The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive attorney's fees and costs from Respondent pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On June 24, 1994, Dolly Davis, Insurance Specialist at the Department's Daytona Beach Service Office, sent a letter to Mary Russo, Examiner, Bureau of Specialty Insurers, which brought to the Department's attention that Capital was utilizing a billing service disclosure form in conjunction with its standard premium financing agreement to collect a charge for a supplemental product, allegedly in violation of Sections 627.8405 and 627.838, Florida Statutes. On August 25, 1994, Al Willis, Bureau Chief, Bureau of Specialty Insurance, sent a memorandum to Dennis Silverman, Legal Services, in which Mr. Willis requested the Division of Legal Services to issue an immediate final order to revoke Capital's license to transact premium financing or to fine Capital for allegedly violating Sections 627.8405 and 627.838, Florida Statutes. Mr. Willis explained in the memorandum that the Department became aware of the alleged violations through examinations of Ace Auto Insurance and Accountable Auto-Star, both of which were believed to be affiliated with Capital. On August 30, 1994, the Department issued its Notice of Intent to Non-Renew Capital National's license. The Department stated in the Notice that the Department had obtained evidence that Capital was financing automobile club memberships in violation of Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes, and was utilizing a form in conjunction with its premium finance agreement which had not been approved by the Department in violation of Section 627.838, Florida Statutes. The case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for an administrative hearing. The parties agreed to submit memoranda of law and proposed recommended orders based on stipulated facts in lieu of an evidentiary hearing. The parties agreed that the sole issue to be determined by the administrative law judge was whether Capital was financing the purchase of automobile club memberships in violation of Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes. The parties stipulated that the billing service disclosure form used by Capital is executed on the same day the premium finance agreement is executed, and the billing disclosure form is physically a separate document from the premium finance agreement. On January 8, 1996, the administrative law judge entered a Recommended Order, concluding that although the billing service disclosure form was part of the premium finance agreement, Capital was not financing automobile club memberships and, therefore, was not in violation of Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes. On February 15, 1996, the Department issued a declaratory statement, In the Matter of Just Premium Finance, Inc., Case No. 12412-95-C-JAB, in which the Department took the position that Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes, prohibits as financing a premium finance company's collection of a charge for the purchase of a supplemental product, despite the fact that the premium company does not advance any funds or charge a rate of interest for performing the service. On March 1, 1996, the Department entered a final order concluding that Capital was financing automobile club memberships in violation of Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes. Capital appealed the final order to the Third District Court of Appeal, Capital National Financial Corporation v. Department of Insurance and Treasurer, Case No. 96-0826. On November 6, 1996, the Department issued a Report of Examination for Dome Premium Finance Company, in which the Department noted that Dome was engaging in activities prohibited by Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes, by utilizing a separate billing disclosure form for the payment of supplemental products. On November 18, 1996, the Department sent a letter to Richard Perry, President of Perry and Company, in which the Department requested confirmation that all companies managed or serviced by Perry and Company had terminated the practice of using separate consumer finance agreements. On January 12, 1997, Mr. Perry verified that all companies managed or serviced by Perry and Company had terminated this practice. Perry and Company manages and/or services the following premium finance companies: Freedom Premium Finance Corporation; Equity Premium, Inc.; Puritan Budget Plan, Inc.; and Gibraltar Budget Plan, Inc. Capital National was the only premium finance company to challenge the Department's interpretation of Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes, and thus, it was the only premium finance company to receive a Notice of Intent to Non-Renew its license. The Notice of Intent to Non-Renew was used for the first time against Capital and has never been used again. On March 12, 1997, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the Department's final order, finding that Capital was not financing automobile club membership under Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes. On April 29, 1997, pursuant to the Third District Court of Appeal's Mandate, the Department issued an amended final order consistent with the Appellate Court's decision. Capital incurred total attorney's fees of $23,010 and costs of $2,024 in defending against the Department's Notice of Intent not to renew Capital's premium finance license. The Department has agreed that the fees and costs are reasonable. Capital is domiciled in the State of Florida. Currently Capital has ten employees. Since its inception, Capital has never had more than 15 employees.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Chapter 648, Florida Statutes (2007),1 by charging more for a bail bond than the statutorily allowed amount, withholding and failing to return money to his principal or the principal’s wife, and suggesting employment of a particular attorney to represent the principal, and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed against Respondent’s limited surety (bail bond) license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible, in relevant part, for regulating limited surety licensees (bail bond agents) in Florida pursuant to Chapter 648. Respondent is licensed as a bail bond agent in Florida pursuant to license number A054475. Respondent conducts business as the sole owner of Nickel American Bail Bonds (Nickel). Nickel is located at 2641 Airport Road, Naples, Florida 34112-4878. Respondent is the primary agent for Nickel. Respondent employs Mr. Anthony Robert Bennett (Tony Bennett) directly through Nickel and through SWFLGPS Monitoring Solutions (GPS Solutions). GPS Solutions is a fictitious name registered to Freedom 247, Inc. (Freedom), a Florida, for-profit corporation, for which Respondent is a principal and controlling shareholder. At the time of the events at issue in this proceeding, Mr. Tony Bennett was licensed as a temporary bail bond agent through Nickel. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Tony Bennett was a licensed bail bond agent through Nickel. At the time of the events at issue in this proceeding, Respondent also employed Ms. Michelle Blake. Respondent employed Ms. Blake directly and through Nickel. Ms. Blake sometimes performed minor tasks for GPS Solutions. Sometime in December 2007, the Sheriff for Collier County, Florida (Collier County Sheriff), arrested Mr. Edel Rodriguez and incarcerated Mr. Rodriguez in the Collier County Jail. The court set bond in the amount of $202,000.00 for all charges. During December 2007, Ms. Ana Cabrera, the wife of Mr. Rodriguez, attempted to arrange bond for her husband with Respondent, but was unsuccessful. She successfully obtained a bond when she returned to Respondent’s office on January 2, 2008, with two friends who were willing to secure the bond with mortgages on their homes. Bankers Insurance Company (Bankers) issued a bond in the aggregate amount of $202,000.00 pursuant to what is identified in the record as three separate identification numbers. Bankers issued identification numbers 510505690-0 and 510505182-2, each for $100,000.00, and identification number 580036136-7 for $2,000.00. The Collier County Sheriff released Mr. Rodriguez from custody on January 2, 2008. Mr. Rodriguez enjoyed approximately 72 days of freedom until March 15, 2008, at 8:50 p.m., when Respondent re-arrested Mr. Rodriguez, where Mr. Rodriguez worked, and returned Mr. Rodriguez to the custody of the Collier County Sheriff. The maximum amount that Respondent was permitted under Florida law to charge Mr. Rodriguez for his 72 days of freedom was 10 percent of $202,000.00, or $20,200.00. Respondent charged Mr. Rodriguez $22,040.00 in violation of Section 648.33 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-221.105(2). Ms. Cabrera paid $20,200.00 on January 2, 2008, when she signed the bond documents.2 Mr. Rodriguez paid an additional $1,840.00 in fees related to the use of the GPS device required by Respondent. The GPS device was a cost of the bail bond transaction that was required by Respondent. Respondent paid a company identified in the record as Secure Alert up to $9.00 a day to monitor the GPS device and charged Mr. Rodriguez $12.00 a day for a monthly profit of $90.00, but at a gross monthly cost to Mr. Rodriguez of $360.00. Respondent allowed Mr. Rodriguez to spend the first 24 hours of his release from jail without a GPS device without fear that Mr. Rodriguez was a flight danger. As will be discussed in greater detail, Mr. Rodriguez eventually cut the GPS device from his leg. For reasons discussed hereinafter, the fact-finder finds that the act of cutting the device from Mr. Rodriguez's leg represented more of a financial threat to Respondent than a threat of flight by Mr. Rodriguez. The court did not order Mr. Rodriguez to wear a GPS device as a condition of his release. The Bankers bond documents did not require a GPS device as a condition of the bond documents. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-221.100 does not require a GPS device as a condition of release. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-221.100 prohibits Mr. Rodriguez from: departing the jurisdiction of the court, which was Collier County, Florida; moving from one address to another; demonstrating any intention to cause a forfeiture of the bond; and being arrested or incarcerated for any offense while on bond. There is no credible and persuasive evidence that any one of the foregoing factors were present in this case. Respondent testified that the GPS device was not a cost of the bail bond transaction. For reasons previously discussed in paragraphs 12 and 13, the fact-finder finds Respondent’s testimony to be less than credible and persuasive. Other testimony by Respondent belies his disclaimer. For example, Respondent testified, in substantial effect, that he would not have participated without the GPS device and that he did not intend to re-arrest Mr. Rodriguez until he discovered that Mr. Rodriguez had cut the GPS strap from his leg. For reasons discussed in paragraphs 12 and 13, the overwhelming evidence shows that Respondent’s decision to re-arrest Mr. Rodriguez had nothing to do with a threat of flight and had everything to do with a financial threat to Respondent. Mr. Rodriguez cut the GPS strap because the GPS strap was malfunctioning while Mr. Rodriguez was at work at the Wal- Mart located at 11748 Tamiami Trail, Naples, Florida, in Collier County, Florida, within the jurisdiction of the court. The malfunctioning device caused Mr. Rodriguez embarrassment, irritation, and discomfort on the job. Mr. Rodriguez was a plumber by trade, did not understand much English, and needed his job to pay the $360.00 monthly fee Respondent charged for the GPS device. Mr. Rodriguez placed the severed GPS device in his personal vehicle. The severed device continued to accurately disclose the location of Mr. Rodriguez at his job. Mr. Rodriguez telephoned Mr. Tony Bennett for instructions. While Mr. Tony Bennett had some difficulty understanding Mr. Rodriguez, Mr. Tony Bennett understood enough to instruct Mr. Rodriguez to bring the defective device in on Monday for repair or exchange. There was no attempt at flight or to evade Respondent. When Respondent arrived at the Wal-Mart, Mr. Rodriguez continued to work. It was approximately 8:50 p.m. None of this activity violated any of the court ordered conditions of release, applicable rules, or the conditions of the Bankers bond instruments. Respondent surrendered Mr. Rodriguez back to the Collier County Sheriff's office. On the statement of surrender form, Respondent indicated that Mr. Rodriguez had violated the bail agreement. That assertion is incorrect. Mr. Rodriguez acted in good faith to comply with the bail agreement and was in material compliance with the terms of the agreement at all times. Mr. Rodriguez did not violate the terms of release ordered by the court, the Bankers bond instruments, or applicable rules. Respondent has not refunded any of the excess premium to Mr. Rodriguez. Respondent is not entitled to retain the excess premium. At some point between December 2007 and January 2, 2008, Respondent recommended that Ms. Cabrera retain a specific attorney identified in the record as Mr. Josh Faett. In doing so, Respondent violated Subsection 648.44(1)(a).3 Neither Mr. Rodriguez nor Ms. Cabrera speaks or reads English. Ms. Blake filled in the blanks on the application for bond for Ms. Cabrera and provided little, if any, explanation to Ms. Cabrera.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating the statutory provisions cited in paragraph 35, suspending Respondent’s license for seven months, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $22,040.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 2010.
The Issue The purpose of the public hearing was to review the application to consolidate New River Bank, Oakland Park, Florida, and 1st United Bank, Boca Raton, Florida, in accordance with Florida law.
Findings Of Fact 1st United Bancorp (Bancorp) is a Florida bank holding company which maintains its principal place of business at 980 North Federal Highway, Boca Raton, Florida. 1st United is a Florida chartered bank and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bancorp and operates full service banking facilities at seven locations in Palm Beach and Martin Counties. New River is a Florida chartered bank which maintains its executive offices at 2901 West Oakland Park Boulevard, Oakland Park, Florida, and operates two banking facilities in Broward County, Florida. The Department is the duly designated state agency vested with the responsibility of processing and approving or disapproving a plan of any financial entity to acquire the assets and assume the liabilities of another financial entity pursuant to Section 655.414, Florida Statutes. On July 13, 1993, Bancorp and New River entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement which provides that Bancorp will cause 1st United to purchase substantially all of the assets and to assume substantially all of the liabilities of New River, after which New River will be liquidated and dissolved. The agreement noted above was duly adopted by majority vote of the respective Boards of Directors of Bancorp, 1st United and New River. In addition, the respective Boards of Directors of Bancorp, 1st United and New River duly adopted by majority vote a Plan of Acquisition of Assets and Assumption of Liabilities which summarized pertinent portions of the agreement and which includes all of the terms and conditions required by Section 655.414 (1), Florida Statutes. On September 7, 1993, 1st United and New River submitted an application to the Department seeking the Department's approval for the purchase of New River's assets and assumption of its liabilities as set forth in the agreement and as summarized by the plan. Submitted with the application were the requisite filing fee and all of the required documents including copies of the agreement, the plan and certified copies of the authorizing resolutions of the respective boards of directors. On September 17, 1993, the Department caused notice of the receipt of the application to be published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. This published notice met the requirements of Rule 3C-9.003(1), Florida Administrative Code. On September 7, 1993, Warren Orlando, in his capacity as president of 1st United, filed a petition for public hearing and notice of intention to appear on behalf of 1st United. On October 27, 1993, the Department referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the purpose of conducting a public hearing pursuant to Section 120.60(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 3C-9.004, Florida Administrative Code. Notice that a public hearing would be held on the application on December 13, 1993, was duly published in conformity with Rule 3C-9.005, Florida Administrative Code, in the Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, Palm Beach Post, and Stuart News, newspapers of general circulation in the communities in which 1st United and New River do business. The agreement provides that New River will receive a combination of cash and Bancorp common stock equal to the net asset value, as defined in the plan, of the assets and liabilities of New River being purchased or assumed. The agreement further provides that after the closing of the asset acquisition, New River shall cease operations and commence dissolution and liquidation proceedings. Substantially all of the Bancorp common stock and available cash received by New River from Bancorp will be distributed to New River shareholders, other than dissenting shareholders. New River stockholders will receive a pro rata portion of the Bancorp common stock and cash available for distribution. After the acquisition of the assets and assumption of liabilities as set forth in the agreement and as summarized in the plan, 1st United will have adequate capital structure in relation to its activities and its deposit liabilities. The acquisition of the assets and assumption of liabilities as set forth in the agreement and as summarized in the plan, if consummated, are not contrary to the public interest. The respective boards of directors of Bancorp and New River requested the opinion of Alex Sheshunoff & Co. Investment Banking with regard to the fairness to the respective shareholders of each corporation, from a financial point of view, of the terms and conditions of the agreement. Alex Sheshunoff & Co. Investment Banking is regularly engaged in and is an expert authority in the valuation of bank and bank holding company securities in connection with bank mergers and acquisitions. Thomas Mecredy is an expert in the valuation of bank and bank holding companies in connection with bank mergers and acquisitions. On December 8, 1993, Alex Sheshunoff & Co. Investment Banking through Thomas Mecredy issued its opinion to the respective Boards of Directors of Bancorp and New River that the terms and conditions of the agreement were fair and equitable to the shareholders of each corporation. Pursuant to the agreement, New River's Board of Directors duly adopted a plan of dissolution and complete liquidation for New River. The plan of dissolution provides that after the sale of assets and assumption of liabilities the Board of Directors will reserve a sufficient amount of Bancorp stock and cash for payment of liquidation expenses and payment of liabilities not assumed by 1st United, including contingent liabilities (general reserves). In addition to the general reserves, New River will create a special reserve (special reserve) in an amount which it considers sufficient to defend and satisfy certain potential claims which may be asserted against New River by shareholders of New River in conjunction with the organization and initial offering of common stock of New River. In determining the amounts necessary to establish the general reserves and special reserve, New River's board of directors consulted with the national law firm of Proskauer Rose Goetz and Mendelsohn with respect to both reserves and the Florida law firm of Shutts & Bowen with respect to the special reserve for advice concerning the potential liability on the part of New River in connection with both known claims and potential claims and the amounts, if any, for which New River could be held liable. Shareholder E.D. Hittson noted that the book value of the New River stock is approximately $11.00 per share versus the $4.50 per share value of the 1st United stock. In response, bank officials noted that 1st United has dividend and strong growth potential not available to New River. Shareholder James Weck questioned provisions being made to satisfy outstanding lawsuit liabilities, the future location of the facility, and the effect on New River employees. In response, bank officials stated that the potential lawsuit liability is included in the reserve amounts, that no decision has been made as to the future location of the banking facility but that the needs of the service area will be met, and that it is their intention to draw talent from the New River staff. Shareholder Amine Semaan questioned whether New River would be represented on the Board of Directors at 1st United, whether minority areas would be a priority for the future location of the facility, and whether another buyer would have paid $10.50 per share. In response, bank officials maintained that New River will have one member on the Board of Directors at 1st United, that the needs of the service area will be met, and that no other, more attractive, buyer is available. On January 11, 1994, MaryAnn Cassel, a shareholder who reportedly attended the public hearing on December 13, 1993, filed a motion for leave to become a party. Such motion alleged that the movant, a minority shareholder, will be forced to accept Bancorp common stock in exchange for her New River shares or be forced to accept appraisal rights in lieu of her shares. Further, movant claimed that the plan is not fair to all parties because the shares of New River have been undervalued. Having deemed such motion untimely, and having determined such request does not allege circumstances unknown to movant prior to the December 13, 1993 public hearing, it is denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Donald E. Thompson, II Proskauer Rose Goetz and Mendelsohn One Boca Place, Suite 340 2155 Glades Road Boca Raton, Florida 37431 Michael W. Ford Phillip T. Ridolfo, Jr. Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwody & Cole Phillips Point East Tower 777 South Flagler Drive, Suite 900 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Jeffrey D. Jones Department of Banking and Finance Division of Banking The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 David S. Zimble Zimble Formoso-Murias, P.A. 1401 Brickell Avenue, Suite 730 Miami, Florida 33131
Findings Of Fact A Quit-Claim Deed was executed the 3rd day of March, 1975, by Bayshore 21, Inc., first party to Marc Broxmeyer an undivided 70 percent interest; Gerald Schefflan and Pearl Schefflan, his wife, an undivided 20 percent interest; and Yetta Young an undivided 10 percent interest. The deed was recorded in Official Records Book of Dade County, Florida. The deed reflects that no documentary stamp taxes were affixed to the deed. At the time of the conveyance there existed upon the property three outstanding mortgages: one in the amount of One Million Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($1,450,000) in favor of Washington Federal Savings and Loan; one in the amount of One Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand One Hundred Six Dollars ($1,880,106) in favor of Sidney Salomon, et al.; and Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($12,500) in favor of Harold Kravitz. The total consideration for the conveyance amounted to Three Million Three Hundred Forty- Two Thousand Six Hundred Six Dollars ($3,342,606). The undisputed facts of the transaction as outlined at the hearing and agreed to by the Petitioners' attorney are as follows: Prior to August 17, 1974, all the outstanding stock of a corporation known as Tepmon of Florida, Inc., (Marvin Glick, presidents and controlling person and Eugene J. Howard, secretary) was held by Sidney Salomon, Jr., Hid Salomon, III, Elliot Stein, the Estate of Preston Estep and John Soult. On or about April 17, 1974, these people entered into an agreement for purchase and sale of corporate stock with Bayshore 21, Inc., pursuant to which Bayshore 21, Inc., agreed to purchase for Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($3,500,000) all of the outstanding capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. At the time, Tepmon of Florida, Inc., had as its only asset a certain parcel of real property known as the Golden Strand Hotel, as shown by suit, Shoprite Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Tepmon, Inc., et al. in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, Case No. 74-29983. Pursuant to the purchase and sale agreement, a closing was to be held in various stages on August 19 and 20, 1974, at which time Sidney Salomon, et al., delivered to Bayshore 21, Inc., all of the capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. Bayshore 21, Inc., in turn executed and delivered at the closing a chattel mortgage in the amount of One Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand One Hundred Six Dollars ($1,880,106), the security for which there was sixty-nine (69) shares of capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., which stock represented the outstanding stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., and carried with it the ownership and control of said corporation. Also given to Sidney Salomon, et al, by Bayshore 21, Inc., at the closing was a purchase money mortgage in the amount of One Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand One Hundred Six Dollars ($1,880,106), which mortgage secured the real property known as the Golden Strand Hotel. The reason for the two separate security devices, one the chattel mortgage secured by the outstanding sixty-nine (69) shares of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., stock and the other the real property mortgage secured by the Golden Strand Hotel, was that the parties contemplated that upon Bayshore 21's acquisition of the outstanding Page 3 of 7' pages capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., Tepmon would be dissolved and completely liquidated. Mindful that such liquidation would render valueless as collateral the capital stock of Tepmon, the parties provided in a collateral security agreement, dated August 20, 1974, that the purchase money real estate mortgage would constitute the substitute collateral security for repayment of the outstanding purchase money obligation owed by Bayshore 21, Inc., to Sid Salomon, et al., effective upon the dissolution of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. Subsequent to acquiring all the capital stock of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., Bayshore 21, Inc., did in fact effectuate a complete dissolution and liquidation of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. Pursuant to such dissolution, the sole asset of Tepmon of Florida, Inc, the Golden Strand Hotel, should have become titled in the name of Tepmon of Florida, Inc.'s sole stockholder, Bayshore 21, Inc., in order to give effect to the validity of the purchase money mortgage. This is not what occurred however, as Sidney Salomon, et al., point out in their Cross-Claim to the aforementioned suit, the truthfulness of which assertions have been admitted by the Petitioners. The September 5, 1974 deed of conveyance of the Golden Strand Hotel from Tepmon of Florida, Inc., to Petitioners (which should have been to Bayshore 21, Inc.) contained only minimum stamps in the amount of eighty-five cents (85). As a result of the Cross-Claim in the aforementioned suit filed by Sidney Salomon, et al., against Petitioners, a stipulation and agreement was entered into resolving the matter in a manner which gave effect to the purchase money real estate mortgage given by Bayshore 21, Inc., to the Salomons. Pursuant to such stipulation, the Petitioners agreed that "the allegations made in the Cross Claim . . . are true and correct and Cross Claimants are entitled to the relief prayed for therein. Cross Defendants [Petitioners] have no defenses thereto, legal or equitable, or any kind whatsoever Pursuant to this stipulation, the Petitioners agreed to execute Quit-Claim Deeds conveying any interest they may have received in the property pursuant to the September 5, 1974 deed of conveyance from Tepmon of Florida, Inc., to Bayshore 21, Inc., the entity which was the sole stockholder of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., at the time of its dissolution and liquidation. By Quit-Claim Deeds dated January 2, 1975, Gerald and Pearl Schefflan conveyed their interest to Bayshore 21, Inc., Yetta Young conveyed her interest back to Bayshore 21, Inc., Marc Broxmeyer conveyed his interest back to Bayshore 21, Inc., and the last Board of Directors of Tepmon of Florida, Inc., comprised of Marvin Glick and Eugene Howard, also conveyed any interest that entity may have retained back to Bayshore 21, Inc. At this point Bayshore 21, Inc., finally held the title it was supposed to have acquired upon the dissolution and liquidation of Tepmon of Florida, Inc. Also at this point the validity of the purchase money real estate mortgage given by Bayshore 21, Inc., to Sidney Salomon, et al., was reestablished and the parties were returned to the posture called for and required by their purchase and sale agreement dated April 17, 1974. When, on March 3, 1975, Bayshore 21, Inc., conveyed title to the Golden Strand Hotel to the Petitioners in this action, by unstamped deed, the conveyance was a voluntary conveyance. At the time of the conveyance, three outstanding mortgages encumbered the real property. Such mortgages were a One Million Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollar ($1,450,000) mortgage in favor of Washington Federal Savings and Loan; the One Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand One Hundred Six Dollar ($1,880,106) purchase money mortgage in favor of Sidney Salomon, et al.; and a Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollar ($12,500) mortgage in favor of Harold Kravitz. When Petitioners took title to this real property, they took title subject to three outstanding mortgages. The Hearing Officer further in summary finds: The transactions related in the foregoing findings of fact ultimately transferred title of real property to Bayshore 21, Inc., pursuant to an agreement dated April 17, 1974. Fee simple title was then transferred from Bayshore, Inc., to Petitioners by Quit-Claim Deed dated March 3, 1975, subject to mortgage liens.
Recommendation Affirm the assessment of documentary stamp taxes made by the Respondent in this cause. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Eugene J. Howard, Esquire 2212 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33137
Findings Of Fact The First Variable Rate Fund for Government Income, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as the Fund) is an open-end diversified investment company incorporated under Maryland law. The Fund is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, as a diversified, open-end management company. The Fund has an authorized capital of 2.5 billion shares of common stock with a par value of $.001 per share which may be issued in classes and are freely transferable. Each outstanding share is entitled to one vote on all matters submitted to a vote of stockholders and to a prorata share of dividends declared and of the Fund's net assets in liquidation. Shares of the Fund are issued and redeemed at their net asset value. It is the Fund's policy to maintain a constant net asset value of $1.00 per share. The net asset value is determined by subtracting liabilities from value of assets and dividing the remainder by the number of outstanding shares. The Fund's shares are sold to the public without a sales charge. The Fund is a money market fund. Its investment goals are high current income, preservation of capital and liquidity. In pursuing these goals, the Fund invests solely in debt obligations issued or guaranteed by the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, assignments of interests in such obligations, and commitments to purchase such obligations ("U.S. Government- backed obligators"). The fund may invest in U.S. Government-backed obligations subject to repurchase agreements with recognized securities dealers and banks. Some of the U.S. Government-backed securities are supported by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury; others are supported by the right of the issuer to borrow from the Treasury; still others are supported only by the credit of the instrumentality. The Portfolio of Investments of the Fund on December 31, 1982 contains the following types of investments: U.S. Treasury Bills; Student Loan Marketing Association; Certificates of Deposit; Certificates of Deposit Investment Pools with U.S. Government guarantee on the underlying certificates; Repurchase agreements collateralized by securities issued by or guaranteed by the U.S. Government; Variable rate loans guaranteed by agencies of the U.S. Government. The Portfolio of Investments of the Fund on December 31, 1981 contains the following types of investments: U.S. Treasury Bills; Federal Farm Credit Banks; Repurchase agreements substantially collateralized by securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. Government; Certificate of Deposit Investment pools with U.S. Government guarantee on the underlying certificates; Variable rate loans guaranteed by agencies of the U.S. Government. Repurchase agreements are transactions in which a person purchases a security and simultaneously commits to resell that security to the seller at a mutually agreed upon time and price. The seller's obligation is secured by the underlying security. The resale price reflects the purchase price plus an agreed upon market rate of interest. While the underlying security may bear a maturity in excess of one year, the term of the repurchase agreement is always less than one year. In the event of the bankruptcy of a seller during the term of a repurchase agreement, a substantial legal question exists as to whether the Fund would be deemed the owners of the underlying security or would be deemed only to have a security interest in and lien upon such security. If the Fund's interest is deemed a security interest in and lien upon such security, the Fund may realize a loss or may be delayed in receiving the repurchase price due it pursuant to the agreement or in selling the underlying security. The Fund will only engage in repurchase agreements with recognized securities dealers and banks. In addition, the Fund will only engage in repurchase agreements reasonably designed to secure fully during the term of the agreement the seller's obligation to repurchase the underlying security and will monitor the market value of the underlying security during the term of the agreement. If the value of the underlying security declines, the Fund may require the seller to pledge additional securities or cash or secure the seller's obligations pursuant to the agreement. If the seller defaults on its obligation to repurchase and the value of the underlying security declines, the Fund may incur a loss and may incur expenses in selling the underlying security. Although all the securities purchased by the Fund are Government-backed as to principal or secured by such securities, some of the types of Government securities the Fund buys may be sold at a premium which is not backed by a Government guarantee. The premiums are amortized over the life of the security; however, if a security should default or be prepaid, the fund could realize as a loss the unamortized portion of such premium. Petitioners, R. W. and Joyce S. Aronson remitted $66.56 by check #235 dated April 10, 1982 in payment of Florida Intangible Tax for 1982. If it is determined that the Fund at issue herein is totally exempt from taxation, the aforesaid Petitioners are entitled to a refund in the amount of $3.96. Petitioner, Helen T. Aronson remitted $84.30 by check #138 dated February 28, 1983 in payment of Florida Intangible Tax for 1983. If it is determined that the Fund at issue herein is totally exempt from taxation, the aforesaid Petitioner is entitled to a refund in the amount of $16.73. The Department of Revenue computes intangible tax on shares of corporations on the basis of "just value" which for publicly held corporations, is market value. The Department of Revenue computed the value of the shares of the Fund on the basis of market value. A review of the Prospectus forwarded with the stipulation of facts discloses that in the Prospectus dated March 1, 1982 only $73,186,000 was invested in United States Government obligations of the total of $1,121,285,000 invested by the Fund; and that in Prospectus dated February 28, 1983, $199,387,000 was invested in United States Government obligations of the total of $1,125,500,000 invested by the Fund. Thus, approximately 6.5 percent in 1982 and 17.7 percent in 1983 of the value of the funds were invested in funds exempt from the Florida intangible tax. Six and one-half percent (6-1/2 %) of $3.96 is $0.26 and 17.7 percent of $16.73 is $2.96.
The Issue Whether Respondent's application of the inflation protection clause of the agreement to purchase real estate, thereby increasing the purchase price, discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (FFHA) and Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2004).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tyrone Harrison 8412 Peterson Road Odessa, Florida 33556 Cristina A. Equi, Esquire Gray & Robinson, P.A. 301 East Pine Street, Suite 1400 Post Office Box 3068 Orlando, Florida 32802-3068 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the administrative agency charged with responsibility for administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Mortgage Refunds Research and Consulting ("Mortgage"), is a Florida corporation that is wholely owned by Respondent, Richard Vidair. Respondent has sole responsibility for the direction, control, operation, and management of Mortgage. Respondent is not licensed as a private investigator and Mortgage is not a licensed private investigative agency. Respondent is considered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to be a third party tracer. Respondent and his agency locate persons who may be owed refunds for mortgage insurance premiums. From sometime in August, 1990, through May 2, 1991, Respondent contacted individuals who may be owed mortgage insurance refunds by the federal government. Respondent solicited a fee contingent upon actual receipt of the mortgage refund from the federal government. Respondent obtained from the United States government a list of persons owed mortgage refunds. Such lists are available to anyone for a nominal processing fee. Respondent determined the whereabouts of persons named on the list. Respondent either telephoned or mailed a letter to the person named on the list and informed that person of the service offered by Respondent. Respondent included in the letter sent to the person a finder's fee agreement to be signed by the person on the list. Once the contract was signed and returned to Respondent, Respondent provided the person on the list with additional documents to be filled out for the purpose of filing a claim with the federal government. Government refunds were mailed directly to the person on the list. The terms of the finder's fee agreement required the person on the list to pay Respondent's fee within three days of the date the person received his or her money from the government. The agreement further provided that if Respondent's fee was not paid within 30 days, Respondent was entitled to a fee equal to 50 percent of the government refund. Finally, the agreement provided that all collection and legal expenses incurred by Respondent in collecting the finder's fee must be paid by the other party. Respondent received a letter in March, 1991, from the Division of Licensing notifying Respondent that his activities required licensure. After conferring with his attorney, Respondent terminated his activities in Florida but continued his activities outside the state. On October 14, 1987, an attorney for the Division of Licensing issued an internal legal opinion to then Division Director Dave Register. The opinion concluded that persons who engage in the business of locating individuals to whom mortgage insurance premium refunds are due from the federal government are not required to be licensed pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. On October 30, 1987, Ken Rouse, General Counsel, Department of State, issued a legal opinion which rescinded the prior internal opinion and concluded that such activities must be licensed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 1C-3.122(1), imposing an administrative fine of $500 pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 1C-3.113(1)(a)2, imposing an administrative fine of $150 pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 1C- 3.113(1)(b)2, and ordering Respondent to cease all investigative activities until Respondent is properly licensed in accordance with Chapter 493. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23 day of January 1992. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23th day of January 1992.
The Issue Whether the Department of General Services should disqualify Savin Corporation's bid for failure to submit a separate supply price list.
Findings Of Fact On April 26, 1984, DGS issued ITB 402-600-38-B entitled "Walk-up Convenience Copiers, Plain Bond Paper" to establish a state contract for the purchase of walk-up convenience copiers. The ITB contains general and special conditions and specifications. The specifications provide for four types and twelve classes of copiers with four acquisition plans -- one-year lease, two- year lease, three-year lease, and outright purchase. Vendors may submit a bid for each type, class, and acquisition plan. Savin submitted a bid for all acquisition plans in Type I, Classes 1-10; Type II, Classes 1-3; Type III, Classes 1-10; and Type IV, Classes 1-10. /4 The special conditions of the ITB require that a price sheet (page 14 of the ITB) be submitted for each machine bid. The price sheets are used to evaluate the bids, and contracts are awarded in each category to the bidder submitting the lowest cost per copy. The cost per copy is determined by a cost formula set for in the special conditions which consist of three factors: machine cost, labor cost, and supply cost. The following special conditions of the Invitation To Bid relates to supply costs: C) SUPPLY COST- The bidder shall compute supply costs on the Manufacturer's Brand. If there is an existing state contract for supplies for the manufacturer's brand equipment; the state contract price may be substituted. Supply costs will be rounded to six (6) decimal points. All other costs will also be rounded off to six (6) decimal points. The volume price used by the vendor to compute supply cost shall be based on the monthly median volume of the type and class being bid. Supply cost submitted shall be firm for the contract period, except for paper, and all supply costs shall be current market price, verifiable. The price list shall also include the manufacturer's standard test pattern as the original document. Vendor must complete the supply price list (See page 13) and include it with his bid and must submit a separate supply price list reflecting volume discount prices to substantiate that correct price volumes were used unless state contract prices were used. A contract award may include supplies during the term of this contract if deemed in the best interest of the State. By electing to substitute state contract supplies, the vendor is certifying that his equipment, using said supplies, will meet all performance requirements of this bid and of the equipment manufacturer. Failure to include the supply price lists and manufacturer's guaranteed yields with your bid shall automatically disqualify the bid. NOTE: In the event of a variance between supply prices listed on the bid sheet and the supply price list submitted with the bid, the supply price list prices shall prevail, and the bidder's cost per copy will be adjusted accordingly. NOTE: All cost formulas will be verified by the Division of Purchasing and errors in extension will be corrected. In the event incorrect supply costs volumes are used by a bidder, the Division of Purchasing will adjust these costs to the median volume range. The above quoted portion of the ITB makes it absolutely clear that each vendor had to submit two supply price lists: the supply price list set forth on page 13 and a separate supply price list, reflecting quantity discounts which was to be used to "substantiate that correct price volumes were used." Further, it was specifically stated that the failure to include both supply price lists with the bid would result in the bid being automatically disqualified. The page 13 supply price list consists of a list of various supplies and two columns for the bidder to complete entitled "Net Delivered Price (per carton)" and "Manufacturer's Guaranteed Yield". Page 13 was included in the ITB to cure a problem the Department had in the 1983-84 contract year with the manufacturer's guaranteed yield. A note at the bottom of page 13 reminds the bidder that a separate supply price list must be submitted with the bid. It states: NOTE: Bidders must submit their quantity discount prices for supplies on a separate sheet for verification and inclusion in the contract should the State elect to award supplies. The separate supply price list reflecting quantity discounts was required to verify the prices submitted by the bidder on pages 13 and 14 and to prevent the practice of low-balling". "Low-balling" occurs when a bidder uses a large quantity supply cost to determine the cost per copy on a low volume machine. This results in an artificially low cost per copy and gives the "low- balling" bidder an advantage over other bidders who use the correct supply price based on the median volume of the machine being bid. To verify that the proper cost per copy is submitted the prices on the separate supply price list are compared to the prices on the bid sheet. If there is a conflict, the prices on the separate supply price list prevail, and the prices on the bid sheet and on page 13 are adjusted to conform to the prices on the separate supply sheet. Prior to the 1984 Invitation to Bid Savin historically offered the state volume discount pricing for supplies. However, for the 1984-85 Invitation to Bid Savin decided to offer set pricing for supplies rather than volume discount pricing. Under set pricing the price of the supply item remains the same regardless of the quantity purchased. By offering a set price for supplies, at the lowest published discount pricing level offered to the Federal government, Savin felt it would gain a competitive advantage in Florida and other states that had competitive bidding. In states where competitive bidding was not used Savin did not offer set pricing but used published quantity discount pricing. In response to the 1984 Invitation to Bid, Savin completed the Supply Price List on page 13 and the bid sheet on page 14 for each machine bid. However, Savin did not submit the separate supply price list for each bid as required by the note at the bottom of page 13 and the underlined portion of the special conditions relating to supply cost. Because the separate supply price lists were not submitted with the bids, the Department determined that Savin's bids were unresponsive. The Department also disqualified three or four other vendors, including Royal, Panasonic, and Southern Copy Products, because they did not submit the separate supply price lists. Savin did not submit the separate supply price list because it interpreted the terms and conditions of the ITB as requiring a separate supply price list only when quantity discount pricing was being offered. Because Savin was offering set pricing, it did not consider that the separate supply price list was necessary. However, the only way the Department could determine whether a vendor was offering set pricing or quantity discount pricing was by referring to the separate supply price list. Several other vendors that offered set pricing including Canon, Mita Copy Star America, Pitney Bowes, Monroe and A. B. Dick, submitted separate supply price lists with their bids which indicated that set pricing was being offered. The separate supply price list not only indicated whether quantity discount pricing or set pricing was being offered, as stated above, it was used by the Department to verify the prices submitted on the bid sheets and on page 13. In one case where the bidder offered set pricing, the supply prices for toner and developer listed on the bid sheets and on page 13 differed from the prices on the separate supply price list, and the prices on the bid sheets and page 13 were adjusted to conform with the prices on the separate supply price list. Therefore, the inclusion of the separate supply price list was not necessary only when discount pricing was offered, it was necessary when set pricing was offered. The separate supply price list established that set pricing was being offered; it established the price at which the bidder must sell the supplies; and it was used to verify the prices on the bid sheet and page 13. /5 Therefore, the omission of the separate supply price list from the response to the ITB cannot be considered a minor irregularity which may be waived. Although a separate supply price list is required by the ITB, the list does not have to follow any particular format. The separate list sufficiently indicates that set pricing is being offered if only one price is quoted for a given supply. If varying prices are offered for a given supply, based on the amount ordered, then quantity discount pricing is being offered. Many of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner have been rejected in whole or in part. The majority have been rejected by way of making contrary findings of fact as set forth above. Others have not been addressed in the findings of fact because they are conclusions of law or argument on the issue. However, other proposed findings are rejected for the reasons stated in the subparagraphs below: Paragraphs 17 and 18 are rejected as irrelevant, immaterial and not supported by competent substantial evidence. When Mr. Hittinger was asked whether he assumed that Savin was offering quantity discount pricing, he answered "I didn't assume. I didn't make any assumptions." (T-266). Mrs. Hayes stated: "I am afraid on a bid situation, we can't assume what their pricing would have been if they had submitted it." (T-245) Mr. Nee did indicate that the disqualification of Savin did not make any sense, but explained that statement by stating: "The phrase that didn't make any sense was talking about Savin's failure to submit a quantity discount price list... Because Savin had always done it in the past, and they -- they never left -- if we asked them to cross every T, they crossed every T and it didn't make any sense that something apparently looked to be omitted". Paragraph 15 is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. The evidence indicates that the primary purpose of page 13 was not to establish the price at which vendors would be obligated to sell their supplies, but was included in the ITB for the submission of manufacturer's guaranteed yields (T-144, T-146; T-158-16O, T-166-167, T-242). Further, the witnesses who testified that the vendor would be bound by the prices on page 13 all qualified their answers. In response to the question of whether the bidder would be bound by the prices on page 13, Mrs. Hayes responded, "...if he did submit a substantiating document that he is offering a set price, and that set price agrees with the price that is on page 13, yes." (T-242); Mr. Hittinger responded: "If he receives an award, yes"; "If he had a responsive bid" (T- 264); and "No, in itself it does not. It would have to have a supporting verification sheet to complete that offer." (T-268); Mr. Barker responded, "If they are correct," (T-163). Virtually all the witnesses testified that it was the separate supply price list that established the prices by which the vendors would be bound. Paragraph B is rejected as irrelevant, however, the evidence supports a finding that some state agencies utilize volume discounts on copier supplies and some state agencies do not purchase in sufficient quantities to utilize volume discounts.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Savin's bids be disqualified. DONE AND ENTERED this of 7th June 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1985.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Michael Crudele, should be disciplined for alleged violations of the statutes and rules governing the conduct of insurance agents.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Michael Crudele, is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in Florida as a life insurance agent and as a life and health insurance agent. The Respondent was the agent-of-record on two American Life and Casualty Insurance Company (American Life) annuities purchased by Mary Clem, one in the face amount of $30,000 dated October 28, 1992, and the other in the face amount of $20,000 dated December 28, 1992. Clem was 84 years old at the time and a widow. The annuities represented more than 80 percent of her life savings. The Respondent became agent-of-record on these annuities at the request of Charles Perks, a good friend and former fellow Metropolitan Life agent. Clem had been an insurance customer of Perks since approximately 1985. When Clem complained to Perks that "the bottom fell out of interest" on her certificates of deposit, he suggested the American Life annuities as a safe alternative that paid higher interest. But Perks was not an authorized agent for American Life, so he asked the Respondent to participate in the sales and split the commissions. In 1992, the Respondent became involved in the Zuma Engineering Co., Inc., a startup tire recycling venture. After being introduced to Zuma, the Respondent became very enthusiastic about its prospects. He invested $30,000 in Zuma, received stock in return for his investment, and became a thirty percent owner. He also became involved in all aspects of the startup business, from promoting the business to the public, to raising capital from and working with private investors, to cleaning up Zuma's recycling facility. He understood that he was a corporate director, but corporate filings with the Secretary of State indicate that he was a vice-president from October 27, 1993, until March 20, 1994. The Respondent not only solicited investors himself, he participated in recruiting a sales force. As part of this effort, he recruited his friend Charles Perks. In late 1993 and early 1994, Perks and the Respondent approached Mary Clem to solicit her investment in Zuma. It is not clear from the evidence how the solicitation of Mary Clem proceeded. It is believed that Clem may have initially contacted Perks around the time of the anniversary date of the $30,000 annuity to complain that she had been notified of a drop in the interest rate paid by the annuity. Mary Clem received a guaranteed 5.75 percent interest, plus a one percent interest "bonus" for a total of 6.75 percent interest during the first year of her two American Life annuities. The "bonus" interest automatically terminated at the end of the first year. In addition, the evidence was that the standard interest guarantee decreased to five percent starting with the second year. It is not clear when Clem received notice of the decrease in the interest guarantee or whether she received notice from American Life as to the elimination of the interest "bonus," but it is found that by December 2, 1993, Clem knew the interest rate on her $30,000 annuity was being decreased to five percent for the second year of the annuity. It is possible that she also knew by then that the interest on her $20,000 annuity was being decreased to five percent as well. Perks saw Mary Clem's dissatisfaction with the American Life annuities as an opportunity to sell Zuma promissory notes to her. On or about December 2, 1993, Charles Perks approached Mary Clem and sold her a $10,000 promissory note issued by Zuma. On its face, the promissory note was dated December 3, 1993, and paid twelve percent interest, with a single balloon payment of principal and interest due on June 3, 1995. The evidence was that the Respondent did not participate in this transaction on December 2, 1993. Mary Clem does not recall, and both Perks and the Respondent testified that the Respondent was not present. The Respondent testified that he was not even aware of this $10,000 Zuma note until the Department's Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint on or about July, 1996, but this testimony is rejected as not being credible. It is found that the Respondent knew about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 promissory note either on December 2, 1993, or soon thereafter. It is found that by December 2, 1993, or shortly thereafter, Clem complained to both Perks and the Respondent about the interest on her annuities. It is found that all three of them discussed Zuma promissory notes as an alternative investment. Contrary to the Respondent's testimony, it is found that, if he did not already know about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note by then, the Respondent would have learned of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note during these discussions. It also is found that, based on those discussions, Clem decided to surrender her $20,000 annuity and use the money to buy Zuma promissory notes. It is found that Perks and the Respondent helped Clem with the surrender of her $20,000 annuity. It also is found, contrary to the Respondent's testimony, that Perks and the Respondent assisted in arranging for Clem to be able to purchase a Zuma promissory note in the face amount of $20,000 for the net cash surrender value of the $20,000 annuity, after deduction of premium tax and surrender penalty. When American Life was notified of Clem's desire to surrender the $20,000 annuity, the company contacted the Respondent and asked him to "conserve" the annuity, i.e., dissuade Clem from surrendering it. It is found that, if he did not already know about it by then, the Respondent would have learned of Clem's intentions to buy Zuma promissory notes when he contacted her on behalf of American Life to comply with American Life's request that he attempt to conserve the annuity. It also is found that, if he did not already know about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note, he would have learned of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note at this time. By letter dated January 24, 1994, American Life responded to Clem's request to surrender her $20,000 annuity. American Life's letter advised Clem that she was entitled to principal and $69.67 in interest, less premium tax in the amount of $213.69 and surrender charges in the amount of $1,625.65, for a net of $18,230.33. A check for the net amount was enclosed. A copy of American Life's January 24, 1994, letter was sent to the Respondent as the agent-of-record. On or about February 1, 1994, Perks and the Respondent went to Clem's home to complete the purchase of a $20,000 Zuma promissory note. The Respondent testified that, since all of the arrangements had been made in advance, the Respondent's role in the transaction was solely as "corporate director and verifier" on behalf of Zuma; however, the Respondent also would receive $900 of the $2,000 commission paid by Zuma on the transaction. Meanwhile, his additional role as American Life's agent required him to attempt to "conserve" the annuity policy. At one point, the Respondent testified that, as "corporate director and verifier," he inquired into Clem's assets (presumably to ascertain if the investment was appropriate for her). But he also testified that he assumed her assets were unchanged from 1992, raising a question as to whether the Respondent undertook any inquiry into Clem's assets on February 1, 1994, at all. At another point, the Respondent testified that he understood Mary Clem to have $200,000 in assets. See Department Exhibit 6. But, if so, those assets consisted of her home, the annuities and the $10,000 Zuma promissory note. It is found that the Respondent had no reason to believe she had any other assets. The Respondent also testified that he did not determine from his alleged inquiry into Clem's assets, and did not know, that Clem already had purchased a $10,000 Zuma promissory note. As previously found, it is considered incredible that the Respondent did not already know by February 1, 1994, that Clem had purchased the $10,000 Zuma promissory note; it is all the more incredible that he would not have learned of it from a diligent inquiry into Clem's assets for purposes of determining the appropriateness of the $20,000 Zuma investment. Mary Clem testified that the Respondent and Perks touted the safety of the Zuma investment as well as the higher interest it paid. The Respondent testified that, although acting in the conflicting roles described in the preceding finding, he discussed the differences between the two investments, including the risk of the Zuma investment. The Respondent testified that he read to Mary Clem from a written disclosure statement that defined Zuma's promissory notes as being a "risk investment," but no written disclosure statement was introduced in evidence. In any event, the "verification" was a mere formality; as the Respondent knew full well, Clem already had decided to buy the promissory note. Clem wrote a personal check in the amount of $18,230, and Perks and the Respondent gave her Zuma's $20,000 promissory note bearing twelve percent interest. The note was erroneously dated February 1, 1993, and erroneously stated on its face that the single balloon payment of principal and interest was due on February 1, 1995. The note was supposed to have a 24- month term from February 1, 1994, to February 1, 1996. (This discrepancy would lead to problems later. See Findings 32-33, infra.) In view of the conflict of interest inherent in the Respondent's multiple roles in the transaction, it is found that the Respondent did not make a good faith inquiry into appropriateness of the Zuma investment for Mary Clem and did not fully disclose the risk associated with it, as compared to the American Life annuity. If the Respondent disclosed the risk, it is found that he did not do so fully and clearly, again probably due to the conflict of interest inherent in his multiple roles. Neither Mary Clem nor her late husband had ever invested in any stocks, mutual funds or even bonds. Before Mary Clem invested in the American Life annuities, she and her late husband always invested in certificates of deposit. While it is true that Clem wanted higher interest than she was getting on her annuities, she also wanted safety and security. It is found that, if the Respondent had fully and completely disclosed the risk of investing in Zuma promissory notes, Mary Clem would not have invested in them. Mary Clem also surrendered her $30,000 American Life annuity and used the money she received to buy another Zuma promissory note. The Respondent claimed not to have known anything about the third Zuma note, and the Department was not able to prove that he did. It is not clear exactly when Clem decided to surrender her $30,000 annuity and buy a third Zuma note. It was before March 3, 1994, the date of the American Life letter responding to Clem's request to surrender her $30,000 annuity. American Life's letter advised Clem that she was entitled to principal and $16.04 in interest, less premium tax in the amount of $324.71 and surrender charges in the amount of $2,474.92, for a net of $27,216.41. A check for the net amount was enclosed. As with Clem's request to surrender her $20,000 annuity, American Life contacted the Respondent and asked him to try to "conserve" the annuity. The Respondent also received a copy of American Life's March 3, 1994, letter as the agent-of- record. The Respondent admitted that he telephoned Clem on or about February 28, 1994, to try to conserve the annuity but that Clem was adamant. He claimed that Clem did not tell him what she intended to do with the money and that he did not ask. The meeting at which Clem bought the third Zuma promissory note took place on March 10, 1994. Mary Clem thought the Respondent was there but could not swear to it. Perks also testified that he thought the Respondent was there. The Respondent testified that he definitely was not there and did not know the transaction took place. By that time of the meeting on March 10, 1994, the Respondent had become suspicious and distrustful of Zuma's principals. They had diluted his thirty percent share of the company to a mere 0.3 percent. In addition, the Respondent did not think that the principals were following the business plan they had "sold" the Respondent, and which the Respondent in turn had "sold" to private investors, including Mary Clem. By early March 1994, the Respondent began to take steps to attempt to protect the investors in Zuma, including himself, and force Zuma to follow its business plan. Eventually, he emptied Zuma's accounts and placed the funds in the trust account of the lawyers he hired to sue Zuma and its principals to enjoin them to follow the business plan. The court ruled against the Respondent and required him to return the money to Zuma. The Respondent paid his lawyers' fees out of his own pocket. Based on the timing of events, it seems probable that the Respondent did not meet with Perks and Clem on March 10, 1994. By that time, he was becoming deeply involved in his dispute with Zuma and its principals. It is less clear that the Respondent was completely ignorant of Clem's intention to use the money from the surrender of the $30,000 American Life annuity to buy a third Zuma note, but he may well have lost track of Mary Clem and her intentions in the midst of his dispute with Zuma and its principals. It had been arranged before the March 10, 1994, meeting for Clem to be able to purchase a Zuma promissory note in the face amount of $30,000 for the net cash surrender value of the $30,000 annuity, after deduction of premium tax and surrender penalty. The Respondent denied participating in making these arrangements or having any knowledge of them. A similar arrangement already had been made for the $20,000 annuity and Zuma note, and it is conceivable that Perks did not require the Respondent's participation to arrange it for the $30,000 annuity and Zuma note. It is found that the evidence did not prove the Respondent's participation. On March 10, 1994, Clem wrote a personal check in the amount of $27,2126.41, and received Zuma's $30,000 promissory note dated March 10, 1994. On its face, the note paid twelve percent interest, with quarterly payments of $900 interest and the principal payable on March 10, 1996. The Respondent contacted Mary Clem in June or July, 1994, to inquire about her Zuma investment. Clem told him everything was fine. In December 1994, the notes were revised to show Mary Clem's daughter as a beneficiary on the notes in the event of Clem's death. The revised $20,000 note preserved the erroneous issuance and due dates. See Finding 21, supra. The $900 interest payment due on the $30,000 Zuma note on March 1995, was seriously past due. In addition, no payments were made on the $20,000 note. On April 1, 1995, the $20,000 note was renewed upon payment of $6,200 interest and penalties. Under the renewal note, monthly interest payments of $200 were due, and a balloon payment of principal and remaining interest was due on September 1, 1995. By mid-1995, Zuma was in default again, and Clem received no payments after August 8, 1995. Zuma paid Clem a total of just $23,400 on the three promissory notes. The Respondent conceded that there was a high risk of losing one's entire investment in Zuma and that someone investing in Zuma had to be prepared to lose the entire investment. He also conceded that Mary Clem should not have invested the bulk of her life savings in Zuma. He also conceded that it would have been significant to know, and he should have wanted to know, the extent of Clem's investment in Zuma before increasing her investment in Zuma.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Michael Crudele, guilty of violating Sections 626.611(7), 626.621(3), and 626.621(6), Florida Statutes (1993); and (2) suspending his license and eligibility for licensure as a life insurance agent and as a life and health insurance agent for six months. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1998.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of a violation of bail bondsmen disciplinary statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bondsman. He operates Freedom Bail Bonds in Orlando, Florida. On May 28, 1988, law enforcement officers of the Orange County Sheriff's Office arrested John P. Moody and placed him in the Orange County jail. Mr. Moody had never previously been arrested. After he was arrested, Mr. Moody contactedRespondent about obtaining a bail bond in order to get out of jail. Respondent agreed to come to the jail and interview Mr. Moody to determine if Freedom Bail Bonds could provide him a bond. When Respondent arrived at the jail on the evening of May 28, he was informed by an officer of the three charges that were pending against Mr. Moody. The bond was $1000 per charge, and the premium was 10% of the bond. Respondent met with Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had any assets to secure the bond. Mr. Moody explained that he had no assets such as a car, cash, or cash equivalent. However, he said that he owned jointly with his mother some land in Orange County. At the conclusion of the interview, Respondent had decided to write the bond. Respondent then learned from the booking officer that another charge had been added. Following a brief conversation between Respondent and Mr. Moody concerning the new charge, Respondent learned from the booking officer that a fifth charge had been added. After another conversation with Mr. Moody, Respondent learned in this manner that a sixth, and final, charge had been added. In all, Mr. Moody was charged with one count of failing to return a hired automobile and five counts of fraudulent bank deposits. Each charge carried a $1000 bond, so Mr. Moody now required a total bond of $6000, which in turn required a total premium of $600. Due to the increased amount of the bond, Respondent informed Mr. Moody that he would have to secure the bond with a mortgage on the property jointly held with his mother. Mr. Moody agreed, but asked Respondent not to contact Mr. Moody's mother immediately. It was the middle of the night, and Mr. Moody's mother is an invalid. Respondent agreed to allow Mr. Moody to contact his mother later and obtain her signature on a mortgage. Because Mr. Moody lacked the funds, a friend, Marion Reed Johnson, agreed to pay the premium. Knowing that Mr. Moody would not be able to obtain that evening his mother's signature to a mortgage, Respondent insisted on some interim security and agreed to accept six $1000 promissory notes from Mr. Johnson. These notes were payable on demand, but, according to their terms, became void if Mr. Moody appeared in court when ordered to do so and discharged all of the obligations of the bail bond. Respondent gave Mr. Johnson receipts for the $600 premium and six $1000 notes as soon as Respondent received these items. At the same time, also on the evening of May 28, Respondent completed a bail bond application and indemnity form, on which Mr. Moody provided certain background information. Mr. Moody and Mr. Johnson also signed indemnifications in favor of the surety. The application form states that the surety: shall have control and jurisdiction over the principal during the term for which the bond is executed and shall have the right to apprehend, arrest and surrender the principal to the proper officials at any time as provided by law. The application form also provides: In the event surrender of principal is made prior to the time set for principal's appearances, and for reason other than as enumerated below is paragraph 3, then principal shall be entitled to a refund of the bond premium. It is understood and agreed that the happening of any one of the following events shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations to the Surety hereunder, and the Surety shall have the right to forthwith apprehend, arrest and surrender principal, and principal shall have no right to any refund of premium whatsoever. Said events which shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations hereunder are: If principal shall depart the jurisdiction of the court without the written consent of the court and the Surety or its Agent. * * * If principal shall commit any act which shall constitute reasonable evidence of principal's intention to cause a forfeiture of said bond. * * * The application and indemnities were signed. Mr. Johnson paid the $600 premium and executed and delivered the six $1000 demand notes. Respondent then caused Freedom Bail Bond to issue the bond. Mr. Moody was released from the jail during the evening of his arrest (actually during the predawn hours of May 29). May 28 was a Saturday. The following Monday, Respondent gave one of his employees a copy of the warranty deed from Mr. Moody's mother to herself and Mr. Moody. Mr. Moody hadgiven a copy of the deed to Respondent during their initial interview in order to allow Respondent to prepare the mortgage that Mr. Moody had agreed to provide. Respondent instructed the employee to use the legal description from the warranty deed to prepare a mortgage and send it to Mr. Moody for execution by his mother and him. The employee did as instructed and promptly mailed the mortgage to Mr. Moody with instructions for execution, witnessing, and notarization. After about a week, Respondent asked the employee if she had received the executed mortgage. She replied that she had not and proceeded to telephone Mr. Moody. When she asked him about the mortgage, Mr. Moody did not express any unwillingness to sign it, but said that he had not received it. Confirming the mailing address, the employee agreed to send him another mortgage and did so on June 6, 1988. Several times after mailing the second mortgage, the employee contacted Mr. Moody and discussed the need to get the document fully executed and delivered to Freedom Bail Bonds. On one occasion, Mr. Moody agreed to return the executed mortgage on June 22. But on the last of these conversations, Mr. Moody informed the employee, for the first time, that he had no intention of providing the mortgage. The employee told Respondent what Mr. Moody had said and returned the file to Respondent for further action. At about the same time that Respondent's officehad sent the mortgage to Mr. Moody the second time, Mr. Moody's sister telephoned Respondent. Estranged from her brother, she was concerned that Mr. Moody, whom she believed had misused funds of their invalid mother in the past, might try to obtain their mother's signature on a mortgage to secure a bond in order to get out of jail. Mr. Moody's sister informed Respondent that her brother was not authorized to obtain their mother's signature on the mortgage. She said that her brother was not to be trusted, had improperly removed money from their mother's trust in the past, and had defaulted on at least one debt so as to require the creditor to lien the jointly held property in order to be repaid. At about the same time, a different employee of Respondent received an anonymous telephone tip that Mr. Moody was about to depart, or had already departed, on a trip to Alabama with another man. The informant described what turned out to be a vehicle owned by Mr. Johnson, with whom Mr. Moody had been living since his release from jail on May 29. Several attempts by Respondent's employees to reach Mr. Moody over the next two to four days were unsuccessful. In fact, Mr. Moody had gone to Alabama, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Orange County Circuit Court. On July 18, 1988, one of Respondent's employees contacted the Clerk of Court's office and learned that Mr. Moody had not qualified for the services of a Public Defender. In addition, the employee had been notified on or about July 6, byreceipt of a notice of hearing on a Determination of Counsel, that Mr. Moody had not been diligent in obtaining counsel. After determining that other Determination of Counsel hearings had been and were being set by the Court, the employee reasonably concluded that Mr. Moody was not diligently trying to obtain counsel or independently resolve the pending criminal matters. The employee communicated this information to Respondent on July 18. Respondent contacted Mr. Moody by telephone on July 18 and asked when he was going to supply the executed mortgage. Mr. Moody responded that he had determined that Respondent did not need the additional security and was not going to provide it. At this point, Respondent concluded that it was likely that Mr. Moody had in fact left the state without permission. Respondent also concluded that Mr. Moody no longer represented an acceptable risk. Respondent thus directed another employee to join him to arrest Mr. Moody and surrender him to the Orange County Sheriff's Office. Respondent and his employee immediately visited Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had left the state. Mr. Moody admitted doing so. Respondent and the employee then arrested Mr. Moody and returned him to jail. Mr. Moody remained in jail for 63 days until he pleaded guilty to the charges. He was sentenced to the time served, placed on probation for four years, and required to makerestitution, which he has done so far in accordance with the schedule. Following his release from jail, Mr. Moody returned to live with Mr. Johnson and gradually repaid him the $600 that he owed him. Although Mr. Moody demanded return of the $600, he never offered any proof of payment to Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson never demanded the return of the money. Respondent has retained the $600 premium. The six $1000 notes were automatically voided when Mr. Moody was arrested on July 18.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399 (904) 488 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney David D. Hershel Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney Alan B. Robinson 56 East Pine Street Orlando, FL 32801
