The Issue Whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact For many years Mark Dunning Industries, Inc. (MDI), held the contract for trash removal and processing for Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida (NAS Pensacola). In the summer of 1995, the contract for these services, for a period beginning January 1996, were the subject of a bid solicitation. The apparent winner of the bid was Ohio Disposal Systems, Inc (ODSI). This bid was contested by MDI. Ultimately, ODSI prevailed in the bid contest and was selected to perform the contract. Performance was to begin on January 1, 1996, however, ODSI was not informed that it was to be the contractor until early December 1995. Petitioner was born on July 12, 1922. He is a U.S. citizen from Puerto Rico, and of Hispanic origin. Petitioner first came to be employed by MDI in the summer of 1994. Petitioner worked on the "hill," which is an elevated portion of the trash dump on board NAS Pensacola. It was his job to weld broken equipment. He also operated two kinds of equipment: a Bobcat, which is a small front-end loader, and a backhoe with a dozer blade mounted on the front. Petitioner was paid about $16.00 per hour as a welder. Victor Cantrel, Petitioner's friend, commenced employment with MDI in July 1995. He worked on the "hill" and also drove the Bobcat and the back-hoe. He would utilize this equipment to push trash into a compactor. In trash-handling parlance, he was known as a "hill man." He was not a welder. He worked closely with Petitioner. Mr. Cantrel was born on June 25, 1972, and is Anglo- American. He was paid about $9.00 per hour. The supervisor of Petitioner and Mr. Cantrel, during the latter months of 1995 while they were working for MDI, was Thomas Lucky. The principal of ODSI was Vince Crawford. On or about December 28, 1995, at the end of the workday, Mr. Lucky informed the employees, including Petitioner, Mr. Cantrel, and a number of trash truck drivers, that there was to be a meeting in the company office near the "hill." Present at the meeting in the office, which commenced around 6:30 p.m., was Petitioner, Mr. Cantrel, Mr. Lucky, several truck drivers, Mr. Crawford, and his wife Cathy. Mr. Crawford informed the assembled employees that he was bringing in all new equipment; that because there would be new equipment, the new employees of ODSI would be able to work 40 hours per week; and that due to the requirement to get his company in shape in time to meet the January 1, 1996, deadline, many of the employees of MDI would be offered jobs with ODSI. After revealing these preliminary matters, Mr. Crawford asked a man named Lee what he did at MDI; this man said that he was a truck driver. Mr. Crawford told him that he was hired with the new company. Then he asked Mr. Cantrel what he did; he said he drove the Bobcat. Mr. Crawford said, "Recycle, huh. You are hired." Mr. Cantrel subsequently filed an employment application. However, he knew that after the announcement at the meeting, he was going to work for ODSI. When Mr. Crawford inquired of two more people, they both responded, "truck driver," and Mr. Crawford informed them that they were hired. When he asked Petitioner, Petitioner said, "Welder." Mr. Crawford then said, "We don't need no welders here." This was the first and last encounter Petitioner had with Mr. Crawford. The next day Petitioner arrived at work at the usual time and was informed that he no longer was employed at that facility. On January 2, 1996, Petitioner presented an employment application to the office at ODSI seeking employment as a "Welder and/or Heavy Equip. Opr." He never received a response. No evidence was adduced that at that time there were job openings for a "welder and/or heavy equipment operator." Additionally, according to Petitioner, no one from ODSI informed Petitioner that he was not qualified. No evidence was adduced at the hearing which indicated that Mr. Crawford noticed that Petitioner was 73 years of age, or that he was a Puerto Rican, or that he was of Hispanic origin. The unrebutted evidence demonstrated that Petitioner was not hired, at the time jobs were available, because Mr. Crawford was bringing in new equipment. New equipment does not require frequent welding and, therefore, Mr. Crawford did not need a welder.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding Respondent committed no unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Committe, Esquire 17 South Palafox Place, Suite 322 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 H. William Wasden, Esquire Pierce, Ledyard, Latta, Wasden & Bowron, P.C. Post Office Box 16046 Mobile, Alabama 36616 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner received notice of the August 19, 2005, administrative hearing, and if not, whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on his race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. In the fall of 2004, Petitioner's cousin, Barry Walker, worked for Respondent as a cook. Mr. Walker recommended that Respondent hire Petitioner as a dishwasher. James Pigneri, Respondent's owner, interviewed Petitioner and decided to hire him as a dishwasher on a trial basis. Petitioner began washing dishes for Respondent in September 2004. In October 2004, Petitioner began a 90-day probationary period as Respondent's dishwasher. At that time, PMI Employee Leasing (PMI) became Petitioner's co-employer. PMI has a contractual relationship with Respondent. Through this contract, PMI assumes responsibility for Respondent's human resource issues, payroll needs, employee benefits, and workers’ compensation coverage. On October 10, 2004, Petitioner signed an acknowledgement that he had received a copy of PMI's employee handbook, which included PMI's policies on discrimination, harassment, or other civil rights violations. The handbook states that employees must immediately notify PMI for certain workplace claims, including but not limited to, claims involving release from work, labor relation problems, and discrimination. The handbook requires employees to inform PMI within 48 hours if employment ceases for any reason. PMI's discrimination and harassment policies provide employees with a toll-free telephone number. When an employee makes a complaint or files a grievance, PMI performs an investigation and takes any corrective action that is required. The cook-line in Respondent's kitchen consist of work stations for all sauté and grill cooks. The cook-line runs parallel to a row of glass windows between the kitchen and the dining room and around the corner between the kitchen and the outside deck. Customers in the dining room and on the deck can see all of the cooks preparing food at the work stations along the cook-line. On the evening of December 18, 2004, Respondent's business was crowded with customers in the dining room and on the deck. On December 18, 2004, Petitioner was working in Respondent's kitchen. Sometime during the dinner shift, Petitioner was standing on the cook-line near the windows, talking to a cook named Bob. Petitioner was discussing a scar on his body. During the discussion, Petitioner raised his shirt, exposing his chest, arm, and armpit. The cook named Bob told Petitioner to put his shirt down. Erin Pigneri, a white male, is the son of Respondent's owner, James Pignari. As one of Respondent's certified food managers, Erin Pigneri must be vigilant about compliance with health code regulations when he works as Respondent's shift manager. Erin Pigneri has authority to recommend that employees be fired, but his father, James Pigneri, makes the final employment decision. On December 18, 2004, Erin Pigneri, was working as Respondent's manager and was in charge of the restaurant because his father was not working that night. When Erin Pigneri saw Petitioner with his shirt raised up, he yelled out for Petitioner put his shirt back on and to get off the cook-line. Erin Pigneri was alarmed to see Petitioner with his shirt off on the cook-line because customers could see Petitioner and because Petitioner's action violated the health code. Petitioner's reaction was immediately insubordinate. Petitioner told Erin Pigneri that he could not speak to Petitioner in that tone of voice. Erin Pigneri had to tell Petitioner several times to put his shirt on, explaining that Petitioner was committing a major health-code violation. When Petitioner walked up to Erin Pigneri, the two men began to confront each other using profanity but no racial slurs. Erin Pigneri finally told Petitioner that, "I'm a 35- year-old man and no 19-year-old punk is going to talk to me in that manner and if you don't like it, you can leave." Erin Pigneri did not use a racial slur or tell Petitioner to "paint yourself white." After the confrontation, Erin Pigneri left the kitchen. Petitioner went back to work, completing his shift without further incident. Petitioner did not have further conversation with Erin Pigneri on the evening of December 18, 2004. Erin Pigneri did not discuss Petitioner or the shirt incident with any of the waiters or any other staff members that night. On Monday evening, December 20, 2004, Erin Pigneri was in the restaurant when Petitioner and his cousin, Mr. Walker, came to work. Petitioner was dressed in nicer clothes than he usually wore to work. Mr. Walker approached Erin and James Pigneri, telling them that they needed to have a meeting. Erin and James Pigneri followed Petitioner and Mr. Walker into the kitchen. The conversation began with Mr. Walker complaining that he understood some racist things were going on at the restaurant. Mr. Walker wanted talk about Erin Pigneri's alleged use of the "N" word. Erin Pigneri did not understand Mr. Walker's concern because Mr. Walker had been at work on the cook-line during the December 18, 2004, shirt incident. According to Petitioner's testimony at the hearing, Mr. Walker had talked to a waiter over the weekend. The waiter was Mr. Walker's girlfriend. Petitioner testified that the waiter/girlfriend told Mr. Walker that she heard Erin Pigneri use the "N" word in reference to Petitioner after Erin Pigneri left the kitchen after the shirt incident on December 18, 2004. Petitioner testified that neither he nor Mr. Walker had first- hand knowledge of Erin Pigneri's alleged use the "N" word in the dining room. Neither Mr. Walker nor the waiter provided testimony at the hearing. Accordingly, this hearsay evidence is not competent evidence that Erin Pigneri used a racial slur in the dining room after the "shirt incident." During the meeting on December 20, 2004, Erin Pigneri explained to Petitioner and Mr. Walker that the incident on December 18, 2004, involved Petitioner's insubordination and not racism. Mr. Walker wanted to know why Erin Pigneri had not fired Petitioner on Saturday night if he had been insubordinate. Erin Pigneri told Mr. Walker that he would have fired Petitioner but he did not want Respondent to lose Mr. Walker as an employee. Apparently, it is relatively easy to replace a dishwasher but not easy to replace a cook like Mr. Walker. Erin Pigneri asked Mr. Walker and another African- American who worked in the kitchen whether they had ever heard him make derogatory racial slurs. There is no persuasive evidence that Erin Pigneri ever made such comments even though Petitioner occasionally, and in a joking manner, called Erin Pigneri slang names like Cracker, Dago, and Guinea. Petitioner was present when Mr. Walker and Erin Pigneri discussed the alleged racial slurs. Petitioner's only contribution to the conversation was to repeatedly ask whether he was fired. Erin Pigneri never told Petitioner he was fired. After hearing Mr. Walker's concern and Erin Pigneri's explanation, James Pigneri specifically told Petitioner that he was not fired. James Pigneri told Petitioner that he needed to talk to Erin Pigneri and that they needed to work things out, man-to-man. After the meeting, Mr. Walker began his work for the evening shift on December 20, 2004. Petitioner walked around talking on his cell phone, telling his mother that he had been fired and she needed to pick him up. James Pigneri told Petitioner again that he was not fired, that Petitioner should go talk to Erin Pigneri, and that Erin Pigneri was waiting to talk to Petitioner. Erin Pigneri waited in his office for Petitioner to come in to see him. Petitioner never took advantage of that opportunity. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that James Pigneri made an alleged racial slur in reference to Petitioner at some unidentified point in time. According to Petitioner, he learned about the alleged racial slur second-hand from a cook named Bob. Bob did not testify at the hearing; therefore, there is no competent evidence that James Pigneri ever made a racial slur in reference to Petitioner or any other employee. Contrary to PMI's reporting procedures, Petitioner never called or informed PMI that he had been harassed, discriminated against, fired, terminated, or ceased working for Respondent for any reason. On December 22, 2004, PMI correctly concluded that Petitioner had voluntarily terminated or abandoned his employment. When Petitioner filed his Employment Complaint of Discrimination on January 11, 2005, Petitioner listed his address as 6526 Lance Street, Panama City, Florida, which is his mother's residence. On April 18, 2005, FCHR sent the Determination: No Cause to Petitioner at 6501 Pridgen Street, Panama City, Florida, which is the address of one of Petitioner's friends. When Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief on May 25, 2005, Petitioner listed his address the same as his mother's home. FCHR transmitted the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings, indicating that Petitioner's address of record was the same as his friend's home. Therefore, the June 9, 2005, Notice of Hearing, and the July 12, 2005, Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing were sent to Petitioner at his friend's address. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that between January 2005 and August 2005, he lived back and forth between his mother's and his friend's residences. When he lived with his friend, Petitioner did not check his mail at his mother's home every day. However, Petitioner admitted that he received the June 9, 2005, Notice of Hearing, scheduling the hearing for July 18, 2005, and the July 12, 2005, Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing for August 19, 2005. Petitioner testified that he knew the first hearing was rescheduled to take place on August 19, 2005. According to Petitioner, he misplaced the "papers" identifying the location of the hearing at the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims in Panama City, Florida. Petitioner asserts that he went to the county courthouse on August 19, 2005, based on his erroneous belief that the hearing was to take place at that location. After determining that there was no administrative hearing scheduled at the county courthouse on August 19, 2005, Petitioner did not attempt to call FCHR or the Division of Administrative Hearings. On December 1, 2005, the undersigned sent Petitioner a Notice of Hearing, scheduling the hearing after remand for January 25, 2005. The December 1, 2005, Notice of Hearing was sent to Petitioner at his mother's and his friend's addresses. The copy of the notice sent to his friend's home was returned as undeliverable. During the hearing on January 25, 2005, Petitioner testified that he used one of the earlier notices (dated June 9, 2005, and/or July 12, 2005) to locate the hearing site for that day. This was necessary because Petitioner had misplaced the December 1, 2005, Notice of Hearing. All three notices have listed the hearing site as the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims, 2401 State Avenue, Panama City, Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary R. Wheeler, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod Pope & Weaver, P.A. Post Office Box 550770 Jacksonville, Florida 32255-0770 Marlow Williams 6526 Lance Street Panama City, Florida 32404
The Issue Whether Respondent, Sanford Housing Authority (Respondent), committed an unlawful employment practice as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner, Jimitre Smith (Petitioner), be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female who was pregnant during a portion of the time events occurred related to her employment with Respondent. At the time of Petitioner’s initial employment with Respondent, the Sanford Housing Authority operated public housing complexes within its geographical area pursuant to a HUD program to provide housing assistant to low income, qualified residents. At some point, the Orlando Housing Authority stepped in to take over the management of Respondent’s properties. Due to the deteriorating condition of Respondent’s properties, residents were provided Section 8 vouchers so that they could obtain private rental opportunities. In the midst of the transition period, Petitioner’s employment with Respondent ended. Petitioner was initially hired by Respondent to replace a receptionist who was out on maternity leave. The assignment was part-time and temporary. It began on or about March 31, 2010. When the receptionist returned to work, Petitioner was offered a second part-time job as leasing clerk. Although the record is not clear when this second job started, it is undisputed that Petitioner sought and was granted maternity leave due to her own pregnancy on September 27, 2010. It was during this time period that the Orlando Housing Authority stepped in to take over Respondent’s responsibilities. Mr. Fleming, an employee of the Orlando Housing Authority, served as the Interim Executive Director for Respondent. In November 2010 residents were advised of the plan to demolish the substandard housing units. Since the units would not be leased, a leasing clerk was no longer required. Although Petitioner had been told she could return to work after her maternity leave, there was no position available for her at that time. Once the Orlando Housing Authority took over management, all of the day-to-day work was assigned to its employees. Respondent kept a handful of maintenance workers, but there is no evidence Petitioner sought and/or was denied that type of job. Petitioner claimed she should have been offered or allowed to apply for a job with the Orlando Housing Authority. There is no evidence that entity was required to hire her or that it refused to hire her because of her gender or pregnancy or that Respondent refused to recommend Petitioner for employment due to her gender or pregnancy. When Petitioner was cleared for return to work in December 2010, there was not a job to return to as Respondent did not have a position for her. There is no evidence that Respondent hired anyone during or after Petitioner’s pregnancy or that Petitioner was refused a job that she was qualified to perform. Had a suitable job been available, it most likely would have come through the Orlando Housing Authority. In January of 2011, Respondent formally eliminated Respondent’s part-time position through a reduction in workforce decision. At that time, Petitioner received a severance payment from Respondent and an offer for other job training opportunities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, and dismissing her employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jimitre Rochelle Smith 804 South Bay Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771 Ricardo L. Gilmore, Esquire Saxon, Gilmore, Carraway and Gibbons, P.A. Suite 600 201 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was retaliated against in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner worked for FCTC for several years in several different positions, including as a career pathways supervisor, and most recently as a grant writer. FCTC was, for all times relevant to Petitioner’s allegations, a conversion charter technical center in St. Johns County, Florida, operating pursuant to a charter contract with the District by a privately organized 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, the First Coast Technical Institute (FCTI). On July 1, 2016, the District began operating the educational programs at FCTC, due to the dire financial situation which had developed at the college. In taking over the programs at FCTC, the District immediately recognized that the administrative staff at FCTC was bloated and needed to be streamlined. Further, because FCTC would now be operated by the District, the District endeavored to evaluate FCTC’s structure to determine how it could operate more like a District school, including with respect to personnel structure. The District set out to reorganize and restructure FCTC to align it with the District and address administrative redundancy and financial issues. To facilitate this transition and evaluation, the District placed all administrative employees at FCTC on temporary contracts, effective July 1, 2016. This decision was made sometime in June 2016. On the morning of July 1, 2016, all employees of FCTC were called to a meeting held by Dr. Joseph Joyner, the District Superintendent. At that meeting, Dr. Joyner introduced Cathy Mittelstadt as the interim principal. At the conclusion of the meeting, all administrative personnel, including Petitioner, were offered temporary employment contracts, for a term of approximately six months. The contracts could be terminated by either party with two weeks’ notice. No administrative employee was placed on a longer temporary contract. The temporary employment contracts, including Petitioner’s, began on July 1, 2016, and terminated on December 21, 2016. Petitioner’s temporary employment contract expressly incorporates District Board Rule 6.10(3). Board Rule 6.10(3) concerns temporary employment with the District, and provides that temporary employees work for a limited amount of time. The rule does not state that temporary employees enjoy an expectation of employment beyond the contract term. As the interim principal, Ms. Middelstadt was tasked by the District with evaluating the structure of FCTC to determine how it could be streamlined to address budget and financial issues and also bring it in line with how other District schools operated. The elimination of positions at FCTC was contemplated as part of this evaluation. Every administrative position at FCTC was evaluated for potential elimination. Ultimately, Ms. Mittelstadt was responsible for recommending to the District’s Executive Cabinet (Executive Cabinet) how FCTC should be restructured. As part of this process, Ms. Mittelstadt was also responsible for recommending to the Executive Cabinet those positions that would be eliminated as part of the restructuring process. The Executive Cabinet did not reject any of Ms. Mittelstadt’s recommendations, but rather, accepted them without change. The Executive Cabinet would not have taken any action with respect to any employee working at FCTC without a recommendation from Ms. Mittelstadt. Ms. Weber had limited involvement in the restructuring process. She provided ministerial assistance to Ms. Mittelstadt during this process, but she was not responsible for, or involved in, the decision as to how the school would be restructured, or for any recommendations regarding the same. FCTC employees were kept informed as to the status of restructuring during the process. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber did not tell any administrative employee at FCTC, including Petitioner, that they could expect their contract would be renewed or that they would retain their positions past the term of their temporary employment contract. Petitioner understood that he was being appointed to a temporary employment contract not to extend past December 21, 2016. Ms. Mittelstadt made the determination as part of the restructuring process that Petitioner’s position should be eliminated, and that his temporary employment contract would be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms. Ms. Mittelstadt recommended this course of action to the Executive Cabinet, which approved it. Through Ms. Mittelstadt’s evaluation and assessment of the needs of FCTC, she determined that a full-time grant writer was not necessary for FCTC. Certain tasks related to grants obtained by the School District, including accounting related tasks, are handled in the District’s main office, and the remaining tasks related to grants are handled at particular schools by a different position, career specialists. Indeed, no other District school employs a full-time grant writer. In furtherance of the District’s decision to streamline administration at FCTC and realign it with how other District schools operated, Ms. Mittelstadt determined that the grant writer position occupied by Petitioner, as well as another type of position at FCTC, the program manager position, should be eliminated, and the duties performed within those positions subsumed within the career specialist position, as in other District schools. The District distributed a vacancy announcement for the Career Specialist position to all FCTC employees, including Petitioner. The announcement included a job description for the position. The job description and vacancy announcement were used to fill the position. The job description provides that grant writing and management, encompassing Petitioner’s duties as a grant writer, are part of the duties, among others, of a career specialist. Petitioner did not apply for this position. Petitioner was informed at a meeting on November 18, 2016, that his contract would be allowed to expire effective December 21, 2016, and not renewed. Present at this meeting, in addition to Petitioner, were Ms. Mittelstadt, Ms. Weber, and Brennan Asplen, the District’s Deputy Superintendent for Academic & Student Services. At the meeting, Petitioner was provided a notice indicating that his temporary employment contract was expiring pursuant to its terms. Petitioner was permitted to work through the remainder of his contract term with no diminution in benefits or pay. Petitioner requested to be placed in another position at FCTC at this time, but was informed there were no vacancies posted for him to be moved to, that the District was not placing non-renewed employees into positions, and that he could apply to any position he liked when it was posted. One position, a Case Manager in the Career Pathways program, was funded from a grant, and that position was technically vacant under the grant. However, FCTC was in a hiring freeze at the time, as Ms. Mittelstadt made the decision to not fill the Case Manager position given, and during, the extensive realignment and assessment of FCTC whose budget was being scrutinized at a deep level. The District did not place any other non-renewed employees into positions. The Case Manager position was eventually advertised in April 2017. Petitioner did not apply for the position despite being informed of it and having nothing restricting him from doing so. Petitioner’s work performance played no role in the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber both indicated that they did not retaliate against Petitioner for any reason. In fact, Petitioner was not the only person whose position was eliminated. Ms. Mittelstadt also recommended that six or seven other positions also be eliminated. Furthermore, approximately 12 to 15 FCTC employees resigned, and their positions were eliminated. Had those employees not resigned, their positions still would have been eliminated and those employees’ contracts would have been allowed to expire. Petitioner filed the complaint or charge, at issue in this proceeding, with the FCHR on December 22, 2016 (December 22nd Complaint). In it, Petitioner alleges that he was retaliated against in violation of the FCRA. While Petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time that he filed the December 22nd Complaint, he obtained representation from a lawyer thereafter, and during the FCHR’s investigation of this complaint. This was not Petitioner’s first complaint filed with FCHR concerning his work at FCTC. Just before the District began operating the programs at FCTC, and specifically on June 27, 2016, Petitioner filed a complaint (June 27th Complaint) with the FCHR also alleging retaliation. The June 27th Complaint was received by the FCHR on June 28, 2016. Petitioner introduced no evidence showing that at the time the decision was made to place individuals on temporary employment contracts, that the District was aware of his June 27th Complaint. Petitioner alleges in the December 22nd Complaint that the District terminated his employment because he engaged in protected activity under the FCRA. Petitioner does not allege in the complaint that he was subjected to a hostile work environment or harassment due to any retaliatory animus on the part of the District. Rather, Petitioner only alleges that he believes he frustrated his supervisor at various times, not that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. On August 17, 2017, the FCHR issued a no-cause determination. On September 20, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Unlawful Employment Practice, initiating the instant proceeding. In the Petition, Petitioner largely alleges that he believes the District submitted false information to the FCHR and that the District was guilty of various acts of fraud and abuses. Specifically, Petitioner alleged: Not only did the SJCSD lie about its relationship with FCTC, the SJCSD deliberately lied about my position working collaboratively with other SJCSD personnel assigned to grants administration and my unique ability to assist the SJCSD in avoiding mistakes that they were driven to make, mistakes that rose to the point that they became criminal. The SJCSD committed to a path of making such criminal errors with federal funds and falsifying their account of why they fired me. I have assembled sufficient evidence to show that the SJCSD is guilty of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and that they fired me as a whistle blower having abundant evidence of their crimes committed against the public interest for the personal benefit of key administrators. In his Petition, Petitioner did not identify reasons why he believes the FCHR’s “No Reasonable Cause” finding was without merit. And other than his alleged retaliatory firing, Petitioner does not identify any other adverse effects that he suffered as a result of the SJCSD “criminal” activities, or allege that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. Petitioner alleged for the first time at hearing that the District subjected him to a hostile work environment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. He alleged this hostile work environment centered on three actions. First, that the District did not provide him a copy of a harassment complaint filed by another employee concerning him in a timely manner, and did not set up the meetings he requested to address that complaint the way he wished. Second, that District personnel did not provide him access to “SunGard” software. And, third, that District officials asked him to sign a form related to grants that he did not wish to sign. Regarding the first allegation, sometime prior to July 1, 2016, Renee Staufaccher filed a complaint with Stephanie Thomas regarding Petitioner’s conduct. This complaint was lodged while the District was not operating the programs at FCTC. District officials told Petitioner that complaints lodged during this time period should be referred to FCTI. Once the District began operating the programs at FCTC, Petitioner reached out to Ms. Weber for a copy of Ms. Staufaccher’s complaint. Ms. Weber took steps to obtain that complaint, and it was provided to Petitioner within roughly two weeks of his request, despite Ms. Weber being out of the office one of those weeks. Petitioner requested to meet with Ms. Staufaccher and Ms. Thomas regarding the nature of the complaint and his concerns about whether the complaint was authentic. Ms. Staufaccher was no longer employed at FCTC within a matter of days of this request. Petitioner also requested to meet with Ms. Thomas only a matter of days before she ceased working at FCTC. Petitioner was not afforded the meeting or other items requested because the matter concerned old, not ongoing events occurring prior to the time the District began operating FCTC. Petitioner did not interact with, or report to, Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas during this time, and neither supervised him. Petitioner never disclosed to the District that he was suffering continued harassment at the hands of Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas subsequent to July 1, 2016. Petitioner offered no evidence that his request was handled differently from any other District employee, and Ms. Weber credibly testified he was treated the same as any other District employee in this regard. Regarding the second allegation, Petitioner alleged at the hearing that the District did not provide him access to SunGard, a computer program that had some relation to the performance of his job duties. At hearing, Petitioner represented that he was never provided access to this program. However, he later conceded that he did have access to this program during his employment. Specifically, prior to being given direct access to this program, Petitioner was provided access to the information in the program through the assistance of another District employee. This provided Petitioner with access to the information he needed to perform his job, including generating reports. Accordingly, it was not necessary for Petitioner to have direct access to SunGard to perform his job duties. The District was not authorizing extensive access to SunGard during this time because it was in the process of creating new systems and processes to bring FCTC in line with the District’s standards. In short, Petitioner was still able to perform his job, despite his complaint that he was not given direct access to SunGard. As to Petitioner’s third complaint, on or about October 2016, Jena Young, formerly employed in the District’s accounting office, asked Petitioner to sign a form related to grant accounting. Ms. Young was not Petitioner’s supervisor. Petitioner stated that he did not want to sign the form because he believed there was incorrect information on the form. Petitioner was not forced to sign the form, and was not told he must sign the form or face adverse consequences. Ultimately, he did not sign the form. The District maintains a rule governing harassment in the workplace. The rule provides a complaint procedure for employees to complain of harassment. The rule provides multiple avenues for employees to report harassment, and provides that complaints will be investigated and discipline meted out for employees impermissibly harassing others in violation of the rule. The rule prohibits retaliation against an employee who files a complaint. Notably, Petitioner never filed a harassment complaint about conduct occurring subsequent to July 1, 2016, despite his being aware of the rule. Petitioner’s protected activity at issue in this case concerns his June 27th Complaint and varied grievances that he filed while he was an employee at FCTC prior to July 1, 2016. Petitioner only offered three grievances into evidence--his first grievance, his ninth grievance and his tenth grievance-- all lodged prior to July 1, 2016, and all concerning the conduct of administrators at FCTC while it was still operated by FCTI and not the District. Petitioner’s first grievance was filed on May 21, 2015, alleging that FCTC’s then-president, Sandra Fortner, engaged in nepotism by hiring her friends and family, and that he experienced a hostile work environment because a co-worker, William Waterman, was rude to him in meetings and in e-mails. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was being discriminated against on the basis of a protected class or that he believed anyone else was being discriminated against or adversely affected because of their protected class. Petitioner’s ninth and tenth grievances, both filed on June 13, 2016, allege that Ms. Fortner engaged in nepotism by hiring her associates, and that Stephanie Thomas, FCTC’s Human Resources Director, and Ms. Stauffacher, were complicit in that nepotism. Indeed, Petitioner testified that the thrust of these grievances was that members of potential protected classes did not get to interview for jobs at FCTC, not because of those protected classes, but because they were not Ms. Fortner’s friends or family. Ms. Mittelstadt had not seen the grievances that Petitioner filed, and had no knowledge of the June 27th Complaint when she determined that his contract be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms and his position eliminated. Petitioner introduced no evidence that Ms. Mittelstadt ever saw any of his grievances or the June 27th Complaint at the time she made the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt credibly testified that none of Petitioner’s grievances, requests for grievances, e-mails related to grievances, or his June 27th Complaint played any role in her recommendation that his position be eliminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gregory R. Lulkoski in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Gregory Ryan Lulkoski 212 River Island Circle St. Augustine, Florida 32095 (eServed) Michael P. Spellman, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Jeffrey Douglas Slanker, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Robert J. Sniffen, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against in employment by the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact In 1989 Dennis Presson filed a complaint of discrimination against Walt Disney World Co., Respondent, alleging he was denied employment with Disney by reason of his handicap (epilepsy). This complaint was settled between the parties by a Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 1) on June 23, 1989 at which time Respondent agreed to employ Petitioner as a Property Craftsworker Assistant and Petitioner was so employed on June 28, 1989. On October 6, 1989 Petitioner was given a written reprimand for refusing to follow a directive given by his shop foreman. (Exhibit 20.) On November 11, 1989 Petitioner was given an oral reprimand for disruptive behavior in the shop. (Exhibit 24.) On November 29, 1989 Petitioner was given an oral reprimand for excessive absences and tardiness. (Exhibit 26.) Over a period of four months Petitioner had been absent (or tardy) a total of 25.5 hours. On February 6, 1990 Petitioner was given a written reprimand for disrupting the harmonious and productive working atmosphere of the shop. (Exhibit 25.) On May 16, 1990 Petitioner was given a written reprimand for unprofessional craftsmanship for using chewing gum as a woodfiller to repair a chair. (Exhibit 22.) On July 23, 1990 Petitioner was given a written reprimand for using shop machinery in a unsafe manner. (Exhibit 23.) In August 1990 while Petitioner was working in the Furnishings Department to which he was originally assigned, the work in that department declined and, in lieu of laying off some of the workers in the Furnishings Department, three of these property craftsman assistants, including Petitioner, were temporarily assigned to the Resorts Decorating Department to work there through the first week of October 1990. (Exhibit 27.) On or about October 10, 1990 Petitioner was returned to the Furnishings Department and on October 11, 1990 was laid off due to lack of work. On November 2, 1990 the remaining six property craftworker assistants employed by Respondent in the Furnishings Department were laid off. All craftworker assistants who had been employed by Respondent for one year or more were given a right to return within 12 months if jobs became available. This is pursuant to a contract between Respondent and the employees' union. None of those property craftsworker assistants laid off at or about the time Petitioner was laid off were rehired as property craftsworker assistants during the ensuing 12 months. Petitioner contends that after he was laid off four new people were hired as property craftsworkers, a position for which he deemed himself qualified. However, the position of property craftsworker required carpentry experience which the four new hires had and Petitioner did not. Property craftsworker's assistant does not require carpentry experience to qualify for hiring in that position. During the time Petitioner was employed by Respondent no craftsworker assistant was promoted to craftsworker. Credible evidence was presented that while Petitioner was employed as a property craftsworker assistant the quality of his work was satisfactory so long as he was closely supervised by his foreman; however, when not closely supervised both the quality and quantity of his work output declined. Petitioner's testimony that he worked best when someone was not looking over his shoulder is not credible. Petitioner's testimony that he was transferred to Resorts Decorating and then transferred back to Furnishings to be laid off was totally discredited by competent evidence that, when faced with lack of work in Furnishings for property craftsworkers assistants, Disney attempted to have these employees temporarily moved other departments where their skills could be used for a short period in lieu of laying them off. When their function could no longer be justified at their temporary employment position, they were returned to the Department from which they were loaned. In the instance of Petitioner's transfer, he and two other craftsworker assistants were transferred to the Resorts Decorating Department from August 20, 1990 until the first week of October 1990. (Exhibit 27.)
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed by Dennis M. Presson against Walt Disney World be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis M. Presson 2816 4th Street Orlando, Florida 32820 Susan K. McKenna, Esquire 322 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Margaret A. Jones/Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Room 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32302 4149 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Building F, Room 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32302 4149
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed with the Respondent from August 3, 1985 until May 10, 1986, as a waitress in the dining room of the Kings Inn Restaurant in Pensacola, Florida. In March, 1987, the Petitioner became pregnant. She then informed her employer, Mr. Judge of her pregnancy. He told her initially that she could work as long as the doctor allowed her to. Shortly thereafter, he told her that she could not work after five months of pregnancy. On another occasion, his assistant manager, Mr. Dungan, told her that she could not work after she "started showing." Once the Respondent, Mr. Judge, learned of the Petitioner's pregnancy, he began a regime of harassing treatment. For instance, Mr. Judge made her do the "side work," filling up all the salt and pepper shakers and sugar bowls for all of the waitresses and waitress stations. It had always been uniform policy that each waitress had the responsibility to do her own side work for her own station and tables. Mr. Judge also began yelling and cursing at her in front of her workers and customers, causing her great humiliation and embarrassment. He criticized her publicly about her posture and the way she serviced customers, although she had always had an excellent record as a competent waitress and had no complaints from customers or former employers, before announcing that she was pregnant. Mr. Judge also began a practice of constantly questioning other employees about the Petitioner's job performance, although he apparently learned of no substandard performance in both her duties and her attitude toward her customers. He also took her to task about her "charge tips" being less than other employees, apparently the measure he used to determine if a waitress was serving her customers appropriately and adequately. This situation, however, was caused by his discriminatory conduct toward her in giving her fewer tables to serve and thus, reducing her tip income. Mr. Judge additionally assigned her to clean up a portion of the kitchen area, particularly the "bread shelves" when normal policy had been for kitchen personnel to perform all kitchen clean-up duties, with any clean up of the bread shelf area being rotated amongst the dining room personnel. The Petitioner, however, was singled out for this duty exclusively after it became known that she was pregnant. The Petitioner was also required to stay late and perform certain closing duties at the end of business late at night, much more often than other waitresses. In addition to performing restaurant closing duties, she was frequently required to wait on cocktail tables as late as 2:00 in the morning on many of the "late duty" occasions, even though she was hired as, and until she became pregnant worked exclusively as, food waitress. Petitioner's testimony and Petitioner's exhibit 2, in evidence, establishes that, although Petitioner was only scheduled to stay late three times in March, three times in April and once in May that, in fact, she worked late, that is, after all other employees or waitresses had been released for the evening seven out of nine days that she worked in March; nine out of twelve days she worked in April; and six out of the seven days she worked in May. Indeed, on May 10, 1986, the last day she worked for the Respondent, Mr. Judge required her to stay late and to "bus" all the tables, that is clean all the tables, in the dining room, allowing the waitress who was scheduled to stay late that night to leave early. The Petitioner became quite upset at this turn of events and resigned her position, due to the repeated pattern of harassment as described herein. Although Mr. Judge initially told the Petitioner that she could work as long as the doctor allowed her to during her pregnancy, in fact, on April 11, 1986, Mr. Judge hired the Petitioner's replacement. He hired Pamela Modes and had the Petitioner train her in her waitress duties. He stated to Ms. Modes privately when hiring her "that he needed a food waitress" because "he's got a girl that's pregnant." Additionally, he told the Petitioner that he objected to her working because of her pregnancy and claimed his insurance would not allow him to employ her after she was five months pregnant. These statements, coupled with the statement by his assistant manager, Mr. Dungan, to the effect that she would not be employed there "once she started showing" reveal an intent by the employer to terminate the employee, the Petitioner, because of her pregnancy. Instead of terminating her outright, the Respondent chose to put sufficient pressure on the Petitioner through extra, unscheduled work duties and the other above-mentioned forms of harassment, so as to coerce her into leaving the Respondent's employ. The Petitioner thus made a prima facia showing that she was forced to terminate employment due to her sex and her pregnancy, and no countervailing evidence was adduced by the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida Human Relations Commission finding that an unlawful employment practice has occurred through the Respondent's discrimination against the Petitioner because of her sex (pregnancy) and that she be accorded all relief allowed under the above- cited section, including backpay and related benefits in accordance with the requirements of Section 760.10(13), Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 21st of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra A. Larson, Pro Se 9742 Aileron Avenue, Apt. 606 Pensacola, Florida 32506 Dracut Corporation d/b/a Kings Inn Restaurant Lawrence F. Judge, Jr. Owner/General Manager 1309 Maldonado Pensacola Beach, Florida 32561-2323 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Phillips is a person of the masculine sex. He was employed as a maintenance foreman at Respondent Martin Stables South, Inc. (Martin Stables), of Reddick, Florida, from May 19, 2005, until June 27, 2005. Edmund Martin is the president of Martin Stables. He is also the only stockholder. Mr. Martin is aware of the number of employees working at Martin Stables. He testified that Martin Stables had less than 15 employees during the period May 19, 2005 to June 27, 2005. Moreover, he testified that Martin Stables never employed 15 or more employees in the current year, or in the year preceding May 19, 2005. He further stated that Martin Stables had never employed as many as 15 employees at any given time. Mr. Phillips provided no evidence contradicting this assertion.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John L. Phillips Post Office Box 771011 Ocala, Florida 34477 David A. Glenny, Esquire Bice Cole Law Firm, P.L. 1333 Southeast Twenty-Fifth Loop Suite 101 Ocala, Florida 34471 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 10, 1989, Petitioner, Mark Cleveland, a male, applied through Job Service of Florida, for employment as a telemarketer with Respondent, Sears Roebuck and Company at the Sears store located in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner had several years of sales experience with at least six months of experience in telemarketing. He also had a good speaking voice as evidenced by the fact that he is currently employed as a disc jockey at a local radio station. Clearly, Respondent was qualified for the telemarketing position. The telemarketer position would enable Petitioner to earn approximately $85.00 a week or $365.50 a month. The telemarketing section at the Pensacola Sears store consisted of virtually all women with perhaps three or four rare male telemarketers. Petitioner had two separate interviews with two different Sears employees responsible for filling the telemarketing positions. During the Petitioner's interviews with the two Sears employees, Petitioner was repeatedly questioned on whether he could work with all women or mostly all women and be supervised by women. Petitioner assured his interviewers that he could since he grew up with six sisters and in general liked working with women. Petitioner left the interview with the information that he would be hired after another supervisor reviewed the applications and that he would be called once the supervisor's review was complete. After several days, Petitioner, being excited about what he thought was going to be his new job, called one of the two women who interviewed him. He was informed that the telemarketing positions had been filled. Later that same day Petitioner discovered that the positions had, in fact, not been filled and that he had been told an untruth. The telemarketing positions were eventually filled by women. Petitioner remained out of work for approximately four months before he was hired as a telemarketer by the Pensacola News Journal. A Notice of Assignment and Order was issued on August 27, 1991, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Notice. This Notice was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent did not respond to the Notice. On October 10, 1991, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the formal hearing for 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990. The location of the hearing was listed in the Notice. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent's address and acknowledgment of this litigation was confirmed when Respondent filed its answer to the Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Even though Respondent received adequate notice of the hearing in this matter, the Respondent did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Petitioner was present at the hearing. The Respondent did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned that it would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Respondent to appear, the hearing was commenced. As a consequence of Respondent's failure to appear, no evidence rebutting Petitioner's facts were introduced into evidence at the hearing and specifically no evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose was introduced at the hearing. 1/ Petitioner has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on his sex, given the fact that Sears tried to mislead him into believing the telemarketing positions had been filled when they had not, the positions were all eventually filled by women and Sears' clear concern over Petitioner's ability to work with women. Such facts lead to the reasonable inference that Sears was engaging in an unlawful employment practice based on Respondent being a male, a protected class, in order to preserve a female work force in telemarketing. Such discrimination based on sex is prohibited under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and Petitioner is entitled to relief from that discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner was the subject of an illegal employment practice and awarding Petitioner $1,462.00 in backpay plus reasonable costs of $100.95 and an attorney's fee of $2,550.00. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1992.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, the appropriate relief for such action.
Findings Of Fact For purposes of this case, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent in July of 2007. Although the Petitioner had worked for the Respondent in prior years (at another location), he had voluntarily left the company to pursue other opportunities. When the Petitioner returned to employment with the Respondent in connection with this case, it was ten years after a heart transplant. At the time of hiring, the Respondent knew the Petitioner's medical condition and age. The Petitioner is approximately 61 years of age. The Respondent is a national corporation with several sites for engineering and manufacture of its products. The Respondent is an equal opportunity employer and maintains policies prohibiting unlawful discrimination. One of the Respondent's facilities, Sykes Creek, is located in Brevard County, Florida. The Petitioner was hired to work at the Sykes Creek facility in the role of engineering supervisor. The Sykes Creek site builds luxury power yachts ranging from 50–to-60 feet in length. The price of these yachts runs from approximately $900,000 to $2,000,000 each. Typically, the yacht is ordered and customized to the buyer's specification. The Petitioner was responsible for supervising and directing work at Sykes Creek and reported to Kevin Shaw, his immediate supervisor. Mr. Shaw in turn reported to the plant manager, Steven Fielder. The Petitioner reviewed the work and attendance of approximately 21 hourly employees. When the Petitioner was hired (2007), the Sykes Creek facility produced 116 yachts and employed approximately 575 people. Within the Petitioner's department (engineering) there were 26 people; four others like Petitioner were salaried employees. The economic crunch that struck most of the nation drastically reduced the Respondent's business. In 2008 the Respondent instituted unpaid furloughs and layoffs due to the lack of business. By 2009 the economic condition in the industry had not improved. Accordingly, the Respondent had to make additional cuts to its staff. To that end, Mr. Fielder advised Mr. Shaw that the Petitioner's department would have to be cut to reduce the number of hourly employees and one salaried employee. To determine who should be cut, the Respondent looked to the number of years of service with the company and the skill set/education they provided for the facility. The Petitioner had the shortest length of service with the Respondent except for an employee named Julie Halesma. That person was not chosen for lay-off because she was a credentialed industrial engineer. The Petitioner did not have those credentials. The Petitioner was not offered a lower, hourly paid position because he did not have the skill set to perform the work as well as the hourly employees who were already doing the jobs. A number of employees were laid off the same day the Petitioner was dismissed. The Petitioner's job position was eliminated and has not, as of the date of hearing, been restored. The Respondent has continued to lay off workers. In 2009 the Sykes Creek facility was down to 175 employees. The engineering department was down to 15 people. Absent a return to more prosperous times, it is not expected that the facility will be able to rehire employees. The job tasks that the Petitioner performed are now shared by other employees at the facility. Throughout his time at the Sykes Creek facility, the Petitioner was allowed to take time off as needed to attend to medical issues. Based upon the frequency of the medical leave, the Respondent knew or should have known that the Petitioner's medical condition required monthly treatment. The extent of the medical treatment, however, was unknown to the Respondent. As a salaried employee the Petitioner did not have to "punch the clock." The Respondent allowed the Petitioner to complete his work as he might dictate so that he was free to leave the facility to attend to his medical needs. Clearly, the Respondent knew the Petitioner had had the heart transplant at the time of hiring but that medical condition did not impede the Petitioner's ability to perform his job assignments. The medical situation required that he be absent, but there is no indication that Petitioner could not perform his job. The cost of the Petitioner's medical care was unknown to the persons charged with making the lay-off decisions. The cost of the Petitioner's medical care played no part in the decision to eliminate the Petitioner's job. Similarly, the Petitioner's age did not play a part of the Respondent's decision to eliminate the Petitioner's job. The Respondent articulated legitimate business reasons for eliminating the Petitioner's job position. Clearly the Respondent knew of the Petitioner's age at the time of hiring. The Respondent did not replace the Petitioner with a younger employee. The Respondent's explanation for whom it chose to retain in employment was not based upon an employee's age but rather legitimate business interests. Episodes during which the Petitioner required medical attention at the facility did not rise to a level to cause the Respondent to be concerned for Petitioner's medical well-being. Incidents of the Petitioner being light headed or with low blood sugar did not cause the Respondent to seek to eliminate the Petitioner's job position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by the Petitioner, and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Rolf J. Bierman 1035 Palmer Road Rockledge, Florida 32955 Brian W. Koji, Esquire Bona M. Kim, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 324 South Hyde Park Avenue, Suite 225 Tampa, Florida 33606 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301