Findings Of Fact On February 7, 14 and 21, 1989, respondent, School Board of Pinellas County (Board), published a legal advertisement in an area newspaper inviting prospective bidders to submit proposals for certain construction work to be performed on two elementary schools, Walsingham and Cross Bayou, located in Largo and Pinellas Park, Florida, respectively. The bidders were advised that their bids must be "prepared and submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifications" and that such drawings and specifications could be obtained from the Board. Such bids were to be filed with the Board no later than 2:00 p.m. on March 6, 1989. The notice also provided that the bids would be opened the same day. Bids were timely filed by at least five contracting firms, including petitioner, Prelude Construction Company, Inc. (Prelude), and intervenors, Lincoln Construction Company (Lincoln) and Bandes Construction Company (Bandes). In filing these proposals, each bidder represented he had "thoroughly examined all of the contract documents." After the bids were opened and reviewed by Board personnel, Lincoln, Prelude and Bandes were ranked first, second and fourth, respectively, based upon the dollar amount of their proposals. 2/ Thereafter, the Board issued its notice of intended action on March 7, 1989, wherein it advised all parties of its intention to award the contract to Lincoln. In doing so, the Board concluded that, although a bid bond accompanying Lincoln's proposal was not dated March 5 or 6 as required by the specifications, the deviation was minor and could be waived. That action prompted Prelude to file its protest. Through testimony of Lincoln's vice-president, it was established that the Board staff intended to change its initial position and to recommend to the Board that Lincoln's bid proposal be rejected and the contract awarded to Bandes. This change was prompted by the Board staff's discovery on the day of hearing (April 3) that, with the exception of Bandes, all bidders had failed to list the, roofing subcontractor on their bid proposals. The Board staff accordingly concluded that all bidders except Bandes should be disqualified. The bid specification upon which the Board relies to award the contract to Bandes is found in Part One, paragraph 1.1 of section 07511 of the bid specifications. The requirement is a relatively new one and imposes the following requirement upon bidders: NOTE: The contractor is required to list the name of the roofing subcontractor on the form of proposal, Section 1C. Section 1C is entitled "Form of Proposal" and includes the following section on page 1C-3 to be filled in by the bidder: The following subcontractors will be contracted with on this project. Type of Subcontractor Name of Subcontractor (Trade Specialty) (Company/Firm) The column on the left side is intended to identify the subcontractor by specialty, such as plumbing or roofing, while the blank spaces in the right hand column are to be filled in by the bidders with the name of the subcontractor who will perform the specialty. The Board has not been consistent in requiring bidders to list the name of subcontractors on the bid documents. According to the uncontroverted testimony of Lincoln, the Board requires the listing of subcontractors on some projects but not on others. For example, on the specifications for the recently let contract for the prototype new media center at four elementary schools, the left hand column on the above form was filled in by the Board with five types of subcontractors who were required on the project, including roofing. This meant that the bidder was to fill in the blanks in the right hand column with the name of the subcontractor who he intended to use on each specialty. However, on other contracts, including the one under challenge, both columns in the Form for Proposal have been left blank, and Lincoln construed this to mean that the name of the subcontractor was not required. Indeed, Lincoln pointed out, without contradiction, that on a recent contract which left both columns blank, as was true in this case, it was awarded the contract even though it did not identify the roofing subcontractor on its proposal. Because of this prior agency practice, Lincoln assumed the same policy would be used again. However, Lincoln conceded it had failed to read the requirement in paragraph 1.1 of section 07511 before preparing its proposal. There was no evidence that Lincoln gained any substantial advantage over other bidders by this omission. Also relevant to this controversy is Paragraph 10A of the General Requirements. This item is found on page 1B-11 and reads as follows: Each bidder shall indicate the names of specific major Subcontractors if called for on the form of proposal. If listing of Subcontractors is required and the Bidder fails to list them, the bid may, at Owner's option, be disqualified. (Emphasis added) This authority to waive the requirement is reinforced by language in Paragraph 21 of the General Requirements which provides in part that "(t)he owner reserves the right to waive minor technicalities." According to the Board's outside architectural consultant, who was the author of a portion of the contract specifications including section 07511, the omission of the name of the roofing subcontractor is a "minor" technicality that can be waived. However, the consultant had no personal knowledge as to whether the provision had actually been waived by the Board on prior contracts.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered awarding the contract in question to Bandes Construction Company. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1989.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Respondent's intended award of a lease for office space to Intervenor, Anthony Abraham Enterprise, is arbitrary and capricious and whether the proposal of the Petitioner, Adlee Developers, the current lessor, is responsive.
Findings Of Fact The parties agreed that on April 7, 1991, the Department issued an Invitation to Bid entitled, "Invitation To Bid For Existing Facilities State Of Florida Lease Number 590:2286, Dade County" This procurement was for the provision of 30,086 net rentable square feet to be used for office space in Dade County. A 3% variance was permitted. The facility was to house the District's Aging and Adult Services office which has been a tenant in Petitioner's building for several years and remained there during the pendancy of this protest process. According to the published advertisement, a pre-proposal conference was to be held on April 22, 1991, with all bids due by the bid opening to be held at 10:00 AM on May 30, 1991. The pre-bid conference was conducted by Philip A. Davis, then the District's facilities service manager and included not only a written agenda but also a review of the evaluation process by which each responsive bid would be examined. Petitioner asserts that the potential bidders were told, at that conference, that annual rental increases for the ten year lease period could not exceed five per cent (5%) and claims that Abraham's bid exceeded those guidelines. Thorough examination of the documentary evidence presented and the transcript of the proceedings, including a search for the reference thereto in Petitioner's counsel's Proposed Findings of Fact, fails to reveal any support for that assertion as to an increase limitation. The ITB for this procurement, in the section related to the evaluation of bids, indicated that pursuant to the provisions of Sections 5-3 and 5-11 of HRSM 70-1, dealing with the procurement of leased space, the responsive bids would be reviewed by an evaluation committee which would visit each proposed facility and apply the evaluation criteria to it in order to determine the lowest and best bidder. The evaluation criteria award factors listed in the ITB defined a successful bid as that one determined to be the lowest and best. That listing of evaluation criteria outlined among its categories associated fiscal costs, location, and facility. As to the first, the committee was to look at rental rates for both the basic term of the lease and the optional renewal period. The rates were to be evaluated using present value methodology applying the present value discount rate of 8.08% and rates proposed were to be within projected budgeting restraints of the Department. The total weight for the rental rate category was to be no more than 40 points with 35 points being the maximum for the basic term and 5 points for the option. Evaluation of the location was to be based on the effect of environmental factors including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the operations planned therefor. This included the proximity of the facility to a preferred area such as a co-location, a courthouse, or main traffic areas. This item carried a maximum weight of 10 points. Also included in location were the frequency and availability of public transportation, (5 points); the proximity of the facility to the clients to be served, (5 points); the aesthetics of not only the building but the surrounding neighborhood, (10 points); and security issues, (10 points). The third major factor for evaluation was the facility itself and here the committee was to examine the susceptibility of the offered space to efficient layout and good utilization, (15 points), and the susceptibility of the building, parking area and property as a whole to possible future expansion, (5 points). In that regard, the Bid Submittal Form attached to the ITB called for the successful bidder whose property did not have appropriate zoning at the time of award to promptly seek zoning appropriate to the use classification of the property so that it might be used for the purposes contemplated by the department within 30 days. In the event that could not be done, the award could be rescinded by the department without liability. The committee could award up to 100 points. The basic philosophy of this procurement was found in paragraph 1 of the Bid Award section of the ITB which provided: The department agrees to enter into a lease agreement based on submission and acceptance of the bid in the best interest of the department and the state. After the bid opening, three of the four bids received, excluding Petitioner's which was initially determined to be non-responsive, were evaluated by the Department's bid evaluation committee according to the above point system which allowed no discretion or deviation from the formula in comparing rental rates between bidders. Once Petitioner's bid was thereafter determined to be responsive, it, too was evaluated by the committee. At this second evaluation session, relating to Adlee's bid only, the committee scored the bid and added its scores to the original score sheets upon which the other three bidders' scores had been placed. Abraham had the lowest rental rates for the basic term of the lease and received the maximum award of 35 points for that category while Adlee received points. Abraham received an additional 2.29 points for the optional period rates while Adlee got 0. In the other categories, "location" and "facility", which comprised 60% of the points, Adlee's facility was routinely rated superior to Abraham's except for the area related to susceptibility for future expansion in which Abraham was rated higher by a small amount. Overall, however, Adlee was awarded 620.41 points and Abraham 571.03 points and as a result, Adlee was rated by the committee to be the lowest and best bidder. RCL, another bidder, was rated second, with Abraham third and DCIC fourth. Thereafter, the committee chairman, Mr. VanWerne, forwarded the new (and complete) evaluation results to the District Administrator on June 14, 1991 by an addendum dated June 27, 1991 which recommended award of the bid to Petitioner, Adlee Developers. No award was made at the time. Several factors not pertinent to the issues here caused that delay. Among the major of these was pending legislation which would have transferred the operation needing this space to another agency. This transfer was never consummated, however. On or before March 20, 1992, the new District Administrator, Mr. Towey, who had been appointed to his office in December, 1991, and who was made aware that this procurement had not been finalized, requested all available material on it so that he could study it and make his decision based on his own review of the submission. As a part of his determination process, he visited and inspected both the Adlee and the Abraham sites. One of the factors he considered was what appeared to be the significant monetary discrepancy between the two pertinent bids. Initial calculations indicated that Abraham's bid was approximately $835,000.00 lower than Adlee's over the ten year basic term of the lease. This amount was subsequently determined to be somewhat lower but the discrepancy is still significant. Nonetheless, because of that difference, Mr. Towey called a meeting with the members of the evaluation committee which had evaluated the bidders and had recommended Adlee. His stated reason for calling that meeting was to allow him to hear their reasons for rating the submissions as they had done and to take that information into consideration when he made his final decision. None of the committee members who testified at the hearing at Petitioner's behest indicated any feelings of pressure or intimidation by Mr. Towey. During his meeting with the committee members, Mr. Towey went over several of the evaluation criteria award factors to determine the committee's rationale. Of major importance was the issue of cost, of the availability of the facility to transportation to and from the building, employee security and the ability to control access to the facility, and the availability of on-site parking without cost to both employees and clients. It appears the Adlee facility is a multistory building with some parking available on site and would be easier to control. In addition, it is closer to public transportation access points. There is, however, some indication that on-site parking for clients would not be free and the closest free parking is some distance away. According to Adlee's representative, this matter would not be a problem, however, as adequate, free on site parking, which apparently was not initially identified as a problem, could be provided in any new lease. The Abraham facility is a one story building surrounded by on-site parking. In that regard, however, at hearing, Petitioner raised the claim that the Abraham site did not, in actuality, provide adequate parking because the zoning requirements of the City of South Miami, the municipality in which the facility is located, did not permit the required number of parking spaces to accommodate the prospective need. Petitioner sought and received permission to depose the Building and Zoning Director for the city, Sonia Lama, who ultimately indicated that the Abraham site was grandfathered in under the old zoning rule and, thereby, had adequate parking available. In any case, had this not been true, under the terms of the ITB, any zoning deficiencies could have been corrected after award, or the award rescinded without penalty to the Department. After the meeting with the committee, Mr. Towey indicated he would probably go against the committee's recommendation. One of his reasons for doing so, as he indicated to them, was the appearance certain amenities in the facility would give. In the period between the time the committee met and Mr. Towey was ready to decide, there were several newspaper articles published in the Miami area which were negative in their approach to Department leasing policies and this publicity had an effect on him. In his response to a reporter's question, in fact, Mr. Towey indicated he would not permit the lease of any property which contained such amenities while he was District Director. There is some evidence that the wet bar referred to here was a sink and counter used by agency employees to make coffee. However, before making his decision, Mr. Towey also met with Herbert Adler of Adlee. Mr. Towey advised him he was concerned about the fact that the Adlee property provided a wet bar, a private bathroom and some other amenities in that suite of offices occupied by the Department. Mr. Towey was adamant in his public and private pronouncements on the subject that there would be no such amenities in HRS offices in his District while he was in charge. At the meeting in issue, Mr. Adler made it very clear he was willing to remove all the offending amenities to bring the space into conformity with Mr. Towey's standards. Mr. Towey obviously took Adler at his word as he did not consider this matter to be an issue when he evaluated the bids. Based on his independent evaluation of the proposals, and considering all the pertinent factors, Mr. Towey decided not to concur with the committee's recommendation and instead recommended to the Department's Office of General Services that the bid be awarded to Abraham. Because his recommendation differed from that of the evaluation committee, under the provisions of Section 5-13, HRS Manual 70-1, he was required to forward additional justification for his position. In his forwarding memorandum dated March 20, 1992 to Mr. King Davis of the Department's Office of General Services, Mr. Towey listed as his reasons for disagreement with the committee's recommendation, (1) the lower term cost of Abraham's bid, (2) his opinion that the one story floor plan of Abraham was more convenient and accessible to clients, and (3) the provision for ample free parking at the Abraham site as opposed to the limited parking at the Adlee building. Petitioner claims that Mr. Towey's justification for disagreement was improper because, (a) the rental difference he cited was not based on the ITB formula and did not consider the difference in square footage offered; (b) the rental rate comparison compared a proposed lease with an existing lease, not with a proposal; and (c) the reference to on-site parking referred to the situation under the existing lease with Adlee and not to what could occur under a new lease. The major factor in Mr. Towey's decision was the price differential between the two offerings. While the difference may not have been as great as presented initially by the department staff, even taken in its most conservative light of about half that amount, and considering the appropriate figures, the difference was still considerable and significant. In the continuing period of budgetary austerity under which state operations have been and must continue to be conducted, the financial consideration loomed large in his thinking. As for the parking situation, no change for the better was provided for in Adlee's proposal and even if it were, it was but one of several factors. When Mr. Towey's March 20, 1992 memorandum in justification of his disagreement was evaluated at the Office of General services, it was determined that his decision was rational and objectively justified. Thereafter, by letter dated April 2, 1992, the Office of General Services authorized District 11 to award the lease to Abraham and this decision was transmitted to all responsive bidders by letter dated April 7, 1992. It was this action which prompted Petitioner's protest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the protest by Adlee Developers, Inc., of the award of procurement No. 590:2286 to Anthony Abraham Enterprises. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-2798 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted that the pre-bid conference was held but reject the finding that a 5% limit was mentioned. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted except for the next to last sentence which is rejected. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but not probative of any material issue. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 30. Rejected. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. - 5. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. & 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 25. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Melinda S. Gentile, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell 200 East Broward Blvd. P.O. Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Paul J. Martin, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol - Suite 1501 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Peter W. Homer, Esquire Greer, Homer & Bonner, P.A. 3400 International Place 100 S.E. 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 John Slye General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk DHRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent's determination that the bid submitted by Petitioner was non-responsive, was arbitrary, capricious, or beyond Respondent's scope of discretion as a state agency.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the formal hearing, the following relevant facts are made: A. Background The Department issued a Request For Proposal and Bid Submittal Form (BID) for a full service lease, Lease Number 700:0556, seeking to rent office space in an existing facility located in Polk County, Florida. Responses to the BID were to be filed with the Department by 10:00 a.m. on June 12, 1990. Six proposals were timely submitted in response to the BID, including McCarty's and Fearn's proposal. The Department evaluated the six proposals and made site visits to the properties proposed to be leased. The McCarty proposal received the highest evaluation score of 95.4 points, while the Fearn proposal received the second highest evaluation score of 92.6 points. Because the McCarty proposal had been found responsive to the BID and received the highest evaluation score, the Department awarded the lease contract for Lease No. 700:0556 to McCarty. Fearn filed a timely protest challenging the award to McCarty. The Fearn protest was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for hearing. However, after the protest was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings but before McCarty could intervene or a hearing could be held, the Department reviewed the McCarty proposal and found it to be non- responsive. The Department determined that the McCarty proposal was non-responsive because the McCarty proposal was for more space than authorized by the BID and that not all owners of the property proposed to be leased signed the BID. After determining that the McCarty proposal was non-responsive, the Department rejected the McCarty proposal and awarded the lease contract for Lease No. 700:0556 to Fearn. Upon Fearn withdrawing its protest, the Division of Administrative Hearings closed its file by relinquishing jurisdiction to the Department and the Department entered a Final Order dismissing the Fearn protest. By letter dated July 31, 1990, the Department advised McCarty of its decision to reject his proposal as non- responsive and award the bid to Fearn. By this same letter, the Department advised McCarty of his right to file a protest and his right to a formal administrative hearing. B. Lease Space Requirement Prior to issuing the BID the Department submitted to the Department of General Services (DGS) a Request For Prior Approval of Space Need (BPM Form 4405) wherein the Department justified, through a Letter of Agency Staffing, the need for 3,108 square feet of office space to be located in an existing facility in Auburndale, Polk County, Florida. However, the Department requested approval of only 3,017 net square feet. DGS approved the request for 3,017 net square feet of space and the Department issued the BID referred to in Finding of Fact l. The BID requested bidders to submit proposals to lease 3,017 square feet (plus or minus 3%) measured in accordance with Standard Method of Space Measurement and advised the bidder that the space offered must be within the plus or minus three percent required. The maximum square footage requested by the BID was 3,108 square feet (3017 + 3%). The McCarty proposal was for 3,150 square feet or 42 square feet over the maximum requested. The Department was aware of, and considered, the square feet of rental space proposed by each response to the BID in the initial evaluation since it rejected two proposals for exceeding this requirement by 145 and 392 square feet, respectively. The Department apparently considered the excess 42 square feet of space in the McCarty proposal in its initial evaluation but through an oversight failed to reject the McCarty proposal as it had in the other two proposals. Upon the Fearn protest being filed the Department's legal office reviewed the McCarty proposal and determined that the excess 42 square feet of space was a deviation that should not have been waived. At this point, the McCarty proposal was found to be non-responsive. The price per square foot of the McCarty proposal in all years, one through five, was less than the Fearn proposal. The total price of the lease in the McCarty proposal, including the excess 42 square feet, in all years, one through five, was less than the Fearn proposal. There was no evidence that the cost of the McCarty proposal would exceed the amount budgeted by the Department for this lease. C. Signature of Owner(s) and Transfer of Ownership Requirements. At the time McCarty signed and submitted the BID he was co-owner of the property bid with Adrian Gabaldon. Gabaldon was aware that McCarty was offering the property in question for lease to the Department having witnessed McCarty's signature on the BID and having been involved with the Department personnel concerning the BID. Section D. 4. A, General Provision, page 8 of the BID provides in pertinent part: Each proposal shall be signed by the owner,(s), corporate officer(s), or legal representative(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal McCarty's signature was the only signature, as owner, appearing on the McCarty proposal. Below McCarty's signature the word "owner" was handwritten. Gabaldon signed the McCarty proposal as a witness to McCarty's signature and not as an owner. There is insufficient evidence to establish that at the time McCarty submitted his proposal the property bid was owned by a partnership consisting of McCarty and Gabaldon. There is no printed or typewritten partnership name in the vicinity of McCarty's signature in his proposal or anywhere else in his proposal. Sometime between the date McCarty submitted his BID and the date of the hearing, Gabaldon transferred his interest in the property bid to McCarty. D. General By signing the BID, McCarty agreed to comply with all terms and conditions of the BID and certified his understanding of those terms and conditions. In accordance with Section D.10., General Provisions, page 9 of the BID, all question concerning the specifications were to be directed to C. Donald Waldron. And, although McCarty or Gabaldon may have discussed the space requirement and other matters with certain employees of the Department, they knew, or should have known, that these questions should have been directed to Waldron. Otherwise, the answer could not be relied upon. Neither McCarty or Gabaldon ever contacted Waldron concerning the terms, conditions or specifications of the BID and, more specifically, concerning the space requirement or who was required to sign the BID. Submitted with the Fearn proposal was a letter from Entrepreneur of Tampa as owner of the property bid in the Fearn proposal appointing David Fearn, CCIM and The Fearn Partnership, Inc. as its agent to submit a proposal on behalf of Entrepreneur of Tampa.
Recommendation Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated Hearing Officer, William R. Cave, held a formal hearing in the above- captioned case on October 16, 1990 in Tampa, Florida.
The Issue The issues are: (1) whether the Petitioner's notice of bid protest filed on June 5, 1996, was timely under Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, and, if not, whether Petitioner has waived its right to participate in bid protest proceedings; and (2) if Petitioner's bid protest was timely filed, whether the Respondent acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally or dishonestly in rejecting the Petitioner's bid.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a general contractor which operates in Alachua County and surrounding areas. The Respondent is the governing body of the school district in Alachua County. In April and May, 1996, the Respondent publicly advertised an Invitation to Bid on the Project which consists of hard courts for basketball, driveway paving and new drainage provisions. Petitioner and three other bidders timely submitted sealed bids to the Respondent at its office located at the E. Manning, Jr. Annex, 1817 East University Avenue, Gainesville, Florida. Petitioner's bid proposal included a Contractor's Qualification Statement setting forth Petitioner's experience and financial qualifications to act as the general contractor for the Project. There is no evidence that Petitioner is disqualified as a responsible bidder because: (a) it colluded with other bidders; (b) it based its proposal on bid prices which were obviously unbalanced; (c) it included any false entry in its bid proposal; or (d) it failed to completely fill out the required list of subcontractors. The Invitation to Bid does not set forth any other specific conditions which would disqualify an otherwise responsible bidder. However, Respondent reserves the right to reject any and all bids when it determines that such rejection is in its interest. Respondent publicly opened the bids and read them aloud at 2:00 P.M. on May 9, 1996 as required by the Invitation to Bid. Petitioner did not attend the opening of the bids. The Invitation to Bid specified that the bids would be "tabulated and evaluated by the Superintendent of Schools of Alachua County or member or members of his staff or other individual or individuals designated by him." Edward Gable is Respondent's Director of Facilities. The Superintendent designated Mr. Gable to evaluate bids received for facility projects and to formulate recommendations to Respondent. The Invitation to Bid does not set forth a time certain in which Respondent will notify bidders of its decision or intended decision. However, it does state as follows: At the next regular or special meeting of the Board or at the designated meeting thereafter, the bids, as so opened, tabulated and evaluated, and the recommend- ation of the Superintendent of Schools of Alachua County regarding them shall be presented to the lowest responsible bidder meeting the requirements of the law and the State Board of Education Regulations. In Section 19.1 of the Instructions to Bidders, Respondent informs bidders that it will award the contract to the lowest bidder as soon as possible provided that the lowest bid is reasonable and in Respondent's best interest. The Invitation to Bid provides bidders with the following notice relative to Respondent's decision or intended decision concerning a contract award: The Board shall provide notice of its decision or intended decision concerning a contract award. Notice shall be given either by posting the bid tabulation at the location where the bids were opened or by certified United States mail, return receipt requested. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in s. 120.53(5), Florida Statues, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Any person who is affected adversely by the decision or intended decision shall file with the Board a written "Notice of Protest" within seventy-two (72) hours after posting or notification. A formal written protest shall be filed within ten (10) calendar days after filing the 'Notice of Protest.' Section 17.1 of the Instructions to Bidders contains the following language concerning Respondent's decision or intended decision: 17.1 The Board shall provide notice of its decision or intended decision concerning a contract award. For any other decision, notice shall be given either by posting the bid tabulation at the location where the bids were opened or by certified United States mail, return receipt requested. Section 18.1 of the Instructions to Bidders provides as follows: Bid tabulations with recommended awards will be posted for review by interested parties at the Planning and Construction Department, 1817 East University Avenue, Gainesville, Florida, following the bid opening, and will remain posted for a period of 72 hours. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute as (sic) waiver of proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The Invitation to Bid and the Instructions to Bidders distinguish between a protest concerning a contract award and a protest related to the specifications contained in an invitation to bid or in a request for proposals. In the latter context, a bidder must file a written protest within seventy-two (72) hours after receipt of the project plans and specifications. This case does not involve a protest of a bid solicitation. By virtue of the above referenced provisions in the Invitation to Bid and the Instructions to Bidders, Respondent gave all bidders sufficient and reasonable notice that a posted tabulation together with its recommendation constituted Respondent's intended decision. The bid specifications in the instant case required bidders to submit a bid on a base contract for certain school facility improvements with alternate bids relative to additional improvements in the event Respondent decided to include such features in the Project. Petitioner's base bid was $135,000; it was the lowest bid submitted. The next low bid was from Watson Construction Company, Inc. (Watson) at $133,345. Two additional bids were higher than Watson's bid. On the morning of May 30, 1996 one of Petitioner's employees, Roger "Dave" Williams" phoned Mr. Gable to inquire about the status of the bid award. Mr. Gable was unavailable to take the call. Mr. Williams left a message for Mr. Gable to return the call. Next, at approximately 10:00 a.m. on May 30, 1996, Mr. Williams called a member of Mr. Gable's staff who stated that, as far as he knew, Respondent had not made a decision on the contract. Mr. Gable completed his evaluation and posted the bid tabulation on May 30, 1996 at 3:00 p.m. Included on the bid tabulation was the following statement: RECOMMENDED ACTION: It is recommended that the Board reject the low base bid as submitted by D. E. Wallace Construction Corporation, Alachua, Florida, due to past unsatisfactory contract performance. It is recommended that the Board accept the base bid of $133,345. and award a contract for construction totaling $133,345. to Watson Construction, Gainesville, Florida. Completion of this project shall be within ninety (90) consecutive calendar days from the date indicated in the 'Notice to Proceed.' The bid tabulation clearly notes that "[f]ailure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120, Florida Statutes." Respondent regularly posts notices of intended decisions concerning bid awards on a bulletin board in the main hallway of the E. D. Manning Annex. A title at the top of the bulletin board identifies it as the location for bid postings. Respondent posts a copy of Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, and a copy of the Respondent's Policy DJC--Bidding Requirements below the title of the bulletin board. Respondent has adopted Policy DJC as a rule through a formal rulemaking process. Policy DJC states as follows in pertinent part: The Board shall provide notice of its decision or intended decision concerning a bid solicitation or a contract award. For a bid solicitation, notice of a decision or intended decision shall be given by United States mail or by hand delivery. For any other Board decisions, notice shall be given either by posting the bid tabulation at the location where the bids were opened or by certified United States mail, return receipt requested. The notice shall contain the following two paragraphs. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in s. 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Any person who is affected adversely by the decision or intended decision shall file with the Board a written notice of protest within 72 hours after the posting or notification. A formal written protest shall be filed within 10 calendar days after filing the notice of protest. . . . Failure to file a timely notice of protest or failure to file a timely formal written protest shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Immediately below Policy DJC is a space where Respondent always posts its bid tabulations which include the recommended action on each project and notice that "[f]ailure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120, Florida Statutes." The bottom of the board, in large letters, contains the following words: "Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes." This permanent bulletin board, read as a whole, contains more than enough information to provide bidders with notice of an intended decision and the time frames within which a disappointed bidder must file a written protest. Although he was not required to do so, Mr. Gable telephoned Petitioner's office on the afternoon of May 30, 1996 to advise its president, D. Wallace, of the recommendation. Petitioner was not available to accept that call. Mr. Gable placed another courtesy telephone call to Petitioner on the morning of May 31, 1996. During that conversation, Mr. Gable informed Mr. Wallace of the recommendation for Respondent to reject Petitioner's bid and accept the next lowest bid. Petitioner's representative inspected the posting board in the afternoon on May 31, 1996. On June 3, 1996, Respondent sent Petitioner by facsimile transmission a copy of the agenda for Respondent's June 4 meeting, items H.1. of which was: H.1. Bid Award for Project SBAC CB436 - Newberry High School Site Improvements. Bids for the construction of this project were received on May 9, 1996. Recommendation will be presented. The seventy-two hour window in which a bidder may file a protest does not include Saturdays, Sundays or holidays. Therefore, the time in which a bidder could have filed a protest of Respondent's intended decision in this case, expired June 4, 1996 at 3:00 p.m. No bidder had filed a written protest at that time. Respondent held a regular meeting on June 4, 1996, at 7:00 p.m. When Respondent considered the bid award for Project SBAC CB 436, Mr. Gable presented the recommendation that the Board reject Petitioner's bid and accept Watson's bid due to Petitioner's past unsatisfactory contract performance. Petitioner's counsel spoke against the recommendation. At that time the Petitioner had not filed any written notice of protest. After discussion, Respondent voted to award the contract to Watson. Respondent and Watson executed a contract for the construction of the Project on June 4, 1996. The next day, on June 5, 1996, at 3:40 p.m., Petitioner filed with Respondent, by facsimile transmission, a Notice of Protest challenging the award of the contract for the Project to Watson. The filing of this protest was untimely. Therefore, Petitioner waived its right to protest Respondent's decision or intended decision on the Project. The basis of Respondent's intended decision and ultimate final decision to reject Petitioner's low bid was due to Petitioner's past unsatisfactory performance. The following facts support a finding that Petitioner was not a responsible bidder. Respondent awarded Petitioner the contract for a previous construction project, Project SBAC CA 149, Additions and Renovations for Terwillegar Elementary School. That project included the construction of a number of school buildings. The contract amount was approximately 5.1 million dollars. The last building in the Terwillegar project became "substantially complete" in September, 1995. In January, 1996, Mr. Gable wrote a letter to Petitioner, informing him of the outstanding punch list items for the Terwillegar project. A contractor must complete punch list items and have them approved prior to "final completion." In the Terwillegar Project, the contract provided for compilation of items on the punch list within thirty (30) days from "substantial completion." As of May 30, 1996, Petitioner had not responded to Mr. Gable's letter about the Terwillegar punch list, nor had it completed the punch list. Many of the items on the list were minor, but some of the items involved the safety or integrity of the building structure. The Terwillegar project contract also contained a project closeout section which listed a variety of documents and other materials that Petitioner had to provide to Respondent as part of the "final completion." Included in the Terwillegar project's closeout were items such as insurance change-over requirements, warranties, workmanship bonds, maintenance agreements, final certifications, a final payment request, consent of surety, maintenance manuals, record drawings, record specifications, record project date, and operating instructions. As of May 30, 1996, Petitioner had not provided any of the Terwillegar project closeout materials to the Respondent. The delay in project closeout, after substantial completion, is completely unacceptable to the Respondent. Prior to the opening of bids in this case, Petitioner filed a civil suit against Respondent seeking approximately $1,500,000 representing the unpaid contract balance, subcontractors' and material suppliers' claims for labor and material, and other delay-related damages on the Terwillegar project. Petitioner's claim that Respondent's intended decision and/or final decision was based on personal animosity and bias against Mr. Wallace is contrary to more persuasive evidence. Specifically, Petitioner's Exhibit 6 is not persuasive evidence of bias. The Petitioner's president, D.E. Wallace, has over 30 years in the construction field, including 22 years as an owner/operator of a general contractor company. He has completed more than 100 projects in north Florida in the past eighteen (18) years, including 30 school board construction projects. Mr. Wallace has worked on approximately nine (9) school board projects in Alachua County. He holds himself out as being "completely familiar and knowledgeable in government and building codes, ordinances, regulations, etc."
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's protest as untimely. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: David L. Worthy, Esquire 4128 Northwest 13th Street Gainesville, Florida 32609 Thomas L. Wittmer, Esquire 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601 Robert W. Hughes, Superintendent Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601-5498 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent's intent to award a contract for bridge-tending services (RFP DOT 92/93 2088 REBID) to Intervenor constitutes fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, illegal or dishonest action.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to findings of fact set forth in paragraphs 1.-12., below. Stipulated Facts Respondent issued the RFP for bridge-tending services on May 14, 1993. Proposals submitted in response to the RFP were opened on June 16, 1993. Proposals were submitted by five firms, including Petitioner and Intervenor. All proposals were determined at the time to be responsive. A Technical Review Committee (TRC) was appointed to review the technical portion of the proposals. The three members of the TRC were Alan Hyman, J. L. Gillis, and Yingyong Sujjavanich. The members reviewed the technical portion of the proposals on June 17, 1993. The evaluation forms completed by the TRC and a summary score sheet were delivered to Respondent's purchasing office on the morning of June 18, 1993. The price proposal was evaluated by Respondent's purchasing office. The price evaluation of each proposal was performed by applying a formula which compared the submitted price quotations. After the scores for the technical proposal and the cost proposals were totalled, it was determined that Intervenor's proposal had earned the highest number of points. This result was presented to Respondent's District 2 Executive Committee and a recommendation was communicated by the Purchasing Director to award the RFP to Intervenor. The Executive Committee accepted the recommendation and directed that the contract be awarded to Intervenor. On June 18, 1993, at 4 p.m., the bid tabs were posted noticing Respondent's intent to award the contract to Intervenor. On or about July 6, 1993, Petitioner requested a meeting with Respondent's representatives regarding the RFP. That meeting was held on July 9, 1993. At the meeting, Petitioner raised an issue regarding an arithmetic error in the scoring of the technical proposals. Intervenor remained the proposer with the highest number of points. However, another proposal formerly ranked as number two was lowered to number three status and Petitioner, previously ranked number three, was raised to number two rank. On July 12, 1993, Respondent posted an amended bid tab indicating its intent to award the contract to Intervenor. Other Facts Respondent chose to score the bid pricing, a non- subjective task, in Respondent's District 2 office. Technical portions of the proposals were reviewed by the TRC, comprised of members from Respondent's District 5 office. This unusual step was taken by Respondent in order to reduce prejudice to any proposal in view of previous accusations made against District 2 employees. Bud Rosier, Respondent's employee, has overall responsibility for bridge determination that District 5 employees chosen as committee members were qualified to evaluate the proposals. Each response to the RFP contained a technical proposal and a price proposal. Intervenor's technical proposal received 1.33 points less than Petitioner's technical proposal. The price proposals, as noted above, were scored in accordance with a mathematical formula that compares price proposals to each other and does not take any subjective factors into consideration. Intervenor was awarded 5.55 points, compared to Petitioner who received no points for a proposal more than $140,000 higher for the initial year of the contemplated contract. Although members of the TRC were not given any background information by Respondent regarding the competing proposals, beyond that contained in the submitted bid packages, no information was withheld from the committee. The members were given adequate time to review the proposals and do any desired independent background checking regarding past performance of any proposer, although no requirement in the RFP mandated such a background review. At least one of the TRC members, Sujjavanich, chose not to independently research past performance of the Intervenor. No evidence was offered at hearing with regard to whether the other two members independently researched any of the proposers' past performances. Even if review of past performance, apart from the materials submitted by the proposers, were required by provisions of the RFP, failure of the evaluators to accomplish that task would result only in the loss to Intervenor of the 3.66 points awarded for past performance and Intervenor, with a remaining total of 81.89 points, would remain the highest ranked proposer. In view of the objective process used to arrive at the results of the evaluation of the prices of the competing proposals, there was no need to provide this information to the members of the TRC who were doing the technical proposal evaluation. Although the RFP provided that the TRC would be given such results, the failure of Respondent's personnel to provide this information to the evaluators could not have made any difference in the final result since the committee, using the objective price evaluation criteria, would have arrived at the same result as the purchasing office on cost scores. The admitted failure to provide the superfluous cost information to the TRC is inadequate to show that such omission resulted in prejudice to the final scores of any of the competing proposals and must be considered to be only a minor variation from the RFP by Respondent. Contrary to Petitioner's allegations, there is no competent substantial evidence to support any finding that the members of the TRC (Hyman, Gillis, and Sujjavanich) did not possess required background, experience or professional credentials adequate for evaluating proposals for bridge-tending services. All three members of the TRC were familiar with the RFP, attachments to the RFP, bridge-tending procedures and bridge-tending qualification procedures. There is no competent substantial evidence to establish that Intervenor's proposal is not financially feasible. Proposed utilization of 72 bridge-tenders by Intervenor for a total price of $673,333.44 does not mean that 72 bridge-tender positions would be established or filled, or that the positions would be paid at the rate proposed by Petitioner of $8.40 per hour. The evidence establishes that a proposer would need an optimum number of bridge requirements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting the award of the bid in RFP DOT 92/93 2088 Rebid to Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-4271BID The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. 1.-12. Accepted. 13.-16. Rejected, relevancy. 17. Accepted. 18.-19. Rejected, relevancy. 20.-25. Accepted. 26.-27. Rejected, cumulative. 28. Rejected, credibility. 29.-33. Rejected, relevancy. 34.-35. Accepted. 36.-37. Rejected, argumentative and mischaracterization. 38.-46. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 47.-51. Rejected, relevancy. Intervenor's Proposed Findings. 1.-2. Rejected, cumulative. 3.-4. Accepted. 5.-6. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, cumulative. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, argumentative. 10.-11. Rejected, unnecessary. 12.-13. Adopted by reference. 14.-16. Accepted, but not verbatim. 17.-22. Adopted by reference. 23. Rejected, unnecessary. 24.-30. Adopted, but not verbatim. 31. Rejected, narrative. 32.-35. Rejected, cumulative. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-11. Adopted. 12. Rejected, unnecessary. 13.-17. Adopted, not verbatim. 18.-19. Rejected, cumulative. 20.-22. Adopted. 23. Rejected, recitation of RFP. 24.-26. Adopted. 27. Rejected, recitation of RFP. 28.-29. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Cassidy, III, Esquire. John O. Williams, Esquire Renaissance Square 1343 East Tennessee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Carolyn S. Holifield, Esquire Mark D. Tucker, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Timothy G. Schoenwalder, Esquire 204-B South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3068 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building # 562 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The ultimate issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent should award a contract in accordance with an invitation to bid to the Petitioner, to some other bidder, or reject all bids and reissue an invitation. Petitioner contends that it was the low bidder in response to the invitation; that its bid was responsive; and to the extent that it was not responsive, any defects were of a minor sort which should be waived. Petitioner contends that the Respondent has previously waived irregularities such as existed in the Petitioner's bid and should therefore waive them in this case. The Respondent contends that the Petitioner's bid was not responsive, that the irregularities in Petitioner's bid are not minor, that any mistakes the Respondent has made in past acquisitions should not be repeated, and that the contract should be awarded to another company.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent issued an invitation to bid for a project known as the "Animal Science/Dairy Science Building" at the University of Florida. The project was given No. BR-108 by the Respondent. Petitioner was the lowest bidder in response to the invitation. The next lowest bidder, Charles R. Perry Construction Company, submitted a bid approximately $37,000 higher than Petitioner's bid. Perry has not filed any formal protest nor intervened in this proceeding. Petitioner is a responsible contractor and has in the past entered into construction contracts with the Respondent. Petitioner's bid was rejected by the Respondent. The Petitioner protested the rejection of its bid in a timely manner. Paragraph "B-15" of the bid specifications provides in pertinent part, as follows: In order that the Owner may be assured that only qualified and competent sub- contractors will be employed on the project, each Bidder shall submit with his Proposal a list of the subcontractors who would perform the work for each Divi- sion of the Specifications as indicated by the "List of Subcontractors" form contained in these Specifications... only one subcontractor shall be listed for each phase of the work. * * * No change shall be made in the list of subcontractors, before or after the award of a contract, unless agreed to in writing by the Owner. Section "B" of the invitation for bid provided space for the bidder to list the name and address of subcontractors for the roofing, masonry, plumbing, mechanical, electrical, meat processing equipment, and controls and instrumentation phases of the project. In Section "B" of its bid, Petitioner listed two subcontractors for the plumbing, mechanical, and controls and instrumentation phases of the project. Listing two subcontractors does not comport with the bid specification requiring that only one subcontractor be listed for each phase. Petitioner listed two subcontractors because one of the subcontractors submitted a proposal to Petitioner only fifteen minutes prior to the time when the bid had to be submitted, and Petitioner was unsure of whether the last-minute proposal included all of the work that the Petitioner anticipated would be required. In addition, Petitioner felt that one of the subcontractors may not have been acceptable to the Respondent. The requirement that bidders list only one subcontractor for each phase of a project helps to discourage "bid shopping." Bid shopping is a practice whereby a contractor who receives a bid from a subcontractor approaches another subcontractor with that bid and encourages the other subcontractor to reduce its price. If the other subcontractor responds, this reduced price can be taken back to the original subcontractor. The original subcontractor is then confronted with the choices of either lowering its bid or losing the project. Bid shopping that occurs after a bid has been accepted by the owner does not benefit the owner. It benefits only the bidder, who is able to reduce its costs and therefore increase its profit. Requiring that one subcontractor be listed for each phase cannot serve to completely eliminate bid shopping. A contractor could still bid shop by listing itself as the subcontractor, then after winning the contract shop between several subcontractors. A contractor could also bid shop by changing subcontractors after the bid award. In either case, however, the contractor would need to secure the approval of the owner. The practice is thus discouraged. If a bidder lists two subcontractors for a phase of the project, that bidder would have an advantage over those who listed only one subcontractor. Listing two subcontractors enables the bidder to make a choice as to the best subcontract bid at a time later than the choice is made by bidders who list only one subcontractor. In addition, listing two subcontractors makes it easier for the bidder to engage in bid shopping, which would be more difficult for bidders who listed only one subcontractor. Paragraph "B-24" of the bid specifications for this project provides in pertinent part: The Contract will be awarded . . . to the lowest qualified bidder pro- vided his bid is reasonable and it is in the best interest of the Owner to accept it. * * * The Owner reserves the right to waive any informality in bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the Owner. The listing of two subcontractors for phases of the project is not a mere informality in the bid. It is directly contrary to Paragraph "B-15" of the bid specifications. It would not be in the interest of the owner to accept a bid in which two subcontractors are listed for phases of the project. The integrity of the acquisition process would be damaged by allowing such a deviation because a bidder who listed two subcontractors would have gained an advantage over bidders who complied with the bid specifications. It is not in the best interest of the Respondent to waive the defect in the Petitioner's bid. On at least two prior occasions, the Respondent awarded contracts to bidders who listed more than one subcontractor per phase of the work. One of these projects was for a gymnasium at Florida Atlantic University (Project No. BR-603). Another was for a window replacement project at Florida State University (Project No. BR-342). In at least three other projects, the Respondent awarded contracts where the bidder failed to list the name of any subcontractor for one or more phases of the work. These were for the cancer center at the University of South Florida (Project No. BR-569), the student housing facility at the University of South Florida (Project No. BR-576), and an expansion project at Florida A & M University (Project No. BR-343). The bid specifications for all of these projects were not offered into evidence; however, the Respondent had utilized the same specifications as required in this project at all pertinent times. Failing to list any subcontractor for a phase of a project constitutes approximately the same defect in a bid response as listing two subcontractors. It provides even greater opportunities for bid shopping and an advantage to the bidder over those who list subcontractors as required by the specifications. In several other projects, it appears that the Respondent has awarded contracts to bidders whose bids contained defects of the same magnitude, but a different sort than the listing of two subcontractors. It does not appear that the Respondent has awarded contracts where bidders have listed more than one subcontractor, no subcontractor, or otherwise violated bid specifications because of any policy or because of any expressed waiver of the defect. Rather, it appears that the Respondent has not adequately policed bids to determine responsiveness to the bid specifications. This is especially true with respect to the listing of subcontractors. It appears that no one on the Respondent's staff took the responsibility to consider whether one subcontractor was listed for each phase of a project as required in the specifications. The only policy that the Respondent established was a policy of being too lax in examining bids. The Petitioner did not list two subcontractors for various phases of this project because of any reliance on past conduct of the Respondent. Petitioner's agent overlooked the bid requirements in Preparing its bid response. In prior bids submitted by the Petitioner in response to bid invitations issued by Respondent, Petitioner listed only one subcontractor, as required. Generally, unless it is otherwise required, Petitioner prefers to list two subcontractors because of the flexibility it provides to the owner and to Petitioner. Petitioner was not aware that Respondent had previously awarded contracts to bidders who listed more than one subcontractor for a phase of the work when it submitted its bid in this instance.
Findings Of Fact On or about August 10, 1979, HRS caused a legal advertisement to be published concerning its Purchase Order No. 52579, requesting bids for window film installation pursuant to HRS Bid No. 30-497WR. The Invitation to Bid provided, in part, that: As the best interests of the State may require, the right is reserved to make award(s) by individual item, group of items, all or none or a combination thereof; to reject any and all bids or waive any minor irregularity or technicality in bids received. When it is determined there is competition to the lowest responsive bidder, then other bids may not be evaluated. Bidders are cautioned to make no assumptions unless their bid has been evaluated as being responsive. Among the special conditions of the Invitation to Bid was the following: The successful bidder will furnish and install window insulation film on all glass exposures of buildings designated as one through eight with the exception of these [sic] windows now having film installed. These buildings are commonly known as the Winewood Complex which is located at One Winewood Blvd., Tallahassee, Florida 32301. Subleased or other occupied space will be an addition to the basic glass square footage of buildings five, six, seven and eight now occupied by the Department of Corrections, Winewood Office Park Lmtd. and the Parole and Probation Commission. Prospective bidders will be provided these applicable locations by the project manager. The bid will contain a diagram and listing of these square footages. The computations of total square footages of applicable glass areas will be separated by buildings. This is necessary so that after the installation of the film on each building is completed and accepted by the project manager, an invoice can be submitted for payment. [Emphasis added]. In addition, tee following clause was also contained in the Special Conditions of the Invitation to Bid: All work performed by the Contractor in completing the subject project shall be guaranteed by the Contractor against all defect resulting from the use of materials, equipment and workmanship for a period of five years from the date of final completion of the subject project. If, within any guarantee period, repairs or changes are required in connection with the guarantee work, which in the opinion of the Owner is rendered necessary as a result of the use of materials, equipment or workmanship which are defective or inferior or not in accordance with the terms of the Contract, the Contractor shall, promptly upon receipt of notice from the Owner and without expense to the Owner, proceed to: Place in satisfactory condition in very [sic] particular all of such guaranteed work, correct all defects therein; and make good all damages to the structure or contents thereof, which in the opinion of the Owner, is the result of the use of materials, equipment, or workmanship which are inferior, defective, or not in accordance with the terms of the Contract; and made [sic] good any work or materials or the equipment and contects [sic] of structures or site disturbed in fulfilling any such guarantee. [Emphasis added]. The Special Conditions also provided that: No interpretation of the meaning of the Drawings, specifications, or other Bidding Documents, no correction of any apparent ambitquity [sic], inconsistency or error therein, will be made to any Bidder orally. Every request for such interpretation or correction should be in writing, addressed to the Project Manager. All such interpretations and supplemental instruction will be in the form of written addenda to the Bidding Documents. Only the interpretation or correction so given by the Project Manager in writing, shall be binding and prospective Bidders are advised that no other source is authorized to give information concerning, or to explain or interpret the Bidding Documents. Finally, the Invitation to Bid also provided for modification of bids if received in writing prior to bid opening. HRS distributed more than 25 bid invitations pursuant to the aforementioned bid, and in response thereto received four bids, one of which was a "no bid". Of the three remaining bidders, Solar-X of Tallahassee submitted a total bid of $34,624.88, based upon a measurement of 29,096 square feet at a price of $1.19 per square foot; Florida Solar Power, Inc. submitted a total bid of $30,079.14, based upon 30,693 square feet at $.98 per square foot; and, finally, Petitioner submitted a total bid of $43,555.10 based upon a calculation of 37,874 square feet at $1.15 per square foot. The bids of Solar-X of Tallahassee and Florida Solar Power, Inc. were determined to be unresponsive to the Invitation to Bid for reasons not here pertinent. Although Petitioner's bid contained a total square footage on which it proposed to install window film, the bid did not break down the area of glass on a per-building basis as required by the conditions of the Invitation to Bid. In addition, the conditions of the Invitation to Bid required that building space occupied by sublessors be separately computed in bid responses in order to attempt to pass on to those sublessors their pro-rata share of the cost. Petitioner did not separate this space in its bid as required. Petitioner also failed to furnish with its bid a diagram of exposed glass area in each building as required in the special conditions. Finally, Petitioner's bid response contained the following warranty provision: . . .3M Company and the [Petitioner] warrants [sic] "SCOTCHING" Brand Solar Control films against peeling, cracking, crazing, or loosening for a period of five (5) years after installation in the event the product is found to be defective under this warranty. [Petitioner] will replace such quantity of the film proved to be defective with the [Petitioner] additionally providing the reapplication labor free of charge for the first two (2) years of the warranty. The customer shall pay for any reapplication labor charges during the last three (3) years of the warranty. . .[Emphasis added]. At final hearing, a representative of Petitioner testified that this warranty was the manufacturer's warranty, and that Petitioner, as the seller of the product, intended that full warranty protection in accordance with the conditions of the Invitation to Bid be part of Petitioner's bid. However, nothing to this affect appears in Petitioner's bid, nor did Petitioner attempt to modify its bid in writing before bid opening to make HRS aware of its intentions in this regard. Although bid opening was initially scheduled for August 24, 1979, the opening date was extended to September 4, 1979, by addendum to the Invitation to Bid. After opening, bids ware reviewed by the staff of the Director of the Office of General Service in HRS for technical compliance with the Invitation to Bid. As a result of this review, it was determined that Petitioner's bid was the only bid submitted which complied with all provisions of the bid specifications, and the staff, therefore, recommended award of the contract to Petitioner. At this point the question of the award of the contract came to the attention of the Purchasing Director of HRS's Central General Services, whose office is responsible for evaluation of bids for compliance with the terms and conditions of an Invitation to Bid, state purchasing law and administrative rules relating to state commodity purchases. During the course of this review, it was determined that Petitioner's bid did not comply with the conditions of the Invitation to Bid in that it failed to break down its bid on a per-building basis and, additionally, improperly qualified the five-year warranty requirement contained in the Invitation to Bid and its conditions. At the Federal hearing in this cause the Purchasing Director for Central General Services also testified that he had received oral communications from other vendors, some of whom submitted bids and some who did not, to the effect that the technical specifications of the Invitation to Bid were tailored to the products sold by Petitioner to such an extent as to effectively close the bidding process to competition. None of these vendors protested the content of the specifications as required in the Invitation to Bid, nor was any direct testimony adduced at final hearing in this cause from these vendors. Although the Division of Purchasing of the Department of General Services also concluded that the bid specifications were too restrictive, there is insufficient evidence in the record in this proceeding upon which to base a conclusion that the specifications contained in the Invitation to Bid were either tailored to Petitioner's product, or were so restrictive as to limit competitive bidding. Indeed, one of the actual bidders, Solar-X of Tallahassee, submitted a bid which complied with the technical specifications, but was rejected because it included an unacceptable contingency clause for late delivery. After extensive in-house review by various HRS employees, a letter dated October 4, 1979, was forwarded to all vendors advising that HRS, after ". . .an extensive analysis of the bid responses. . ." had decided to reject all bids and issue a second call for bids. This letter also indicated that ". . .areas of concern which were expressed relative to the initial invitation will be addressed in the second call." The letter did not attempt to further identify the "areas of concern." The facts of record in this proceeding clearly establish that Petitioner's bid was not responsive to the Invitation to Bid. Petitioner did not include in its bid a diagram of each building on which window film was to be installed, nor did the bid indicate the number of square feet contained in each building. The two vendors whose bids were rejected apparently had no difficulty complying with this requirement. As a result, HRS was precluded from comparing the per-building cost of the competing bids, and, had the contract been awarded to Petitioner, HRS could not have determined the proper amount of periodic progress segments without performing independent measurement. Most importantly, however, Petitioner improperly qualified the five- year warranty provision contained in the Special Conditions. Petitioner's bid, on its face, limited its responsibility to replacement of defective window film during the five-year warranty period, and required that HRS be responsible for payment of labor charges for reinstallation during the last three years of the warranty period. This warranty qualification was clearly contrary to the requirement that any product replacement or reinstallation be without expense to HRS for a period of five years from the date of final completion of the project. There was extensive testimony at final hearing concerning allegations by Petitioner of improper conduct on the part of the HRS Purchasing Director for Central General Services which allegedly resulted in the decision to reject all bids and submit a second call for bids. Testimony on this issue involved Petitioner's assertion that the HRS employee's relationship by marriage to one of the unsuccessful bidders led to his conclusion that the technical specifications were so narrowly drawn as to preclude a consideration of his relative's product, and that the specifications should be redrafted so as to allow consideration of products other than Petitioner's. In light of the fact that Petitioner's bid was not responsive to the Invitation to Bid, in that it improperly qualified the warranty required, and did not contain square footage computations on a per-building basis, it is unnecessary to reach the question of the propriety of any conduct on the part of the HRS employee. The propriety of the rejection of Petitioner's bid was determined by Petitioner's failure to comply with the Special Conditions of the Invitation to Bid, and could not have been affected by the alleged misconduct on the part of an employee of HRS. Both Petitioner and Respondent have submitted proposed findings of fact for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that such proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in this Recommended Order, they have been specifically rejected as being irrelevant to the issues in this cause, or as not having been supported by the evidence.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(e) and (1)(m), Florida Statutes (2003),1 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2), and if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed real estate sales associate. She was licensed in 2003. Her license number is 3061179. Respondent was working for Weichert Realty in the Orlando area at the time of the final hearing. She started working for that firm in October 2006, and prior to that, she “did not do a whole lot with [her] license as far as practicing real estate.” Respondent filled out and submitted her license application over the Internet. She submitted a signed notarized statement dated January 15, 2003, attesting that she answered the questions in the application “completely and truthfully to the best of [her] knowledge.” She also submitted a fingerprint card. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that there were at least three material misstatements and omissions in Respondent’s license application. First, Respondent did not provide a Social Security number (SSN) in her license application. The SSN that she subsequently provided to the Division, 378-72-0704, was incorrect. Respondent testified that her SSN is 378-62-0704. That is the SSN listed for Respondent in the driver’s license records maintained by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). There is evidence suggesting that Respondent’s SSN may actually be 380-80-3178, but the evidence is not clear and convincing on that point.3 The document on which Respondent provided the incorrect SSN was not offered into evidence by the Division. Respondent denied providing an incorrect SSN, and she testified that if she did provide an incorrect SSN, it must have been typographical error. Second, the only name listed for Respondent in her license application was Yolanda Orr, which was Respondent’s married name and her legal name at the time she submitted her application. Respondent answered “no” to the question that asked whether she has ever “used, been known as or called by another name (example - maiden name . . .) or alias other than the name singed to the application.” (Emphasis supplied.) Respondent’s maiden name is Yolanda Small. She used that name until July 1998, when she was married. She was divorced in February 2006, and she is again using her maiden name. Respondent currently has two valid forms of identification issued by DHSMV: a Florida driver’s license in the name of Yolanda D. Small (No. S540-964-67-7491) and a Florida identification card in the name of Yolanda D. Orr (No. O600-964-57-7490). The driver’s license was issued in March 2006,4 and expires in July 2010; the identification card was issued in August 2002, and expires in July 2007. The birth date listed on the driver’s license is July 9, 1967, whereas the birth date listed on the identification card is July 9, 1957. Respondent testified that her middle name is Daniella, not Denise. She further testified that she has never used the name Yolanda Denise Orr. In response to a request to the state court in Michigan for records relating to Respondent, the Division was provided documentation of multiple traffic offenses committed in Flint, Michigan in 1999 and 2001 by Yolanda Denise Orr, as well as documentation of criminal offenses committed in Michigan by Yolanda Daniella Orr and Yolanda Danielle Orr. The traffic records do not list the defendant’s Social Security number, but the birth date listed in the records matches Respondent’s birth date. Respondent’s testimony that the traffic offenses did not involve her was not persuasive, nor was her claim there must be multiple Yolanda Orr’s in Flint, Michigan, with the same birth date as hers. Respondent admitted to being in Flint, Michigan at the time of the traffic offenses, and she admitted that she drove a Ford vehicle at the time of the ticket that was issued to Yolanda Denise Orr in October 2001 while driving a Ford. Moreover, the Michigan driver’s license number of Yolanda Denise Orr contained in the traffic records -- O600961139544 -- is identical (except for one number) to the Michigan driver’s license number -- O600961135544 -- that Respondent surrendered to DHSMV when she first applied for a Florida driver’s license. The evidence is clear and convincing that the Yolanda Denise Orr referred to in the traffic records is Respondent, and that Respondent failed to disclose that name (and her maiden name, Yolanda Small) in her license application. Third, Respondent only disclosed one criminal offense in response to the question in the application that asked whether she had “ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) . . . .” The criminal offense that Respondent disclosed was, according to the application, a 1987 offense in Louisiana which Respondent “used the wrong social security number” when “filling out [her] financial aid papers for the first time.” There is no evidence that Respondent was prosecuted for such an offense in Louisiana. Respondent was, however, prosecuted in federal court in Michigan in 1993 for using a false SSN on two separate student loan applications. Those offenses were prosecuted as part of an indictment that also included four counts of filing fraudulent tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service and two counts of using a false SSN on tax returns. In February 1995, Respondent pled guilty to one count of filing a fraudulent tax return, one count of using a false SSN on a tax return, and one count of using a false SSN on student loan applications. The other counts of the indictment were dismissed as part of her plea agreement. In September 1995, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of the offenses to which she pled guilty and was sentenced to six months in federal prison, followed by three years of probation. She was also required to pay restitution in the amount of $8,177 to the Internal Revenue Service and restitution in the amount of $2,761 to the U.S. Department of Education. Respondent testified that “the whole reason the [federal] case came about” was that she filed a tax return not knowing that one had already been filed on her behalf by H&R Block; that the investigation into the “double” filing of the tax return led to the charge involving the “student loan application that had the wrong social security number on it”; and that it was her understanding that the offenses related to the student loan application submitted to Grambling State University, not any colleges in Michigan. Respondent’s testimony regarding the circumstances giving rise to the federal offenses was not credible because, among other things, she was charged with filing false tax returns on three separate occasions -- in 1990, 1991, and 1992 - - not just one time. The background check conducted on Respondent based upon the fingerprint card that she submitted as part of her license application identified two additional criminal offenses that Respondent did not disclose in her application. The first undisclosed offense was a 1990 felony retail fraud offense prosecuted in state court in Michigan. Respondent pled guilty to the offense and was sentenced to one year of probation. The record does not reflect the circumstances surrounding the retail fraud offense, but Respondent described it as “basically a petty theft.” The second undisclosed offense was a 1991 bad check charge, which was also prosecuted in state court in Michigan. The case was not resolved until February 2001 because, according to Respondent, it involved a check she wrote prior to leaving for college and she was unaware that that a case was pending against her until she returned to Michigan after college. Respondent was required to disclose criminal traffic offenses in her license applications; she was not required to disclose traffic offenses such as “parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations.” The traffic records suggest that several of the offenses may have been criminal in nature (e.g., driving with a suspended license), but the evidence was not clear and convincing on that issue.5 Respondent testified that she did not disclose the state court offenses because she did not remember them at the time she submitted her license application. She testified that she considered the federal offenses to be related and that she thought that disclosing one of the offenses was adequate since the other offenses were related and prosecuted together. Respondent’s explanation as to why she did not disclose all of her federal offenses is not entirely unreasonable under the circumstances. The offenses were all prosecuted in a single criminal proceeding and, even though they involved offenses committed in Michigan between 1990 and 1992 (rather than in Louisiana in 1987), they did involve use of an incorrect SSN on a student loan application. Respondent’s explanation as to why she did not disclose the offenses prosecuted in state court was not plausible. It is understandable that Respondent might not recall all of the details of the retail fraud offense since it occurred more than 10 years before the date of her application, but her testimony that she did not even remember the existence of the offense at the time she filled out her application was not credible or reasonable. Respondent’s testimony that she did not remember the bad check offense at the time she filled out her license application was even less credible because the court records related to that offense reflect that the case was not finally resolved until February 2001, which only two years prior to the date of Respondent’s license application. Respondent testified that she was told by a Division employee that she did not need to disclose all of the counts of the federal case because the related offenses would be discovered as part of the background screening based upon the fingerprint card submitted by Respondent. Respondent offered no evidence to corroborate her unpersuasive, self-serving testimony on this point. Respondent testified that she was directed by the same Division employee to provide a supplemental letter to the Division explaining the federal offenses, and that she did so. However, there is no record of what, if anything, Respondent submitted to the Division. Respondent’s application did not go to the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) for approval even though a criminal history was disclosed in the application. The Commission policy in effect at the time authorized the Division to approve such applications on a case-by-case basis. The policy did not require an applicant such as Respondent to appear before the Commission, as is the case under current Commission policy. Respondent did not present any evidence of mitigation at the final hearing. However, in her post-hearing filing, she stated, “I am a single mother, and as such, I rely on my real estate business as my only source of income.”
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order that: finds Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (Count I of the Administrative Complaint); finds Respondent guilty of violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2) and, hence, Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Count II of the Administrative Complaint); revokes Respondent’s license; and imposes an administrative fine of $1,000 or the Division’s investigative costs, whichever is less. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2007.
The Issue On May 12, 2004, did Respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT), act illegally, arbitrarily, dishonestly, or fraudulently when it cancelled the posting and noticed its intent to reject the bid of Rosiek Construction Co., Inc. (Rosiek), in relation to financial project Nos. 256903-1-52-01 and 256903-1-56-01, Pinellas Bayway Bridge Replacement, SR 682 (the Project)? § 120.57(3)(f), Fla. Stat. (2004).
Findings Of Fact The subject of this protest is financial project Nos. 256903-1-52-01 and 256903-1-56-01, Pinellas Bayway Bridge Replacement. Respondent and 12 other pre-qualified bidders received copies of the bid solicitation notice, plans and specifications for the Project at issue. Rosiek submitted a responsive bid for the Pinellas Bayway Bridge Replacement on April 28, 2004. There were no other bidders. Rosiek is pre-qualified to bid and receive the contract for the Project and therefore is a responsible bidder. On May 12, 2004, DOT posted its notice of intent to reject all bids. Rosiek timely filed this bid protest on May 14, 2004, with DOT, along with the statutorily required bid protest bond. DOT's 2004 Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction is applicable to this project. FACTS BASED UPON ROSIEK'S ADMISSIONS DOT had advertised its bid solicitation notice for Financial Project Nos. 256903-1-52-01 and 256903-1-56-01, Pinellas Bayway Bridge Replacement on or about March 4, 2004. Rosiek received the copy of the Bid Solicitation Notice for the Project. Rosiek did not file a specifications challenge with respect to the referenced Project. DOT advertised the amount of $37,087,000.00 as its budgeted amount for the Project. Rosiek submitted a total bid of $50,470,378.12 for the Project (total bid A+B). ADDITIONAL FACTS Juanita Moore is a manager of the DOT Contracts Administration Office. She served as a member of the Technical Review Committee and the Awards Committee in relation to the Project. When the Technical Review Committee is confronted with a bid, such as the Rosiek bid, which is from a single bidder, something is missing from the bid or for certain differentials in price between the bid received and the official cost estimate, the Technical Review Committee considers these to be "problem jobs." In connection with terminology, Ms. Moore explained that the budget figure, referred to in the Bid Solicitation Notice for the Project as a Proposal Budget Estimate, is derived from an earlier estimate in the process and in turn an official cost estimate was established for the Project. The official cost estimate is also referred to simply as the estimate. The official cost estimate has not been disclosed as has been explained in the Preliminary Statement to the Recommended Order. The official cost estimate here is broken down into component items within the Project pertaining to cost for Mobilization, Concrete Class IV, Concrete Class V, etc. After the Technical Review Committee considered the Rosiek bid, the bid was passed on to the Awards Committee where it was decided to reject the bid. According to Ms. Moore the bid was rejected as too high when compared to the official cost estimate. The reference to a bid being too high relates to a bid which is more than 10 percent in excess of the official cost estimate. The budget figure and the official cost estimate are not necessarily the same in a given instance. The fact that it was the only bid was also a factor considered in the rejection. As Ms. Moore explained, at the time the Rosiek bid was rejected, it was principally because it was too high in relation to the official cost estimate. Given the posture in this case, the rejection as the only bid will form the basis for resolving this dispute, absent DOT's willingness to divulge the amount of the official cost estimate or how it was established. DOT does not have an established policy for rejecting bids based upon the fact that only a single bidder responded to the solicitation. In her experience, Ms. Moore does not remember DOT rejecting a bid solely on the ground that there was only one bidder. The minutes of the Awards Committee meeting held on May 12, 2004, detail the response by that committee to the Rosiek bid. In the copy of that document provided for this proceeding, DOT's official cost estimate is redacted. The percentage differential between the official cost estimate and the Rosiek bid is likewise redacted. The item number 0101-1 for Mobilization reflects Rosiek's bid of $4,900,000.00 compared to the official cost estimate which is redacted. Similarly, Item No. 0400-4-4, Concrete Class IV refers to the contractor bid price of $800.00 per cubic yard compared with the official cost estimate which is redacted. There are other comparisons between several additional categories or items in which the contractors bid price is reflected but the official cost estimate in comparison is redacted. The minutes go on to describe how the review being made by the Awards Committee led to the conclusion that the official cost estimate could be adjusted, placing the bid received by Rosiek a certain percentage above the estimate on a 10 percent criteria job but the differential between the adjusted official cost estimate and the Rosiek bid is not revealed as a percentage because of redaction. The DOT district where the project would be located is District 7, the Tampa office. The minutes of the Awards Committee meeting indicate that the district and the Technical Review Committee recommended to the Awards Committee that it reject the Rosiek bid and re-advertise. That was the decision made by the Awards Committee on May 12, 2004, to re-let in June. Nothing in the minutes prepared by the Awards Committee refers to the significance of Rosiek as the only bidder and any concern which the Awards Committee had about that fact. On May 12, 2004, when DOT provided a Cancellation of Posting and a Notice of Intent to Reject to Rosiek, it did not state the rationale for that decision. It merely indicated to Rosiek that it was DOT's intent to reject all bids on the project and advised Rosiek of its opportunity to contest that decision. On May 5, 2004, Kenneth A. Hartmann, P.E., the District 7 Secretary, prepared the District Response to Post- Bid Evaluation of Bids in Excess of Approved Award Criteria. The document is presented in question-and-answer form. In response to the question numbered 4 within the document, related to the prospect of critical safety deficiencies in the existing system being corrected by the construction of a new bridge, Mr. Hartmann responded with the answer "No." In relation to question numbered 2, excluding normal inflation, the question was asked whether re-advertising the project would likely result in a higher bid. Mr. Hartman answered "No." In response to question numbered 16, related to his recommendation as the district secretary, for action that should be taken by the Awards Committee he stated "This project should be rejected and re-advertised for a June 2004 1st [sic]. Considering that the project is medium to large and was competing against two other large bridge projects on the same day it is understandable that the contractor's bid was higher than our estimate." In response to question numbered 15 concerning the work load level of the contracting industry in the locality where the project would be constructed, Mr. Hartmann referred to "a high level of work load." At hearing Donald Skelton, P.E., the District 7 Secretary testified in support of the rejection of the Rosiek bid. In the past he had served as Director of Transportation Development with DOT, a position that made him responsible for preparation of the design plans and contract packages that are bid. He had involvement with this Project pertaining to the preparation of design plans and getting the Project to contract letting. He reviewed the Rosiek bid. In discussions related to the Rosiek bid during the post-bid evaluation period, there was a concern over a lack of competition and the differential between, what Mr. Skelton refers to, as the budget amount and the bid amount by Rosiek. Mr. Skelton was mindful of potential safety issues that might warrant the prospect of trying to find additional money to fund the Project, if it was necessary to replace the existing bridge for safety reasons. If the bridge were structurally deficient or in bad shape, that would need to be addressed, versus the additional time necessary to potentially rebid the project. No safety issues of that sort were found by Mr. Skelton. Mr. Skelton explained that the fact that there was single bidder made it difficult, if not impossible, to make a comparison between that bid and what the true market value of the bridge construction would be. Mr. Skelton expressed the hope by the DOT, that there would be more than one bidder in the future to truly get an impression of the degree of competition and whether the competition would result in a realistic price for the public. He recognized that there is no guarantee that DOT is going to get a lower bid if the project is re-bid. Mr. Skelton indicated that when you have multiple bids you can compare what the economic system would support in relation to the affordability of the project. That comparison is of similarity in prices among the competitors trying to win the job, with the belief that bidders put their best effort forward to prevail in the competition. A single bid does not give any indication of market factors, in his view. Michael Rosiek is the vice-president for Rosiek. In his testimony, he expressed a concern that if the project was re-let for bid, Rosiek's competitive position would not be good, in that the other contractors would have read the Rosiek bid that was made in the first letting, informing the competitors of the Rosiek price to its detriment. Further, Mr. Rosiek expressed a concern that in a re-letting the company would be bidding "against ourselves." Louis Wenick, P.E., has a business consulting service. The nature of the business is consulting work relating to the construction industry. A considerable part of the business involves DOT projects. In his work Mr. Wenick is involved with scheduling, cost analysis, and entitlement analysis in DOT projects. He is familiar with DOT's specifications, policies, and procedures. Mr. Wenick is a registered engineer in Florida and a certified general contractor in Florida. Mr. Wenick obtained information from DOT concerning its history in receiving sole bids for a project and the instances in which the sole bidder was awarded the contract. Mr. Wenick looked at procedures followed by DOT in awarding contracts. Mr. Wenick looked at the DOT experience in re- letting bids to determine if a company was a low bidder in the first letting when bids were rejected, and what percentage of the time that low bidder would succeed in being awarded the contract upon a re-letting. Mr. Wenick prepared certain charts intended to depict the DOT response in the areas examined by the witness. Rosiek's Exhibit numbered 3 is referred to as Problem Jobs for the April 28, 2004, letting, with two posting dates of May 20, 2004, and June 7, 2004, respectively. The chart depicts the proposal I.D. number (bid), the project number and the type of problem identified in reviewing bid responses and a brief statement of the Technical Committee's comments and the Awards Committee's disposition in those projects depicted. Nothing more is described in the chart. In no case set forth in the chart was the type of problem described in any detail or, limited to an experience with a single bidder, as opposed to perceived problems in relation to the bid that was too high, as well as having a single bidder or to the problem of having a bid that was too high alone. Seven projects were awarded. Two were not. The rejections were based upon the bids being too high. One of the projects initially awarded was later rejected due to the unavailability of local funding to support the project. Mr. Wenick prepared a chart, Rosiek's Exhibit numbered 4. This reflects the DOT award results for sole or single bidders from the period July 1999 through April 2005. The columns in the chart show the numeric count of sole bids, at certain letting dates, with the contracts numbers, the name of the low bidder, and the disposition of the bids. The numeric count of sole bids is a running tally over the period. This reflects 52 sole bids of which eight were rejected, making the percentage accepted 84.62 percent. Again the nature of the projects is not shown in the chart, and this chart does not indicate the basis for rejection. Rosiek's Exhibit numbered 5 is another chart prepared by Mr. Wenick. It reflects instances in which projects were re-let for bid in the period July 1999 to April 2005. The letting dates are reflected. The project numbers, the low bidders names, if known, and the amount quoted is set out. The re-let date if the project was re-let is reflected. The low quote on re-bid and the low bidder's name on re-bid are reflected, as is the percentage difference between the low quote in the first letting and the low quote in the re- letting. Where data is established in all columns in the chart, 18 of the projects are shown to have been re-bid out of 24 projects that were bid initially. Within that group, five bidders who bid in the initial letting were awarded the contract in the re-letting, while 13 low bidders in the first letting were disappointed in the re-letting. This equates to 27.78 percent success rate by the low bidder in the initial letting when re-bidding in the re-letting. Having considered the exhibits prepared by Mr. Wenick, the information is insufficient to discern the reason for DOT's past policies and practices and to compare them to the present case for consistencies in the application of those policies and practices when rejecting bids. Additionally, the reason for the choices in any single project described in the charts cannot be appropriately understood from the charts and compared to the experience here. On the topic of the success rate for contractors who provided the low bid in the original letting and the low bid in the re-letting, it is so general an analysis, that it cannot be relied upon to determine the real significance for contractors who provided the low bid in the original letting, only to be disappointed in the re-letting when the contractor did not receive the contract.
Recommendation Upon consideration, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Rosiek Amended Formal Written Protest challenging the DOT decision to reject its bid. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 2005.
