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NORMAN ALEXANDER vs. CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 82-003347RX (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-003347RX Latest Update: Feb. 25, 1983

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: By Warranty Deed dated July 2, 1982, petitioner was conveyed "Lot 151, Less the South 1/2 thereof" in Glenwood Subdivision. Lot 151 is presently zoned RS-50. The minimum lot area per dwelling unit in an RS-50 district is 5,000 square feet. Section 131.044, Code of Ordinances of the City of Clearwater. According to the subdivision plat, Glenwood Subdivision contains 154 platted lots, with an average lot size of 8,844 square feet. The smallest platted lot in the subdivision is 6,000 square feet. Lot 151 contains approximately 12,000 square feet. There is an existing single-family dwelling on the southern portion of Lot 151 which portion contains 7,700 square feet. Computations performed from a metes and bounds description of the northern part of Lot 151 which was conveyed to petitioner illustrates that petitioner's portion of Lot 151 contains 4,320 square feet. Section 20-2 of Ordinance No. 1449 provides, in part, that: ". . .Building permits shall not be issued for structures located on subdivided property created subsequent to the adoption of this Ordinance unless such plat of record is recorded in the Public Records of Pinellas County. The City Commission may permit lots of record to be cut in size to not less than the zone permits, without requiring a replat." No request was made to and no approval was given by the Clearwater City Commission to divide Lot 151, a platted lot. The restrictions for Glenwood Subdivision require that only one single- family dwelling house be erected on any single lot or plot. In August of 1982, petitioner applied to the Building Inspection Department of the City of Clearwater for a building permit to erect a single- family residence on his property. Apparently, a survey of the property did accompany the application, but no one in the Building Inspection Department verified the lot size. Petitioner was issued a building permit. Prior to October 27, 1982, petitioner had the land cleared, made soil boring tests, paid water meter fees, laid pilings and had the foundation and walls in place for the lower level of his new residence. The costs of this work, and other expenses related thereto, amounted to some $18,350.00. On or about October 27, 1982, the City issued a "red tag" on the project because it was discovered that petitioner's lot size was substandard. This was the first notification petitioner had of any problem with his lot size. He had never made inquiry concerning the zoning requirements for his lot. Petitioner continued construction on his residence. Two more "red tags" were issued on or about November 2 and November 25, 1982. On the latter date, petitioner was ordered to stop work on the project. Petitioner estimates that between August, 1982, and the date of his hearing (January 26, 1983), he expended approximately $40,710.00 on the purchase of his land and the partial construction of his residence. As noted in the Introduction, petitioner's application for a variance from the lot size requirements was denied by the City's Zoning Enforcement Officer, his appeal to the Board of Adjustment and Appeal on Zoning was denied and the instant proceeding resulted.

Florida Laws (1) 120.65
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INDIANTOWN COGENERATION vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 90-008072EPP (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Indiantown, Florida Dec. 21, 1990 Number: 90-008072EPP Latest Update: Dec. 29, 1992

The Issue The issue for determination is whether the proposed Indiantown Cogeneration, L.P. (ICL) Project site is consistent and in compliance with existing land use plans and zoning ordinances of Martin County and Okeechobee County, Florida. See Section 403.508(2), Florida Statutes. No party to the proceeding disputes that the site is consistent and in compliance with the plans and ordinances in effect on December 21, 1990, when the application was filed.

Findings Of Fact ICL published notices of this land use hearing on June 15, 1991, in The Stuart News, on June 19, 1991, in The Indiantown News, and on June 16, 1991, in The Okeechobee News. Notices of this hearing were published by the Department of Enviromental Regulation in the Florida Administrative Weekly on June 28, 1991. ICL mailed notice of this hearing to the chief executives of the local and regional authorities with responsibility for zoning and land use planning whose jurisdiction includes the site. The Applicant, ICL, posted a notice of this hearing at the proposed site. ICL proposes to construct and operate a 330 Mw cogeneration facility which captures waste heat from electrical generation to produce steam for industrial processes. The facility will burn pulverized coal to generate electricity for sale to Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) and supply up to 225,000 pounds per hour of steam for drying operations at the adjacent Caulkins Citrus Processing plant. Steam generation will be accomplished by means of a pulverized coal boiler. The boiler will be of an outdoor natural-circulation type in which coal will be mixed with air and ignited. Electricity will be generated by passing steam produced by the boiler through an extraction-condensing turbine generator. Sulfur oxide and nitrogen oxide compounds and particulates will be removed from the boiler exhaust gases using various removal systems. Coal will be delivered by trains arriving from the north. A rail loop and coal unloading, handling and storage facilities will be constructed onsite. Ash will be temporarily stored in onsite silos before being removed from the site. A new site access road will be constructed along the western and southern boundary of the site to provide access to State Road 710 and West Farm Road. A railroad spur across the adjacent Florida Steel plant site will connect the site to the CSX railroad. The proposed project will include a water pipeline that will extend 19 miles southeast from Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough in Okeechobee County to the facility site. An intake structure will be constructed at Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough to pump water to the plant site. To distribute electricity generated, the ICL facility's electrical switch yard will connect to an existing FPL electrical transmission line which crosses the northern portion of the Project site. Site for Indiantown Cogeneration Project The site for the proposed Indiantown Cogeneration Project is a 220 acre tract which lies approximately 20 miles west of Stuart, three miles northwest of Indiantown and nine miles east of Lake Okeechobee. To the north of the Site are the Caulkins Citrus Processing Plant and a vacant Florida Steel Corporation plant site. Both of these facilities border State Road 710 and the CSX Railroad. The proposed corridor for the cooling water pipeline to serve the Project is within the existing CSX Railroad right-of-way which parallels State Road 710, running southeast from the intake structure location in Okeechobee County to the site. The permanent right-of-way for the pipeline is to be located within this corridor. Consistency and Compliance of the Project Site with Local Land Use Plans of Martin County The proposed site is designated for "Industrial" use on the Land Use Map adopted by the Martin County Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) as part of its 1990 Comprehensive Growth Management Plan (Martin Plan). The Martin Plan was the local land use plan in effect in Martin County on the date ICL filed this SCA. This Plan encouraged future development of industrial uses, including cogeneration facilities, to occur under a planned unit development industrial zoning classification. The evidence at the hearing established that the Project is consistent and in compliance with the Martin Plan in effect on the date ICL filed the SCA. During the PUD(i) rezoning process discussed below, the proposed project was also reviewed by Martin County for consistency with the other policies of the Martin Plan. The project, as proposed, was found to be consistent with this Plan. On July 9, 1991, the Martin County BOCC adopted a land text amendment (ICL Exhibit 9), which added steam/electricity cogeneration plants as permitted uses within areas designated Industrial. The Department of Community Affairs has made no determination as to the amendment's compliance or non-compliance with Chapter 163 and specifically reserves its responsibility to review the amendment pursuant to its statutory authorization. Consistency of the Project Site With Martin County Zoning Regulations The Project is consistent and in compliance with the industrial zoning of Martin County that was in effect for the Project Site on December 21, 1990, the date ICL filed its SCA. On July 23, 1991, the BOCC granted petitions by ICL to change the zoning for the proposed site from M-3 and M-1, industrial, to Planned Unit Development (industrial) or PUD(i); to grant a height exception for structures higher than 60 feet; and to grant an advertised conditional use for utilities. All parties present throughout the land use hearing have stipulated that this zoning change and related approvals do not affect adversely the use of the site as the location for the proposed power plant while still protecting the public interest under the applicable land use plan and zoning ordinances of Martin County. The later-adopted PUD(i) zoning criteria for the Project are contained in a document titled "Indiantown Cogeneration Project Planned Unit Development Zoning Agreement" between ICL, the current property owners, and the Martin County BOCC, dated July 23, 1991. The PUD Agreement establishes certain conditions and standards upon which construction and operation of the ICL project may be undertaken at the proposed site. The Agreement incorporates and references various other local regulations with which a project at this site must comply. The PUD(i) zoning agreement also recognizes that final approval for the project will be obtained under the Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act, Chapter 403, Part II, Florida Statutes, and that the final development plan of approval contemplated by the Agreement would be obtained through this certification process. The PUD(i) Agreement provides that ICL shall have the right to develop the project in accordance with applicable laws, ordinances and regulations; with the provisions and requirements of the PUD(i) Zoning Agreement; and with the Preliminary and Final Development Plans. Exhibit D to the PUD(i) Zoning Agreement is a Preliminary Development Plan for the ICL project. This exhibit provides a conceptual layout for the proposed project that is subject to modification based on detailed site planning and engineering required as part of the certification of the Project in conjunction with the final development plan approval (site certification process). The Project, as proposed in the SCA, is consistent with this Preliminary Development Plan. A development schedule for the proposed project is established in Exhibit E to the PUD(i) Agreement. This timetable contemplates and incorporates site certification by the Governor and Cabinet under the Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act. ICL will be able to develop the Project proposed in the SCA consistent with this timetable. Twenty-two (22) Special Conditions are established for the Indiantown Cogeneration Project in Exhibit F to the PUD Agreement. ICL has committed to meet all of the Special Conditions and its design, as developed to date and presented in the site certification application, is consistent and in compliance with all twenty-two Special Conditions. The special conditions are: Special Conditions 1 and 4 require that certain precautions be taken in the event that archaeological artifacts or endangered plants and animals are discovered on the site. A $1 million Community trust program is to be created by ICL to benefit projects in the Indiantown community, under Special Condition 2. Special Condition 8 requires ICL to encourage Project employees to live and become active in the Indiantown Community. Under Special Condition l0, ICL is to make employment applications available in the Indiantown area during periods of significant hiring. Special Condition 3 provides that ICL is solely responsible for obtaining necessary drainage permits from the South Florida Water Management District and that Martin County has no responsibility for funding of Project drainage improvements. With regard to special Condition 5, the Department of Community Affairs concurs that the evidence at the land use hearing established that the Project at this location is consistent and in compliance with local land use plans and zoning ordinances in effect as of December 21, 1990. Special Condition 6 prohibits disposal of wastewater filter cake at the Martin County landfill. Under Special Condition 7, ICL agrees not to haul fill to or from the Site without Martin County approval. This is in compliance with the Excavation and Fill provisions of the Martin County Code, Sections 33-804, 805, 806, and 809. A hazardous waste management plan, consis- tent with a hazardous waste management plan attached to the Zoning Agreement, is required by Special Condition 8. Landscaping along the access road and around the administration buildings and parking areas is required by Special Condition 10. This condition satisfies the requirements of the Martin County Landscape Code, Chapter 23, Article III of the Martin County Code. Special Condition l3 requires that plant operations not cause unreasonable levels of sound to reach the boundary of any existing adjacent residential district. ICL is to provide general public notice of any planned steamblows. No quantitative noise standards are established by Martin County. Special Condition 14 establishes performance standards which are consistent with the provisions of Section 33-581.44(G) and (H) of the Martin County Code. The performance standards establish limits on the density of smoke; size of particulates; emissions of odors, dust and dirt, and of obnoxious gases and fumes; sewage disposal; set-backs for unenclosed buildings; fire protection measures; building heights; vegetative buffers adjacent to S.R. 710; and Project lighting. Several of these special performance standards provide additionally for compliance to be shown as part of the final certification order under the Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act. Special Conditions 15 and 17 provide that potable water and wastewater services for the Project will be supplied by the Indiantown Company. Final agreements for the provisions of these services are to be provided as part of the final development plan approval. Special Condition 16 provides for protection of upland and wetland preserve areas as shown on the approved development plans. This condition complies with the upland and wetland preservation policies of the Martin County Comprehensive Growth Management Plan. The size and dimension criteria of project facilities are governed by Special Condition 18. Special Condition 19 requires that soil erosion and sedimentation be controlled during construction through such practices as wetting, seeding or sodding of exposed areas. Under Special Condition 20, shoulders of Project roadways are to be stabilized. Pursuant to Special Condition 22, a south-bound turn lane on S.R. 710 is to be constructed at the entrance road to the Project. Permitted uses on the site are set out in Special Condition 23, allowing uses including pulverized coal electric generating unit, coal handling and storage facilities, rail trans- portation facilities, and other associated facilities. The uses permitted are described in greater detail in attachment 4 to that Exhibit F. The ICL Project, as designed, committed to by ICL, and proposed in the site certification application, is consistent and in compliance with the foregoing provisions of the PUD(i) Zoning Agreement. Project Compliance with Martin County Height Limitations On July 23, 1991, the Martin County BOCC adopted a special exception to allow heights in excess of 60 feet for facilities associated with the Indiantown Cogeneration Project. The project, as proposed, is consistent and in compliance with the provisions of this height exception. The PUD(i) Zoning Agreement in Special Condition 13 establishes maximum heights of the various project facilities; and the proposed Indiantown Cogeneration Project, as designed, committed to by ICL and proposed in the site certification application, complies with all of them. Consistency and Compliance of the Water Pipeline, Rail Spur and Site Access Road with Local Land Use Plans and Zoning Ordinances of Martin and Okeechobee Counties The location and construction of the cooling water pipeline is consistent with the policies of the Martin County Comprehensive Growth Management Plan that protect the residential quality of life and prevent impacts to tree canopies and soil erosion from such uses. The Martin County Zoning Code provides, in Chapter 35, Article II, that normal linear distribution facilities, such as the proposed water pipeline, are excepted from the definition of those utilities that are treated as advertised conditional uses. The water pipeline is, therefore, a permitted use in all zoning districts in Martin County. The Electric Utility Element of the adopted Okeechobee County Comprehensive Plan (Okeechobee Plan) provides that support facilities needed to provide electric utility service are deemed consistent with that Plan and are an allowed use in all land use categories. The water pipeline and intake structure are necessary support facilities to the Indiantown Cogeneration Project and, therefore, are consistent with the Okeechobee Plan. The Okeechobee County zoning ordinance allows, in any zoning district, installations necessary to the performance of an essential service, including water systems. Such facilities are to conform to the character of the zoning district. The water pipeline and intake structure are consistent with these provisions of the Okeechobee County zoning regulations. The Martin Plan provides that new rail facilities and roads be designed to minimize impacts on natural systems, which ICL has done in the siting of the rail spur and site access road to serve the site. The proposed location of the site access road is in the basic alignment of a future road between S.R. 710 and West Farm Road shown in the Traffic Circulation Element of the Martin Plan. The site access road to be constructed by ICL fulfills this objective of the Plan. Martin County zoning regulations are silent on the issue of the location of a rail spur or new roads. The proposed access road and rail spur are, therefore, consistent and in compliance with Martin County land use plans and zoning ordinances.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Siting Board, enter a final order determining that the proposed Indiantown Cogeneration Project and its site (including the associated water pipeline and intake structure), as proposed in the Site Certification Application, are consistent and in compliance with land use plans and zoning ordinances of Martin and Okeechobee Counties. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas S. Roberts Gary P. Sams Attorneys at Law Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, FL 32314 (Counsel for Applicant) Richard T. Donelan, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Kathryn Funchess, Assistant General Counsel David L. Jordan, Assistant General Counsel Stephen Pfeiffer, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Vernon Whittier R. Bishop Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399 Fred W. Van Vonno Assistant County Attorney Martin County 2401 Southeast Monterey Road Stuart, FL 34996 John Fumero Attorney at Law South Florida Water Management District 3301 Gun Club Road Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, FL 33416-4680 Roger G. Saberson Attorney at Law 70 S.E. 4th Avenue Delray Beach, FL 33483-4514 (Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council) Peter Merritt Suite 205 3228 Southwest Martin Downs Boulevard P. O. Box 1529 Palm City, FL 34990 (Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council) Ken Plante, General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399 Robert V. Elias, Staff Counsel Division of Legal Services Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Room 212 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 Brian Sodt Ernie Caldwell, Interim Executive Director Central Florida Regional Planning Council Post Office Box 2089 Bartow, FL 33830-2089 John D. Cassels, Jr. Attorney at Law Post Office Box 968 400 Northwest Second Street Okeechobee, FL 34973 (Counsel for Okeechobee County) James Antista, General Counsel Kenneth McLaughlin, Assistant General Counsel Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1600 Hamilton S. Oven, Jr., P.E., Administrator Office of Siting Coordination Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Room 153 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Honorable Lawton Chiles Governor, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 Honorable Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State State of Florida The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Honorable Tom Gallagher Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350

Florida Laws (7) 120.68403.501403.502403.508403.5095403.516403.519
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GLENN SINGER vs ROBERT NIEMAN, 04-000518FE (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Feb. 12, 2004 Number: 04-000518FE Latest Update: Jul. 27, 2005

The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Glenn Singer (Petitioner or Singer) is entitled to attorney's fees and costs from the Complainant/Respondent, Robert Nieman (Respondent or Nieman), pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (2004).

Findings Of Fact On June 10, 2002, the Respondent executed a Complaint that was filed with the Ethics Commission against the Petitioner. At the time of the filing, the Respondent was on paid administrative leave or suspension from the Police Department of the Town of Golden Beach (Town). Nevertheless, the Respondent remained employed by the Town and at the time of hearing in this cause the Respondent was employed as a police sergeant. Immediately prior to filing the Complaint against the Petitioner the Respondent served as the interim police chief for the Town. At all times material to this case the Petitioner was a councilman serving on the Town’s governing council. As such, the Petitioner was subject to the ethics provisions governed by the Ethics Commission. The Petitioner and the Respondent have known one another since childhood. Prior to the incidents complained of herein the two had considered themselves cordial acquaintances. The Respondent’s Complaint itemized four concerns that he believed demonstrated violations of ethics provisions. The specifics of the Complaint are set forth in Petitioner’s Exhibit 1. In general, the Respondent believed that the Petitioner had used his position as a Town councilman to obtain a building permit at a lesser value than should have been reported. He based this assertion on information told to him by persons working within the Town who overheard comments made by the Petitioner and a building official. The Respondent believed that Linda Epperson, who has 20-plus years of experience in the construction business, had opined that the value of the work to be performed at the Petitioner’s home greatly exceeded the value set forth in the permit sought. Ms. Epperson’s comments regarding the permit issue were overheard by another Town employee, Rosemary Wascura. At hearing, Ms. Epperson denied making the comments. Ms. Epperson is still employed by the Town and would like to continue her employment until her retirement vests (another four years). Ms. Wascura (who is a personal friend of the Respondent’s) does not work for the Town any longer. Ms. Wascura’s testimony was credible and persuasive as to the incident regarding the conversation between the Petitioner and a building official. Although it is not concluded the Petitioner used his position to influence the building official and receive a reduced permit cost, it is found that the factual information upon which the Respondent relied in making such assertion was grounded in an eyewitness account of an incident and not mere speculation. The second allegation of the Complaint also dealt with a subcontractor who had performed services for the Petitioner at his home. That subcontractor was subsequently awarded a Town contract for brick pavers to be installed at the entrance to the Town. The basis for the Respondent’s concern regarding this allegation stemmed from unsealed bids that were submitted for the brick paver project. According to Ms. Wascura the subcontractor who had provided a favorable job for the Petitioner was to receive the bid on the Town job. Although wrongdoing on the Petitioner’s part was not substantiated, the basis for the Respondent’s assertion was supported by the information he received from Ms. Wascura. In as much as Ms. Wascura was privy to comments from the building officials at the time, it was reasonable for Respondent to believe that something untoward had occurred when the same subcontractor received the Town’s bid, especially when the bid amount was later changed to cover a shortfall on the construction cost (the increased amount would have resulted in the subcontractor not being the lowest bidder after all). As to the third assertion in the Complaint, the Respondent claimed that the Petitioner had physically assaulted a temporary security guard employed by the Town while the Police Guardhouse was being built. The Respondent based this claim on the personal observations he made when the security guard reported the incident, the pictures he took of the guard (depicting the damaged shirt), and the identification of the Petitioner as the perpetrator that the victim made from a photograph. Although the assault was never fully investigated (the security guard could not be located and the matter was dropped), the Respondent had a reasonable basis to believe some inappropriate act had occurred and that the Petitioner could be involved. Finally, the fourth claim set forth in the Respondent’s Complaint alleged that the Petitioner had changed a vote on a variance request after being called aside by someone known as “Vinnie” in this record. According to eyewitnesses to the incident, the Petitioner voted against Vinnie’s variance then changed his vote after Vinnie whispered something in the councilman’s ear, and the two left the room briefly. When the Petitioner returned to the council table, he changed his vote to favor Vinnie’s variance. Although it is not concluded the Petitioner did anything improper in changing his vote, or that the variance would not have received sufficient favorable votes to pass even without the Petitioner’s vote, it is clear that the Respondent thought the activity was highly unusual and suspect. The Town council meetings are videotaped. A videotape of the proceeding disproving the account of the witnesses was not provided. It is unusual to allow anyone to approach the council seats to privately discuss anything with a council member during a council session. As for why the Petitioner would change his vote, the Respondent believed it had to do with a boat mooring that the Petitioner sought. Although the Petitioner did not own a boat at the time, the gossip among Town workers had been that the Petitioner wanted to be able to moor his boat at a certain angle to avoid an impeded view of the waterway. In return, he allegedly supported Vinnie’s variance. Although the rumor was unfounded, when the story was viewed in light of the Petitioner’s actions with Vinnie at the council meeting, it formed a reasonable basis for Respondent’s concerns. On July 9, 2002, the staff attorney for the Ethics Commission sent Respondent a letter requesting additional information regarding the Complaint. The forms included with that letter constitute the Complaint Amendment that was executed by the Respondent on July 19, 2002. Sometime in August 2002 the Respondent was fired from his position with the Town. He filed an appeal of the termination and ultimately won his job back. At that time he desired to drop the entire matter against the Petitioner. To that end he executed and filed with the Ethics Commission a Request to Withdraw the Complaint. The Request to Withdraw was denied on December 9, 2003. Also on December 9, 2003, the Ethics Commission issued a Public Report that dismissed the Respondent’s complaint against the Petitioner. On January 4, 2004, the Petitioner filed a Fee Petition pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes. The Fee Petition asserts that the Respondent acted with a malicious intent to injure the reputation of the Petitioner. The Respondent’s intent was to bring to light the allegations against the Petitioner because he believed the information he had been given was accurate. It proved to be inaccurate. He did not investigate each of the claims before filing the Complaint and Complaint Amendment but believed his sources to be credible Town employees. In retrospect, the Respondent believes he could have avoided the professional pitfalls that befell his employment had he not filed the Complaint. Nevertheless, based on the information he had at the time from credible Town employees, the Respondent acted to cause some investigation of the Petitioner’s activities. The Respondent did not know that the comments from Town employees were false or not subject to confirmation. The Respondent personally observed Vinnie’s intervention at the council table. Had it not dovetailed with the rumor regarding the Petitioner’s proposed boat issue, the conversation would have still appeared unusual at best. Coupled with the other unverified information, it gave the appearance of impropriety warranting investigation. Similarly, none of the other allegations could be easily discredited. The Respondent relied on comments attributed to Ms. Wascura and Ms. Epperson. He had no reason to doubt the veracity of his friend. Further, he could not foresee that Ms. Epperson would not acknowledge making statements pertaining to the permit issue. The original documents pertaining to the permits pulled for the Petitioner’s property are in storage and were not available at the hearing. A computer-generated report was provided to the Ethic Commission’s investigator. That report does not contain the detail and dates that might have verified the account provided by Ms. Wascura. The Respondent’s efforts to obtain copies of public records were thwarted. The Petitioner’s efforts to paint Ms. Epperson as a gossip whose alleged statements should not have been credited is not supported by the weight of persuasive evidence. Ms. Epperson was an experienced person whose knowledge in the construction industry made her a credible source for information. She was employed in a position that made her privy to the activities of the building department. She now disavows making the comments that were the subject matter of the Complaint. Nevertheless, the Respondent believed the comments attributed to her and believed they were from a credible source. If attorney’s fees and costs are entered in this cause the beneficiary of an award will be the Town. The Petitioner has incurred no expenses or costs associated with the defense of the Complaint. The Town agreed to pay and has paid all attorney’s fees and costs associated with this case. The Petitioner presented several invoices from the Law Offices of Stuart R. Michelson that were alleged to pertain to the instant case. One invoice dated January 6, 2004, set forth 25.00 hours had been expended by Ilene L. Michelson (partner) at the rate of $200.00 per hour. The invoice also noted 5.50 hours had been expended by Stuart R. Michelson (senior partner) also at the rate of $200.00 per hour. The total of the first invoice including costs was $6,594.54. The second invoice, dated June 10, 2004, itemized time expended by James Birch (associate attorney) billed at the rate of $125.00 per hour; Michael Torres (law clerk) billed at the rate of $75.00 per hour; Robert J. Longchamps (law clerk 2) also billed at the rate of $75.00 per hour; and Stuart R. Michelson (senior partner) billed at the rate of $200.00 per hour. The total attorney’s fees for this second invoice equaled $3,232.50; with costs the second invoice was $3,772.38. A third invoice dated September 9, 2004 documented $1,187.50 in fees for time expended by James Birch, Michael Torres, Robert J. Longchamps, and Stuart R. Michelson. The total for fees and costs for the invoice were $4,308.85. The costs and fees claimed in this cause are set forth in detail in Petitioner’s Exhibit 8. However, bills attached to invoices identify other parties not related to the instant case. For example, an invoice from United Reporting, Inc., references the case James Vardalis v. Robert Neiman. The Petitioner’s case is not the same matter. Similarly, a second invoice from United Reporting, Inc. (dated June 16, 2004) references Michael Addicott v. Neiman. The Petitioner did not delineate which of the costs were solely attributable to this case. It is unclear whether the fees were also incurred for other cases related to this Respondent (but not the Petitioner herein). The Petitioner also presented testimony from an expert witness who was to be paid by the Town. That witness, an attorney, was to be paid $200.00 per hour for his efforts in this matter. In connection with his work in this matter and other cases the expert billed the Town a total of $8,050.00. Exactly what portion of that amount is attributable to solely this case is unknown (see page 77 of the transcript in this case). Although the Petitioner’s expert testified that the hourly rates for fees applied in this cause were reasonable, there was no evidence that the time was actually expended in connection with the instant case. There is no way to know if the services were performed for the defense of the Respondent’s Complaint.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Fee Petition in this case. S DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: James J. Birch, Esquire Law Office of Stuart R. Michelson 200 Southeast 13th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33133 Robert Nieman 9731 Southwest 12th Street Pembroke Pines, Florida 33026 Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phillip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709

Florida Laws (3) 112.317120.569120.57
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CENTERVILLAGE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs CITY OF TALLA, 90-006431VR (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 11, 1990 Number: 90-006431VR Latest Update: Dec. 27, 1990

The Issue Whether Centervillage Limited Partnership has demonstrated, by a preponderance of evidence, that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan.

Findings Of Fact Procedure. On or about August 6, 1990, Centervillage filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination with the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department. (Application VR0027T) The following information concerning the development of the Centervillage property was contained on the Application: "Gerald E. Songy" is listed as the "owner/agent." Question 3 lists the name of the project as "Centervillage Limited Partnership." "Progress . . . Toward Completion" is described as:(1) planning, (2) site preparation, (3) Leon County environmental permits, (4) DER Dredge and Fill Permit, (5) DOT Drainage Connection Permit. Original P.U.D., Rezoning, Minor subdivision Approval and a stormwater agreement with Leon County, are included in Centervillage's application as forms of government approvals and as the actions of government relied on prior to committing funds toward completion of the proposed development. On September 10 and 17, 1990, hearings were held to consider the Application before the Staff Committee comprised of the City Attorney, the Director of Planning for the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission and the Director of Growth Management for the City. By letter dated September 17, 1990, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department informed Centervillage that the Application had been denied. By letter dated September 28, 1990, to Mr. Gumula, Centervillage appealed the decision to deny the Application. By letter dated October 10, 1990, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to review this matter. By agreement of the parties, the undersigned allowed the parties to supplement the record in this matter on November 26, 1990. The Property. Centervillage currently owns approximately 27.20 acres of property (the Property) located at the Northeast corner of Capital Circle, Northeast, and Centerville Road, Tallahassee, Florida (Application). Centervillage began assembling the Property, through various transactions, in the early 1980's. By October, 1984, Centervillage had acquired the bulk of the Property. (T-3 p. 23) Prior to Centervillage's initial acquisition of the Property, the prior owners of portions of the Property began development of the site as an industrial, mini-warehouse development. This prior development activity involved a series of violations of state and local environmental laws and regulations. (T-3 pp. 50-51, 59) As a result of improper development activities by the prior owners of the Property, fines were imposed and, at the time Centervillage made the initial purchase, the Property was subject to a Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) consent order. (T-3 p. 26) Development Activity. The project that Centervillage proposes to develop is a shopping center containing 200,000 square feet of gross leasable space on approximately 18 of the total 27.20 acres. (T-3 p. 96) The balance of the property is dedicated to stormwater facilities. (T-3 pp. 96-99) During the process of acquiring the 27.20 acres it currently owns, Centervillage began preparing the Property for future development by clearing and demolishing existing structures such as mobile homes, concrete driveways, and wells. (T-1 pp. 27-28) Permits were obtained early in the process to demolish these structures and in December 1984, the front corner of the Property was selectively cleared. (T-1 p. 28) In April, 1986, Leon County (the County) began construction of a ditch on a portion of the perimeter of the Property. The purpose of this ditch was to allow stormwater discharge from a Centerville Road construction project that the County was involved in. The County had been unable to locate an alternative site to provide any catchment and holding facility to handle the stormwater run off and, as a result, had encountered problems with the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (DER). (T-3, pp. 70-71) At the same time, Centervillage was involved in attempting to resolve problems associated with improper development activity on the Property by its previous owners. These factors led to cooperative efforts on the part of both Centervillage and the County in dealing with the DER and to conceptual agreements between the Centervillage and the County regarding aspects of future development of the Property. Centervillage granted the County a temporary easement for the purpose of constructing the drainage ditch. (T-1 p. 28, T-3 p. 52) The drainage ditch constructed on the site turned out to be a "long, skinny holding pond." (T-1 p. 29) The County constructed over 80 percent of the overall onsite perimeter ditch in mid to late 1986. (T-1 p. 29) The property subject to the temporary easement will be conveyed to the County pursuant to a formalized conceptual agreement between Centervillage and the County. (App. Ex. G, G-8) This agreement will be the subject of expanded discussion later in this Final Order. Construction of the majority of the current improvements on the Property began in June of 1989. The work consisted of: construction of a holding pond sized for commercial development; construction of some two and a half acres of wetlands; and construction of the perimeter ditch from the north end of the project to Centerville Road, then west along Centerville Road under Capital Circle. (T-1 pp. 30-31) The work also included vegetation of the perimeter ditch to create wetlands. (T-1 p. 31) This development activity also involved the placing of 50,000 to 60,000 cubic yards of fill material on the site. (T-1 p. 30) In May and June of 1989, Centervillage acquired over six acres of adjoining property in order to construct a stormwater facility which it had agreed to provide as part of its conceptual agreements with the County and in partial mitigation against prior improper development on the Property. (App. Ex. H, H-2; T-1 p. 11; T-3 pp. 125-126; T-3 pp. 26-27) The two and a half acres of new wetlands Centervillage constructed on the property was also in mitigation for prior improper development activity engaged in by previous owners of the Property. (T-1 p. 30) Further development has been permitted but not constructed. This work is to involve the construction of culverts, crossings, and onsite, upland filtration facilities. (T-1 pp. 31-32) As a result of the 1989 development activity, the northern 7.57 acres of the property has been excavated for the stormwater facility and some 18 acres of the Property have been filled from depths of two to six feet. (T-3 p. 97) Government Approvals. In July, 1984, the City approved Centervillage's request for a Planned Unit Development (P.U.D.) to allow the Property to be developed as a shopping center to be constructed in three phases. Each phase of construction was to involve 50,000 square feet of retail space. (App. Ex. G, G-1) In December, 1984, the City approved an amendment to the previously approved P.U.D., to add additional property and to expand the size of the development by the addition of approximately 20,000 square feet of retail space. (App. Ex. G, G-2) In January, 1988, Centervillage received rezoning approval from the P.U.D. to Commercial Parkway, limited use site plan (CP zoning). (App. Ex. G, G-3; T-3 pp. 25-26) The limited use site plan outlines, among other things, the limited access to the Property and the reestablishment of the canopy road on portions of Centerville Road which abut the property. (App. Ex. G, G-3) In May, 1988, the City approved Centervillage's application for minor subdivision approval. This minor subdivision approval established one parcel as the previously developed mini-warehouse site to the east of the Property and the other parcel as the Property as it currently exists except for 2.79 acres on Capital Circle which had not been acquired at that time. (App. Ex. G, G-4) In October, 1988, the City granted a separate minor subdivision approval which addressed the additional 2.79 acres. (Minor subdivision approval, dated October 26, 1988, signed by Donny Brown, Development Coordinator for the City.) The parcel containing the mini-warehouse facility was sold in 1986, and is no longer part of the Property. (T-1 pp. 37-38) On July 22, 1988, the DER issued an environmental permit to Centervillage. (App. Ex. E, E-9) This permit was a result of extensive negotiations between DER and Centervillage and also involved the County because of the County's own permitting problems with the road improvement Project. (T-1 pp. 63-65) This DER permit specifies that the "permit does not convey any vested rights." (App. Ex. E, E-9, paragraph 3) On August 17, 1988, the County issued Environmental Management Permit #88-0299 to Centervillage. This permit was for "earth work only" and specified that "stormwater runoff [would] be required upon final development plans." (App. Ex. E, E-1) On October 25, 1988, the County accepted Centervillage's hydrological analysis on the Property. (App. Ex. E, E-3) On December 5, 1988, Centervillage received notification from the County that the project site was exempt from site plan review. (App. Ex. E, E- 9) Currently, there is not a city-approved site plan for the Centervillage project. (T-3 p. 115) On May 3, 1989, the County issued Environmental Permit #89-0230. This permit reflects approval of an additional of 630,000 square feet of impervious surface to the site. Centervillage's application for this permit also lists the proposed use of the Property as "M-1 mini-warehouses and CP shopping center." (App. Ex. E, E-5) Centervillage began its construction of the majority of current site improvements in June of 1989. (T-1 p. 30) In meetings between Centervillage and the City it was never confirmed that the approval of an additional 630,000 square feet of impervious surface on the site was a valid assumption. (T-3 p. 138) The County issued two additional environmental permits in 1989, one for tree removal (App. Ex. E, E-6) and one for stormwater permit amendments. (App. Ex. E, E-7) In March, 1990, the County issued an additional environmental permit for tree removal. (App. Ex. E, E-8) In January and in June, 1990, the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) issued two separate drainage connection permits to Centervillage. (App. Ex. E, E-10, E-11) Until October, 1990, the County performed the environmental regulatory services for both the County and the City. (T-3 p. 56) At the time the County issued the environmental permits described in this Final Order, there was no City of Tallahassee Environmental Ordinance. (T- 3 pp. 73-74) At the time the County issued the environmental permits described in this Final Order, the County Chief of Environmental Management regularly appeared before the Tallahassee City Commission as part of his duties in issuing environmental permits for property within the City. (T-3 p. 56) At the time the County environmental permits described in this Final Order were issued to Centervillage, the City would look to a County environmental permit before issuing a building permit. (T-3 p. 74) At the November 26, 1990, hearing in this case, the Chief of Environmental Management for the County testified that he knew of no specific resolution or ordinance that granted environmental permitting authority within city limits to the County. (T-3 pp. 74-75) However, the testimony at the November 26, 1990, hearing in this case establishes that the City relied on the County's environmental permitting in making its own permitting decisions. (T-3 pp. 56, 73-75) In practice and effect, the County was acting on behalf of the City in granting local environmental permits. (T-3 pp. 73-80) The County has never been delegated the authority to make land use decisions, such as subdivision approvals, for property within the City. (T-3 pp. 74-76) The rezoning of the Property from P.U.D. to CP Zoning, approved by the City in January, 1988, provided no specific approval of densities and intensities for development of the Centervillage project. (T-3 pp. 130-132) When Centervillage requested rezoning of the Property from P.U.D. in January, 1988, its managing general partner assumed that as part of the approved zoning change it received approval for the same density and intensity of development that existed under the P.U.D. (T-3 p. 125) The Conceptual Agreement. In early 1986, the County was in the process of attempting to widen and improve Centerville Road. (T-1 p. 28) During this construction by the County, the DER asserted jurisdiction over the road project and the construction was stalled because the County did not have adequate property on which to construct facilities for the storage and treatment of stormwater runoff generated by the road construction project. (T-3 pp. 70-71, 82-84) During the initial rezoning and permitting process, Centervillage was required to address the effects of prior improper development activity engaged in on a portion of the Property by previous owners. As a result of the prior improper development on the Property, Centervillage was required to mitigate against flooding problems and to facilitate revegetation of a denuded canopy road segment along Centerville Road. (T-3 p. 52) On April 11, 1986, James G. Parrish, Administrator for the County, presented Centervillage with a conceptual agreement whereby, among other things, Centervillage agreed to grant necessary easements to the County for the construction of a drainage ditch on the Property to accept and store stormwater runoff from the County's Centerville Road improvement project. (App. Ex. G, G- 6) During 1986, the County and Centervillage cooperated through a series of permitting contacts specific to the development of a shopping center, to establish a major regional water management facility, to provide water management for the Centerville Road project, and to engage in cooperative efforts to reforest the canopy road. (T-3 pp. 52-53) These cooperative permitting contacts included contacts with the DER. (T-3 p. 53) The conceptual agreement was finally formalized and adopted by the Leon County Commission on July 18, 1989. (App. Ex. G, G-8) In this agreement, Centervillage obligated itself to acquire additional property, construct a stormwater management facility and to convey the completed facility to the County. (App. Ex. G, G-8) In the formalized conceptual agreement, the County agreed to fully cooperate in the efforts of Centervillage to obtain all permits necessary to complete all improvements in accordance with the DER permit issued to Centervillage in July, 1988. (App. Ex. G, G-8) The formalized conceptual agreement further provides that the County will not require any additional stormwater retention or detention above that required by the County environmental permit issued to Centervillage previously. (App. Ex. G, G-8) The agreement also provides that the County will allow Centervillage to develop the southwest portion of the Property, fronting Capital Circle Northeast and Centerville Road," to its fullest commercial potential, subject only to existing zoning ordinances, terms and conditions of the limited use site plan, approval of subsequent short-term applications for environmental management permits, and Leon County Environmental Permit number 88-0299." This portion of the agreement also provides that the property will no longer be "protected from development." (App. Ex. G, G-8, paragraph 8) Centervillage is obligated, pursuant to the agreement, to convey in excess of 7 acres of property and the drainage ditch area for no additional consideration. (T-3 pp. 85-86) Absent the agreement of Centervillage to provide stormwater drainage and retention on the Property and to convey that portion of the Property to the County, the County could not have completed the Centerville Road improvement project. (T-3 pp. 70-71) Centervillage's agreement to donate land to the County was tied to the DER permits issued to both Centervillage and the County. (T-1 p. 41) Centervillage's agreement to provide the 7.57 acre stormwater facility to the County was a required condition in connection with the issuance of the environmental management permit issued by the County. (T-3 p. 88) The City was privy to the conceptual agreement between Centervillage and the County from the development stages through to its final, formal approval by the County Commission in July 1989. The plans for the stormwater facility were discussed with and reviewed by the City, with the understanding that the city would accept and maintain the facilities. (T-3 pp. 86-87) During these discussion with City personnel, there was no indication given that the agreement included land use decisions. (T-3 pp. 90-91) The 7.57 acre stormwater facility serves more than the development area. The facility is a major component of the total drainage system for the City of Tallahassee. (T-3 p. 88) The size of the 7.57 acre stormwater facility is not directly related to the Centervillage development proposal. (T-3 p. 90) Development Expenses. The cost of purchasing the original tract was $1,812,012.00. Centervillage has since sold a portion of the original tract for $738,282.00. Centervillage's net land costs for the Property are $1,073,730.00. (App. Ex. C, C-1) Centervillage incurred costs of $175,000.00 in purchasing land pursuant to the conceptual agreement with the County. (T-3 pp. 123-126) Other than the $175,000.00 expended pursuant to the conceptual agreement, the balance of costs of purchase of land were not incurred in reliance on any act or omission of the City. Interest and property taxes paid by Centervillage were $1,279,753.30. (App. Ex. C, C-1) No significant portion of the costs attributed to interest and property taxes were incurred in reliance on any act or omission of the City. Centervillage incurred $543,624.50 in costs associated with site work, clearing, and landscaping on the Property. Significant portions of these costs were incurred beginning in June, 1989. (T-1 pp. 30-31) These costs were substantially incurred after Centervillage had engaged in extensive negotiations with state and local government entities and after permits were issued by the state DER and DOT as well as environmental permits issued by the County. At the time the County issued these permits it was, in practice and effect, acting on behalf of the City. These negotiations, agreements, permits and approvals are outlined in the Government Approvals portion of this Final Order. Centervillage has established that it expended well in excess of $400,000.00 on testing, inspection, soil investigation, engineer and survey fees, architectural fees, legal and title fees and general development expenses associated with the development of the Property. (App. Ex. C, C-1) Centervillage has proved that a significant portion of these "soft costs" were expanded during the period it engaged in extensive negotiations with and after Centervillage obtained permits and approvals from the various state and local government entities as outlined in the Government Approvals portion of this Final Order. Centervillage would not have made the large expenditure of funds, or made the commitment to convey significant portions of the property to the County pursuant to the Conceptual Agreement if it had not obtained the zoning approvals and environmental permits that were necessary to construct a community size shopping center of approximately 200,000 square feet. (T-1 pp. 68-70; T-3 pp. 127-128) The evidence in this case establishes that Centervillage reasonably relied on the approvals and environmental permits it obtained from state and local governments, as well as on the conceptual agreement between Centervillage and the County in changing its position and in incurring substantial costs associated with the development of the Property. Current Status of the Development. Centervillage took a site that was a drainage way, added properties to it, accomplished an enormous amount of permitting and fill work to come up with a fairly level buildable site suitable for building anything allowed within the zoning and the Comprehensive Plan. (T-1 p. 18) The shopping center project has been pursued by Centervillage for the past several years. Centervillage has never proposed any alternative plans to the City or other governmental authorities in the history of its project. (T-3 pp. 57-60, 82; T-1 pp. 17-18) Environmental Management Permit #89-0230, issued on May 3, 1989, by the County, contemplated approval of the addition of 630,000 square feet of impervious surface to the Property. (App. Ex. E) Centervillage relied on this approval and incurred substantial costs in proceeding with the further development of the Property. At the hearing on November 26, 1990, Centervillage presented the testimony of Richard Moore, a licensed professional engineer. (T-3 p. 94) Mr. Moore has been involved with the Centervillage project for seven years. (T-3 p. 95) Mr. Moore testified that he prepared a layout based on several planning concepts on engineering design and determined that 630,000 square feet of impervious surface allowed 200,000 square feet of gross leasable space and allowed the development of adequate parking with good internal circulation and sufficient green areas to allow for aesthetic landscaping. (T-3 pp. 106-107) Mr. Moore further testified that this square footage ratio is on average with design standards accepted in the engineering community. (T-3 p. 107) According to Mr. Moore's testimony, if Centervillage is required to meet consistency and concurrency requirements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the shopping center development could be limited or delayed because the Property is located on a constrained roadway. (T-3 pp. 103-106) The DOT and the City have scheduled widening of Capital Circle, on which the Centervillage Property fronts, for 1991. (T-3 pp. 109-110) However, based upon Mr. Moore's testimony, Centervillage has established that constrained roadway limitations could limit or delay the project under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan despite the current improvement schedule. According to Mr. Moore's testimony, under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the proximity of the Property to Centerville Road, a canopy road, could limit the development of a shopping center to 100,000 square feet of leasable space. (T-3 pp. 103-104) As of July 16, 1990, the date of adoption of the City of Tallahassee Vesting Ordinance, the stormwater facilities on the Property were not complete. Additional water treatment facilities must still be constructed for runoff from the site. (T-3 pp. 19-21) No roadways, water and sewer services or electrical services have been constructed on site. (T-3 p. 108)

Florida Laws (3) 120.65163.31677.57
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RAY OUTDOOR ADVERTISING vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 84-003872 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003872 Latest Update: Aug. 21, 1986

Findings Of Fact State outdoor advertising permits numbered 11332-10 and AC679-10 were issued to Harry Moody Outdoor Advertising in August of 1979. These permits authorized a sign on S.R. 40, 2.5 miles east of U.S. 441/27/301, in Marion County, Florida. A building permit was issued by the City of Ocala in August, 1979, and Moody erected an outdoor advertising sign in 1979 pursuant to these permits. On June 25, 1984, Moody removed this sign when the property owner was bulldozing the property in preparation for the construction of a restaurant on the site. Moody planned to reerect this sign after the restaurant had been constructed. On July 23, 1984, Ray Outdoor Advertising received a building permit from the City of Ocala to erect a sign at 2141 E. Silver Springs Boulevard in Ocala. This location is within 750 feet of the site where Moody held permits. When Ray applied to the Department for state permits for its location, the Department denied the application because Ray's proposed location was too close to the permitted location of Moody to comply with the spacing rule. Ray's proposed site was 276 feet west of the location where Moody held state permits. Moody has a lease for the location where the Department has issued his state permits. This lease has been maintained, and it is renewed from year to year until revoked. There is no evidence that the lease was ever cancelled. In October of 1984, when the property where Moody's sign had been located was cleared and the sign could be reerected, Moody applied to the City of Ocala for a building permit. On October 26, 1984, this permit was denied because a building permit had been issued to Ray, and the site where the Moody sign was to be reerected was too close to the location where Ray's building permit authorized it to build a sign. In summary, the Department will not issue Ray a state permit because of the proximity of the site where Moody holds state permits, and the City of Ocala will not issue Moody a building permit to reerect its sign because of the proximity of the site where Ray has a building permit.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter its Final Order dismissing its notice of revocation of permits numbered 11332-10 and AC679-10 held by Harry Moody Outdoor Advertising; and denying the application of Ray Outdoor Advertising for a permit on U.S. 40, 1.9 mile east of U.S. 441/301, in Marion County, Florida. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 21st day of August, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day August, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Ray Green, Esquire 2600 Gulf Life Tower Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Timothy C. Laubach, Esquire 511 N. Ferncreek Avenue Orlando, Florida 32803 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 A. J. Spalla, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064

Florida Laws (6) 120.57479.01479.07479.08479.15479.155
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CAPITAL CITY BANK vs FRANKLIN COUNTY AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 14-000517 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Apalachicola, Florida Jan. 31, 2014 Number: 14-000517 Latest Update: Sep. 08, 2014

The Issue The issue is whether Franklin County (County) has given reasonable assurance that it satisfies all requirements for an after-the-fact permit authorizing the construction of a rock revetment seaward of the coastal construction control line (CCCL) on Alligator Drive, also known as County Road 370.

Findings Of Fact The Nature of the Dispute The origins of this dispute date back a number of years. In short, the County currently has two adjoining revetments seaward of the CCCL on County Road 370 (Alligator Drive) located on Alligator Point in the southeastern corner of the County.1 County Road 370, situated immediately adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico, is a vulnerable structure and eligible for armoring. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.002(64). The old revetment is permitted; the new revetment is not. Pursuant to a Department enforcement action directed at both revetments, the County applied for an after-the-fact permit to authorize the construction of the new revetment. See Case No. 12-3276EF. The two revetments, totaling around 2,800 feet in length, abut County Road 370 and join near the intersection of Alligator Drive and Tom Roberts Road. The road itself is around 50 or 60 feet from the edge of the revetments. The old revetment extends around 2,000 feet west of the intersection while the new revetment extends 800 feet east of the intersection. There is a curve in the road at the intersection, and at that point the road elevation drops two or three feet for an undisclosed distance. The revetments, however, run in a straight line. There is no beach and dune system in front of the old revetment, while a small amount of exposed sand is located on the far eastern end of the new revetment. Due to storm events over the years, unauthorized debris has been placed on top of the old revetment by the County. Under the terms of the enforcement action, the County is required to remove the debris. This will reduce the height of the old revetment by several feet below its original height of nine feet National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD).2 Where the two revetments join, however, the height differs by only around a foot. The Bank owns property across the street from the old revetment and alleges that, for several reasons, the site and design of the new revetment, coupled with the reduction in height of the old revetment, will cause erosion of the shoreline around the old revetment and expose County Road 370 and the adjacent upland Bank property to erosion. Although the current design and location of the old revetment have been finalized through prior agency action, the Bank has asked that the permit be denied unless the County relocates rock boulders from the new to the old revetment and raises its height back to nine feet NGVD. The County asserts that the Bank's real aim here is to require the County, at taxpayer expense, to reconstruct the old revetment to its original height. Otherwise, the Department will not waive the 30-year erosion control line restriction and allow the Bank to fully develop its property that is seaward of the CCCL. See § 161.053(5)(b), Fla. Stat. The Old Revetment Since the late 1970s, the County has owned and maintained that portion of County Road 370 that is the subject of this dispute. In May 1986, the Department of Natural Resources, which was later merged with the Department, issued to the County CCCL Permit No. FR-204 for the construction of the old revetment, then 1,500 feet long. The revetment was located approximately 350 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-211 to approximately 150 feet west of the Department Reference Monument R-213. In November 1994, the Department issued to the County CCCL Permit No. FR-446 for the re-construction of the old revetment, as well as a 500-foot extension of the eastern limits of the structure with granite boulders. The revetment, as extended, is located approximately 540 feet west of Department Reference Monument R-212 to approximately 140 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-213. The permit did not authorize placement of any construction debris within the revetment. With the extension, the total length of the old revetment is now approximately 2,000 feet. After an application for a joint coastal permit to conduct a beach and dune restoration project was filed by the County in September 2006, a Department site inspection revealed the presence of concrete debris and other debris material stacked on top of the old revetment. A debris removal plan was formulated by the Department, which was intended to be incorporated as a special condition in the joint coastal permit. In May 2011, the joint coastal permit was approved and included a debris removal plan. Because of financial constraints, however, the County did not undertake and complete the work relating to the beach and dune restoration plan or the debris removal plan. In January 2012, another inspection was conducted by the Department to document how much debris was in the old revetment and where it was located. The inspection revealed the presence of a significant amount of concrete debris and other debris material scattered throughout the revetment and continuing eastward. That same month, largely at the urging of the Bank, the Department issued a one-count Notice of Violation (NOV) alleging that after a storm event in July 2005, the County placed unauthorized construction debris and other debris material in the old revetment seaward of the CCCL, and that the debris still remained within the footprint of the revetment. See Case No. 12- 3276EF. (The Bank unsuccessfully attempted to intervene in the enforcement action.) As corrective action, the County was required to remove all debris, seaward of the CCCL, from and adjacent to the footprint of the old revetment no later than 60 days after the end of the hurricane season. That work has not yet been performed, probably because the work on both revetments will take place at the same time. After the debris is removed, the height of the old revetment will vary from between five and eight feet NGVD rather than the original nine-foot height. This was not the relief that the non-party Bank desired in the enforcement action. Instead, the Bank has always wanted the old revetment to be reconstructed to the nine-foot NGVD standard authorized in the original construction permit. Even so, the enforcement action is now final, as no appeal was taken by the County. Except for the unauthorized debris, the old revetment meets all Department standards. The New Revetment Under emergency circumstances, between September 2000 and July 2005 the County placed material, including granite rock boulders and debris material, in a location east of the old revetment, seaward of the CCCL. The construction activity is located approximately 140 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-213 to approximately 80 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-214 and is around 800 feet in length. However, the County did not obtain a permit for the temporary structure within 60 days after its construction, as required by section 161.085(3), Florida Statutes. In July 2005, Hurricane Dennis made landfall in the Florida Panhandle causing damage to the shoreline along Alligator Drive. As an emergency measure after the storm event, the County placed rock boulders that had been displaced back into the new revetment seaward of the CCCL. The County also placed other unauthorized concrete debris and debris material within the footprint of the rock revetment seaward of the CCCL. Again, no timely authorization for this work was obtained by the County. In August 2012, the Department issued an Amended NOV in Case No. 12-3276EF adding a second count, which alleged that the County had failed to obtain a permit for the placement of the rock boulders and unauthorized debris. On April 18, 2013, the Department issued a Final Order in Case No. 12-3276EF. As to Count II, it gave the County two options for corrective action: (a) that the County submit "a complete permit application for a rigid coastal armoring structure located between Department reference monuments R-213 and R-214 that complies with all applicable Department permitting rules and statutes"; or (b) that "the County remove all material placed seaward of the CCCL pursuant to a Department approved debris removal plan[,]" leaving that portion of County Road 370 without a revetment. 2013 Fla. ENV LEXIS 16 at *16. Desiring to protect its infrastructure, the County opted to apply for an after-the-fact permit. The Permit Application In March 2013, the County filed an application for an after-the-fact permit for the construction of the new revetment. As directed by the Department, the County proposes to construct a new revetment located between Department Reference Monuments R- 213 and R-214. The height of the new revetment will be around nine feet NGVD, while its slope will be one vertical to three horizontal. The old revetment is not quite as steep, having a slope of one vertical to two horizontal. The application includes a debris removal plan for the removal of construction debris as well as other debris scattered through the new revetment. Construction debris occupies a large portion of the new revetment and largely appears to be associated with storm damaged concrete sidewalk. All derelict concrete and asphalt material that is located water ward of Alligator Drive and landward of the mean high water line is to be removed. Both the County and its engineering consultant will monitor the work at the project. After reviewing the application, the Department proposed to issue after-the-fact CCCL Permit FR-897. The Bank then filed its Petition, as later amended. Petitioner's Objections As summarized in its PRO, the Bank alleges that the County did not give reasonable assurance that the following statutory and rule provisions have been satisfied: section 161.053(1)(a), which provides that special siting and design considerations shall be necessary seaward of the CCCL "to ensure protection of . . . adjacent properties"; rule 62B-33.005(2), which requires that the applicant provide the Department with sufficient information to show that adverse impacts associated with the construction have been minimized and that construction will not result in a significant adverse impact"; rule 62B-33.005(3)(a), which requires that the Department "[d]eny any application for an activity which either individually or cumulatively would result in a significant adverse impact including potential cumulative effects"; rule 62B-33.0051(2), which provides that armoring "shall be sited and designed to minimize adverse impacts to the beach and dune system, marine turtles, native salt-tolerant vegetation, and existing upland and adjacent structures"; and rule 62B-33.0051(2)(a), which requires armoring to "be sited as far landward as practicable to minimize adverse impacts . . . on existing upland and adjacent structures." See PRO, pp. 16-17. A common thread in these regulatory citations is that a revetment should be constructed in a manner that does not cause adverse impacts on "adjacent property." Except for the above cited provisions, no other permit requirements are contested, and the County's prima facie case satisfied those other requirements. The Bank's odd-shaped property, acquired in a foreclosure proceeding, abuts that portion of Alligator Drive immediately adjacent to the old revetment. The eastern boundary of the Bank's property is at least 300 feet west of the new revetment and extends westward along County Road 370 until it intersects with Harbor Circle. The entire tract is separated from the old revetment by County Road 370, a two-lane paved road. The property was once used as a KOA campground; however, the predecessor owner acquired development rights for a Planned Unit Development, which apparently cannot be fully developed unless the old revetment is raised back to its original height by the County or some other acceptable form of erosion protection is provided by the Bank at its own expense. The essence of the Bank's complaint is that the new revetment, as now sited and designed, will expose the old revetment to a higher rate of erosion, and ultimately accelerate the erosion of its property across the street. The Bank asserts that this will occur for three reasons. First, the removal of construction debris from the old revetment will lower its height, weaken the structure, and create a "discontinuity in height and composition between the revetments," resulting in increased exposure to erosion. Second, the toe of the new revetment (at the western end of the structure) will extend ten feet further seaward than the old revetment, creating a discontinuity and placing the old revetment at higher exposure to erosion. Finally, the Bank contends a discontinuity already exists between the two revetments due to the curved shape of the road at the intersection, causing the western end of the new revetment to extend further seaward than the old revetment. The Bank argues that the discontinuity will amplify the wave action on the shoreline during a severe storm event and eventually cause a breach of the old revetment. In sum, the Bank is essentially arguing that unless the two revetments mirror each other in height and slope, and consist of the same construction materials, the after-the-fact permit must be denied. The Bank's expert, Mr. Chou, a coastal engineer, was employed shortly before the final hearing and made one visit to the site. Regarding the removal of unauthorized construction debris from the old revetment, Mr. Chou was concerned that, while not ideal, the debris offers a degree of shoreline protection. He recommended that if removed, the debris be replaced with boulders comparable to the design standard of the new revetment. However, the record shows that when the loose and uneven debris is removed from the old revetment, the existing rocks will be moved to an interlocking or "chinking" configuration that actually enhances the stability and integrity of the structure.3 The Bank is also concerned that the height and slope of the two revetments differ. Mr. Chou testified that there exists the increased potential for erosion as a result of what he described as a discontinuity, or a difference of characteristics, between the two revetments. He opined that the protective function of the old revetment will be compromised by the removal of the granite boulders, which will lower the overall height of the revetment between two and four feet. According to Mr. Chou, if the new revetment suffers a direct hit by a major storm, i.e., one capable of dislodging the armor, he would "expect damage, significant damage, right next to it." Mr. Chou conceded, however, that if a permit is not approved, and the County elects to remove the new revetment, it could result in a significant adverse impact to property located along Alligator Drive. Mr. Chou further acknowledged that there will be no significant adverse effect on the old revetment during "everyday" winds, waves, and currents. Finally, he agreed that if the toes of the new and old revetments are essentially the same, as the certified engineering plans demonstrate they are, it will "minimize" the discontinuity that he describes. Notably, in 2005, Hurricane Dennis actually caused accretion (an increase in sand) on the Bank property, rather than erosion. While there are some differences in height and slope between the two revetments, no meaningful differences from an engineering perspective were shown. Through the County's coastal engineer, Mr. Dombrowski, who over the years has visited the site dozens of times and worked on a number of major projects in the area, it was credibly demonstrated that the old and new revetments will, in effect, form one continuous armoring structure that will provide shoreline protection along Alligator Drive. In terms of toe, slope, height, and construction material, there will be one continuous and straight revetment along the road, with a "fairly consistent elevation and slope going from one end to the other." If a major storm event occurs, the impacts to both revetments will likely be the same. In any event, there is no requirement that the County construct a revetment that is storm proof or prevents severe storm damage. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the new revetment is consistent with the siting and design criteria in rule 62B-33.0051(2). The design of the new revetment is consistent with generally accepted engineering practice. The new revetment is sited and designed so that there will be no significant adverse impacts, individually or cumulatively, to the adjacent shoreline. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.005(3). The County has provided the Department with sufficient information to show that adverse and other impacts associated with the construction are minimized, and the new revetment will not result in a significant adverse impact to the Bank's property. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.005(2). The new revetment should toll erosion – which now occurs on Alligator Point at the rate of five feet per year -- and provide shoreline protection. Finally, the construction of the new revetment will not cause an adverse impact to the old revetment. For all practical purposes, the two revetments have existed side-by-side since 2005. The Bank failed to offer any credible evidence that the new revetment has had a significant adverse impact on the old revetment over the last nine years.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order approving the County's application for after- the-fact permit number FR-897. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2014.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.569120.57120.68161.053403.412
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JACK VASILAROS, EDWARD D. CARLSON, AND PAUL A. MEISSNER vs DON CURTIS PIERSON AND CITY OF CLEARWATER, 90-002919 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida May 11, 1990 Number: 90-002919 Latest Update: Jan. 14, 1991

The Issue Whether Respondent Pierson should be granted variances to permit construction of a triplex on a lot 95 feet wide and 87 feet deep. To do so the three variances required are (1) of 5 feet in width, (2) of 13 feet in depth, and (3) 753 square feet in area (10,000 square feet required).

Findings Of Fact Don Curtis Pierson owns the north one-half of Lot 2 and all of Lot 3, Block 6, Revised Map of Clearwater Beach, and has owned this property for some 28 years. The property is zoned RM-20 and is high density residential developed. Pierson's lot is approximately 95 feet by 87 feet (approximately 82,500 square feet). The property is currently occupied by a duplex which was constructed according to Code, except for variances of zero setback from the coastal construction control zone and a 6 foot height variance to permit the construction of a building 31 feet in height. Appellant is the owner of a multifamily building adjacent to Pierson's property which was constructed before various code provisions became effective and was constructed to the lot lines without any setbacks. When Pierson applied for variances in 1983 to construct a triplex on his property, the Board of Adjustment Appeal granted setback variances of 10 feet in rear and front setback lines to permit the construction of a triplex on this property. Vasilaros appealed that grant, and on July 12, 1983 the undersigned heard that appeal. On August 31, 1983, an order was entered denying the setbacks, but approving the construction of a triplex on the lot less than 10,000 square feet in area. That approval was predicated upon then Section 131.020 of the Land Development Code which waived the area requirement for a lot of record. This Section was removed in the 1985 rewrite of the Land Development Code. Specific code provisions respecting the size of the lot on which a three family structure may be erected are in Section 135.044 which requires a minimum lot area of 10,000 square feet, and minimum lot width and depth of 100 feet each. The applicant's only hardship upon which the requested variance can be granted is the uniqueness of the property becoming nonconforming solely by reason of zoning changes.

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