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JAMES A. BITTING vs CRAWFORD AND CO., 90-004855 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Aug. 06, 1990 Number: 90-004855 Latest Update: Dec. 18, 1990

Findings Of Fact James A. Bitting, Petitioner, was first employed by Crawford and Company in its Tampa office as a property appraiser in October 1973, and remained so employed until he was terminated in July 1988. Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident in 1983 while on company business and sustained back injuries which thereafter was the source of lower back pain if he remained in one position (either standing or sitting) for an extended period. However, he made no claim and submitted no medical evidence of this handicap until after his termination from employment by Respondent. In 1987 and 1988, claims cases at Crawford decreased, and the regional office began telling the Tampa office that they should look to a reduction of personnel. Satellite offices at Brooksville and Plant City were closed and the adjustors in charge of those offices were brought in to the Tampa office. At the time of his termination there were four outside adjusters at the Tampa office with Respondent being the only designated property adjuster. The others dealt primarily with casualty claims. Property claims had declined to a point there were insufficient claims to occupy one adjuster full-time and Petitioner was being given a few simple casualty claims. The regional office and the Tampa office generally agreed that one appraiser should be terminated. At the time this determination was made Respondent had the lowest evaluations of the four adjusters. Further, he had received the second phase of a progressive discipline notice (Ex. 2) stating his work performance was unsatisfactory due to non-compliance with work standards. Petitioner presented no evidence to support his contention that his age was a proximate cause of his termination, other than his bare allegation that during this period no employee under 40 was terminated. Substantial evidence was presented that Respondent continues to have numerous people in it's work force older than 50 and 60 years of age. During the presentation of his case, Petitioner referred repeatedly to the failure of Respondent to provide him with a comfortable office chair in which he could sit without hurting his back. Although several employees of Respondent were aware that Petitioner had a back problem, Petitioner, prior to his dismissal, never presented any medical evidence that he needed special equipment, or was physically unable to perform any tasks. He had continued to climb ladders to the roofs of houses when necessary in his job as property adjuster. Following Petitioner's termination, his job was not filled. Respondent, as part of their reorganization, moved another adjuster into the department vacated by Petitioner, but this employee brought with her workers compensation claims which consumed 75-80% of her time. Later Respondent also transferred into the Tampa office a property general adjuster to drum up more casualty business. Upon his arrival he did the property claims formerly done by Petitioner using about 10% of his work time, and spent 80-90% of his time soliciting new business. A property general adjuster is qualified to handle complex claims involving industrial losses while a property adjuster like Petitioner is limited to handling less complex residential claims.

Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Petitioner has failed to prove that his termination from employment by Crawford and Company was influenced by Petitioner's age or handicap, and that his Petition for Relief be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: G. G. Harvey Manager, CFE Post Office Box 5047 Atlanta, GA 30302 James A. Bitting 11730 Marjorie Avenue Tampa, FL 33612 Louis P. DiLorenzo, Esquire One Lincoln Center Syracuse, New York 13202-1355 Dana Baird General Counsel and Acting Executive Director Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1990.

USC (1) 42 USC 2000e Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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BETTY MCNAIR vs WESTGATE MOTEL, 05-000025 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Perry, Florida Jan. 05, 2005 Number: 05-000025 Latest Update: May 30, 2006

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner had been discriminated against based upon race for alleged denial of lodging, as addressed in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact 1. The Findings of Fact are in essence as stated in the above Preliminary Statement concerning the Petitioner's lack of appearance at the hearing. The hearing was duly noticed at the last address of record for the parties, including the Petitioner. No appearance has ever been entered since the convening of the hearing and no communication, by the Petitioner, with the undersigned, telephonically, or in writing or otherwise has been made to explain her absence from the duly- scheduled hearing. She has provided no indication that she wishes to prosecute her claim. Accordingly, being advised in the premises, it is

Recommendation RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing this Petition for lack of prosecution, based upon the above-stated reasons. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Betty McNair Post Office Box 1358 Perry, Florida 32547 Gregory S. Parker, Esquire The Parker Law Firm 315 West Green Street Post Office Drawer 509 Perry, Florida 32348

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MONICA SCOPEL vs EVENTS BY PREMIER, 17-000445 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jan. 19, 2017 Number: 17-000445 Latest Update: Jul. 13, 2017

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged by Petitioner in her Employment Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") on May 3, 2016; and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based on the record as a whole and the evidence presented, the undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant facts: Petitioner started her employment in July 2002 with Events by Premier. The company provides exclusive catering services for the Jewish Center in Aventura, Florida.3/ Petitioner's employment in 2002 followed her marriage to Michael Pollak, a co-owner of Events by Premier. Petitioner became a full-time employee in 2013 and was assigned to the position of kitchen manager. At that point, her husband was the chef and supervised her work in the kitchen. Their work relationship continued in this manner until she was terminated from employment in late July 2015. Petitioner's performance was satisfactory, and there was no evidence to suggest that she was unable to adequately perform her duties as kitchen manager. The evidence was largely undisputed that the position of kitchen manager was created specifically to accommodate Petitioner and her husband, a co-owner of the business. There had been no prior kitchen manager positions at Events by Premier, and the title and position were not needed to operate the business. Another owner of Events by Premier, and its president, was Steven Pollak. He is the brother of Michael Pollak and was Petitioner's brother-in-law. During the weeks leading up to her termination in July 2015, her relationship with her husband, Michael Pollak, became openly strained and tense due to marital problems. Steven Pollak described the work environment between Petitioner and her husband as not a good one, and it created, as he described, a "toxic" work environment. There was screaming, hollering, and profanity exchanged between Petitioner and her husband at work. It was decided that Petitioner needed to be terminated for the best interests of the company and also due to the unprofitability of the company in the first half of 2015.4/ As a result of the poor working environment existing between Petitioner and her husband, and Respondent's unprofitable performance in the first half of the year 2015, Steven Pollak informed Petitioner on July 26, 2015, that he was letting her go.5/ After she was fired, Petitioner filed a Complaint with FCHR. The basis of her Complaint was that she was terminated because of her "marital status." At the hearing, Petitioner explained her opinion regarding the basis for her termination. She felt that her termination occurred because the company feared that she knew things about the company, including improper unemployment claims and other financial information.6/ It was clear to the undersigned that Petitioner had serious emotional and relational issues with her husband that made it difficult, if not impossible, for her to work harmoniously with him. She testified at the hearing and characterized her relationship with her husband after her termination as "out of control." Based upon the evidence presented and the record as a whole, Petitioner was not terminated because of her "marital status." Rather, the evidence demonstrated that there were legitimate and non-discriminatory business reasons for terminating Petitioner. Similarly, her termination was based upon the hostile relationship which existed between Petitioner and her husband, Michael Pollak, in the weeks and months leading up to her filing a petition for divorce--not because of her marital status (e.g., not because she was married, separated, or divorced).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief and find in Respondent's favor. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2017.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.68509.092760.01760.02760.10760.11
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MARSHA MERCER vs LDM, INC., 94-001459 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Mar. 17, 1994 Number: 94-001459 Latest Update: Mar. 07, 1995

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been subjected to discrimination within the meaning of the relevant provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, based upon alleged sexual harassment in the course of her employment and retaliation for her complaints concerning the alleged sexual harassment.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was an employee of the Respondent at times pertinent hereto. It is undisputed that that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and that timeliness and jurisdictional requirements have been met. The Respondent obtained a contract with the United States Navy for a project to be performed at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida. It became the contractor for the project in approximately December of 1991. The contract, in pertinent part, provided that the Respondent would provide local cartage trucking services for the Navy on and in the environs of the Pensacola Naval Air Station. The project involved loading and transportation of aircraft parts and related supplies and equipment. The Petitioner was hired as a truck driver, delivering aircraft parts for the naval aviation depot (NADEP). During the course of that employment, there came a time when the Petitioner contended that she had been discriminated against because of her gender. The Petitioner contends that in a meeting in December of 1991, she was told by Terry Meyers, an employee of the Respondent and the Petitioner's supervisor, that she "didn't look like a truck driver" and that she had three weeks to look for another job. The meeting in which the statements were allegedly made was a meeting called by the Petitioner's supervisor and the project manager, Mr. Danny Francis, to address certain deficiencies in the Petitioner's performance. Another employee, Mr. Braughton, was also counseled at the meeting concerning his performance as a truck driver. His was the same type of employment position as that occupied by the Petitioner. Mr. Braughton is a white male. The Petitioner maintains that she informed a white male employee, Mike Morris, of the statements allegedly made at the meeting and that he immediately made a telephone call to Mr. Frank Moody, the president of the corporation, to put the president and the corporation on notice of sexual discrimination against the Petitioner. The Petitioner, however, was not present when Mr. Morris made that telephone call to Mr. Moody. Even had he made reference to alleged sexual discrimination in his telephone call to Mr. Moody, Mr. Morris only learned of the purported sexually-discriminatory statements from the Petitioner. The Petitioner maintained that Mr. Morris informed her that he had heard the statements made while standing at the door of the room in which the meeting occurred and that Mr. Morris initiated the telephone call on his own volition to Mr. Moody, based upon hearing those statements. Mr. Morris, however, testified to the contrary, stating that the Petitioner approached him and claimed that she was on probation and was fearful of being laid off from employment and that the Petitioner told him of the alleged sexually-discriminatory statements and that he did not hear them himself. He further testified that the Petitioner instructed him to contact Mr. Moody concerning her fears about her job and the alleged discriminatory statements or she would contact "HRO and EEO and have the contract shut down". Mr. Morris, indeed, called Mr. Moody but never mentioned the statements alleged by the Petitioner to have been made to her by Mr. Meyers during the performance evaluation meeting. In fact, it has been demonstrated by Mr. Morris' testimony, which the Hearing Officer accepts as more credible, that the Petitioner never complained to Mr. Morris about a sexually-discriminatory statement or purported sexual discrimination. Mr. Morris, instead, spoke to Mr. Moody about problems he saw occurring in the operation in Pensacola which he attributed to the project manager, Mr. Danny Francis. He told Mr. Moody that Mr. Francis was allowing employees to leave work early without Mr.. Moody's knowledge and still crediting them with working a full day on such occasions which, in effect, cost the corporation additional salary monies which were unearned. The meeting in which the Petitioner was allegedly confronted with the statement that she did not look like a truck driver and had three weeks to look for another job was called and conducted by Mr. Francis and Mr. Meyers was present. It is undisputed that Mr. Moody terminated Mr. Francis shortly after the telephone conversation with Mr. Morris. He replaced Mr. Francis with the current project manager, John Jacobs. Mr. Moody testified that in a telephone conversation with the Petitioner that she never mentioned to him the alleged sexually-discriminatory statements referenced above. Instead, he was told by both Mr. Morris and the Petitioner that she was concerned that she might lose her job because of the results of the meeting with Mr. Francis, in which he told her that she needed to improve her job performance. In fact, the management of the Respondent perceived a genuine job performance problem involving the Petitioner's conduct of her job duties. This was disclosed in the testimony of both Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Morris, where it was revealed that the Petitioner had had a continuing problem performing her job correctly and that Mr. Morris and the management personnel had worked with her constantly during the course of her employment term with the Respondent, taking more time and personal attention with her than with other employees. This was done in order to repetitively explain her job duties and give her additional chances to improve her work performance, in comparison to the lesser degree of attention and remedial help that they accorded other employees. Prior to February 3, 1993, the Petitioner had been employed with the Respondent for over a year. The testimony of Mr. Jacobs established, however, that even though her probationary period had long since elapsed, he still considered the Petitioner to be, in effect, an employee in training because she was deficient in correctly accomplishing all of the duties of her job. She was slow in performing her job duties, including preventive maintenance inspections of her vehicle and in making the "pickups and deliveries" of freight she was required to transport on her truck in the performance of her duties. The counseling session concerning her work performance occurring in December of 1991, referenced above, was during her probationary period. The white male employee, Mr. Rick Braughton, who was also counseled about deficient work performance on that occasion, was informed that he might not remain employed past his probationary period unless his performance improved. The Respondent had a regular practice and procedure, as part of its truck safety and preventive maintenance program, that employees, who were drivers, were required to give a preventive maintenance and safety inspection of their vehicles each day prior to leaving the company facility or terminal to transport aviation parts or other freight. This was regarded as crucial to proper job performance by the employer because of the concern about safety of the drivers and avoidance of damage, and liability for damage, to the expensive equipment and parts which the Respondent was required by its contract to transport, such as expensive military aircraft parts and related equipment. Among these preventive maintenance inspection duties that driver/employees, such as the Petitioner, were required to perform daily was the requirement to check the air in the truck tires and "top off" the tires with the required air pressure, if necessary. 10 Mr. Jacobs established that there came a time when the Petitioner was noted to have failed on multiple occasions, in the same week, to check and air her tires. Finally, upon this deficiency coming to his attention again on February 3, 1993, Mr. Jacobs suspended the Petitioner for a day without pay, for failing to check and air her tires. The Petitioner claims that she was the only employee singled out for this treatment concerning failure to inspect and air her tires. The testimony of Mr. Jacobs is deemed more credible, having observed the candor and demeanor of all of the witnesses, and it is determined that the employer had a good-faith belief that the Petitioner was deficient in this regard and that the reprimand, consisting of the one-day suspension, was justified. It was not demonstrated that, even if the Petitioner's version of events is true and that other driver/employees were not disciplined for failure to air their tires, that such a circumstance occurred as a result of the employer's knowledge of other driver/employees failing to air their tires and arbitrarily choosing not to discipline them. In fact, it was not demonstrated by preponderant, non-self-serving evidence that other employees had not been disciplined for failure to air their tires. In fact, it was not shown, other than by the self-serving testimony of the Petitioner, that other employees had failed to air their tires when required. The other drivers are mostly male, but one is a female. There was no showing that she was treated any differently than the male drivers. In summary, it has been established that the employer accorded the reprimand to the Petitioner because of a good-faith belief that her performance had been deficient, on repeated occasions, in this respect. It is undisputed that prior to the date the Petitioner received the reprimand, consisting of one-day suspension without pay, that the Petitioner had a generally good attitude about her job insofar as management was able to observe. Even though management had had some concerns about her performance and the slow manner in which she was learning certain aspects of her job, with resulting deficient effects upon her performance, management forbore from using these concerns to reduce her performance rating. She received good evaluations of her performance, insofar as her personnel record is concerned, prior to the time she was suspended for one day on February 3, 1993. After the Petitioner received the suspension she developed a "bad attitude" insofar as her perception of management was concerned. She began to complain frequently about vehicle safety or purported concerns she had about the condition of her vehicle related to safety, particularly the truck brakes. Prior to her suspension, she had never complained in this regard. Management also perceived that she appeared to show down her work performance and management came to believe that it was an intentional delay of her work performance on an ongoing basis. Prior to receiving the reprimand, she was never known to complain to management concerning discrimination on account of her gender. She had never informed the project manager or any other supervisory personnel concerning her purported belief that employee Meyers was "following her". Only after she received the reprimand on February 3, 1993 did she elect to file a sexual discrimination charge with the Commission. Mr. Meyers had some supervisory authority over the Petitioner. His job duties also required that he drive his truck around the Naval Air Station and the immediate vicinity in the normal performance of his duties. This circumstance resulted in his being in close proximity to the Petitioner during the course of their respective work days. He contends that he was not purposely following her for the purpose of harassing her. The overall evidence of record reveals, however, that he, indeed, did follow or stop in her vicinity on a number of occasions to observe her work performance. This was not shown to be out of the ordinary scope of his supervisory duties, especially because of management's concern that the Petitioner was not progressing in the learning and performance of her job duties as well as other employees, including the other female driver. The project manager, Mr. Jacobs, felt that the Petitioner's attitude continued to decline after the February 3, 1993 reprimand. He felt that her attitude and performance reached its lowest level on the date she was observed to be loading "unauthorized equipment" (apparently a portion of a helicopter assembly weighing approximately 4,000 pounds) on the flatbed trailer of her assigned work truck. She was not authorized to load that equipment and apparently, according to her testimony, she did so in order to provide a substantial amount of weight on her trailer for the purpose of having her brakes inspected by the quality assurance official for the project. She went to an unauthorized area for approximately one hour to have this inspection performed without the approval of the Respondent's management. Further, it was not necessary, in order to evaluate the brakes on the vehicle for proper function and safety, to have the weight of the unauthorized load placed on the trailer. If, indeed, the brakes had been defective, it would have been entirely possible that the expensive aircraft parts she had placed on the trailer without authorization could have been substantially damaged, the truck or other property could have been damaged, and, indeed, the Petitioner or other persons could have been injured. Additionally, the Petitioner misrepresented the reason she was in the unauthorized area where she had her brakes inspected by Mr. Lett, the quality assurance officer. In this connection, because she had begun to complain repeatedly about the condition of her brakes and her vehicle (after her reprimand), the project manager, Mr. Jacobs, had had certain other employees come in on several occasions at approximately 6:00 a.m., before normal working hours, and before the Petitioner arrived on the job site, to inspect the Petitioner's truck for safety and appropriate preventive maintenance purposes. These employees were not informed that it was the Petitioner's truck they were inspecting at the time they were told to do the inspections. The Respondent was attempting to ascertain the true condition of the Petitioner's truck and determine whether her reports concerning safety problems, particularly with her brakes, were accurate or not. In fact, on the morning of the day when the unauthorized load was placed on the truck and the Petitioner had Mr. Lett perform the inspection of her brakes at the unauthorized area, one of the Petitioner's co-employees had inspected her brakes before she arrived to take custody of her truck that morning. He had determined that the brakes were operating properly. The Petitioner and Mr. Lett apparently felt that the brakes were deficient when they were inspected early in the afternoon of that day. The record does not reveal whether the brakes were deficient when Mr. Lett inspected them or that some change in the adjustment of the brakes or other problem had arisen since the employee inspected them early that morning and found them to be in proper operating order. Be that as it may, management was of the belief on that day and prior thereto that the Petitioner, although reporting brake deficiency problems, did not truly experience such brake deficiency problems with her truck. This belief was based upon management perceptions concerning the Petitioner's attitude after her reprimand and upon the independent, confidential inspections management had other employees do on the Petitioner's truck. Accordingly, whether its belief was accurate or not, management was of the good-faith belief, on the date she was observed loading unauthorized, expensive equipment onto the flatbed truck, in an unnecessary fashion, for the purpose of having her brakes inspected, while being absent from her work assignment for one hour in an unauthorized area, that it had performance-related reasons to terminate her, which it did. This decision was made against the background of the increasingly poor attitude displayed by the Petitioner since her reprimand and because of the continuing problems management had experienced with the Petitioner's job performance since her initial employment one and one- half years previously. Although the Petitioner testified that as early as December of 1991, the management of the Respondent had spoken with her regarding her work performance and she interpreted that meeting as an attack on her gender and not upon her poor work habits, this contention was not verified by any other testimony. Having observed the candor and demeanor of the Petitioner versus that of the other witnesses, it is determined that her testimony is less creditable because of its self-serving nature. Although the Petitioner testified that a comment was made that "she did not look like a truck driver" and that she had three weeks to find another job, this was not verified through testimony of any other witness. To the extent that any other witnesses testified concerning these statements being made in a belief that discrimination had been exhibited toward the Petitioner, the evidence reveals that this information only came to these people through self-serving reports by the Petitioner herself. Meyers directly contradicts that these statements were made to the Petitioner and he states that he never heard anyone tell her that she had three weeks to look for a job or that she "didn't look like a truck driver". The petitioner provided no testimony or evidence which could show how these alleged statements constituted "sexual discrimination" or how the statements related to her sexual discrimination claim. It was not shown that any member of management, with employment-decision authority, made or condoned such statements even if it had been established that they evidenced gender-based discrimination, which was not done. The Petitioner did not complain of sexual discrimination per se until after she had received a reprimand from management. Likewise, she began to repetitively claim that her equipment was unsafe after the reprimand. The Petitioner may have been overly sensitive to management's concern for safety inspections of her truck because of being reprimanded for safety violations and was afraid she would "get into trouble" with management if she did not constantly report feared safety problems. The fact was established, however, that management had a genuine, good-faith belief that it was being harassed by these repetitive, unsafe equipment reports by the Petitioner, given the then- prevailing atmosphere surrounding the Petitioner's employment, characterized by her less than satisfactory attitude, as perceived by management, and the fact that management's confidential inspections of her equipment did not reveal any safety problems of the type reported by the Petitioner. Finally, it is especially noteworthy that during this period of time when the Petitioner made the claim of sexual discrimination and retaliation based upon her claim, that the Respondent had in its employ, in an identical job position, a female truck driver who had had no unsatisfactory experience by management with her performance, was not subjected to investigative or disciplinary measures, and who is still satisfactorily employed with the Respondent.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the petition herein in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1459 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The Petitioner has submitted proposed findings of fact which are not in separately-numbered, discrete paragraphs. The paragraphs contain some proposed findings of fact which the Hearing Officer accepts and some which are rejected as being not supported by preponderant evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the same subject matter. The proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner are intertwined with argument and discussions of the weight of the evidence or testimony. Because the paragraphs in the proposed findings of fact contain both findings of fact which the Hearing Officer accepts and which the Hearing Officer rejects, discrete, specific rulings thereon are not practicable. It suffices to say that all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner are subordinate to, but have been considered and addressed in the findings of fact portion of this Recommended Order and have been in that fashion completely ruled upon. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact The same considerations are true of the Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Some portions of the findings of fact proposed by the Respondent consist of merely discussions and argument concerning the weight of the evidence and some are acceptable to the Hearing Officer based upon the Hearing Officer's determination of the weight and credibility of the testimony and evidence. Some are rejected as being unnecessary or subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact made on the same subject matter. Here, again, this Recommended Order completely and adequately addresses the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, and the Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted to the extent they are not inconsistent with those made by the Hearing Officer and to the extent they are inconsistent therewith, they are rejected as being not supported by preponderant evidence or as being immaterial, unnecessary, or subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Barry W. McCleary, Esquire 3 West Garden Street Suite 380 Pensacola, FL 32501 Donna Gardner, Esquire 213 South Alcaniz Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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SHANNON M. SPENCE vs OCALA MANAGEMENT, INC., D/B/A QUALITY INN, 94-006652 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Nov. 30, 1994 Number: 94-006652 Latest Update: Feb. 24, 2000

The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent discriminated unlawfully against the Petitioner by discharging him because of a handicap contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the nature and extent of financial loss suffered by the Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Shannon M. Spence, was employed from March 1993 until May 1, 1993 by the Respondent. The Respondent is an employer as defined by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, who earned on average $125/week, was employed by the Respondent as a bouncer and "bar backer", a person who assisted the bartender. On or about April 29, 1993, the Petitioner suffered an on the job injury which was duly reported to the employer and for which the Petitioner was treated at a local hospital pursuant to arrangements made by the employer. The Petitioner's injury was determined to be a right inguinal hernia, and the Petitioner was cautioned against lifting more than 25 pounds and standing for long periods of time. The Petitioner reported for work the following day, and communicated to his supervisor his inability to lift and to stand for long periods of time. His supervisor, Jess Wall or J.W., placed the Petitioner on security detail for the parking lot and entrance. There were additional light duties available for security personnel within the employer's business in which the employee could have been placed. The Petitioner's employment was terminated later that evening. The testimony is conflicting regarding whether the Petitioner was discharged because he was dating another employee, or because he was injured, or quit in sympathy with Jess Wall, who was also terminated on that evening. The most credible evidence is that the Petitioner was discharged because of his injury, but was told it was because he was dating another employee. The prohibition against dating was a new rule, it was applied against the Petitioner without any prior warning, the female employee was not discharged, and the Petitioner was the only person discharged for this activity although there were others who dated employees. The alternative theory that Petitioner quit in sympathy with the head bouncer, Mr. Wall, is specifically rejected for lack of credibility of the various witnesses. The Petitioner subsequently settled his workman's compensation claim arising from this injury with the Respondent for $15,000. No details were received regarding the allocation of moneys for medical and wages. The Petitioner is entitled to back wages from his discharge until the hearing on April 27, 1995, less any mitigation, including any portion of the settlement of his workman's compensation claim attributable to lost wages, occurring after surgical repair of the hernia when the Petitioner was reemployed. The Petitioner is entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission find that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by the Respondent, and that the Respondent be ordered to pay the Petitioner his lost wages from May 1, 1993 until April 27, 1995 less any amounts the Petitioner earned during this period and any amounts included in the workman's compensation settlement specifically provided for wages; that the Commission retain jurisdiction for the award of damages and attorney's fees and costs; and the Commission remand the matter for a determination of the attorney's fees and costs and to permit the Respondent to present any evidence in mitigation of its damages. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of their findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1,2 Subsumed in Paragraph 1 and 2. Paragraph 3-5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 3-5. Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-9. Paragraph 9 Subsumed in 3 and 11. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 4 Rejected because the date was April 29, 1993. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 4,5. Paragraph 6,7 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 8,9 Subsumed in Paragraphs 10,11. COPIES FURNISHED: James P. Tarquin, Esquire Michael B. Staley, Esquire P.O. Box 906190 Ocala, FL 34478 John Daley, Esquire 201 E. Pine Street 15th Floor Orlando, FL 32801 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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SUSHON S. DILLARD vs INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF PANCAKES, 12-003379 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lee, Florida Oct. 15, 2012 Number: 12-003379 Latest Update: Dec. 18, 2013

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Pritesh, Inc., d/b/a IHOP 36-151 ("IHOP"), committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2011),1/ by discharging Petitioner from her employment in retaliation for her complaints regarding racial and religious discrimination in the workplace.

Findings Of Fact IHOP is an employer as that term is defined in subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. IHOP is a restaurant in Leesburg. IHOP is owned by Pritesh Patel, who owns and operates a total of four International House of Pancakes stores in the Leesburg area through his corporation, Pritesh, Inc. Petitioner is a black female who is an observant Jew. Because of her religious beliefs, Petitioner does not work on the Sabbath, from sundown on Friday until sunset on Saturday. Petitioner was hired to work as a server at IHOP on March 19, 2012. She made it clear that she did not work on the Sabbath, and IHOP agreed to respect her religious beliefs. There was some difference in recollection as to the notice Petitioner gave to IHOP. Petitioner testified that she made it clear she could not work until sundown on Saturdays. The store manager, Brian Jackson, also recalled that Petitioner stated she could only work Saturday evenings. Mr. Patel testified that Petitioner said that she could work on Saturday "afternoon." Petitioner's version is credited as being more consistent with her stated beliefs, though there is no doubt that Mr. Patel was testifying honestly as to his recollection. Petitioner was the only black server working at IHOP at this time. Both Mr. Patel and Mr. Jackson credibly testified that IHOP has had many black servers through the years. Mr. Jackson noted that Petitioner only worked for IHOP for a period of two weeks and therefore was in no position to judge IHOP's minority hiring practices. Petitioner testified that assistant manager Hemanshu "Shu" Patel, a relative of the owner, created a hostile working environment for her from the time she started on March 19. She complained that Shu would alter the seating chart so that she would have fewer tables to cover, meaning a reduction in her tips. Petitioner also stated that Shu was disrespectful and rude, in a manner that caused her to believe there was a racial motivation behind his actions. Despite the fact that Shu was subordinate to Mr. Jackson, Petitioner believed that Shu was really in charge because he was a relative of Mr. Patel and therefore "untouchable" as an employee of IHOP. Petitioner's main complaint was that Shu, who was in charge of work schedules for the restaurant, scheduled her to work on Saturdays. Petitioner testified that on the first Saturday of her employment, March 24, Shu called her to come into work at noon. She replied that she could not come in until after sundown. This problem was apparently worked out to Petitioner's satisfaction, and she was not required to report to work on Saturday afternoon. However, when Shu posted the next week's schedule on the following Tuesday, Petitioner saw that she had been scheduled to work on the morning of Saturday, March 31. Petitioner complained. Both Mr. Patel and Mr. Jackson testified that Shu had merely made an error in scheduling that was rectified as soon as Petitioner notified them of the problem. Petitioner did not deny that the problem was resolved mid-week, well before any Sabbath conflict could arise. Mr. Patel testified that he wanted Petitioner to work from 4 p.m. until midnight on Saturday, March 31, so that she would not lose a day's work due to the scheduling error. Shu phoned Petitioner early on Saturday afternoon and asked her to come in. Petitioner told Shu that she could not come in until 8 p.m. Mr. Patel testified that he did not need someone to work a four-hour shift, and that Petitioner was told not to come in. As a further reason for declining to work on Saturday evening, Petitioner testified that she had only been trained for the morning shift. Mr. Jackson testified that the only distinction between the dayshift and the nightshift is that the latter is less busy. All servers are trained for the morning shift. Mr. Jackson stated that, once trained for the morning shift, a server would find the night shift "a piece of cake." Petitioner's reason for not working in the evening was not credible in this respect. Mr. Patel testified that he had no problem with Petitioner's not working on that Saturday, provided that she understood she was going lose a day. Mr. Patel stated that from his point of view the problems began when Petitioner insisted that he give her weekday hours to make up for the lost Saturday hours. Mr. Patel declined to cut another employee's hours for Petitioner. Petitioner came in to work on the morning of Sunday, April 1. Sunday morning is a busy time for IHOP. According to head server Bernadine Hengst, Petitioner stood near her at the register and voiced her complaints about Shu, who was working in the kitchen. Shu heard Petitioner and stepped into the dining room, asking her, "You got something to say to me?" Petitioner and Shu became loud, and their argument was moved outside for fear of disturbing a restaurant full of people. Petitioner finished her shift then went home and composed a letter to Mr. Patel. She made copies of the letter for every employee at IHOP. Ms. Hengst was the first to see the letter. She phoned Mr. Jackson at home to tell him about it, and Mr. Jackson phoned Mr. Patel. The letter read as follows: On March 19, 2012, I was hired to work as a server. I am a professional, pleasant, respectful, prompt and dutiful individual. As the only African-American server, it is imperative that you know since I have arrived at IHOP, I have faced fierce blatant hostility from a manager ("Shu") and co- workers ("C.C., Misti and Cherish"). I feel Shu has deliberately created a divisive and hostile working environment. It is my understanding Shu is a family member yet his behavior is definitely bad for business. On two separate occasions, Shu altered the seating chart that Brian originally created and took two tables from me. He lacks proficient management skills and is totally unprofessional, disrespectful and rude. On Sunday, April 1, 2012, Shu spoke to me in a loud, impolite manner in front of staff and customers. Shu communicated in a very bellicose fashion and for a moment, it felt as though he would physically attack me. You must take it serious that Shu's conduct is detrimental to your business. When Shu hired me I made it clear that I am Jewish and do not work on the Sabbath ("Saturday"). Nevertheless, Shu called me to come into work on Saturday about noon; I told him I would come in after the Sabbath at 7:00 p.m. The following week I was scheduled to work a Saturday, which in turn caused me to lose a day of work. Also on April 1, 2012, Shu assigned me only two booths for the whole day; when I spoke up about it he threatened to take another booth from me. This type of attitude and his unfair behavior cannot be tolerated in the United States of America in 2012. Shu is outwardly mean, discriminative, and racist towards me. He acts like a tyrant, a bully and he feels he is untouchable. On Sunday, April 1, I was only assigned two booths while my co-workers had four to six tables. This was unfair seating arrangements. At the end of the day, Bernie [Hengst] told all the servers to tip out the busboy, yet I did not because I was unjustly treated by only being assigned two tables. This was one-sided and insulting. I am an exceptional waitress and I depend on this job to pay my bills. During my first week, I was scheduled to work 36.10 hours and this week I was only given approximately 23.0 hours. Everyone should be treated fairly and equally. I ask that you continue to give me a full schedule each week. This letter officially informs you of the battles I have dealt with in your establishment and I have not worked here for one whole month. All Americans have the right to work without being harassed. I urge you to intervene and equitably resolve this issue. Ms. Hengst testified that Shu is a loud person who "talks with his hands," but she saw nothing that gave her the impression that Shu would "physically attack" Petitioner. She did not detect that Shu treated Petitioner any differently than he treated other servers. Ms. Hengst saw Petitioner as an equal participant in the April 1 confrontation. As to Petitioner's complaint about the number of tables to which she was assigned, Mr. Jackson testified that servers are always trained on two booths and then moved to four booths after training is completed. He stated that Petitioner was doing a "terrible" job working four booths, which caused Shu to move her down to two. Mr. Jackson stated that it is counterproductive to overwhelm a new server, and that the server must demonstrate the ability to perform the basics before taking on more tables. On the morning of April 2, after reading Petitioner's letter, Mr. Patel went to the IHOP and sat down for a meeting with Petitioner in hopes of addressing her complaints. Mr. Patel testified that the first thing Petitioner asked him was, "Do you know how many black employees you have?" Though he had been willing to discuss Petitioner's grievances concerning scheduling, Mr. Patel decided to fire Petitioner when she started "threatening us" based on claims of "black and white discriminating." He decided to fire Petitioner for the future of his business, because he did not want the problems associated with allegations of discrimination. Mr. Jackson was also at the April 2 meeting, and testified that Petitioner claimed she was being singled out because of her race. Based on all the testimony, it is found that Petitioner had little basis for claiming that IHOP was discriminating against her based on her race or religion during the actual course of her job. She was mistakenly scheduled to work on Saturday, but was not required to come in to the store once she made management aware of the error. She did lose one shift's worth of work for March 31, but that was partly due to her declining to work the evening shift. The evidence established that Shu Patel was loud, somewhat hotheaded, and perhaps not the ideal choice for managing a busy restaurant, but did not establish that he singled out Petitioner for particular abuse because of her race or religion. The evidence established that Petitioner's poor job performance was the cause of at least some of the friction between her and IHOP management. However, Mr. Patel's own testimony established that he dismissed Petitioner in direct retaliation for her complaint of discriminatory employment practices. IHOP offered no legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Petitioner's dismissal.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Pritesh, Inc., d/b/a IHOP 36- 151 committed an act of unlawful retaliation against Petitioner. It is further recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations remand this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary proceeding to establish the amount of back pay/lost wages owed to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2013.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68760.01760.02760.10760.11
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HERBERT DAWKINS vs RHODES, INC., 91-000080 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jan. 03, 1991 Number: 91-000080 Latest Update: Mar. 12, 1991

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment based on race.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner has worked as a furniture finisher and repairman for over 30 years. He was hired by Respondent on October 10, 1986. At that time, he worked at Respondent's store located on U.S. Route 441 in the Orlando area. Respondent is a furniture retailer. Although Respondent does not manufacture furniture, at least in the Orlando area, Respondent employs persons to perform various work on furniture, such as to repair damage in shipment or delivery. From 1986 through the end of 1987, Petitioner was the only finisher employed by Respondent and the only person qualified to perform major repairs. During this time, Petitioner performed a variety of services, including finishing, repair, upholstery, set up, and service calls. In December, 1987, Petitioner was transferred to Respondent's Landstreet facility. In general, Respondent was experiencing increasing retail sales at this time. To meet the needs associated with increased sales activity, Respondent added another warehouse employee to perform touch- up work and new equipment, such as a spray booth, to assist finishing and repair work. As Respondent's business increased, the demands on Petitioner also increased. Petitioner possesses substantial skills with respect to furniture finishing. However, Petitioner takes considerable time to perform his work. While retail activity had remained modest, Respondent tolerated Petitioner's slow pace. But as sales increased, Respondent pressured Petitioner to increase the pace of his work. On August 16, 1988, a supervisor gave Petitioner a performance and potential summary in connection with a periodic performance review. The summary states that Petitioner's performance rating is below average. The summary identifies Petitioner's major weakness as "complain[ing] about everything and everybody." The summary notes Petitioner's slow pace, poor work habits, refusal to use new finishing aids, and refusal to give up his "old ways." The summary also states that his results were generally reasonable, but his overall results "leave something to be desired." On December 8, 1988, a supervisor gave Petitioner a disciplinary action form. The form states that, in the four months since the August 8 performance summary, Petitioner has shown no significant improvement. The form concludes that, "If there is no improvement there will be no more chances." Petitioner refused to sign the December 8 disciplinary action form. Petitioner became angry at the meeting at which the form was produced. Respondent fired Petitioner on December 28, 1988. Petitioner is a black person. However, he presented no evidence that his race was a factor in the termination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner. ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald M. McElrath, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Margaret Jones, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Herbert Dawkins 7055 Hennepin Blvd. Orlando, FL 32818 Jerry Lind, Operations Manager Rhodes, Inc. 901 Landstreet Rd. Orlando, FL 32821

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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BETTY K. HARRIS vs. KAPOK TREE RESTAURANT, 87-001416 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-001416 Latest Update: Jun. 16, 1987

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a waitress at the Kapok Tree Restaurant in October, 1983. She suffered a heart attack in August, 1985 and remained out of work until January, 1986 at which time she was rehired by Respondent as a hostess. From January, 1986 until June 3, 1986 Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a hostess, and her duties included greeting and seating customers. She also made sure customers' reservations were in order and that customers were equally distributed among the waiters and waitresses. While she was a hostess, Petitioner's supervisors were Scott Evans and Janice Kehoe. Respondent rehired Petitioner in January, 1986 as a hostess rather than a waitress because the duties of a hostess are less strenuous than those of a waitress, and Petitioner willingly accepted the position. She enjoyed her job as hostess very much, and had no medical limitations which in any way precluded or adversely affected her performance of a hostess' duties. While employed as a waitress Petitioner was counseled, and placed on one-week suspension without pay by her supervisor on April 30, 1984 for being rude to customers. She also received a disciplinary warning slip on May 26, 1985 for poor attitude and uncooperative response to job training and supervisor direction. After being rehired as a hostess, her performance was less than ideal and she became flustered and gruff with customers, according to Scott Evans and Janice Kehoe, her supervisors. She was counseled approximately five times about her performance as a hostess, and then was laid off on June 3, 1986 because business volume was down, and only the most outstanding employees could be retained. Since petitioner's performance was only satisfactory, but not as outstanding as others, she was selected to be laid-off. There is no competent substantial evidence that Petitioner's heart condition, or insurance expenses associated therewith, were in any way considered by, or factors in, Respondent's decision to lay-off Petitioner. Ten other employees were laid-off, or had their hours reduced, at approximately the same time as Petitioner's lay-off due to slow business volume. Respondent does currently employ handicapped workers. There is no evidence that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in this case due to any handicap. Petitioner would not be considered for rehire by Respondent due to her performance as a hostess.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry M. Broklehurst, Esquire 2420 Enterprise Road, Suite 204 Clearwater, Florida 33575 W. Reynolds Allen, Esquire Gail Goldman Holtzman, Esquire 609 West Horatio Street Tampa, Florida 33606 Ronald M. McElrath Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518-4748 Miles Lance, Esquire Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518-4748

Florida Laws (1) 120.65
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DARYL ROYSTER vs PATE STEVEDORE CO, INC., 07-001527 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Apr. 03, 2007 Number: 07-001527 Latest Update: Mar. 19, 2008

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Darryl Royster, was subjected to employment discrimination, by allegedly being terminated on the basis of his race or disability/handicap, by denial of a promotion and training, being subjected to discriminatory terms and conditions of employment, and by retaliation.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed by Pate Steveodore Company, Inc., (Pate) at times pertinent hereto. The Petitioner is an African-American male. Pate is a licensed Stevodore Company operating at the Port of Pensacola. Pate typically handles loading or unloading of various types of cargo, including soy beans, frozen food products, and other materials from railroad cars located in the port or onto ships berthed at the port. Pate has a staff of six permanent employees, including a president, vice-president, office manager, accounting clerk, and pier superintendent, as well as a part-time payroll clerk. Depending on the amount of work available at any particular time, Pate employs from 0 to 60 longshoremen, the majority of whom are African-American. The Petitioner was first employed by Pate in September 2005, as a longshoreman, responsible for loading and unloading box cars. Scott Miller is the former supervisor of the Petitioner. In his testimony he established that, typically, two teams of three longshoremen each would be assigned to load or unload each box car. The members of such teams work together to load or unload cargo from pallets, typically completing the unloading of two cars in a morning and two cars in the afternoon. The employees typically take breaks from the work in between pallets or box cars, but are allowed to take breaks whenever they feel the need. They arrange the schedule for taking breaks among themselves and without direction from supervisors. The Petitioner was working on August 2, 2006. On that date he contends that he suffered a back injury while lifting a 110 pound sack of beans. He states that he attempted to inform his supervisor, Mr. Miller, of the alleged injury, but was instructed to either return to work that day, or to leave if he was unable to do so. Mr. Miller was apparently frustrated with the Petitioner on that day because the Petitioner had left the work area on two occasions that morning for prolonged periods of time. The first time was when he went to the main office of Pate to discuss the fact that his child support payments were being withheld from his checks and to demand that the money be returned to him. The Petitioner wanted Pate to reimburse him for the withheld amounts and Pate explained to the Petitioner that they were legally required to make the deductions from his payroll. The second time that day he went to the main office to inform Mr. Pate that he had a job interview with an insurance company and would not be returning to work that afternoon after lunch. The Petitioner told Mr. Pate that he had already informed Mr. Miller that he would not be working that afternoon. Actually, he had never told Mr. Miller he was going to be absent in the afternoon. Because Mr. Miller did not have a replacement for the unexpected absence of the Petitioner, Mr. Miller had to perform the Petitioner's job loading and unloading cargo, during both the morning and afternoon absences. Mr. Miller told Mr. Pate of his dissatisfaction with the unexcused absences and having to perform the Petitioner's work himself. Pate did not hear from the Petitioner again until August 8, 2006, when Michael Pate, the company president, and Rosalee Garrett, the office manager, received a fax from the Petitioner requesting that they pass along certain information to the company's workers' compensation carrier, so that the Petitioner could be paid for the time he had been off work. The Petitioner informed Pate that he would be retuning to work the following week and attached a note from a medical clinic asking that he be excused from work until August 14, 2006. Ms. Garrett responded to the request and forwarded the requested information to the company's workers' compensation carrier. She also requested that the Petitioner report to the office so that he could complete an accident report form so that his workers' compensation claim could be properly processed. Pate's workers' compensation carrier's coverage policy and the workers' compensation law requires that an accident report be submitted by the claimant.1/ On August 11, 2006, the Petitioner wrote to Mr. Pate and Ms. Garrett informing them that he would not be able to return to work until October 20, 2006, because he was still experiencing back pain and rectal bleeding. The Petitioner wanted to wait until he could be seen by a doctor so that he could determine the source of those two problems. The Petitioner informed Mr. Pate and Ms. Garrett that he could perform light-duty work that did not involve bending or heavy lifting, such as running errands for the company, supervising other employees, and that he could also do work on the computer. Thereafter, on August 28, 2006, the Petitioner came to Pate's main office, again requesting light-duty work. There was no such work available, however, and Mr. Pate so informed the Petitioner. At that point the Petitioner became very upset and belligerent and began cursing Mr. Pate. Mr. Pate regarded that as threatening behavior and insubordination and was unwilling to tolerate such conduct. Mr. Pate escorted the Petitioner out of the office to converse with him outside, away from the other employees, because of his behavior, but was unsuccessful and thereupon terminated him. He told him to leave the premises, but ultimately had to call the port security office to have the port security personnel escort the Petitioner off the premises and outside the secure area of the Port of Pensacola. The testimony of Ms. Garrett corroborates that of Mr. Pate in establishing that the Petitioner was terminated because he became threatening, argumentative, and insubordinate toward Mr. Pate. In terms of his claim regarding racial discrimination, based upon allegedly different terms and conditions of employment imposed upon him, the Petitioner claims that he and other African-American employees were not allowed to take breaks or to train for and become forklift operators. The testimony of three witnesses, however, established that African-American employees are granted the same breaks as white employees and are otherwise treated the same with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment. The Petitioner was allowed to, and did take breaks during his employment with Pate. Moreover, contrary to the Petitioner's position, it was established, by persuasive, credible testimony, that in terms of the alleged issue concerning African-American employees not being allowed to become forklift drivers, that Pate conducted training so that such employees could become forklift drivers. Some employees took advantage of that training and became forklift drivers. In fact, the majority of Pate's forklift drivers are African-American. The Petitioner also contended that he was discriminated against in terms of his race for failure of Pate to promote or train him or other African-American employees. According to the preponderant, persuasive testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, however, there was no open position available at Pate, during the Petitioner's employment time there, to which he could have been promoted, nor had he ever applied for a promotion position. There was no denial of training opportunities because there was no training offered to any employee during the period of time of the Petitioner's employment with Pate and there was no evidence to show that the Petitioner ever requested training for any position at Pate. As found above, before the Petitioner became employed there, Pate did offer training for forklift drivers and trained some employees as forklift drivers, the majority of whom were African-American.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and the arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2008.

CFR (1) 29 CFR 1630.2(j)(3)(i) Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57440.185
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JACQUELINE A. IRBY vs. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY AND ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, 89-000874 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000874 Latest Update: May 24, 1989

Findings Of Fact Jacqueline A. Irby was employed as an Allstate Insurance Agent from April 25, 1983 until her dismissal July 17, 1987. Respondent has a company policy prohibiting employees from bringing firearms into company offices or carrying them while on company business. Violation of this policy can result in termination. (Exhibit 6). Petitioner was aware of this policy when employed in 1983 (Exhibit 1). She was unsure the policy applied to her office which she rented in the building not otherwise used by Respondent. On April 14, 1987, Petitioner wrote a memo to her supervising sales manager, Randy Rouse, stating that she had witnessed Judith Gill walk into her office with a handgun and point it directly at Petitioner's client. Both Gill and Petitioner were Allstate Agents sharing office spaces if not actually partners. During the subsequent investigation of this incident, Petitioner acknowledged to Rouse that she kept a .357 Magnum in her office for her protection when she worked late at night. Both Gill and Petitioner were fired by Respondent as Allstate Agents on or about July 17, 1987. Petitioner presented Exhibits 2 through 5 representing disciplinary action taken by Respondent against male Allstate Agents. Although the maximum penalty authorized by Respondent's Policy Statements Manual (Exhibit 6) for their offenses was dismissal, each of these Agents received a lesser punishment. None of the offenses noted in Exhibits 2 through 5 involved a firearm violation. No evidence was presented regarding the Agent hired to replace Petitioner, if any, or the sex of such replacement.

Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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