The Issue Whether Respondent County is guilty of an unlawful employment practice pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is female, and within a class protected by Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent County is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claimed that Respondent treated her disparately from male employees on the basis of her gender in the areas of pay during her probationary period, reprimands and discipline, provision of equipment, poor performance evaluations, and training. Petitioner's initial relationship with Respondent was as an independent contractor at Respondent's Sanitary Landfill under a written contract entered into on September 15, 1989. In this capacity, she acted as a "spotter." As an independent contractor, she received $250 per month and salvage rights to whatever material customers brought to the Respondent's Sanitary Landfill. Effective August 14, 1990, the State Division of Personnel and Retirement required Respondent to put all contractual people on the County payroll. Thereafter, Petitioner was paid $350 per month and continued to have salvage rights only at the sufferance of the Respondent. After that date, Petitioner earned retirement and social security benefits. Withholding of federal taxes and deduction of social security benefits were also provided.(P-12). The value of the salvage rights were never calculated by anyone. While she was employed as a "spotter," Petitioner was the only female "spotter." Petitioner was on probation as an employee from August to December 1990. Petitioner was paid $1.442 per hour from August 12, 1990 through October 1990, and $1.63 per hour from October 1990 through December 3, 1990. At that time, her rate of pay was raised to $3.85 per hour. The record contains no evidence of what was paid to any male employee similarly situated during this period. Without proof that similarly situated male spotters were consistently paid better, there is no proof of gender discrimination in pay during Petitioner's probationary period.3 Mark Hawes, a male, was hired as a spotter on June 1, 1993. He was paid $4.35 per hour while on probation. Willie George, also male, was hired as a spotter on October 1, 1993, and was paid $4.4805 per hour while on probation. There is no evidence of how much Petitioner was being paid during this period, so there is no means of assessing disparate treatment in pay, if any, during this period.4 During the period that Petitioner was employed as a "spotter," there was no statute or rule requiring that "spotters" receive formalized training or be certified in any field. During Petitioner's employment, no spotter were provided more than a printed Job Description and on-the-job oral instructions. They were expected to use courtesy and common sense in dealing with the public. Two employees (gender unspecified) who were not spotters were sent to train at a state "school" to become Certified Landfill Operators. A State Rule was enacted after Petitioner was terminated which required that all spotters must have eight hours of specialized training. Thereafter, the Respondent provided such training to spotters. At all times material to any Personnel Citations, Petitioner was a union member, and all benefits of her union's collective bargaining agreement with the Respondent accrued to her. No performance evaluations were submitted in evidence. With the exception of the events related within the following findings of fact, no witness found any fault with Petitioner in the performance of her job description as a "spotter" at Respondent's landfill. (P-1) Wayne Hardee, Director of the Landfill, issued a Personnel Citation against Petitioner early in her employment on the basis of lack of personal hygiene. The citation was later removed from Petitioner's personnel file as an act of good will. On or about January 16, 1994, Petitioner admitted to an immediate supervisor that her carelessness with a hand-held CB radio had resulted in loss of the radio. She offered to pay for the radio. Mr. Hardee did not require her to pay for the radio, but issued a written Personnel Citation to her on January 20, 1994 for her carelessness. This Personnel Citation simultaneously cited Petitioner because Mr. Hardee had received complaints that Petitioner was overly concerned about other spotters doing their jobs. In this Personnel Citation, Mr. Hardee warned Petitioner to do her job without complaining about other employees. Petitioner admitted that she signed this citation and that she did not grieve it through her union. The radio was later recovered, but the citation remained in Petitioner's personnel file. (P-2) On Saturday, July 9, 1994, Petitioner called her union's senior shop steward, Jessie Ellzey, to the landfill to complain about items left at her spotter station. Mr. Ellzey's perception was that Petitioner was accusing another employee of putting the items in the wrong place. Petitioner also told Mr. Ellzey that another employee had threatened her. After investigation and interviews the following week, Mr. Ellzey and Mr. Hardee determined that the items had been brought by a landfill customer to the landfill between shift changes. Mr. Hardee's and Mr. Ellzey's perception was that Petitioner had unfairly complained about another spotter, Willie George, not doing his job. At least three days and two meetings were involved in this investigation and counseling procedure. Mr. Hardee issued a written Personnel Citation against Petitioner for complaining about a co-employee. (P-3) Petitioner also was suspended without pay for one day and warned that if the problem was not corrected, further disciplinary action would be taken against her. Petitioner did not grieve this citation through her union. Based on all of Mr. Ellzey's credible testimony, due to reputation testimony about Mr. Ellzey's standard operating procedure, and because Petitioner was actually suspended for one day without pay, I reject as not credible Petitioner's testimony that she never knew of this citation in time to grieve it. On August 13, 1994, Ann Harrell, a landfill customer, filed a written complaint of rudeness against Petitioner. (P-9) A written complaint of rudeness by Petitioner was also filed by another customer, Mr. Richburg, at about the same time. Mr. Hardee considered courtesy to customers to be an unstated policy of County government and further perceived rudeness to customers to be an on-going problem in Petitioner's relationship with the public. Due to the foregoing written complaints and many similar oral complaints he had received, Mr. Hardee assigned Petitioner two days' suspension without pay by a written Personnel Citation issued August 15, 1994. The citation also warned Petitioner she would be terminated if there were another complaint about her. Petitioner refused to sign this citation. (P-4) On August 25, 1994, Petitioner grieved the August 15, 1994 Personnel Citation through her union. (P-5) A hearing was held in response to Petitioner's grievance. All concerned agree that Mr. Ellzey, the union representative advocating Petitioner's position, and not a representative of management, kept Petitioner from testifying. Chester Humphries testified on Petitioner's behalf at the grievance hearing that he had been unable to hear what Mr. Richburg said but could hear what Petitioner said to Mr. Richburg. From this, Mr. Hardee inferred that Petitioner had raised her voice to Mr. Richburg. Mr. Hardee assessed Petitioner's character witnesses in Petitioner's favor but noted that they knew nothing about the specific incident between Petitioner and Mr. Richburg. Ultimately, Mr. Hardee relied on Mr. Richburg's testimony concerning the incident. (P-6) Mr. Hardee denied Petitioner's grievance and disciplined Petitioner in accord with the August 15, 1994 Personnel Citation. Upon advice of her union steward, Petitioner did not appeal the grievance hearing result. It was further agreed that if Petitioner's behavior resulted in no more complaints against her for 30 working days, the August 15, 1994, citation would be removed from her personnel file. Petitioner met this requirement, and the citation was removed from her personnel file. (P-6; P-7). Petitioner's December 13, 1994, charge of discrimination before the Florida Commission on Human Relations listed August 11, 1994, as the last date of alleged discrimination. No witness at formal hearing herein, including Mr. Ellzey and Mr. Humphries, both of whom also had been present at the grievance hearing, confirmed Petitioner's perception that her gender had affected the result of her grievance hearing. Another female employee (not a landfill spotter) currently works in Respondent's administrative offices. That female employee also has had employment disputes with Mr. Hardee which she attributes to his gender bias, but the type of dispute was not clearly specified on this record. Therefore, no similarity to Petitioner's situation can be discerned and no pattern of gender bias was proven on that basis. This female employee is still employed by Respondent. A different female employee (also not a spotter) employed by Respondent's Emergency Medical Services (EMS) was terminated by Mr. Bill Beddow, EMS Director, for failing to timely report (or complain about) her immediate supervisor for "doing something [Mr. Beddow] thought he shouldn't be doing with drugs." The male supervisor resigned for "personal reasons." The female employee was rehired by Mr. Beddow after intercession by her union. This means another female not similarly situated to Petitioner was terminated for not complaining about a male employee's job performance and was then hired back, whereas Petitioner was progressively disciplined with reprimands and suspensions for repetitive unsubstantiated complaints about male employees' job performances. Petitioner seeks to have the conclusion drawn that female employees were disciplined both for reporting and for not reporting male employees' misbehavior. However, the two isolated situations are so dissimilar as to develop no pattern recognizable at law. I accept as credible and unrefuted Petitioner's testimony that all of the complaints she initiated about other employees were oral. However, Petitioner's testimony that she did not complain about other employees' performance of, or failure to perform, their jobs and her assertion that her complaints were only motivated by the requirements of her Job Description to "inspect loads" and "report all problems" was not corroborated by any other witness. Petitioner's testimony that her concerns were directed not at individual employees but at addressing hazardous wastes also was not corroborated by any other witness.5 Petitioner's middle level supervisor acknowledged that Petitioner told him that other employees had improperly handled hazardous materials as well as non-hazardous materials but that he did not cite anyone as a result of Petitioner's complaints about hazardous wastes because it was impossible to prove who was responsible. He counseled all subordinates about each incident whenever he considered counseling appropriate. Otherwise, all witnesses with reason to know the situation generally acknowledged that Petitioner's oral complaints were recurring almost daily and were directed to other employees' job performances rather than hazardous materials. It is the repetitive and personal nature of Petitioner's complaints rather than their being oral that management found offensive. The evidence also generally shows that all employees orally complained about each other and that Petitioner's two immediate supervisors, Felippe McCelroy and Robert Murray, orally reprimanded everybody who complained or who was complained about as they each saw fit within their supervisory discretion on individual occasions. No gender pattern is to be discerned from the foregoing. Only on those occasions that either an oral or written complaint reached Mr. Hardee was anyone written up and/or disciplined. Petitioner complained about not being assigned or provided with one of Respondent employer's trucks when other male employees were provided trucks. With the exception of the following findings related to the Respondent's trucks, there is no relevant evidence in this record concerning employees' use of trucks. All employees were cautioned against carelessness. Tommy Dean, a male employee, dented one of Respondent's trucks. He was not disciplined for careless driving. There is no evidence the dent was caused by Mr. Dean's careless driving. In February 1995, Charles Kennedy, a male spotter, filed a written complaint or incident report. Therein, he claimed that Petitioner had attempted to prohibit his bulldozing landfill material out of the way because Petitioner was trying to remove salvageable items. He further alleged that Petitioner had thrown a jar of grease at him. Petitioner was requested to file a written account of the incident. In her written account, she basically admitted the incident but not any intent to hit Mr. Kennedy with the grease jar. Mr. Kennedy was not disciplined for filing the written complaint/report. Petitioner was not disciplined for the actions complained about by Mr. Kennedy. Instead, as of February 3, 1995, landfill spotters were prohibited from salvaging at the landfill. (P-13) Petitioner desires that the conclusion be drawn that male spotters who complained in writing about other employees were not disciplined for complaining but that Petitioner, a female, was disciplined for making oral complaints. However, it appears Respondent addressed Mr. Kennedy's written complaint in much the same way as it had addressed Petitioner's oral complaint against Willie George, by giving each participant in the dispute a chance to state his or her position, before management decided who should be disciplined. The difference was that Mr. Kennedy was not a chronic complainer and management's investigation revealed some fault on both sides, so a neutral solution was found rather than discipline being imposed. There is no evidence beyond Petitioner's assertion that she was ever asked to do more work or heavier work than male spotters. From this point on, the dates that events occurred or their chronology is not entirely clear from the record. However, approximately April 14, 1995, there was an occasion when Petitioner was asked to move metal pieces in a wheelbarrow-sized pile over a three-hour period. The largest piece weighed 21 pounds. The next day, Petitioner reported a workers' compensation back injury or aggravation. She was then off work until approximately May 11, 1995, when she returned to "light duty." She worked for awhile for only four hours per day. Respondent hired someone to help her. It is disputed whether Petitioner was reinjured or whether Mr. Hardee just sent her home. However, on or about July 8, 1995, Mr. Hardee discussed the situation with "the workers' compensation people," and it was agreed there was not enough light duty work for Petitioner. Three months later, Petitioner returned to full duty. Because a spotter had been hired to do her work, Petitioner was assigned to a variety of jobs. She worked at the dog pound, the recycling building, and even washed Mr. Hardee's truck.6 One day, Petitioner's immediate supervisor ordered her to cut out the top of a metal drum. At formal hearing, Petitioner asserted that this was heavier work than she should have been required to do on light duty, but there is no evidence the supervisor's order was motivated by gender bias. There also is no evidence a full-time male spotter was never required to do similarly heavy work. Petitioner advised her supervisor that she had hurt her arms and elbows and she went home on sick leave. Petitioner had complained over the term of her employment about not being provided one of Respondent's trucks so that she could conveniently get from her sector of the landfill to a restroom. After her workers' compensation injury, Respondent arranged for male employees to drive Petitioner to the restroom. Eventually, Respondent provided Petitioner with a portable toilet in her work sector. Mr. Hardee maintained that no spotter had ever been assigned a truck but that all spotters, including Petitioner, had access to one. There is evidence to show that male employees drove the trucks and Petitioner did not, but insufficient evidence to show this was an active management decision or that Mr. Hardee acquiesced in male employees preempting trucks as a result of any gender bias. On or about November 13, 1995, Petitioner informed Mr. Hardee that she was permanently physically disabled and would have to be on light duty indefinitely. After consultation with his "workers' compensation people," Mr. Hardee terminated Petitioner as of that date. 7 At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted Respondent was still paying her workers' compensation benefits and that her workers' compensation claim has not been settled.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding no discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1997.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on January 2, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In his Charge of Discrimination, Petitioner, Jeffrey S. Wytrwal, alleges that after he had suffered a knee injury, Respondent, Waste Management of Putnam County, violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, by failing to find him a "light duty" position "due to [his] disability and [because of] unfair favoritism throughout this company." Respondent denies the charge of discrimination and contends that Petitioner does not suffer from a disability, and even if he did, it had no positions in the company which were compatible with his medical restrictions. Respondent is engaged in the business of providing solid waste collection services for the residents of Putnam County, Florida. Testimony by Respondent's district manager, Brian Watkins, established that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the law and is thus subject to the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Petitioner worked for Respondent as a driver on a garbage truck from 1990 until 1993, and then again beginning in January 1995. The work is physically demanding, and it requires that the driver frequently jump in and out of the vehicle to sling or empty garbage cans into the rear-end loader. After working a 12-15 hour shift on January 28, 1997, Petitioner was home sitting on his bed "half Indian style" when he attempted to stand up. His right knee locked; he was transported to a local hospital; and he later underwent arthroscopic surgery to correct the injury. After suffering the foregoing injury, Petitioner qualified for disability payments from his employer, and he began receiving a monthly disability check in the amount of $888.00. On an undisclosed date after Petitioner suffered his injury, Respondent changed its hauling operation from a two-man team (a driver and swingman) on each truck to a single driver. This meant that the bona fide occupational requirements for the position of driver required that he engage in bending, stooping, and climbing on a repetitive basis for long hours each day without the aid of a "swingman." On October 14, 1997, Petitioner was released by his doctor to return to work and was given a certificate which read "No bending, stooping, climbing (Light Duty Only, if available)." These restrictions obviously did not allow Petitioner to return to his former job. Upon obtaining the release, Petitioner telephoned his supervisor, John Rakoczy, and asked if he could go back to work on "light duty," performing duties that would be compatible with his medical restrictions. On a very few occasions, Respondent had authorized an injured worker to perform other temporary duties if his injuries "fit a temporary job." However, except for two already filled dispatcher positions in the office, Respondent had no jobs which did not require bending, stooping, or climbing. Therefore, without making fundamental alterations in the company's operations, which would result in an undue hardship to the company, Rakoczy could not offer Petitioner part- time or restricted work. Petitioner did not seek the office dispatcher position, and he produced no evidence that he was qualified to perform that job. Although Petitioner admits that his knee has improved since October 1997, he never again contacted his employer regarding reemployment. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that he agreed with Rakoczy's assessment that no light duty jobs were available within the company. Even so, he and his wife "took it hard," and in January 1998 he filed his Charge of Discrimination. Petitioner has not alleged, nor presented competent and credible evidence, that his knee injury continues to limit the full and normal uses of his physical facilities. While it is undisputed that the injury may have limited his physical facilities during his recuperation, there is no evidence that it continues to do so, or that others regard him as having a disability. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is disabled within the meaning of the law. Respondent's decision to not offer Petitioner light duty was not based on discriminatory reasons, as Petitioner has alleged, but was based on the fact that there were no jobs which were compatible with Petitioner's medical restrictions. While collecting medical disability payments, Petitioner also filed a worker's compensation claim against his employer in October 1997, and this claim was settled in May 1999 for the sum of $27,000.00. By agreeing to the settlement, Petitioner was no longer eligible for disability payments, and they terminated in May 1999. Until he settled his worker's compensation claim, Petitioner did not look for other employment. After the case was settled, however, he secured a job within a week at a local country club doing maintenance and landscaping work, and he has worked there since that time. There is no evidence as to how his current job duties compare with the duties that he performed for Respondent. Further, the difference in compensation, if any, between the new job and Petitioner's former job is not of record. Although Petitioner contended that Respondent had offered "light duty" to other injured workers in the past, he could only identify one such worker named "Keith," who had lost four fingers in an accident. Unlike Petitioner, however, that worker was able to perform a variety of temporary jobs despite the limitations caused by his injury. Neither the Charge of Discrimination, nor the record evidence, reveals the specific relief that Petitioner is requesting. Rather, the complaint merely lodges allegations of discrimination against Respondent. Respondent suggests that Petitioner's injury was pre-existing, and occurred before January 28, 1997, and that Petitioner may be malingering. This is based on the treating physician's notes which reflected that Petitioner had his symptoms prior to the date of the injury. Even if this were true, however, this fact would appear to bear on the legitimacy of Petitioner's worker's compensation claim, and not the charge of discrimination. Finally, even though the treating physician suspected that Petitioner might be malingering with his injury, this was only a suspicion and was not medically confirmed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey S. Wytrwal Post Office Box 701 Satsuma, Florida 32189-0701 Joseph P. Shelton, Esquire 1500 Resurgens Plaza 945 East Paces Ferry Road Atlanta, Georgia 30326-1125 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from his position as a janitor with Respondent because of his handicap, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lee, was hired by Respondent in August 1994 as a custodial worker at the Tallahassee Mall in Tallahassee, Florida. As a janitor Petitioner's duties included bending, stooping, and lifting. He was assigned to zone 3 in the Mall. Up until 1996, when Petitioner was injured, Petitioner received good evaluations on his job performance. Indeed Petitioner was very proud of the quality of his work and took special care to do his job well. Sometime prior to May 20, 1996, Petitioner, while at work and in the scope of his employment, stepped on a set of stairs which were not properly attached to a stage in the Tallahassee Mall. The steps slipped causing Petitioner's feet to come out from under him. Petitioner fell flat on his back. As a consequence Petitioner suffered a permanent back injury for which he received workers' compensation. The injury impairs his ability to work and therefore is a handicap. Around May 20, 1996, Petitioner was released by his doctor and was given orders for light duty with no bending, stooping, or heavy lifting. Petitioner gave these orders to his supervisor, Mr. Navin, when he returned to work on May 20, 1996. Respondent had light duty work available which Petitioner was qualified to perform. However, Respondent did not assign Petitioner to light duty work, but changed his work area from zone 3 to zone 1. Zone 1 is located at the front entrance to the mall and requires more work to maintain. Petitioner attempted to perform his duties but could only work for 3 1/2 hours before being overcome by pain from his injury. Petitioner could not work the next four working days because of the aggravation of his injury. On May 28, 1996, after returning to work, Petitioner was again given full duty work. Petitioner attempted to perform his custodial duties for about 2 weeks. However, the pain from his injury was so severe he again requested light duty work. Petitioner's supervisor asked Petitioner to bring him another notice from his doctor. Petitioner's doctor faxed the supervisor a second notice and Petitioner was placed on light duty work. Once Petitioner was placed on light duty work, the mall manager, Mr. Renninger, followed Petitioner around the mall watching him all the time while he worked. On July 8, 1996, prior to the mall opening for business, Petitioner was helping one of the mall store owners with a problem. Such aid was part of Petitioner's job. The mall manager walked up to Petitioner and began to yell at him in a very rude and disrespectful manner. The manager would not listen to Petitioner's explanation of the event. The manager gave Petitioner a written disciplinary notice for his aid to the mall store owner. The manager continued to follow Petitioner around the mall while he worked. Sometime around August 15, 1996, the mall manager advised the mall's employees that they should take their respective vacations prior to October. Petitioner thought it would be a good time for him to take the 4-day vacation time he had accumulated during his employment with the mall. He could use the time to allow his back to heal more. On August 15, 1996, Petitioner requested vacation leave and vacation pay for the period beginning September 3, 1996 and ending September 9, 1996. Initially, the request was denied. Petitioner's supervisor felt he had missed too much work and been late too often. However, Petitioner had only been absent or late in relation to his back injury. Petitioner explained that fact to his supervisor. His supervisor agreed and approved Petitioner's vacation. Petitioner returned to work on August 10, 1996. An argument with the administrative assistant occurred when she refused to recognize that Petitioner was entitled to be paid for his vacation time. She was not going to turn in any time for him so that Petitioner could get paid while on vacation. Getting a paycheck was a serious matter to Petitioner, and Petitioner, understandably, became gruff with the administrative assistant. Petitioner only raised his voice at the administrative assistant. He was not abusive and did not curse at her. In fact, the administrative assistant yelled at Petitioner when he raised the subject of his pay "Now, before you start bitching." Petitioner called the headquarters of Respondent and confirmed he had vacation time and pay accrued. After this incident Petitioner was fired ostensibly for mistreating the administrative assistant. The administrative assistant, who was incorrect, was not terminated. The reason appears to be a pretext. Petitioner's pay was $5.35 per hour and he worked a 40-hour-work-week. After his termination, Petitioner actively sought employment but could not find any until September 1, 1997. At that time he began work for Tallahassee Community College as a custodial worker with light duties at a higher rate of pay. Petitioner's search for work was reasonable.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner and awarding Petitioner backpay in the amount of $11,770.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2000.
The Issue Has Respondent committed an "unlawful employment practice" against Petitioner, pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, based upon a Petition for Relief dated October 13, 1997, referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Florida Commission on Human Relations?
Findings Of Fact Respondent stipulated to jurisdiction, and the evidence demonstrates that by number of employees, Respondent is an "employer" as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a freight company which ships and receives living nursery stock by truck through a depot/warehouse. Petitioner was employed there from 1993 until June 16, 1995. In the course of formal hearing, Petitioner waived his Charge of Discrimination on the basis of his national origin (United States citizen). (TR-116). There is no evidence the Respondent employs anyone other than United States citizens. The remainder of Petitioner's allegations were that Respondent failed to accommodate one or more handicaps and subjected Petitioner to disparate treatment from similarly situated black employees. Petitioner also related a series of remarks and one personnel action that he considered to be harassing and abusive due to his handicaps. The "handicaps" that Petitioner testified to were high blood pressure, an undefined heart condition requiring medication, "bad knees," and problems with his back. At formal hearing, no medical physician or health care professional corroborated the foregoing conditions. However, it is undisputed that on or about January 9, 1995, Petitioner presented a physician's excuse to Respondent's Warehouse Supervisor, Jeff Bradner. That physician's excuse stated that Petitioner could return to work on that date, working 10 hours per day, 5 days per week, doing medium lifting, that is, "lifting 30 pounds and frequently lifting and/or carrying objects weighing 25 pounds." The excuse further stated that Petitioner was to avoid squatting, kneeling, and climbing. Mr. Bradner informed Eddie Payne, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, that the foregoing January 9, 1995, medical restrictions were to be observed for Petitioner. Attached to both Petitioner's initial Charge of Discrimination and his later Petition for Review was another physician's letter dated January 29, 1993. It stated, in pertinent part: [Petitioner], patient of record, suffers from high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease. These conditions are aggravated by the stress caused by problems he has with his teenage son. Also attached was a March 3, 1994, doctor's letter stating that Petitioner had a spine and knee injury. It contains the same restrictions as the January 9, 1995, letter. Because the 1993 and 1994 letters are part of the record herein, (attached to the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief), I have taken official recognition thereof and find that they supplement or explain Petitioner's oral testimony at formal hearing to the effect that Petitioner was suffering from high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease in 1993, and from a knee injury in 1994. However, these letters were not introduced in evidence at formal hearing, and Petitioner did not testify that he ever presented any such written medical confirmations of these conditions to any of Respondent Employer's supervisory personnel. Mr. Payne and Mr. Bradner denied that any oral or written requests for accommodation had been received from Petitioner other than the January 9, 1995, doctor's excuse listing specific restrictions. Contrary to Petitioner's testimony, Mr. Payne denied knowing of Petitioner's heart condition. There also is no corroboration of Petitioner's testimony that he orally requested any accommodation specifically because of his high blood pressure or heart condition at any material time. Furthermore, and most importantly, the 1993 letter places no restrictions on Petitioner in the workplace, and the 1994 letter imposes the same restrictions as the 1995 letter, which is in evidence. The only medical condition any of his co-workers ever heard Petitioner complain about was his "bad knees." Upon the record as a whole, it is inferred that Eddie Payne also knew Petitioner complained of "bad knees." At all times material, both before January 9, 1995, and afterwards, Petitioner worked for Respondent as a "checker." Checkers have the most physically non-taxing job in Respondent's operation. They make sure that "wheelers" or "loaders" place unloaded freight on pallets in the correct location in the warehouse and that "loaders" load the correct freight from the warehouse or warehouse dock into the correct truck. In this capacity, the bulk of Petitioner's work was carrying a clipboard, making notations thereon, and orally directing others where to put boxes. Petitioner testified that due to his blood pressure and back condition, he "needed" to sit down for 15 minutes' rest every 20 minutes after January 9, 1995. The evidence as a whole does not indicate that Petitioner clearly enunciated this "need" to any supervisor. Moreover, the credible evidence supports the inference that no one could work effectively as a checker while taking 15 minute breaks as frequently as every 20 minutes, because each truck needed to be loaded or unloaded as a component, so as to avoid shipping errors. Therefore, substituting other checkers every 20 minutes would have adversely affected Respondent's business and would constitute an unreasonable accommodation for Petitioner and undue hardship for the Employer. Either substituting another checker or waiting on Petitioner to rest every 20 minutes would have been unduly costly, burdensome, or substantially disruptive and would have altered the nature of Respondent's business. Prior to January 9, 1995, Petitioner worked at least a 40-50 hour week and was paid by the number of hours he worked. Due to the nature of Respondent's business and the hours when freight was received, Petitioner's usual hours before January 9, 1995, were from approximately 4:00-4:30 p.m. until 9:30 a.m. (17- 18 hours) three days a week, mostly Monday, Tuesday and Thursday. At all times material, both before and after January 9, 1995, only twenty-five percent as much freight came in on Wednesdays and Fridays as came in on the other three work days of each week. Therefore, all employees were not needed for a 17-18 hour day on those days, and employees had the option of working at whatever was available on those days to "make their hours" for pay purposes. At all times material, on Wednesdays and Fridays, all employees who wanted to work took turns digging weeds out of the cracks in the Respondent's paved parking lot with a claw on a broom handle or the edge of a shovel; picking the weeds up with a shovel; and throwing them away. Sometimes a blower was used. In accord with the January 9, 1995, physician's written restrictions, Eddie Payne accommodated Petitioner by assigning him to work from 10:00 p.m. until 8:00 a.m., so that Petitioner would only be working 10 hours per day. This assignment had Petitioner working the hours during which the employer needed the most men because those were the hours when the workload was the heaviest. Petitioner complained because Mr. Payne would not let him work his 10 hours from 4:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m., a less busy time, but he complained only because those hours were more convenient for him. Petitioner related that after January 9, 1995, he was made to lift more than 30 pounds of parking lot weeds at a time, with the shovel, after getting on his hands and knees to dig the weeds out, and always in the hot sun, which aggravated his undisclosed heart condition. He also related that he never got to use the blower like other employees. His testimony on this issue is not credible in light of the contrary testimony of all the other witnesses. Even if credible, Petitioner was not forced to do this work. He was permitted to do this "make work" during slow days so that he would earn at least 40 hours per week. Witnesses confirmed that another "make work" project on a single occasion was digging muck out of a ditch. Petitioner testified that he was required to dig more than 30 pounds of muck in each shovelful that he lifted out of the ditch. His description was neither corroborated or refuted, but again, Petitioner was the one who controlled the content of each shovel, and he could have declined to work at that "make work" project. According to Petitioner's time cards, from which information Petitioner received his pay, Petitioner usually worked only 10 hours or less per day after January 9, 1995. Occasionally, he worked more than 10 hours, but less than 11 hours per day. Petitioner and Eddie Payne were fishing buddies outside of work, and on at least one occasion, Eddie Payne treated his subordinates, including Petitioner, to a night-clubbing expedition. Petitioner asserted that on the job, Eddie Payne had used derogatory and profane language to him, on account of his handicaps. Once, when Petitioner wanted to punch-out early, Mr. Payne supposedly said, "Go home if you need to, you crippled old pussy." Once, Mr. Payne allegedly called Petitioner "a crippled old Mother F-----." Mr. Payne denied ever using such language either socially or on the job. Mr. Bradner testified that he had instructed his subordinates against profanity on the job, and related that Mr. Payne had a reputation for not using profanity. No other witness corroborated Petitioner's testimony that any such language had ever been addressed to Petitioner. Petitioner called Matthew Hickox, a co-employee, as a witness. Mr. Hickox related that Petitioner would often "act goofy," by doing a "Quasimodo imitation," twisting his arm, making a face, and dragging one leg behind him. When Petitioner did this, other employees would "make cracks." Petitioner claimed that dragging his leg behind him was evidence of his handicap. Mr. Hickox's opinion was that "disabled don't give you the right to act like a nut and then people not make some comment." Petitioner testified that he had only become entirely disabled since leaving Respondent's employ June 16, 1995. Although Petitioner moved slowly and evidenced pain on rising and sitting, he was able to move around and approach the witness stand at formal hearing. The undersigned observed no twisted arm, facial contortions, or dragging leg. It is inferred from observing the candor and demeanor of all the witnesses, including Petitioner, and from the whole of the evidence, but particularly from Mr. Hickox's testimony, that on such occasions as Petitioner performed his imitation on the job, Mr. Payne or Mr. Bradner may have vehemently ordered Petitioner back to work and warned him to cut out the horseplay. Petitioner claimed to have received only a fifteen-cent per hour raise when other employees received more. According to Petitioner, the other employees, including Mr. Gonzalez, were raised by twenty-five cents per quarter hour for a $1.00 per hour raise. What anyone was being paid before this raise is not in evidence. Since no evidence indicates whether this raise occurred before or after January 9, 1995, when Respondent's management clearly knew of any of Petitioner's restrictions, there was no nexus between the lack of raise and handicap discrimination.2 Petitioner also developed no nexus between this raise and racial discrimination. According to Eddie Payne, Petitioner was a sub-average worker. According to Eddie Payne and Jeff Bradner, they frequently had to instruct Petitioner to resume work. Mr. Bradner related an incident when Petitioner was leaning on a shovel in the parking lot, so Mr. Bradner sarcastically commented, "You're not getting much work done leaning on that shovel," but this motivational comment was not directed at a handicap. No employee testified that any supervisor's instructions to Petitioner, which they observed or overheard, were offensive or otherwise inappropriate. On one occasion, Petitioner was told by Mr. Bradner to stop kicking a "basketball of tape" around; throw it away; and get back to work. No employee other than Petitioner found this instruction offensive. On another occasion, Petitioner was given a written reprimand when a truckload of freight was sent to the wrong location. Petitioner attributed the error to a black "loader" named James Oliver and perceived the reprimand as discriminatory because Mr. Oliver was not reprimanded. Petitioner's superiors reprimanded Petitioner as a formal personnel action instead of Mr. Oliver because they considered Petitioner responsible for the error and resultant costs since Petitioner was in the superior position of checker. Petitioner suffered no loss of pay, hours, or seniority as a result of the reprimand. Petitioner's assertions that he was required to climb tall ladders to change light bulbs in the warehouse, to squat to lift boxes, and to kneel to pull weeds were denied by management witnesses and uncorroborated by Petitioner's witnesses. On one occasion, Petitioner had just come on duty and was having a coke and a cigarette, when Mr. Bradner told him to get to work helping a black loader named "Willie T." unload a truck. On this single occasion, Petitioner may have been asked to lift boxes in excess of 30 pounds, but the boxes also may have weighed as little as 20 pounds. This incident may have occurred before Mr. Bradner knew of Petitioner's medical restrictions on January 9, 1995, but it was probably afterwards. If so, this single incident was contrary to Petitioner's doctor's instructions, but Petitioner admittedly never complained to Mr. Bradner about this one-time incident in terms of "lack of accommodation" for his physical limitations. On the same occasion, Willie T., who already had been loading the truck for three hours, took a coke and cigarette break a half an hour after Petitioner began to help him unload the truck. Willie T. asked Petitioner to join him on his break, which Petitioner did. Mr. Bradner spotted them and instructed Petitioner to return to loading the truck because he felt Petitioner was not entitled to a break after only a half an hour of work, but did feel that Willie T. was entitled to a break after three full hours of work. This was a bona fide business consideration of Respondent. Petitioner failed to establish a nexus of racially discriminatory intent on the basis of this incident. On June 16, 1995, Petitioner was sweeping the warehouse floor, leaving trails of residue behind. Petitioner intended to go back and sweep up the residue, but before he could do so, Mr. Bradner told him that he was leaving trails and that he should do a better job. Petitioner considered this instruction to be demeaning and discriminatory, but he did not reply to Mr. Bradner. Mr. Bradner noted that Petitioner began to do a better job of sweeping, and Mr. Bradner left the area. Petitioner perceived that his co-workers were laughing at the incident and became upset. Petitioner finished sweeping one section of the warehouse and asked Eddie Payne if he could clock-out. He assumed that Eddie Payne knew he was upset because of Mr. Bradner's comment but did not tell him so. Eddie Payne authorized Petitioner to clock-out. Petitioner clocked-out and never returned to work for Respondent
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Human Relations Commission enter a Final Order denying and dismissing the Petition for Relief on all issues. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1998.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a Public Employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(2). Lloyd A. Perry was formerly an employee of the Respondent, and a public employee within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(3). Dana E. Pratt was formerly an employee of the Respondent, and a public employee within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(3). Prior to February 17, 1976, Lloyd A. Perry was employed by the Citrus County Road Department for a period of over four years. Immediately prior to the time that his employment was terminated, Perry was a roller operator. Except for rare occasions when he performed work as a flagman, or other work in conjunction with his roller work, Perry operated a tandem road roller. For the several months prior to February, 1976, Perry had continuously operated the same roller machine. Prior to February, 1976, none of Perry's supervisors informed him that his work was unsatisfactory, reprimanded him for performing work in an unsatisfactory manner, or indicated to him in any way that his job was in jeopardy for unsatisfactory performance of his duties. Dana E. Pratt had been employed by the Citrus County Road Department for approximately five years prior to February, 1976. For four years prior to that date he had been a motor grader operator. Pratt had annually received formal evaluations and his evaluations had always been very good. Prior to February, 1976, Pratt had never been criticized for below average or unsatisfactory work. He had never received any written reprimand for unsatisfactory performance on the job. From approximately December, 1973 until February, 1976, Perry had operated the newest grader machine in use by the Citrus County Road Department. No one else had operated the machine since it was acquired by the Citrus County Road Department. During February, 1976, Thomas Hutchinson was the Citrus County Road Superintendent. William Hitt was thee Assistant Road Superintendent. Hutchinson and Hitt served under the direction of the Citrus County Board of County Commissioners. Perry, Pratt, and numerous other employees of the Citrus County Road Department had, prior to February, 1976, become dissatisfied with conditions in the Road Department, primarily the manner of direction given the department by Hutchinson and Hitt. On Sunday, February 8, 1976, Perry drafted a petition specifying numerous grievances against Hutchinson and Hitt. It was his intention to secure the signatures of employees of the Road Department on the petition, and to present it to the Board of County Commissioners. Perry sought the assistance of County Commissioner DeBusk in drafting the petition. DeBusk offered several suggestions and his daughter typed the petition for Perry. Perry secured six or seven signatures on that Sunday. He was the first person to sign the petition, and Dana Pratt was the third. On Monday, February 9, Pratt informed his office that he had business to attend to and would not be at work that day. He did not claim sick leave for the time he missed. Prior to work and during the lunch hour he called as many employees of the Road Department as he could. After working hours he waited at a business establishment called the "Country Store" which was located in close proximity to the place where Road Department employees checked out of work. Forty-six employees of the Road Department signed the petition. Dana Pratt assisted in soliciting people to sign the petition. There was no evidence offered at the hearing from which it could be determined that those persons signing the petition did so other than freely and voluntarily. On Tuesday, February 10, 1976, Perry called his supervisor, Mr. Hutchinson, and told him that he had business to attend to. Hutchinson asked him if he was going to solicit more signatures. Perry told him that he was not. The Board of County Commissioners was meeting on that date, and Perry presented the petition to the Board. Members of the Board discussed the petition at length during the meeting. One commissioner asked Perry if he was big enough to go back to work and forget about the matter. Perry said that he was. On February 11, 1976 Perry returned to work at the regular time. Rather than being assigned to his regular duty as a roller operator, he was assigned to flag traffic for a grader operator. He continued in that capacity until Tuesday, February 17. On that date, at approximately 11:00 or 11:30 A.M. Tom Morton, the grader foreman, informed Perry that his employment was terminated as of 1:00 P.M. on that date. Both Morton and William Hitt told Perry that they did not know why he was fired. Dana Pratt attended the County Commission meeting on February 10. He was asked about whether he threatened a Road Department employee named Langley with respect to signing the petition. Pratt told the County Commission that he did not threaten Langley, and no evidence was offered at the hearing to establish that he did. On February 12, 1976, Pratt used the new grader machine that he had been using for some time prior thereto. At the end of that day his supervisors informed him that he would be using the oldest machine in the Department thereafter. He began using it on February 13. It took some time to get it started on that date. It also took some time to get it started on Monday, February 16. This was an old machine, and had been difficult to start for some years prior to the time that it was assigned to Pratt. At 12:30 on February 17, 1976, Tom Morton informed Pratt that his employment was terminated as of 1:00 P.M. on that date. Pratt was never given any reasons for his termination. On February 17, 1976, the Citrus County Board of County Commissioners acted to terminate the employment of Perry and Pratt. These actions were taken upon the recommendation of Mr. Hutchinson. Ostensibly the reason for Pratt's termination was that he had marked out on sick leave on a day when he was not sick. Ostensibly the reason for Perry's termination was that he had been missing from the job for approximately an hour. The evidence would not support a finding that Perry and Pratt were fired for these reasons. These reasons offered by Hutchinson, and followed by the Board of County Commissioners, were used as a ruse. On February 18, 1976, the day after Pratt and Perry were fired, Hutchinson called a meeting of all employees of the Road Department. Hutchinson told the employees that he had nothing to do with the termination, but he also told them that he would tolerate no more petitions and that if anyone did not like working conditions at the Road Department they could leave. He said that he had four County Commissioners in his pocket, and he reminded the employees that unemployment in Citrus County was high. He told the employees that he would take care of any petitions they distributed. During the week the petition was distributed, Hutchinson told one employee of the Road Department, James Johnson, that Johnson could be put in jail for signing the petition. During that same week he told his assistant superintendent, William Hitt, that all of the men who signed the petition had to go. After Perry and Pratt were fired, Hutchinson told Hitt that he got two, and he would get the rest. The basis for Hutchinson's recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners that Perry and Pratt be terminated was the fact that they participated in the distribution of the petition, and presenting it to the Board of County Commissioners. There was no evidence offerred at the hearing to indicate that any members of the Board of County Commissioners knew Hutchinson was presenting false reasons for the terminations; however, they did act to adopt the recommendation. The Board of County Commissioners did know that Pratt and Perry were among the leaders in distributing the petition highly critical of Hutchinson's work, and was clearly on notice that Hutchinson may have ulterior motives in recommending their dismissal.
The Issue Whether Petitioner may proceed in this forum without receiving a Determination by the Florida Commission on Human Relations; and, if so, Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner upon the basis of handicap.
Findings Of Fact Paragraphs 1-3 of the Preliminary Statement are adopted as Findings of Fact. Respondent is an "employer" within the definition of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner was hired in January 1996, as a Code Enforcement Officer. His job description entailed inspecting property within Nassau County, writing up inspection reports, and assisting in the prosecution of violations, as follows: MAJOR JOB DUTIES: Inspects residential and non-residential properties to determine whether properties are in compliance with County zoning code, sign ordinance, litter ordinance, 911 house numbering, and other codes and ordinances. Inspects active construction sites for compliance with building permits and contractor licensing requirements. Inspects buildings for unsafe conditions and initiates abatement actions on emergency conditions. May be required to offer testimony in Court regarding condition of persons and/or properties which have been found to be in violation of applicable County codes or ordinances. Prepares records and reports on observed violations and identifies improvements needed or conditions requiring correction. Performs re-inspections; prepares necessary records and reports regarding re-inspections. Maintains a current knowledge of all codes, ordinances, procedures and techniques involved in the field of code enforcement. Counsels with contractors and property owners and participates in meetings and events to promote citizen understanding of County ordinances and codes. (The Major Job Duties are not a complete statement of all duties required of the job. Incumbents will be required to perform such other related job duties as may be assigned or required.) (P-1) Once a Code complaint was determined by inspection to be "founded," a 30-day warning was issued to the offender, and a recheck inspection was made on the 30-day deadline. Depending upon extensions and cleanup progress, a citation to appear in court or before the County Code Enforcement Board was issued. (P-15) Petitioner was hired with the understanding that he had one year in which to earn either a Level II Florida Code Enforcement Officer Certification or a Level II Florida Law Enforcement Officer Certification. He did not timely meet either requirement. Respondent had to prompt him, as described below. In February 1997, Petitioner was hospitalized for two weeks and diagnosed as having "bi-polar disorder." Upon competent medical testimony, it is found that: Bi-polar disorder is a lifelong mental condition which impairs one's ability to concentrate and which can substantially limit one's major life activities. People with bi-polar disorder are more susceptible to stress than people who do not suffer from that condition. Petitioner was prescribed medications for his bi-polar disorder, the side-effects of which also include impairment of concentration. In Petitioner's case, his bi-polar disorder, or the medicines prescribed to treat it, or a combination of both, manifested as mild paranoia and a lack of focus. According to his psychiatrist, Petitioner's perceptions, particularly of others' motivations, may not be entirely accurate, and he can be distracted from his work by "thoughts of special meaning." Petitioner would benefit from structure in his daily work. The amount of structure Petitioner needs depends upon his medical condition at any given time. However, with proper medication to stabilize his condition, medical personnel felt Petitioner was capable, upon release in 1997 and at the date of hearing, of performing the duties of a Code Enforcement Officer as described above. As of the date of hearing, Petitioner was employed by a medical transport company as a driver. He picks up people at their homes and drives them to various hospitals and doctors' offices for medical appointments throughout three counties. He does this 40 hours per week plus 30-35 hours of overtime every three weeks.1 His employer provides him with a "manifest," listing the names and addresses for pickup, with the pickup time and destination for medical care. He repeats trips to many locations, and he uses a map for unfamiliar locations. He considers this manifest to be the only type of "agenda" he needs to do his current job. Petitioner's problems with daily living, due to his bi-polar disorder, include significant weight gain, needing his wife to set out his morning medications, and an inability to maintain his train of thought in daily life as well as in his professional life. When stabilized and released from the hospital in 1997, Petitioner returned to work. Respondent's Risk Management (insurance) and Human Resources Offices knew that he had some mental condition. His secretary, Aimee Steele, knew he had suffered a "nervous breakdown," Petitioner's term. Jack D'Amato, Chief of Public Works, knew that Petitioner's hospitalization had been "stress-related." However, Petitioner did not disclose his condition or request any special accommodation of his bi-polar condition from his superiors at that time. Petitioner was Respondent's sole Code Enforcement Officer from January 29, 1996, to March 1, 2000. During this period, his daily work was largely unsupervised. Until February 2000, Petitioner clocked in and out with a card in a time clock, and there was little or no oversight by his superiors of his arrival and departure times. Aimee Steele was hired as secretary for the Code Enforcement Office two weeks before Petitioner's 1997 hospitalization. In effect, this meant she acted as Petitioner's private secretary from that date until March 1, 2000, when Brenda Rothwell was hired as a second Code Enforcement Officer. Ms. Steele quit approximately two weeks after Brenda Rothwell was promoted to Code Enforcement Manager. However, while Ms. Steele was employed in the Code Enforcement Office, she and Petitioner were good friends. After she left Respondent's employ, Ms. Steele married one of Petitioner's in-laws. She remains Petitioner's good friend. It was always Petitioner's responsibility to select appropriate continuing education courses, get prior approval from his superiors, and submit reimbursement claims through Office Manager Sue Abels. While Ms. Steele was employed, she typed all the paperwork and Petitioner relied on her to do everything necessary except select his courses. Petitioner got his job assignments from a file basket with his name on it into which complaints taken by telephone and other forms were placed. Apparently, while she was employed Ms. Steele wrote-up many of the telephone complaints, went into the filing cabinet to get out forms relative to 30-day rechecks, and put this information in Petitioner's file basket. Petitioner agreed that, regardless of his bi-polar diagnosis, these materials were sufficient to direct him to various inspection sites without any further directions. On August 15, 1997, Mr. D'Amato sent Petitioner a memorandum which reflected that repeated oral requests for Petitioner to provide a written, updated report on his office activities had gone unheeded. Mr. D'Amato required that Petitioner schedule a meeting with him and bring a written report every two weeks. At all times material, Ms. Abels monitored all bookkeeping records and time records for Mr. D'Amato. On August 23, 1997, Ms. Abels circled Petitioner's arrival time on his timecard as "late." In October 1997, Petitioner was provided Respondent's non-discrimination policy in its Policies and Procedures Manual, which also contained personnel rules and grievance procedures. (R-6b-c). While this document is not an example of clarity, the undersigned is satisfied that Petitioner was not misled by it. He testified that he never read it; merely signed for it; and also received, in his words, "almost weekly bulletins" on the subjects contained therein, including the accommodation rights of a disabled or handicapped person.2 During a regular review of invoices, Petitioner was notified on March 19, 1998, that the cell-phone he had been issued for business had been used after business hours for non- job-related calls, totaling $128.40 in charges through March 10, 1998. Petitioner acknowledged that the calls had been personal calls made by his son. Petitioner was given a written warning that if it happened again, he would be dismissed. He was also required to turn in his cell-phone at the end of each work day and pay back the cost of the calls. It was not until April 3, 1998, that Petitioner reimbursed $77.07, against the total owed. On April 9, 1998, Petitioner was advised of more improper cell- phone charges going back to October 14, 1997. As of April 28, 1998, Petitioner still owed Respondent Employer $56.73 for improper calls, although he ultimately paid back the entire amount owed. On June 16, 1998, Mr. D'Amato took the phone away from Petitioner because he had "shown an inability to follow instructions regarding the use of the cellular phone," and due to further abuse of Petitioner's cell-phone privileges, he was provided a radio in his truck which would reach a dispatcher in the main office. (P-13 and R-4c.) Petitioner attempted to show that he had received disparate treatment because of the March 19, 1998, written warning to him and not to others who had also abused the phone policy, but he was only able to demonstrate that one other employee took 19 days to pay $6.44 for personal calls made on his business phone over a two month period. Petitioner did not demonstrate that this employee used a cell-phone or was otherwise "similarly situated" to himself.3 (P-14.) By an April 24, 1998 memorandum, Senior Planner Douglas Correia, a middle management supervisor of Petitioner, advised Mr. D'Amato that Petitioner's productivity had decreased because, on his 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. shift, Petitioner did not leave his office to begin inspections until 9:30 a.m. and returned to the office between 3:15 and 3:30 p.m., and because Petitioner spent most of his time in the office socializing with Ms. Steele. The memorandum further stated that henceforth, to prevent Petitioner "conning" him, Mr. Correia would require Ms. Steele to provide Petitioner with a daily itinerary, placing new complaints, re- visits, citations, and other matters geographically east and west of I-95, and Mr. Correia would then require Petitioner to follow the itinerary which would alternate inspection days for locations on the east or west sides of I-95. (P-10 and R-6c) Based on the foregoing memorandum, it is found that the practice of having Ms. Steele provide an itinerary or agenda for Petitioner began April 24, 1998, for the reasons stated in the memorandum, and did not originate in February 1997 to assist Petitioner with his lack of focus. The December 16, 1998, "roster," offered as representative of the "itineraries" Ms. Steele prepared for Petitioner, only constituted a list by names of the persons cited and an indication these were rechecks on the east side of I-95. (P-11). Within Exhibit P-15, is a "roster" for court appearances and rechecks on August 17, 1998, which is similarly without any complaint numbers or addresses, and a "roster" for court appearances and complaints for December 21, 1998, which provided addresses and a brief description of the nature of the problem only for new complaints. It is therefore found that Ms. Steele's "rosters," hereafter referred to as "agendas," never provided Petitioner with property addresses, citation numbers, dates of previous inspection, or any other information beyond the name of the property owner, except for new complaints, for which an address and description of the problem was given. Petitioner testified he got all information not on the agendas from his file basket. On or about April 28, 1998, as part of the cell-phone investigation, Mr. D'Amato discovered that Petitioner still did not hold the necessary certifications he should have gotten by January 1997 (See Finding of Fact 14.) Mr. D'Amato issued a memorandum giving Petitioner six months from April 28, 1998, to get either a Florida Level II Code Enforcement Officer Certificate or a Level II Florida Law Enforcement Officer Certificate on his own time and at his own expense. Mr. D'Amato also provided extensive information, calendars, and course descriptions of when and how Petitioner could attend the correct continuing education courses and take the test in time to meet the extended qualification date. (R-4b) Petitioner was ultimately certified July 31, 1998. On or about October 28, 1999, Petitioner was hospitalized for surgery on the atrium ring of his heart and installation of a pacemaker. Petitioner was prescribed medicine and released to return to work with no medical restrictions. Mr. D'Amato and all co-employees knew the nature of this hospitalization. Petitioner requested no accommodation from the Employer at that time. The heart condition and its medicines have contributed to Petitioner's weight gain. They also have resulted in a need to use the restroom frequently and a need to move about after a period of sitting. In February 2000, the Code Enforcement Office was physically relocated, and Petitioner was required to fill out timesheets. This was an honor system, but as of the March 27, 2000, promotion of Brenda Rothwell to Code Enforcement Manager, she began to scrutinize Petitioner's arrivals and departures. On March 1, 2000, after competitive interviews, Brenda Rothwell was hired as a second Code Enforcement Officer of equal rank with Petitioner. Ms. Steele and others were her unsuccessful competitors for the second Code Enforcement Officer position. Ms. Rothwell was fully certified when hired. She got her assignments from a file basket with her name on it, like Petitioner's basket. On March 27, 2000, Ms. Rothwell was promoted, with no increase in pay, to Code Enforcement Manager. As such, she became Petitioner's and Ms. Steele's immediate supervisor. At that time, Ms. Rothwell had fourteen and a half years' experience as Code Enforcement Officer of Fernandina Beach compared to Petitioner's four years' experience with Respondent. Petitioner attributes his troubles with the Employer to Ms. Rothwell's "being hired (or promoted) to get rid of me," but it is noted that if his superiors had wanted to, they could have legitimately terminated him any time between January 1997, and the April 1998, letter giving him a six months' extension in which to obtain his minimum certification. Someone noted on Petitioner's timesheet for March 29, 2000, that Petitioner had signed in earlier than his actual arrival time of 8:20 a.m. Ms. Rothwell denied making the notation. Once promoted to manager, Ms. Rothwell set out to professionalize the Code Enforcement Office. It is possible that she sometimes introduced new methods prior to obtaining formal approval from her own superiors or the Code Enforcement Board. However, there is no doubt that as of March 27, 2000, she had de facto authority from her superiors, and by June 2000, when her managerial status was confirmed by the Board, she had full, formal authority to manage the Code Enforcement Office. In one instance, she was not aware of a method of reporting citation case data Petitioner had used (P-15) before she instituted a different one. Petitioner claimed she did not explain the changes or go over new procedures with him. However, Petitioner never raised these issues with their mutual superiors or filed a grievance concerning them. Rather, to every innovation Ms. Rothwell instituted, Petitioner replied something to the effect of "we don't do it that way." Petitioner and Ms. Steele did not get along well with Ms. Rothwell, nor she with them. Ms. Steele testified that she quit two weeks after Ms. Rothwell's promotion to manager due to a "hostile work environment," but Ms. Steele failed to explain exactly what that phrase might describe, other than that she did not like Ms. Rothwell's extensive changes aimed at accountability of personnel. Ms. Steele also failed to file a grievance. In April 2000, a third Code Enforcement Officer was hired on an equal footing with Petitioner. He also got a file basket with his name on it. Thereafter, Ms. Rothwell divided the inspections among the two officers and herself by placing the appropriate forms in their respective file baskets. She also tried to keep Petitioner on the side of the I-95 axis with which he was most familiar. Petitioner testified that after Ms. Steele left, he personally had to take 30-day recheck forms out of the file cabinet and put them in his file basket and he no longer received his daily agenda of which forms from his file basket to process. Ms. Rothwell also imposed the new requirement that, in addition to a timesheet, each inspector had to fill out a daily log showing all the calls he or she made, the complaint number for each call, how much time was spent at each location, whether each property was in compliance or not in compliance, specific remarks about the condition of each property, and when the inspector signed in and out for lunch and breaks. These logs were to be turned in at the office at the end of each day. (R-5) On April 5, 2000, Petitioner told Ms. Rothwell that he would be attending a continuing education course in Jacksonville the next day from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., She considered this inappropriately short notice, but at that time, Ms. Rothwell believed Petitioner had been pre-approved by their superiors for the April 6, 2000, class, as he previously had been approved for a March 2000, course through paperwork done by Ms. Steele. Petitioner came to the Code Enforcement Office at 8:15 a.m. on April 6, 2000, to pick up one of the Employer's trucks to go to the class. He made out his timesheet showing he worked 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Ms. Rothwell marked his timesheet as showing he came in later than the time he signed in. (P-9) He attended the class and received a certificate of completion. (R-3c). When he was in class, he was supposed to show that fact on his timesheet, instead of showing that he was working. He was not docked any pay as a result of this state of affairs, but it impacted a later decision to discipline him. On April 25, 2000, Mr. D'Amato, in the presence of Ms. Abels, discussed Petitioner's timesheets with him. Mr. D'Amato then gave Petitioner an oral reprimand for falsification of written records, on the basis of an investigation/audit performed by Ms. Abels. (R-4d). Mr. D'Amato relied on Ms. Abels' investigation to invoke the discipline. Ms. Abels relied, in part, on input from Ms. Rothwell and others. Not every underlying detail of these records was recreated by Ms. Abels or Ms. Rothwell at hearing, but Ms. Rothwell could specifically recall the April 6, 2000, incident. Ms. Abels' investigation/audit showed four late morning arrivals, for which Petitioner wrote down a more favorable arrival time. Only one of the four dates was the April 6, 2000, continuing education date described above. The investigation/audit also showed Petitioner took a short lunch, without Ms. Rothwell's approval, to compensate for his late arrival that morning, and three lunch breaks for which Petitioner wrote in a more favorable length of time than that actually taken. The single April 6, 2000, component of the disciplinary action may have been unfair to Petitioner, but it does not constitute a conspiracy. Ms. Abels is a very credible witness that no conspiracy existed. There also is no evidence that the falsification of record charges related to Petitioner's mental or physical condition. Petitioner asserted that prior to Ms. Rothwell's employment he had understood that he could round the times on his timesheets into 15 minute increments. The Policies and Procedure Manual does not support him. By a memorandum on or about August 9, 2000, Ms. Rothwell suspended Petitioner for five days without pay, from August 10 through August 15. He was to report back to work on August 17, 2000. This was discipline for "falsification of written records" (R-3a, R-5) due to 12 dates in July when she considered his logs to be incomplete and because she believed that on July 24, 2000, he called in from lunch, requesting the dispatcher to clock him in 21 minutes earlier than his call. The logs for the days listed in the August 9, 2000, disciplinary action generally support a finding that Petitioner did not complete all of the columns on each one, usually failing to put in the complaint number and/or a complete address. Without complaint numbers, rechecks may go undone, prosecution of citations is hampered, and consistency of statistics is impaired. Ms. Rothwell testified that she accepted an oral report from someone in the main office, probably the dispatcher, that Petitioner had requested the dispatcher to falsify his sign-in time from lunch on July 24, 2000. Ms. Rothwell could not recall for sure who told her. As of the August 9, 2000, discipline, Petitioner did not deny her construction of events. At hearing, Petitioner did not deny asking the dispatcher to sign him in, or that he was twenty-one minutes late in calling in from lunch on July 24, 2000, but he testified that when he made his explanation of the delay, the dispatcher said, "I'll take care of it." Petitioner's explanation for his lateness on July 24, 2000, was that his truck's two-way radio had not worked; that someone was on the pay phone nearest his lunch break; and that he had to drive to a second pay phone to call in. It is noted that he personally stated on his log for that day that he took only an hour for lunch. (R-3a, R-5). Because of the August 9, 2000, suspension, Petitioner consulted the Center for Independent Living of Jacksonville, an organization which assists disabled persons. One of its Coordinators wrote a letter to Mr. D'Amato on August 15, 2000, asking for "reasonable accommodations" of Petitioner's health conditions and medication problems, pursuant to the ADA. Bi-polarity is not named in the letter; it is referred to as a "medical condition." The letter does disclose Petitioner's heart condition. (P-2) The accommodations requested were flexibility in Petitioner's lunch hour and his 15 minute breaks each morning and afternoon; the opportunity to walk around after every 30-40 minutes of sitting; and reinstating the agendas of the past to help him focus and to ensure he and his immediate supervisor were not miscommunicating priorities. (P-2) Mr. D'Amato requested that Petitioner provide medical verification of his need for accommodations. On August 16, 2000, Dr. Twiggs, a Family Practice Physician, sent a letter stating that to the best of his knowledge, Petitioner could perform the duties of a Code Enforcement Officer. (P-3) On August 23, 2000, Dr. Twiggs sent another letter saying that Petitioner was medically stable and able to perform the duties of a Code Enforcement Officer. He did not mention bi- polarity but went on to say that: As a result of his medication, I agree that there is a need for frequent water and restroom breaks which should be a reasonable request for accommodation and flexibility in lunch, morning, and afternoon breaks. Because of a heart condition, it is advisable that after 30-40 minutes of sitting, he should stand and walk around for a few minutes to help improve circulation. As he sometimes has difficulty focusing initially in the morning after taking his medication, I agree that a daily or weekly agenda and good communication with his immediate supervisor should help with his focusing on priorities and details of his duties. (P-4) On August 11, 2000, Ms. Rothwell had sent Petitioner a speed memo telling him to proceed with a new case number and a weekly status report on code violations of a certain property location and its owner. Petitioner was on suspension August 10- 15, 2000. Presumably, he reported for work on August 17, 2000. Petitioner failed to report to Ms. Rothwell on the named property on August 25, 2000, as required by her prior speed memo. Ms. Rothwell brought this to his attention by an August 28, 2000, formal memorandum. However, Petitioner had written a speed memo to Ms. Rothwell, dated August 22, 2000, stating that he had done all he could and "why don't you go give him a citation (repeat offense) and bring him before the Board." Ms. Rothwell, not unreasonably, construed his reply as telling her to "go do it yourself," which she received August 29, 2000. On that date, she cited Petitioner with insubordination, warning him that any future incidents of the same nature would result in his termination. (R-3b) On August 31, 2000, the Employer agreed, in writing, to all of Petitioner's requests for accommodation. Ms. Rothwell and Mr. D'Amato were copied with this memorandum. (P-5) Sometime thereafter, there was a reorganization which placed the Code Enforcement Office under the supervision of Mr. Whitey Moran of the Building Department, rather than Mr. D'Amato of the Public Works Department. Ms. Rothwell bought a two-gallon water cooler, which Petitioner was permitted to fill with the Employer's water and ice and carry in his truck. He was permitted to take stretch breaks every 30 to 40 minutes and to take restroom breaks as necessary. He got a 15-minute break in the morning, an hour for lunch, and a 15-minute break in the afternoon. The Employer initially requested that he radio in whenever he left and returned to his truck for these breaks and for inspections, so that the Employer could be sure he had not collapsed and was not in need of help due to his disclosed medical conditions, but that request was rescinded within a few days. Petitioner testified that Ms. Rothwell told him she would never provide him with an agenda. Their conflicting accounts of what was said amounts to a "he said/she said" situation dependent more upon their respective viewpoints than accuracy, and constitutes an equipoise of evidence. Ms. Rothwell testified that the complaints all had a complaint number in their upper right-hand corner and she regularly attached all the complaints from Petitioner's file basket to a two-part speed memo upon which she had written the numbers of the attached complaints, but she could produce none of these "packaged agendas" at hearing and none were produced in response to an appropriate discovery request. Petitioner testified that he wanted Ms. Rothwell to provide him with the Aimee Steele-type of agenda described above at Finding of Fact 34, but she never did. Upon the credible evidence and testimony as a whole, it is found that Ms. Rothwell did not provide any list/agenda of locations. Having determined as fact that the Employer did not provide a daily agenda, listing each day's inspections by name of property owner and whether they were rechecks or something else and whether they were on one side of I-95 or the other, it is significant to note Petitioner's view of what such an agenda purportedly would have done. Petitioner testified that he knew how to do his job and that he only needed an agenda to avoid Ms. Rothwell's accusing him each time he returned to the office of not doing an assignment or asking why he had followed up on one complaint and not another. Also, Petitioner never told Ms. Rothwell or anyone that he could not do his job as structured without an agenda after August 31, 2000. He never raised the absence of an agenda with Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Moran, the County Coordinator, or the Human Resources Office, and he never filed a grievance. Petitioner's explanation as to why he never filed a grievance against Ms. Rothwell or anyone else was that Mr. D'Amato had intimidated him during the 1998 investigation of Petitioner's cell-phone calls by saying something about "the buck stops here," and "you should not go against the chain of command." Assuming arguendo that Mr. D'Amato made such comments in 1998, and Mr. D'Amato denied that he did, it is illogical to assume the comments were designed to deter Petitioner from filing a legitimate grievance with Mr. Moran against Ms. Rothwell in 2000, especially since Petitioner agreed his cell-phone had been misused when Mr. D'Amato's comments were allegedly made. On or about October 9, 2000, it was discovered that Petitioner had attended an approved continuing education course in March 2000, but that on April 6, 2000 and in May 2000, he had attended courses without pre-approval, and had thereby obligated the Employer to pay $383 directly to the university hosting the classes. This violation of the Employer's Policies and Procedure Manual added to the April 24, 1998, memorandum on poor productivity (Finding of Fact 32), the April 25, 2000, oral reprimand for falsification of records (Finding of Fact 51), the August 9, 2000, suspension for falsification of records (Finding of Facts 53-55), and the August 29, 2000, written warning for insubordination (Finding of Fact 61), resulted in Ms. Rothwell suspending Petitioner without pay for five days, on October 12, 13, 16, 17, and 18, 2000. (R-3c) Petitioner testified that he perceived Ms. Rothwell as "out to get him," either because she gave him three-day suspensions on Fridays or gave him three suspensions on Fridays, intimating that his work schedule could cause him to suffer greater punishment if he were suspended on a Friday than some other day, although how is unclear. There is no evidence of Petitioner's being suspended for three days. There is no evidence of Ms. Rothwell suspending him three times for five days. Therefore, his testimony on this issue is not persuasive. It is also notable that Petitioner did not file a grievance against Ms. Rothwell for improperly or unfairly suspending him either of the two times she suspended him. By December 2000, each of the three Code Enforcement Officers were required to do 20-30 inspections per day. Petitioner's logs (R-5) showed far less than that number were being done by him. On December 14, 2000, a complaint was received by Ms. Rothwell because Petitioner investigated a location he erroneously got out of the file cabinet himself. On December 15, 2000, Ms. Rothwell, with the concurrence of Mr. Moran and the Human Resources Coordinator, terminated Petitioner, effective January 3, 2001, for offenses against the Policies and Procedure Manual. The termination memorandum cited the April 24, 1998, productivity memorandum; April 25, 2000, oral warning; an allegation that on June 13, 2000, Petitioner had placed a citation warning in a residential mail box, contrary to the Code requirement of mailing it; the August 9, 2000, five-day suspension; the August 29, 2000, warning; and the October 9, 2000, five-day suspension. It also listed eleven citizen complaints of Petitioner's failure to perform his duties or poor performance which Ms. Rothwell characterized as "selective" or "improper" Code enforcement. The nature of the complaints synopsized in Ms. Rothwell's December 15, 2000, memorandum are varied. A tortured construction of several of them might lead to conjecture that Petitioner went to the wrong address and cited the wrong property on one or more occasions. However, many involved Petitioner's not going to the correct location at all or going to the location of an alleged citation and then turning in inspection remarks stating that the alleged Code violation was non-existent or resolved. Thereafter, subsequent inspections by Ms. Rothwell and/or the other Code Enforcement Officer revealed no improvement or a worsening of the violation originally reported. For instance, Petitioner noted conditions that did not exist (trailer present after it was removed) or that the issue had been referred to a person (Mr. Larson) who no longer worked for the Employer at the time Petitioner claimed he had referred the matter to him. These situations amount to either falsification of records or selective enforcement by Petitioner. In one instance, he refused to speak to a citizen he had cited. Petitioner had seen the memorandum, but claimed never to have seen the complaints underlying Ms. Rothwell's synopses. He did not refute each complaint synopsis at hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ______ ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July 2002.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been employed with the Florida Department of Transportation since 1971. He is a graduate of the University of West Florida, with a degree in business management. Petitioner is 38 years old, with a physical disability which limits his use of his left hand and arm, and his left leg is shorter than his right. In 1979, Petitioner was employed by Respondent in its right-of-way section, as a Right-of-Way Agent III. In that position, he was responsible for the coordination of the Acquisition, Relocation and Property Management sections of Respondent's District III. One of Petitioner's subordinates was H. E. Walls, who was in charge of the Acquisition section. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was J. F. Culpepper, Assistant Right-of-Way Administrator. In April, 1980, a new Right-of-Way Administrator, J. A. Alfes, was assigned to District III. In 1980, and again in 1981, Petitioner filed charges of discrimination against Respondent with the Florida Commission on Human Relations premised upon Petitioner's aforementioned disability. The 1980 charge was resolved through the entry of a settlement agreement. The charge filed in 1981 was premised upon the same disability, but that charge was ultimately dismissed by the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In January, 1981, a hearing was held in Tallahassee, Florida, on one of the charges of discrimination filed by Petitioner. On the day following that hearing, Petitioner was called into Mr. Alfes' office in Chipley, Florida, and was told that the hearing held in Tallahassee had been several hours of "horse shit." On May 18, 1981, Mr. Alfes advised Petitioner of an impending reorganization of the section in which Petitioner was employed. Subsequently, on June 17, 1981, Mr. Alfes told Petitioner that there would be "consequences" as a result of Petitioner's having filed complaints with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In 1981 a reorganization of functions occurred in all six districts statewide of DOT. This reorganization eliminated one classification of position, Right-of-Way Agent III, which Petitioner had held in District III, and elevated the positions at the head of Acquisition and Relocation sections to the administrator level. At the time this reorganization occurred, Petitioner, as previously mentioned, was a Right-of-Way Agent III, and Herbert Walls headed the Acquisition section. Mr. Alfes, Petitioner's immediate superior, recommended that Petitioner be placed in charge of Relocation, and that Mr. Walls, who had been working in Acquisition, be placed in charge of the Acquisition section in light of his experience in that area since 1978. J. F. Culpepper, who occupied the position on DOT's organization chart to whom the Acquisition section, Relocation section, and Property Management section would report, recommended that the Petitioner be placed in charge of the Acquisition section, based upon his belief that Petitioner was better qualified by reason of his real estate training and college degree. Mr. Walls had only a high school diploma. During the period of his employment with DOT, Petitioner had not handled any complete right-of-way acquisition matters, and had never negotiated for DOT in the acquisition of any right-of-way parcels. Petitioner had, however, attended two relocation seminars while employed by DOT. Mr. Walls had been continually engaged in acquisition work for DOT since at least 1978. DOT's District Engineer, Alan Potter, was the DOT employee ultimately responsible for selecting the heads of the Acquisition and Relocation sections. Mr. Potter concurred with the recommendation that Petitioner be placed in charge of the Relocation section, based upon his belief that it was the most important job involved in right-of-way acquisition, and that it required a very thorough and cautious person. Based upon Mr. Potter's evaluation of Petitioner as possessed of high ability, and being very mature and compassionate, Petitioner was placed in charge of the Relocation section. At the time Petitioner was named as head of Relocation and Mr. Walls was placed as head of Acquisition, the two positions were both classified as Right-of-Way Specialist II's, pay grade 22. Later both were reclassified as Right-of-Way Administrator I's, at pay grade 23. The record in this cause establishes that neither position was more prestigious" than the other, or that either position placed the individual holding it in a more favorable posture for promotion or advancement. Subsequently, in the summer of 1981, the reorganization of DOT was completed, with Mr. Walls having been appointed head of Acquisition, with approximately six subordinates. Petitioner became responsible for Relocation, and shared the supervision of a clerical employee with the head of Property Management. After reorganization, Mr. Alfes relocated Petitioner's office in another building 100 feet away from the main office. Petitioner's office was initially located in a passageway and, as a result, Petitioner was required several times a day to make trips to the main building to obtain files necessary to complete his work. In August of 1983, prior to final hearing in this cause, Mr. Alfes retired, and Petitioner's office was relocated in a more spacious office close to the Acquisition section.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the petition for relief, and denying the relief requested therein. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd of May, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: BEN R. PATTERSON, ESQUIRE POST OFFICE BOX 4289 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32315 VERNON L. WHITTIER, JR., ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HAYDON BURNS BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 JEAN OWEN, ESQUIRE ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS WOODCREST OFFICE CENTER 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD SUITE 240, BUILDING F TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303 DONALD A. GRIFFIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD BUILDING F, SUITE 240 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was discriminated against on the basis of his race, color, or national origin in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2000).1
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Bamawo is a black male from Nigeria. Mr. Bamawo began working for the Department at the Dade Correctional Institution ("DCI") as a correctional officer in March 1993. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Bamawo was a career service employee whose duties included the care, custody, and control of inmates of the institution. Mr. Bamawo normally worked the third shift, from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. During most of the time Mr. Bamawo was employed at DCI, Captain Scott Pardue, as the third shift supervisor, directly supervised Mr. Bamawo. According to Mr. Bamawo, he and Captain Pardue did not "see eye-to-eye" even though Mr. Bamawo tried to get along with Captain Pardue. The first incident that Mr. Bamawo considers discriminatory occurred in 1995, when Captain Pardue formally disciplined Mr. Bamawo for writing graffiti.3 Mr. Bamawo denies that he wrote the graffiti, and he made a verbal complaint to a superior officer identified as "Colonel Thompson." Mr. Bamawo also asserts that, in 1995, an Anglo corrections officer was promoted to sergeant, and Mr. Bamawo was required to follow his orders. Mr. Bamawo asserted that he made many complaints to Captain Pardue about this sergeant but that Captain Pardue did nothing. Also in 1995, Captain Pardue made two remarks to Mr. Bamawo that Mr. Bamawo considered offensive: On one occasion, Captain Pardue apparently was looking at a picture of an African woman in a National Geographic magazine when he asked Mr. Bamawo if "you people live in houses or sleep in trees"; Mr. Bamawo believed Captain Pardue was making a derogatory comment about Mr. Bamawo's being a native of Africa. Another occasion was at Thanksgiving, when Mr. Bamawo brought a can of corn to a covered-dish lunch; Mr. Bamawo opened the can of corn and set it on the table with the other food, and Captain Pardue asked if this was the way people in Africa ate corn. These remarks caused Mr. Bamawo to be humiliated and embarrassed in front of his co-workers. Mr. Bamawo asserts that Captain Pardue refused to approve his requests for time off the job but would approve time off for Anglo officers. When Captain Pardue refused Mr. Bamawo's requests for time off, Mr. Bamawo asked other captains for approval, and, when they refused to approve his requests for time off, Mr. Bamawo called in sick. Mr. Bamawo recalls that, on one occasion, he was forced to miss an appointment because Captain Pardue ordered him to work overtime. According to Mr. Bamawo, Captain Pardue accused Mr. Bamawo of being a minute late on one occasion and penalized him, although Mr. Bamawo recalls that Captain Pardue did not penalize others for being late. It was Mr. Bamawo's perception while he worked at DCI that, countless times, Captain Pardue changed the work assignments of Anglo officers when they requested a change, but that Captain Pardue never changed Mr. Bamawo's work assignment when he requested a change. Mr. Bamawo believed that he was given the assignments that no one else wanted. On March 21, 2000, Mr. Bamawo was involved in an altercation with Sergeant Frankie Tindall. Mr. Bamawo called Sergeant Tindall "bitch" and threatened to "blow away" Sergeant Tindall when Sergeant Tindall questioned Mr. Bamawo about trash that littered his post.4 On April 23, 2000, Captain Pardue designated Correctional Officer Orol as third-shift supervisor in DCI's north annex "Yard One"; Mr. Bamawo was one of three other correctional officers assigned to Yard One at the time. As designated supervisor, Mr. Orol had the authority to assign tasks to the three other officers. Mr. Bamawo protested Captain Pardue's choice of Mr. Orol because Mr. Orol had been out of the academy only six months; Mr. Bamawo felt that he should have been designated supervisor because he was the senior officer on the shift. Captain Pardue told Mr. Bamawo that he felt more confident with Mr. Orol in the position of supervisor. Mr. Bamawo told Captain Pardue that he was going to file a grievance. At some point during the daylight hours of the third shift on April 23, 2000, Mr. Orol told Mr. Bamawo to complete a check of the perimeter fence, which Mr. Bamawo considered a difficult job to do in the daylight because it was very hot work. Mr. Bamawo refused the order and told Mr. Orol that he would do the fence check when the sun went down. After a time, Mr. Orol called Mr. Bamawo on the radio and told him again to check the perimeter fence; Mr. Bamawo again refused, using a radio shorthand phrase meaning, "Do it yourself." Captain Pardue was monitoring the radio transmission and heard the exchange between Mr. Bamawo and Mr. Orol. Captain Pardue thought that Mr. Bamawo had responded to Mr. Orol in a "nasty" tone of voice, and, fearing that Mr. Bamawo and Mr. Orol might get into a confrontation, Captain Pardue radioed Mr. Bamawo and told him to come to the control room. Captain Pardue took Mr. Bamawo into a copy room and confronted him about his attitude toward Mr. Orol. Mr. Bamawo again complained about Captain Pardue's choice of Mr. Orol as supervisor rather than Mr. Bamawo. During the discussion, Mr. Bamawo became agitated, turned, and walked away from Captain Pardue. Captain Pardue called to him and told him to come back; Mr. Bamawo turned back and approached Captain Pardue with his fists clenched, called Captain Pardue "bitch," and said he would "bust" Captain Pardue.5 At this point, Captain Pardue, fearing for his safety, called Jeffrey Wainwright, who was the acting warden of DCI. After talking with Captain Pardue and Mr. Bamawo, Mr. Wainwright reassigned Mr. Bamawo to the women's facility across the street from DCI. Mr. Bamawo threatened to file a discrimination complaint if Mr. Wainwright did anything to him as a result of the incident with Captain Pardue. Mr. Bamawo was terminated from his employment with the Department on May 4, 2000. Mr. Bamawo appealed his termination to PERC, which found that the Department had just cause to terminate him based on the incidents of March 21 and April 23, 2000. Mr. Bamawo testified that, through the years, Captain Pardue made "countless" derogatory remarks about Mr. Bamawo's race and national origin. At first, according to Mr. Bamawo, he thought that Captain Pardue was joking, but that, eventually, he saw hate behind Captain Pardue's remarks.6 Mr. Bamawo also claims that Captain Pardue gave him bad work assignments; refused to give him days off; and used rookie officers like Mr. Orol to "agitate" him. Mr. Bamawo believes that he was terminated in retaliation for having threatened to file a grievance against Captain Pardue for unprofessional conduct because Captain Pardue designated Mr. Orol as the supervisor on April 23, 2000, and allowed him to give orders to more senior correctional officers. Other than his complaint to "Colonel Thompson" about the graffiti incident in 1995, Mr. Bamawo did not complain during the years he worked at DCI, either verbally or in writing, that Captain Pardue made racist remarks or derogatory remarks about his national origin or that Captain Pardue discriminated against him in any respect. Mr. Bamawo stayed in his job as a correctional officer at DCI because he liked the job, thought everyone was friendly, and liked working with the inmates. He had no problem with anyone on the job except Captain Pardue and Sergeant Tindall.7 Summary The evidence presented by Mr. Bamawo is not sufficient to support a finding that his termination by the Department was motivated by discriminatory intent or retaliatory. Mr. Bamawo failed to present any evidence to support a finding that the Department has ever imposed a lesser penalty on anyone not a black or a person of African origin for having threatened a Department sergeant or captain with violence. Mr. Bamawo has failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that his termination was retaliatory because he had not, at the time he was terminated, filed an employment discrimination complaint; rather, Mr. Bamawo had merely threatened Mr. Wainwright that he would file such a complaint if disciplinary action were taken against him for the April 23, 2000, incident involving Captain Pardue. The evidence presented by Mr. Bamawo is not sufficient to support a finding that he was subjected to continual harassment based on his race or national origin such that his ability to function as a correctional officer was impeded. Although Mr. Bamawo, as a black man of African origin, is a member of two protected classes, he did not present evidence sufficient to establish that he was treated differently from other correctional officers with respect to pay, assignments, time off, or any other aspect of his employment with the Department, and he did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that he was forced to endure an abusive and hostile work environment at DCI. The evidence submitted by Mr. Bamawo is sufficient to establish that, in 1995, Captain Pardue made a remark about Africans sleeping in trees and a remark about the manner in which Africans served canned corn, but, even though Mr. Bamawo was humiliated and embarrassed by these boorish remarks, these two isolated instances of derogatory comments based on race and national origin are not indicative of a pervasively hostile or abusive work environment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief of Oghenerhoro Bamawo. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2003.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated subsection 760.10(1), Florida Statutes by denying Petitioner a promotion on account of his race and color.
Findings Of Fact Henry E. Tate is a forty-nine year old black male who has worked at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) since April 12, 1965. (tr-10, 11) From 1965 until the present, a series of civilian contractors have had agreements with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to perform logistical and housekeeping duties at KSC. These included Transworld Airline, the Boeing Company and Expedient Services, Inc. (tr-34) In January 1983, EG & G Florida, Inc., (EG&G) assumed the master base contract for logistics and housekeeping, but it was not until July 1983 that it took over operational control of the roads and grounds department. EG & G employs in excess of fifteen persons. (tr-101, 102, Exhibit number 11) Except for three or four months in the early 1970's when he worked in the mechanic shop, Mr. Tate was employed in the roads and grounds department steadily from 1965. As each successor contractor took over he applied for, and was hired for the same job. This included EG & G in July 1983. (tr-11, 13, 34) His current title is lead labor operator- pest control and he makes $10.16, plus $.75 lead pay, per hour. (tr-11) Mr. Tate's duties in the roads and grounds department have included pesticide and herbicide spraying of the grounds and buildings, and all aspects of weed, insect and pest control, both indoors and out. At different times he has driven dump trucks and operated forklifts, locals and trailer trucks. (tr-ll, 12, Exhibit number 15) In 1971, Mr. Tate was made "lead" over pest control, herbiciding and sanitation. In that capacity he worked directly under a supervisor who gave him instructions as to the work to be performed. He would then take his people and get the work done. Afterwards he would report back on the results. (tr-51, 56, 57, Exhibit 115) He has remained a lead worker since that time; even though the formal title was abolished in 1984, the pay differential remains. (tr-152) The rationale for the higher pay is that leads assign work to crews which vary commonly from two to eight people. Leads order material and perform some, administrative tasks in conjunction with the functions of their job classification. (tr-153) At varying times Mr. Tate has served as lead over one to ten persons. He is currently lead over a crew of six. (tr-13, 14, 36, 49, 266, 267) During the period of the TWA contract, Mr. Tate filled in as acting supervisor when his supervisor was on vacation. (tr-47) In November 1983, EG & G posted a job listing for the position of Supervisor, Roads and Grounds Department. The job posting number 1125 required a high school diploma, five years supervisory experience in the assigned area of responsibility and a State of Florida restricted pesticide license. (Exhibit number 1) Mr. Tate applied for the job. He has a high school education and felt that his long experience in the field and his lead experience qualified him. His supervisor vacating the job also thought Mr. Tate was qualified and would be hired. (tr-60) Mr. Tate was not interviewed for job posting number 1125; nor were the two other internal applicants who were also black. (tr-18, 275, 276) Instead a white male was hired. That individual, Ted Bender, had an associate degree in business administration, some supervisory experience and the required pesticide license. (Exhibit number 13) Mr. Tate was informed of the posting result by a form dated November 8, 1983. The basis for his non-selection was checked, "meeting minimum qualifications", with an asterick and the hand-written notation, "Must have a restricted pesticide license in the State of Florida". No other basis was checked or noted. (exhibit number 2) At the time that he applied for job posting number 1125, Henry Tate had applied for his pesticide license but did not receive it until December 1983. He studied on his own, reading anything he could find on pest control, and took vacation time off to go to Gainesville to take the license exam. His current license expires October 31, 1987. (tr-15, 64, Joint Prehearing Stipulation) Ted Bender resigned in May 1938, and the vacancy was again posted. Job posting number 1331 stated a posting date of May 24, 1984 and a closing date of May 28, 1984. It differed from posting number 1125 in the requirement that the successful applicant get a restricted pesticide license within sixty days of position acceptance. The five years supervisory experience in assigned area of responsibility and high school diploma requirements remained the same. (Exhibit number 5) Henry Tate applied again and was interviewed on May 31, 1984, by Raymond Tuttle, who at that time was Manager of Roads and Grounds. At the end of the interview Mr. Tuttle filled out the company Interviewer's Report form with the following appraisal: Job qualifications are met if lead time is classified as supervisory experience. He has worked with pesticides for approximately 15 years on KSC. He has a working knowledge of pesticide application although he has no formal horticulture training. He has attended several extension service sponsored seminars over the past 15 years that covered pest control problems in our local area. He currently holds a valid state of Florida pesticide license. Mr. Tate seems willing to accept the responsibilities involved but would require some management skills training to aid in the performance of this position. (Exhibit number 15) He rated Mr. Tate "good" on a scale which ranged from "top" to "unsuitable"; he checked "Hold-Further Review" for the recommended action. (tr. 157, 164, Exhibit 15) During the interview he did not tell Mr. Tate there was a problem with his supervisory experience. (tr-23, 183) Raymond Tuttle also interviewed another internal candidate, William Deffendall. He noted on the Interviewer's Report that this candidate did not meet minimum qualifications. (Exhibit 14) After the interviews, Raymond Tuttle went to see Nancy King, who at that time was Supervisor of Employment at EG & G. He asked her whether lead time could be considered as supervisory experience and she did not have an answer. They both looked at the files and could not find anyone who had supervisory background or a restricted pesticide license. At that point they discussed advertising for external candidates and drafted the advertisement. (tr-185, 186, 205, 207, 208) Sometime later, after the first week in June, Nancy Ring asked Mr. Erikson in employment relations whether lead time could be used to meet the supervision requirement. He also had to check; and when he got back to Ms. King a few days later the answer was that EG & G had not used lead time in lieu of supervisory experience. (tr-232, 233, 234) Meanwhile, on June 4, 1984, Mr. Tate was given his posting result form: "You were not selected for this position due to:" *Other ". The handwritten explanation of "other" was "Other candidates are being considered." (Exhibit number 16) At that time there were no other candidates available to be considered as Messers. Tate and Deffendall were the only internal applicants; no candidates with applications on file met the minimum qualifications, and the advertisement for external candidates didn't run until June 12, 1984. (tr-191, 211) The advertisement that ran from June 12-June 17, 1984, differed materially from both job posting number 1331 and the position description for Supervisor, Roads and Grounds that was in effect at that time. The newspaper notice required not a high school degree, but a "B.S. in Agriculture", and 3-5 years experience in horticulture, entomology and supervision. The formal education requirement was therefore increased and the experience requirement was reduced from 5 years to "3-5 years". (Exhibit number 22) Ms. King admitted that the advertisement was not a formal upgrading of the job. (tr-237) More significantly, Raymond Tuttle admitted that they were not looking for someone with a Bachelor's degree but rather increased the requirements to keep out a flood of candidates. (tr-190) According to Ms. King, the company has a policy of substituting experience for educational requirements and the B.S. degree would not have excluded Mr. Tate. However, he was not told of this and there was no way that an individual reading the advertisement could surmise that. (tr-214, 238, 239) Four candidates responded to the advertisement and were interviewed; all were white. (tr-203) The first choice among those candidates was Richard Van Epp, rated "high" by Raymond Tuttle. Mr. Van Epp's application reveals solid experience in landscape work, including supervision, but nothing specific in entomology, a deficiency also noted on Raymond Tuttle's Interviewer's Report. (Exhibit number 17) Richard Van Epp was offered the job but turned it down. (tr-172) The second-choice candidate, Larry Gast, was hired effective July 24, 1984, with a salary offer of $13.50 per hour in a salary range of $9.94 (minimum), $12.64 (mid) and $15.34 (maximum). (Exhibit number 5) Mr. Gast was rated "high" by Raymond Tuttle with a notation on the Interviewer's Report that he met all requirements of this position. Mr. Gast's application reveals a B.S. degree from the University of Florida in 1980, with his major field in entomology. Prior to college he was in high school. The only job experiences listed on his resume and application are lab technician with the U.S. Department of Agriculture in Gainesville, from 11/79 to 3/81; and from 4/81- 6/84, production supervisor/entomologist with the U.S. Sugar Corporation in Clewiston, Florida. (Exhibit number 18) At the time that he was hired by EG & G Larry Gast had approximately three years and two months experience supervising others in a related field. This falls within the minimum required by the newspaper advertisement but falls short of the five years required by the job posting and position description. (Exhibit number 5) On July 23, 1584, Henry Tate was sent another posting result form, this time checked "Another candidate was selected." (Exhibit number 20) He was called into Mr. Tuttle's office and was told that a new supervisor was hired. He was told that pesticides were no problem, herbicides were no problem, but that Mr. Tuttle was "not comfortable" with his background in horticulture. Mr. Tuttle also told him that something might come along later. Mr. Tate replied that he had been in roads and grounds for almost 20 years and how much later was he supposed to wait. (tr-274) Henry Tate was never told that there was any problem with his lack of supervisory experience until the fact finding conference held before an investigator from the Florida Commission on Human Relations. (tr-32, 253, 273) Sometime after the fact finding conference, Earle Patrick, who was then EG&G's Equal Employment Opportunity, Supervisor, called Mr. Tate and asked why he had not applied for another Supervisor job posting. This posting also required supervisory experience and Mr. Tate quickly informed him that he had no more experience than when he applied for the first job. (tr-272) Earle Patrick's convoluted testimony explaining why the phone call was made ended with this exchange: Q. [by Mr. Betancourt] Well, did you think he was qualified for this position and had a shot at it? A. No, I didn't. Q. So you were calling him about a job he couldn't possibly get? A. That's right. (tr-261) When Larry Gast was initially hired he was Supervisor of Roads and Grounds in charge of grounds maintenance and pest control. He supervised approximately 29 individuals and had three leads. There was another Supervisor of Roads and Grounds in charge of road maintenance and sanitation services. The Roads and Grounds Department was reorganized in early 1985 to create three supervisors. Larry Gast became responsible for the bridgetenders and pest control and his staff was reduced to fifteen individuals, including one lead, Henry Tate. Nine of the staff are bridgetenders who never leave the bridge and do not require a lead. The remaining workers can be anywhere in an area 28 miles long and 14 miles wide. As lead, in the words of Larry Gast, Henry Tate is the "eyes in the field" for those workers. This organizational structure still exists. (tr-121, 123, 266, 267, 269, Exhibit number 11) The reorganization brought Larry Gast's position closer into line with the industry standard described by EG & G's Manager of Personnel Management, Stephen Mansfield. That standard says that supervisors should be able to handle six to eight people; anything more tends to stretch the supervisor thin; anything less would suggest that you may not need a supervisor. (tr-151,152) With 29 persons, Larry Gast concedes he was stretched very thin. (tr-270) Henry Tate was highly qualified for the position of Supervisor of Roads and Grounds, job posting number 1331. While EG & G had never counted lead time for supervisory experience in the past, the evidence strongly suggests that the issue simply never arose in the past. Various individuals in the employment office couldn't immediately answer when asked if lead time could be considered. Most supervisor positions do not require previous supervisory experience. (tr-136) At one point during another reorganization, approximately 16 leads were reclassified as supervisors. (tr-153, 156) The substantial weight of evidence supports a finding that EG &G did not consider Henry Tate unqualified: For job posting number 1125, he was told only that he lacked the restrictive pesticide license and he was not interviewed. He then got the required license. He was interviewed for job posting number 1331 and was not informed that there was a problem with his failure to meet minimum qualifications until well after the position was filled and the discrimination issue was raised. Neither job posting result forms so informed him, despite the fact that the form includes a line to be checked with regard to meeting minimum qualifications. Raymond Tuttle rated Tate a "good" candidate and put his application "on hold", both of which are inconsistent with a belief that the individual is unqualified. Earle Patrick's intent in calling Henry Tate about the new supervisory position could hardly be so perverse as he has contrived in his testimony. EG & G cannot legitimately claim that Mr. Tate's lack of supervisory experience was the basis for their rejection of his request for promotion. They commenced the solicitation of outside candidates well before the answer on lead time came back. (tr-210, 211, 233)`' While Henry Tate may have benefitted from some training to acquire polish as a supervisor, training is provided routinely by EG & G for all new, as well as old supervisors. (tr-244) The company espouses a policy of promoting from within.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the administrative complaint filed in this case and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Michael Rada was a certified general contractor, the qualifying agent for A-Team Remodeling and Design, Inc. and held license number CG C026705 of the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. On or around December 10, 1987, Mrs. Katherine Hill contracted with A- Team Plumbing, Inc. to renovate a bathroom in her home. A-Team Plumbing, Inc. is an entity separate and distinct from A-Team Remodeling and Design, Inc. and Mr. Rada was not associated with A-Team Plumbing, Inc. Following A-Team Plumbing, Inc.'s failure to complete the job, Mr. Rada, on behalf of A-Team Remodeling and Design, Inc. agreed with Mrs. Hill to re-do the job. Mr. Rada, as qualifying agent for A-Team Remodeling and Design, Inc., applied to the City of Plantation for the building permit on January 11, 1988, and it was issued on February 13, 1988. At the instruction of the City of Plantation, the job was gutted, and Mr. Rada began his work sometime in March, 1988. The job should have been completed in two to three weeks, but was not completed until May 6, 1988. During construction, Mr. Rada's work was erratic and at times dilatory. On several occasions, he made appointments to work on the job, necessitating Mrs. Hill's absence from her employment, and, then, he would not keep the appointments or even contact Mrs. Hill about his failure to report. In addition to having failed to complete the job in a timely manner, the proof demonstrated that when completed the work failed to conform to that standard existent in the community for similar work. Even after the final inspection, a hole remained in an adjoining closet wall, the base boards were not flush with the walls and "gop" hung down in one corner of the room. Mrs. Hill refused to pay for the job because of her dissatisfaction. As general contractor, Mr. Rada assumed responsibility for the completion of the job at the time of his initial visit to Mrs. Hill and his application for the building permit. By failing to complete the job in a workmanlike and timely manner, Mr. Rada's performance was incompetent and exemplified misconduct in the practice of contracting.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered imposing on Respondent an administrative fine of $750. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 28th day of July 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-187 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 1. Subordinate to the result reached. Addressed in paragraph 2. Subordinate to the result reached. Subordinate to the result reached. Subordinate to the result reached 2. Subordinate to the result reached. In part, subordinate to the result reached; in part, addressed in paragraph 3. Addressed in paragraph 3. Subordinate to the result reached. Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 5. Addressed in paragraphs 3 and 4. In part, addressed in paragraphs 4 and 5; in part, subordinate to the result; in part, not supported by competent and substantial evidence. In part, subordinate to the result reached; in part, addressed in paragraphs 4 and 5. In part, subordinate to the result reached; in part addressed in paragraph 2. Subordinate to the result reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Michael Rada, pro se 4576 Northwest 16th Terrace Tamarac Lakes, Florida 33304 Fred Seely Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================
