The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to certification as a disadvantaged business enterprise.
Findings Of Fact ALS is a Florida corporation which filed an application for DBE certification on or about August 21, 1996. On December 13, 1996, the Department issued the notice of intent to deny Petitioner’s application. ALS is owned by Rachel and Bobby Lines. Mr. Lines owns forty percent of the company, his wife the remaining sixty. Mrs. Lines serves as president for the corporation. ALS is in the business of providing seeding and grassing services for construction contracts. Mr. and Mrs. Lines have been in this business since the 1970s. Mrs. Lines has a bachelor’s degree in business and has always had an active role in the family business. In 1979 and 1980 Mrs. Lines borrowed $10,000 and invested the money in ALS. These loans were secured by assets which did not belong to Mr. Lines. Unlike his wife, Mr. Lines was not personally liable for the loans. Similarly, in 1981 and 1983 Mrs. Lines obtained loans for which she was personally responsible and used the funds to benefit ALS. All loans secured by Mrs. Lines were repaid by Petitioner. During the years the loans were secured, Mr. Lines did not borrow monies, for which he was personally responsible, to fund ALS business activities. In short, Mr. Lines made no capital contribution to the business commensurate with the funding Mrs. Lines put into the business. When the Petitioner was incorporated in 1980, one hundred percent of the corporate stock was placed in Mr. Lines’ name. Although Mrs. Lines agreed to this arrangement, it did not truly reflect the partnership that she and her husband enjoyed regarding the business. Moreover, the issuance of the stock in her husband’s name did not accurately consider and compensate her for the loans for which she personally would have been liable had the company not repaid the sums she secured in its behalf. Mrs. Lines has worked full-time for the Petitioner since 1986. It is undisputed that she is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the company. In 1991, Mr. Lines conveyed sixty percent of the Petitioner’s stock to his wife. Mrs. Lines became president of ALS at the same time. In 1995, ALS was certified by Palm Beach County, the Palm Beach County Aviation Authority, and the South Florida Water Management District as a minority business enterprise. While it is apparent both Mr. and Mrs. Lines have contributed “sweat equity” to their company, only Mrs. Lines has personally been liable for loans taken out in order to put money into the company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order granting Petitioner’s application for certification as a DBE. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Attn: Ms. Diedre Grubbs, MS #58 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Mary S. Miller Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon-Burns Bldg, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Mary Piccard, Esquire Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. 318 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Patricia Smithwick Valz, is entitled to an award of attorney's fees as a "prevailing small business party" in the underlying administrative proceeding.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment previously imposed against Yzaguirre Enterprises, Inc., was properly applied to Respondent as a successor-in-interest to Yzaguirre Enterprises, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner (also referred to herein as the "Department") is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, monitoring businesses within the state to ensure that such businesses are providing the requisite workers' compensation insurance coverage for all employees. The Department's headquarters are located in Tallahassee, Florida, but its investigators are spread throughout the state in order to more effectively monitor businesses. The Department is authorized to impose penalties against any businesses failing to maintain the proper insurance coverage for its employees. Workers' compensation coverage is required if a business entity has one or more employees and is engaged in the construction industry in Florida. Workers' compensation coverage may be secured via three non-mutually exclusive methods: 1) the purchase of a workers' compensation insurance policy; 2) arranging for the payment of wages and workers' compensation coverage through an employee leasing company; or 3) applying for and receiving a certificate of exemption from workers' compensation coverage, if certain statutorily-mandated criteria are met. Respondent is a sole proprietorship and is a duly- certified general contractor (License No. CGC1505393) in the State of Florida. Respondent was engaged in the work of carpentry on August 4, 2009. Carpentry has a construction industry classification code of 5654. Respondent's sole proprietorship is a successor-in- interest to a corporation known as Yzaguirre Enterprises, Inc. (YEI). Tammy Yzaguirre was the vice-president and a director of YEI. That corporation was administratively dissolved on September 25, 2009, for failure to file its annual report. YEI was primarily engaged in the business of carpentry. On October 13, 2008, the Department conducted an investigation of a job site in Immokalee, Florida, where YEI was engaged in work. During its investigation, the Department ascertained that several employees of YEI were not covered by a valid workers' compensation insurance policy, nor were those workers exempt from coverage. A Stop-Work Order was issued by the Department against YEI and posted on the work site. The Stop-Work Order, along with an Order of Penalty Assessment, was also given to Esequiel Yzaguirre (by hand- delivery) on November 12, 2008. Meanwhile, an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was issued by the Department and sent to Respondent via certified mail. The Amended Order imposed a penalty in the amount of one hundred fifty-one thousand, seven hundred fifty-eight dollars and forty-six cents ($151,758.46). Neither the Stop-Work Order, nor the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, was timely challenged by YEI. While Respondent did engage in some discussions and exchange of documents with the Department concerning the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, she did not avail herself of the appeal rights stated in the Order. Respondent did not enter into a settlement agreement or payment plan with the Department, because she did not have any money to make payments. As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, the Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment had not been released. Instead of paying the amount set forth in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, Respondent formed a sole proprietorship in her name, obtained the necessary licenses and certifications to operate, and began to engage in the work of general construction again. Prior to commencing this work, Respondent obtained a workers' compensation insurance policy in an effort to satisfy all state requirements. Respondent did not intentionally attempt to break or circumvent any laws by the commencement of her new business. Respondent did not know that starting a new business in her name would be deemed improper by the Department. On August 4, 2009, the Department was engaged in a "sweep" in Immokalee, Florida. A sweep entails a large number of investigators working together in one place at one time for the purpose of determining whether employers in the area were complying with workers' compensation insurance requirements. During its sweep, a Department investigator noticed a YEI truck parked at a job site. The investigator took action to determine who was working out of the truck and obtained information about Respondent, i.e., that Respondent's new sole proprietorship may be engaged in on-going work at that site. Respondent argues that the truck was not being used by the new sole proprietorship. Rather, the truck had been loaned to some individuals who were working on their own or with other employers. Thus, claims Respondent, the Department should not be allowed to take any action against the sole proprietorship. There is no valid basis for Respondent's position. Upon further investigation, the Department ascertained that Respondent was operating under an entity that was deemed a successor-in-interest to YEI. That being the case, the Department issued its Order, which was served via hand-delivery to Respondent on August 5, 2009. At final hearing, Respondent attempted to object to the Department's findings relating to the initial Stop-Work Order from 2008. However, inasmuch as that Stop-Work Order was never formally challenged and became final by operation of law, the time for objections to it has passed. Thus, Respondent's testimony concerning whether or not all the workers listed in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment were actually YEI's employees was not accepted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, affirming the Order Applying Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Successor Corporation or Business Entity. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2010.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner for signing an affidavit allegedly adverse to Respondent and for testifying on behalf of another employee in a proceeding filed under Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer as defined in the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent employed Petitioner at Respondent's place of business located in Tallahassee, Florida. On March 29, 1990, Petitioner and Respondent's representative signed an Employment Agreement in which Petitioner agreed, inter alia, that during his employment, he would refrain from: (1) performing services for any person, during business hours, or at any other time, when said services were not authorized by Respondent; (2) soliciting work for or accepting any business from any customer of the company on behalf himself or for any others. On March 30, 1990, Petitioner and Respondent's representative signed a Sales Employee Compensation Plan in which Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner a starting salary of $1,200 per month as a guarantee against commission on sales for the first three months. Thereafter, Respondent's salary of $1,200 per month was to be a draw against commission on sales. Petitioner had to sell a minimum of $8,000 per month to earn his draw. Pursuant to the Sales Employee Compensation Plan, Petitioner earned a percent of sales, ranging from 10 percent to 20 percent, depending on the type of service Petitioner sold. He received commissions after the work was completed and the customer paid for the service. For example, Petitioner earned 15 percent of the annualized value of all pest control work, termite work, or special onetime service that he sold. He earned 20 percent of the initial month's service charge on all annual pest control service that he sold provided that he performed the start-up. Respondent paid Petitioner 20 percent of the total value of all real estate inspections (certification or clearance letter) that Petitioner performed. Under the Sales Employee Compensation Plan, Petitioner elected to receive 2.5 percent of monthly net commissionable sales, or $150, whichever was greater, as a gasoline allowance and to furnish his own transportation. However, Respondent's former branch manager gave Petitioner a gasoline credit card and told Petitioner to put the gasoline allowance in his pocket. The record indicates that the former branch manager acted beyond the scope of his authority in this regard. Upon employment, Respondent's former branch manager gave Petitioner a key to the office. Petitioner also received a pest control kit with which to perform the initial pest control treatment after selling a service contract. Respondent gave Petitioner a voice-pager so that he could stay in touch with the office and respond quickly to "office" leads. No other employee had the benefit of a voice-pager. In May of 1990, Petitioner successfully completed a training course in pest control. That September, he completed a course in termite control. On or about January 14, 1991, Petitioner became qualified to prepare wood infestation reports. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was allowed to sell Respondent's services in north Florida and south Georgia. There were two kinds of sales leads. Petitioner could develop his own "creative" leads and sell anywhere within the sales territory of the Tallahassee branch office. Respondent's office manager logged all incoming "phone" or "office" leads and distributed them to the salesmen based on a geographic division of the sales territory. Petitioner lived in south Georgia; therefore, the office manager gave him all "office" leads originating in Georgia and on the east side of Tallahassee. Contrary to Petitioner's testimony, neither the office manager nor any other supervisor ever discriminated against Petitioner by withholding leads from him or by taking the best leads for themselves or another salesman. On or about September 16, 1991, Petitioner sold a customer a termite protection contract instead of a termite service contract on a very expensive home without Respondent's approval. This incident resulted in the preparation of a written Disciplinary Action Report (DAR) which states that Petitioner would be terminated if he could not follow Respondent's policy governing sales of termite protection and service contracts. Respondent's testimony that he signed this DAR under the threat of violence not credible. On February 26, 1992, Petitioner signed an affidavit relating to the employment relationship between Norm Arrington and Respondent. Mr. Arrington had been a salesman for Respondent and Petitioner's coworker. On March 9, 1992, Petitioner performed a wood-destroying organism inspection on residential property in Tallahassee, Florida. Petitioner issued a Form 1145 (October '89) Wood Destroying Organisms Inspection Report without identifying visible and accessible evidence of and damage caused by subterranean termites on the exterior of the structure. The Florida Department of Agriculture fined Petitioner $300 dollars for failing to report evidence of termite damage. Respondent paid this fine on Petitioner's behalf. Petitioner failed to report to work on September 12, 1992, for a sales meeting. He claimed he had an emergency but did not call in to explain his absence. Respondent wrote a DAR dated September 14, 1992, warning Petitioner that he would be suspended without pay for three days or terminated if he repeated this type of conduct. Petitioner presented contradictory record evidence concerning his reason for missing the sales meeting: (a) family medical emergency; and (b) mechanical problem with vehicle. Until October of 1992, Petitioner was successful in meeting or exceeding his minimum quota of $8,000 in sales revenue on an averaged monthly basis. One month he earned an award for being Respondent's top salesman statewide. However, in November of 1992, Petitioner's monthly sales revenues dropped below an acceptable level for an experienced salesman. Thereafter, Petitioner was in overdraw status, averaging between $3,000 and $4,000 per month in sales. Except for the month of February, 1993, Petitioner never again met his monthly minimum quota. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner's father owned a construction company. Respondent occasionally hired Petitioner's father to perform termite repair work. Respondent always hired outside contractors to do repair work for customers because of the liability involved and to prevent giving the impression that Terminix, Inc. was in the construction business. Petitioner was also trained as a carpenter. Petitioner admits that, during the months of his highest sales, he solicited and received "building" leads from Respondent's customers. As a result of these leads, Petitioner performed carpentry work, such as building cabinets or repairing damaged woodwork, for Respondent's customers. Petitioner's testimony that Respondent authorized this outside employment is not persuasive. In February of 1993, Tim Carey was Respondent's sales manager. He attended an out-of-town divisional sales meeting and returned to Tallahassee with motivational material to share with his staff. In the material was a poster which stated, "If you don't know where you going . . . you'll probably end up someplace else." Mr. Carey gave a copy of the poster to all salesmen including Petitioner sometime before Petitioner gave testimony adverse to Respondent. Petitioner's testimony that Mr. Carey gave the poster to Petitioner alone as a means of retaliation is not persuasive. On March 22, 1993, Petitioner testified by deposition on behalf of Norm Arrington in an unrelated age discrimination case. Around the end of March or the first of April, 1993, Tim Carey became Respondent's sales manager-in-charge. Respondent's Tallahassee branch did not have a branch manager at that time. Mr. Carey was responsible for all operations under the direct supervision of Ralph Potter, Respondent's regional manager. Mr. Carey officially became branch manager before Respondent terminated Petitioner on June 30, 1993. One of Mr. Carey's first acts as sales manager-in-charge was to change the locks to the office and the pesticide storage room. Petitioner signed a statement that he received a key to the office on March 31, 1993. However, Mr. Carey did not reissue an office key to Petitioner or any other sales representatives because they, unlike route technicians, did not work after normal business hours. Petitioner's testimony that his key was taken away as a discriminatory act is not persuasive. The undersigned also rejects Petitioner's testimony that the office was locked during office hours so that he was unable to use the phone. Mr. Carey also took Petitioner's company gasoline credit card because Petitioner was not entitled to use the card and receive a gasoline allowance too. This action was to enforce company policy, and not to retaliate against Petitioner. Soon after Mr. Carey became sales manager-in-charge, he and the office manager began receiving calls from customers wanting to know when Petitioner was going to finish their carpentry work. Sales meetings were interrupted at times by calls on Petitioner's voice-pager with inquiries about unfinished jobs. On one occasion, Petitioner came to the office at noon with paint on his hands which had been clean earlier that morning. On another occasion Mr. Carey could hear saws operating in the background when Petitioner called the office during business hours. Mr. Carey gave Petitioner repeated verbal warnings not to solicit outside employment or perform outside work for Respondent's customers. After each verbal reprimand, Petitioner would promise that he would stop and that it would not happen again. Mr. Carey eventually took Petitioner's voice-pager away and replaced it with a tone beeper like the ones used by other employees. The purpose of this action was to reduce overhead expenses and alleviate problems with Petitioner abusing the privilege of having a voice-pager. Petitioner could no longer receive direct messages relating to his construction business. Petitioner's testimony that Respondent discriminated against him by taking his voice-pager is contrary to more persuasive testimony. In April or May of 1993, Petitioner performed unauthorized work for one of Respondent's customers who sent one check to pay for a termite inspection and for Petitioner's carpentry work. In order to balance the office books, Respondent deposited the customer's check and wrote a separate company check made payable to Petitioner. Respondent again warned Petitioner not to perform unauthorized work for the company's customers. On May 17, 1993, Respondent prepared another DAR reprimanding Petitioner for two incidents. The first involved Petitioner's issuance of a clearance letter for Ms. Fortune's residence even though Petitioner had identified wood rot on the premises. Petitioner claimed he knew Ms. Fortune and issued the clearance letter based on her promise that she would repair the damage. A subsequent inspection revealed that the customer had not made the repairs. The second incident covered by the May 17, 1993, DAR involved one of Respondent's national relocation customers, Prudential Relocation. Petitioner prepared a wood destroying organism report for the customer without inspecting the inside of the structure. Respondent was responsible for repairing wood rot damage on the house. Petitioner violated Respondent's policy regardless of whether he wrote "exterior only" on the report. Neither party signed the May 17, 1993, DAR. However, Mr. Carey discussed both incidents with Petitioner and warned him that he would be suspended or discharged if: (a) Petitioner gave a clearance letter without inspecting the interior of the structure; and (b) Petitioner issued a clearance letter on a structure with water damage. On another occasion, Petitioner informed Mr. Carey that someone had stollen his pest control kit out of the back of his truck. Petitioner filed a police report on the missing pesticide kit. Several days later, a lady, who was not Respondent's customer, reported that Petitioner left the service equipment at her home after using it to treat her residence. Respondent recovered the missing equipment and did not return it to Petitioner. From that time on, a service technician performed Petitioner's initial pesticide treatments. Petitioner's testimony that Respondent took his pest control kit as a retaliatory act is rejected. Petitioner was not allowed to use the service equipment again because: (a) He left registered material in an unsupervised location; (b) He used the equipment to service a non-customer's property; and (c) He could schedule the start-ups for his new customers through the office. Petitioner's testimony that Respondent took the pest control equipment away and deliberately delayed the start-up service or failed to service on Petitioner's new accounts is not persuasive. On June 8, 1993, Ralph Potter and Tim Carey had a conference with Petitioner. The result of the meeting was a DAR signed by Mr. Potter and Mr. Carey. During the conference, the parties discussed: (a) Petitioner's poor performance for the first week of June, 1993, in which he created only $90 in revenues; (b) Petitioner's poor attitude; and (c) Petitioner's work ethic. Mr. Potter advised Petitioner that he would thereafter be expected to produce $2,500 per week in sales. Petitioner was counseled not to make negative comments, not to perform outside jobs on company time, and not to solicit from or do any work for Respondent's customers. The DAR listed suspension without pay or termination as future corrective action, if required. Petitioner refused to sign the June 8, 1993, DAR. Petitioner's attitude created problems as follows: (1) Mr. Carey had to ask Petitioner to leave a sales meeting because of his negative comments; (2) Petitioner disagreed with Mr. Carey over the proper way to complete required daily written sales reports; (3) Mr. Carey had to ask Petitioner to leave the office by 9:00 a.m. for his first appointment of the day; and (4) Petitioner resented not being allowed to answer the office phone even though company policy dictated that only the office manager, sales manager, or branch manager could answer the phone. Petitioner's testimony that Respondent offered him a job which would have reduced his income significantly is rejected as contrary to more persuasive evidence. Likewise, the undersigned rejects Petitioner's testimony that Ralph Potter physically attacked Petitioner in the men's room during an out-of-town meeting. Respondent discharged Petitioner on June 30, 1993. Petitioner's termination was the result of his unsatisfactory job performance and his failure to follow his supervisors' instructions. There is no persuasive competent substantial evidence to indicate that Respondent retaliated against Petitioner because he participated in a discrimination suit on behalf of a co-worker. To the contrary, Petitioner's employment record presents a history of problems with his supervisors. When Tim Carey became sales manager-in-charge, he and Ralph Potter warned Petitioner repeatedly that, regardless of his past working conditions, Petitioner would be expected to follow company policies. Petitioner's refusal to heed their advice and to increase his productivity resulted in job separation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned recommends that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of August, 1995. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Petitioner did not file Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-3 Accepted as modified in Findings of Fact 1-6. 4-5 Accepted as modified in Findings of Fact 9 & 14. Accepted as modified in Findings of Fact 11 & 18. Accepted in Findings of Fact 10, 13, 25, & 30. Accepted in Findings of Fact 12 except the administrative case involved only one incident. Accepted as modified in Findings of Fact 25-27. Accepted in Findings of Fact 10. Accepted in Findings of Fact 9 regarding leads. However, Petitioner never received a new key from Mr. Carey. Accepted in Findings of Fact 28 & 29. 13-14 Accepted but unnecessary to resolution of case. Accepted. See Findings of Fact 11, 33, & 34. Not a finding of fact. More of a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda G. Miklowitz, Esquire Post Office Box 14922 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4922 James M. Nicholas, Esquire Post Office Box 814 Melbourne, Florida 32902 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel 325 John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Curtis Ketchup is black and worked for Standard Container Company at its Tampa, Florida, warehouse from 1968 until his employment was terminated on April 8, 1981. Ketchup was employed as warehouseman and truck driver whose primary duties consisted of loading and unloading trucks and delivering products to Respondent's customers in the area served by the Tampa warehouse. At all times here relevant Ruby Jellico was the manager of Respondent's Tampa operation. She ran both the office and warehouse and supervised two warehousemen and one clerk/secretary. In 1980 business had slowed down in the Tampa Operation and Jellico's function was changed to have her call on customers more than before to solicit additional business. During her absence V. J. Marria, whose title was sales assistant/secretary, took most of the telephone orders and prepared the necessary papers to accomplish the delivery of the product. With a total of only four employees at the Tampa operation, all of these employees sometimes took orders and dealt with customers. Petitioner was the second highest in seniority and pay with the company in Tampa. Although Petitioner contends he was warehouse manager until April 1, 1981, at which time he was demoted, the evidence is clear that Petitioner was never designated warehouse manager; that neither his authority nor his pay was cut on or about April 1, 1951; and whether or not he was, in fact, acting as warehouse manager is irrelevant since no evidence of discrimination in this regard was presented. Petitioner served part-time as a Holiness Pentecostal minister and had discussed with his fellow employees and Jellico his desire to give up his job with Respondent and devote his full time to the ministry. He inquired of Jellico if he could withdraw the funds he had accrued in the company's profit- sharing plan and was told the only way these funds could be withdrawn was by a plan member leaving the company either by dying, retiring, or resigning. Respondent has an employee profit-sharing plan to which employees become members after working with the company for a specified period of time. Contributions to this plan are made by the company and the funds are invested by the manager of the plan. The plan is intended to provide additional benefits to an employee after he retires from the company or to his survivors if he dies before retirement. Petitioner's decision to leave the company if he could withdraw his funds from the profit-sharing plan was communicated to Jellico, who relayed the information that Petitioner wanted to retire and withdraw his funds from the profit-sharing plan to Harry Peyton, the company treasurer, at the home office in Fairfield, New Jersey. Peyton told Jellico that he would have an advance on the funds due Petitioner sent to the Tampa office and that it was necessary for Petitioner to submit his resignation in writing and to agree to endorse back to the company the check he would later receive when the exact amount due him was disbursed at the end of the calendar year. As a further result of these conversations between Jellico and Petitioner, Ken Sessions was employed on April 7, 1981, as Petitioner's replacement. On April 9, 1981, Petitioner talked to Peyton by telephone and Peyton told Petitioner that it was necessary for him to terminate his employment with the company in order to withdraw his funds from the company profit-sharing plan. When the advance on Petitioner's share in the company's profit-sharing plan was received in Tampa on April 14, 1981, Jellico called Petitioner and told him he could come in and pick up the check for $4,834.33. Upon his arrival in the office, Petitioner gave Jellico his resignation letter (Exhibit 7) dated April 8, 1981, the last day worked by Petitioner. Petitioner also signed Exhibit 8 in which he acknowledged discussing the termination of his employment with Respondent as soon as a replacement could be found for him and agreed to repay the amount of the advance at the end of 1981 when the exact amount due him under the profit-sharing plan was determined. In early 1982 an additional check in the amount of some $800 was forwarded to Petitioner to close out all funds due him. Petitioner contends that on April 8, 1981, while lifting a pallet from a shelf above his head he felt a sharp pain in his neck. The following morning, April 9, Petitioner's wife called Jellico to tell her Petitioner had net slept well the night before, was tense, and did not feel well. Jellico suggested he see a doctor. On April 9, 1981, Petitioner went to St. Joseph's Hospital, Tampa, where he was seen by a Dr. Mooney. Notations taken and treatment rendered on this visit are contained in Exhibit 6. Although Petitioner testified he believes he told Dr. Mooney about the pain he experienced while lifting the pallet on April 8, 1981, no mention is made of this in Exhibit (Nor did Petitioner tell any of Respondent's employees of this pain experienced on April The first notice received by Respondent of this alleged incident was a call from a State Worker's Compensation official some months later inquiring why no accident report had been filed. In addition to filing a claim for Worker's Compensation for the injury allegedly occurred on April 8, 1981, petitioner filed suit in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County against Respondent alleging discrimination. This latter action was dismissed before going to trial and Petitioner was also unsuccessful in his Worker's Compensation claim.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner proved that Respondent violated chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2014),1/ by failing to secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment.
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant facts: The Parties Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement in chapter 440 that employers in the state of Florida secure the payment of workers' compensation insurance benefits covering their employees. Perez Concrete is a subcontractor/corporation registered to do business in Florida. Its principal business address is 6632 Willow Street, Mount Dora, Florida. Intervenor, KC Curb, is a contractor/corporation registered to do business in Florida. Its principal business address is 4975 Patch Road, Orlando, Florida. A representative of the FFVA Mutual Insurance Company (FFVA) testified. FFVA is a mutual insurance company in Florida which provides, among other things, workers' compensation insurance coverage. The witness was an underwriting supervisor. In general, workers' compensation policies go through a yearly review and renewal process handled by the underwriter. KC Curb had been a client of FFVA since 2006. Perez Concrete has never been a client of FFVA, and Perez Concrete is not a named insured on the workers' compensation insurance policy held by KC Curb from 2013 through 2015. There have been occasions when KC Curb picks up employees of subcontractors and includes them in its self-audits. Under those circumstances, KC Curb pays the premium for those particular subcontractor employees. If KC Curb pays a premium that includes the payroll for a subcontractor's employee, his or her workers' compensation benefits are covered by the KC Curb workers' compensation policy. FFVA performs an audit each year on all of the workers' compensation policies it writes. The final audit is performed, in part, to determine the final premium due on the account for that year. During a final audit, FFVA reviews any payroll paid to subcontractors. If those subcontractors did not have a certificate of insurance, then FFVA would include the payroll paid to that subcontractor to calculate the final premium due from the general contractor. If FFVA identified that there were certain subcontractor employees during the audit that worked for Perez Concrete, who were doing work on the subcontract with KC Curb, the premium would be calculated based upon those additional Perez Concrete employees. As a result, those Perez Concrete employees would be covered under the KC Curb workers' compensation insurance policy and entitled to benefits if injured on the job. KC Curb's final premium would be based on the final yearly audit including any subcontractor employees of Perez Concrete. The subcontractor employees would be covered for any injuries on the job that might have occurred during the year audited. The premium ultimately charged to the general contractor is based solely on the payroll, and not on named employees. KC Curb also does a monthly self-audit which only includes its payroll. The company makes a monthly premium payment based on what is shown in its monthly audit. If KC Curb picks up or includes an employee of a subcontractor on its monthly self-audit and reports pay going to that person, then that subcontractor employee is covered for workers' compensation benefits. When end-of-the-year audits are performed, the reports provided by KC Curb contains names of its own employees or a description of employees. This report would list the employees of KC Curb, but it would not list the employees of any subcontractors, only the amount of payroll for those subcontractors. The owner of Perez Concrete is Agustin Osorio, who testified. Perez Concrete builds concrete sidewalks, driveways, curbs, and inlets. It also does the framing and finishes the concrete. Perez Concrete had a workers' compensation insurance policy providing benefit to its employees in place from August 2013 through April 2015, with Madison Insurance Company. See, generally, Resp. Exhs. B-D. Perez Concrete's policy was canceled for late payments on April 10, 2015. Apparently, Perez Concrete was late with two payments, and the Madison Insurance Company canceled Perez Concrete's workers' compensation policy. Perez Concrete had two employees, in addition to Osorio, in July 2015, when it was first visited by Petitioner's compliance investigator, Stephanie Scarton. Scarton stopped by while the employees were performing a small sidewalk finished job in Rockledge, Florida, for KC Curb. During this first meeting, Osorio told Scarton that the KC Curb's workers' compensation policy "was covering me." Osorio testified that she responded "everything was all right." Upon questioning by the undersigned, Osorio clarified that the first visit of the investigator was in the middle of July 2015 at a work location in Rockledge, Florida. After discussing his operations and telling the investigator about the KC Curb policy coverage, she left. Osorio testified that Scarton called KC Curb that same day to confirm his comments, and then she told him that everything was "all right." Osorio testified that the same investigator visited again on August 19, 2015. That day, she gave him the Stop-Work Order. Osorio testified that it was during the August 19, 2015, visit that she changed her previous response and said that Perez Concrete was not covered under the KC Curb policy. As the owner, Osorio had a valid exemption for himself from workers' compensation coverage from January 2014 through January 2016. Resp. Exh. E. Osorio had a conversation with "Robin" from KC Curb (date not specified). When he asked her whether Perez Concrete was covered, she told him that his company would be covered under KC Curb's workers' compensation policy. Osorio testified that Perez Concrete pays KC Curb seven percent of the weekly revenue derived from working for KC Curb, in order to be included on KC Curbs workers' compensation policy. Perez Concrete pays an additional one percent to KC Curb to be included on its general liability insurance policy. Perez Concrete had bought its own workers' compensation policy in 2013 and in 2014. Resp. Exhs. B-D. When Perez Concrete's policy was canceled by Madison Insurance Company on April 10, 2015, Osorio contacted KC Curb about the insurance. Osorio understood that by doing so, he had secured the payment of workers' compensation insurance coverage for his employees. When Osorio contacted the KC Curb representatives, he told them that he wanted to continue working with them and asked them about the insurance coverage. Petitioner's compliance investigator, Scarton, testified. She has held that position since approximately April 2013. She conducts random site visits to verify that companies have workers' compensation coverage. She conducts approximately 80 compliance investigations per month. On July 6, 2015, she conducted a random visit at a construction site where concrete work was being performed by Perez Concrete. She spoke with Osorio who told her that he did not have workers' compensation insurance coverage, but that he was covered through another company. In checking her CCAS automated data system, she confirmed that Perez Concrete did not carry its own workers' compensation policy.2/ After speaking with Osorio and getting his explanation, she contacted KC Curb and spoke with Robin Sempier. She was informed that KC Curb paid the workers' compensation coverage for Perez Concrete. Sempier told the investigator that KC Curb was allowed to proceed in that fashion with its subcontractors under an arrangement from a previous compliance case handled by Petitioner.3/ After speaking with Sempier about Perez Concrete's situation, Scarton contacted her supervisor, Robert Serrone. He directed her to refer the case involving Perez Concrete to Petitioner's fraud unit and to let them handle the investigation. Scarton's next involvement was in August 2015, when she was contacted by her supervisor and directed to issue a stop-work order to Perez Concrete. She obtained the Stop-Work Order, and served it on Perez Concrete on August 19, 2015. Petitioner also served Perez Concrete with a business records request. Perez Concrete did not comply with the request, nor did it submit any business records to Petitioner. Upon inquiry by the undersigned, the parties stipulated on the record that the appropriate amount of the penalty would be $11,902.20, should a violation be proven. The investigator asked the KC Curb representative to send her documentation confirming that KC Curb pays the workers' compensation coverage for Perez Concrete. The investigator opined on cross-examination that the employees of Perez Concrete were not covered by KC Curb. Scarton concluded that "in accordance with the investigations that we conduct, Perez Concrete would need to carry the coverage." Tr., p. 139, line 7. She later stated that on July 6, 2015, she could not confirm insurance coverage "one way or another." Tr., p. 140, lines 6 and 13. Professor Joseph W. Little of Gainesville, Florida, was called to testify as an expert on behalf of Perez Concrete and KC Curb. He is currently employed as an adjunct faculty member at the University of Florida, College of Law. He is also Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of Florida, College of Law. He had been employed as a professor at the University of Florida, College of Law, since 1967, teaching workers' compensation law. Little is unquestionably an expert in the field of Workers' Compensation Law. Little also authored the legal hornbook entitled "Workers' Compensation," a publication of the West Publishing Company. Little reviewed the facts of the case by reviewing the documentation provided by counsel who retained him. This included the Stop-Work Order, the petition, an amended petition, motions, and orders issued in the case. He also studied the applicable statutes and administrative rules of Petitioner as well as decisional law that he felt was relevant.4/ Little testified, and the undersigned considered, that he was not aware of any decisional law in the state of Florida interpreting the word "secure" to mean "buy" or "must buy," so long as there was an agreement between the subcontractor and the prime contractor that one or the other would purchase the insurance. Tr., p. 180, line 4. Little testified that the concept of the "statutory employer" found in chapter 440 has remained in place and steady throughout the history of the statute. He pointed out other relevant statutes in chapter 440 that needed to be read in pari materia with one another. An insurance agent from Bouchard Insurance, John Manis, also testified. Bouchard Insurance is a commercial insurance agency which sells workers' compensation insurance. Bouchard Insurance represents FFVA and sells workers' compensation insurance as an agent for that company. Manis had worked on the KC Curb account since 2005. He is familiar with how KC Curb and FFVA conduct their workers' compensation business together, including the payment of premiums. When a workers' compensation policy is written, the business will give its payrolls to the agent who determines the class codes that are applied and used in the policy. At the end of each year, an audit is conducted on those payrolls to determine whether or not the business owes money to FFVA, or if a refund from FFVA is in order. Some companies, like KC Curb, do a monthly audit--during which they input their payroll and are told what premium is due for the month. When a subcontractor of KC Curb declines or fails to obtain its own insurance policy, the subcontractor's employee becomes "like an employee of KC Curb," and FFVA will charge KC Curb for those employees, as if they were its own. The names of actual subcontractor employees are provided at audit time, not during the year. Apparently, this is a common practice in the industry. The office manager for KC Curb is Sempier. She testified that KC Curb is a concrete curb construction company that has been in business for 22 years in the Orlando area. It performs concrete construction services using a combination of in- house crews and subcontractors. One of Sempier's duties is to monitor subcontractor compliance with the Workers' Compensation Laws. She characterized KC Curb as being "very on top of that." Subcontractors are required to provide KC Curb with certificates of insurance before they start any work. Subcontractors are required to produce a certificate of workers' compensation insurance, or they go under the KC Curb policy as an uninsured subcontractor. Although KC Curb requires subcontractors to get their own insurance because this is much less expensive, some of them cannot or do not secure their own, so KC Curb secures it. The subcontractor is back-charged for this coverage. In monthly workers' compensation self-audits, Sempier includes a sheet that shows payroll for KC Curb's uninsured contractors and its own employees. Those numbers are combined together along with other clerical classes and the insurance premium payment is calculated. Tr., p. 221, line 3. Although not required by the FFVA, KC Curb includes payroll numbers for its uninsured subcontractors in each monthly self-audit. Tr., p. 221, line 11. Respondent's Exhibit J, entitled "Self-Reported Payroll," was explained by the witness. The document, prepared and issued by KC Curb for 2015, includes an entry reflecting the total payroll paid each month for KC Curb. This included both KC Curb's own W-2 employees and employees of subcontractors. Tr., p. 227, line 19. The second page of Respondent's Exhibit J (with information regarding other subcontractors redacted) shows that the payroll for employees of Perez Concrete was included beginning April 2, 2015. Tr., p. 224, line 16. Respondent's Exhibit J indicates, bottom right, the number of employees that were picked up from Perez Concrete.5/ Monthly premiums are paid by KC Curb instantaneously "on-line" and are based on the total payroll numbers listed in Respondent's Exhibit J, beginning with page 2. The payment comes directly out a KC Curb's checking account. Sempier testified that once payment was made, all employees included in the payroll amounts are covered by KC Curb's workers' compensation policy, including the Perez Concrete employee number listed. Tr., p. 224, line 23, and p. 253, line 14. See Resp. Ex. J, p. 2, bottom right. Work orders are received from the subcontractors for KC Curb. Those work orders are supposed to list the names of the subcontractor's employees. In this manner, KC Curb is able to determine how many employees are going to be covered by insurance for a particular subcontractor. When KC Curb was informed that the policy of insurance for Perez Concrete had been canceled, KC Curb called Perez Concrete's insurance agent to get the exact date of cancellation. When Perez Concrete's workers' compensation insurance cancellation was confirmed, KC Curb notified Perez Concrete in writing that it needed to promptly provide new certificates of insurance. See Resp. Exh. H. Perez Concrete was likewise notified in writing of KC Curb's requirements for "KC Curb to provide Workers' Compensation Insurance for your Company." See Resp. Exh. I. Osorio testified that Perez Concrete chose to have KC Curb secure the insurance for Perez Concrete after April 10, 2015, and he signed Respondent's Exhibit I agreeing to follow the guidelines for workers' compensation insurance. Thereafter, KC Curb began to pick up and include Perez Concrete's employees on its monthly self-audits. Likewise, it started to pay a premium amount for insurance which included payroll related to Perez Concrete's employees. Sempier was contacted by Petitioner's investigator, Scarton. When she informed the investigator that KC Curb was compliant with the law and was following a procedure previously permitted, the investigator called back that same day and asked for her to get something from her agent verifying that Perez Concrete was covered. Sempier testified that she promptly obtained a letter from KC Curb's insurance confirming coverage for Perez Concrete and thought she attached it with her email back to the investigator. Tr., p. 256, line 18. She subsequently learned that she attached the wrong document to the email, and the investigator did not receive the confirmation letter.6/ The evidence indicated that in the year 2015, KC Curb provided workers' compensation insurance coverage as a "statutory employer" for the employees of approximately seven of its subcontractors.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, issue a final order withdrawing or dismissing the proposed penalty and finding that Respondent was in compliance with the statute during the relevant period of time. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2016.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations should grant the Petition for Relief alleging that the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of his marital status, in violation of Section 760.10, Fla. Stat. (1995).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Shaker Lakes Apartments Company d/b/a Seasons of Tampa, Limited, is a property management company whose principal place of business is in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. The Respondent owns real property or conducts business in Florida and has 15 or more employees. The Petitioner, Jerry Dolinger, was hired by the Respondent on or about August 14, 1989, as a maintenance supervisor at a starting pay of $12,000 a year. On or about May 1, 1991, the Petitioner was promoted to district manager at an annual salary of $20,541.57 ($395.03 per week), plus hospitalization benefits and the use of a company car. By the end of 1992, the Petitioner was demoted to maintenance supervisor, but his salary and benefits remained the same. The Petitioner's wife, Karen Dolinger, also was employed by the Respondent, as property manager for Seasons of Tampa, Limited. On or about April 1, 1993, the Petitioner's wife resigned due to disputes with and conduct of the Respondent's vice-president of operations, Jacqueline McCullough. Upon her resignation, she distributed a letter to all residents of the apartment complex giving the residents information concerning the change in property management and the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the Respondent's management personnel in Ohio. The Respondent did not wish to have the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the Respondent's management personnel in Ohio given to the tenants at Seasons of Tampa. The Respondent wished to have those individuals remain unknown to the tenants so all tenant complaints and similar issues would have to be resolved locally through the property manager and district manager. On or about April 2, 1993, Jacquelyn McCullough telephoned the Petitioner and asked whether he had any knowledge of his wife's letter to the tenants. The Petitioner denied any knowledge and in fact had no such knowledge. She asked if the Petitioner also intended to resign, and the Petitioner answered that he did not. Later on April 2, 1993, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner's employment. One of the reasons given for the termination--an alleged temporary staff reduction--was a pretext. (Within days of the Petitioner's termination, the Respondent hired someone to take the Petitioner's place as maintenance supervisor.) The other reason--alleged insubordination and disloyalty--was based on the Respondent's belief that the Petitioner knew about and participated in the letter to the tenants. But the only basis for this belief was the Petitioner's marital status. Since there was no evidence to support the Respondent's belief, the basis of the Petitioner's termination was his marital status. The Petitioner was unable to find reemployment until approximately June 11, 1993. However, his new employment was at a salary of only $17,000 a year, a reduction of $68.11 a week. The Petitioner suffered this reduction in salary until November 5, 1993, when he obtain employment at a salary higher than what he earned with the Respondent, together with hospitalization benefits and the use of a company car, for a total of salary loss during this period of $1,430.31. The Petitioner's loss of use of the Respondent's company car from April 2 through November 5, 1993, cost him monetary damages of $295 a month for replacement transportation, or approximately $2,100. (The Affidavit of Petitioner's damages incorrectly multiplies the monthly expense by 31 weeks, resulting in an incorrect alleged total loss of $9,145.) In order to redeem the second mortgage on the Petitioner's home, which went into default as a result of the loss of the Petitioner's salary, the Petitioner and his wife had to refinance, at a cost of $2,033.02. The Petitioner also claims damages due to the loss of life and health and hospitalization insurance from April 2 through November 5, 1993. But the Petitioner's testimony was that he could not afford to replace those insurance coverages, and there was not evidence that he suffered any out-of-pocket uninsured expenses that would have been covered by them. The Petitioner also claims damages for the loss of $3,775 worth of personal items sold to pay necessary living expenses for the period from April 2 through November 5, 1993. But those sums already are accounted for in loss of salary and would result in a double recovery if added to the loss of salary. Based on the Affidavit of Plaintiff's Attorney's Fees, a reasonable attorney fee in this case is $6,492.50. Based on the Certificate of Costs, reasonable costs to be taxed to the Respondent in this case is $178.42.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order: finding the Respondent guilty of illegal discrimination on the basis of the Petitioner's marital status; and (2) requiring that the Respondent pay the Petitioner a total of $9,692.03, together with legal interest from November 5, 1993, plus $6,492.50 as a reasonable attorney fee, together with legal interest from May 1, 1996, as affirmative relief from the effects of the illegal practice. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5381 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Conclusion of law. 2.-5. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not conclusion of law, subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Annual salary rejected as inconsistent with the Affidavit of Petitioner's Damages; otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 9.-10. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 11.-15. Accepted and incorporated. 16. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 17.-23. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Amount of loss rejected as not proven by the evidence; "mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries" rejected as not relevant in this proceeding; otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Davis, Esquire 620 E. Twiggs Street, Suite 305 Tampa, Florida 33602-3929 Jacqueline McCullough Vice President Shaker Lakes Apartments Company 1422 Euclid Avenue, Suite 1146 Cleveland, Ohio 44115-1951 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was required to carry workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees, and if so, the penalty that should be assessed. Whether the Petitioner violated the Stop Work Order entered May 18, 2005, and, if so, the penalty that should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the requirement of Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure workers' compensation insurance coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Tak-A-Way is a Florida corporation which engages in the business of performing small jobs such as removing trash and debris, digging up small driveways, and excavation. Tak-A-Way owns several dump trucks, and it maintains a permanent storage yard for materials and equipment. Tak-A-Way's payroll records for the period January 2003 through May 2005 establish that several persons were listed as "Help" and received regular checks from Tak-A-Way during this period. Donald Oppenheim is the owner and president of Tak-A-Way. He is exempted from workers' compensation coverage. On May 18, 2005, during a routine investigation, an investigator employed by the Department observed two men ripping up an asphalt driveway and loading the asphalt into a truck at a private residence in Pompano Beach, Florida. One man was operating a backhoe, and the other was operating a bobcat. The equipment and trucks being used at the site displayed the name “Tak-A-Way”, and the two men confirmed that they were employed by Tak-A-Way. The men were identified as Andy Oppenheim and Kevin McManus. The Department did not find any record of workers’ compensation insurance in its database for employees of Tak-A- Way, and Mr. Oppenheim confirmed during a conversation with the Department’s investigator that Tak-A-Way had no workers' compensation coverage for any of its employees. The Department's investigator issued a Stop Work Order against Tak-A-Way on May 18, 2005, because it did not have workers’ compensation coverage for its employees; the Stop Work Order was hand-delivered to Mr. Oppenheim on the date of issue. The Stop Work Order required that Tak-A-Way "cease all business operations in this state" and advised that a penalty of $1,000.00 per day would be imposed if Tak-A-Way were to conduct any business in violation of the Stop Work Order. Finally, the Stop Work Order included the following: "This Stop Work Order shall remain in effect until the Division issues an order releasing the Stop Work Order, or until the Division issues an order of conditional release from Stop Work Order pursuant to the employer entering into a payment agreement schedule for periodic payment of penalty." Penalty Assessment for Failure to Have Workers' Compensation Insurance Coverage At the same time that she delivered the Stop Work Order to Mr. Oppenheim, the Department's investigator delivered a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation, in which Mr. Oppenheim was directed to produce business records for the period extending from November 3, 2003, through May 18, 2005.2 Mr. Oppenheim produced Tak-A-Way's business records as requested, and the Department's investigator used the payroll information in the records for calculating the penalty to be assessed for Tak-A-Way's failure to have workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees. The Department uses the National Council of Compensation Insurance, Inc. ("NCCI") Scopes Manual, which includes risk classifications and definitions used to determine rates for workers' compensation insurance coverage. The payroll records provided by Mr. Oppenheim did not indicate the workers' compensation classification codes assigned to Tak-A-Way's employees, so, in accordance with the NCCI Basic Manual for Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance ("Basic Manual"), the Department's investigator assigned all of Tak-A-Way's operations to what she determined to be the highest- rated classifications of its business operations. As shown in the worksheets attached to both the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the Department's investigator classified all of Tak-A-Way's employees under the classification "Excavation," Code 6217, for the period extending from November 3, 2003, through December 31, 2004, which had an approved manual rate of $13.79 per $100.00 in payroll for that period; she classified all of Tak-A-Way's employees under the classification "Concrete," Code 5213, for the period extending from January 1, 2005, through May 18, 2005, with an approved manual rate of $24.66 per $100.00 in payroll for that period; and she classified all of Tak-A-Way's employees under the classification "Erection Permanent Yard," Code 8227, for the period extending from January 1, 2005, through May 18, 2005, with an approved manual rate of $9.38 per $100.00 in payroll for that period. The worksheets showed the premium calculation for each classification to be $19,248.91, $10,130.08, and $365.82, respectively, for a total premium of $29,744.81. The penalty, calculated as 1.5 times the premium for each classification, was shown on the worksheets as $28,873.37, $15,195.12, and $548.73, respectively, for a total penalty for the failure to have workers' compensation insurance coverage of $44,617.22. The operations included in the NCCI Scopes Manual classification "Excavation & Drivers," Code 6217, describe most closely the business operations of Tak-A-Way during the period of time covered by the penalty assessment for the failure to have workers' compensation insurance coverage. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the nature of Tak-A-Way's operations changed on or about January 1, 2005, nor did the Department's investigator provide any explanation for the change in classification from "Excavation" to "Concrete" effective January 1, 2005.3 In the absence of any evidence to support the change in classification, the Department has failed to sustain the $44,617.22 penalty assessment for the failure of Tak-A-Way to carry workers' compensation insurance coverage from November 3, 2003, through May 18, 2005. Rather, the premium calculation for the period from January 1, 2005, through May 18, 2005, should be based on the classification of "Excavation," Code 6217, which carried the approved manual rate of $12.77 for that period, and not on the classification of "Concrete," Code 5213.4 Tak-A-Way maintained a permanent storage yard in which its material and equipment was stored during the times material to this proceeding. The Department's investigator correctly included a premium calculation for "Erection Permanent Yard," Code 8227, as part of the calculation of the penalty against Tak-A-Way for failure to carry workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees. Tak-A-Way obtained workers' compensation insurance coverage from Florida Citrus, Business & Industry, effective June 1, 2005. Penalty Assessment for Violating Stop Work Order On May 24, 2005, the Department’s investigator observed a Tak-A-Way truck traveling in front of her on the street and concluded that Tak-A-Way was conducting business in violation of the Stop Work Order issued May 18, 2005. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment against Tak-A- Way issued on June 1, 2005, included a penalty of $1,000.00 for Tak-A-Way's violation of the Stop Work Order from May 24, 2005, to May 25, 2005, for a total penalty of $45.617.22. Tak-A-Way conducted business operations after the Stop Work Order was issued. Mr. Oppenheim rented dump trucks owned by Tak-A-Way to Preston Contractors. Mr. Oppenheim, who was the only Tak-A-Way employee involved in the business operations at the time, would drive a truck to one of Preston Contractors' construction sites, towing his pickup truck. He would park the truck and leave the site, and employees of Preston Contractors would fill the truck with construction debris. Mr. Oppenheim would return to the construction site and drive the truck to the landfill and dump the load of debris. At times, there were several Tak-A-Way dump trucks at the Preston Contractors' construction site. According to invoices maintained by Preston Contractors, it paid Tak-A-Way for truck rental and dump fees from February 2005 to September 2005. On November 22, 2005, the Department issued a Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, increasing the penalty for Tak-A-Way's violation of the Stop Work Order to $73,000.00, covering the period extending from May 19, 2005, through September 21, 2005, for a total penalty of $117,617.22. Based on the evidence presented, Tak-A-Way was conducting business operations in violation of the Stop Work Order during the period for which the penalty was assessed and had not obtained either an order releasing the Stop Work Order or an Order of Conditional Release from Stop Work Order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order: Finding that Tak-A-Way, Inc., failed to have workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees, in violation of Sections 440.10(1)(a) and 440.38(1), Florida Statutes; Finding that Tak-A-Way, Inc., engaged in business operations during the pendency of a Stop Work Order, in violation of Section 440.107(7)(a), Florida Statutes; Assessing a penalty against Tak-A-Way, Inc., equal to 1.5 times premium based on the approved manual rate for the classification "Excavation," Code 6217, for the period extending from November 3, 2003, through May 18, 2005, and on the approved manual rate for the classification "Construction & Erection - Permanent Yard," Code 8227, for the period extending from January 1, 2005, through May 18, 2005 as provided in Section 440.107(7)(a) and (d), Florida Statutes; and Assessing a penalty of $73,000.00, against Tak-A-Way, Inc., for engaging in business operations in violation of the May 18, 2005, Stop Work Order, as provided in Section 440.107(7)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2006.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Sheila A. Cunningham, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Florida Credit Union, on account of her race or due to retaliation for her opposition to an unlawful employment practice in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, who was at all times relevant to this matter an employee of Respondent, is African-American. There was no direct testimony as to the number of persons employed by Respondent. However, given the testimony describing a large financial institution with multiple departments, including a data scanning department and a call center, there is sufficient competent, substantial evidence to establish an inference that Respondent employs more than 15 full-time employees at any given time. Petitioner was first hired by Respondent on November 20, 2007. On February 2, 2008, she was transferred to the position of Courtesy Pay Credit Advisor (CPCA), a position held until her termination on March 21, 2014. From 2012 through the time of her termination, Jennifer Perez was Petitioner’s direct supervisor. Ms. Perez reported to Mr. Colson, who supervised the credit advisor department. Over the years, Petitioner received a number of certificates and awards for good performance in her position. CPCAs are responsible for collections on delinquent accounts of members by bringing the account to a positive balance within 60 days of delinquency. If a credit union member’s account is delinquent for more than 60 days, it must be written off, resulting in a loss to Respondent. Failure to timely write-off a negative account can subject Respondent to fines and negative audit ratings. A common way of bringing an account current is to arrange a loan with Respondent to pay the delinquent balance. Loan types include a “bounce-free” loan and a “work-out loan.” Both are designed to allow for payment of the negative account in installment payments. The bounce-free loan has only the negative account balance involved, while the work-out loan combines the negative balance with another existing loan. CPCAs receive additional compensation for such loans, known as “incentives,” of $10 to $15, though the record suggests that a dispute over an incentive of $40 was a triggering cause of the adverse employment action in this case. CPCAs are also responsible for “packing” loans, which includes taking the loan paperwork to the optical department to input and image the documents into Respondent’s system. The optical department periodically provides reports on loans for which documentation has not been submitted for input and imaging. Petitioner testified credibly that the optical department would occasionally neglect to scan loans that were submitted. However, there was no evidence to suggest that to be a frequent or pervasive problem. Respondent routinely employs one or two CPCAs at any given time. The CPCAs are assigned a “queue,” which is an alphabetical assignment of member accounts. The evidence suggests that Petitioner served as the CPCA for all delinquent member accounts for a period of almost one year, a practice that ended when Vikki Martello was hired as a CPCA on February 27, 2012. Upon her hiring, Ms. Martello was assigned the accounts of members with last names beginning with the letters A through K, and Petitioner was assigned the accounts of members with last names beginning with the letters L through Z. Ms. Martello was transferred to another position on July 11, 2013. Jennifer Munyan was hired as a CPCA on May 20, 2013, and was assigned the A through K queue. Since Petitioner’s termination, Ms. Munyan has handled all delinquent accounts. Petitioner mentioned several incidents over the course of her employment that she believed to be evidence of her poor treatment by Respondent. These incidents appear to have occurred more than one year before Petitioner filed her employment complaint of discrimination. They are cited here for purposes of background. Petitioner testified that starting in 2010 or 2011, Respondent began to hire younger credit advisors on the basis of their friendship with management. The new employees engaged in childish activities such as throwing paper clips and blowing bubbles. Petitioner indicated that they were “written up” for those activities. There was no suggestion that either the hiring or the write-ups were based on race. For a period of time, Petitioner was assigned what she believed to be a disproportionate share of holiday weekend shifts. Mr. Colson “corrected that and then that was okay.” There was no suggestion that the issues with scheduling were based on race. Shortly after Ms. Martello was hired on February 27, 2012, she was asked to accompany Mr. Colson and Ms. Perez to a branch office to train employees. Petitioner felt “that was not right,” and that she was being excluded from performing certain job tasks. She testified that Respondent’s assignment of training and other duties to persons other than herself led to a sympathetic nick-name of “invisible credit advisor.” Petitioner admitted that, in her opinion, Ms. Martello was an excellent employee. Mr. Colson testified credibly that Petitioner was not asked to assist in the new hire training since she was already behind on managing her accounts, and that “[t]here’s no compensation or award or anything for training another employee, it's just additional work.” There was no suggestion that the decision to have Ms. Martello assist with training was based on race. Petitioner alleged that despite her requests, she was not allowed to shadow other employees, particularly in the call center, so that she could learn the responsibilities of the member service representative position. She testified that in response to her requests, Ms. Perez would say “okay, we'll see about it, but nothing never happened. And I asked like three or four times and it was always we'll see about it.” Petitioner did not claim in her testimony that she was denied these opportunities because of her race. Petitioner generally claimed she was denied promotional opportunities because she was not allowed to train as a back-up. However, she failed to present any evidence of an open and available position for which she had applied, or for which she was denied. Furthermore, there was no suggestion that race played a role in any such denial. Respondent’s employees are informed of work performance issues in several ways, including informal discussions, e-mail communication, individual or group meetings, coaching reports, and annual evaluations. On March 19, 2012, Petitioner received her annual performance review. Although Respondent was complementary of Petitioner’s improvements in her work, and spoke favorably of her interpersonal relationships and work ethic, the review noted a number of “improvement opportunities and development areas” to be implemented over the course of the following year. Deficiencies in job performance included Petitioner’s practice of making initial contact with a delinquent member by letter, rather than the more effective practice of a phone call; the failure to provide sufficiently descriptive account notations; the failure to “charge off” loans correctly resulting in errors for others to correct; the failure to close checking accounts after workout options or loans were complete resulting in further delinquencies; and the failure to set up loan distributions correctly, resulting in unwarranted loan delinquencies and resultant customer complaints. The performance review also cited issues with Petitioner’s negative accounts extending beyond the required time frame, which was noted in Respondent’s quarterly audit report. The deficiencies noted in the performance review resulted in higher than normal charge-offs, and losses to Respondent. Petitioner improved her performance in some areas, but only for short periods of time. Mr. Colson did not issue Petitioner any coaching reports in 2012 because he believed that Petitioner’s mistakes were not intentional, that she had a positive attitude, that she had no attendance issues, and that “she seemed to like her job a lot.” It was Mr. Colson’s belief that with additional training and a cooperative approach, Petitioner’s performance issues could be corrected. On February 27, 2013, Petitioner received her next annual performance review. Petitioner was again complemented on her interaction with members, her teamwork, and her general positive work ethic. It was noted that Petitioner had responded well to coaching such that she rarely made mistakes in setting up automatic loan payments. The review noted, however, a number of areas for improvement, including some that had not been resolved from the previous year’s review. Of particular concern was the high number of missing loan packets, some of which were months past due; the failure to meet consecutive deadlines for submitting completed work; and the failure to begin work on accounts in an appropriate and timely manner. Petitioner was again instructed to make initial contact with delinquent members by phone or email, rather than by letter; and was advised of several of her accounts that were charged-off after missing the 60-day deadline. Finally, Petitioner was provided with a printout of the 142 overdrawn checking accounts in her queue, only 40 of which (28 percent), had been worked in the previous 60 days. Although some early-stage overdraft accounts carried a “high self-cure rate,” the low number of accounts worked was deemed unacceptably low. After receiving her 2013 performance review, Petitioner improved in some areas of her performance, but again only for a short period of time. Beginning on July 15, 2013, Petitioner, Ms. Martello (until she completed her transfer from the collections department), and Ms. Munyan (upon her assignment to the collections department) were provided with periodic email updates from Ms. Perez on the number of loan packets for which each was responsible that had not been submitted to the optical department. The updates and related correspondence between Petitioner and Ms. Perez revealed the following: July 15, 2013 Petitioner - 37 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 4 missing loan packets July 19, 2013 Petitioner - 36 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 6 missing loan packets July 30, 2013 Petitioner - 34 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 5 missing loan packets August 5, 2013 Petitioner - 29 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 2 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 1 missing loan packet August 14, 2013 Petitioner - 31 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 2 missing loan packets August 19, 2013 Petitioner - 38 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets August 27, 2013 Petitioner - 42 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 4 missing loan packets September 3, 2013 Petitioner - 38 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets September 10, 2013 Petitioner - 42 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets September 16, 2013 Petitioner - 32 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 4 missing loan packets On September 18, 2013, Ms. Perez sent an email to Petitioner and Ms. Munyan advising them that credit union auditors were scheduled to arrive on September 30, 2013. Thus, Petitioner and Ms. Munyan were instructed to “[m]ake sure all of your loan packets are up to date, so that no one comes to us requesting something that cannot be located.” October 1, 2013 (for loan packets through September 27) Petitioner - 38 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 3 missing loan packets The October 1, 2013, update further advised Petitioner and Ms. Munyan that “[t]he auditors are here for the next three weeks. If they review any of these loans, it will be a problem that we do not have them scanned yet and if we are missing documents. Please get these turned in this week!” On October 12, 2013, Petitioner sent Ms. Perez an email stating that “I worked on some loan packets on 10/12. Please don’t send email until I turn my loan packets in on 10/16.” October 25, 2013 Petitioner - 20 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 7 missing loan packets November 4, 2013 Petitioner - 28 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 4 missing loan packets November 12, 2013 Petitioner - 33 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets On November 15, 2013, Petitioner sent Ms. Perez an email stating that “Optical have some loan packets that were turned in today, please don’t send out list until after 11/18/13.” November 22, 2013 Petitioner - 35 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 7 missing loan packets December 11, 2013 Petitioner - 41 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 1 missing loan packet December 18, 2013 Petitioner - 32 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 2 missing loan packets On October 9, 2013, Mr. Colson met with Petitioner and Ms. Munyan to discuss the results of an attorney audit that was critical of several collections practices. In particular, too many accounts were not being worked until the later stage of delinquency; too much time was allowed to elapse between contacts with the members; and workflow notations were not properly completed. A spreadsheet provided during the October 9, 2013, meeting revealed that Petitioner had 92 accounts in her queue, 57 of which had never been worked. Ms. Munyan had 90 accounts in her queue, 25 of which had never been worked. In November of 2013, Petitioner spoke with Ms. Perez regarding an incident in which Petitioner alleged that Ms. Munyan claimed one of her incentive credits. Ms. Perez advised Petitioner to come back to her if it occurred again. Ms. Perez discussed the incentive issue with Mr. Colson. They determined that, due to a high volume of negative accounts anticipated over the upcoming holidays, and in recognition of the priority on not missing an opportunity to resolve negative accounts, a policy for incentives when a CPCA had to handle incoming calls and loan requests from members who were not in the CPCA’s queue was warranted. On November 19, 2013, Ms. Perez sent an e-mail to Petitioner and Ms. Munyan setting out the policy for handling calls when the other CPCA was not available. Outgoing calls and loan initiation were limited to customers within the CPCA’s queue. However, if a CPCA was not in the office or was unavailable to handle a customer request, the other CPCA was instructed to accept incoming calls from members not in their queue. The CPCA who first entered notes of a customer contact prior to a loan being booked was to receive the incentive. On December 9, 2013, Ms. Munyan received a communication from a member with a negative account, entered the first notes of contact with the member into the workflow history, and sent loan paperwork for a bounce-free loan to the member. On December 10, 2013, Petitioner spoke with the customer and took additional application information over the phone. Later that same day, Petitioner went to Mr. Colson to approve a refinance loan for the customer. Mr. Colson approved Petitioner to proceed with the refinance loan based on the customer’s income, but did not know at the time that Ms. Munyan had already started the loan process. Since Ms. Munyan made the first contact with the customer, the incentive was credited to Ms. Munyan. Petitioner proceeded to make several entries on the workflow history asserting her claim to the incentive. Petitioner apparently discussed the matter within the office, leading to her testimony that “[t]he department was upset about it because I showed it to them.” In December 2013, having been made aware of the workflow history comments regarding the disputed incentive; having received complaints regarding Petitioner from the manager of Respondent’s contact center; and having continuing issues with Petitioner’s failure to submit loan documents to the optical department, Mr. Colson prepared a series of coaching reports to individually address the issues. It was decided to issue separate coaching reports for each issue of concern, rather than a single lengthy report, in order to keep the issues separate. Respondent has previously issued multiple coaching reports to employees under comparable circumstances. On December 20, 2013, Petitioner was called into a meeting with Mr. Colson. She thought the meeting was to discuss the disputed incentive. Instead, she was presented with the coaching reports. The first coaching report was issued for Petitioner’s notations into the workflow system related to her intent to claim the disputed incentive credit. Petitioner had previously received training on the information to be entered in the workflow system. During the training sessions, which were conducted periodically, and which included the distribution of printed materials, it was stressed that the workflow notes should not be editorial or contain side comments. Mr. Colson explained that, in the event of a legal dispute with a member regarding their account, the collection record, including the notations entered into the workflow system, would be made part of a court record. As applied to Petitioner’s notations, Mr. Colson was concerned about having to testify about notations in the collection record regarding incentives or commissions for working on a work-out request. Petitioner alleged that Ms. Martello and other unidentified credit advisors made similar notations in the workflow system without being written up, but provided no evidence to support her assertion. Mr. Colson knew of no other instance of a CPCA making notations in the workflow system related to an incentive dispute or other internal employee dispute. Mr. Colson believed that the notations made by Petitioner regarding the incentive dispute were not pertinent to the collection record, thus violating Respondent’s policy and warranting the issuance of the coaching report. Petitioner signed the first coaching report, with the comment that “I thought that I was doing the right thing on this acct.” The second coaching report addressed Petitioner’s act of taking a fee refund voucher to Respondent’s contact center department for approval. The contact center has staff on duty beyond Respondent’s normal 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. business hours. The fee refund had to be done on November 25, 2013, since that was the 60th day of the negative account, after which the account would have to be written off. The fee refund was for an amount that exceeded Petitioner’s approval authority. Despite the time frame involved, Petitioner did not get the fee refund voucher approved by the clerk of the collections department, which would be the normal course, before the 5:00 p.m. close of business. During the December 20, 2013, meeting, Mr. Colson discussed the practice of taking vouchers to the call center for processing after 5:00 p.m. Mr. Colson had been approached by the assistant vice president of the contact center regarding Petitioner’s multiple visits after 5:00 p.m. to his department “to have transactions done, fees refunded, things of that nature on members' accounts.” As a result, call center employees were being pulled away from their normal tasks to do transactions that were not a normal function of their job. Petitioner alleged that other credit advisors went to the call center to have such transactions processed, including Ms. Martello, Melonice Lindsey, and Howard Miller, but provided no evidence to support her assertion. Mr. Colson had no knowledge of other credit advisors who engaged in this activity, or any other improprieties regarding the processing of fee refunds. The second coaching report addressed additional issues related to the November 25, 2013, fee refund transaction, including the fact that Petitioner did not work on the sixty-day negative account when she arrived to work that morning, and that she did not enter any notation in the workflow history regarding the fee refund. Mr. Colson believed that the issues regarding the fee refund transaction warranted the issuance of the coaching report. Petitioner signed the second coaching report, with the comment that “I didn’t do this intentionally. I forgot to get voucher back from Katie to give to [Mr. Colson] to sign.” The third coaching report addressed the ongoing problem of Petitioner’s failure to provide loan documentation to the optical department for input and scanning, the details of which are set forth in paragraph 22 above. Petitioner signed the report with the comment that “[s]ome of these loans have been turned into optical. I will review this matter.” Petitioner alleged that other employees had fallen behind on submitting paperwork, but were not written up or terminated. Petitioner did not identify, by name or race, any of the allegedly comparable employees, or establish that they had a comparable history of failing to submit loan documentation. The only evidence adduced at the hearing established that Ms. Martello and Ms. Munyan were not comparable to Petitioner in the number or frequency of late-submitted loan packets. Petitioner stated that she had previously advised Ms. Perez of her intent to work on Saturday, December 21, 2013, to catch up on her loan paperwork. Mr. Colson was not aware of Petitioner’s intent to do so but, given the length of time that the problem continued to exist, would still have issued the coaching report to Petitioner. At some point after January 2, 2014, during Mr. Colson’s daily review of compliance reports, he noted an account that was over 60 days, requiring that it be written off. The account was assigned to Petitioner, and Mr. Colson saw from the workflow history that Petitioner did not begin work on the account until it was 58 days past due. Working her accounts earlier in the delinquency stage had been previously addressed with Petitioner. On January 6, 2014, Petitioner was given a coaching report and placed on a 60-day probation for deficient work performance related to the written-off account. Petitioner signed the January 6, 2014, coaching report with the comment that “voucher was paperclip to another voucher by mistake. I usually check these daily.” Petitioner testified that other employees failed to timely charge-off accounts but were not counseled, but provided no evidence to support her assertion. The only comparator for whom evidence was received was Khrissy Adams, a Caucasian woman, who was given a coaching report and placed on a 30-day probation for failing to timely write-off an account. There was no evidence of Ms. Adams having received previous coaching reports so as to warrant a lengthier period of probation, as was given to Petitioner. As part of the process established after the December 20, 2013, meeting and coaching reports, Petitioner was to submit her loan packets to either Ms. Perez or Mr. Colson for review before they were sent to be scanned. That review revealed that a large number of the loan packets contained significant errors in the consumer lending plan, which is the contract a member signs to obtain a loan. Many of the consumer lending plans had missing signatures, and some packets had no consumer lending plan at all. Furthermore, Petitioner indicated that some members elected to purchase loan insurance when the member had, in fact, declined insurance, resulting in unapproved charges to a member. The errors noted by Respondent were serious, potentially resulting in the loan contracts being invalid and unenforceable. The errors could have been violative of Regulation Z, which governs fair lending practices and, if there were a sufficient number of instances, resulted in a class action lawsuit against Respondent, exposing it to considerable cost. Due to the ongoing performance issues, as well as the severity of the issues related to Petitioner’s completed loan packets, the decision was made that termination of Petitioner’s employment was appropriate. Petitioner was thereafter terminated from employment on March 21, 2014. Petitioner identified no instance of any racially- disparaging comments directed at herself or any other employee by anyone affiliated with Respondent. There was no non-hearsay evidence of any employee outside of Petitioner’s protected class who engaged in conduct similar to that of Petitioner, but without consequence, upon which to support a finding that the employee was treated more favorably. Mr. Colson testified credibly that Petitioner’s race had no bearing on the decision to terminate her employment. Rather, Mr. Colson testified convincingly that the decision was based solely on Petitioner’s continuing and increasingly poor job performance. Mr. Colson felt Petitioner’s poor performance was not due to a lack of trying on Petitioner’s part; it was simply the result of a lack of ability on her part. Petitioner asserted that she was written up, placed on probation, and subsequently terminated from employment in retaliation for complaining that Ms. Munyan improperly claimed her incentive. In that regard, she testified that: I know that by me going to management . . . it really started all this, I think, because I’m thinking to myself, if I would have just kept my mouth shut, maybe I would have had my job, but other employees have went to Mr. Colson before with problems like that . . . . But my thing is, after I went to management I get written up out of retaliation. I got blind-sided. I didn’t know that was going to happen. And, to me, that’s retaliation. Petitioner does not claim that she was denied the incentive credit because or her race. Finally, Petitioner complained that some of her personal belonging were damaged or not returned to her after her employment was terminated, testifying that “[t]hey broke up all of my things and, to me, that was not right. To me, that was discriminative.” Even if there were some evidence that Petitioner’s belongings had been damaged on purpose -- which there was not -- there was no evidence that such damage was the result of racial animus. A review of the entire record of this proceeding reveals not a shred of evidence that any of the employment actions of which Petitioner complains were the result of racial bias or discrimination. The only testimony that can be reasonably read as suggesting some racial bias behind the employment actions at issue are Petitioner’s testimony as follows: and I know that discrimination do exist. I do know that’s a problem all across the board in America . . . [a]nd if I did not feel that I was discriminated against I would never have did all this . . . but my thing is I know there’s favorites at that credit union. I know that certain people get away with things. To me, I was discriminated against, I'm gonna say for the record, because of my race, because if I think that I know within my heart if the tables were turned, if I was white and went to management, I would still had a job because to me it just got blown out of proportion by me going to management. And as everyone can clearly see, it all started from there, because if it wasn't started from there, why would I have gotten written up in first place for my work that happened prior to, you know, that -- you know, that year? So, that's what started that. So my point is, is that if I wouldn't have never said anything, I would have probably still been working there. In the absence of some corroborative evidence, Petitioner’s statements alone cannot provide the support to sustain a charge of racial discrimination. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made due to Petitioner’s race. Rather, the decision was based on Petitioner’s performance in her job as reflected in the employee coaching reports. Furthermore, there was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that persons who were not African-American were treated differently from Petitioner, or were subject to dissimilar personnel policies and practices. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made in retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to an unlawful employment practice. Rather, to the extent there was some retaliation involved, it was for bringing an internal employee complaint over a disputed incentive to management, a complaint that had no implication of race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Florida Credit Union, did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Sheila A. Cunningham, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014-00645. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Sheila Annette Cunningham 1835 Northwest 27th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34475 Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 R. Michelle Tatum, Esquire John E. Duvall, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP 225 Water Street, Suite 710 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was required to secure workers' compensation insurance for employees as delineated by Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes (2008), and, if so, whether he did so. If Petitioner was required to provide insurance and did not, this case must also address what penalty for such failure is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for administering and enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure workers' compensation insurance for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. At all times material to this case, the Department alleged the Petitioner is an "employer" as that term is used within the law. In contrast, the Petitioner has denied being an employer and maintains he was not required to secure workers' compensation insurance for anyone. The Petitioner is from Mexico but is domiciled in Florida. He has been engaged in the business of roofing for approximately twenty years. Roofing is a construction activity under the workers' compensation law. On February 15, 2006, the Department's investigator, Kathleen Petracco, along with an investigator from the Martin County Building Department, Contractor Licensing, made a random stop at 861 SW Bay Pointe Circle, Palm City, Florida. Investigator Petracco observed nine workers performing roofing work at that location. Of the nine workers, only one spoke English well enough to respond directly to inquiries presented by Investigator Petracco. That individual, identified in this record as "Victor," served as the translator for the other workers who spoke Spanish. According to Victor, the lead worker (later known to be Victor Briceno), he and the other eight workers all worked for an individual by the name of “Jesse.” “Jesse” or "Jessie" was later determined to be Jesus Mijares, the Petitioner. Through Victor, Investigator Petracco also interviewed Remigio Lopez, Luis Velasquez, Rubin Hernandez, Antonio Briceno, Jose Velasca, Sebastian Rodriguez and Marco Duran. All of the workers represented that they worked for the Petitioner who paid them $100.00 per day in either cash or by check. Investigator Petracco contacted the Petitioner who informed her that he was asked by “Steve” (later determined to be Steve Thaden) from All American General Construction (All American) to go to the worksite with a crew to tear off a roof. At that time the Petitioner admitted that the workers on the site were his employees whom he paid $100 per day in either cash or by check. Joe Jameson is one of the owners of All American. The company has been in busy since Hurricane Andrew struck Florida. Mr. Jameson acknowledged that Steve Thaden (his nephew) had been employed by the company but claimed that Mr. Thaden was not authorized to hire the Petitioner or others to perform work on jobsites. There is no evidence that the Petitioner and the nine men at the jobsite in question were employees of All American on the date Inspector Petracco visited the site. An individual may be exempt from workers’ compensation benefits. To be exempt, an application must be filed and the procedures of the law must be met. None of the nine men on the jobsite were exempt under the law. The Department maintains a database (the Coverage and Compliance Automated System or CCAS) of all workers’ compensation exemptions in the State of Florida. Inspector Petracco found a construction exemption for Jesus Mijares through the Paul E. Hahn Corporation, with an effective period of February 28, 2004, through February 27, 2006. 11. Sections 440.107(3) and 440.107(7)(a), Florida Statutes, authorize the Department to issue stop work orders to employers unable to provide proof of workers’ compensation coverage. Failure to provide such proof is deemed “an immediate serious danger to public health, safety, or welfare. . . ,” and the Department has no discretion in issuing a stop-work order. See § 440.107(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Prior to issuing a stop-work order, the Department’s investigator must determine: the identity of the employer; whether the employer has secured the payment of workers’ compensation for the workers on a job site, either through a policy or employee leasing; the type of work being performed by the workers; and the type of remuneration (for example, check or cash). In this case, Investigator Petracco accepted the representations of the Petitioner and the nine workers at the site. Accordingly, Investigator Petracco determined that the Petitioner had employees operating at a job site for whom he had failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation insurance. Based upon this determination, on February 15, 2006, the Department issued to, and personally served on Petitioner, a stop-work order and order of penalty assessment for failing to obtain coverage that meets the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statute, and the Insurance Code, Chapter 726, Florida Statutes (2006). Also at that time, Investigator Petracco issued a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation (Records Request) to Petitioner. The Records Request required Petitioner to produce business records for a period of three years, from February 15, 2003, through February 15, 2006. Employers working on job sites in Florida are required to keep business records that enable the Department to determine whether the employer is in compliance with the workers' compensation law. At the time the Order was issued, and pursuant to Section 440.107(5), Florida Statutes, the Department had in effect Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.015. The Rule provides, in part: In order for the Department to determine that an employer is in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 440, F.S., every business entity conducting business within the state of Florida shall maintain for the immediately preceding three year period true and accurate records. Such business records shall include original documentation of the following, or copies, when originals are not in the possession of or under the control of the business entity: All workers’ compensation insurance policies of the business entity, and all endorsements, notices of cancellation, nonrenewal, or reinstatement of such policies. * * * Records indicating for every pay period a description of work performed and amount of pay or description of other remuneration paid or owed to each person by the business entity, such as time sheets, time cards, attendance records, earnings records, payroll summaries, payroll journals, ledgers or registers, daily logs or schedules, time and materials listings. All contracts entered into with a professional employer organization (PEO) or employee leasing company, temporary labor company, payroll or business record keeping company. If such services are not pursuant to a written contract, written documentation including the name, business address, telephone number, and FEIN or social security number of all principals if an FEIN is not held, of each such PEO, temporary labor company, payroll or business record keeping company; and For every contract with a PEO: a payroll ledger for each pay period during the contract period identifying each worker by name, address, home telephone number, and social security number or documentation showing that the worker was eligible for employment in the United States during the contract for his/her services, and a description of work performed during each payperiod by each worker, and the amount paid each pay period to each worker. A business entity may maintain such records or contract for their maintenance by the PEO to which the records pertain. * * * All check ledgers and bank statements for checking, savings, credit union, or any other bank accounts established by the business entity or on its behalf; and All federal income tax forms prepared by or on behalf of the business and all State of Florida, Department of Unemployment Compensation UCT-6 forms and any other forms or reports prepared by the business or on its behalf for filing with the Florida Department of Unemployment Compensation. The Petitioner failed to provide any of the requested records, including his federal tax returns. The Petitioner failed to provide a credible explanation as to why he did not provide the records requested. Further, the Petitioner's self- serving assertions at the hearing that the nine men were not his employees has not been deemed credible. It is undisputed that nine workers were performing a roofing construction service at the jobsite. They were dispatched to the site by the Petitioner, paid a daily wage by the Petitioner, and were accountable to the Petitioner for the quality of their work performance. When an employer fails to provide requested business records that the statute requires it to maintain and to make those records available to the Department, the Respondent may impute that employer’s payroll using the statewide average weekly wage as defined in Section 440.12(2), Florida Statutes, multiplied by a factor of l.5. See § 440.107(7)(e), Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.028. Based upon the foregoing, the Department imputed the gross payroll for the entire period for which the requested business records were not produced. By imputing the gross payroll of the employees utilizing the average weekly wage in effect at the time the stop- work order was issued, the Department calculated a penalty for the time period of October 1, 2003, through February 15, 2006. The average weekly wage was $683.00 in 2006. Investigator Petracco assigned a class code to the type of work performed by Petitioner utilizing the SCOPES Manual, multiplied the class code’s assigned approved manual rate by the imputed gross payroll per $100.00, and then multiplied all by 1.5. She then utilized the imputed payroll for the same number of employees for each of the years assessed pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.028(2). The Amended Order was issued and assessed a penalty of $635,727.60. That Amended Order was served on Petitioner by certified mail on August 3, 2006. Investigator Petracco acknowledged that the approved manual rate for class codes may fluctuate from year to year and the penalty worksheet reflected any such fluctuations for the computations she performed. Additionally, Investigator Petracco did not include the Petitioner on the penalty worksheet, and did not factor him into the penalty calculation because he possessed a valid workers’ compensation exemption for the penalty period. Later, after further reflection on the matter, Investigator Petracco recalculated the penalty assessment. This decision was based, in part, upon Investigator Petracco giving the Petitioner the benefit of the doubt in accepting the assertions that the employees were paid at a rate of $100 per day and by going back only to January 1, 2005. The Department relied on these assertions and thus recalculated the penalty to the reduced amount of $236,209.79. Investigator Petracco issued the Second Amended Order which was served via a Motion to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment. The Motion to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment was granted by order on February 11, 2008. Investigator Petracco also utilized business records that were subsequently provided by Petitioner’s counsel in response to the prior records request. In so doing, Jesus Mijares was included in the penalty for the period of May 15, 2003, through January 23, 2004, for which he was paid remuneration (in the form of checks written to him), and during which he did not have a current, valid workers’ compensation exemption. These checks were made payable directly to Jesus Mijares from the Paul E. Hahn Company. That company did not have a workers’ compensation policy or any coverage for its employees. Although the Petitioner claimed that all of the workers were employees of various companies that he procured them for, there are no copies of checks or any records that would corroborate this assertion. The Petitioner further asserts that he was the victim of the matter. The credible evidence supports the findings that the Petitioner was contacted to perform roofing construction, that he procured the workers to do the work requested, that the workers were paid a daily rate of $100.00 (either in cash or check), and that the Petitioner was responsible for assuring that the roofing work was performed correctly. The Petitioner has been doing roofing for 20 years. Presumably, he performs the work in a satisfactory manner. The Petitioner does not have workers' compensation insurance coverage for any of the men who work for him. Moreover, the men are not covered by any of the general contractors for whom the Petitioner does the work. Finally, the men are not part of an employment pool that covers them. The Petitioner provided copies of checks to the Department from the Paul E. Hahn Company that were provided to other individuals who were employees of that company. The checks were remuneration to the employees only. In contrast, the Petitioner was unable to explain why some employees received checks and he received checks from which he was to pay other workers. Based upon the most credible assessment of the facts, it must be found that the Petitioner operated as a subcontractor. He paid his employees from the check written to him. Based upon the checks written to him by the Paul E. Hahn Company, based on the lack of records provided by the Petitioner, and the past trend of his work history as a roofing subcontractor, together with the statements from the men on the jobsite, it is found that the Petitioner was an employer within the meaning of the workers' compensation law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a Final Order sustaining the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and imposing a penalty in the amount of $236,209.79 against this Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Colin M. Roopnarine, Esquire Kristian Dunn, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 R. Patrick Beatty, Esquire 32 East Ocean Boulevard Post Office Drawer 2333 Stuart, Florida 34995 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
