Findings Of Fact Prior to his termination, Petitioner had been employed as a Correctional Officer by the Respondent, Department of Corrections, at Glades Correctional Institute for approximately two years. On April 3, 1987, Petitioner signed a written statement acknowledging that he was immediately responsible for reading the rules of the Respondent. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Mr. Edward Minor, Correctional Officer Supervisor at Glades Correctional Institute. Mr. Chester Lambdin is the Superintendent of Glades Correctional Institute. Although he felt ill, Petitioner reported to work on January 25, 1989 before his scheduled eight hour work shift was to begin at midnight and continue through January 26, 1989. Petitioner left work due to his illness before the end of his January 26, 1989 shift. Petitioner did not report to work after he left on January 26, 1989. On January 26, 1989, Petitioner contacted his supervisor, Mr. Minor, and informed him that he was ill; that he would not report to work for about two days and that he had a doctor's excuse for his absence. Mr. Minor excused Petitioner for two days, January 27, 1989 and January 28, 1989. Petitioner's doctor's excuse covered the period of January 27, 1989 through January 30, 1989. Petitioner gave the excuse to a fellow worker and requested the associate to deliver the excuse to Mr. Minor. Before February 2, 1989, Mr. Minor did not see the excuse. Petitioner did not contact Mr. Minor until the afternoon or evening of February 2, 1989. Petitioner was not scheduled to work on January 30 or January 31, 1989. Petitioner stated that he knew he should contact his supervisor before each work shift if he were ill and would not report to work, but he stated that most of his fellow workers did not follow the procedure and were not penalized for failure to make the required report. Notice before an absence is the standard policy of the Respondent. Petitioner was on unauthorized leave on January 29, 1989, February 1, 1989 and February 2, 1989. On February 3, 1989, Mr. Lambdin drafted a letter to Petitioner, which was posted by certified mail, informing Petitioner that he had been deemed to have abandoned his position as a Correctional Officer I at Glades Correctional Institution and to have resigned from the career service system.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration issue a final order that the Petitioner abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service System as contemplated by Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of May 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-1189 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. The Respondent was the sole party who submitted Proposed Findings of Fact. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2; rejected in part as not supported by competent and substantial evidence. Rejected as conclusion of law. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 11. As to first sentence, rejected as irrelevant. As to the remainder, adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Lynne Winston, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Mr. Lewis C. Stewart 692 Waddel Way Pahokee, Florida 33476 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Varga, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
The Issue The issue presented herein is whether or not Union Correctional Institution's Policy and Procedure Directive 3.04.11 is a rule not promulgated pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and therefore is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution at Raiford, Florida. Petitioner is a black male affected by pseudofolliculitis barbae or "PFB," a skin condition caused by ingrown facial hairs which manifests itself in lesions and irritation in affected areas. The best treatment for "PFB" is to refrain from shaving in the affected areas and allowing the facial hair to grow. Petitioner has allowed his facial hair to grow and does not at the present time shave. If an inmate chose, or for some reason was required to shave and irritation developed, medicinal preparations available at the institution's infirmary could be administered to alleviate the irritation. Further, should an infection or other serious medical problem develop as a result of the shave, arrangements would be made for such an inmate to see a dermatologist at the Lake Butler Institution's infirmary. Alcohol, although a drying agent, would further irritate the affected area. (Testimony of Dr. Julius Avilez, general practitioner employed at Union Correctional Institution's infirmary) On February 26, 1981, Respondent issued Policy and Procedure Directive 3.04.11, Inmate Package Permit. The directive indicated that items containing alcohol would not be accepted in packages received by inmates at all institutions and community facilities within the Department of Corrections. Subsequent to the issuance of the above directive, the Petitioner, on February 3, 1984, had several items confiscated from an approved package by Officer K. E. Scates, a Property Room Officer at the institution. Two plastic containers of splash-on aftershave cologne, trade name "Brut" with S and D alcohol content, were confiscated and are presently being held in the institution's Property Room as property of the State. The aftershave lotion was confiscated by the institution authorities pursuant to the above directive and the Petitioner was notified that the substance would be forfeited unless arrangements were made for return of the substance to either its source or Petitioner's family.
The Issue This is a rule challenge proceeding in which the Petitioner originally sought a determination pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, that Rule 33-6.006, Florida Administrative Code, was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. This case began with the filing of a Petition For Administrative Determination on December 23, 1986. On March 26, 1987, this Hearing Officer issued a Final Order of Dismissal which granted the Department's motion to dismiss. The Final Order Of Dismissal concluded that the Petitioner had failed to allege standing to challenge Subsections (2) through (9) of Rule 33-6.006, because his allegations were insufficient to show that his substantial interests were affected by those subsections of the rule. The Final Order Of Dismissal went on to conclude that the Petitioner had sufficiently alleged standing to challenge Subsection (1) of the challenged rule, but also concluded that the Petitioner had failed to sufficiently allege facts sufficient to show the invalidity of the rule. In this regard the Final Order Of Dismissal specifically stated at paragraph 12: In order to sufficiently allege the invalidity of an existing rule, a rule challenge petition must assert, at a minimum, that the challenged rule is in some specified way a departure from statutory authority granted to the rule enacting agency by the Legislature. Where, as here, the rule is nothing more than a repetition of the statutory provision, the rule may be unnecessary, but it is not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it does not in any way depart from the statutory mandate. Because of the identical provisions of the subject rule language and the applicable statute, the Petitioner has not, and cannot, allege any facts sufficient to show that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because he has not, and cannot, allege any differences between the statutory mandate and the rule mandate. The Petitioner sought appellate review of the Final Order Of Dismissal. In Diaz v. Florida Department of Corrections, 519 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), appeal dismissed, 525 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1988), the First District Court of Appeal issued an opinion which primarily addressed the constitutionality of the statutory authority for the challenged rule. In that opinion the court concluded as follows: Accordingly, we declare section 945.10(2) Florida Statutes (1985), to be unconstitutional. The case is remanded to the DOAH hearing officer for further proceedings to determine the validity of Rule 33-6.006(1) in light of this opinion. On March 21, 1988, the appellate court issued its mandate and the case was once again before the Hearing Officer for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. The appellate court decision left undisturbed the conclusion that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge Subsections (2) through (9) of Rule 33-6.006. Accordingly, the issue on remand is limited to a determination of the validity of Subsection (1) of Rule 33-6.006, Florida Administrative Code. As discussed in the conclusions of law, that determination involves a consideration of statutory amendments which took effect after the appellate court decision and were, therefore, not considered by the appellate court. At the final hearing, both parties presented the testimony of witnesses and the Petitioner also offered several exhibits. During the course of the hearing the Petitioner was granted leave to file two late exhibits consisting of selected portions of the Department's Policy and Procedure Directives and selected portions of the Florida State Prison Institutional Operating Procedures. The Respondent was granted leave to file post-hearing objections to any late-filed exhibits. The late-filed exhibits were submitted by the Petitioner and the Respondent promptly filed objections to same. Upon consideration, the objections to the exhibits are overruled and the late-filed exhibits are received as part of the record in this case. Following the hearing, a transcript of tide proceedings at hearing was also filed. Thereafter, both parties filed timely proposed final orders containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties' proposed final orders have been carefully considered during the preparation of this final order. Specific rulings on all findings of fact proposed by the parties are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated herein.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Findings stipulated by the parties Florida Administrative Code Chapters 1S, 22I, 28, and 33, as found in the Florida Administrative Code Annotated, through the April 1988 supplement, are true and correct copies of those rule chapters. The Petitioner's current address is: Enrique J. Diaz Inmate Number 065599 Florida State Prison Post Office Box 747 Starke, Florida 32091 The Respondent's name and address is: Florida Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Department rule on which an administrative determination is sought is Rule 33-6.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, which states: No inmate of any institution, facility, or program shall have access to any information contained in the files of the Department. The statutory provisions on which the subject Department rule is based are Sections 944.09 and 945.10, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner's interests are substantially affected by Rule 33- 6.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, in that: He is a convicted felon, lawfully confined in the custody of the Department. He wishes to obtain from the Department, for the lawful cost of copying, documents he was once given by the Department, but which he no longer has in his possession, including, but not limited to: Institutional grievances filed by him. Grievance appeals filed by him. Disciplinary Reports issued against him. Disciplinary Report Worksheets issued against him. He wishes to obtain from the Department, for the lawful cost of copying, documents which are public records and which can be obtained by anyone from sources outside the Department, including, but not limited to: His Judgment and Sentence forms. His Uniform Commitment to Custody form. He wishes to obtain from the Department documents which are public records and which are normally provided to any member of the public requesting same, including, but not limited to: The Department's annual report. Ordinary records kept in the normal course of business, such as might be kept by any state agency. He had been refused any and all documents from the Department because of Rule 33-6.006(1), Florida Administrative Code. FINDINGS BASED ON EVIDENCE AT HEARING Inmates are given copies of any disciplinary reports they receive at the time they receive the disciplinary report, plus the results of any subsequent disciplinary hearing. These copies are carbon copies rather than photocopies. Inmates are given answers to inmate requests, institutional grievances, and grievance appeals they file. These answers are given to the inmate with a copy of his original filing. The act of giving an inmate another, identical, copy of any disciplinary report, disciplinary worksheet, inmate request, institutional grievance, or grievance appeal he had previously been given does not create a security problem. The act of giving an inmate another, identical, copy of his Judgment and Sentence forms, which are public documents contained in the files and records of the appropriate Clerks of Court, does not create a security problcm. Copies of the above documents are routinely made for attorneys and the news media. The actual cost of providing these copies is charged. The Department would not provide copies of the above documents if it were known the copies would be given to an inmate. The Department's Administrative Gain Time Manual is made available to the news media, the public, and attorneys. The Department refuses to make this manual available to inmates. The Florida State Prison Institutional Operating Procedures (IOPs) are public records, but the Department refuses to make copies of them for individual inmates because of Rule 33- 6.006(1), even though some of the IOPs are in the prison law library. The Department's Policy and Procedure Directives are freely available to the public, but the Department refuse to make them available to inmates. Florida State Prison, where the Petitioner is incarcerated, has approximately 1164 inmates. In accordance with state statute, the institution keeps a file on each inmate. Each file consists of from two to eighteen legal size folders of documents. The files include such material as investigation reports, disciplinary reports, special review information, presentence reports, psychological and medical reports, detainers, gain time, and other information. There are three people in the Florida State Prison records department responsible for inmate files. It takes the FSP record department three or four hours daily to file newly received documents. The FSP records department also has other duties, such as posting gain time, cell changes, and disciplinary reports. The FSP records department has received few, if any, requests for information from the public or the news media. Most of their requests come from attorneys. The attorneys' requests for information place additional burdens on the small FSP records department staff. By way of example, it took approximately two hours to "screen" the Petitioner's file at FSP and his file is smaller than that of 75 or 80 per cent of the inmates. Florida State Prison has only three photocopy machines for the entire institution. The machines are used extensively and are subject to frequent malfunctions. The Admissions and Release office maintains the official file on each inmate at the central office. Currently, there are 33,000 inmates in custody. The primary reason that the Admissions and Release office does not want inmates to have hands-on access to their central office files is to maintain the integrity of the record. The Department has had to use the files in court to defend and substantiate the calculations for release dates. The Admissions and Release office has denied all inmate requests for copies of information from its files. The Admissions and Release office is currently shorthanded. Whenever there is a new court decision affecting inmate rights or sentences, the office is flooded with correspondence and requests from inmates. The office has already received some grievances and requests from inmates concerning the appellate court decision in this case. The office expects a flood of requests if inmates are given access to Department records. During the past four years the Admissions and Release office has had very few requests for access to its files from the news media or the general public. The Department's central files contain access codes for the Department's computers. If inmates could obtain the access codes, it would compromise the integrity of the Department's computer records. Before release of any information from the Department's central office files, the information is screened for confidential information. Even documents which appear to be facially innocent have to be read to determine whether they contain information about informants or victims. The Department is concerned that if inmates are allowed broad access to Department files, such access will create security problems. But the Department is even more concerned about the sheer volume of requests that would result from allowing broad access and the impact the expected volume of requests would have on Department staff and copying equipment. The Department is also generally of the view that it is virtually impossible to write a rule which would describe which documents should be available for inmate access and which should not. Rather, the Department is of the view that decisions regarding release of documents to inmates must be made on a case by case basis after review of each document in each file.
The Issue Whether Proposed Rule 33.9007(9), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Steven Rivera, Petitioner, is currently serving a prison sentence at Walton Correctional Institution at DeFuniak Springs, Florida. He is on his fifth commitment to prison. Respondent supervises the operation of correctional institutions in Florida and promulgates rules governing the operation of the prisons and various subjects relating to inmates of these prisons. The proposed rule here under challenge provides: Any inmate who is serving his fourth commitment to prison or higher shall be excluded from work release if the inmate has previously been given the opportunity to participate in work release, except that an inmate may be given consideration if the inmate has demonstrated outstanding institutional adjustment and if extenuating circumstances exist. Petitioner has been admitted to the work release program in a prior commitment and, with more than four prison commitments is in the class of prisoner covered by this rule. Accordingly, he has standing to challenge the rule. The work release program is intended to motivate the individual offender toward self improvement, to ease the transition from prison into the community, place the inmate in employment to which he or she may return after release from the institution, permit the offender to contribute towards his own support and the support of his or her family, help determine the prisoner's readiness for parole, preserve family and community ties, and permit the offender to develop or maintain occupational skills. (Exhibit 6) The Florida work release program has been in effect for many years allowing Department of Corrections officers the opportunity to gain experience in the effectiveness and efficacy of the program. First commitment offenders are more likely to benefit from work release than are those who have three or more prior commitments. Inmates who have been given one chance in the work release program and are subsequently recommitted to the prison institution have thereby demonstrated that they did not obtain the anticipated benefit of remaining crime free subsequent to being admitted to the work release program. Following a murder committed by a prisoner who escaped from the work release program at another institution, a Task Force was set up to study the work release program and prepare recommendations affecting this program. As a result of this Task Force's recommendations, wide ranging changes to the rules affecting the work release program were promulgated of which the rule here challenged is only one small subsection. Furthermore, prior to the commission of the crime referred to above, there were approximately 4000 prisoners admitted to the work release program. Legislative changes since that time have limited the maximum number of prisoners admitted to the work release program to 2100. Although Petitioner contends that there is no rule definition of commitment, this is a word that is well recognized in the prison community. As defined by one of Respondent's witnesses in these proceedings, each time a prisoner is committed following a release from a prior commitment whether in Florida or in another jurisdiction, this counts as an additional commitment. If the inmate commits an offense while in confinement, is taken to court and receives an additional sentence, this is not counted as an additional commitment. This method of counting commitments inures to the benefit of the prison inmates. Petitioner also contends that the phrase "has demonstrated outstanding institutional adjustment and if extenuating circumstances exist" is arbitrary and vests unbridled discretion in the prison officials. However, admission to the work release program is a privilege which all prisoners admitted to such program must earn. They earn this privilege by adhering to the code of conduct established for prisoners, by participating in education, drug and alcohol abuse programs, and by other acts contributing to earning gain time. Certain classes of prisoners, e.g. those who have committed serious crimes, sex crimes, and crimes evincing a violent disposition must demonstrate more clearly than does the less violent criminal that he is eligible for work release. No one act can show that one prisoner is better deserving for the limited number that can be admitted to the work release program than is another prisoner. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider innumerable factors to determine which are the prisoners most likely to benefit from work release based upon their history and their current conduct in the prison system. A finite list of factors to be considered in determining those most eligible for work release is impracticable because the list would be too numerous and could still omit factors deserving consideration. The proposed rules, including the rule in issue here, provide that certain prisoners are not eligible for work release; but the rule provides two exceptions to this general disqualification, to wit: those who "demonstrate outstanding institutional adjustment and extenuating circumstances." By providing these exceptions, the rule removes the arbitrary exclusion of certain prisoners from work release regardless of their good conduct in prison and demonstration that they have totally reformed and are most unlikely ever to again commit a crime.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are inmates presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution, Polk City, Florida. Polk Correctional Institution is a prison facility maintained by the Florida Department of Corrections. The superintendent of Polk Correctional Institution issued a directive, which is dated February 18, 1982, and entitled "Interoffice Memorandum". The memorandum is directed to all inmates and relates to visiting procedures. It provides: Effective Saturday, March 6, 1982, inmates will no longer be permitted to receive visitors on both Saturday and Sunday of the same week. Visiting policy in the past has permitted inmates to receive visits on both Saturday and Sunday of the same week, but not from the same visitor. This change means that you must receive all your visitors on either Saturday or Sunday. If your (sic) receive a visit on Saturday, you will not be permitted to receive another visit on Sunday. This change in visiting procedure will help alleviate the overcrowded situation in the visitor's park and allow you and your family to visit together more comfortably. The memorandum applies only within Polk Correctional Institution. It was issued by the superintendent without any effort being made to promulgate it as a rule. No effort was made to publish notice, to give affected persons an opportunity to be heard, nor to conduct hearings and allow input from members of the public. The superintendent did not construe the memorandum as being a rule. He considered it authorized under the provisions of Section 945.21, Florida Statutes; Department of Corrections Rule 33-5.01, Florida Administrative Code; and Department of Corrections "Policy and Procedure Directive" Number 3.04.12, which was issued April 8, 1981. Rule 33-5.01 provides: The Secretary shall authorize each Superintendent to adopt policies stating the conditions and circumstances under which visits may be conducted including: the regular visiting hours of the insti- tution; the items which visitors may take in or out of an institution, and what items are contraband; what persons or groups may visit, and in what numbers; and the specific standards of conduct which shall prevail during such visits. All visiting policies promulgated by the Superintendents shall be subject to approval by the Secretary. Department of Corrections Policy and Procedure Directive 3.04.12 provides at Paragraph V.A. 1: Visiting days shall normally be designated as Saturday and Sunday between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Where unusual circum- stances occur, additional days may be designated for visiting. Institutions are authorized to restrict visiting to one of these days; or when facilities permit, visiting may be permitted more than one day. The directive provides at Paragraph V.B.: There is no limit on the number of individuals that may visit an inmate on any particular visiting day other than those restrictions imposed regarding limited space at each institution. Each institution is authorized to place a limitation when physical facilities are restrictive. However, reasonableness should be exercised when possible in regard to the number of visitors that would be permitted. Those institutions restricting visits to either Saturday or Sunday, but not both, may permit special exception in the case of those individuals that have traveled a significant dis- tance, especially when such visits are on an infrequent basis. This policy directive has not been promulgated as a rule. It is not published in the Florida Administrative Code, does not bear a numerical designation that accords with rules of the Department of State, and appears to have been adopted on authority of Department of Corrections Rules 33-4.02(), 33-3.06, and 33-5, Florida Administrative Code. None of these rules sets out visiting conditions with the specificity found in the policy and procedure directive. Prior to the March 6, 1982 effective date of the Superintendent's memorandum, which is the basis for this proceeding, inmates at Polk Correctional Institution were allowed to receive visitors on both Saturday and Sunday. This prior policy was based upon memoranda that had been issued by the superintendent in the same manner as the February 18, 1982 memorandum.
Findings Of Fact Respondent stipulated that petitioners are substantially affected by the proposed rule. The evidence showed that its provisions would apply to them. PFB Pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB) is a chronic condition afflicting 45 to 50 percent of black men. PFB occurs when facial hair grows back into the skin. It is by no means a medical emergency, but complicating infections do occur. Once the beard hairs grow out a centimeter or more there is little or no likelihood that they will curl back and bury themselves in the facial skin. The accepted treatment is to let the beard grow. 1/ v EXISTING PRACTICE Until recently, prisoners with PFB were given prescriptions authorizing them to grow their beards no longer than one quarter inch. Dr. Julian Avilas, a physician at Union Correctional Institution, now routinely prescribes letting the beard grow at least 10 millimeters. David E. Watson, an assistant superintendent at Florida State Prison, testified that the practices in place at Union Correctional Institution were the same as would be required under the proposed rule. He originally testified that "closely trimmed" meant clean shaven. He was clean shaven at the hearing, and testified that to trim a beard closely was to sieve as closely as he had the morning of the hearing. Under skillful examination on redirect, however, he said that closely trimmed meant only as long as medically necessary. On December 1, 1983, Josh Green was given a prescription permitting him to grow his beard, but no longer than one quarter inch. He gets "bumps" whether he shaves with a razor or trims with clippers, which are preset to trim close enough to the skin to make the length of the beard less than one quarter inch. Generally speaking, the inmates do not have access to scissors. Two weeks before the hearing, he was required to shave cleanly, even though he showed the prescription to the guard who required this. Prisoners call these prescriptions "passes" and many keep them on their persons. Prison medical personnel gave Joseph Redman a prescription directing him to grow his beard no longer than one quarter inch, some time before December 19, 1983, the day a guard told him to trim his beard. He refused, believing his beard to be less than a quarter inch, and was sentenced to 30 days disciplinary confinement as a result. No measurements were ever taken. Herman L. Bentley's prescription also specifies that he is not to grow his beard longer than one quarter inch. Since the prescription was written on November 22,, 1983, however, guards have required him to shave cleanly seven or eight times, the prescription notwithstanding. Jerome Henry Carter was given a prescription for an indefinite period directing him to grow his beard, but no longer than a quarter inch, in December of 1983. Officer Smith nevertheless required him to shave in February of 1984, even though he was told of the prescription. Gary Reed has also had the experience of being required to shave "all the way" even though prison medical authorities had written a prescription directing him to let his beard grow, to a length less than one quarter inch. Joe Lewis Holland's prescription directed that he be allowed to grow his beard to a length of at least 10 millimeters. After the prescription was written in January of 1984, he and a guard had a disagreement about the length of his beard. HAIRCUTS Joe Lewis Holland also got into a dispute with a guard about whether his haircut was in good taste. He was wearing a neat, clean "moderate Afro" before the barber cut his hair close to the scalp, at the guard's direction. See Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. The barber gave him one haircut, then another, then a third, before enough hair had been cut to suit the guard. Hennard Harris' hair was "tight, in a ball," off his neck and ears. When he declined a guard's request that he comb it out so the guard could see how long it was, the guard ordered that it all be cut off. RULE RATIONALE Mr. Watson explained the considerations behind forbidding full beards and requiring short haircuts. According to his uncontroverted testimony, uniformity of prisoners' appearance is a desideratum in and of itself. There are health and sanitation problems with longer hair. Many inmates are involved in food preparation. The prison issues toothpaste, but not shampoo. In a fight, long hair can be pulled more readily than short hair. Some inmates work in close proximity to machinery. Although some visitors to the prison have short hair and do not wear beards, it is easier, in general, to distinguish inmates from visitors if the former are all close shaven. (Prison uniforms also help in this regard.) Escapees would be able to alter their appearance more rapidly if they had long hair (by cutting it off) or a beard (by shaving) than if they were put to the trouble of acquiring a wig or a false beard. The policy of requiring prisoners to forego beards and keep their hair short is not uniformly observed in the United States. Nevada and Nebraska have different policies in their prisons. Both petitioners and respondent filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which have been considered in preparation of the final order. To the extent findings of fact have not been adopted, they have been deemed unsupported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, cumulative or subordinate.
The Issue Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, William Van Poyck, and the Intervenor, Robert David Roy, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner and the Intervenor are subject to the rules of the Respondent. The evidence failed to prove that the Petitioner and Intervenor are, or have been, placed in administrative confinement by the Respondent. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, the Florida Department of Corrections, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, a rule of the Respondent, governs the placement of an inmate in "administrative confinement". "Administrative confinement" is "the removal of an inmate from the general inmate population for . . . " various specified reasons. Rule 33-3.0081(1), Florida Administrative Code. By letter dated September 27, 1990, the Respondent advised the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee"), of proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Be letter dated November 5, 1990, M. Catherine Green, an attorney with the Committee, informed the Respondent that a review of the proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, had been completed. Ms. Green also informed the Respondent of certain "technical errors" and "substantive errors" that she found with Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Green indicated that a "substantive error" referred to "errors which will result in recommended objections to the committee unless they are eliminated prior to adoption." Among the "substantive errors" identified by Ms. Green, was a comment concerning the following portion of Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code: (3) Placement in administrative confinement shall be for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results. Ms. Green's comment concerning the portion of Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, quoted in finding of fact 9 was, in pertinent part, as follows: What does "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" mean? This has the effect of not notifying the inmate of the length of time in which he will be in administrative confinement and the criteria to be considered in releasing him or her. The rule discusses criteria for placing inmates in administrative confinement, but sets no criteria other than "desired results" as to when an inmate shall be released. If the two criteria are the same, please make that clear. Another of the "substantive errors" identified by Ms. Green, was a comment concerning the following portion of Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code: (4)(a) An inmate may be placed in administrative confinement by the senior correctional officer after an informal hearing when no reasonable alternative exists. The reason for placement shall be explained to the inmate, and he shall be given an opportunity to present his views on the matter to the senior correctional officer. When the senior correctional officer places an inmate in administrative confinement, this action shall be documented on a Report . . ., including the reasons for the action and a summary of the inmate's comments or objections. The inmate may also submit a written statement. Rule 33-3.0081(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, provides for review of the senior correctional officer's "informal hearing" and Rule 33-3.0081(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code, provides for a 48-hour delay in the "informal hearing" in case of certain emergencies. Ms. Green's comment concerning the portion of Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, quoted in finding of fact 11 was, in pertinent part, as follows: Please provide a cross reference to the rules of procedure for an informal hearing. Does the review procedure conflict with provisions of Chapter 33-29, F.A.C.? Please clarify what the phrase "when no reasonable alternative exists" means in reference to an inmate's confinement after an informal hearing. . . . . In a letter dated January 23, 1991, the Respondent, through a Senior Attorney, responded to Ms. Green's comments. The following response to Ms. Green's comments concerning Rule 33- 3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, was made: The Department of Corrections will delete the phrase "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" and replace it with "continue until the factors which created the need for protective management have been resolved". The Respondent subsequently proposed to amend Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, by deleting the phrase "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" and replacing it with the phrase "continue until the factors which created the need for protective management have been resolved". The proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, does not substantively change the circumstances under which an inmate placed in administrative confinement will be returned to the general inmate population. Under Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, prior to the proposed amendment, "the shortest time possible" occurred when the factors which necessitated placing an inmate in administrative confinement no longer applied. The proposed amendment merely clarifies when "the shortest time possible" has occurred. The following response to Ms. Green's comments concerning Rule 33- 3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, was also made in the January 23, 1991, letter: The Department of Corrections will delete the phrase "an informal hearing" and insert "being advised of an incident or situation which prohibits the inmate from remaining in open population without endangering himself or others or compromising the security of the institution". The Respondent subsequently proposed to amend Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, by deleting the terms "informal hearing" and replacing them with the following underlined language: (4)(a) An inmate may be placed in administrative confinement by the senior correctional officer after being advised of a situation or incident which prohibits the inmate from remaining in open population without endangering himself or others or compromising the security of the institution, if the situation cannot be resolved. The reason for placement shall be explained to the inmate, and he shall be given an opportunity to present his views on the matter to the senior correctional officer. When the senior correctional officer places an inmate in administrative confinement, this action shall be documented on a Report . . ., including the reasons for the action and a summary of the inmate's comments or objections. The inmate may also submit a written statement. . . . The proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, does not substantively change the manner in which an inmate is informed that he or she is being placed in administrative confinement. The "informal hearing" previously required in Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, required no more than the proposed amendment provides for. By eliminating the terms "informal hearing" the proposed rule amendment eliminates any confusion as to whether some more formal process is to be followed by the Respondent in informing an inmate that he or she is being placed in administrative confinement. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which contained the proposed amendments at issue in this proceeding was subsequently filed by the Respondent with the Bureau of Administrative Code, for publication, and with the Committee. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking included the following "purpose and effect" clause: The proposed amendments are needed in order to correct technical and substantive errors noted by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. The proposed amendments provide clarification of policies and procedures regarding administrative confinement and protective management. The purpose and effect clause is consistent with the substantive changes to Rule 33-3.0081(3) and (4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, at issue in this proceeding. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, at issue in this proceeding are arbitrary or capricious. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that any of the suggestions concerning Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, made by Ms. Green were ever approved, adopted, or reviewed by the Committee. In fact, Ms. Green indicates in her letter that "substantive errors" she perceived would be recommended as objections to the Committee only if they were not eliminated prior to adoption. Since the "substantive errors" at issue in this proceeding were eliminated, they were apparently never recommended or considered by the Committee.
The Issue This case arises out of a challenge by the Petitioners to the validity of Rule 33-3.02(6), Florida Administrative Code; Policy and Procedure Directive 2.02.13, and Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure No. 81-82. The Petitioners specifically challenge the validity of those portions of the above- provisions relating to the issue of clothing to the inmates. At the final hearing, Petitioners, Joseph Redman, Nyadzi D. Rufu and Jimmy L. Rogers, testified on their own behalf and also called as witnesses Charles Connors and Paul Gunning. Petitioners offered and had admitted into evidence five exhibits. Respondents called no witnesses and offered no exhibits into evidence. The Petitioner S. B. Ridley, did not appear at the formal hearing. The Hearing Officer was informed by one of the other Petitioners at the formal hearing that Mr. Ridley had been transferred to Polk Correctional Institution. Mr. Ridley was given due notice of the hearing held on February 17, 1984, and has filed no pleading or motion with the undersigned Hearing Officer seeking either a continuance or other relief. The Petitioners and counsel for the Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings and conclusions are inconsistent with this order, they were rejected as unsupported by the evidence or as unnecessary to a resolution of this cause.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Joseph Redman, Nyadzi D. Rufu and Jimmy L. Rogers are inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution, Raiford, Florida. On November 5, 1982, as Petitioner Rogers was being released from disciplinary confinement, he entered the laundry to obtain another pair of state issued pants, socks and underwear. The name tag was coming off of his jacket and because of this it was confiscated. He asked for another jacket and was told he could not be issued one. He was eventually issued another jacket which was also confiscated. For a period of time, Petitioner Rogers had no jacket for those times when he was required to walk and be outside in the cold. The laundry manager at Union Correctional Institution is responsible for the issue of all clothing to the prisoners. The manager follows Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure 81-82 in issuing clothing an Union Correctional Institution. That operating procedure provides in relevant part: 81-82.1 Purpose This memorandum is published as a guide in the issuance of inmate clothing, and the providing of laundry facilities for the inmate population. 81-82.2 Authority Florida Statutes 945.21, 944.09 section 20.315 Department of Corrections Administrative Rules, Chapter 33-3.02(6). 81-82.3 Clothing Issue Each inmate shall be issued the following clothing items: 3 each Blue Shirts 3 pairs Blue Trousers 1 each Web Belt 1 pair Boxer Shorts 1 pair Socks 1 pair Shoes, High Top. Inmates assigned to the Food Service Departments and Canteens shall be issued one additional suit of clothing because of their having to work on Sundays, enabling them to change clothing daily. 81-82.6 Special Issue Inmate Jackets are issued in October of each year and picked up for storage in April. An inmate may have his jacket laundered on any Friday. Hats, caps, and other special clothing items are issued to the Department Supervisor for distribution to the work squad. The Supervisor is responsible for those items of issue. 81-82.7 Miscellaneous Information The Laundry Manager/Clothing Officer shall maintain a record of the various clothing items issued to each inmate. If clothing issue is abused, either through neglect or by intent, the officer will initiate appropriate action. The official inmate uniform throughout the institution is issue blue shirt and trousers. Inmates assigned to the following areas are issued white shirts and trousers in lieu of the regular blue uniform: Food Service Administration Building Workers Main Gate Workers Utility Man on each Close Supervision Squad (For Identification) Canteen Workers. Each inmate who turns in a jacket (at the end of winter) shall be issued a pair of hemmed walking shorts for wearing on the athletic field or after hours in the housing area. The manager was not aware of and has not utilized Policy and Procedure Directive 2.02.13, in issuing clothing at Union Correctional Institution. That policy and procedure directive provides in relevant part: AUTHORITY: Section 20.315, 944.09 and 945.21, Florida Statutes Department of Corrections, Administrative Rules, Chapter 33-3.02(6) PURPOSE: The purpose of this Directive is to establish a uniform procedure for issuing inmate clothing and linens. This will enable the Department to control the costs of clothing and linens in a more economical manner. GENERAL: Appropriate internal measures will be taken by each operating location to implement the provisions of this Directive. It is the Department's expressed intent that all inmate clothing be appropriately fitted and suited for the environment and that Departmental facilities provide sufficient laundering facilities to ensure that appropriate health standards are maintained. The clothing and linen will be exchanged on a one for one basis after the initial issue. Should an inmate intentionally damage or destroy his/her uniforms, appropriate action should be taken by the Superintendent to reimburse the State, if possible. It is imperative that the custodial staff be well informed of the provisions of this Directive and any exceptions or deviations from this Policy set forth will have to be approved by the Regional Director. STANDARD CLOTHING ISSUE (MALE): Each male inmate may be issued the items of clothing and linen specified below. The phrase "Maximum Clothing Issue" is used in this Directive to permit the substitution of personal clothing or to permit the issuance of less than maximum quantities where appropriate. Unless otherwise designated, the inmate will not have excess clothing and linens in his possession. Each inmate will be responsible for the clothing and linen issued to him. Maximum Clothing Issue - Blues and Whites Items Quantity Shirts 3 for 5 day post 5 for 7 day post 3 for 5 day post 5 for 7 day post Maximum Clothing Issue - Other Items Items Quantity Undershorts 3 pairs Undershirts/T shirts 3 Socks 2 pairs (changed daily) Belt with Buckle 1 Shoes 1 pair Jacket (winter only) 1 Long underwear (winter only for outside detail) 2 Regions III, IV and V may substitute two sweatshirts for two pairs of long underwear for winter use. E. Clothing - Special Items such as food service linens, coverall's aprons, cooks' caps, gloves, rubber boots, raincoats, athletic uniforms, barber and butcher jackets, straw hats and safety helmets shall be considered tools of the trade and will be issued directly to the department requiring them. The superintendent will, on recommendation and justification by department head, determine what items are to be purchased and issued to inmate. All items issued on a departmental basis that can be appropriately marked shall have the standardized department initials stenciled on the item. It will be the responsibility of the superintendent to establish a laundry schedule for these items. Only those inmates who work outside for eight hours each day are issued long underwear during the winter months. The inmates do not go outside when the temperature is below 40 degrees. The laundry does not issue raincoats to the inmates. The raincoats are under industry inventory and each department can draw raincoats out of that inventory. The raincoats are paid for by the department drawing them out and the work supervisor from that department issues them to the inmates. Raincoats are sold in the canteen at Union Correctional Institution. The laundry stocks long underwear but no longer stocks T-shirts. The laundry does not stock sweatshirts. There are two types of blue uniforms. The laundry issues coveralls to special jobs but no coveralls are issued to inmates personally. It is within the laundry manager's discretion as to when he issues new clothing as opposed to used clothing. It is the laundry manager's responsibility to remain within his budget for the year. T-shirts are not included in the list of clothing issue items in Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure 81-82. This may be due in part to budget restrictions. T-shirts are included in the "maximum clothing issue" list in Policy and Procedure Directive 2.02.13. Practically every inmate in Union Correctional Institution is required to go outside in order to go to work or to school. The inmates must also go outside in order to go to the chow hall or the clinic. The west unit is approximately a 4 or 5 minute walk from the chow hall. Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure No. 81-82 is signed and issued by the Superintendent of UCI and cites as its authority Florida Statutes 945.21, 944.09, Section 20.315, and Rule 3303.02(6), Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent has not contested the fact that the operating procedure was not promulgated in accordance with the requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. There was no evidence presented as to the procedures followed in adopting the Policy and Procedure Directive 2.02.13.
Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed on September 12, 1991. The Petition was filed by Ervin James Horton. In the Petition Rule 33-3.00125, Florida Administrative Code, and I.O.P. #P2-89.10 were challenged. The Challenged Rule is titled "Inmate Telephone Use." The Challenged Rule sets forth the "minimum telephone privileges that shall be granted inmates. . . ." The I.O.P. apparently deals with the same general subject as the Challenged Rule. The Petition includes the use of legal terms and phrases with little in the way of factual explanation. As an example, paragraph 4, Affected Interest of the Petitioner, Second Amended Petition, provides the following: 4. That the (Petitioner) is affected by the Agancy [sic] promulgation of 33-3.00125 et. seq. that materially fail to follow the applicable rulemaking procedure setforth [sic] in 120.54. And, establish adequate standards for the Agency decision making as needed June 6th, 1990, August 13th, 1990 that exceed it [sic] grant of authority and fail [sic] to include the requirements of (consistancy) [sic] in delegating to I.O.P. P2-89.10 as 33-1.007(1), (3), (4) mandate and the unbridle [sic] discretion exercised by the Agency to deny (telephonic communication) needed for judicial reason [sic] as requirements of the court in Case # 90- 2968-23 Horton v. Florida Federal S.B. as not being available for judicial needs. [Emphasis in original]. This paragraph is fairly typical of most of the Petition, the First Amended Petition and the Second Amended Petition. Although it contains some "legalize", it does not, read alone or in conjunction with all of the Petitioner's pleadings, adequately put the Respondent on notice as to what the Petitioner is challenging or the basis for his challenge. Apparently, the Petitioner is complaining of the actions of several employees of the Respondent relating to several alleged incidents involving attempts by the Petitioner to use a telephone. In the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition, paragraphs 13-20 pertain to an incident which allegedly occurred in December, 1989, paragraphs 21-42 pertain to an incident which allegedly occurred in May and/or August, 1990, paragraphs 43A-48A pertain to an incident which allegedly occurred in August, 1989, and paragraphs 52A-59A pertain to an incident which allegedly occurred in January, 1991. These events are further referred to in other portions of the Petition and throughout the First and Second Amended Petitions. Paragraph 24, Statement of the Facts, of the First Amended Petition is fairly typical of the allegations concerning specific actions complained of by the Petitioner: 24 That the (Petitioner) has repeatively [sic] been subjected to the (practices) arbitrary, capriociously [sic], exercise pursuant to 33-3.00125 et. seq. F.A.C. as by Florida State prison administrators as T.L. Barton, L.E. Turner, P.C. Decker, and dates of July 23rd, 1988; June 5th, 1990, August 13th, 1989 and as setforth [sic] herein; [Emphasis in original]. The alleged incidents complained of by the Petitioner have allegedly been the subject of unsuccessful grievance proceedings. Having failed to obtain a favorable response to his grievances, the Petitioner is seeking through this process to have the particular incidents reviewed. The Petitioner's allegations concerning the alleged incidents involving his attempts to obtain use of the telephone are not merely allegations intended to prove the Petitioner's standing to institute this proceeding. The Petitioner is complaining about, and seeking review of, actions of the Respondent in denying him the use of a telephone on the dates raised by the Petitioner in his Petition and his First and Second Amended Petitions. 9 The Petitioner has also attempted to raise constitutional arguments to support his challenge to the Challenged Rule and the I.O.P. See paragraphs 6, 11-12, 17, 20, 44A, 50A and 60A of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition. The Petitioner also mentions constitutional provisions in numerous other parts of the Petition, the First Amended Petition and the Second Amended Petition. The statements concerning constitutional issues consist of mere statements that constitutional rights are being violated without any facts to support an argument that the Challenged Rule or the I.O.P. is unconstitutional. Insufficient alleged facts concerning why it is believed that the specific requirements or provisions of the Challenged Rule and the I.O.P. are an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition, the First Amended Petition and the Second Amended Petition. On November 18, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Cancelling Formal Hearing was entered. On December 6, 1991, a pleading titled "Petitioner [sic] Amended Petition Pursuant to Order Issued Nov. 18th 1991 According [sic] Opportunity to Amend" was filed by the Petitioner. The First Amended Petition is very similar to the Petition and suffers from the same deficiencies. The First Amended Petition is devoid of a sufficient statement of the alleged facts pertinent to the issues raised in the Petition or the First Amended Petition which, if proven, would support a determination that the Challenged Rule and the I.O.P. are invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. On December 9, 1991, an Order Concerning Amended Petition was entered dismissing the First Amended Petition and giving the parties an opportunity to file proposed final orders. On December 12, 1991, the Petitioner filed a document titled Petitioner's Motion to File a Second and Final Amendment" and a Second Amended Petition. The Second Amended Petition does nothing to correct the deficiencies of the Petition or the First Amended Petition. The motion to file the Second Amended Petition was denied by Order entered December 18, 1991.
The Issue Whether proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.018(10) and (11), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
