Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
HARRELL ROOFING, INC. vs FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY, 92-005465BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 09, 1992 Number: 92-005465BID Latest Update: Dec. 02, 1992

The Issue Whether Allstate Construction's (Allstate) bid was delivered in time. Whether Florida State University (FSU) had the authority to waive the lateness of Allstate's bid if it was late. Whether the failure by Allstate to acknowledge receipt of Addendum No. 2 was a bidding irregularity. Whether Allstate's failure to acknowledge receipt of Addendum No. 2 could be waived by FSU.

Findings Of Fact Florida State University requested bids for repairs to the roof and walls of Thagard Student Health Center on July 2, 1992. Thereafter, two addenda were issued. The first addendum was issued on July 27, 1992, and the second on July 28, 1992. Item #1 of Specifications in Addendum No. 1, which is attached, changed the date the bids were to be presented to August 6, 1992 at 2:00 p.m. in Room 124-D of Mendenhall Maintenance Building at FSU. Item #1 to Specifications in Addendum No. 2, which is attached, changed the specifications of ringlets and counterflashings published in Item #4 to Specifications in Addendum No. 1; and Item #2 in Addendum No. 2 changed the specifications of the materials in the cants published in the original specifications. On August 6, 1992, representatives of Harrell, Southeast, and FSU were present in Room 124-D, Mendenhall Maintenance Building prior to 2:00 p.m. Harrell and Southeast had already presented their bids to Sallie Dixon, FSU's representative. One of the persons present had called upon Ms. Dixon to call time and open the bids, but she had not done so when Dot Mathews and Joe O'Neil entered the room. Mr. O'Neil announced to those present that Ms. Mathews was late because he had misdirected her to another part of the building when Ms. Mathews's had entered the office he was in, Room 124, and had asked directions. Ms. Mathews immediately handed Allstate's bid to Ms. Dixon, and Ms. Dixon received it. Immediately, Ms. Dixon opened, tabulated, and posted the bids. Allstate had the lowest responsible bid. Allstate's bid did not acknowledge receipt of Addendum No. 2. FSU's rules on bidding provide that the official time will be that of the clock in the reception area of the Purchasing Department; however, the opening was held in Mendenhall Maintenance Building because of repairs to the Purchasing Department, and the university's officials were uncertain whether the reception area and clock existed at the time of the opening. It was the clear impression of all present, except Ms. Mathews, that the bid presented by Ms. Mathews was after 2:00 p.m. The estimates of the time varied, but none placed the time beyond 2:04 p.m. FSU generally sent an acknowledgment form with an addendum which required the bidders to acknowledge receipt of the addendum; however, in this instance, the addendum was sent by the supervising engineer, and an acknowledgment form was not sent with the addendum. The specifications did not require acknowledgment of addenda. The essence of the substantial amount of testimony received on the impact of the changes was (1) that the change in thickness of materials had a negligible impact, and (2) the real change in costs was the result of the requirement that the paint finish be by the manufacturer. The requirement that the materials be painted by the manufacturer was part of Addendum No.1. Further, the bidders are deemed manufacturers, and the finish that they put on the manufactured items is "by the manufacturer". Although testimony was received that Petitioner would have manufactured the items and then had them coated thereby increasing their total costs, an alternative method of manufacture was described by Allstate's representative in which the painted raw materials are retouched after being cut and welded into the finished structures. Petitioner's choice of the first method was explained by its representative to be its effort to comply with the bid requirement that the winning contractor guarantee the finish for twenty years. Intervenor's choice was to use the second method. To the extent that one method may have been more expensive that the other, there was no prohibition of the Petitioner to adopt the less expensive method; and, therefore, there was no economic advantage to Allstate. In the absence of an economic advantage to Allstate, Allstate's failure to acknowledge Addendum No. 2 was a minor irregularity. FSU waived the lateness of Allstate's bid and Allstate's failure to acknowledge Addendum No. 2, and awarded the bid to Allstate.

Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's Petition be dismissed, and the bid be awarded to Allstate Construction, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX CASE NO. 92-5465BID Florida State University and Allstate Construction, Inc. submitted proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Florida State University's Proposed Findings: Para 1-4 Adopted. Para 5-7 Not necessary/irrelevant. Para 8 Adopted. Para 9-11 Not necessary/irrelevant. Para 12-24 Adopted. Para 25 Not necessary/irrelevant. Allstate Construction's Proposed Findings: Para 1,2 Adopted. Para 3 Not necessary/irrelevant. Para 4-8 Adopted. Para 9 Not necessary/irrelevant. Para 10-15 Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Wendell Parker Mike Harrell Harrell Roofing, Inc. P.O. Box 20421 Tallahassee, FL 32316 Sonja Mathews Florida State University 540 W. Jefferson Street Tallahassee, FL 32306-4038 Davisson F. Dunlap, Jr. 3375-A Capital Circle, N.E. Tallahassee, FL 32308 Jeff Miller Route 16, Box 1307 Tallahassee, FL 32310 Dale W. Lick, President Florida State University 211 Westcott Building Tallahassee, FL 32306-1037 Gerold B. Jaski, General Counsel Florida State University 540 West Jefferson Street Tallahassee, FL 32306

Florida Laws (1) 120.53 Florida Administrative Code (1) 6C2-2.015
# 1
FIRST MASTER LESSORS, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 89-005292BID (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Sep. 29, 1989 Number: 89-005292BID Latest Update: Nov. 14, 1989

The Issue The primary issue for determination is whether Respondent's decision to rescind a previous notice of award of a bid to Petitioner First Master Lessors, Inc., on the basis that the original bid was nonresponsive, was appropriate. If rescission of that bid award was proper, a secondary issue is whether Respondent was also justified in rejecting the competing bid submitted on behalf of Petitioner DSJ Realty Company Inc.

Findings Of Fact Respondent issued an Invitation To Bid in order to obtain a leasehold of 15,397 square feet of office space to house operations of its child support enforcement office in Lakeland, Florida, for a term of seven years with an option to renew the lease for two additional three year periods. The Invitation To Bid (ITB) states Respondent's reservation of the right to reject, if in the best interest of the State of Florida, any and all bids. Further, the invitation states a number of conditions that submitting bidders must meet in order for their bids to be deemed responsive. Among the stated conditions is the requirement that bids be submitted on the standardized bid submittal form enclosed in the ITB in compliance with conditions specified on that form. Further, bidders are directed to complete the bid submittal form providing acknowledgements requested by the form. Another stated condition of the ITB is the requirement that a bidder be the owner of record of the facility and parking areas offered for lease; or, if a lessee seeking to sublease, submit with the bid proposal documentation of authority to sublease the facility and parking areas. A further ITB condition requires each bid to be signed by the owner, corporate officers or legal representative of the bidding entity. Corporate, trade or partnership titles of the bidding entity are to be stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature. Bid submissions signed by an agent are required to be accompanied by written evidence from the owner of record documenting the agent's authority. All bid submittal signatures are to be notarized. Page 4 of the standardized bid submittal form enclosed in the ITB requires, in paragraph 11, that any bid offering premises for consideration (including parking areas), which are presently occupied or which will covered by other active leases on the anticipated lease effective date, must be accompanied by documentation executed by those tenants indicating their acknowledgement of the bid and their ability to vacate the premises by the proposed lease effective date. Submitting bidders are required to indicate whether this requirement is applicable to their bid. Page 4 of the standard bid submittal form contains a number of other conditions which require agreement by the submitting bidder. Proof of the bidder's agreement to those conditions is to be documented by the bidder's initials on each page of the bid submittal package and the bidder's notarized signature on page 16, the submittal form's concluding page. Among the conditions on Page 4 of the form is the agreement of the successful bidder to provide leased space to Respondent for exclusive use on a 24 hour basis, seven days per week during the term of any lease resulting from the bid. This condition further explicitly states that the space to be leased will be fully occupied during normal working hours of 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. during the week and may be fully or partially occupied at other times as necessary in Respondent's discretion. Respondent's bid request specified that bidders must offer a minimum of 65 parking spaces in conjunction with premises proposed for lease. Of those spaces, two spaces were required to meet requirements of accessibility for handicapped parking. Of the remaining spaces, 52 spaces were required to accommodate full size automobiles. All parking was required to be provided as part of the lease cost to Respondent and under the "control of the bidder, off street, suitably paved and lined." On May 16, 1989, five bids were opened, including those submitted on behalf of Petitioner DSJ Realty Company Inc. (DSJ), and Petitioner First Master Lessors, Inc. (MASTER). Out of the five bids opened, only the bids of MASTER and DSJ were determined to be responsive. After evaluation of the bids by Respondent's personnel, the bid was awarded to MASTER on July 6, 1989. On July 11, 1989, and in response to the award to MASTER, a notice of intent to protest the award was filed by counsel for Dale S. Jones, as trustee; DSJ; and Elizabethan Development, Inc. (ELIZABETHAN). By letter dated July 12, 1989, Alan Taylor filed a protest of the lease award to MASTER. That letter simply stated its efficacy as a protest with the words "[w]e hereby protest the award of lease # 590:2087 to First Master Lessors, Inc." No particular factual or legal basis for the protest was stated. Taylor is associated with ELIZABETHAN and his letter is typed on stationary of that business entity. Taylor, designated the bidder on page one of the DSJ bid submittal, was authorized to act solely on behalf of DSJ in the submission of its bid by its president, Dale S. Jones, Jr. Documentation of that authority is contained in a May 8, 1989 memorandum attached to the bid package. There is no documentation in the bid submittal package of DSJ that Taylor was empowered to act on behalf of ELIZABETHAN, or that ELIZABETHAN was authorized to act on behalf of any entity in regard to the bid submittal. While not set forth in the bid package, testimony at the final hearing establishes that Jones is the sole owner of DSJ. Subsequent to the filing of the DSJ protest, Respondent determined to reject the bids of MASTER and DSJ as nonresponsive. By letter dated August 28, 1989, Respondent informed both counsel for DSJ and MASTER of this decision. As set forth in the August 28, 1989 letter, Respondent's decision to reject the bid of DSJ was based upon the failure of DSJ's bid submittal to reflect that its agent, Alan Taylor, or the proposed lessee designated in that bid submittal, DSJ Realty Company, had control of the property offered for lease to Respondent. The August 28, 1989 letter also stated Respondent's rejection of MASTER's bid due to a lack of control of the property sought to be leased, specifically control over parking spaces to be provided in conjunction with the premises to be leased. MASTER's bid submittal stated that the bid requirements in paragraph 11 of the bid submittal form requiring documentation of acknowledgements by any existing tenants of the premises (including parking areas) offered for lease, and ability of those existing tenants to vacate the premises, was not applicable. In response to the bid requirement for 65 parking spaces, MASTER's bid proposed 17 "exclusive" spaces on site and 48 "nonexclusive" spaces off site. An attachment to the bid response was a copy of a letter dated June 10, 1983, from the First Christian Church to a predecessor of MASTER, First Bank of Lakeland. The church, located across the street from the site proposed to be leased to Respondent by MASTER, granted "permission to the First Bank of Lakeland to use our parking lot for the convenience of their employees." Subsequent to the opening of bids and receipt of DSJ's bid protest, MASTER provided Respondent with another letter from the church reciting permission for MASTER to use 48 spaces within the church parking lot for the parking of Respondent's employees and clients, provided that the church reserved the right to use those spaces at any time upon the giving of one week's written notice to MASTER. The church also reserved the right to cancel the agreement at any time upon the giving of 60 days written notice. The letter was dated May 15, 1989. Also, as established at the final hearing, yet another letter was sent to MASTER's authorized agent from the church. That letter documents the rejection by the church of any "formalization" of a reciprocal parking arrangement with regard to the premises proposed to be leased by MASTER. However, the letter, dated July 20, 1989, restated the church's consent to the use of the parking lot by tenants of the premises proposed for lease by MASTER in accordance with its previous letter of May 15, 1989. Another letter attached to the bid submittal of MASTER, is also dated May 15, 1989. Directed to Respondent's facilities services manager, this letter is signed by an individual named Geneva Pettus as "[a]gent for First Master Lessors, Inc." The letter signed by Pettus references the 1983 letter from the church and states in pertinent part: We further guarantee your parking requirements during the term of the lease and will accommodate such spaces either within our own building or other locations if changes in the above parking facilities should occur. The MASTER bid submittal contains no documentation of authority of Geneva Pettus to act as agent for MASTER. Further, as established by the proof at final hearing, the vast majority of on site spaces controlled by MASTER are leased to present tenants or their employees. Remaining unencumbered parking spaces are inadequate to meet Respondent's bid requirements. The "guarantee" by Pettus, absent her lack of authorization to act for MASTER, is further invalidated by failure of MASTER to provide acknowledgements, as required by paragraph 11 of the bid submittal form, from the existing lessees of those parking spaces controlled by MASTER which would have to be vacated in order to comply with bid requirements. The proof establishes that MASTER did not have control of a portion of the property submitted for lease consideration by Respondent, specifically the proposed parking areas. Such lack of control is nonresponsive to Respondent's bid requirements. Notably, the May 15, 1989 date of Pettus' letter coincides with the May 15, 1989 letter to MASTER from the church. Respondent's facilities service manager, involved in evaluation of the bid submittals, was understandably concerned that this letter's existence was not disclosed to Respondent's personnel prior to August 17, 1989. The position of the church as reflected in the letter caused Respondent's personnel to reevaluate the issue of whether MASTER's bid demonstrated the requisite control over the property submitted for bid consideration and concluded that such control was absent. The DSJ bid submittal contains the notarized signature of Dale S. Jones, Jr., in the space on page 16 reserved for the signature of the bidder. His signature is followed by the title "PARTNER." That term is not further described, nor is a partnership or connection of that partnership with Jones identified in the bid package. At the final hearing, Jones confirmed his signature. However, the proof fails to establish that the required initials on each page of the DSJ bid package are those of Jones. Jones was unacquainted with the bid package submitted on his behalf, having merely looked through the package before affixing his signature. Further, the bid submittal form, on page 16, has a blank space for insertion of the name of the bidder submitting the bid package. The bid package submitted on behalf of DSJ contains no name in this portion of the submittal form. Page 16 of the bid submittal form also requires that the bidder indicate the name of the entity in whose name the subsequent lease is to be written, if that entity is one other than the bidder. The bid, signed by Jones and submitted by Taylor on behalf of DSJ, contains the statement that any future lease resulting from the bid should be titled in the name of "DSJ REALTY COMPANY as managing and Leasing Agent for Crystal Lake 301 and 302 Joint Venture." Also attached to the DSJ bid submittal package is a copy of an instrument entitled "DEED TO TRUSTEE UNDER TRUST AGREEMENT." By terms of that instrument, the fee simple title to the property and appurtenances of the site of the building proposed to be leased by DSJ, was purportedly conveyed to Dale S. Jones, Jr., as "Trustee under Land Trust Agreement dated June 15, 1987". By terms of the deed, Jones is granted specific authority to convey, lease or otherwise exercise those rights to property which are commensurate with ownership. The grantor of the deed, dated July 7, 1987, is Florida Southern College. The bid package of DSJ contains no documentation that either Jones or DSJ is authorized to act as an agent on behalf of "Crystal Lake 301 and 302 Joint Venture." Further, the bid package of DSJ offers no explanation as to the identity of this entity. As established by Jones' testimony at hearing, the entities "Dale S. Jones, Trustee" and DSJ Realty, Inc., are not interrelated businesses. The DSJ bid submittal further contains no documentation of authority for ELIZABETHAN or Taylor to act as an agent on behalf of "Crystal Lake 301 and 302 Joint Venture." It is found that the bid submittal of DSJ is nonresponsive to the requirements of Respondent's ITB. In response to Respondent's letter rejecting the bids of Petitioners, counsel for both parties filed petitions dated September 8, 1989, protesting the decision and requesting administrative proceedings. The petition filed on behalf of DSJ, ELIZABETHAN, and Dale S. Jones, as Trustee, was entitled "PETITION FOR FORMAL HEARING AND FORMAL BID PROTEST" and alleges the submitting bidder to be ELIZABETHAN. The document, in support of the July 12, 1989 protest of the bid award to MASTER, sets forth specific grounds for that protest. Further, it is alleged in the petition that DSJ was appointed to act as the agent of Dale S. Jones, as trustee, in appointing ELIZABETHAN as his agent. It is found that these allegations, with regard to the identity of the submitting bidder, are not supported by any competent substantial proof; that Dale S. Jones, as trustee was not a submitting bidder; and that ELIZABETHAN was not a submitting bidder. Each petition filed in opposition to Respondent's August 28, 1989 rejection letter, was accompanied by a $5,000 cashier's check payable to Respondent. MASTER subsequently substituted this check with a surety bond. DSJ's July 12, 1989 protest of the bid award was not accompanied by any bond.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the bids of MASTER and DSJ to be unresponsive; finding the cancellation of the award to MASTER to be justified; dismissing ELIZABETHAN and Dale S. Jones, as trustee, as petitioners in this proceeding; and rejecting all bids. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner Master's Proposed Findings. Petitioner MASTER's proposed findings consisted of 21 pages encompassing unnumbered paragraphs dealing with an intertwined mixture of legal conclusions, argument and proposed factual findings. Therefore, MASTER's submission cannot be treated by the Hearing Officer in this appendix on an individualized basis for each proposed finding. However, MASTER's submission has been reviewed and addressed, where possible, by the findings of fact set forth in this recommended order. Otherwise, all disputed issues of material fact have been addressed by the evidence adduced at the hearing held in this cause. Petitioner DSJ's Proposed Findings. Addressed in substance, remainder rejected as unnecessary. Rejected, unsupported by the evidence. Addressed in substance. Rejected, unnecessary to result. 7.-1I. Adopted in substance. Rejected, unsupported by the evidence. Addressed in substance. Adopted by reference. Adopted in substance. 16.-21. Not relevant inasmuch as Jones, in an individual capacity or the legal capacity of trustee or partner, was not a bidder. 22.-23. Adopted in substance. Rejected, legal conclusion, relevancy. Addressed in substance. 26 Rejected, not supported by the evidence. Taylor was authorized to act on behalf of DSJ Realty, Inc., by the corporate president. 27.-28. Rejected, not supported by the evidence; no evidence that Jones was a bidder. 29.-32. Rejected as unnecessary in view of result. 33.-42. Adopted in substance. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1-12. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Farley, Esq. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 4000 West Buffalo Avenue 5th Floor, Room 500 Tampa, FL 33614 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, Esq. General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Bruce Marger, Esq. 1700 66th Street, North Suite 501 St. Petersburg, FL 33710 David H. Simmons, Esq. 120 South Orange Avenue P.O. Box 67 Orlando, FL 32602 =================================================================

Florida Laws (5) 120.53120.57255.25287.012287.042
# 2
D. E. WALLACE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs ALACHUA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 96-003140BID (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 05, 1996 Number: 96-003140BID Latest Update: Jan. 21, 1999

The Issue The issues are: (1) whether the Petitioner's notice of bid protest filed on June 5, 1996, was timely under Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, and, if not, whether Petitioner has waived its right to participate in bid protest proceedings; and (2) if Petitioner's bid protest was timely filed, whether the Respondent acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally or dishonestly in rejecting the Petitioner's bid.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a general contractor which operates in Alachua County and surrounding areas. The Respondent is the governing body of the school district in Alachua County. In April and May, 1996, the Respondent publicly advertised an Invitation to Bid on the Project which consists of hard courts for basketball, driveway paving and new drainage provisions. Petitioner and three other bidders timely submitted sealed bids to the Respondent at its office located at the E. Manning, Jr. Annex, 1817 East University Avenue, Gainesville, Florida. Petitioner's bid proposal included a Contractor's Qualification Statement setting forth Petitioner's experience and financial qualifications to act as the general contractor for the Project. There is no evidence that Petitioner is disqualified as a responsible bidder because: (a) it colluded with other bidders; (b) it based its proposal on bid prices which were obviously unbalanced; (c) it included any false entry in its bid proposal; or (d) it failed to completely fill out the required list of subcontractors. The Invitation to Bid does not set forth any other specific conditions which would disqualify an otherwise responsible bidder. However, Respondent reserves the right to reject any and all bids when it determines that such rejection is in its interest. Respondent publicly opened the bids and read them aloud at 2:00 P.M. on May 9, 1996 as required by the Invitation to Bid. Petitioner did not attend the opening of the bids. The Invitation to Bid specified that the bids would be "tabulated and evaluated by the Superintendent of Schools of Alachua County or member or members of his staff or other individual or individuals designated by him." Edward Gable is Respondent's Director of Facilities. The Superintendent designated Mr. Gable to evaluate bids received for facility projects and to formulate recommendations to Respondent. The Invitation to Bid does not set forth a time certain in which Respondent will notify bidders of its decision or intended decision. However, it does state as follows: At the next regular or special meeting of the Board or at the designated meeting thereafter, the bids, as so opened, tabulated and evaluated, and the recommend- ation of the Superintendent of Schools of Alachua County regarding them shall be presented to the lowest responsible bidder meeting the requirements of the law and the State Board of Education Regulations. In Section 19.1 of the Instructions to Bidders, Respondent informs bidders that it will award the contract to the lowest bidder as soon as possible provided that the lowest bid is reasonable and in Respondent's best interest. The Invitation to Bid provides bidders with the following notice relative to Respondent's decision or intended decision concerning a contract award: The Board shall provide notice of its decision or intended decision concerning a contract award. Notice shall be given either by posting the bid tabulation at the location where the bids were opened or by certified United States mail, return receipt requested. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in s. 120.53(5), Florida Statues, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Any person who is affected adversely by the decision or intended decision shall file with the Board a written "Notice of Protest" within seventy-two (72) hours after posting or notification. A formal written protest shall be filed within ten (10) calendar days after filing the 'Notice of Protest.' Section 17.1 of the Instructions to Bidders contains the following language concerning Respondent's decision or intended decision: 17.1 The Board shall provide notice of its decision or intended decision concerning a contract award. For any other decision, notice shall be given either by posting the bid tabulation at the location where the bids were opened or by certified United States mail, return receipt requested. Section 18.1 of the Instructions to Bidders provides as follows: Bid tabulations with recommended awards will be posted for review by interested parties at the Planning and Construction Department, 1817 East University Avenue, Gainesville, Florida, following the bid opening, and will remain posted for a period of 72 hours. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute as (sic) waiver of proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The Invitation to Bid and the Instructions to Bidders distinguish between a protest concerning a contract award and a protest related to the specifications contained in an invitation to bid or in a request for proposals. In the latter context, a bidder must file a written protest within seventy-two (72) hours after receipt of the project plans and specifications. This case does not involve a protest of a bid solicitation. By virtue of the above referenced provisions in the Invitation to Bid and the Instructions to Bidders, Respondent gave all bidders sufficient and reasonable notice that a posted tabulation together with its recommendation constituted Respondent's intended decision. The bid specifications in the instant case required bidders to submit a bid on a base contract for certain school facility improvements with alternate bids relative to additional improvements in the event Respondent decided to include such features in the Project. Petitioner's base bid was $135,000; it was the lowest bid submitted. The next low bid was from Watson Construction Company, Inc. (Watson) at $133,345. Two additional bids were higher than Watson's bid. On the morning of May 30, 1996 one of Petitioner's employees, Roger "Dave" Williams" phoned Mr. Gable to inquire about the status of the bid award. Mr. Gable was unavailable to take the call. Mr. Williams left a message for Mr. Gable to return the call. Next, at approximately 10:00 a.m. on May 30, 1996, Mr. Williams called a member of Mr. Gable's staff who stated that, as far as he knew, Respondent had not made a decision on the contract. Mr. Gable completed his evaluation and posted the bid tabulation on May 30, 1996 at 3:00 p.m. Included on the bid tabulation was the following statement: RECOMMENDED ACTION: It is recommended that the Board reject the low base bid as submitted by D. E. Wallace Construction Corporation, Alachua, Florida, due to past unsatisfactory contract performance. It is recommended that the Board accept the base bid of $133,345. and award a contract for construction totaling $133,345. to Watson Construction, Gainesville, Florida. Completion of this project shall be within ninety (90) consecutive calendar days from the date indicated in the 'Notice to Proceed.' The bid tabulation clearly notes that "[f]ailure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120, Florida Statutes." Respondent regularly posts notices of intended decisions concerning bid awards on a bulletin board in the main hallway of the E. D. Manning Annex. A title at the top of the bulletin board identifies it as the location for bid postings. Respondent posts a copy of Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, and a copy of the Respondent's Policy DJC--Bidding Requirements below the title of the bulletin board. Respondent has adopted Policy DJC as a rule through a formal rulemaking process. Policy DJC states as follows in pertinent part: The Board shall provide notice of its decision or intended decision concerning a bid solicitation or a contract award. For a bid solicitation, notice of a decision or intended decision shall be given by United States mail or by hand delivery. For any other Board decisions, notice shall be given either by posting the bid tabulation at the location where the bids were opened or by certified United States mail, return receipt requested. The notice shall contain the following two paragraphs. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in s. 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Any person who is affected adversely by the decision or intended decision shall file with the Board a written notice of protest within 72 hours after the posting or notification. A formal written protest shall be filed within 10 calendar days after filing the notice of protest. . . . Failure to file a timely notice of protest or failure to file a timely formal written protest shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Immediately below Policy DJC is a space where Respondent always posts its bid tabulations which include the recommended action on each project and notice that "[f]ailure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120, Florida Statutes." The bottom of the board, in large letters, contains the following words: "Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes." This permanent bulletin board, read as a whole, contains more than enough information to provide bidders with notice of an intended decision and the time frames within which a disappointed bidder must file a written protest. Although he was not required to do so, Mr. Gable telephoned Petitioner's office on the afternoon of May 30, 1996 to advise its president, D. Wallace, of the recommendation. Petitioner was not available to accept that call. Mr. Gable placed another courtesy telephone call to Petitioner on the morning of May 31, 1996. During that conversation, Mr. Gable informed Mr. Wallace of the recommendation for Respondent to reject Petitioner's bid and accept the next lowest bid. Petitioner's representative inspected the posting board in the afternoon on May 31, 1996. On June 3, 1996, Respondent sent Petitioner by facsimile transmission a copy of the agenda for Respondent's June 4 meeting, items H.1. of which was: H.1. Bid Award for Project SBAC CB436 - Newberry High School Site Improvements. Bids for the construction of this project were received on May 9, 1996. Recommendation will be presented. The seventy-two hour window in which a bidder may file a protest does not include Saturdays, Sundays or holidays. Therefore, the time in which a bidder could have filed a protest of Respondent's intended decision in this case, expired June 4, 1996 at 3:00 p.m. No bidder had filed a written protest at that time. Respondent held a regular meeting on June 4, 1996, at 7:00 p.m. When Respondent considered the bid award for Project SBAC CB 436, Mr. Gable presented the recommendation that the Board reject Petitioner's bid and accept Watson's bid due to Petitioner's past unsatisfactory contract performance. Petitioner's counsel spoke against the recommendation. At that time the Petitioner had not filed any written notice of protest. After discussion, Respondent voted to award the contract to Watson. Respondent and Watson executed a contract for the construction of the Project on June 4, 1996. The next day, on June 5, 1996, at 3:40 p.m., Petitioner filed with Respondent, by facsimile transmission, a Notice of Protest challenging the award of the contract for the Project to Watson. The filing of this protest was untimely. Therefore, Petitioner waived its right to protest Respondent's decision or intended decision on the Project. The basis of Respondent's intended decision and ultimate final decision to reject Petitioner's low bid was due to Petitioner's past unsatisfactory performance. The following facts support a finding that Petitioner was not a responsible bidder. Respondent awarded Petitioner the contract for a previous construction project, Project SBAC CA 149, Additions and Renovations for Terwillegar Elementary School. That project included the construction of a number of school buildings. The contract amount was approximately 5.1 million dollars. The last building in the Terwillegar project became "substantially complete" in September, 1995. In January, 1996, Mr. Gable wrote a letter to Petitioner, informing him of the outstanding punch list items for the Terwillegar project. A contractor must complete punch list items and have them approved prior to "final completion." In the Terwillegar Project, the contract provided for compilation of items on the punch list within thirty (30) days from "substantial completion." As of May 30, 1996, Petitioner had not responded to Mr. Gable's letter about the Terwillegar punch list, nor had it completed the punch list. Many of the items on the list were minor, but some of the items involved the safety or integrity of the building structure. The Terwillegar project contract also contained a project closeout section which listed a variety of documents and other materials that Petitioner had to provide to Respondent as part of the "final completion." Included in the Terwillegar project's closeout were items such as insurance change-over requirements, warranties, workmanship bonds, maintenance agreements, final certifications, a final payment request, consent of surety, maintenance manuals, record drawings, record specifications, record project date, and operating instructions. As of May 30, 1996, Petitioner had not provided any of the Terwillegar project closeout materials to the Respondent. The delay in project closeout, after substantial completion, is completely unacceptable to the Respondent. Prior to the opening of bids in this case, Petitioner filed a civil suit against Respondent seeking approximately $1,500,000 representing the unpaid contract balance, subcontractors' and material suppliers' claims for labor and material, and other delay-related damages on the Terwillegar project. Petitioner's claim that Respondent's intended decision and/or final decision was based on personal animosity and bias against Mr. Wallace is contrary to more persuasive evidence. Specifically, Petitioner's Exhibit 6 is not persuasive evidence of bias. The Petitioner's president, D.E. Wallace, has over 30 years in the construction field, including 22 years as an owner/operator of a general contractor company. He has completed more than 100 projects in north Florida in the past eighteen (18) years, including 30 school board construction projects. Mr. Wallace has worked on approximately nine (9) school board projects in Alachua County. He holds himself out as being "completely familiar and knowledgeable in government and building codes, ordinances, regulations, etc."

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's protest as untimely. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: David L. Worthy, Esquire 4128 Northwest 13th Street Gainesville, Florida 32609 Thomas L. Wittmer, Esquire 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601 Robert W. Hughes, Superintendent Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601-5498 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

Florida Laws (3) 120.52120.53120.57
# 3
PAB CONSULTANTS, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 93-004271BID (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 03, 1993 Number: 93-004271BID Latest Update: Dec. 13, 1993

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent's intent to award a contract for bridge-tending services (RFP DOT 92/93 2088 REBID) to Intervenor constitutes fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, illegal or dishonest action.

Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to findings of fact set forth in paragraphs 1.-12., below. Stipulated Facts Respondent issued the RFP for bridge-tending services on May 14, 1993. Proposals submitted in response to the RFP were opened on June 16, 1993. Proposals were submitted by five firms, including Petitioner and Intervenor. All proposals were determined at the time to be responsive. A Technical Review Committee (TRC) was appointed to review the technical portion of the proposals. The three members of the TRC were Alan Hyman, J. L. Gillis, and Yingyong Sujjavanich. The members reviewed the technical portion of the proposals on June 17, 1993. The evaluation forms completed by the TRC and a summary score sheet were delivered to Respondent's purchasing office on the morning of June 18, 1993. The price proposal was evaluated by Respondent's purchasing office. The price evaluation of each proposal was performed by applying a formula which compared the submitted price quotations. After the scores for the technical proposal and the cost proposals were totalled, it was determined that Intervenor's proposal had earned the highest number of points. This result was presented to Respondent's District 2 Executive Committee and a recommendation was communicated by the Purchasing Director to award the RFP to Intervenor. The Executive Committee accepted the recommendation and directed that the contract be awarded to Intervenor. On June 18, 1993, at 4 p.m., the bid tabs were posted noticing Respondent's intent to award the contract to Intervenor. On or about July 6, 1993, Petitioner requested a meeting with Respondent's representatives regarding the RFP. That meeting was held on July 9, 1993. At the meeting, Petitioner raised an issue regarding an arithmetic error in the scoring of the technical proposals. Intervenor remained the proposer with the highest number of points. However, another proposal formerly ranked as number two was lowered to number three status and Petitioner, previously ranked number three, was raised to number two rank. On July 12, 1993, Respondent posted an amended bid tab indicating its intent to award the contract to Intervenor. Other Facts Respondent chose to score the bid pricing, a non- subjective task, in Respondent's District 2 office. Technical portions of the proposals were reviewed by the TRC, comprised of members from Respondent's District 5 office. This unusual step was taken by Respondent in order to reduce prejudice to any proposal in view of previous accusations made against District 2 employees. Bud Rosier, Respondent's employee, has overall responsibility for bridge determination that District 5 employees chosen as committee members were qualified to evaluate the proposals. Each response to the RFP contained a technical proposal and a price proposal. Intervenor's technical proposal received 1.33 points less than Petitioner's technical proposal. The price proposals, as noted above, were scored in accordance with a mathematical formula that compares price proposals to each other and does not take any subjective factors into consideration. Intervenor was awarded 5.55 points, compared to Petitioner who received no points for a proposal more than $140,000 higher for the initial year of the contemplated contract. Although members of the TRC were not given any background information by Respondent regarding the competing proposals, beyond that contained in the submitted bid packages, no information was withheld from the committee. The members were given adequate time to review the proposals and do any desired independent background checking regarding past performance of any proposer, although no requirement in the RFP mandated such a background review. At least one of the TRC members, Sujjavanich, chose not to independently research past performance of the Intervenor. No evidence was offered at hearing with regard to whether the other two members independently researched any of the proposers' past performances. Even if review of past performance, apart from the materials submitted by the proposers, were required by provisions of the RFP, failure of the evaluators to accomplish that task would result only in the loss to Intervenor of the 3.66 points awarded for past performance and Intervenor, with a remaining total of 81.89 points, would remain the highest ranked proposer. In view of the objective process used to arrive at the results of the evaluation of the prices of the competing proposals, there was no need to provide this information to the members of the TRC who were doing the technical proposal evaluation. Although the RFP provided that the TRC would be given such results, the failure of Respondent's personnel to provide this information to the evaluators could not have made any difference in the final result since the committee, using the objective price evaluation criteria, would have arrived at the same result as the purchasing office on cost scores. The admitted failure to provide the superfluous cost information to the TRC is inadequate to show that such omission resulted in prejudice to the final scores of any of the competing proposals and must be considered to be only a minor variation from the RFP by Respondent. Contrary to Petitioner's allegations, there is no competent substantial evidence to support any finding that the members of the TRC (Hyman, Gillis, and Sujjavanich) did not possess required background, experience or professional credentials adequate for evaluating proposals for bridge-tending services. All three members of the TRC were familiar with the RFP, attachments to the RFP, bridge-tending procedures and bridge-tending qualification procedures. There is no competent substantial evidence to establish that Intervenor's proposal is not financially feasible. Proposed utilization of 72 bridge-tenders by Intervenor for a total price of $673,333.44 does not mean that 72 bridge-tender positions would be established or filled, or that the positions would be paid at the rate proposed by Petitioner of $8.40 per hour. The evidence establishes that a proposer would need an optimum number of bridge requirements.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting the award of the bid in RFP DOT 92/93 2088 Rebid to Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-4271BID The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. 1.-12. Accepted. 13.-16. Rejected, relevancy. 17. Accepted. 18.-19. Rejected, relevancy. 20.-25. Accepted. 26.-27. Rejected, cumulative. 28. Rejected, credibility. 29.-33. Rejected, relevancy. 34.-35. Accepted. 36.-37. Rejected, argumentative and mischaracterization. 38.-46. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 47.-51. Rejected, relevancy. Intervenor's Proposed Findings. 1.-2. Rejected, cumulative. 3.-4. Accepted. 5.-6. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, cumulative. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, argumentative. 10.-11. Rejected, unnecessary. 12.-13. Adopted by reference. 14.-16. Accepted, but not verbatim. 17.-22. Adopted by reference. 23. Rejected, unnecessary. 24.-30. Adopted, but not verbatim. 31. Rejected, narrative. 32.-35. Rejected, cumulative. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-11. Adopted. 12. Rejected, unnecessary. 13.-17. Adopted, not verbatim. 18.-19. Rejected, cumulative. 20.-22. Adopted. 23. Rejected, recitation of RFP. 24.-26. Adopted. 27. Rejected, recitation of RFP. 28.-29. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Cassidy, III, Esquire. John O. Williams, Esquire Renaissance Square 1343 East Tennessee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Carolyn S. Holifield, Esquire Mark D. Tucker, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Timothy G. Schoenwalder, Esquire 204-B South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3068 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building # 562 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57120.68
# 4
PRELUDE CONSTRUCTION CO. vs. PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 89-001468BID (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-001468BID Latest Update: Apr. 20, 1989

Findings Of Fact On February 7, 14 and 21, 1989, respondent, School Board of Pinellas County (Board), published a legal advertisement in an area newspaper inviting prospective bidders to submit proposals for certain construction work to be performed on two elementary schools, Walsingham and Cross Bayou, located in Largo and Pinellas Park, Florida, respectively. The bidders were advised that their bids must be "prepared and submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifications" and that such drawings and specifications could be obtained from the Board. Such bids were to be filed with the Board no later than 2:00 p.m. on March 6, 1989. The notice also provided that the bids would be opened the same day. Bids were timely filed by at least five contracting firms, including petitioner, Prelude Construction Company, Inc. (Prelude), and intervenors, Lincoln Construction Company (Lincoln) and Bandes Construction Company (Bandes). In filing these proposals, each bidder represented he had "thoroughly examined all of the contract documents." After the bids were opened and reviewed by Board personnel, Lincoln, Prelude and Bandes were ranked first, second and fourth, respectively, based upon the dollar amount of their proposals. 2/ Thereafter, the Board issued its notice of intended action on March 7, 1989, wherein it advised all parties of its intention to award the contract to Lincoln. In doing so, the Board concluded that, although a bid bond accompanying Lincoln's proposal was not dated March 5 or 6 as required by the specifications, the deviation was minor and could be waived. That action prompted Prelude to file its protest. Through testimony of Lincoln's vice-president, it was established that the Board staff intended to change its initial position and to recommend to the Board that Lincoln's bid proposal be rejected and the contract awarded to Bandes. This change was prompted by the Board staff's discovery on the day of hearing (April 3) that, with the exception of Bandes, all bidders had failed to list the, roofing subcontractor on their bid proposals. The Board staff accordingly concluded that all bidders except Bandes should be disqualified. The bid specification upon which the Board relies to award the contract to Bandes is found in Part One, paragraph 1.1 of section 07511 of the bid specifications. The requirement is a relatively new one and imposes the following requirement upon bidders: NOTE: The contractor is required to list the name of the roofing subcontractor on the form of proposal, Section 1C. Section 1C is entitled "Form of Proposal" and includes the following section on page 1C-3 to be filled in by the bidder: The following subcontractors will be contracted with on this project. Type of Subcontractor Name of Subcontractor (Trade Specialty) (Company/Firm) The column on the left side is intended to identify the subcontractor by specialty, such as plumbing or roofing, while the blank spaces in the right hand column are to be filled in by the bidders with the name of the subcontractor who will perform the specialty. The Board has not been consistent in requiring bidders to list the name of subcontractors on the bid documents. According to the uncontroverted testimony of Lincoln, the Board requires the listing of subcontractors on some projects but not on others. For example, on the specifications for the recently let contract for the prototype new media center at four elementary schools, the left hand column on the above form was filled in by the Board with five types of subcontractors who were required on the project, including roofing. This meant that the bidder was to fill in the blanks in the right hand column with the name of the subcontractor who he intended to use on each specialty. However, on other contracts, including the one under challenge, both columns in the Form for Proposal have been left blank, and Lincoln construed this to mean that the name of the subcontractor was not required. Indeed, Lincoln pointed out, without contradiction, that on a recent contract which left both columns blank, as was true in this case, it was awarded the contract even though it did not identify the roofing subcontractor on its proposal. Because of this prior agency practice, Lincoln assumed the same policy would be used again. However, Lincoln conceded it had failed to read the requirement in paragraph 1.1 of section 07511 before preparing its proposal. There was no evidence that Lincoln gained any substantial advantage over other bidders by this omission. Also relevant to this controversy is Paragraph 10A of the General Requirements. This item is found on page 1B-11 and reads as follows: Each bidder shall indicate the names of specific major Subcontractors if called for on the form of proposal. If listing of Subcontractors is required and the Bidder fails to list them, the bid may, at Owner's option, be disqualified. (Emphasis added) This authority to waive the requirement is reinforced by language in Paragraph 21 of the General Requirements which provides in part that "(t)he owner reserves the right to waive minor technicalities." According to the Board's outside architectural consultant, who was the author of a portion of the contract specifications including section 07511, the omission of the name of the roofing subcontractor is a "minor" technicality that can be waived. However, the consultant had no personal knowledge as to whether the provision had actually been waived by the Board on prior contracts.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered awarding the contract in question to Bandes Construction Company. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1989.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57255.0515
# 5
DIALIGHT CORPORATION vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 06-004287BID (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 03, 2006 Number: 06-004287BID Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024
# 6
NATIONWIDE CREDIT, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 99-001192BID (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 17, 1999 Number: 99-001192BID Latest Update: Jun. 14, 1999

The Issue Was the Department of Education's (Department) refusal to review and evaluate Nationwide Credit, Inc.'s (Nationwide) response to the Department's Request for Proposal, Collection Services for Defaulted Florida Guaranteed Student Loans and Delinquent Florida Teacher Scholarships Loans, No. 99-06 (RFP) contrary to governing statutes and rules, clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious? Was the Department's failure to consider the reason for Nationwide's untimely delivery of its response to the RFP contrary to governing statutes and rules?

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Nationwide is a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the State of Florida. Nationwide is in the business of collecting defaulted student loans and has worked with the State of Florida, and specifically the Department, for approximately nine years. On October 9, 1998, the Department issued RFP No.99-06, which solicited proposals for the provision of collection services for defaulted student loans. The technical requirements and requests found in the RFP were prepared by the Office of Student Financial Affairs (OSFA) which was the section within the Department requesting the services and the section which ultimately performed the review and evaluation of the responses to the RFP. The initial deadline for receipt of responses to the RFP was 3:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) on December 3, 1998. The responses were to be delivered to the Department's Office of Purchasing for initial inspection and distribution to OSFA. The Department, through four separate RFP addenda, received and accepted by Nationwide, revised and postponed the response deadline until January 20, 1999, at 3:00 p.m. EST. The postponement was caused by the delay of the Department responding to questions posed by prospective vendors during the question and answer portion of the RFP procurement process. Nationwide had been prepared to submit it proposal to the Department on the date of the previous deadlines. The Department scheduled the deadline for receipt of proposals at 3:00 p.m. to accommodate those prospective vendors who used third-party delivery services. The response review process as established by the RFP consisted of the following: (a) a review of the technical components to be completed by February 3, 1999; (b) a cost proposal evaluation to be completed by February 9, 1999; and (c) a posting of intended award by February 16, 1999. In accordance with the RFP, multiple contracts were to be entered into based on the highest ranked responses. The actual signing of these contracts was not to occur until March 1999, after approval of the awards by the State Board of Education. Nationwide has previously provided the Department with the same services called for by the RFP. It was Nationwide's wish that it continue to provide those services and accordingly, its employees expended between 50 and 70 hours preparing Nationwide's response. On January 19, 1999, Nationwide, from its office in Marietta, Georgia, utilized a third party, Federal Express, to deliver Nationwide's response to the Department's RFP. Nationwide's general business practice is to use Federal Express and there has never been a problem with late delivery. Nationwide does not have an office in Tallahassee, Florida. Nationwide's only Florida office is in south Florida. Nationwide directed Federal Express to ship its response to the RFP by Priority Overnight Service and further directed Federal Express to deliver Nationwide's response to the RFP to the Department by 10:00 a.m. EST on January 20, 1999. These instructions to Federal Express were clearly reflected on the Airbill. Federal Express picked up Nationwide's proposal at 1:20 p.m. EST on January 19, 1999. Due to an error in the Federal Express distribution process, Nationwide's response to the RFP was not delivered to the Department until January 21, 1999, at 10:41 a.m. EST. Nationwide did not contact the Department on January 20, 1999, after 10:00 a.m. EST (the time Federal Express was to deliver Nationwide's proposal) to determine if its proposal had been delivered timely by Federal Express. There was sufficient time between 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. on January 20, 1999, for Nationwide to hand deliver its proposal to the Department had Nationwide been aware that its proposal had not been delivered by Federal Express as requested by Nationwide. Eighteen responses were submitted to the Department's Office of Purchasing prior to 3:00 p.m. EST on January 20, 1999. In order to ensure that no vendor had access to another vendor's proposal, the proposals were locked in a secured room. At 3:01 p.m. EST on January 20, 1999, the Office of Purchasing physically opened the 18 responses that were timely submitted and in its possession. The Office of Purchasing then conducted an initial review which included a tabulation of the responses to ensure that all responses satisfied procedural requirements. The timely proposals were also inspected to ensure that the appropriate transmittal letter was enclosed. The Office of Purchasing did not open the technical or price components of the responses. Once the initial review was completed by the Office of Purchasing, the proposals were sent to OSFA for purposes of conducting the detailed technical review contemplated by the RFP. The initial review by the Office of Purchasing took two days, and the proposals were not forwarded to OSFA until around January 25, 1999. At the time Nationwide's proposal was received by the Department, the Office of Purchasing was still in the process of completing its initial review. None of the timely proposals had been forwarded to OSFA for detailed review at this time. By letter dated January 27, 1999, the Department advised Nationwide that its proposal had been received after the deadline and that its proposal must be "retrieved no later than February 15, 1999." At this time, the evaluation of the technical and costs proposals by OSFA had not been completed. The Department similarly advised another vendor whose proposal had been received 30 minutes after the deadline. Nationwide did not retrieve its proposal, and it still remains in an unopened state with the Department. The Department rejected Nationwide's proposal without any consideration being given to the circumstances surrounding the untimeliness of Nationwide's proposal. At the time Nationwide's proposal was rejected, the Office of Purchasing had knowledge of the fact that Nationwide had submitted its proposal to Federal Express in advance of the due date and in sufficient time to be delivered timely to the Department. On February 8, 1999, after contacting the Office of Purchasing to determine the reasons for the rejection of its proposal, Nationwide provided the Department with a written explanation from Federal Express explaining why Nationwide's proposal was untimely. Nationwide then requested the Department to consider the circumstances and use its discretion to waive the late filing and review the proposal. By letter dated February 12, 1999, the Department advised Nationwide that it was unable to consider Nationwide's untimely proposal. It is the Department's policy that, under the purchasing rules of the State of Florida, it should never consider or review a proposal received from a vendor after the date and time specified in the RFP regardless of the reason for the untimeliness. However, the Department did indicate that it may waive that policy where the untimeliness is due to an "act of God," such as a tornado or hurricane, which prevented timely delivery or resulted in the Department's office being unable to accept delivery in a timely fashion. General Conditions, Paragraph 3, of Form PUR-7033, revised 6/1/98, provides in relevant part as follows: PROPOSAL OPENING: Shall be public, on the date, location, and the time specified on the acknowledgement form. It is the proposer's responsibility to assure that this proposal is delivered at the proper time and place of the proposal opening. Proposals which for any reason are not so delivered, will not be considered. (Emphasis furnished.) Section 40.16 of the RFP provides as follows: PUBLIC OPENING OF PROPOSALS Each proposal will be dated, time-marked, and logged by the department as received. Each will also be examined to verify that it is properly addressed and sealed. Any proposal received after the specified date and time for receipt of proposals will be rejected and returned unopened to the contractor. (Emphasis furnished.) Section 40.17 of the RFP provides as follows: REJECTION OF PROPOSALS Proposals which do not conform to the requirements of this Request for Proposal may be rejected by the department. Proposals may be rejected for reasons which include, but are not limited to, the following: * * * The proposal is received late. (Emphasis furnished.) Section 40.15 of the RFP provides as follows: 40.15 ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSALS * * * The department also reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to waive minor irregularities in proposals. A minor irregularity is a variation from the Request for Proposal which does not affect the price of the proposal, or give the contractor an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other contractors, or adversely impact the interest of the department. (Emphasis furnished.)

Florida Laws (1) 120.57 Florida Administrative Code (2) 60A-1.00160A-1.002
# 7
PIONEER CONTRACTING, INC. vs BROWARD COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 90-002862BID (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida May 09, 1990 Number: 90-002862BID Latest Update: Jun. 29, 1990

Findings Of Fact On February 28, 1990, Respondent issued an invitation to bid (ITB) on a construction project referred to as Florida Atlantic University Modulars. The ITB required a base bid and bids on five alternates to the base project. Each bidder was instructed that it must bid on the base project and on each alternate for its bid proposal to be considered responsive. On March 19, 1990, Addendum 1 to the ITB was issued to all prospective bidders. This was an informational addendum and advised the date, time, and location of the posting of the award recommendation. Addendum 1 was not required to be returned by the bidder as a part of the response to the ITB. On March 21, 1990, Addendum 2 to the ITB was issued to all prospective bidders. This was also an informational addendum and advised as to a non- mandatory, pre-bid conference to be held March 27, 1990. Addendum 2 was not required to be returned by the bidder as a part of the response to the ITB. On March 30, 1990, Addendum 3 to the ITB was issued to all prospective bidders. This addendum advised that the date and time for the bid opening had been changed to April 9, 1990, at 2:00 p.m. Addendum 3 also contained modifications, explanations and corrections to the original drawings and specifications which impacted the cost and scope of the project. Immediately above the signature line on the cover page of Addendum 3 was the following: This document must be returned in it's [sic] entirety with the bid. Please sign below to verify that you have read and understand all the changes. Item 2 on page ADD-1 of Addendum 3 required each bidder to submit its per unit price structure with its response to the ITB and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: ... The unit price shall not be included in Base Bid. Submit a separate sheet with bid package. The following instructions are given in Paragraph 1(c) of the Instructions to Bidder: NO ERASURES ARE PERMITTED. If a correction is necessary, draw a single line through the entered figure and enter the corrected figure above it. Corrections must be initialed by the person signing the bid. Any illegible entries, pencil bids or corrections not initialed will not be tabulated. The instructions are repeated in Paragraph 1 of the General Conditions of the ITB: EXECUTION OF BID: ... No erasures are permitted. If a correction is necessary, draw a single line through the entered figure and enter the corrected figure above it. Corrections must be initialed by the person signing the bid. Any illegible entries, pencil bids, or corrections not initialed will not be tabulated. The following is contained as part of the Instructions to Bidder: Failure to complete, sign, seal and return the required documents will result in rejection of your bid. Any questions should be directed to Susan Kuzenka, (305) 761-7460, Purchasing Department, Broward Community College. (Emphasis in the original.) Paragraph 8 of the General Conditions portion of the bid package provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 8. AWARDS. As the best interest of Broward Community College may require, the right is reserved to reject any and all bids and to waive any irregularity in bids received ... On April 9, 1990, Petitioner submitted a bid to Respondent in response to the ITB. Petitioner had received the complete bid package, including all instructions and addenda to the bid package. At the pre-bid conference held March 27, 1990, an employee of Respondent emphasized to the attendees that it was necessary for the bidders to return Addendum 3 in its entirety. Petitioner did not attend the non-mandatory, pre-bid conference. The base bid submitted by Petitioner was $1,085,790.00. The base bid of Double E Construction Co., the next low bidder and the bidder to whom Respondent intends to award the contract, was $1,113,300.00. Petitioner's bid for each of the alternates was lower than that of Double E Construction Co. Petitioner failed to return the entire Addendum 3 as instructed. On page four of the bid package Petitioner acknowledged that it had received Addendum 3, and it signed and returned the cover sheet to Addendum 3 under the language quoted in the foregoing Paragraph 4. Respondent considered this an important requirement because it wanted to prevent a bidder from later claiming that it had not received Addendum 3 or that it had received information different than that contained in Addendum 3. Petitioner made a correction to its bid for Alternate Number 3 found on page 5 of 13 of Petitioner's bid. Petitioner's bid for this alternate was $88,000. In the space for the written amount of the bid, Petitioner's president inserted by hand the words "Eighty-eight Thousand". In the space for the numerical insertion of the bid he initially wrote the sum $125,000 (which was the amount of Petitioner's bid for Alternate 4). He struck through the figure $125,000 and wrote above the stricken figure the figure $88,000. He did not initial his change. Respondent has never accepted changes to price quotations which were not initialed because it is concerned that uninitialed corrections on bids may result in challenges to the integrity of the bid process and may expose its staff to charges of collusion from a disgruntled bidder. Pioneer did not include a unit price structure in its bid as required by Addendum 3. The unit price structure is an informational item that is not separately considered by Respondent to determine the lowest bidder on this project. On April 6, 1990, Petitioner's estimator on this bid telephoned Susan Kuzenka regarding the unit price structure sheet to inquire as to the format that should be followed in submitting the unit price structure. Ms. Kuzenka is named in the Instructions to Bidder as the person in Respondent's purchasing department to whom questions about the bid process should be directed. Petitioner's estimator was told that the unit prices would be required to be submitted by the successful bidder at the pre-construction meeting after the bids were opened, but that the unit price structure need not be submitted with the bid. Petitioner's president verified this information on April 9, 1990, prior to the bid opening, during a telephone conference with the project engineer employed by Respondent for this project. In reliance on the information that was supplied by Respondent's agents, Petitioner did not submit its unit price structure sheet with its bid. Following its examination of all bids, the bid of Petitioner was disqualified on three grounds. The first reason cited by Respondent was that Petitioner failed to return the entire Addendum (3) as required. The second reason was that Petitioner did not initial a correction to a quoted price figure. The third reason was that Petitioner did not include the unit price structure as required in Addendum (3). Petitioner thereafter timely protested its disqualification and the intended award of the contract to Double E Construction Co. Petitioner contends that the reasons cited by Respondent for its disqualification are minor irregularities that should be waived by Respondent. Additionally, Petitioner contends that the third reason should not disqualify it because Petitioner acted in reliance upon the instructions of Respondent's agents in not submitting the unit price structure along with its bid package. This proceeding followed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Broward Community College, enter a final order which denies the bid protest of Petitioner, Pioneer Contracting, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioners. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2. 6 and 7 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made in paragraph 10. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings in the last sentence of paragraph 4 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached because of the clear instructions contained in Addendum 3. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings in the last two sentences of paragraph 5 are supported by the evidence, but are not adopted as findings of fact because they are unnecessary to the conclusions reached. All proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent are adopted in material part. Copies furnished: Eric L. Dauber, Esquire Beyer & Dauber Suite 5300 2101 W. Commercial Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33309 James D. Camp III, Counsel Broward Community College Fort Lauderdale Center 225 East Las Olas Blvd. Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Janet Rickenbacker Director of Purchasing Broward Community College Fort Lauderdale Center 225 East Las Olas Blvd. Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
# 8
ADLEE DEVELOPERS, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 92-002798BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida May 06, 1992 Number: 92-002798BID Latest Update: Jul. 31, 1992

The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Respondent's intended award of a lease for office space to Intervenor, Anthony Abraham Enterprise, is arbitrary and capricious and whether the proposal of the Petitioner, Adlee Developers, the current lessor, is responsive.

Findings Of Fact The parties agreed that on April 7, 1991, the Department issued an Invitation to Bid entitled, "Invitation To Bid For Existing Facilities State Of Florida Lease Number 590:2286, Dade County" This procurement was for the provision of 30,086 net rentable square feet to be used for office space in Dade County. A 3% variance was permitted. The facility was to house the District's Aging and Adult Services office which has been a tenant in Petitioner's building for several years and remained there during the pendancy of this protest process. According to the published advertisement, a pre-proposal conference was to be held on April 22, 1991, with all bids due by the bid opening to be held at 10:00 AM on May 30, 1991. The pre-bid conference was conducted by Philip A. Davis, then the District's facilities service manager and included not only a written agenda but also a review of the evaluation process by which each responsive bid would be examined. Petitioner asserts that the potential bidders were told, at that conference, that annual rental increases for the ten year lease period could not exceed five per cent (5%) and claims that Abraham's bid exceeded those guidelines. Thorough examination of the documentary evidence presented and the transcript of the proceedings, including a search for the reference thereto in Petitioner's counsel's Proposed Findings of Fact, fails to reveal any support for that assertion as to an increase limitation. The ITB for this procurement, in the section related to the evaluation of bids, indicated that pursuant to the provisions of Sections 5-3 and 5-11 of HRSM 70-1, dealing with the procurement of leased space, the responsive bids would be reviewed by an evaluation committee which would visit each proposed facility and apply the evaluation criteria to it in order to determine the lowest and best bidder. The evaluation criteria award factors listed in the ITB defined a successful bid as that one determined to be the lowest and best. That listing of evaluation criteria outlined among its categories associated fiscal costs, location, and facility. As to the first, the committee was to look at rental rates for both the basic term of the lease and the optional renewal period. The rates were to be evaluated using present value methodology applying the present value discount rate of 8.08% and rates proposed were to be within projected budgeting restraints of the Department. The total weight for the rental rate category was to be no more than 40 points with 35 points being the maximum for the basic term and 5 points for the option. Evaluation of the location was to be based on the effect of environmental factors including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the operations planned therefor. This included the proximity of the facility to a preferred area such as a co-location, a courthouse, or main traffic areas. This item carried a maximum weight of 10 points. Also included in location were the frequency and availability of public transportation, (5 points); the proximity of the facility to the clients to be served, (5 points); the aesthetics of not only the building but the surrounding neighborhood, (10 points); and security issues, (10 points). The third major factor for evaluation was the facility itself and here the committee was to examine the susceptibility of the offered space to efficient layout and good utilization, (15 points), and the susceptibility of the building, parking area and property as a whole to possible future expansion, (5 points). In that regard, the Bid Submittal Form attached to the ITB called for the successful bidder whose property did not have appropriate zoning at the time of award to promptly seek zoning appropriate to the use classification of the property so that it might be used for the purposes contemplated by the department within 30 days. In the event that could not be done, the award could be rescinded by the department without liability. The committee could award up to 100 points. The basic philosophy of this procurement was found in paragraph 1 of the Bid Award section of the ITB which provided: The department agrees to enter into a lease agreement based on submission and acceptance of the bid in the best interest of the department and the state. After the bid opening, three of the four bids received, excluding Petitioner's which was initially determined to be non-responsive, were evaluated by the Department's bid evaluation committee according to the above point system which allowed no discretion or deviation from the formula in comparing rental rates between bidders. Once Petitioner's bid was thereafter determined to be responsive, it, too was evaluated by the committee. At this second evaluation session, relating to Adlee's bid only, the committee scored the bid and added its scores to the original score sheets upon which the other three bidders' scores had been placed. Abraham had the lowest rental rates for the basic term of the lease and received the maximum award of 35 points for that category while Adlee received points. Abraham received an additional 2.29 points for the optional period rates while Adlee got 0. In the other categories, "location" and "facility", which comprised 60% of the points, Adlee's facility was routinely rated superior to Abraham's except for the area related to susceptibility for future expansion in which Abraham was rated higher by a small amount. Overall, however, Adlee was awarded 620.41 points and Abraham 571.03 points and as a result, Adlee was rated by the committee to be the lowest and best bidder. RCL, another bidder, was rated second, with Abraham third and DCIC fourth. Thereafter, the committee chairman, Mr. VanWerne, forwarded the new (and complete) evaluation results to the District Administrator on June 14, 1991 by an addendum dated June 27, 1991 which recommended award of the bid to Petitioner, Adlee Developers. No award was made at the time. Several factors not pertinent to the issues here caused that delay. Among the major of these was pending legislation which would have transferred the operation needing this space to another agency. This transfer was never consummated, however. On or before March 20, 1992, the new District Administrator, Mr. Towey, who had been appointed to his office in December, 1991, and who was made aware that this procurement had not been finalized, requested all available material on it so that he could study it and make his decision based on his own review of the submission. As a part of his determination process, he visited and inspected both the Adlee and the Abraham sites. One of the factors he considered was what appeared to be the significant monetary discrepancy between the two pertinent bids. Initial calculations indicated that Abraham's bid was approximately $835,000.00 lower than Adlee's over the ten year basic term of the lease. This amount was subsequently determined to be somewhat lower but the discrepancy is still significant. Nonetheless, because of that difference, Mr. Towey called a meeting with the members of the evaluation committee which had evaluated the bidders and had recommended Adlee. His stated reason for calling that meeting was to allow him to hear their reasons for rating the submissions as they had done and to take that information into consideration when he made his final decision. None of the committee members who testified at the hearing at Petitioner's behest indicated any feelings of pressure or intimidation by Mr. Towey. During his meeting with the committee members, Mr. Towey went over several of the evaluation criteria award factors to determine the committee's rationale. Of major importance was the issue of cost, of the availability of the facility to transportation to and from the building, employee security and the ability to control access to the facility, and the availability of on-site parking without cost to both employees and clients. It appears the Adlee facility is a multistory building with some parking available on site and would be easier to control. In addition, it is closer to public transportation access points. There is, however, some indication that on-site parking for clients would not be free and the closest free parking is some distance away. According to Adlee's representative, this matter would not be a problem, however, as adequate, free on site parking, which apparently was not initially identified as a problem, could be provided in any new lease. The Abraham facility is a one story building surrounded by on-site parking. In that regard, however, at hearing, Petitioner raised the claim that the Abraham site did not, in actuality, provide adequate parking because the zoning requirements of the City of South Miami, the municipality in which the facility is located, did not permit the required number of parking spaces to accommodate the prospective need. Petitioner sought and received permission to depose the Building and Zoning Director for the city, Sonia Lama, who ultimately indicated that the Abraham site was grandfathered in under the old zoning rule and, thereby, had adequate parking available. In any case, had this not been true, under the terms of the ITB, any zoning deficiencies could have been corrected after award, or the award rescinded without penalty to the Department. After the meeting with the committee, Mr. Towey indicated he would probably go against the committee's recommendation. One of his reasons for doing so, as he indicated to them, was the appearance certain amenities in the facility would give. In the period between the time the committee met and Mr. Towey was ready to decide, there were several newspaper articles published in the Miami area which were negative in their approach to Department leasing policies and this publicity had an effect on him. In his response to a reporter's question, in fact, Mr. Towey indicated he would not permit the lease of any property which contained such amenities while he was District Director. There is some evidence that the wet bar referred to here was a sink and counter used by agency employees to make coffee. However, before making his decision, Mr. Towey also met with Herbert Adler of Adlee. Mr. Towey advised him he was concerned about the fact that the Adlee property provided a wet bar, a private bathroom and some other amenities in that suite of offices occupied by the Department. Mr. Towey was adamant in his public and private pronouncements on the subject that there would be no such amenities in HRS offices in his District while he was in charge. At the meeting in issue, Mr. Adler made it very clear he was willing to remove all the offending amenities to bring the space into conformity with Mr. Towey's standards. Mr. Towey obviously took Adler at his word as he did not consider this matter to be an issue when he evaluated the bids. Based on his independent evaluation of the proposals, and considering all the pertinent factors, Mr. Towey decided not to concur with the committee's recommendation and instead recommended to the Department's Office of General Services that the bid be awarded to Abraham. Because his recommendation differed from that of the evaluation committee, under the provisions of Section 5-13, HRS Manual 70-1, he was required to forward additional justification for his position. In his forwarding memorandum dated March 20, 1992 to Mr. King Davis of the Department's Office of General Services, Mr. Towey listed as his reasons for disagreement with the committee's recommendation, (1) the lower term cost of Abraham's bid, (2) his opinion that the one story floor plan of Abraham was more convenient and accessible to clients, and (3) the provision for ample free parking at the Abraham site as opposed to the limited parking at the Adlee building. Petitioner claims that Mr. Towey's justification for disagreement was improper because, (a) the rental difference he cited was not based on the ITB formula and did not consider the difference in square footage offered; (b) the rental rate comparison compared a proposed lease with an existing lease, not with a proposal; and (c) the reference to on-site parking referred to the situation under the existing lease with Adlee and not to what could occur under a new lease. The major factor in Mr. Towey's decision was the price differential between the two offerings. While the difference may not have been as great as presented initially by the department staff, even taken in its most conservative light of about half that amount, and considering the appropriate figures, the difference was still considerable and significant. In the continuing period of budgetary austerity under which state operations have been and must continue to be conducted, the financial consideration loomed large in his thinking. As for the parking situation, no change for the better was provided for in Adlee's proposal and even if it were, it was but one of several factors. When Mr. Towey's March 20, 1992 memorandum in justification of his disagreement was evaluated at the Office of General services, it was determined that his decision was rational and objectively justified. Thereafter, by letter dated April 2, 1992, the Office of General Services authorized District 11 to award the lease to Abraham and this decision was transmitted to all responsive bidders by letter dated April 7, 1992. It was this action which prompted Petitioner's protest.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the protest by Adlee Developers, Inc., of the award of procurement No. 590:2286 to Anthony Abraham Enterprises. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-2798 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted that the pre-bid conference was held but reject the finding that a 5% limit was mentioned. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted except for the next to last sentence which is rejected. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but not probative of any material issue. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 30. Rejected. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. - 5. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. & 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 25. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Melinda S. Gentile, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell 200 East Broward Blvd. P.O. Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Paul J. Martin, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol - Suite 1501 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Peter W. Homer, Esquire Greer, Homer & Bonner, P.A. 3400 International Place 100 S.E. 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 John Slye General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk DHRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57571.03
# 9
LARRY W. MCCARTY vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 90-005311BID (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Aug. 28, 1990 Number: 90-005311BID Latest Update: Jan. 03, 1991

The Issue Whether Respondent's determination that the bid submitted by Petitioner was non-responsive, was arbitrary, capricious, or beyond Respondent's scope of discretion as a state agency.

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the formal hearing, the following relevant facts are made: A. Background The Department issued a Request For Proposal and Bid Submittal Form (BID) for a full service lease, Lease Number 700:0556, seeking to rent office space in an existing facility located in Polk County, Florida. Responses to the BID were to be filed with the Department by 10:00 a.m. on June 12, 1990. Six proposals were timely submitted in response to the BID, including McCarty's and Fearn's proposal. The Department evaluated the six proposals and made site visits to the properties proposed to be leased. The McCarty proposal received the highest evaluation score of 95.4 points, while the Fearn proposal received the second highest evaluation score of 92.6 points. Because the McCarty proposal had been found responsive to the BID and received the highest evaluation score, the Department awarded the lease contract for Lease No. 700:0556 to McCarty. Fearn filed a timely protest challenging the award to McCarty. The Fearn protest was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for hearing. However, after the protest was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings but before McCarty could intervene or a hearing could be held, the Department reviewed the McCarty proposal and found it to be non- responsive. The Department determined that the McCarty proposal was non-responsive because the McCarty proposal was for more space than authorized by the BID and that not all owners of the property proposed to be leased signed the BID. After determining that the McCarty proposal was non-responsive, the Department rejected the McCarty proposal and awarded the lease contract for Lease No. 700:0556 to Fearn. Upon Fearn withdrawing its protest, the Division of Administrative Hearings closed its file by relinquishing jurisdiction to the Department and the Department entered a Final Order dismissing the Fearn protest. By letter dated July 31, 1990, the Department advised McCarty of its decision to reject his proposal as non- responsive and award the bid to Fearn. By this same letter, the Department advised McCarty of his right to file a protest and his right to a formal administrative hearing. B. Lease Space Requirement Prior to issuing the BID the Department submitted to the Department of General Services (DGS) a Request For Prior Approval of Space Need (BPM Form 4405) wherein the Department justified, through a Letter of Agency Staffing, the need for 3,108 square feet of office space to be located in an existing facility in Auburndale, Polk County, Florida. However, the Department requested approval of only 3,017 net square feet. DGS approved the request for 3,017 net square feet of space and the Department issued the BID referred to in Finding of Fact l. The BID requested bidders to submit proposals to lease 3,017 square feet (plus or minus 3%) measured in accordance with Standard Method of Space Measurement and advised the bidder that the space offered must be within the plus or minus three percent required. The maximum square footage requested by the BID was 3,108 square feet (3017 + 3%). The McCarty proposal was for 3,150 square feet or 42 square feet over the maximum requested. The Department was aware of, and considered, the square feet of rental space proposed by each response to the BID in the initial evaluation since it rejected two proposals for exceeding this requirement by 145 and 392 square feet, respectively. The Department apparently considered the excess 42 square feet of space in the McCarty proposal in its initial evaluation but through an oversight failed to reject the McCarty proposal as it had in the other two proposals. Upon the Fearn protest being filed the Department's legal office reviewed the McCarty proposal and determined that the excess 42 square feet of space was a deviation that should not have been waived. At this point, the McCarty proposal was found to be non-responsive. The price per square foot of the McCarty proposal in all years, one through five, was less than the Fearn proposal. The total price of the lease in the McCarty proposal, including the excess 42 square feet, in all years, one through five, was less than the Fearn proposal. There was no evidence that the cost of the McCarty proposal would exceed the amount budgeted by the Department for this lease. C. Signature of Owner(s) and Transfer of Ownership Requirements. At the time McCarty signed and submitted the BID he was co-owner of the property bid with Adrian Gabaldon. Gabaldon was aware that McCarty was offering the property in question for lease to the Department having witnessed McCarty's signature on the BID and having been involved with the Department personnel concerning the BID. Section D. 4. A, General Provision, page 8 of the BID provides in pertinent part: Each proposal shall be signed by the owner,(s), corporate officer(s), or legal representative(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal McCarty's signature was the only signature, as owner, appearing on the McCarty proposal. Below McCarty's signature the word "owner" was handwritten. Gabaldon signed the McCarty proposal as a witness to McCarty's signature and not as an owner. There is insufficient evidence to establish that at the time McCarty submitted his proposal the property bid was owned by a partnership consisting of McCarty and Gabaldon. There is no printed or typewritten partnership name in the vicinity of McCarty's signature in his proposal or anywhere else in his proposal. Sometime between the date McCarty submitted his BID and the date of the hearing, Gabaldon transferred his interest in the property bid to McCarty. D. General By signing the BID, McCarty agreed to comply with all terms and conditions of the BID and certified his understanding of those terms and conditions. In accordance with Section D.10., General Provisions, page 9 of the BID, all question concerning the specifications were to be directed to C. Donald Waldron. And, although McCarty or Gabaldon may have discussed the space requirement and other matters with certain employees of the Department, they knew, or should have known, that these questions should have been directed to Waldron. Otherwise, the answer could not be relied upon. Neither McCarty or Gabaldon ever contacted Waldron concerning the terms, conditions or specifications of the BID and, more specifically, concerning the space requirement or who was required to sign the BID. Submitted with the Fearn proposal was a letter from Entrepreneur of Tampa as owner of the property bid in the Fearn proposal appointing David Fearn, CCIM and The Fearn Partnership, Inc. as its agent to submit a proposal on behalf of Entrepreneur of Tampa.

Recommendation Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated Hearing Officer, William R. Cave, held a formal hearing in the above- captioned case on October 16, 1990 in Tampa, Florida.

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer