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BOARD OF DENTISTRY vs. RONALD FRIEDENSOHN, 82-002094 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002094 Latest Update: Dec. 03, 1982

The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, based on conduct set forth hereinafter, has engaged in conduct violative of Section 466.028(1)(o) and Section 455.241(1), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint. 2/ Upon consideration of the Administrative Complaint filed herein, the Request for Admissions propounded to the Petitioner by the Respondent on August 24, 1982, the arguments of counsel, and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following:

Findings Of Fact By its Administrative Complaint filed herein dated July 7, 1982, the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Dentistry (Petitioner herein), seeks to suspend, revoke, or take other disciplinary action against Ronald Friedensohn, D.M.D., a licensed dentist in the State of Florida who has been issued license No. DN0007254. The Administrative Complaint contained two counts. Count I of the Administrative Complaint charged Respondent with violating Section 466.028(1)(o), Florida Statutes, for failing to make available to a patient, copies of the patient's records. Count II of the Administrative Complaint, as amended, charged Respondent with a violation of Section 455.241(1), Florida Statutes, due to an alleged refusal to release a patient's records to that patient until a disputed fee was paid, and thereby violated Section 466.028(1)(bb), Florida Statutes. On August 24, 1982, Respondent propounded a Request for Admissions to the Petitioner requesting that the Petitioner admit or deny the following within 30 days of service: Mrs. Barbara Ruderman has never made a formal request, herself, to Dr. Ronald Friedensohn for her x-rays and dental records pursuant to Florida Statute 455.241. An authorized legal representative has never requested, from Dr. Friedensohn, Mrs. Ruderman's records or x-rays. The only individual ever to request Mrs. Ruderman's x-rays and records was her husband, Morton Ruderman. Mr. Morton Ruderman, her husband, is not a duly appointed legal representative of Mrs. Ruderman. Petitioner failed to respond to the Request for Admissions within the 30-day period. However, the Petitioner did respond to the Request for Admissions on October 12, 1982, denying all admissions. In this regard, the Petitioner did not request an extension, nor was one provided to Petitioner, to respond to the Request for Admissions. Likewise, the Petitioner did not file any objections to the Request for Admissions within the appropriate time period. At the outset of the hearing, Respondent's counsel filed an ore tenus motion for a ruling, from the undersigned, to have deemed as admitted the admissions propounded to the Petitioner on August 24, 1982.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed herein, as amended at the hearing, against Ronald Friedensohn, D.M.D., shall be DISMISSED in its entirety, with prejudice. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of December, 1982, at Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1982.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57466.028
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. JOSEPH F. SCIOLI, JR., 83-003040 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003040 Latest Update: Jun. 26, 1984

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a registered residential contractor having been issued license number RR 0040275. In approximately 1980, Respondent entered into a contract to erect a screen room for a Mr. Lewis. Under the terms of the contract, Respondent was to obtain the necessary building permit. After the contract had been signed, Respondent's grandfather died, and Respondent therefore went to New Jersey. He left the permit application with his qualifying agent to sign and process through the building department. When Respondent returned from New Jersey approximately 30 to 35 days later, he went to the Lewis job site and found the project almost completed. Respondent did not check to ascertain if the permit had been obtained, but rather completed the screen room himself. Lewis subsequently contacted Respondent to say that he had received a notice of violation from the building department for erecting a screen room without a permit. Respondent contacted the building department and advised that it was not Lewis's fault, but rather that it was Respondent's responsibility to pull the permit. Respondent was charged with unlawfully erecting a screen room without a permit; he appeared in court and pled guilty; and he paid a $250 fine pursuant to the adjudication of guilt entered on April 20, 1981, in the County Court in and for Dade County, Florida, in Case No. 81-50438. On June 24, 1981, Respondent submitted to the Construction Industry Licensing Board a Contractor's Registration application. On that application, Respondent answered in the negative the following question: "Has any person named in (i) below ever been convicted of any offense in this state or elsewhere other than traffic violations?" At the time Respondent gave that answer, he believed it to be true. He understood the question to call for information on criminal acts and did not comprehend the "screen room" charge to have been criminal conduct. Since Respondent answered that question in the negative, his application for registration was processed in accordance with normal procedures. Had Respondent answered that question in the affirmative, his application would not have gone through normal processing but rather would have been presented to the Construction Industry Licensing Board for the Board's determination of whether to approve the application based upon a consideration of the facts. On November 22, 1982, Respondent contracted with Naomi Blanton to construct an addition to Blanton's home located in the City of Miami, in Dade County, Florida, for a contract price of $11,250. When Respondent had first met with Blanton several months earlier, he had told her he could guarantee completion of the project within 45 days. No contract was entered into at that time, however, since Blanton had not obtained the financing she needed in order to construct an addition. When the contract was signed on November 22, Respondent told Blanton he would start the job when he finished the Chamber of Commerce building he was con structing but that he was starting a 12-unit duplex project around Christmas and would not be able to guarantee any 45-day completion deadline. Accordingly, when the contract was signed, no completion date was included in the terms of that written contract, since Respondent did not know when he could guarantee completion. The Blanton contract written by Respondent specifically provided that Respondent would obtain the building permit. On December 22 and 23, 1982, two of Respondent's employees arrived at the Blanton job site, dug a trench, knocked down the utility room, and moved Mrs. Blanton's washing machine. No further work was done until January 1983. Since Respondent knew that he was required to obtain the building permit before commencing any construction work, Respondent submitted his plans and permit application to the City of Miami Building Department. After the plans had been there about a week, he was advised that his plans would not be accepted unless they were drawn by an architect, although that is not required by the South Florida Building Code. After attempting several more times to obtain approval from the City of Miami Building Department, Respondent hired an architect to redraw the plans and secure the building permit. By this time, Respondent found himself unable to concentrate on operating his business efficiently, since he was preoccupied with spending time with his father who was dying of cancer. Also by this time, Blanton had commenced telephone calls to Respondent on an almost daily basis as late as 11:00 p.m. at his office, at his home, at his mother's home, and at his father's home. Respondent offered to return Blanton's deposit, but she refused to cancel the contract and threatened Respondent that she would sue him if he did not comply with that contract. Respondent commenced working on the Blanton job, although no permit had yet been obtained. The contract on the Blanton job called for payments at certain stages of the construction. By January 27, 1983, Respondent had completed a sufficient amount of the work under the contract so that Blanton had paid him a total of $8,270 in accordance with the draw schedule contained in the contract. Respondent ceased working on January 27, 1983, and advised Blanton and her attorney that he would do no further work until he could obtain the building permit, which he had still not been able to obtain. Although he told them his work stoppage was due to his continued inability to obtain the permit, he also stopped work due to his father's illness and his continued inability to get along with Mrs. Blanton. A delay occurred with the plans being redrawn by the architect Respondent hired to obtain the Blanton building permit, since the architect needed information from Blanton and she was out of town. After Blanton returned, the architect made unsuccessful attempts to obtain the building permit. Respondent and his architect were finally able to speak to one of the top personnel in the City of Miami Building Department about the problems they were experiencing in obtaining a building permit, and, at about the same time, Blanton contacted that same individual to complain that Respondent had no permit. On May 4, 1983, the building department finally accepted the second permit application together with the plans drawn by the architect, and the building permit was issued on May 4, 1983. No work was performed on the Blanton job between January 27, 1983, when Blanton paid Respondent the draw to which he was entitled by that date, and May 4, 1983, when the building permit was finally issued by the City of Miami. Respondent immediately resumed work and quickly completed the next stage of construction called for under the Blanton contract. Upon completing that next stage, he requested his next draw payment; however, Blanton decided not to pay Respondent for the work completed and had her attorney advise Respondent not to return to the job site. Blanton then had a friend of her son come to Miami from Wisconsin to complete the addition to her home. At all times material hereto, Respondent held a certificate of competency issued by Metropolitan Dade County.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by willfully and deliberately violating Section 301(a) of the South Florida Building Code; imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $2,000 to be paid by a date certain; and dismissing the remaining charges contained in the Administrative Complaint, as amended, against Respondent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas A. Shropshire, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Joseph F. Scioli, Jr. 246 North Krome Avenue Florida City, Florida 33034 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202

Florida Laws (2) 120.57489.129
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs DAVID A. TAYLOR, 89-004270 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Aug. 07, 1989 Number: 89-004270 Latest Update: Feb. 27, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged, in conjunction with the Construction Industry Licensing Board, with the responsibility for prosecuting Administrative Complaints pursuant to chapters 455 and 489, and the rules promulgated thereunder. In September, 1983, license number CR C012950 was issued to Respondent, David A. Taylor, as the qualifying agent for Energywise Homes, Inc., 3305 S.W. 1st Court, Deerfield Beach, FL 33441. License number CR C01295p remained in effect until June 30, 1987. License number CR C012950 was delinquent and invalid from July, 1987, through May 10, 1988. In July, 1987, license number CR C012950 was placed on a delinquent status for non-renewal and considered invalid. On April 19, 1988, Respondent applied for renewal and reinstatement of license number CR C012950. Respondent's application for renewal and reinstatement was approved May 11, 1989. At that time, license number CR C012950 was changed from a qualifying business to an individual license. In April, 1988, Respondent applied to the City of Sebastian, Florida Construction Board (the "City") for an occupational license in order to obtain building permits for jobs he had contracted in that jurisdiction. License number CR C012950 was delinquent and invalid at the time Respondent applied to the City for an occupational license and permits. Respondent presented an altered license to Ms. Kathryn Nappi, the person responsible for issuing occupational licenses for the City in April, 1988, for the purpose of obtaining building permits from the City. The typeface on the license presented by Respondent to Ms. Nappi does not match either that used on the bottom portion of the same license or the copy of the licenses admitted as Respondent's Exhibit 1. Further, the date used on the altered license is not a date normally used by the Construction Industry Licensing Board. Finally, the license presented by Respondent to Ms. Nappi indicated the license was held by Respondent individually rather than as qualifying agent for Energywise Homes, Inc. The testimony of the witnesses for Petitioner was consistent and credible. The procedures followed by Ms. Nappi and her supervisor, Mr. Bruce Cooper, Director of Community Development and Building Official for the City of Sebastian, were customary procedures followed in the ordinary course of their business. Neither witness had any discernible motive for fabricating the events to which they testified. Respondent presented the altered license to Ms. Nappi sometime in April, 1988, for the purpose of obtaining building permits for the five homes to be constructed in the City. Ms. Nappi noticed that the type on the top of the license submitted by Respondent did not match the bottom portion. She brought the discrepancy to the attention of Mr. Cooper. Mr. Cooper confirmed with the Department of Professional Regulation that the license submitted to Ms. Nappi by Respondent had been altered. Mr. Cooper set up a meeting between himself, Respondent, and two detectives to ascertain Respondent's position concerning the altered license. Mr. Cooper did not believe Respondent's position and placed the matter on the agenda for the May 3, 1988, meeting of the Sebastian Construction Board (the "Board") 3/ Respondent and the owner of the five homes for which permits were being sought appeared at the May 3, 1988, meeting of the Board. The Board voted to approve the building permits subject to the issuance of a valid license by the Department of Professional Regulation. The owner requested issuance of the permits because delay was causing his investment to dwindle. The Board also considered the fact that the properties were becoming an eyesore in the City. The Board voted to approve the permits, subject to Respondent obtaining a valid license, and leave the issue of the altered license to the Department of Professional Regulation. Respondent's testimony that he did not present an altered license for the purpose of obtaining building permits from the City, and that he had never previously seen the altered license, is rejected as not credible. Such testimony is inconsistent with statements by Respondent to Mr. Cooper and at the May 3, 1988, meeting of the Board, which were admitted in evidence as exceptions to hearsay under Section 90.8C3(18). Respondent's testimony is also inconsistent with the greater weight of evidence. Financial pressures caused by previous delays in obtaining permits provided a motive for Respondent to present an altered license to obtain building permits for the five homes to be constructed in the City. Previous attempts by others to obtain building permits for five homes to be constructed in the City had been unsuccessful. Respondent made several further attempts to obtain building permits for the five homes to be constructed in the City. The delays in obtaining the permits had caused the investment of the owner of the homes to dwindle. Furthermore, the homes were becoming an eyesore for the City. Respondent committed an act of fraud, deceit, and misconduct in April, 1988, when Respondent intentionally presented an altered license to Ms. Nappi to obtain building permits for the five homes to be constructed in the City. No evidence has been presented to support a finding that Respondent altered the license presented to Ms. Nappi. However, Respondent knew or should have known that the license submitted by him had been altered, and Respondent submitted the altered license for the purpose of obtaining the needed building permits. Even without the requisite intent for fraud, deceit, and misconduct, Respondent is not exonerated. Inadvertently presenting an altered license to Ms. Nappi in April, 1988, at a time when Respondent knew his license was delinquent and invalid constitutes gross negligence and incompetence in the practice of contracting.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of fraud, deceit, gross negligence, incompetency, or misconduct in the practice of contracting in violation of Section 489.129(1)(m). Florida Administrative Code Rule 21E-17.001 provides in relevant part: "The following guidelines Shall be used in disciplinary cases, absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances and subject to the other provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis added) * * * (19) 489.129(1)(m): Gross negligence, incompetence, and/or misconduct, fraud or deceit. (a) Causing no monetary harm to licensee's customer, and no physical harm to any person. First violation, $250 to $750 fine; repeat violation, $1,000 to $1,500 fine and 3 to 9 month suspension. Florida Administrative Code Rule 21E-17.002, describes aggravating and mitigating circumstances which may be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed in a particular proceeding. Petitioner produced no evidence of any aggravating circumstances other than the alleged violations of Sections 489.113 and 489.115. There was no evidence of monetary or other damage to the licensee's customer, actual job site violations, repetitive offenses, the number of complaints filed against Respondent, or actual damage to the licensee's customer. See Fla. Admin. Code Rule 21E-17.002(1),(2),(s),(6), and (8). Considering the absence of any aggravating factors, the length of time Respondent has practiced contracting without any complaint, the de minimis danger to the public, and the fact that the Board approved the permits sought by Respondent because of the beneficial effect the permits would have on the owner and the City, it is recommended that Respondent be fined $250. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of February, 1990. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1990.

Florida Laws (6) 489.105489.113489.115489.117489.119489.129
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. RICHARD E. ULBRICHT, 79-001971 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001971 Latest Update: Jun. 17, 1980

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Based on an Administrative Complaint filed on July 6, 1979, the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board (herein sometimes referred to as the Petitioner or the Board) seeks to take disciplinary action against Licensee Richard E. Ulbricht, d/b/a Ulbricht Construction, Inc., and to impose an administrative fine or $500.00. Respondent is a registered contractor who holds the following licenses: RG 0011921 - Registered General/Active/Issued RGA 0011921 - Registered General/Active/Issued RG OB 11921 - Registered General/Delinquent RM 0014920 - Registered Mechanical/Active/Issued RM 0017586 - Registered Mechanical/Delinquent RS 0019201 - Registered Sheet Metal/Active/Issued RC 0019264 - Registered Roofing/Active/Issued Respondent was first licensed by the Petitioner during February, 1972. On June 14, 1977, Respondent qualified Ulbricht Construction, Inc., as the business entity through which he would conduct his contracting business. The construction activities involved herein took place in the City of Palm Bay, Florida. Palm Bay has no local licensing board. On June 12, 1978, Respondent entered into a contract with Michael D. and Karen K. McCammack to construct a residence for the sum of $39,900.00. Respondent received the full contracted price and the transaction closed on January 4, 1979. Chelsea Title and Guaranty Company closed the transaction for Respondent and the McCammacks on January 4, 1979. Camille Guilbeau is the manager for the Palm Bay branch of Chelsea Title and Guaranty Company. Ms. Guilbeau is in charge of all closing and as such ensures that all outstanding obligations of record are paid. In keeping with Chelsea's policy of protecting itself in the event of outstanding unrecorded claims of liens, Chelsea has a policy of requiring contractors and builders such as Respondent to declare in an affidavit that there is no outstanding work which has been performed, or labor or materials for which a lien could be filed on property in which Chelsea is closing the mortgage transaction. Respondent executed such an affidavit relative to the McCammacks' property, which Chelsea relied on to close the transaction on January 4, 1979 (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). On January 4, 1979, Chelsea Title and Guaranty Company paid Rinker Materials Corporation of Melbourne, Florida, $1,201.02 based on a claim of liens filed December 15, 1978, for materials consisting of concrete block, steel and miscellaneous items which were used on the McCammack property (Petitioner's Exhibit 6). Subsequent to the date of closing, January 4, 1979, liens amounting to approximately $2,761.62 have been filed against the McCammack property based on Respondent's failure to pay bills for labor and/or materials used in connection with the construction of the McCammacks' residence. These lien claims were filed against the McCammacks' property for a drilled well, installation of a pump and tank by Perry and Leighty, Inc., of Melbourne, Florida; two septic tanks, drains and sand supplied by Pence South Brevard Sewer and Septic Tank of Melbourne, Florida (Petitioner's Exhibits 7, 8 and 9). On December 22, 1978, Respondent entered into a contract with Robert J. Greene to construct a residence for $30,500.00 in Palm Bay, Florida. Respondent filed an affidavit of no liens relative to the Greene property on January 10, 1979. Chelsea Title and Guaranty Company relied on this affidavit to close the Greene property transaction on January 10, 1979 (Petitioner's Exhibit 5). Respondent was paid thee entire contract price. On February 12, 1979, Pence South Brevard Sewer and Septic Tank filed a claim of lien in the amount of $1,015.36 for two septic tanks, drains and sand which had been furnished the Respondent for the property of Robert J. and Alice Greene of Palm Bay, Florida, on December 15, 1978 (Petitioner's Exhibits 10 and 11). Approximately $3,496.40 was retained by Chelsea Title and Guaranty Company to satisfy outstanding recorded obligations on the date the Greene transaction closed (Petitioner's Exhibit 13). On February 21, 1979, Respondent caused to be filed in the United States District Court of the Middle District of Florida, a Voluntary Petition for Bankruptcy for Ulbricht Construction, Inc. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2 Composite).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent's contractors licenses set forth hereinabove be REVOKED. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of May, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 1980.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57201.02489.115489.129
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LIVINGSTON B. SHEPPARD vs. BOARD OF DENTISTRY, 79-002019RX (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002019RX Latest Update: Nov. 30, 1979

The Issue The issue presented for consideration concerns the question whether action taken by the Respondent in its efforts to comply with the mandate of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), constitutes a rule or rules which has or have not been duly promulgated in accordance with the provisions of Sections 120.53, 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact This case is here presented on the Petition of Livingston B. Sheppard, D.D.S., by an action against the Board of Dentistry, an agency of the State of Florida and the Department of Professional Regulation, an agency of the State of Florida, as Respondents. The purpose of this Petition is to have declared invalid certain activities of the Respondents pertaining to their efforts at complying with the provisions of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), in promoting license revocation or suspension cases against various dentists licensed to practice in the State of Florida. The Petitioner contends that these activities by the Respondents constitute a rule or rules which fail to comply with requirements of Sections 120.53, 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, Livingston B. Sheppard, D.D.S., is a dentist licensed to practice in the State of Florida and thereby regulated by the Respondents. The Petitioner is also the subject of disciplinary action in Case No. 78-1481 before the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings, and it is the action which was taken against Dr. Sheppard in the course of that prosecution, dealing with the subject of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), which the current Petitioner asserts to be an invalid rule or rules. The language of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), states: (5) No revocation, suspension, annulment, or withdrawal of any license is lawful unless, prior to the institution of agency proceedings, the agency has given reasonable notice by certified mail or actual service to the licensee of facts or conduct which warrant the intended action and the licensee has been given an opportunity to show that he has complied with all lawful requirements for the retention of the license. If the agency is unable to obtain service by certified mail or by actual service, constructive service may be made in the same manner as is provided in chapter 49. Having considered the statement found in the above-referenced Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), counsel for Dr. Sheppard in D.O.A.H Case No. 78-1481 filed a Motion to Dismiss the Administrative Complaint on August 31, 1979, alleging that the agency had failed to comply with the provisions. Oral argument on that motion was scheduled for 2:30 o'clock p.m. on September 17, 1979, and was heard at that time; however, prior to the oral argument, the Board of Dentistry on September 14, 1979, filed a docent in the case, which document attempted compliance with the provisions of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978). The document was entitled "Notice of Intended Action Conference" and by its terms granted Dr. Sheppard an opportunity to appear before H. Fred Varn, Executive Director, Florida State Board of Dentistry, on September 17, 1979, at 10:00 a.m. in Tallahassee, Florida. (A copy of this "Notice of Intended Action Conference" was attached to the Petition in the case sub judice as an exhibit.) The Board of Dentistry had alerted the Hearing Officer to the action it had contemplated by its "Notice of Intended Action Conference." It did so through the Board prosecutor by correspondence of September 14, 1979, a copy of which may be found as the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. Dr. Sheppard filed an objection to the adequacy of the "Notice of Intended Action Conference" and refused to appear at that conference. After considering the oral arguments of the parties directed to the Motion to Dismiss of August 31, 1978, in D.O.A.H. Case No. 78-1481, the Honorable Delphene C. Strickland, Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings, entered her Order dated September 26, 1979. (A copy of that Order has been attached as an exhibit to the current Petition.) In her Order, the Hearing Officer found the "Notice of Intended Action Conference was insufficient, in that the notice did not grant Sheppard sufficient time to prepare for the conference to be held on September 17, 1979, to the extent of demonstrating his compliance with the provisions of Chapter 466, Florida Statutes, as contemplated by Sub section 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978). The Hearing officer did feel that Dr. Sheppard had been notified of those allegations for which he was called upon to defend against and she granted the Board of Dentistry thirty (30) days from the date of her Order, September 26, 1978, to allow the accused an opportunity to show that he had complied with all lawful requirements for the retention of his license. There followed the current Petition which was filed on September 28, 1979. That Petition has been the subject of a Motion to Dismiss which challenged the adequacy of the Petition. The Motion to Dismiss was responded to and in the course of that response the Petitioner's counsel attached a copy of a "Notice of Informal Conference" to be held on October 23, 1979, at 9:00 a.m., in Tallahassee, Florida. (The location of that conference was subsequently changed to a place more convenient for Dr. Sheppard, specifically, St. Petersburg, Florida, but the amendment was otherwise the same as the original October 23, 1979, notice.) When the Motion to Dismiss and response to the motion were considered, the motion was denied by written Order of the undersigned dated October 22, 1979. That Order found in accordance with the Order of Hearing Officer Strickland, in D.O.A.H. Case No. 78-1481, referring to the Order dated September 26, 1979; that the efforts of complying with Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), made by the Board of Dentistry in its attempted action conference to be held September 17, 1979, were not adequate and the prospective events of an action conference that would have been held on September 17, 1979, were deemed to be moot. Nonetheless, in view of the further action by the Board of Dentistry to conduct an informal conference on October 23, 1979, the present case was allowed to go forward on the basis that the Petitioner would be afforded an opportunity to show how the events leading to the written "Notice of Informal Conference" held on October 23, 1979, the notice itself, and the events at the conference constitute a rule or rules that has or have not been duly promulgated in the manner contemplated by Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. In furtherance of this permission, the Petitioner was and is allowed to make the "Notice of Informal Conference" as attached to the response to the Motion to Dismiss a part of the Petition and that "Notice of Informal Conference" is hereby made a part of the Petition. In the course of the hearing a number of witnesses were presented and those witnesses included Tom Guilday, a prosecutor for the Board of Dentistry; Liz Cloud, an employee of the State of Florida, Office of the Secretary of State; H. Fred Varn, Executive Director of the Board of Dentistry; Nancy Wittenberg, Secretary, Department of Professional Regulation; and the Petitioner, Livingston B. Sheppard. In addition, the Petitioner offered three items of evidence which were admitted. The testimony of attorney Guilday established that as prosecutor for the Board of Dentistry in the action against Dr. Sheppard, he spoke with Charles F. Tunnicliff, Acting General Counsel, Department of Professional Regulation, who instructed Guilday to attempt to comply with the requirements of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), and this was in anticipation of the pending Motion to Dismiss to be heard on September 17, 1979. One of the results of that conversation was the letter of September 14, 1979, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, addressed to Hearing Officer Strickland and the primary result was that of the September 14, 1979, "Notice of Intended Action Conference." The conference alluded to was to be held at the office of Mr. Varn. Attorney Guilday did not recall whether the contemplated disposition of September 17, 1979, was one which Tunnicliff indicated would be used in all similar cases pending before the Department of Professional Regulation. After Hearing Officer Strickland's Order was entered on September 26, 1979, attorney Deberah Miller of the Department of Professional Regulation instructed Guilday to comply with Hearing Officer Strickland's Order of September 26, 1979, on the subject of the dictates of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), and this instruction was supported by Memorandum of October 5, 1979, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. There ensued the conference of October 23, 1979, which was held in St. Petersburg, Florida. After the conference, pursuant to the instructions of attorneys Miller and Tunnicliff, Guilday prepared a memorandum on the results of that conference. This memorandum did not carry a recommendation as to the disposition of the case. Throughout this period of time, attorney Guilday was unaware of any general policy within the Department of Professional Regulation or Board of Dentistry which dealt with attempts at compliance with the provisions of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978). None of the discussions which Guilday had with attorneys Tunnicliff and Miller of the Department of Professional Regulation or with other officials of that Department or Board of Dentistry led him to believe that there was any set policy for handling those issues. Guilday did acknowledge that a member of his law firm, one Michael Huey, had been instructed by Staff Attorney Miller on the technique to be utilized in refiling a prosecution against John Parry, D.D.S., wherein the action against Dr. Parry had been dismissed for lack of compliance of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978). A copy of that Memorandum dated October 3, 1979, may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 and it carries with it an attached form for "Notice of Informal Conference" under the terms of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1970), and that format is similar to the October 23, 1979, "Notice of Informal Conference" in the Sheppard case. Guilday indicated in connection with this Memorandum, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, that to his knowledge no discussion on how to comply with the terms of the memorandum was made and no actual compliance with the memorandum has been taken to his knowledge. It was established through the testimony of Liz Cloud of the Office of the Secretary of State and through other witnesses that no formal rules have been filed with the Secretary of State by either of the Respondents dealing with the subject of compliance with the pie visions of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978). Testimony offered by Nancy Wittenberg, Secretary, Department of Professional Regulation, and by H. Fred Varn, Executive Director, Board of Dentistry, established that neither the Department nor the Dental Board has formulated final policies on how to deal with the requirements of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), whether the cases pertain to those such as that of Dr. Sheppard in which the agency, although it has not complied with Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), prior to the filing of the Administrative Complaint, has been granted an opportunity to try to comply or on the occasion where cases are in the investigative stage or the occasion where the cases have been dismissed for noncompliance with Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), and are subject to refiling. It is shown through Secretary Wittenberg's testimony that such compliance with Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), is still in the formative stages and the Memorandum of October 3, 1979, by Staff Attorney Miller with the format for noticing informal conferences to be held under the provisions of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), is but one method under consideration at this time. Moreover, Secretary Wittenberg has not spoken with attorney Guilday about the matters of the Sheppard case that are now in dispute or received reports of conversations between Guilday and Staff Attorneys Tunnicliff and Miller on the subject of the pending Sheppard dispute. Finally, Wittenberg has not instructed any of the support officials within the Department of Professional Regulation, to include departmental attorneys, to formulate policy directed to the implementation of the provisions of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), which action would constitute the final statement by the Department on those matters.

Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.53120.54120.56120.60
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs WILLIAM KEELE, D/B/A, WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, 11-006178 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 05, 2011 Number: 11-006178 Latest Update: Jun. 11, 2012

Findings Of Fact 11. The factual allegations contained in the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on May 19, 2011, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on June 7, 2011, and the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 17, 2012, and fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.

Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or his designee, having considered the record in this case, including the request for administrative hearing received from WILLIAM KEELE, DBA, WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On May 19, 2011, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 11-164-1A to WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 2. On May 19, 2011, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On June 2, 2011, the Department received an Election of Proceeding requesting administrative review (“Petition”) from WILLIAM KEELE, DBA, WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC. A copy of the Petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 4. On June 7, 2011, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to WILLIAM KEELE, DBA, WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment amended the legal name of the employer to WILLIAM KEELE, DBA, WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $43,256.29 against WILLIAM KEELE, DBA, WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment includéd a Notice of Rights wherein WILLIAM KEELE, DBA, WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28- 106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 5. On June 23, 2011, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on WILLIAM KEELE, DBA, WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 6. On July 13, 2011, the Department received an amended Election of Proceeding form (“Amended Petition”) from WILLIAM KEELE, DBA, WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case No. 11-6178. A copy of the Amended Petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference. 7. Following issuance of subsequent Amended Orders of Penalty Assessment, on February 17, 2012, the Department issued a 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to WILLIAM KEELE, DBA, WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $4,708.85 against WILLIAM KEELE, DBA, WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein WILLIAM KEELE, DBA, WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC, A DISSOLVED FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND WILLIAM MILTON KEELE LLC was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 8. On April 5, 2012, the Department filed a Motion to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment with the Division of Administrative Hearings in DOAH Case No. 11-6178. A copy of the Department’s Motion to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment together with the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit E” and incorporated herein by reference. 9. On April 18, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Granting Motion to Amend Penalty Assessment in DOAH Case No. 11-6178. The Order Granting Motion to Amend Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit F” and incorporated herein by reference. 10. On April 30, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge entered an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction due to Respondent’s failure to participate in discovery and appear at the scheduled formal hearing in DOAH Case No. 11-6178. A copy of the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction is attached hereto as “Exhibit G” and incorporated herein by reference.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57120.68 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.2015
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs THOMAS L. JENKINS, 90-006684 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 23, 1990 Number: 90-006684 Latest Update: Feb. 25, 1991

The Issue Whether Respondent violated various provisions of Section 489.129(1) by failing to pay for all roofing materials used on the North Orient Road job; by filing a false payment statement and by having his permitting privilege revoked by the City of Tampa Unified Construction Trades Board.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the Department of Professional Regulation charged, in conjunction with the Construction Industry Licensing Board, with the responsibility to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Chapters 489, 455 and 120, Florida Statutes, and the Rules promulgated pursuant to the statutes. Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto, a certified roofing contractor and a registered roofing contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license numbers CC CO39803 and RC 049317. At all times material hereto, Respondent was the licensed qualifying agent for Jenkins Economy Roofing, Inc., for which Sharon K. Jenkins was an officer. Ed Nabakowski is, and has been at all times material hereto, the owner of the real property and improvements thereon located at 2501 North Orient Road, Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. R. L. Dykes is, and has been at all times material hereto, a certified general contractor duly licensed by the State of Florida. In the months proceeding July 1988, Nabakowski entered into a contract with Dykes wherein Dykes agreed to construct a commercial building upon Nabakowski's property on North Orient Road. Pursuant to that contract, Dykes entered into a subcontract on July 6, 1988, with Respondent Jenkins, doing business as Jenkins Economy Roofing, Inc., wherein Jenkins agreed to construct the roof of the building. Pursuant to the subcontract, Dykes agreed to pay Jenkins the sum of $8,487.00 which payment included costs of all materials, supplies and labor. Pursuant to the subcontract, Jenkins had the sole responsibility for ordering, arranging delivery to the site and paying for such materials and supplies as would be necessary for the construction of the roof. Jenkins construction activities commenced on July 6, 1988 and were concluded within the time contemplated by the subcontract. Greenbriar Building Materials, Inc., was, in July 1988, a supplier of building materials in Tampa, Florida. In connection with his construction of the roof, Jenkins ordered certain materials and supplies from Greenbriar which were delivered to the construction site. The materials and supplies had not been altered in their form or substance in any discernable manner between the Greenbriar warehouse and the construction site. Greenbriar maintained invoice records of the specific materials and supplies delivered to the job site. Greenbriar's records had three invoices for the North Orient Road site. The total sum of the three invoices was in the amount of $5,747.22. The invoiced price of the materials and supplies was usual and reasonable. The materials and supplies listed on the Greenbriar invoices were of such nature and quantity as would normally be used in the construction of the particular roof structure of this project. The materials and supplies listed in the invoices were used for and exhausted in the construction of the roof. By check dated August 8, 1998, Dykes paid Jenkins the sum of $6,790.00 as a draw against the total amount of the subcontract. On August 15, 1988, and as a prerequisite to receiving the draw payment a document titled "Partial Waiver of Lien" was signed by Sharon K. Jenkins as Secretary for Jenkins Economy Roofing, Inc. Under the terms of that document, Respondent warranted that " ... invoices for all materials, supplies and services provided by others ... arising out of work or items furnished to the described property, prior to the date hereto, have been paid." Greenbriar recorded a Claim of Lien in the Official Records of Hillsborough County, Florida, on September 19, 1988, securing the debt for roofing materials delivered to the job site. The lien was in the exact amount of the sum of the three Greenbriar invoices, to wit: $5,747.22. In the text of the Claim of Lien which was executed under oath by Greenbriar, Notice to Owner was certified as having been served on July 26, 1988. There was not and has not been any dispute as to the validity of the lien and all interested parties have acted in accord with the lien's validity. By certified letter dated September 28, 1988, Greenbriar made formal demand of the owner, Nabakowski, for payment of the amount of the Claim of Lien under threat of foreclosure. Nabakowski communicated with Dykes and in accord with professional responsibility, Dykes paid the full amount of the debt due to Greenbriar. Dykes payment to Greenbriar resulted in the satisfaction of the lien against the owners property on December 12, 1988. Dykes was financially harmed by paying the amount necessary to secure the satisfaction of the lien against the owner's property. It caused him to twice pay for the same building materials, since he had already paid Jenkins the amount necessary to pay Greenbriar at the time of his drab on August 8, 1988. Jenkins Economy Roofing had not paid the debt due to Greenbriar for materials supplied to this job at the time of signing the Partial Waiver of Lien. Jenkins Economy Roofing, Inc., did not pay the debt due to Greenbriar for materials supplied to his job site at any time thereafter. Pursuant to a formal complaint filed by Dykes on September 21, 1988, the City of Tampa, Code Compliance Section, conducted an investigation of Jenkins's transactions relative to the construction project on North Orient Road. As a result of the investigation, Jenkins was charged with violations of the City of Tampa Code, Chapter 25, Sections 25-101(6),(7),(19) and (22). A disciplinary action against Respondent was scheduled for hearing before the Unified Construction Trades Board. Respondent was notified of the disciplinary action hearing by certified mail. Respondent failed to respond to or appear at the City of Tampa disciplinary action. Pursuant to evidence produced at the hearing on January 3, 1989, the Unified Construction Trade Board unanimously determined that Respondent was guilty of violating City of Tampa Codes and disciplined Respondent by permanently revoking his permitting privileges. Respondent was notified of this local disciplinary action in writing and was verbally advised of his rights to appeal and the appellate review procedure by Darrow in a subsequent telephone conversation. Respondent did not appeal the local discipline. In Department of Professional Regulation v. Thomas L. Jenkins, DPR Case No. 89-903, which is an unrelated disciplinary action case, the Construction Industry Licensing Board entered a Final Order on November 28, 1990, finding Respondent guilty of violating local building codes, being disciplined by any municipality and misconduct in the practice of contracting, i.e., violations of Section 489.129(1)(d),(e) and (m). The Final Order imposed a fine of $2,500.00 against Respondent and ordered that his license CC CO39803 be suspended until the fine is paid.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding the Respondent guilty of violations of Counts I through V of the Amended Administrative Complaint. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Board REVOKE the Respondent's license as a certified roofing contractor, number CC C039803, and as a registered roofing contractor, number RC 0049317, in accordance with disciplinary guidelines set forth in Rule 21E-17.001, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 25th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-47. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent did not submit proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig M. Dickinson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Thomas L. Jenkins HC 73, Box 3035 Vanceburg, KY 41179 Daniel O'Brien Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (2) 120.57489.129
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. C. WILLIAM HANSEN, 83-001631 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001631 Latest Update: Apr. 12, 1984

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a registered residential and Class A pool contractor having been issued licenses numbered RR 0035167 and RP 0024335. Respondent's address if Route A, Box 19A, Punta Gorda, Florida 33950. In 1980, Respondent contracted to and built a pool for Mr. and Mrs. George Ring of Punta Gorda, Florida. Mr. Robert Berg, the chief building official for the City of Punta Gorda, informed Respondent by letter dated November 13, 1981, that there were code compliance deficiencies in the stem wall constructed by Respondent on the Ring job. On April 16, 1982, the City of Punta Gorda Code Enforcement Board issued an official order, signed by its chairman, directing Respondent to begin remedial work on the stem wall within 15 days. The order further provided that a fine of $25 per day would be imposed for each day past the fifteenth day that work was not started. Respondent assumed that the 15 days began running when he received the order on April 20, 1982, rather than the April 16 order date. He attempted to begin work on May 2, but was unable to do so as the homeowners were then on vacation. Respondent thereafter completed the repairs and, on July 14, 1982, produced an engineer's letter stating that he had inspected the remedial work on the stem wall and found it complied with the building code. The chief building official accepted the engineer's determination and recommended that Respondent's fine be terminated as of July 14, 1982, with an accrued penalty of $1,875.00. These recommendations were later accepted by the Punta Gorda Code Enforcement Board. Respondent contends the fine was miscalculated and that he could not have started work within 15 days of receiving the April 16 order since the homeowners were not present. However, the start work directive and the fine provisions of the April 16 order followed two previous orders citing Respondent for noncompliance in this project. See Petitioner's Exhibit 11 (Board order dated February 12, 1982) and Petitioner's Exhibit 13 (Board order dated march 10, 1982). Thus, the fine ordered on April 16 was resorted to by the local board only after other efforts to obtain Respondent's compliance had failed.

Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a Final Order suspending Respondent's contractor's licenses until he furnishes evidence that he has obtained release or has paid the local board fine. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 12th day of April, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas A. Shropshire, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John Polk, Esquire First National Bank Building Suite 306 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 489.129
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs FRED T. GARRETT, III, 01-003481PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Aug. 31, 2001 Number: 01-003481PL Latest Update: Jul. 03, 2002

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent committed the several violations of Sections 489.129(1)(h)2.,(h)3.,(j),(k), and (n), Florida Statutes (1997), for the reasons stated in the respective Administrative Complaints and, if so, what, if any, penalties should be imposed. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of contracting. Respondent is licensed as a certified general contractor pursuant to license number CG C059414. At all relevant times, Respondent was the qualifying agent for Fred T. Garrett Construction, Inc. ("FTG"). As the qualifying agent, Respondent was responsible for all of FTG's contracting activities in accordance with Section 489.1195, Florida Statutes. Respondent failed to obtain a certificate of authority for Fred T. Garrett Construction, Inc., as required by Section 489.119(2), Florida Statutes. The St. Cyr Case On or about August 21, 1998, Respondent entered into a contract with Louis L. St. Cyr to construct an addition to the residence located at 201 South Bel Air Drive, Plantation, Florida. The contract price was $50,000. Although Mr. St. Cyr paid $2,500 to Respondent, Respondent failed to commence work and canceled the project, thereby abandoning it without just cause and without proper notification to Mr. St. Cyr. The contract did not permit Respondent to keep the $2,500 paid by Mr. St. Cyr, and Respondent failed to refund the payment within 30 days after abandonment. Out of the $2,500 he received from Mr. St. Cyr, however, Respondent paid $1,600.00 to the architect before abandoning the project. Thus, the net amount that Respondent owes to Mr. St. Cyr is $900. Petitioner incurred a total of $1,092.28 in investigative costs relating to the St. Cyr case. The Forney Case On May 22, 1998, Respondent, who was doing business as FTG, entered into a contract with Mr. Warren Forney for the construction of a two-bedroom, one-bath addition to the residence located at 1698 Northeast 33rd Street, Oakland Park, Florida. The contract price was $32,500. The contract with Mr. Forney did not contain a written statement explaining the customer’s rights under the Construction Industries Recovery Fund, as required by Section 489.1425(1), Florida Statutes. On July 7, 1998, Respondent obtained permit number 98-050297 from the Oakland Park Building Department. Construction commenced on or about July 7, 1998, and continued sporadically until October 29, 1998, when Mr. Forney dismissed Respondent for failure to timely complete the project. The Oakland Park Building Department issued notices of violation against the project on August 3, September 11, and October 14, 1998, for various building code violations. Mr. Forney was forced to obtain a homeowner’s permit and subsequently hired a subcontractor to complete the work. Mr. Forney paid Respondent approximately $29,250 before relieving Respondent of his duties. To complete the project, Mr. Forney paid a total of $48,746.52, which was $15,396.52 over and above the original contract price. Petitioner incurred a total of $2,190.78 in investigative costs relating to the Forney case. The Kong Case In or around January 1998, a contractor named Lakeview Concepts hired Respondent to perform demolition work for the Kong dry cleaning store project on the property located at 5171 South University Drive, Davie, Florida. On or about June 17, 1998, permit 98-00002349 was issued to Respondent to perform alterations on commercial property located at 5171 South University Drive, Davie, Florida. Respondent, however, did not yet have a contract with the owner for this work. The next month, on or about July 30, 1998, Respondent, who was doing business as FTG, entered into a contract with Shek Kong to complete the dry cleaning store project at 5171 South University Drive, Davie, Florida, for the contract price of $22,300. Shek Kong made payments to Respondent totaling $16,000. Respondent’s work was of poor quality, however, and on or about November 6, 1998, he ceased work, though the project had not been completed. On or about November 14, 1998, Douglas Frankow, license number CB C052960, gave Mr. Kong an estimate of $20,562 to complete the project. Thereafter, on or about June 30, 1999, Mr. Kong contracted with George Settergren, another licensed contractor, to complete the project for a contract price of $27,956. On December 9, 1999, in Case No. 98-020065 08, the Circuit Court, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, rendered a Final Judgment against Respondent and in favor of Mr. Kong. This judgment awarded Mr. Kong the total amount of $28,693.30, plus 10 percent interest per annum. Petitioner incurred a total of $2,502.78 in investigative costs relating to the Kong case.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 489.129(1)(h)2., (h)3., (j), (k), and (n), Florida Statutes, imposing administrative fines in the aggregate amount of $3,700, assessing investigative costs in the aggregate amount of $5,785.84, placing Respondent's license on probation for a period of four years from the date the Final Order is entered by the Board, and awarding payment of restitution to each customer as follows: (1) to Warren Forney, the amount of $15,396.52; (2) to Shek Kong, satisfaction of the unpaid civil judgment in the amount $28,693.30, plus 10 percent interest accrued thereon; and (3) to Louis L. St. Cyr, the amount of $900. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _________________________________ JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2002.

Florida Laws (7) 17.00117.002489.119489.1195489.127489.129489.1425
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