The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent's licensure and practice Respondent, Douglas N. Graham, is now, and was at all times material hereto, licensed as a chiropractic physician by the State of Florida, having been issued license number CH 0005483. At all times pertinent, Respondent operated two businesses associated with the practice of chiropractic. The first business, a typical chiropractic practice, was operated under the name Action Chiropractic, and was located in a small office building at 8095 Overseas Highway, Marathon, Florida. The second business, known as Club Hygiene, promoted a hygienic (nutritionally sound) lifestyle based on the consumption of uncooked fruit and vegetables, nuts and seeds. As part of the regime at Club Hygiene, fasting (to detoxify the body) was also promoted as an avenue to better health. Club Hygiene was located in Respondent's two-story home at 105 Bruce Court, Marathon, Florida. The ground floor, where the patients (or guests, as they were referred to at Club Hygiene) resided, consisted of three bedrooms, one bathroom, a small recreation room or area, and a porch for dining. Each bedroom contained two beds, allowing a maximum capacity of six guests. On the second level was Respondent's residence, which he shared with up to three "interns,"3 who cared for the guests. The instant case primarily involves concerns voiced by Petitioner regarding the care of two patients (K. E. and B. D.) at Club Hygiene in 1993. Regarding those concerns, Petitioner questioned whether Respondent's record keeping met minimum standards and whether Respondent's treatment met the prevailing standard of care. The K. E. affair On December 7, 1992, K. E. presented as a walk-in at Respondent's chiropractic clinic, Action Chiropractic, for a free consultation to address whether she could benefit from chiropractic care. At the time, K. E., a female, was 25 years of age (date of birth March 7, 1967), 5'6" tall, and weighed 105 pounds. On presentation, K. E. filled out a case history sheet which detailed her present and past symptoms, as follows: occasional dizziness and headache; occasional pain between shoulders; frequent constipation and difficult digestion, with occasional pain over stomach; occasional colds, ear noises, and sore throat; occasional skin eruptions (rash); occasional frequent urination; and, occasional cramps or backache and vaginal discharge, with frequent irregular menstrual cycle. History further revealed an injury to a "muscle in back" over 5 years previous. Personal habits reflected a light appetite, as well as light use of alcohol and drugs. Exercise and sleep habits were noted as moderate. When asked to describe her major complaints and symptoms, K. E. responded, "They said I had scoliosis when I was young. I'm curious if it still is there." The date symptoms were first noticed was stated to be "middle school." K. E.'s visit with Respondent lasted about twenty minutes, and included a brief spinal check, as well as a discussion regarding diet and nutrition. Respondent apparently told K. E. she would benefit from chiropractic care; however, neither the patient record nor the proof at hearing reveal the results of his examination, diagnosis, prognosis, or any treatment plan. Due to a lack of funds, K. E. declined further chiropractic care. At the time, or shortly thereafter, Respondent offered K. E. the opportunity to become an "intern" at Club Hygiene. The Internship Agreement entered into by Respondent and K. E. on January 18, 1993, provided as follows: The internship will last for a period of . . . 6 months . . . beginning on MONDAY, JANUARY 18TH , 1993 and ending on SUNDAY, JULY 18th , 1993. The company will provide the Intern with room, board, and the opportunity for hands- on, first-hand experience in the day-to-day operation of a hygienic retreat, supervision of fasting patients, and hygienic living. The Intern will provide the Company with their full-time efforts in the operation of the retreat in the manner determined by the company and in fitting with all reasonable rules and guidelines to be enforced by the company . . . . As an inducement to complete the internship, interns were apparently rewarded with a supervised fast at the end of their term. When K. E. joined the staff of Club Hygiene in January 1993, she was one of three interns who cared for the patients (guests). Also on staff, and working under Respondent's supervision, was Tim Trader (referred to as Dr. Trader in these proceedings), a unlicensed naturopathic physician.4 As an intern, K. E. changed the guests' linen, cleaned the guest bathroom, assisted with food preparation and, on a rotating basis with the other interns, dined with the guests. Each morning, K. E. also took the guests' blood pressure, and noted their vital signs. When K. E. began work at the club she was suffering health problems and, more particularly, stomach trouble (difficult digestion and pain) and constipation. To assist her, Respondent recommended various diets, and K. E., at Respondent's recommendation, moved from eating predominantly cooked foods to raw natural foods; however, her stomach troubles persisted, and by April 1993 her weight had dropped to about 92 pounds. In April 1993, on the advise of Dr. Trader and with the concurrence of Respondent, K. E. started a fast, water only, as a means to address her health problems. There is, however, no evidence that K. E. was physically examined prior to fasting, although at some point Respondent apparently suggested that "she had severe problems, including but not limited to, malabsorption syndrome, leaky gut syndrome, potential hiatal hernia and resultant malnutrition." Moreover, apart from the meager patient record of K. E.'s office visit in December 1992, there is no patient record or other documentation (evidencing patient history, symtomatology, examination, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment) to justify the care (diet and fasting) offered K. E.5 K. E. fasted for two weeks and by the end of the fast her weight was approximately 87 pounds. During the fast, Respondent was frequently out-of-town; however, K. E. was supervised by Dr. Trader, who assured her vital signs were regularly taken.6 Following the fast, K. E.'s health continued to deteriorate, and her weight dropped to approximately 77 pounds. She became concerned and sought to consult with Frank Sabatino, D.C., another "hygienic physician." Ultimately K. E. was seen by Dr. Sabatino, and also a medical doctor; however, their findings are not of record. Moreover, there was no proof offered at hearing regarding the nature of K. E.'s disorder, whether (given the nature of the disorder) a fast was or was not appropriate, whether the fast caused or contributed to any injury, or what subsequent care (if any) K. E. required. As of the date of hearing, to a lay observer, her appearance evidenced good health. To address whether Respondent's treatment met the prevailing standard of care, Petitioner offered the opinions of two chiropractic physicians, Bruce I. Browne, D.C., and Robert S. Butler, Jr., D.C.7 It was Dr. Browne's opinion that the care Respondent offered K. E., including the supervision (albeit not personal) provided for her fasting, met the prevailing standard of care, but that Respondent failed to maintain patient records that justified the course of treatment. Dr. Butler agreed the patient records were inadequate, but was also of the opinion that Respondent's care failed to meet the prevailing standard of care because he authorized a fast without first performing a complete examination to resolve whether K. E.'s condition was appropriate for a fast, or stated otherwise, whether she was physically capable of withstanding the stress of a fast. Respondent admitted, at hearing, that he had not done any examination that would permit him to appropriately treat K. E. Given the proof, it must be concluded that Respondent failed to maintain patient records regarding K. E. that justified her course of treatment. It must also be concluded that by approving a fast without an adequate examination, Respondent's care of K. E. fell below the prevailing standard. The B. D. affair In or about early November 1993, B. D., a male, and resident of the State of Washington, telephoned Respondent to arrange a visit. At the time, according to Respondent, B. D. had been hospitalized for two or three weeks and "wanted out."8 Respondent agreed.9 B. D. arrived at Club Hygiene on November 7, 1993. At the time, he was 37 years of age (date of birth June 5, 1956), 5' 9 1/2" tall, weighted 115 pounds, and was in extremely poor health. He was also HIV positive, and had developed acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).10 On presentation, as reflected by his case history, B. D. expressed to Respondent the fear or thought that he was dying, and related the following major complaints and symptoms: anal infection, frequent diarrhea, weight loss, inability to assimilate food, fatigue, and loss of energy. At the time, B. D. had been fasting for 1 1/2 days. Examination confirmed the presence of an anal infection (thought to be fungal in origin) oozing clear fluid, and further noted, inter alia, an irritated nose and throat (slight redness), and that the upper cervical and lower lumbar were tender and fixated. Heart was noted to be clear and strong, and the lungs were noted to be clear in all four quadrants. The only recommendation reflected by the patient records relates to the observation concerning the upper cervical and lower lumbar, and reads as follows: "Daily light massage, muscle release, and gentle specific adjustments. P[atien]t concerned about overall health. Monitor closely." B. D. continued his fast (water only) until November 16, 1993 (when he consumed diluted apple and celery juice), and Respondent monitored his progress on a daily basis. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5). The progress notes reflect a weight loss from 115 pounds to 102 1/2 pounds during the course of the fast, but no untoward occurrence. B. D. apparently continued on a juice diet until November 23, 1993, when he was reintroduced to solid food. By that date, B. D.'s weight was noted to have dropped to 100 pounds. On November 24, 1993, B. D.'s blood pressure was noted as 88/62 and his pulse/respiration as 74/20. He was also noted to be fatigued and he rested all day. Between November 24, 1993, and November 28, 1993, the only entry appears to be for November 26, 1993, when B. D.'s blood pressure is noted to be 100/70s. By November 28, 1993, B. D.'s blood pressure was noted to have fallen to 66/50 and his pulse/respiration was noted as 80/20. No entry appears for blood pressure or pulse/respiration on November 29; however, there was an entry that B. D. was "experiencing problem breathing." A morning entry on November 30, 1993, noted "Ronci in all 4 Quads.-very slight. Breathing extremely labored." Blood pressure was noted as 62/42 and pulse/respiration as 80/28. Respondent's progress notes contain no entries for December 1, 1993. On December 2, 1993, the notes reflect "Breathing labored still." Pulse/respiration was recorded as 80/32; however, no blood pressure reading was noted. There are no entries for December 3, 1993. On December 4, 1993, blood pressure was recorded as 62/44 and pulse/respiration as 92/32. B. D. was noted to be very fatigued. No entries appear on December 5, 1993, and on December 6, 1993, at 5:00 p.m., B. D.'s blood pressure is noted as 62/52 and pulse/respiration as 100/weak. B. D. is again noted as very fatigued, and his weight is recorded as 95 1/4 pounds. No entries appear for December 7, 1993. At 11:08 p.m., December 7, 1993, Monroe County Emergency Services were summoned to Club Hygiene by a 911 telephone call, and they arrived at 11:15 p.m. The EMT's (emergency medical technician's) report reflects that for past medical history they were advised that B. D. was HIV positive, and for chief complaint they were advised "Breathing diff[iculty] - Family states onset 1 w[ee]k, getting progressively worse." At 11:20 p.m., blood pressure was noted as 109/53 and pulse/respiration was noted as 113/40. B. D. was transported to Fishermens Hospital and he was admitted through the emergency room at 11:36 p.m. B. D. remained at Fishermens Hospital until December 20, 1993, when he was transferred to Lower Florida Keys Health System for further studies and treatment. The discharge summary from Fishermens Hospital reveals his course as follows: This is 37 year old male who presents to the Emergency Room with dyspnea, weakness for the past several days, states he has been visiting from the state of Washington with his mother and became ill while in the area. His past medical history is negative for previous hospitalization accept (sic) for surgery for right inguinal hernia he states he was found to be HIV positive seven years ago but has been in good health until recently. Family history is negative for TB, diabetes, cancer, and cardiac disease, he has no known allergies, he is single, he has been a heavy abuser of alcohol in the past until four years ago. In the past he worked as an investment consultant with Japan, he does not smoke, he uses no drugs except an occasional marijuana. He states he knows no known risks for AIDS and does not know how he contacted it.11 Review of systems denies any illness prior to be the past few weeks, prior to this admission, he states he is confused regarding his past medical history and does'nt (sic) know how he became HIV positive. Physical examination revealed emaciated 37 year old male who is on a non rebreather oxygen mask. His skin is warm and dry, pupils are equal and regular and react normally to light in accomidation (sic). Teeth are negative. Tembranic membrane is normal. Neck is subtle there is no cervical adenopathy, thyroid is smooth without enlargement, he has rales in both lungs over the entire parietal with respirations of 36 per minute, no wheezing is heard, his pulse is 92, regular sinus rhythm, there are no murmurs. Abdomen is soft without masses. Heart tenderness, there was no peripheral edema. Penial pulses are present. He is alert, although he is slightly confused regarding his recent medical history. Reflexes were equal, there is no vocal motor weakness. * * * Chest x-ray at the time of admission showed pulmonary edema, possibly non-cardiac follow up chest x-ray showed evidence of diffuse infiltrates involving the right lung and also the left lower lobe consistent with pneumocystis carinii pneumonia with evidence of bilateral pulmonary edema. Follow up chest x-ray showed increased . . . desity in the right lung infiltrate and progression of infiltrates to the left mid and lower lung fields with air bronchograms and air alveolgrams Indicating alveolar infiltrates. EKG abnormal record to the extreme right axis deviation, poor R wave progression, sinus tachycardia. Patient was seen in consultation by Dr. Halterman in the event that his respiratory status required intubation, however he never did require this. * * * He was treated in ICU, he developed a pneumothorax, spontaneous pneumothorax and was seen by Dr. Mankowitz for insertion of a chest tube, because of failure to show improvement arrangements were made for transfer to Key West for further studies and treatment and possible Phentolamine, Phetamadine. His condition upon transfer is poor. Prognosis is poor. FINAL DIAGNOSIS: Respiratory failure, secondary to diffused alveolar infiltrates, probable pneumocystis carinii pneumonia. Spontaneous pneumothorax, adult immune deficiency syndrome. B. D. was admitted to Lower Florida Keys Health System, Key West, Florida, at 2:50 p.m., December 20, 1993. Thereafter, his condition deteriorated, and at 9:17 p.m., December 26, 1993, he was pronounced dead. The death summary notes an admitting and final diagnosis as follows: ADMITTING DIAGNOSIS: Pneumonia FINAL DIAGNOSIS: Pneumonia, HIV infection, respiratory failure, respiratory complications, emphysema, cachexia Cause of death, as stated on the Certificate of Death, was cardiopulmonary failure, as a consequence of pneumonia, due to acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). To address whether Respondent's care for B. D. met the prevailing standard of care, as well as whether his records conformed to the minimum requirements of law, Petitioner again called upon Doctors Browne and Butler. With regard to the adequacy of Respondent's patient records, Doctors Browne and Butler concur, and observe that with regard to B. D., the patient records failed to conform with the minimum requirements of law (they failed to include a diagnosis or a treatment plan) and, therefore, failed to justify the course of treatment. Given the record, the opinions of Doctors Browne and Butler regarding the inadequacy of Respondent's records, as they relate to B. D., are credited. With regard to whether Respondent's treatment met the prevailing standard of care, Doctors Browne and Butler offer somewhat differing opinions. Dr. Browne was of the opinion that Respondent's treatment met the prevailing standard until November 30, 1993, when B. D.'s breathing was noted to be extremely labored. At that time, according to Dr. Browne, prevailing practice required Respondent, as a chiropractor, to cease treating B. D. and to advise him to seek relief from another practitioner who possessed the requisite skill, knowledge, and facilities to treat his ailment properly. In Dr. Butler's opinion, Respondent should have called for a chest x-ray, and his failure to do so failed to meet the prevailing standard of care.12 Respondent explained his reaction to B. D.'s congestion and labored breathing, as follows: Q. What did you do, you noted he was congested? A. I suggested he go to a hospital. Q. And his response? A. He did not want to go to a hospital. He wanted to wait it out, and I said you can wait at my house. But if you go down hill, you have to go to a hospital. Q. Is that what happened? A. Yeah. He started to become ever so slightly synodic (sic), meaning that he was breathing but he wasn't getting lots. His fingertips were starting to turn blue. * * * Q. Did you discuss with him at this time a need to get additional care? A. I discussed it with him many times, because this was not, this was not in my league. It was not in my scope. It was not - I did not have access to the tools even if I knew how to treat a man at this point. Those are my concerns for Brian. And, finally, I said, Brian, look, you have to trust my judgment, you go to the hospital whether you want to or not. Q. Who called for the ambulance? A. I have no idea. * * * Q. Did you consider the need for an x-ray when you saw Brian's breathing become labored? A. No. Q. Did you make any suggestions to him at the time you noted his breathing had become labored? A. When it became labored? Q. Yes, sir. Not that I'm aware of saying anything to him. No. I don't believe so. (Transcript, pages 174, 175, and 177). Having considered the proof, Dr. Browne's opinion is accepted as most compelling and provides the most complete description of the breadth of Respondent's obligations, as well as the scope of his breach. On the other hand, Dr. Butler's opinion (that the circumstances required a referral for chest x-ray) has not been rejected; however, Respondent's failure to refer for x-ray (when he realized B. D.'s condition was beyond his knowledge or the methods of treatment available to him) is viewed as a failing subsumed within his breach of the prevailing standard which required that Respondent cease treating B. D. and refer him to another physician who possessed the requisite skill, knowledge, and facilities to treat his ailment properly.13
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds the Respondent committed the offenses alleged in Counts I through VI of the Administrative Complaint, and which imposes, as a penalty for such violations, a suspension of licensure for a term of one (1) year, followed by a two (2) year term of probation (subject to such terms as the Board may reasonably impose), and an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 1998.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Turner has been licensed as a chiropractor in the State of Florida, holding license CH 1454. He has maintained offices as a chiropractic physician at 7650 South U.S. Highway One, Fort Pierce, Florida 34952 since May 19, 1985. Prior Discipline The Board of Chiropractic Examiners has maintained other prosecutions against Dr. Turner. On August 28, 1972 a Final Order was entered revoking Dr. Turner's license for solicitation for prostitution and giving oral medication and injections to a person, but his licensure was reinstated by Order dated September 11, 1974. Thereafter, on July 14, 1977, his licensure was revoked for a second time. Although the Administrative Complaint which had been filed in the second prosecution had alleged sexual misconduct towards patients and staff, those charges were not sustained. The revocation was imposed for obtaining prescriptions for narcotics, stimulants or habit-forming drugs under false pretenses from medical doctors and dentists in an amount so large as to show either drug abuse by Dr. Turner or the offering and administration of drugs to patients, employees, or other persons without lawful authority to do so. Ultimately, Dr. Turner was relicensed, and reestablished his practice in 1985. Alteration of Records The applicable paragraph of the Administrative Complaint alleges that On or about October 25, 1989 a former employee of the Respondent issued a sworn statement, to the State Attorney's Office. In her statement the former employee stated that the Respondent had her change her therapist's notes on a patient to reflect that certain treatments were not being used. The former employee also stated in this interview that the Respondent frequently had her and "other employees" change patient notes in order to mislead future "attorneys" reviewing said notes. Turner hired Debbie Corderre as a therapist and staff member in 1987, and she remained in his employ into 1989. One of the patients to whom she provided therapy was patient E.M. The physical therapists in Dr. Turner's office are not persons who are graduates of a physical therapy school approved for the educational preparation of physical therapists by an accrediting agency recognized by the Council on Post-Secondary Accreditation or who have passed an examination administered by the Department of Professional Regulation to determine fitness to practice as a physical therapist. See Section 486.031 Florida Statutes (1989). Rather, they are persons who have received brief on-the-job training of two weeks or so to provide such therapy as might be ordered by Dr. Turner as part of his office practice. Ms. Corderre testified that Dr. Turner had ordered her to alter the medical records of E.M. to remove diathermy as a therapy given. Diathermy is the heating of body tissues due to their resistance to the passage of high- frequency electromagnetic radiation, electric currents, or ultrasonic waves. (Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 26th Edition 1985). The office therapies included massage, traction, electric muscle stimulation, the use of hot packs and ultrasound treatment. Electric muscle stimulation and ultrasound treatment involved the use of a machine with pads; gel was put on the patient and the pads were attached. Ultrasound was performed using the same machine; lotion was placed on the patient and an instrument attached to the machine was rubbed over the body part being treated. How these treatments differ from diathermy, or what constituted diathermy at Dr. Turner's office, was never adequately explained at the hearing. The office notes maintained for Dr. Turner's patients were broken into four sections, each of which were identical, and permitted notes to be made for four separate visits on one sheet. The notes for each individual visit was made up of five parts. The first included a space for the date and abbreviations for the different therapies next to which a check mark could be placed. These spaces were checked off by therapists for billing purposes. None of these spaces ever were checked in any of the extant records for patient E.M. Below the abbreviations was a larger space for therapists notes, in which the therapist would write the therapy provided to the patient during that visit. Below the therapist's note area was a space of equal size containing the acronym SOAP, in which Dr. Turner would make his notes when he saw the patient, after his therapist had already completed the therapy. The fourth portion of the record of a visit is a line to note any material dispensed to the patient during the visit, and the fifth portion is a line to note any X-rays that may have been taken. In none of the records for patient E.M. have any of the abbreviations for any of the different types of therapy been checked off, even though Dr. Turner maintains that these notes are the source of billing information (Tr. 240-41). It is incomprehensible that from the period October 27, 1987 through April 12, 1988, over a total of 59 visits, that a therapist never correctly filled out the portion of the patient record which another employee would need in order to render a bill for the service provided that day. By way of contrast, however, the records for another patient entered into evidence, B.S., do for the most part, have check marks in that portion of the record for a visit which would be useful for billing. The inference which is drawn from the absence of any billing entries in the records for patient E.M. over so long a period of time is that the records which purport to be the contemporaneous records for E.M. are in fact records generated after the fact by the therapist, Debbie Corderre at the instruction of Dr. Turner. Dr. Turner's contention that Ms. Corderre failed to keep appropriate records is rejected. Ms. Corderre testified that Dr. Turner had instructed her to remove reference to diathermy given to patient E.M. Dr. Turner counters by noting that the insurance claim forms submitted by his office on behalf of patient E.M. to the Workers Compensation insurance carrier for E. M.'s employer never showed that diathermy was administered. Dr. Turner argues that Ms. Corderre's testimony must be wrong, for the insurance billings would have shown a charge for diathermy, if the testimony of Ms. Corderre were correct. Dr. Turner's point is well taken, but it does not negate the core of Ms. Corderre's testimony. Ms. Corderre had told the State Attorney's office before the hearing that she thought Dr. Turner had instructed her to change the records to remove any reference to having provided patient E.M. with ultrasound therapy. Based upon all the evidence I find that the records for patient E.M. were changed by Ms. Corderre in some significant way at the direction of Dr. Turner. Because the original records were necessarily lost, and all that remains are revised records, it is not possible to determine with certainty in what way the records were altered. On this aspect of her testimony the recollection of Ms. Corderre is faulty. Her testimony that she changed all records for patient E.M. is persuasive, and the absence of any entry in the portion of the records used for billing reinforces this conclusion. Why Dr. Turner wanted to have the records changed and the manner in which he told Ms. Corderre to change them are not particularly significant. Dr. Turner regarded the change as sufficiently important to have Ms. Corderre spend almost a full day of filling out the newly created records. He then manufactured what are supposed to be contemporaneous entries of his own in the portion of the records which are his notes (the SOAP notes). Improper Sexual Touching of a Patient Dr. Turner employed Brenda Stanley, who later became Brenda Sika by marriage, during the period August 1988 to 1989. She was trained as a physical therapist at the office. About a month after she was employed, in September 1988, Brenda Sika was injured in an automobile accident, and had gone to the hospital emergency room. She discussed her condition and her need for treatment with Dr. Turner, who agreed to examine her and treat her. Dr. Turner first saw Brenda Sika as a patient on September 13, 1988. Ms. Sika's principle complaints included back pain over the whole back, but which was worse in the lower back; neck pain, and ankle pain, all of which had resulted from the automobile accident. She also had bruising and tenderness of her chest due to the action of her seat belt in the accident. Ms. Sika contends that while she was lying on her stomach in a treatment room on several occasions Dr. Turner had placed his hand on her ankle, and slid it up until his hand was on her buttocks, and that on one occasion he had placed his hands between her legs while she was lying face down, with the inside of his hands on the inside of her legs and his thumb on the outside. She also alleged that on the Sunday following the initial visit on September 13, she sought additional treatment from Dr. Turner, and in the course of that treatment he requested her to remove her bra, remained in the room while she undressed, and afterwards asked her to stretch out her arms, after which he felt her breasts, including placing his hand around the fleshy part of her breasts. Finally, Ms. Sika alleges that while in the X-ray room, Dr. Turner asked to check if her groin muscle had been pulled, and in the process used his thumb and index finger to squeeze or grip her in the groin. It is difficult to accept the contention that Dr. Turner had engaged in inappropriate and unwarranted sexual touching of Ms. Sika's breasts, buttocks or groin area, in view of the continuing employment relationship. Ms. Sika had only recently been hired when she was injured. It seems unlikely that she would have remained in the employ of someone who had engaged in lecherous touching while she was supposedly being treated. She remained an employee of Dr. Stanley for a substantial amount of time, and only left that employment when she went to Michigan for her wedding. What is more significant, however, is that after she returned to Florida following her wedding, she decided to return to employment with Dr. Turner (Tr. 75). Ms. Sika did not tell other employees such as Deborah Coderre or Tammy Prescott that Dr. Turner had engaged in unwarranted sexual advances or made sexual innunendoes to her at the office. With respect to the accusation of fondling of a breast, after the accident Dr. Turner had conducted an examination which included palpation in the area of the rib cage underneath the breast, where there was a bruise caused by the seatbelt in Ms. Sika's car. That sort of touching in an area of complaint is appropriate. The charge with respect to running Dr. Turner's hands from the ankle to the buttocks is unconvincing. Attempting to determine whether there was involvement of a groin muscle would be appropriate, but the description of the examination given by Ms. Sika would have constituted inappropriate conduct, had the examination occurred as described. As stated above, given her continued employment, and reemployment after she had left work with Dr. Tuner at the time of her wedding, the evidence of sexual misconduct is not convincing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Chiropractic enter a final order revoking the licensure of Dr. Turner, without right of reinstatement or relicensure. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of November, 1990. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-5707 Rulings on the proposed findings by the Department: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Finding 9. Recounted in Finding 6, but the testimony that the alteration was to remove diathermy is not accepted. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within in the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected because the testimony was not sufficiently specific to establish that other medical records were altered. The testimony with respect to patient E.M. is sufficiently specific. Rejected because the testimony was not sufficiently specific with respect to alteration of records other than those of E.M. Moreover, the charge made in paragraph 3 is not one with respect to purposeful mis-billing. See, Finding 3. See, ruling on Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 12. Adopted in Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 14. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony recounted in Findings 19-27 is rejected for the reasons stated in Finding 16. Included in Finding 14. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Adopted in Finding 2. Rulings on findings proposed by Dr. Turner: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 1. Rejected as unnecessary, because Dr. Turner's skills are not at issue. Rejected as unnecessary, because Dr. Turner's skills are not at issue. Rejected as unnecessary, because Dr. Turner's skills are not at issue. Rejected as unnecessary, because Dr. Turner's skills are not at issue. Adopted in Finding 12. Adopted in Finding 13. 9 and 10. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary. Generally accepted for the reasons given in Finding 16. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 16. Adopted in Finding 17. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent necessary, adopted in Finding 17. Generally adopted in Finding 17. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent persuasive, these arguments are covered in Findings 16 and 17. Accepted in Finding 17. Adopted in Finding 4. Generally rejected as a recitation of testimony, and because the argument that Dr. Turner had not required Ms. Corderre to change records of diathermy is accepted, but the argument that Dr. Turner did not instruct Ms. Corderre to make some significant changes in E. M.'s record is rejected. The testimony is recounted in Finding 10. Rejected as unnecessary. What is significant is that Ms. Corderre changed records at the direction of the doctor, the exact nature of the change is not essential. See, Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary; any motivation Ms. Corderre might have had to be untruthful has been considered in evaluating her testimony. Rejected as unnecessary, any motivation Ms. Corderre might have had to be untruthful has been considered in evaluating her testimony. Rejected as unnecessary, any motivation Ms. Corderre might have had to be untruthful has been considered in evaluating her testimony. Accepted in that the only findings made with respect to Dr. Turner's conducts are made with respect to the records of E.M. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected. I have accepted most of the testimony of Ms. Corderre. Rejected as unnecessary. No "Taylor" case is at issue here. Rejected. See, especially Finding 9. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia Guilford, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Chiropractic 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Michael A. Mone', Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Elizabeth R. Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Harold M. Braxton, Esquire 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Suite 400 Miami, FL 33156-7115 Donald C. Dowling, Esquire 501 East Atlantic Avenue Delray Beach, FL 33483
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a licensed psychologist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number P4- 0002471 on March 5, 1982. Respondent has been in practice for approximately 16 years, and engages in educational and counseling psychology, rather than clinical or industrial psychology. He is also licensed by the Department of Education as a school psychologist. From October, 1984 until November 21, 1986, E. J. A. was one of Respondent's patients. She began counseling with him for marital problems she was having, and continued counseling with Respondent after her marriage ended in divorce. E. J. A. was a very conscientious patient who always kept her appointments, maintained complete written records of her dreams which she gave to Respondent at each appointment, and expressed no concerns or dissatisfaction about her two years of counseling with Respondent, except for the incident which she testified occurred during her last appointment on November 21, 1986. Up until the last appointment, she testified Respondent made no sexual overtures or improper suggestions. During her counseling, E. J. A. had come to trust Respondent, and had developed an informal, friendly patient-psychologist relationship. E. J. A. had an appointment with Respondent on October 16, 1986, which was without incident. By the middle of November, when he had not heard from her to set up another appointment, Respondent telephoned her at work and requested that she set up another appointment. She agreed and the appointment on November 21, 1986 was scheduled. The November 21 session consisted of a general discussion and review about her two years of counseling. E. J. A. was feeling at the time that she might be ready to end her counseling, although Respondent felt additional sessions, at longer intervals, would be advisable. Counseling sessions were 50 minutes in length, and the November 21 session was routine and without incident until the very end of the session when Respondent and E. J. A. were saying good- bye. As was their usual practice at the end of a session, they both stood up and hugged. According to E. J. A., Respondent then said he wanted her to meet, go out with and have sex with one of his male patients who was having premature ejaculation problems. She testified that Respondent described the male patient as a very good looking Latin man from a wealthy family of Brazilian or Venezuelan origin, who was at home from Purdue law school for the Thanksgiving holiday. E. J. A. testified she asked Respondent why he was asking her to do this, and her testimony was that he said she was a sensitive, caring person who could help this young man. At first she was flattered, and she told Respondent she would think about it and get back with him. She was not initially offended. However, she did not contact Respondent to pursue the matter, and after discussing this with her brother two weeks later, she testified she realized it was unprofessional and immoral, and therefore filed a complaint with Petitioner. Respondent's patient record for E. J. A., after two years of counseling, consists of one sheet of paper with pencil notes on the front and back, as well as statements of Account, some of which have been destroyed or are missing, containing simply the date of her visit, the charge and the same diagnosis on all statements of adult situational disorder with anxiety features. E. J. A.'s dream records which she kept and brought with her throughout counseling were thrown out by Respondent. He testified the dream records were of no value after they had been discussed during a session, and he routinely destroys such notes after discussing them with his patients. His explanation for his own failure to keep detailed patient records was that he had a very good memory and could recall all important matters without written notes. Further, he stated that at one time he had kept voluminous patient notations and found them to be useless. Respondent was interviewed by Petitioner's investigator on or about January 26, 1986 and cooperated fully. After having heard Respondent's testimony at hearing about that interview and his use of the phrase, "I don't recollect," in answer to several questions posed by Petitioner's investigator about his November 21, 1986 session with E. J. A., it is specifically found that Respondent did not admit asking her to have sex with a Latin male patient. Nothing in the record, including testimony about a subsequent meeting between E. J. A. and Respondent on February 1, 1987, constitutes an admission against interest by Respondent concerning this allegation. There is no evidence that Respondent had a Latin male patient, of Venezuelan or Brazilian origin, in November, 1986, nor that he had a Purdue law student as a patient at the time. Respondent denies having a patient that fits the description given by E. J. A.; nor was he counseling a patient with premature ejaculation problems at that time. Nothing in the record rebuts Respondent's apparently sincere denials. The only evidence of unprofessional conduct is E. J. A.'s testimony about the November 21 session, which Respondent has convincingly denied. Respondent has an outstanding reputation as a counseling psychologist in the community. He has counseled hundreds of patients referred to him by three practicing family law attorneys who testified at hearing, and none of those patients has ever expressed any complaints to their attorneys about Respondent. To the contrary, there has been an overwhelming expression of gratitude and satisfaction from these patients to the attorneys who referred them to Respondent. The same three practicing attorneys also testified to seeing Respondent on a professional basis for counseling, and stated their complete satisfaction with, and admiration for, Respondent. During counseling, they testified Respondent took few notes, but he had a complete and astonishing memory. Three medical doctors who have practiced with Respondent, as well as the Chairman of the Department of Rehabilitative Counseling at the University of South Florida, testified that Respondent is an excellent therapist who is conscientious, thorough, caring and highly professional. The deposition of a counseling psychologist who has known Respondent professionally for 16 years was introduced, and supports his reputation for competence and meeting community standards for the profession. After considering all of the evidence, as well as the demeanor of the witnesses and Respondent's excellent reputation in the community, it is found that he did not request E. J. A. to have sex with a male patient and report back to him. He did not commit any act upon his patient, E. J. A., which would constitute sexual misconduct or on consenting experimentation on a human subject. Petitioner presented the American Psychological Association's "Specialty Guidelines for the Delivery of Services by Clinical Psychologists" to establish that the patient records maintained by Respondent concerning E. J. A. were inadequate and failed to meet minimum standards of performance. However, the "Guidelines" specifically state that they "are meant to apply only to those psychologists who voluntarily wish to be designated as clinical psychologists. They do not apply to other psychologists." American Psychologist, Vol. 36, No. 6, p. 640. Since the "Guidelines" specifically guide the specialty practice of clinical psychology only, they are irrelevant to a counseling psychologist such as Respondent, particularly since Respondent has never held himself out as a clinical psychologist in any way. Therefore, Guideline 2.3.4., which requires clinical psychologists to retain patient records for from 3 to 15 years after completion of planned services or last contact, as well as other guidelines concerning patient records, are not relevant to Respondent's practice as a counseling psychologist. According to Dr. Sydney Merin, who was accepted as an expert in psychology, record keeping is always important. Patient records should contain an adequate representation of what went on in each session. Dr. Merin testified that all psychologists are expected to keep adequate patient records, and that Respondent's record on one sheet of paper for counseling with E. J. A. for two years, as well as incomplete Statements of Account, failed to meet minimum standards of performance because they were inadequate. E. J. A.'s dream notebooks had been destroyed, and there is no way to tell from E. J. A.'s records what was discussed, explored, revealed or found in two years of counseling. If Respondent were to die, leave the area, or discontinue his practice, E. J. A. would have no meaningful record of her extensive counseling with him. The testimony of Dr. Fred Dickman, introduced by Respondent by deposition, confirms the testimony of Dr. Merin concerning the importance of keeping adequate patient records. Further, Dr. Dickman testified that at a minimum he keeps a record of each date when he sees a patient, and at least a sentence about each session. Respondent failed to make any notes about what went on in his sessions with E.J.A., other than the date, the charge and diagnosis for insurance billing purposes. He failed to meet the community standard to keep notes of on- going therapy. Although Respondent produced the testimony of three psychiatrists, who were also qualified as experts in the supervision of psychologists, to state that his records for E. J. A. were adequate, this testimony is specifically outweighed by the testimony of Drs. Merin and Dickman since they are both psychologists and, therefore, their testimony is more relevant and persuasive concerning minimum standards of psychology than the testimony of psychiatrists. While these professions may be related, they are separate and distinct, and while adequate patient records of each session may not be required in the profession of psychiatry, they are required in the profession of psychology. Similarly, the testimony of Dr. Calvin Pinkard that the need for notekeeping is debatable is discounted as irrelevant because, although he is an expert in psychology, he was testifying about, and in the context of, teaching students studying to become mental health counselors, not psychologists.
Recommendation Based upon the forgoing, it is recommended that the Board of Psychological Examiners enter a Final Order publicly reprimanding Respondent for the violation of Sections 490.009(2)(q) and (s), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1988. APPENDIX (DOAH Case No. 87-5562) Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 3-4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2, but otherwise Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 7-8. Rejected in Findings of Fact 14, 15, 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 13, but Rejected in Findings of Fact 14-16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Rejected since this is a conclusion of law rather than a proposed finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura P. Gaffney, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Paul B. Johnson, Esquire P. O. Box 3416 Tampa, Florida 33601 Linda Biedermann Executive Director Board of Psychology Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.30 and Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a licensed physician in the State of Florida and holds license number ME 0043566. Respondent has never been the subject of a previous complaint from the Department of Professional Regulation (now the Department of Business and Professional Regulation). No patient involved in this proceeding incurred injury as a result of any procedure performed by Respondent or as a result of any medical record kept by Respondent, nor did any patient claim injury or make a complaint against Respondent. Respondent derived no financial gain from any act or omission alleged in the administrative complaint. All events pertaining to this proceeding occurred in 1987 or 1988. Prior to February 8, 1988, the effective date of Chapter 88-1, Laws of Florida, Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The following acts shall constitute grounds for which the disciplinary action specified in subsection (2) may be taken. * * * (m) Failing to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, including, but not limited to, patient histories, examination results, and test results. * * * (t) Gross or repeated malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The board shall give great weight to the provisions of s. 768.45 when enforcing this paragraph. As used in this paragraph, "repeated malpractice" includes, but is not limited to, three or more claims for medical malpractice within the previous 5-year period resulting in judgment or settlement and which incidents involved negligent conduct by the physician. As used in this paragraph, "gross malpractice" or "the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances", shall not be construed to require more than one instance, event, or act. Section 25 of Chapter 88-1, Florida Statutes, became effective February 8, 1988, and amended the pertinent provisions of Section 458.311(1), Florida Statutes, to read as follows: The following acts shall constitute grounds for which the disciplinary action specified in subsection (2) may be taken. * * * (m) Failing to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, including, but not limited to, patient histories, examination results, test results, records of drugs prescribed, dispensed, or administered, and reports of consultations and hospitalizations. * * * (t) Gross or repeated malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The board shall give great weight to the provisions of s. 768.45 when enforcing this paragraph. As used in this paragraph, "repeated malpractice" includes, but is not limited to, three or more claims for medical malpractice within the previous 5-year period resulting in judgment or settlement and which incidents involved negligent conduct by the physician. As used in this paragraph, "gross malpractice" or "the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances", shall not be construed to require more than one instance, event, or act. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to require that a physician be incompetent to practice medicine in order to be disciplined pursuant to this paragraph. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner had adopted no rules pertaining to the keeping of records by a licensed physician. Imperial Point Medical Center (Imperial Point) is a hospital located in Broward County, Florida. Unless otherwise indicated, all hospital records referred to in this matter are from Imperial Point. PATIENT #1 (C.S.) On August 8, 1988, Respondent performed an upper endoscopy on Patient #1, a male, who was 44 years old at the time of the procedure. This procedure was performed at Imperial Point on an outpatient basis. An upper endoscopy is the viewing of the mouth, the pharynx, the esophagus, the stomach and portions of the duodenum with a fiber optic instrument that allows direct visualization of the lining of these structures and allows therapeutic maneuvers. The records kept of this procedure performed on Patient #1 on August 8, 1988, include an outpatient hospital record entitled "Operative Report". The description of the procedure portion of this report includes the following: ". . . The gastric portion was infiltrated with 1:1,000 adrenaline . . ." Adrenaline, also known as epinephrine, is a vasoconstrictor that can be used to control minor bleeding and oozing. It is used regularly in gastroenterology to treat actively bleeding lesions or ulcers with evidence of recent bleeding prior to performing a more permanent type of hemostasis. Dr. Goldberg testified that epinephrine was usually injected into these areas by a needle. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that epinephrine should not be used in cases of trivial bleeding or oozing or after routine biopsies unless there is an imminent danger of a significant arterial bleed. The testimony of Dr. Cerda and Dr. Singh established that spraying epinephrine over an area that is subject to bleeding is a precautionary technique some gastroenterologists follow. Dr. Singh and Dr. Cerda have both either used this technique, or have observed its use by other physicians. The expert witnesses agreed that the injection by needle of epinephrine into the gastric wall would be a procedure that falls below an established standard of care. There was a dispute among the expert witnesses as to how the term "infiltrated" should be interpreted. Petitioner contends that the term "infiltrated" is synonymous with the term "injected", and that the medical records should be construed to mean that Respondent injected the gastric wall with a needle, and therefore practiced below the standard of care. This contention is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Goldberg. Respondent asserts that the medical record should be construed to mean that Respondent sprayed the gastric wall as a precautionary measure. This contention is consistent with the testimony of the expert witnesses who testified on behalf of the Respondent. This dispute is resolved by finding that the term "infiltrated" does not have the same meaning as the term "injected" and does not prove that Respondent injected Patient #1's gastric wall with a needle. This conclusion is based, in part, on the definition of the term "infiltrate" and on the context in which epinephrine is sometimes administered by gastroenterologists during this type procedure. According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, the term "infiltrate" means to pass a liquid or a gas into something through its interstices or to permeate with a liquid or gas passed through interstices. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, Twenty Sixth Edition (Dorland) has a similar definition of the term "infiltrate". According to Dorland, an "interstice" is small interval, space, or gap in a tissue or structure. According to Dorland, the term permeate means to penetrate or pass through, as through a filter. Also according to Dorland, the term inject means the act of forcing a liquid into a part, as into the subcutaneous, the vascular tree, or an organ. Based on these definitions, it is found that the use of the term "infiltrate" is more consistent with the practice of spraying epinephrine onto the gastric wall, and that the use of the term "infiltrate" does not prove that Respondent injected the epinephrine into the gastric wall with a needle. It is found that Petitioner failed to prove that the use of epinephrine was improper or that the manner in which Respondent used the epinephrine during the subject procedure was improper. Since Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent injected Patient #1 with epinephrine, its charge that Respondent failed to document his reasons for doing so must also fail. A pathology report dated August 8, 1988 contained in the medical file provided a pathological diagnosis as follows: "esophageal brushings: no evidence of malignancy." Brushings are the result of passing a small brush through the biopsy channel of an endoscope, rubbing it over an area of concern that might have either a malignancy or a fungal infection, taking the brush out of the scope, wiping it on a microscopic slide, and sending the slide to the pathologist for cytological examination. The reference to the "esophageal brushings" in the pathology report was error. The brushings taken from Patient #1 during the procedure on August 8, 1988, came from the stomach, a fact obvious to all of the expert witnesses in light of the operative report and operative drawing made by Respondent. Because Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent took esophageal brushings from Patient #1, its charge that he failed to properly document his reasons for doing so must also fail. 1/ Petitioner proved that Respondent's medical records, including his office notes as to Patient #1 failed to contain an adequate medical history for Patient #1 and failed to reflect the findings of any physical examination of Patient #1 by Respondent. Petitioner further proved that such failures fall below an established standard of care as alleged in Count Two of the Amended Administrative Complaint. PATIENT #2 (R.B.) Patient #2 was a 70 year old male seen by Respondent for a consultation because of the patient's history of hematemesis, which is the vomiting of blood. Respondent prepared a formal consultation note dated September 25, 1988. The consultation note contains a description of the patient's condition, references a rectal exam, which was positive for blood, and indicates that a physical examination of the patient was made. Respondent again saw the patient on September 27, 1988 and performed an upper endoscopy. Dr. Goldberg was critical of the medical records kept by Respondent as to this procedure and was of the opinion that the medical records were inadequate. Other, equally credible expert witnesses were of the opinion that the medical records provided sufficient information to document the procedure. While it may be concluded that Respondent's medical records could be improved, it is found that Petitioner failed to prove that the medical records pertaining to this patient were inadequate. It is further found that Petitioner failed to prove the standard by which the adequacy of medical records are to be judged, other than the pertinent statutory standards set forth above. The records kept of this procedure reflect that Respondent "infiltrated" Patient #2 with epinephrine. This is the identical dispute over the meaning of the term "infiltrated" that pertained to Patient #1 as discussed above. For the reasons given in resolving the dispute as it pertains to Patient #1, it is found that the term "infiltrated" does not have the same meaning as the term "injected" and that the use of the term does not prove that Respondent administered the epinephrine by injecting Patient #2 with a needle. It is found that Petitioner failed to prove that the use of epinephrine was improper or that the manner in which Respondent used the epinephrine during the subject procedure was improper. Since Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent injected Patient #2 with epinephrine, its charge that Respondent failed to document his reasons for doing so must also fail. PATIENT #3 (B.B.) Patient #3, a 65 year old female was admitted to Imperial Point with chest pains by her physician, a Dr. Fanfan. Patient #3 had a history of cancer which included the prior surgical removal of a tumor. On October 3, 1988, Respondent performed a colonoscopy of Patient #3. A colonoscopy is an examination of the colon from the anus to the ileocecal valve using a fiber optic instrument. A colonoscopy is indicated to evaluate abnormal X-rays, changes in bowel habits, evidence of bleeding, suspicions of inflammation, tumors, or polyps. Respondent adequately performed the procedure on Patient #3. The colonoscopy detected that Patient #3 had polyps. Subsequent laboratory results established that these were hyperplastic polyps that required no follow-up. Had the polyp been an adenomatous polyp, which is a true neoplasm with malignant potential, a follow-up for recolonoscopy would have been appropriate in one year. Prior to receiving the pathology reports, on the polyp, Respondent recommended a six month follow-up for the patient. This follow-up recommendation was appropriate at the time it was made. Petitioner failed to prove that the recommendation that a follow-up be performed was below an established standard of care. Petitioner failed to prove that the recommendation that the follow-up for this patient with a history of cancer be in six months as opposed to one year fell below an established standard of care. The barium enema for this patient was originally scheduled by the attending physician, Dr. Fanfan. Dr. Fanfan clearly wrote a note on the same day following Respondent's report of the colonoscopy that the barium enema was pending, yet the attending physician did not cancel the barium enema. There is no disagreement among the experts that the barium enema was unnecessary in light of the findings of the colonoscopy. It is medically unnecessary and inappropriate for both tests to be performed on the same day. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent was responsible for the patient once he began his consultation and that Respondent should have canceled the barium enema. Dr. Cerda, Dr. Eberly and Dr. Singh were of the opinion that the attending physician was responsible for scheduling the barium enema and that the attending physician or the radiologist should have canceled the barium enema. Dr. Eberly testified that as the primary care physician, the admitting physician is the "captain of the ship" and has the responsibility to make final determinations with respect to tests of this nature. Because of the conflicting testimony from equally credible expert witnesses, it is found that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated an established standard of care by not cancelling Patient #3's enema. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent's medical records pertaining to Patient #3 were inadequate. He had several criticisms of the records. Dr. Goldberg opined that there should have been a formal consultation note on Patient #3's chart that included past history, present illness, review of systems, allergies, pertinent laboratories, a thorough organ specific or system examination, an impression, an adequate discussion of the consultant's impression and the consultant's plans. He opined that the indications for Patient #3's procedure were inadequately dictated on the procedure notes and that Respondent's history pertaining to Patient #3 was inadequate because there was no pertinent review of systems or past history, no mention of the previous tumor, no mention of allergies, and an extremely scant examination. Other, equally credible expert witnesses were of the opinion that the medical records were adequate. It is found that Petitioner failed to prove the standard by which the adequacy of this patient's medical records are to be judged, other than the pertinent statutory standards set forth above. While it may be concluded that Respondent's medical records could be improved, it is found that Petitioner failed to prove that the medical records fell below an established standard of acceptability. PATIENT #4 (E.K.) On October 4, 1988, Patient #4, a 92 year-old female, was admitted to the hospital with an acute onset of vomiting, dehydration, and abdominal pain. Respondent was asked by Patient #4's attending physician to evaluate Patient #4 for a potential small bowel obstruction following an X-ray that was consistent with a small bowel obstruction. Respondent performed an upper endoscopy on Patient #4 on October 7, 1988. An obstruction of the intestines is a blockage in the large or small intestine. The bowel behind the blockage may become inflated with fluid or air and may be seen on X-ray. The obstruction may result from a variety of abnormalities. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that the upper endoscopy was contra- indicated and potentially dangerous to the patient because of the X-ray indicating a complete bowel obstruction. Dr. Goldberg was also of the opinion that an upper endoscopy should be used only under compelling circumstances if there is a partial bowel obstruction. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent did the right tests on Patient #4, but in the wrong order since he did not first rule out an obstruction. Prior to performing the upper endoscopy Respondent monitored the patient for several days. During that time period, examinations indicated that the patient was having bowel movements. Both the attending physician's notes, Respondent's notes, and the nurse's notes indicate positive bowel signs on October 5 and 6, indicating that there was not a complete bowel obstruction. Respondent ordered a Golytely preparation administered to the patient, which usually consists of one or two liters of non-absorbable solution that basically washes the bowel out. That preparation would have been improper with a complete bowel obstruction. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that the use of a Golytely prep in this patient was a gross judgment error. Dr. Singh was of the opinion that there was no contra-indication for using the preparation in this situation. Petitioner failed to prove that Patient #4 had a complete bowel obstruction or that the procedure, including the use of the Golytely preparation, violated an established standard of care. It is found that Respondent was acting within the scope of his discretion as the consulting physician to order the administration of the Golytely preparation and to perform the upper endoscopy. On October 11, 1988, Respondent performed a colonoscopy on Patient #4. Respondent stated on the operative report that the colonoscopy was indicated because of diverticulitis. Diverticulitis was not mentioned in any of Respondent's notes concerning Patient #4, and there was no notation as to the reasons Respondent thought the patient had diverticulitis. Although Respondent failed to document why he felt that diverticulitis was an appropriate indication for the colonoscope, there is no dispute that a colonoscope was, in fact, indicated. Further, the colonoscope established that the pretest diagnosis of possible diverticulitis was not incorrect. The colonoscopy revealed areas of colitis, and the pathology report noted an ulcer with acute and chronic inflammation. Respondent's experts testified that they were of the opinion that Respondent violated no established standard by listing diverticulitis as an indication for the colonoscopy. It is found that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent practiced below an established level in listing diverticulitis as an indication for the colonoscope. During the colonoscopy, Respondent found several mildly bleeding areas and infiltrated Patient #4 with epinephrine. For the reasons discussed pertaining to Patient #4, it is found that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated an established standard of care in administering epinephrine to Patient #4. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent's handwritten consultation report was inadequate. Dr. Goldberg bases his conclusion on the following observations. The report was difficult to read and failed to include any significant historical events concerning Patient #4. In his consultation report, the Respondent failed to note anything about having done a rectal examination on this patient, whether or not the abdomen was distended, and whether there were active or inactive bowel sounds. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that these findings would help to distinguish between an obstruction and an ileus or paralysis of the bowel. Dr. Goldberg was also of the opinion that the patient's records of the upper endoscopy performed October 7, 1998, fail to reveal any significant findings. Other, equally credible expert witnesses were of the opinion that the medical records were adequate. It is found that Petitioner failed to prove the standard by which the adequacy of medical records are to be judged, other than the pertinent statutory standards set forth above. While it may be concluded that Respondent's medical records could be improved, Petitioner failed to prove that the medical records fell below an established standard of acceptability. PATIENT #5 (J.T.) Patient #5, an 89 year-old male, was admitted to Imperial Point with a history of peptic ulcer disease and arthritis. This patient was seen by Respondent on a consulting basis. The patient was vomiting blood and Respondent was asked to see the patient to determine the source of the bleeding. Respondent performed an upper endoscopy on October 13, 1988, and found a significant outlet obstruction. On October 17, 1988, a G.I. series was performed and a repeat upper endoscopy and pyloric dilatation was performed. The procedures performed by Respondent were properly indicated and had a beneficial result to the patient. Back-to-back pyloric dilatations were appropriate and clinical judgment was properly exercised. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent failed to keep adequate written medical records pertaining to the upper endoscopy of October 13, 1988, in that Respondent's operative report failed to document Respondent's findings in detail. Dr. Goldberg testified that an essential endoscopy report that physicians are trained to do should include the following: indications for the procedure, medication used to sedate the patient, identification of instrument used, description of the anatomical landmarks and their condition as visualized by the physician passing the endoscope, the removal of the scope, the physician's impressions and what the physician plans to do about those impressions, how the patient tolerated the procedure and what the patient's condition was after the procedure, and that the patient was sent to the recovery area. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent failed to keep adequate written medical records pertaining to the procedures performed on this patient on October 17, 1988, in that Respondent's operative report did not document Respondent's findings in detail and did not indicate if the scope was passed through Patient #5's dilated pylorus into the duodenum. In Respondent's impressions on the second endoscopy, he noted pyloric stenosis and duodenal ulcer. In his procedure note Respondent does not mention whether he passed the scope into the duodenum or how he knew there was a duodenal ulcer. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent did not properly document what he did. On October 18, 1988, Respondent performed a repeat pyloric dilation on Patient #5. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent failed to record the reasons for the second procedure and to document his findings. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that the third endoscopy note did not adequately detail the examinations of the esophagus and stomach. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that every procedure note stands alone, and that if a physician does an endoscopy on day one and repeats it on day two, the physician still must make that report complete because it is not always going to be part of a document. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent's records did not stand alone. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent's handwritten consultation note was sketchy and should have contained a history of allergies because of the need to give the patient medications for sedation. Dr. Goldberg's criticisms of Respondent's medical records do not prove that the medical records kept by Respondent were inadequate as measured by an established standard. Other, equally credible expert witnesses were of the opinion that the medical records provided sufficient information to document the procedures and that the records were adequate. While it may be concluded that Respondent's medical records could be improved, it is found that Petitioner failed to prove that the medical records were inadequate. It is further found that Petitioner failed to prove the standard by which the adequacy of medical records are to be judged, other than the pertinent statutory standards set forth above. PATIENT #6 (D.Y.) From October 19, 1988, until October 22, 1988, Respondent was consulting physician to Patient #6, a 72 year-old male, who was admitted to Imperial Point with rectal bleeding. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent failed to keep adequate written medical records pertaining to Patient #6 because a formal consultation note was lacking. The medical records which were reviewed by Dr. Goldberg were incomplete when reviewed by him. A specific reference is made to a consultation note that is not contained in the hospital records. Respondent established that other medical records were missing from the hospital records. In light of the specific reference to the consultation note, it is found that the absence of this consultation note from the hospital records is insufficient to prove that there existed no consultation note. On October 20, 1988, Respondent performed an colonoscopy on this patient and a biopsy was taken in the segmental descending colon area. The colonoscopy could not be completed because the colonoscopy could not pass to the patient's cecum. The following recommendation was made by Respondent (the original is in all capital letters): IN VIEW OF NOT REACHING TO THE CECUM, THE PATIENT WOULD NEED BE (this is an abbreviation for barium enema) AND ALSO IF EVERYTHING IS NEGATIVE, RECOLONOSCOPY IN ONE YEAR AND IF THERE ARE ANY CHANGES IN THE BIOPSY OF THE POLYP, THEN ACCORDINGLY WILL PLAN. On October 21, 1988, the follow-up barium enema was performed by Dr. Nicholas M. Arfaras, a radiologist. The radiology report reflected the following finding: "Also in the sigmoid there is an approximately 1 cm. rounded filling defect identified near the junction with the descending colon. This is felt to be secondary to a polyp." The possible polyp detected by the barium enema should have been followed up. However, it was not established that Respondent was consulted by the attending physician about the results of the barium enema. Dr. Lipton, as the attending physician, would have had the responsibility for following up the recommendations made by Respondent and for bringing Respondent or another gastroenterologist in for further consultations following the barium enema if Dr. Lipton had believed it necessary to do so. This patient was discharged from Imperial Point by Dr. Lipton on October 22, 1988. The final page of the discharge summary for this patient reflected the following notation: "Condition was improved. The patient is to have a follow up in one week in the office with Dr. Lipton and with Dr. Gupta in two weeks." The evidence presented in this proceeding, including Respondent's office notes, does not reflect that Respondent had any involvement with this patient after October 21, 1988, until 1990, when he performed on the patient at North Broward Medical Center a procedure described as a "multiple colonoscopy with multiple biopsies and cauterization." This procedure in 1990 revealed multiple polyps. The polyp removed on colonoscopy in 1988 was an adenomatous polyp, a polyp with significant malignant potential. This patient needed a follow-up colonoscopy in one year. Respondent was the consulting physician and recommended reevaluation of the patient in one year. Follow-up care was not the responsibility of Respondent, but of the treating physician. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent failed to keep adequate written medical records in that Respondent failed to adequately document the indications for the colonoscopy performed on Patient #6 and why the colonoscope could not be passed to Patient #6's cecum. Dr. Goldberg opined that a physician doing a colonoscopy needs to tell why he did not get to the cecum so that the next physician colonoscoping this patient can take appropriate precautions. Other, equally credible expert witnesses were of the opinion that the medical records were adequate and provided sufficient information to document the procedures that were performed. Petitioner failed to prove that the medical records were inadequate. Petitioner failed to prove the standard by which the adequacy of medical records are to be judged, other than the pertinent statutory standards set forth above. PATIENT #7 (C.R.) Respondent was a consulting physician to Patient #7, a 64 year old male who was hospitalized with rectal bleeding. Respondent saw this patient because of a possible colonic fistula, which is a connection with any piece of the intestine and some other structure. Respondent recommended a barium small bowel X-ray and a barium enema, both appropriate clinical recommendations. On November 11, 1987, Respondent performed a colonoscopy on Patient #7. Petitioner contends that Respondent failed to keep adequate written medical records pertaining to the aforementioned procedure in that Respondent failed to document an adequate history as an indication of Patient #7's colonoscopy. This contention is rejected based on the testimony of Dr. Singh. The medical records provide adequate justification for the procedure. Dr. Goldberg was critical of Respondent's records pertaining to this patient and considered the records inadequate. He was of the opinion that the records should have better detailed his findings and should have recorded any follow-up plans for a repeat colonoscopy on the patient. Other, equally credible expert witnesses were of the opinion that the medical records were adequate and provided sufficient information to document the procedures that were performed. Petitioner failed to prove that the medical records were inadequate. Petitioner failed to prove the standard by which the adequacy of medical records are to be judged, other than the pertinent statutory standards set forth above.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order which finds that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, by failing to provide a history or physical examination for Patient #1 as alleged in Count Two, which reprimands Respondent for that violation, and which imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00 against the Respondent for that violation. It is further recommended that all other charges against Respondent contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1993.
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of charges set forth in a three-count Administrative Complaint. The Administrative Complaint charges the Respondent with violations of paragraphs (m), (q), and (t) of Section 458.331(1) Florida Statutes.1
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent, Donald A. Tobkin, M.D., has been licensed, and continues to be licensed, to practice medicine in the State of Florida. His license number is 30942.5 Sometime during the month of December 2004, the Police Department of Hollywood, Florida, (HPD) received information from a confidential informant that the Respondent was soliciting drug-prescribing business and was writing inappropriate and excessive prescriptions for controlled substances. On the basis of that information, the HPD initiated an undercover operation to investigate the information received from the confidential informant. As part of the undercover investigation, on the evening of January 20, 2005, at approximately 9:56pm, an HPD female detective named Nicole Coffin made a telephone call to the Respondent's telephone. The Respondent answered the telephone and identified himself by name. Detective Coffin pretended to be a person named Melissa Beech. She pretended to be a person who was seeking to obtain OxyContin, which is a Schedule II controlled substance. During the entire undercover investigation, Detective Coffin pretended to be a drug-seeker while interacting with the Respondent. On the telephone she told the Respondent that she wanted a prescription for OxyContin and also told the Respondent that a girl somewhere on Federal Highway had given her the Respondent's card and had told her she could call the Respondent if she needed a prescription. Detective Coffin, in her role as Melissa Beech, did not initially describe any medical complaint to the Respondent; she just said she wanted a prescription for OxyContin. In response to the request for a prescription for OxyContin, the Respondent told the make-believe drug-seeker that he could provide the requested prescription, but that they would have to have a "medical reason" for such a prescription. The Respondent then asked the make-believe drug-seeker if she had ever been in an automobile accident. The make-believe drug-seeker answered "yes," because that is the answer she thought would provide a basis for a "medical reason." The Respondent then proceeded to ask the make-believe drug-seeker a long series of leading questions which, if answered "yes," could provide the appearance of a "medical reason" for the requested prescription for OxyContin. This series of questions was for the purpose of establishing a contrived "medical reason" for the prescription sought by the make-believe drug-seeker. There never was, and there never appeared to be, any real "medical reason" for the prescription sought by the make-believe drug-seeker. The sole purpose for the many questions asked by the Respondent, and for the Respondent's written notations related to those questions, was to create the illusion, or the false impression, that there was a "medical reason' for the prescription when, in fact, there was no such reason. The detective who was pretending to be a drug-seeker answered "yes" to all of the leading questions asked by the Respondent. She answered "yes," even when that was not a truthful answer, because she was trying to give the answers she thought the Respondent wanted to hear.6 The Respondent's leading questions included questions asking about such things as whether the make-believe drug-seeker had ever had an automobile accident, whether she had suffered a herniated disk as a result of that accident, whether she had had an MRI, whether she had had any subsequent accidents, whether she had tried any other drugs to relieve pain, whether she had used Oxycontin in the past, and whether in the past the Oxycontin had relieved her pain. During the course of the first telephone conversation between Detective Coffin and the Respondent a number of significant matters were not discussed. The Respondent did not discuss the possibility of surgical treatments to treat the back pain described in response to the Respondent's questions. The Respondent did not discuss the necessity of reviewing the MRI or X-rays that supposedly would confirm the "herniated disc" he had inquired about. The Respondent did not discuss the necessity of obtaining future MRIs, X-rays, or other diagnostic tests to evaluate the "severe back pain" supposedly described by Detective Coffin in her role as Melissa Beech. The Respondent did not mention that she would need to have any follow-up visits with the Respondent. During the course of the first conversation between Detective Coffin and the Respondent, she told the Respondent that she had previously been obtaining Oxycontin "off the street" and that she was seeking a prescription from the Respondent because her street source had "dried up." She also told him that she had previously taken Valium and Percocet. During the course of the first telephone conversation Detective Coffin, pretending to be a drug-seeker, told the Respondent that she suffered from back pain as a result of the make-believe automobile accidents. She did not say that she was currently experiencing pain at the time of that telephone conversation. During the first telephone conversation the Respondent did not ask the make-believe drug-seeker any questions about her menstrual cycle, about whether she was pregnant, or about whether she had had any prior pregnancies or had ever had any children. However, in his written notes the Respondent included notations that purport to be answers to those unasked questions. Similarly, the Respondent did not ask the make-believe drug-seeker any questions about her consumption of alcohol, but included in his notes notations that purport to memorialize the answer to that unasked question. The Respondent's "history" notes also report that he warned the make-believe drug-seeker that OxyContin tablets should not be crushed or broken, even though he did not include any such warning in his telephone conversation with the make-believe drug-seeker. During the first telephone conversation, Detective Coffin was never asked about, and never provided any information about, whether other physicians had either prescribed OxyContin for her or had refused to prescribe OxyContin for her. The only prior sources of OxyContin she mentioned to the Respondent were non-prescription illegal sources on the street. The Respondent never discussed with Detective Coffin the possibility or necessity of a more structured medical treatment plan for addiction. The Respondent never discussed with Detective Coffin the possibility or necessity of a more structured medical treatment plan to treat a complaint of "severe pain." During the course of the first telephone conversation, the Respondent agreed to provide a prescription to the make- believe drug-seeker for a total of sixty-two 80-milligram OxyContin tablets. It was agreed that the make-believe drug- seeker would pay $100.00 for the first prescription and that the Respondent would provide similar prescriptions in the future for $50.00 per prescription. Towards the end of the first telephone conversation the Respondent told the make-believe drug-seeker that he had another matter to attend to and that she should call him later to arrange the time and place for the two of them to meet later that same evening. During the course of the first telephone conversation, which lasted for approximately 14 minutes, the Respondent made written notes of the answers given by the make-believe drug-seeker. Those notes were prepared in such a manner as to resemble the types of notes customarily made by physicians who are making a medical record of information elicited from a patient. A number of the details recorded in the Respondent's notes of the first telephone conversation were inconsistent with the information provided by the make-believe drug-seeker. Specifically, those notes contained a significant amount of information that was never uttered by the make-believe drug- seeker. The fictitious and false history details memorialized in the Respondent's notes are intentional falsehoods. Later that evening, at approximately 12:20am on January 21, 2005, Detective Coffin, still pretending to be the drug-seeking person named Melissa Beech, placed a second telephone call to the Respondent. She spoke with the Respondent for about three minutes on this occasion. Most of the second conversation consisted of providing the Respondent with information about the location where Detective Coffin would be waiting for him and information about where the Respondent should park when he arrived. Law enforcement officers of the HPD attempted to record both of the telephone conversations between the Respondent and Detective Coffin. Both of those attempts were unsuccessful. There is no recording of either of the telephone conversations. Sometime later that evening, during the early morning hours of January 21, 2005, the Respondent met the make-believe drug-seeker at the motel or efficiency apartment. He entered the room where the make-believe drug-seeker was pretending to be staying. Prior to his arrival, two cameras had been concealed in the room by the HPD police officers. During the entire time the Respondent was in the room the two cameras were attempting to record everything he said and everything he did, as well as everything said or done by the detective pretending to be the drug-seeking person named Melissa Beech. After entering the room, the Respondent spoke with the make-believe drug-seeker and asked her additional questions related to her request for a prescription for OxyContin. He made some written notes that purported to be summaries of her answers. During the course of the meeting with the make-believe drug-seeker the Respondent provided her with a document titled "Patient's Acknowledgement," which she signed, but did not read. That document contained information about the patient-physician relationship, about what was expected of the patient, and also memorialized the patient's informed consent to the treatment she was requesting from the Respondent. The Respondent also conducted a brief physical examination of the make-believe patient and made written notes that purported to be a memorialization of what he had observed during the course of his examination. The Respondent's examination of the make-believe drug-seeker included the following: check of pulse and blood pressure, check of reflex responses at several joints, and check of chest sounds with stethoscope. The Respondent performed a deep tendon reflex test on Detective Coffin by striking her wrists, elbows, and knees with a medical hammer. Detective Coffin's feet remained on the floor during this test. A deep tendon reflex test cannot be performed properly with the subject's feet touching the floor. Such a test performed in such a manner will not produce reliable results. The Respondent indicated in his written notes that he had examined Detective Coffin's head, eyes, ears, nose, and throat. However, the Respondent did not perform any examination at all of Detective Coffin's head, ears, nose, or throat. The Respondent perhaps performed a partial examination of Detective Coffin's eyes, but did not perform an adequate examination of her eyes. The Respondent indicated in his written notes that Detective Coffin's pupils were equal, round, and reactive to light and accommodation. However, the Respondent did not conduct any examination of Detective Coffin's eyes that was sufficient to support a conclusion that they were equal, round, and reactive to light and accommodation. The Respondent included in his written notes that Detective Coffin's chest and lungs were clear to auscultation and percussion. The Respondent did not examine Detective Coffin in a manner that could determine whether her chest and lungs were clear to auscultation and percussion. Therefore, the Respondent did not have any basis for writing that the detective's chest and lungs were clear to auscultation and percussion. The Respondent included in his written notes an observation that Detective Coffin's abdomen was soft. The Respondent never touched or otherwise examined Detective Coffin's abdomen. The Respondent had no factual basis for writing that Detective Coffin's abdomen was soft. In his written notes the Respondent indicated that Detective Coffin experienced pain upon lifting her leg thirty degrees. Detective Coffin never raised either leg in the Respondent's presence and never complained of pain in his presence. There was no factual basis for the subject notation. The Respondent never conducted a Rhomberg examination on Detective Coffin, but he included in his written notes an observation that a Rhomberg test was negative. There was no factual basis for such a notation. The Respondent included in his written notes an observation that he had examined Detective Coffin's gait. However, the Respondent never performed an adequate and sufficient examination of Detective Coffin's gait. The Respondent did not conduct a range of motion test of Detective Coffin. The Respondent never asked Detective Coffin to lift her leg towards her chest. Nor did he ask her to touch her toes. The Respondent never asked her to manipulate her body in any way. At no time during the encounter between Detective Coffin and the Respondent did Detective Coffin state that she was experiencing pain. At no time during that encounter did she behave or move in any manner that would suggest she was experiencing pain. To the contrary, Detective Coffin crossed and uncrossed her legs, alternatively slouched and sat up straight in her chair, and made other movements that would indicate to a reasonable prudent physician that she was not experiencing any pain at all. The Respondent never discussed with Detective Coffin the necessity of obtaining further MRIs, X-rays, or other forms of diagnostic testing. He never discussed any need to obtain and review any prior medical records. The Respondent never asked Detective Coffin to sign a medical records release document that would have authorized the Respondent to obtain prior medical records. The Respondent's written notations regarding his examination of the make-believe drug-seeker contain false information because, among other things, the notations contain the results of tests and examinations the Respondent did not perform. Such false notations are intentional falsehoods. The Respondent never discussed with Detective Coffin the need for a follow-up appointment. The Respondent never asked Detective Coffin for any form of identification. Under the circumstances presented in this case, a reasonable prudent physician would have performed a range of motion test and a leg-raising test, neither of which were performed by the Respondent. Under the circumstances presented in this case, a reasonably prudent physician would have established a treatment plan that would have included a schedule for follow-up visits, a review of prior medical records, and plans for future diagnostic tests. The Respondent did not establish any type of treatment plan. The prescription provided to Detective Coffin was inappropriate, unjustified, and excessive because the physical examination was inadequate, the medical record was falsified, and the patient never exhibited any sign of being in pain. Under the circumstances presented in this case, the Respondent's act of providing a prescription to a total stranger with no medical justification for doing so was an action taken other than in the course of the Respondent's professional practice. Ultimately, the Respondent wrote and delivered a prescription to the make-believe patient. The prescription was for sixty-two 80-milligram tablets of OxyContin. This was a 31- day supply if the OxyContin was taken as directed; one tablet every 12 hours. The Respondent wrote several warnings at the bottom of the prescription document. The warnings included such things as the fact that OxyContin impairs driving ability and may cause drowsiness, loss of balance, and/or loss of coordination. The Respondent also wrote on the prescription: "Must swallow whole and do not crush or break." Other law enforcement officers of the HPD were listening to and observing the events inside the room. Shortly after the Respondent handed the prescription to the make-believe patient and received the one hundred dollars from her, other law enforcement officers rushed into the room, arrested the Respondent, and seized various items of the Respondent's personal property, including the medical record he had been preparing regarding his care and treatment of the make-believe patient. With regard to obtaining information about the characteristics of, and the proper use of, specific drugs, medical doctors customarily rely on the information contained in the Physician Desk Reference (PDR) and on the information contained in the manufacturer's package insert that often accompanies a drug. The package insert for OxyContin includes the following information: (Following an initial caption reading WARNING) OxyContin Tablets are a controlled-release oral formulation of oxycodone hydrochloride indicated for the management of moderate to severe pain when a continuous, around-the- clock analgesic is needed for an extended period of time. * * * (Following caption reading CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY) Oxycodone is a pure agonist opioid whose principal therapeutic action is analgesia. *** With pure opioid agonist analgesics, there is no defined maximum dose; the ceiling to analgesic effectiveness is imposed only by side effects, the more serious of which may include somnolence and respiratory depression. * * * As with all opioids, the minimum effective plasma concentration for analgesia will vary widely among patients, especially among patients who have been previously treated with potent agonist opioids. As a result, patients must be treated with individualized titration of dosage to the desired effect. The minimum effective analgesic concentration of oxycodone for any individual patient may increase over time due to an increase in pain, the development of a new pain syndrome and/or the development of analgesic tolerance. * * * OxyContin Tablets are associated with typical opioid-related adverse experiences. There is a general relationship between increasing oxycodone plasma concentration and increasing frequency of dose-related opioid adverse experiences such as nausea, vomiting, CNS effects, and respiratory depression. In opioid-tolerant patients, the situation is altered by the development of tolerance to opioid-related side effects, and the relationship is not clinically relevant. As with all opioids, the dose must be individualized . . . because the effective analgesic dose for some patients will be too high to be tolerated by other patients. (Following caption reading WARNINGS) OxyContin 80 mg and 160 mg Tablets ARE FOR USE IN OPIOID-TOLERANT PATIENTS ONLY. These tablet strengths may cause fatal respiratory depression when administered to patients not previously exposed to opioids. * * * Concerns about abuse, addiction, and diversion should not prevent the proper management of pain. The development of addiction to opioid analgesics in properly managed patients with pain has been reported to be rare. However, data are not available to establish the true incidence of addiction in chronic pain patients.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case to the following effect: Dismissing Counts One and Two of the Administrative Complaint; Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of having violated Section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count Three of the Administrative Complaint; and Imposing a penalty consisting of an administrative fine in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) and the revocation of the Respondent's license to practice medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2006.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed as an osteopathic physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number OS-0001053 in 1954. According to Respondent's office records for a patient named Barry Belikoff, Respondent saw Belikoff in his office on twenty-five (25) occasions between September 5, 1980, and July 24, 1981, and during this time wrote twenty-four (24) prescriptions for a total of 344 Quaaludes (Methaqualone) with a dosage of 300 mg. each. According to his patient records, Respondent also saw Belikoff on thirteen (13) occasions between October 31, 1981 and June 18, 1982 and wrote four (4) prescriptions for controlled substances, including Talwin, Restoril, and Percodan. Respondent was treating Belikoff for back pains and insomnia. According to expert testimony, the records kept by Respondent of this patient's office visits were inadequate and do not provide the required documentation which would support and explain the controlled substances prescribed in this case. In addition, a proper course of patient care would not include the on-going prescription of Quaaludes over almost a one year period at a rate of over one a day without a record of additional tests, x-rays, or neurological exams during this period. Belikoff's patient records do not show any such additional tests, x- rays or exams. Without such documentation in the patient's records, the prescriptions for controlled substances written by Respondent for Belikoff were without medical justification, excessive and inappropriate, according to expert testimony. Respondent was treating a patient named Lyndon Ellis during 1981 and 1982. Ellis was hospitalized on four occasions while under Respondent's care, and according to expert testimony the level of care and medical records for this patient, while hospitalized, were excellent. As a result of office visits by Ellis, Respondent wrote thirty-eight (38) prescriptions for controlled substances between April 20, 1981 and September 29, 1982 which included Percocet 5, Demerol, and Fiorinal. Ellis was being treated by Respondent for chronic headaches and pain from accident injuries, and also for a problem with his toe. However, according to expert testimony, the records kept by Respondent on Ellis' office visits were inadequate and do not provide documentation which would support and explain the controlled substances prescribed in this case. The absence of a thorough patient medical history, exam, evaluation, x- rays and lab tests in this patient's office records is explained by Respondent by the fact that this information was available in hospital records for this patient. Nevertheless, Respondent's office records for Ellis are totally inadequate. These office records do reflect that Respondent was aware of Ellis' overuse of controlled substances and the need to detoxify this patient on October 29, 1982. Yet he prescribed Percocet, a controlled substance, on five additional occasions after October 29, 1982. Without adequate documentation in the patient's records, the prescriptions for controlled substances written by Respondent for Ellis were without medical justification, excessive and inappropriate, according to expert testimony. Between July 14, 1980 and April 23, 1982, Respondent treated a patient named Alan Fogler. During this time Respondent wrote twelve (12) prescriptions for a total of 464 Percodan, a controlled substance. Respondent was treating Fogler for headaches, whiplash and a concussion reported by the patient, as well as allergies, but patient records reveal no x- rays, brain scans, lab work or neurological exams. According to expert testimony, patient records in this case are inadequate and do not justify the treatment rendered which consisted primarily of prescriptions for Percodan. Without adequate patient medical records, the prescriptions for controlled substances were without- medical justification, excessive and inappropriate, accordingly to expert testimony. While treating patients Belikoff, Ellis and Fogler, Respondent repeatedly reissued prescriptions for controlled substances without a substantiation of medical reasons in the patients' office medical records. According to expert testimony concerning the standards expected of osteopathic physicians in keeping office medical records on patients, Respondent did not perform with reasonable skill, nor meet the standards expected of physicians in this aspect of their practice. Vicki Cutcliffe, a deputy sheriff with the Broward County Sheriff's Office, saw Respondent in his office on March 30, April 11 and April 25, 1984 using the alias "Vicki Tarra". After taking a brief medical history which revealed that "Tarra" used alcohol daily, Respondent began treating her for situational anxiety by prescribing controlled substances, including Librium and Tranxene. On April 25 "Tarra" told Respondent she wanted some extra pills for her friend named Jo Ann and asked him to write her friend a prescription. Respondent said he could not do that, but did give "Tarra" a prescription for Tranxene and two refills, after initially giving her a prescription which allowed for only one refill. He told her that she could give some of the pills to her friend and then she could refill the prescription twice. Respondent knew that "Tarra" wanted the extra pills for a friend and that she would give them to her friend who was not a patient of Respondent. According to expert testimony, the treatment given to "Tarra" by Respondent, which consisted simply of prescriptions for controlled substances without adequate documentation of the reasons for this course of treatment in the patient's medical records, was totally inappropriate. Increasing a prescription when a patient says they want some extra pills for a friend is never justified and constitutes malpractice, according to expert testimony.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing it is recommended that a Final Order be issued suspending Respondent's license for a period of two ( 2) years. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of September, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 3 2301 (904) 488- 9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie A. Daniel, Esq. Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 John W. Gaul, D.O. 11360 Tara Drive Plantation, FL 33325 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 ================================================================ =
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the State of, Florida having been issued license No. 0033496. Respondent's address is 133 Darnell Avenue, Spring Hill, Florida 33626. Respondent rendered medical care and treatment to patient B.R. during the period July 11, 1985 to July 15, 1985 while she was a patient at the Oak Hill Community Hospital, Spring Hill, Florida for, among other things, acute transmural myocardial infarction. On or about July 15, 1985, patient B.R. died from acute myocardial infarction after resuscitative procedures were unsuccessful. Patient B.R. was brought to the emergency room at Oak Hill Community Hospital on July 11, 1985 by her husband after complaining of chest pains. Shortly after arrival she suffered a myocardial infarction and "coded." She was resuscitated and placed in the intensive care unit. As the medical services physician on call, Respondent was contacted and assumed the care of patient B.R., a 65 year old female. Respondent is Board-certified in internal medicine and is Board eligible in cardiology having completed a fellowship in cardiology at George Washington University in 1968. B.R. had formerly worked as a licensed practical nurse who suffered a back injury some years ago which resulted in back surgery three times. In 1978, some 10 years before her demise, B.R. suffered a heart attack. She also had a history of diabetes and recently had undergone a thyroidectomy. With this medical history she presented a complex case for care and treatment. With patient presenting the history and symptoms of B.R., a reasonably prudent physician would have ordered daily chest X-rays, had an echocardiagram taken, inserted a Swan-Ganz catheter and consulted with a cardiologist on the treatment of this patient. None of these were done by Respondent. While acknowledging those procedures above listed were clearly indicated, Respondent testified he suggested those procedures to B.R. but, while she was fully competent to understand his recommendation, B.R. refused to be further X-rayed, refused the echocardiagram because she thought it produced some type of nuclear radiation, and also specifically refused to have any tubes inserted in her veins which would result if the Swan-Ganz catheter was inserted. None of the patient's refusals to accept recommended procedures was charted in B.R.'s hospital records. Respondent testified that B.R. specifically directed him to not chart on her hospital record her refusal to undergo the test and procedures recommended by Respondent. Respondent further testified that following her refusal to undergo the test and procedures and under directions to him not to chart those refusals on the hospital chart, he put this history in his office notes. To corroborate thin testimony Respondent presented Exhibit 5, a copy of those office notes containing entries dated July 12, 13, 14, 15, and 23, August 13, September 26, December 13, 1985 and January 29, 1986, comprising 4 typewritten pages. While a patient has a absolute right to refuse treatment or procedures recommended by his/her physician, the patient does not have the right to direct the physician to prepare an incomplete record of his treatment and progress. The principal purpose of the chart is to record medical evidence of the patient's condition, treatment rendered and results obtained to provide a history from which another physician can, if necessary, adequately take over the care of the patient. The record also provides a history of the patient's response to treatment. Respondent's explanation that if he had expected to be away and another physician had to take over the care and treatment of B.R. he would have made the other physician aware of B.R.'s refusal to undergo the recommended procedures totally failed to satisfy the need for a complete record of the patient in one place. To prove the validity of the office notes as a "business record," Respondent testified that for the past 30 years he has maintained office notes in which he has placed information the patient didn't want in the hospital record. An expert witness in the field of questioned documents testified that each dated entry on Exhibit 5 was typed following a new insertion of the paper in the typewriter rather than all entries being typed at the same time or with the same insertion of the paper in the typewriter and this was consistent with what would be expected in normal office procedures. Respondent's office manager and secretary during the times reported on Exhibit 5 testified she was the one who normally transcribed Respondent's dictated notes, that Exhibit 5 was consistent with the normal office practice which would be to date the entries when they were typed, and, although she does not specifically recall typing each entry on Exhibit 5, they were probably all typed by her. Evidence questioning the validity of Respondent's testimony that the office notes were dictated contemporaneously with his treatment of B.R. and typed on the dates indicated included the testimony of the husband of B.R. that B.R. had a zest for life and it would be contrary to her nature to refuse certain procedures or consultations; the fact that on July 14, 1985 B.R. was intubated with the Respondent present; that there was no financial consideration involved as B.R. was adequately insured; the office manager and secretary of Respondent during the period the office notes are alleged to have been prepared is the daughter of Respondent; and the fact that at the peer review committee inquiry into the facts surrounding the death of B.R., Respondent never mentioned the existence of office notes although he was extensively questioned regarding his failure to maintain a more complete medical record in this case. From the foregoing it is found that B.R.'s refusal to submit to the procedures allegedly recommended by Respondent were not contemporaneously recorded in Respondent's office notes and Exhibit 5 was prepared after Respondent appeared before the hospital peer review committee if not also after the administrative complaint was filed in this case.
