ever filed by a parent. Hope Center did not credit the tuition payments as an offset to the service payments on Form 3029 since it understood third party benefits to be social security benefits or insurance benefits received by the parents of a client or paid directly to Hope Center as representative payee. In that event, such payments were properly credited on the form. Respondent's instructions on the use of the form were extremely limited. A Hope Center representative attended one HRS meeting where instructions were given, but the definition of third party payments was not discussed. There is no direct evidence of any other HRS meeting concerning this subject. At no time during the audit period was any member of the Hope Center staff specifically instructed regarding the proper definition of third party payments. Although Hope Center prepared the voucher, no payments could be made until the voucher had been signed by the HRS social worker assigned to Hope Center. In addition, at least one other HRS official was required to sign the voucher. In August 1981, the HRS District II Program Supervisor wrote a memorandum explaining HRS policies applicable to all Long Term Care providers, including Hope Center. Attached to this memorandum was an excerpt from an HRS Client Services Manual which explained, inter alia, the difference between tuition payments and contributions. However, due to a mail mix-up, or some other unexplained reason, Hope Center did not receive the documents. On numerous occasions Hope Center requested manuals, but none were received until after the audit period. At the same time, there is evidence establishing that the then District II program manager was frequently inaccessible during that period of time; and would not return telephone calls. Moreover, his staff could not answer vendor questions concerning the Program. This contributed to Hope Center's lack of knowledge as to whether it was properly filling out Form 3029. Finally, there is evidence (petitioner's exhibit 36) indicating that during the audit period the Program itself was being mismanaged by local HRS representatives. On September 12, 1983, the District II HRS program supervisor advised Holland by letter that one of HRS's concerns with the Hope Center program was "the accounting of donations/contributions made by parents and use of said monies." These concerns apparently arose after a quality assurance review of petitioner's facility was made by HRS auditors in April 1983. Prior to that time, HRS had conducted similar monitoring visits on several occasions. On at least one of those visits, the auditors were shown client ledger cards on which the word "tuition" was clearly reflected. Even so, HRS auditors did not pursue the matter, make inquiry about the charges, or advise Hope Center that it was improper. According to the then District II administrator, although the visits were not full scale audits, this lack of action was inappropriate, for the word "tuition" should have prompted further inquiry on the auditors' part. Therefore, petitioner was justified in concluding that because HRS auditors did not question the item, it was recorded in a proper manner. After receiving the September 12 letter, Hope Center immediately called a meeting of parents to explain this apparent change in policy, and stopped billing parents for "tuition" payments effective October 1, 1983. All such subsequent payments received from parents have been characterized as donations. Thereafter, HRS advised Hope Center by letter dated October 14, 1983, that "tuition charges to parents are forbidden under HRS Rules and Regulations," and that "[i]f donations or contributions are asked of parents it must be made on a Voluntary basis and appropriate documentation of such recorded in [the] accounts." That letter represented the first written notice by HRS to Hope Center specifically stating that its treatment of tuition payments was incorrect. Until that time, the evidence supports a finding that Hope Center believed its prior practice of not treating tuition payments as third party benefits on Form 3029 was in accord with HRS regulations. Paragraph 2-2(o.) of HRS Manual 55-7 defines third party benefits as follows: Any payments received or owing to the client, responsible party, or the Department as reimbursement for the cost of services pro- vided by the Department. Such benefits included but are not limited to, commercial insurance, Civilian Health and Medical Pro- gram of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), Medicare, and Medicaid. A personal allowance may not be provided a client from third party benefits. Cash benefits which are specifi- cally designated to meet the current needs of the clients will be treated as third party benefits. A personal allowance not in excess of $40 may be provided to the client from these payments. Cash benefits will be re- ferred to in this manual as benefit payments, to distinguish them from other third party benefits. Cited by the Manual as examples of third party payments are social security retirement, survivors and disability insurance, supplemental security income, veteran's benefits black lung benefits and railroad retirement. At the same time, HRS Manual 160-2 defines a donation in the following manner: A donation is defined as a gift or contribu- tion as to a charitable organization, etc.; i.e., anything given to the facility for which services rendered to a particular client are not contingent upon receipt of the donation. (Emphasis added) According to the same Manuals a fee is distinguished from a donation because "a fee is an amount paid for services rendered to a particular clients" and includes "payment asked or given for professional services, admissions, licenses, tuition, etc." There is also a definition of third-party benefits in both Subsection 402.33(1)(f), Florida Statutes, and Rule 10-6.01(17), Florida Administrative Code. Neither definition is as explicit as those appearing in the Manuals. Based upon the definitions in the Manuals, it is found that the tuition payments fall within the category of a donation, as set forth in HRS Manual 160-2. Moreover, the fact that the donations were called "tuition" payments does not change their character, since the "services rendered to a particular client (were) not contingent upon receipt of the donation." There was a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding on the part of HRS as to how donations or tuition payments, if voluntary, should have been accounted for by Hope Center during the audit period. For example, the District II legal counsel issued an opinion on November 15, 1983, holding that donations were permissible so long as "the care [the] child receives is not dependent on such contributions donation or pledge." This opinion was disseminated to area vendors, including Hope Center. On the other hand, the District 10 internal audit supervisor interpreted the regulations to mean that any voluntary donation must be credited against the service payment unless the donation exceeded the service payment. Conversely, the District 11 developmental services program supervisor was under the impression that if a truly voluntary donation was made by a parent, it did not have to be offset or credited against the service payment on Form 3029. This understanding was also conveyed by the HRS District 11 residential services director. It was also established that not only was there confusion by HRS on the treatment of donations or voluntary payments, there existed similar confusion and misunderstanding by the agency as to the billing and collecting of actual third party benefits (social security payments). This is evidenced by the fact that during the period in question District 11 was under a "corrective action" to rectify its problems in the collection of such fees, and the District had actually sent a bill to the parents of a deceased client. Moreover, the agency designated itself as representative payee for all such checks, but such action resulted in the monies going into the general revenue fund instead of directly to HRS. Finally, there is evidence that HRS frequently sent incorrect bills to parents for monies due the agency. There are around fifty facilities in District 11 that serve retarded clients. At least three or more have received "tuition" payments from parents of clients during the years 1982 and 1983. None offset the tuition against the service payment reimbursement on their Form 3029. According to HRS, it is awaiting the result of this "test" case until deciding whether to seek reimbursement from those vendors. The HRS reimbursement (around $418 per month) for LTRC clients does not cover all expenses incurred by a facility in providing services. This is true even if state funds from other contracted services are included. Indeed, an HRS representative described the state reimbursement as only enough to provide a "bare-bones" type of service. 3/ In the case of Hope Center, the facility provides speech, music and recreational therapy, and professional and parent counseling, in addition to the services to be provided under its state contract. The estimated cost of serving each client runs between $1,600 and $2,200 per month. The donations (or tuition payments) are designed to defray the cost of providing these additional services, and to enhance the quality of care provided the clients.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's Form 3029, for the two fiscal years ending September 30, 1983, be approved, and that no liability be assessed against petitioner for tuition payments received during those years. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of January 1986, in Tallahassee Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January 1986.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner's position was properly reclassified from Career Service status to Selected Exempt status.
Findings Of Fact Prior to July 1, 2001, Petitioner, Jolly was employed in the Comprehensive Health Planning Section of the Programs, Regulation and Health Facilities Division of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in a Career Service employment position classified and titled Administrative Assistant II Career Service. At the time, Petitioner held permanent Career Service status. The Administrative Assistant II position was certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) as within the Career Service Administrative-Clerical collective bargaining unit, represented by the Florida Public Employees Council 79, AFSCME. In her position, Petitioner performed clerical functions. She did not supervise other employees, perform any managerial functions, or perform any confidential duties. She had no role in labor relations, collective bargaining, the adjustment of grievances filed by employees, or the imposition of discipline upon other employees for breaches of conduct. Similarly, Petitioner had no role in the preparation of agency budgets for collective bargaining, or for other purposes. Sometime around June 15, 2001, Petitioner was notified by DCFS that her position as an Administrative Assistant II would be reclassified as a position within the Selected Exempt Service (SES). The reclassification was effective July 1, 2001. No input from the Petitioner regarding the duties of her position was sought by the Department in its decision to reclassify Petitioner's position. Indeed, the Department reclassified the position based on the fact that Petitioner assisted or aided managerial employees and allegedly had access to confidential material. However, there was no evidence in the record that Petitioner's position involved any confidential matters. Petitioner was terminated from employment with DCFS, without explanation, on June 28, 2002. In terminating her employment as an Administrative Assistant II, DCFS represented that Petitioner had no appeal rights either to PERC or under the bargaining agreement between AFSCME and the State of Florida because her position had been reclassified. However, the evidence does not demonstrate that Petitioner's position was managerial, confidential or supervisory. Therefore, Petitioner's position should not have been reclassified to SES and she is entitled to her rights as a Career Service employee.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, pursuant to Rules 22A-7.010(2)(a) and 22A-8.002(5)(a)3, Florida Administrative Code, abandoned her position and resigned from the State of Florida Career Service System.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Emily D. McGee, was employed by the Respondent, Department, as a Public Assistance Specialist II in the Department's Medically Needy Unit #87 in New Port Richey, Florida. In that assignment, Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor Dorothy White. It is established policy at the HRS facility in question for employees who will be absent to notify their supervisors as soon as possible when they know they will be absent. During her employment, Petitioner had received printed copies of this general policy and of the State rules governing the presumption of abandonment of position in cases where an employee is on unexcused leave for three consecutive workdays. On April 13, 1990, Petitioner was overcome with job stress and was admitted to a residential mental health care facility for four days, which was drawn against Petitioner's earned sick leave. Subsequent to her release, she received outpatient psychological therapy at the Center for the Treatment of Depression in New Port Richey, Florida, with Howard L. Masco, M.D., as her treating physician. On April 20 and again on April 25, 1990, Petitioner was advised by White that in order to properly draw against earned sick leave she must provide a doctor's statement that she was disabled and unable to perform her duties and the projected date of her return to work. On April 25, 1990, a doctor's statement was received, but it did not contain a projected date of return. On April 26, 1990, Petitioner applied to draw against the District V Sick Leave Pool, beginning on May 1, 1990 for an indeterminate period of time. This request was denied by the Committee Administrator. On May 9, 1990, White advised the Petitioner, telephonically and in writing, that her request to draw against the sick leave pool was denied. If she was unable to return to work, Petitioner must submit a written request for leave without pay for her current absence from work, with a beginning date of May 4, 1990 and a projected date of return to work. A physician's statement would also be required. After a period of misunderstanding, a written request with a physicians' statement was submitted by the Petitioner and Leave Without Pay was approved on June 18, 1990 retroactive to May 4, 1990. The physician's statement, dated May 18, 1990, stated that Petitioner has been unable to work since her hospitalization on April 13, 1990 and was still unable to work at the present time. Dr. Masco indicated that he was unable to determine when Petitioner would be able to return to work but that the present diagnosis was depression. Petitioner was advised, in writing, that additional leave could not be granted beyond July 17, 1990 and that Petitioner was required to return to work with medical certification at that time as to her ability to perform her assigned job functions. On the dates between July 18 and July 20, 1990, inclusive, Petitioner neither appeared at work nor informed her supervisor or anyone at HRS that she was going to be absent or was medically unable to return to work. No leave was authorized for her. This period constitutes in excess of three consecutive workdays of absence without approved leave. By letter dated July 27, 1990, Petitioner was advised in writing by the District Administrator that her failure to return to work on July 18 and thereafter constitutes abandonment of position. At the hearing, Petitioner attempted to show that her disability continued beyond July 20, 1990 and up to the present day, and that she had no intention of abandoning her position. That in fact she was physically unable to perform her duties due her continuing stress and depression.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner, Emily D. McGee, abandoned her position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and resigned from the Career Service when, on July 18, 19 and 20, 1990, without authority, she absented herself from her workplace for three consecutive days. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Emily D. McGee Post Office Box 1223 Port Richey, Florida Thomas W. Caufman, Esquire Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 701 94th Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida John Pieno, Jr. Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Linda Stalvey Acting General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Juvenile Welfare Board of Pinellas County (Petitioner) should have treated John Bucci as a mandatory member of the Florida Retirement System from April 1984, through July 1988, and therefore, should be required to submit retroactive adjustments for retirement and social security based upon his earnings during this period.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an independent taxing district created by Special Act in 1945 to provide funding in Pinellas County for services to children. It timely filed a request for hearing on the Respondent's decision to consider John Bucci a mandatory member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from April 1984, through July 1988. The position of the Petitioner is that John Bucci was an independent contractor, and therefore, should not be considered a mandatory member of the FRS. Bucci worked as a janitor for the Petitioner between April 1984, and July 1988. He opened the building in the morning, deactivated the building alarm, made coffee, cleaned the employee restrooms, emptied waste baskets, vacuumed and dusted. From time to time, he also painted and made minor repairs in the building, and took mail to the post office when directed to do so. While Bucci did not receive daily assignments, his duties were routine and had been worked out with representatives of Petitioner when he was initially employed. If there were problems with his cleaning, he would be told to reclean an area, and he was expected to take care of the problem as soon as possible. The Petitioner provided Bucci with all supplies and equipment necessary to do his job. While he worked with the Petitioner, Bucci did not have a written contract, but rather, he had an annually renewable verbal contract. He was paid on an hourly basis, and submitted a monthly record of hours worked each day, which was reviewed and approved for payment by Petitioner. Bucci received annual increases from the Petitioner, but did not negotiate these increases. The Petitioner simply gave him what it considered to be a cost of living increase each year. According to Petitioner, Bucci was not in an established position, and therefore, did not receive fringe benefits. At the time, Bucci was the only person working with the Petitioner which it considered to be an independent contractor. Subsequent to his leaving, Petitioner bid, and now has a written contract for janitorial services with an agency in Pinellas County that offers employment opportunities to retarded citizens. That agency provides all equipment and supplies necessary for janitorial duties. After several counseling sessions with Carole Gunnels, Petitioner's operations manager at the time, Bucci was terminated because of continued problems with his work. Thereafter, it was determined by the Division of Unemployment Compensation, Department of Labor and Employment Security, that he qualified for unemployment benefits. The Comptroller's Office of the State of Florida has issued Memorandum No. 7 (1988-89) regarding determinations of a person's status as an independent contractor or employee. In pertinent part, that Memorandum sets forth twenty factors to be considered in determining if sufficient control is present to establish an employee-employer relationship, and states: The Internal Revenue Service has provided guidance in making this determination in Revenue Ruling 87-41. It provides generally, that the relationship of employer and employee exists when the person or persons for whom the services are performed have the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control of the employer not only as to what shall be done but as to how it shall be done. In this connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually direct and control the manner in which the services are performed; it is sufficient if the employer has the right to do so. The Respondent has adopted Rule 22B-6.001(15), Florida Administrative Code, which defines the term "independent contractor" as an individual who: agrees to provide certain services; works according to his own methods; is not subject to the control of his employer, except as to the results of his work; and does not receive the fringe benefits offered by the employer. A consultant or independent contractor usually: is compensated from another salaries and wages account; does not earn annual or sick leave; and may frequently do a majority of his work in his own office rather than on the employer's premises. In order to determine if Bucci should have been considered to be an employee of the Petitioner, rather than an independent contractor, the Respondent provided Petitioner with a copy of its Employment Relationship Questionnaire, which Petitioner completed on or about April 10, 1989. The information provided by Petitioner on this Questionnaire indicates that Bucci was required to follow regular routines or schedules, the Petitioner could change the methods by which he performed his work or otherwise direct him in the performance of his duties, the work was to be performed by Bucci personally, the Petitioner could discharge him at any time, and he could quit at any time. It was also indicated that Bucci was not filling a regularly established position, but was retained under an oral contract to perform personal services. Bucci did not work full-time with the Petitioner. Rather, he worked an average of between 4 to 5 hours a day with the Petitioner. On rare occasion during the time he was employed with the Petitioner, he did take other part-time cleaning jobs with other employers. However, he did not have any occupational license as a janitorial service, did not advertise as such, had no yellow page listing for janitorial services, and did not have any equipment or supplies necessary to carry out his duties, other than what Petitioner provided him. The characteristics, terms and conditions of Bucci's employment with the Petitioner from April 1984, through July 1988, support the Respondent's determination that he was an employee, rather than an independent contractor, and that he was, therefore, a mandatory member of the FRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a Final Order concluding that John Bucci was a mandatory member of the FRS, and as such denying Petitioner's request for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX (DOAH CASE NO. 89-4067) Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as purely procedural matters and not a relevant proposed finding of fact. 3-4. Rejected in Findings of Fact 2-5, 8-10. The Respondent did not timely file Proposed Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry A. Smiljanich, Esquire P. O. Box 1578 St. Petersburg, FL 33731 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire General Counsel's Office 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Aletta L. Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
