The Issue Is the practice of the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), to decline Medicaid-funded compensation for emergency medical services provided to undocumented aliens once the patients have reached a point of stabilization an unpromulgated rule? The Petitioners' Proposed Final Order identifies the Agency's use of limited InterQual criteria to determine medical necessity as an issue in this proceeding. But the Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy does not raise this issue. Neither party's pre-hearing statement identifies it as an issue. Consequently, this Order does not consider or determine whether the Agency's limitation on the use of InterQual criteria is an "unpromulgated rule."
Findings Of Fact Proceedings Before the Division of Administrative Hearings and the First District Court of Appeal In the beginning this was an action by the Hospitals aimed at stopping Agency efforts to recoup reimbursement of Medicaid payments to the Hospitals for emergency services provided to undocumented aliens once the patients have reached a point of “stabilization.” The issue of whether the Agency could apply the “stabilization” standard to the Hospital claims for Medicaid payment for services provided indigent aliens recurred in Agency claims against hospitals throughout the state to recoup Medicaid payments. Hospitals challenged Agency claims in individual proceedings under section 120.569, which the Agency referred to the Division for disputed fact hearings. Duane Morris, LLP (Duane Morris), led by Joanne Erde, represented the hospitals in the individual proceedings. The Hospitals collectively engaged Duane Morris to represent them in this proceeding challenging the Agency’s stabilization standard as an unpromulgated rule. Joanne B. Erde, Donna Stinson, and Harry Silver were the Hospital’s lawyers in this proceeding. Ms. Erde is an experienced lawyer who has focused her practice in health care. Ms. Stinson is an experienced lawyer who concentrated her practice in health care and administrative law litigation before the Division. The Agency does not question their expertise. Mr. Silver is an experienced lawyer with no Florida administrative law experience. His role in the case was minimal. Depositions taken in one of the individual reimbursement cases were significant evidence in this proceeding. Those depositions make it clear that the Hospitals’ counsel was tuned into the unpromulgated rule issue and using discovery in that case to gather and identify the evidence that they would need in this case. Representation of the Hospitals in individual reimbursement actions provided Hospitals’ counsel the advantage of preparing with level of detail before filing the petition. The engagement letters recognize this stating: “We have an understanding of the facts underlying this matter and have substantial knowledge concerning the law governing the issues in this case.” This well-developed understanding of the facts should have minimized the need for discovery and preparation in this proceeding. Counsel were well positioned to prosecute this matter efficiently. Likewise, counsel’s “substantial knowledge concerning the law governing the issues in this case” should have minimized the need for time spent in research. This is not what happened. The pre-existing representation in the reimbursement cases provided another obvious and significant benefit to the Hospitals and their counsel. Since counsel represented the individual hospital in the separate reimbursement matters, the Hospitals could band together to jointly finance one case that would resolve the troublesome point of “stabilization” issue more consistently and more cheaply than if they litigated it in each and every case. As the basically identical engagement agreements between each hospital and counsel state: “Because many hospitals’ interests in [sic] are similar or identical as it relates to the Alien Issue and in order to keep legal costs to a minimum, each of the participants in the [hospital] Group will [sic] have agreed that it wishes this firm to represent them in a Group.” Because of counsel’s pre-existing relationships with the Hospitals, litigating this matter should have continued or enhanced the client relationships. The time required for this matter could not result in lost business opportunities. In fact, by consolidating the issues common to all the clients and their cases, counsel freed up time to work on other matters. Presentation of the issue for resolution in a single case also saved the Hospitals the greater cost of disputing the issue in each case where the Agency sought reimbursement. The Hospitals and counsel dealt with the only possible downside of the representation by including disclosures about joint representation and a waiver of conflict claims in the engagement letters. This was not a contingent fee case. The agreement provided for monthly billing and payment from counsel’s trust account. Each group member made an initial payment of $10,000 to the trust account. Any time the trust account balance dipped below $15,000, each group member agreed to contribute another $10,000 to the trust account. For counsel, this representation was about as risk free as a legal engagement can be. The Hospitals and their counsel knew from the outset that they would have to prove their reasonableness of their fees and costs if they prevailed and wanted to recover fees. The Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy seeks an award of fees and costs. They could have adjusted their billing practices to provide more detail in preparation for a fees dispute. An "unpromulgated rule challenge" presents a narrow and limited issue. That issue is whether an agency has by declaration or action established a statement of general applicability that is a "rule," as defined in section 120.52(16), without going through the required public rulemaking process required by section 120.54. The validity of the agency's statement is not an issue decided in an "unpromulgated rule challenge." Courts have articulated the legal standards for unpromulgated rule challenges frequently. See, e.g., Coventry First, LLC v. Off. of Ins. Reg., 38 So. 3d 200, 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Dep’t of Rev. v. Vanjaria Enters., 675 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); and the cases those opinions cite. The facts proving the “stabilization” standard were easy to establish. Many Agency documents stated the shift to the “stabilization” standard. Documents of Agency contractors did also. Two examples of how clear it was that the Agency was applying a new standard were the Agency’s statements in its 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 reports to the Governor on efforts to control Medicaid fraud and abuse. The reports describe the “stabilization” standard as “more stringent” and certain to recover millions of dollars for the Agency. As the Agency’s reports to the Governor indicate, the stakes were high in this matter. For the Hospitals and other hospitals collectively affected by the Agency’s effort to recoup past payments by applying the “stabilization” standard, $400,000,000 was at stake. This matter did not present complex or difficult issues, legally or factually. The Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions requiring parties to disclose documents and witnesses and update the disclosures alleviated the discovery demands present in other litigation. The Agency’s failure to fully comply with the pre- hearing instructions and unfounded Motion in Limine added some additional time demands for the Hospital’s counsel. Nonetheless the issues were narrow, and the facts were essentially undisputed, if not undisputable. This matter did not require extraordinary amounts of time for discovery or preparation. Ordinarily challenges to rules or unpromulgated rules impose time pressures on the attorneys because of the requirement in section 120.56 that the hearing commence within 30 days of assignment to the Administrative Law Judge. The time constraint was not a factor in this case. The Hospitals requested waiver of the time requirement to permit more time for discovery. The Agency agreed, and the undersigned granted the request. Thus the Hospitals had the time their counsel said they needed to prepare for the hearing. The appeal imposed no time constraints. Both parties received extensions of time for their filings. Seventeen months passed between filing the notice of appeal and oral argument. Time for the Administrative Proceeding The total number of hours claimed for the services of the three lawyers, their claimed hourly rate, and the total fees claimed appear below. Joanne B. Erde 458.20 hours $550.00 rate $252,010.00 Donna Stinson 136.20 hours $455.00 rate $61,971.00 Harry Silver 93.40 hours $550.00 rate $51,370.00 Total 687.80 hours $365,351.00 The Hospitals’ counsel’s billing records are voluminous. For the proceeding before the Division, the Hospitals’ counsel’s invoices list 180 billing entries for the work of three lawyers. A substantial number of the entries are block billing. In block billing, all of a lawyer’s activities for a period of time, usually a day, are clumped together with one time total for the entire day’s service. It is an acceptable form of billing. But block billing presents difficulties determining the reasonableness of fees because a single block of time accounts for several different activities and the invoice does not establish which activity took how much time. Here are representative examples of the block billing entries from the Division level invoices: August 20, 2012 (Erde) – Conference call with ALJ; telephone conference with AHCA attorney; telephone conference with newspaper reporters – 2.0 hours September 16, 2012 (Erde) – Review depositions; prepare opening remarks; develop impeachment testimony – 5.50 September 27, 2012 (Erde) – Intra-office conference; finalize interrogatories; work on direct – 8.50 October 2, 2012 (Stinson) – Review and revise Motion in Limine; Telephone conferences with Joanne Erde and Harry Silver; review emails regarding discovery issues - `2.60 October 19, 2012 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss proposed order; Research Re: other OIG audits; research on validity of agency rules – 2.10 hours November 9, 2012 (Erde) – Conference with ALJ; Intra-Office conference to discuss status; further drafting of proposed order – 7.70 hours. November 19, 2012 (Stinson) – Final Review and Revisions to Proposed Final order; Telephone conferences with Joanne Erde to Review final Changes and comments; Review AHCA’s proposed order and revised proposed order – 3.20 hours. Many of the entries, block or individual, do not provide sufficient detail to judge the reasonableness of the time reported. “Prepare for deposition and hearing,” “review depositions,” “review new documents,” “review draft documents,” “intra-office conference” and “attention to discovery” are recurrent examples. Senior lawyers with more expertise and higher billing rates are expected to be more efficient. This, the fact that the matter was not complicated, the relative simplicity of the issue, and the fact that the Hospitals’ counsel already had a great deal of familiarity with the facts and law involved, all require reducing the number of hours compensated in order for them to be reasonable. For this matter, in these circumstances, the claimed number of hours is quite high. The claimed 687.80 hours amounts to working eight hours a day for 86 days, two of which were the hearing. This is not reasonable. A reasonable number of hours for the proceedings before the Division is 180. That is the equivalent of 22.5 eight-hour days. That is sufficient to handle the matter before the Division from start to finish. The number includes consideration of the worked caused by the needless difficulties presented by the Agency in discovery and with its Motion in Limine. Time for the Appellate Proceeding The fees that the Hospitals seek for the appeal are broken down by hours and rates as follows: Joanne B. Erde 255.10 hours $560.00 $142,856.00 Joanne B. Erde 202.80 hours $580.00 $117,624.00 Donna Stinson 88.50 hours $460.00 $40,710.00 Donna Stinson 67.10 hours $500.00 $33,550.00 W.D. Zaffuto 48.30 hours $435.00 $21,010.50 Rob Peccola 10.90 hours $275.00 $2,997.50 Rob Peccola 17.50 hours $300.00 $5,250.00 L. Rodriguez- Taseff 6.20 hours $520.00 $3,224.00 L. Rodriguez- Taseff 19.50 hours $545.00 $10,627.50 Rachel Pontikes 38.20 hours $515.00 $19,673.00 Total 754.10 hours $397,522.50 For the appellate proceeding, the invoices present 341 entries, a substantial number of which are block billing for work by six lawyers. Here are representative examples from the appellate level invoices: May 16, 2013 (Erde) – Reviewed AHCA’s initial brief; intra- office conference to discuss; preliminary review of record – 2.90 May 24, 2013 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss response to brief; preparation to respond to brief – 2.50 May 30, 2013 (Erde) – Attention to Appeal issues; finalize request for extension; brief research re jurisdictional issues – 1.60 June 18, 2013 (Peccola) – Strategy with J. Erde regarding research needs; review/analyze case law cited in answer brief; conduct legal research regarding documentary evidence and exhibits on appellate review; write email memo to J. Erde regarding same – 2.00 July 19, 2013 (Zaffuto) – Revise/draft Answer Brief; discuss extension of time with H. Gurland; research appellate rules regarding extension of time and staying proceedings pending ruling on motion; review appendix to answer brief; instructions to assistant regarding edits and filing of answer brief and appendix prepare answer brief for filing; call to clerk regarding extension of time review initial brief by AHCA and final order by ALJ – 5.50 August 14, 2013 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss brief; further revised brief – 5.80 August 15, 2013 (Stinson) Reviewed appellees' answer brief; discussed language in answer brief with Joanne Erde – 2.50 October 9, 2013 (Stinson) – Review draft motion to relinquish regarding admission of exhibit; exchange e-mails with Joanne Erde; telephone conference with Joanne Erde – 1.60 October 10, 2013 (Erde) – Attention to new motion re relinquishing jurisdiction; review of revisions; further revisions – 6.00 October 30, 2013 (Erde) – Research re: AHCA’s current behavior; intra-office conference to discuss status of action at DOAH - .70 November 7, 2013 (Peccola) – Strategy with J. Erde regarding Appellees’ response in opposition to Appellant’s motion for supplemental briefing; conduct research regarding same; draft same; look up 1st DCA local rule on appellate motions and email same to J. Erde – 3.60 December 5, 2013 (Erde) – Research Re: supplemental briefing issues; research to find old emails from AHCA re: inability to produce witnesses -.90 January 21, 2014 (Rodriguez-Taseff) – Working on Supplemental Answer Brief – legal argument re authentication and cases distinguishing marchines [sic]; editing facts – 6.70 February 3, 2014 (Erde) – Review and revise response to motion for further briefing; intra-office conference to discuss same – 2.20 May 2, 2014 (Pontikes) – Continue to review relevant case law regarding the definition of an unpromulgated rule; continue to analyze the briefs and the arguments; continue to draft an outline of the argument discussed – 5.00 June 5, 2014 (Erde) – draft email to group regarding AHCA’s settlement offer; reviewed supplemental settlement offer from AHCA; draft email to group re same – 1.70 June 11, 2014 (Erde) – Attention to finalizing response to AHCA’s notice of dismissal and filing of fee petition; memo to members of group – 8.00 July 21, 2014 (Erde) – completed motion for rehearing re: fees as sanctions; drafted status report for DOAH regarding status of DCA opinion; drafted status report in companion case; emails with AHCA re: withdrawing pending audits – 6.90 July 21, 2014 (Peccola) – Strategy with D. Stinson and J. Erde regarding motion for rehearing; revise/edit same; review/revise edit notices in trial court 1.20. The descriptive entries in the invoices for the appellate representation also lack sufficient detail. Examples are: “begin preparation to respond to AHCA”s brief,” “attention to appeal issues,” “preparation to draft answer brief,” and “research and draft answer brief.” For the appellate proceedings, Duane Morris added four lawyers, none with experience in Florida administrative or appellate matters. W.D. Zaffuto, L. Rodriguez-Taseff, and Rachel Pontikes are senior level lawyers in Duane Morris offices outside of Florida. Rob Peccola is a junior level lawyer from a Duane Morris office outside of Florida. The apparent result is those lawyers spending more time on issues than the more experienced Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson would. One example of this is a July 19, 2013, billing entry where a lawyer spent time researching “appellate rules regarding extension of time and staying proceedings pending ruling on motion.” The two lawyers primarily responsible for this matter, both laying claim to Florida appellate expertise, would only need to quickly check the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to confirm their recollection of the rules, something that would probably take less time than it took to make the time entry and review the draft bill. Hospitals’ also filed a puzzling motion that presents a discreet example of needless attorney time billed in this matter. The Hospitals expended 21.8 hours on a Motion for Rehearing of the court’s order awarding them fees and costs. The court’s opinion and the Final Order stated that fees and costs were awarded under section 120.595(4)(a), Florida Statutes. Yet the Hospitals’ motion fretted that fees might be assessed under section 120.595(4)(b), which caps fees at $50,000. The court denied the motion. Two things stand out when reviewing the invoices for the appellate proceeding. The first is that the appeal took more hours than the trial proceeding. A trial proceeding is generally more time-consuming because of discovery, a hearing much longer than an oral argument, witness preparation, document review, and preparing a proposed order. The second is the sheer number of hours. Hospitals’ counsel seeks payment for 754.10 hours in the appellate proceeding. This is 66.3 more than for the Division proceeding. It included a two day hearing, trial preparation, research, and preparing a 37 page proposed final order. In eight-hour days the claimed hours amount to a staggering 94.26 days. That amounts to one lawyer working on the appeal for eight hours a day for three months. Of this time, 613.5 hours were spent by Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson, lawyers with expertise in the subject area, who had prepared the case for hearing, who participated in the hearing, who closely reviewed the entire record for preparation of their proposed final order, who researched the issues before the hearing and for the proposed final order, and who wrote the proposed final order. With all this knowledge and experience with the record and the law, handling the appeal should have taken less time than the proceeding before the Division.2/ One factor supports the appellate proceeding taking as many hours, or a few more hours, than the administrative proceeding. It is the Agency’s disputatious conduct over a scrivener’s error in the Final Order which erroneously stated that the Agency’s Exhibit 1 had been admitted. The Agency’s conduct increased the time needed to represent the Hospitals in the appeal. The Agency relied upon the exhibit in its initial brief, although it twice cited page 359 of the transcript where the objection to the exhibit was sustained. Also the Agency’s and the Hospitals’ proposed final orders correctly stated that Agency Exhibit 1 had not been admitted. The Hospitals’ Answer Brief noted that Agency Exhibit 1 had not been admitted. The transcript of the final hearing and both parties’ proposed final orders were clear that the exhibit had not been admitted. Yet the Agency argued in its Reply Brief that it had been. This required the Hospitals to move to remand the case for correction of the error. The Agency opposed the motion. The court granted the motion. The Final Order was corrected and jurisdiction relinquished back to the court. The Agency used this as an opportunity to trigger a new round of briefing about whether Exhibit 1 should have been admitted. This has been considered in determining the reasonable number of hours for handling the appeal. A reasonable number of hours for handling the appeal is 225. Converted to eight-hour days, this would be 28.13 days. For the appeal, Duane Morris attributes 28.4 hours of the work to a junior lawyer. This is 3.8 percent of the total time claimed. Applying that percentage to 225 hours, results in 8.6 hours attributed to the junior lawyer with the remaining 216.45 hours attributed to senior lawyers. Attorneys and Fees Each party presented expert testimony on the issues of reasonable hours and reasonable fees. The Agency presented the testimony of M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire. The Hospitals presented the testimony of David Ashburn, Esquire. As is so often the case with warring experts, the testimony of the witnesses conflicts dramatically. Mr. Bryant opined that a reasonable rate for senior lawyers, such as Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson, ranged between $350 and $450 per hour. The reasonable rate for junior lawyers was $200 per hour. Mr. Ashburn opined that the reasonable hourly rate for senior lawyers ranged between $595 and $700 and the reasonable rate for junior lawyers was between $275 and $300. The contrast was the same for the opinions on the reasonable number of hours needed to handle the two stages of this litigation. Mr. Bryant testified that the administrative proceeding should have taken 150 to 170 hours and that the appeal should have taken 175 to 195 hours. Mr. Ashburn testified that the Hospitals’ claimed 687 hours for the proceeding before the Division and 754.10 hour for the appellate proceeding were reasonable. The Hospitals argue that somehow practicing in a large national law firm, like Duane Morris justifies a higher rate. The theory is unpersuasive. A national law firm is nothing special. There is no convincing, credible evidence to support a conclusion that lawyers from a national firm in comparison to smaller state or local firms provide better representation or more skilled and efficient lawyering that justifies a higher rate. Based upon the evidence presented in this record, a reasonable rate for the senior lawyers participating in this matter is $425 per hour. A reasonable rate for the junior lawyer participating in this matter is $200.00. Fee Amounts A reasonable fee amount for representation in the proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings is $76,500. A reasonable fee amount for the proceeding before the First District Court of Appeal is $93,701.25. Costs Hospitals seek $6,333.63 in costs. The evidence proves these costs are reasonable. The Agency does not dispute them.
Findings Of Fact At all times material herein, the Respondent was a licensed Health and Legal Expense Insurance agent in the State of Florida. By criminal indictment filed October 4, 1984, Respondent was charged with the crimes of conspiracy to commit fraud, use of the mails to defraud and the use of a fictitious name or address to defraud. After a jury trial, Respondent was convicted of the offenses of conspiracy to commit fraud, in violation of Title 18, USC, Section 1341, Title 29, USC, Section 501(c), all in violation of Title 18, USC, Section 371, as charged in Count One of the Indictment and mail fraud, all in violation of Title 18, USC, Sections 1341 and 1342, as charged in Counts Two through Five of the Indictment. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) was at all times material herein a labor union affiliated with the AFL- CIO, a labor organization as defined in Section 402 of Title 29, United States Code. Florida Public Employees Council 79 (Council 79) was at all times material herein a labor union affiliated with AFSCME and the AFL-CIO, a labor organization as defined in Section 402 of Title 29, United States Code. The scheme upon which the Respondent's conviction rests, was directed toward both AFSCME and Council 79. At all times herein, Respondent was employed by either AFSCME or Council 79. Upon Council 79 being chartered, Respondent became its Tallahassee Regional Director. The record does not reflect any persons as victims of the scheme upon which the Respondent's conviction rests other than AFSCME and Council 79. Respondent's participation in the schemes upon which his conviction rests was as follows: (a) at the directions of William Van Zandt, Assistant to Jerry Wurf, President of AFSCME, and Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, President of Council 79, Respondent enrolled David J. Michalski as an employee of Council 79 and met with David J. Michalski in November 1979 to set up an address where payments on expense account vouchers and salaries would be delivered, and assisted David J. Michalski in opening an account at the bank for this purpose, and; (b) contacted George Albert Cuneo, Jr., President and owner of Cuneo Advertising, Inc., and requested that Cuneo mail bills for printing a Council 79 newspaper directly to G.A.D., Inc. G.A.D., Inc. was a corporation used by defendants other than Respondent to funnel inflated bills for advertising and public relations for payment by AFSCME or Council 79. The record is clear that Respondent had no knowledge of the schemes, was following orders of his superiors, and received no money, property, or other consideration for his participation in the schemes. The only evidence in the record concerning the Respondent's participation in the mail fraud is that the Respondent did apparently mail some matters concerning David R. Michalski's expense vouchers. Whether he mailed anything concerning the "kick-back scheme" or the inflated bills for advertising and public relations is not clear from the record. Respondent had never been convicted of a crime before this conviction. Respondent was sentenced to three (3) years on Count One but served only eight (8) months. The sentences in Count Two through Five were suspended and Respondent was placed on probation. Respondent was placed on probation for six (6) months on Counts Two through Four which began immediately and was placed on three (3) years probation on Count Five which was to run consecutively with the sentence imposed in Count One. After serving the eight (8) months of his sentence, Respondent returned to Tallahassee and enrolled in, and completed, a course in insurance at Tallahassee Community College hoping to further expand his existing insurance license. The record is clear that Respondent's reputation for truth and veracity in the community is good despite his conviction, and the Respondent enjoys a good reputation as far as his integrity in dealing with others in concerned.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Insurance, enter a Final Order dismissing all counts of the Administrative Complaint filed herein. Respectfully submitted and entered this 31st day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4404 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3 as clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 with the exception of the phrase "with in excess of ten numbers" which is rejected as immaterial since there was no substantial competent evidence in the record to show that any individual member had been defrauded or that any conspiracy to defraud was directed at any individual member. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 2-7. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Findings of Facts 9 and 11. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 19.-20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert V. Ellias, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire PATTERSON and TRAYNHAM 1215 Thomasville Road Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Frank M. Murphy, Respondent, on May 26, 1977, filed a voluntary petition of bankruptcy in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida and was discharged November 4, 1977. At the time of the filing of the Administrative Complaint Respondent's license had lapsed by reason of his failure to renew, but the license was subsequently reinstated and is now current. Since his discharge by the bankruptcy court Respondent has continued doing work under his general contractor's license and no complaints against him have been received by Petitioner. Respondent's creditors whose debts were discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings continue to do business with Respondent on a cash basis. The First City Bank in Gainesville, Florida has, since his discharge in bankruptcy, extended Respondent credit in the amount of $3,000 and the account is current in accordance with the terms of the loan. The billings of the accountant who has done Respondent's account work since his discharge are current. Delores J. Mathys loaned Respondent in excess of $10,000 prior to his charge in bankruptcy and has loaned him additional money subsequent to his discharge. She is currently negotiating with him for the construction of a new home. Keller Building Products has, since Respondent's discharge in bankruptcy, extended Respondent credit to the extent of $5,000 and this account is current. Other suppliers have extended Respondent credit since his discharge and his accounts with them are curent. Subcontractors who have done work on projects for which Respondent is general contractor since his discharge have been paid. Other customers for whom Respondent has done work since his discharge are satisfied with his work and will continue to employ him as their contractor. Exhibit 2, a financial statement dated April 25, 1978 shows Respondent to have a current net worth in excess of $85,000, some $78,000 of which consists of real property owned jointly with his wife. Respondent's reputation in the business community in which he utilizes his certification is good.
Findings Of Fact On or about May 19, 1989, Viola DePeugh filed a complaint with the Department of Insurance, Bureau of Consumer Services, stating that the Petitioner, a licensed health and accident insurance agent for National States Insurance Company, visited the DePeugh home on or about May 4, 1989, and: tried to intimidate her and her husband; stated that the insurance agent who had sold them their Old Southern policy was "a crook and a liar" and not licensed by the Department; and stated that Old Southern had gone bankrupt and was about to go bankrupt again. The Respondent investigated the DePeugh complaint to the extent of interviewing the DePeughs and obtaining sworn written statements from them. Viola DePeugh's sworn written statement reiterated her May 19, 1989, complaint to the Department. She stated that the Petitioner had reviewed the DePeughs' Old Southern insurance policy, had stated that Old Southern had been bankrupt once before and was going bankrupt again, and had stated that her Old Southern agent was a "crook." Her husband, Forrest DePeugh, gave a sworn written statement that he had been present at the time of the Petitioner's statements to his wife and that he could verify his wife's statements. Besides the interviews with the DePeughs and their sworn written statements, the Department did not further investigate the DePeugh complaint. On or about September 21, 1989, the Respondent filed an Administrative Complaint charging the Petitioner with violations of parts of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, based on the DePeugh allegations. The Administrative Complaint charges essentially that, in order to induce the DePeughs to change from their Old Southern policy to a policy the Petitioner was selling, the Petitioner falsely represented to the DePeughs that Old Southern Insurance Company had been in bankruptcy and was about to go bankrupt again and that the DePeughs' insurance agent was "a crook." The Administrative Complaint was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal administrative proceeding and was assigned Case No. 89-5712. The Petitioner's defense to the Administrative Complaint was that he did not make the statements attributed to him, not that the statements were true. The Recommended Order in Case No. 89-5712 found that the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the DePeugh allegations were true. A Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint was entered on or about June 21, 1990. At the time of its filing on or about September 21, 1989, the Administrative Complaint against the Petitioner had a reasonable basis in law and in fact. If the DePeughs testified in accordance with Viola DePeugh's written complaint and sworn written statement, their testimony would have been legally sufficient to sustain the charges in the Administrative Complaint notwithstanding the Petitioner's denial of the charges. It was simply a case of the DePeughs' word against the Petitioner's word. There were no other witnesses, and there was no reason for the Respondent to think that further investigation would have uncovered extrinsic evidence that would support the Petitioner's denial of the charges or impeach the credibility of the DePeughs. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the Respondent to file the Administrative Complaint against the Petitioner.
