Findings Of Fact On August 24, 1981, Famous Brands Television and Appliances, Inc., entered into a Consent Order with the State Attorney for Palm Beach County, Florida, whereby Famous Brands, together with its principals and officers and agents, agreed to cease and desist from utilizing "bait and switch" practices or be held in contempt of court. At all times material to that litigation, Respondent Bill Lacek was the president of Famous Brands Television and Appliances, Inc. Famous Brands became bankrupt. Lacek knew that his credibility had been affected by his management of Famous Brands. Therefore, when he opened V.T.S. Video, Inc., a similar business, he placed the corporation in the name of his sister Rose Richard. Although ostensibly the president and sole director of V.T.S. Video, Rose Richard's duties were limited to those of a bookkeeper/office manager, the same duties which she had when she worked for her brother at Famous Brands. V.T.S. Video was in the business of advertising and offering for sale video, television and stereo products to the general public. The business was located at 25 North Military Trail, West Palm Beach, Florida. Respondent Bill Lacek formulated, controlled, and directed the acts and practices at V.T.S. Video. He was personally responsible for the purchasing, advertising, marketing, and promoting of the products sold by V.T.S. Video. He personally wrote the advertising, established the sales commission structure for the employees of V.T.S. Video, and attended sales meetings. Lacek solicited customers through newspaper advertising, including advertisements in The Palm Beach Post. Lacek's advertisements included ads for Sony and Hitachi televisions and video cameras. Respondent Lacek's advertisements were not bona fide offers to sell the advertised products. When customers appeared at V.T.S. Video to purchase the advertised Sony or Hitachi products, they were told by V.T.S. Video employees that the Sony or Hitachi products were not available or that the only product available was a "floor model," i.e., a model which has been used at the business for demonstration purposes and which frequently has been damaged and is, therefore, an unattractive product for purchase. Additionally, Lacek and the employees of V.T.S. Video would disparage the advertised products and "switch" the shopper to a different brand, the item which Lacek intended to sell instead of the advertised product. To assure that his salesmen would follow his established "switch and bait" techniques, Lacek set the sales commission structure so that no commission was paid to a salesman who sold the advertised product (if one were available) rather than the product to which the customer was to be switched. Further, the advertisements written by Lacek did not disclose the fact that the advertised item was a floor model. Hopper Electronics in Miami purchases from the factory rebuilt or refurbished products which it then sells to wholesalers. A rebuilt or refurbished product is a product which has been returned to the factory as defective by a customer or a distributor. The factory repairs the item and then re-boxes it for sale. In other words, a rebuilt or refurbished ("RB") product is a used product. Lacek purchased from Hopper on behalf of V.T.S. Video between 3,000 and 5,000 Emerson "RB" products between approximately late 1986 and late 1987. All of the Emerson RB units purchased from Hopper Electronics carried a label saying "RB" on the back of the unit itself and a label saying "RB" on the box containing the unit. Lacek paid Hopper Electronics a total of $780,000 for Emerson RB units during that time period. Although Lacek knew that the RB units were used and not new products, his newspaper ads for those units did not disclose that the products were used or that they were RB products. The Emerson televisions and VCRs purchased from Hopper were sold to the public as new products. Lacek instructed his employees not to disclose that the Emersons were not new products. If a customer questioned the "RB" label appearing on the back of the unit or on the box, the customer was told that the product had been re-boxed or that the product was from Riviera Beach. Respondent Bill Lacek knew that his sales practices were deceptive and that they constituted unfair trade practices, even prior to the institution of this proceeding, since they were the same practices that he was enjoined from utilizing when he signed the Consent Order on behalf of Famous Brands Television and Appliances, Inc., in 1981. Respondent Lacek's practices in the operation of V.T.S. Video have injured the public. Two Assistant Attorneys General represented Petitioner at the final hearing in this cause. Attached to Petitioner's proposed recommended order are affidavits from those attorneys stating that they have spent 220 hours combined in the "investigation and resolution" of this matter. Petitioner has failed to submit a cost affidavit and has therefore waived its statutory right to recover reasonable costs in this action. The Agreed Final Order to Cease and Desist entered into by Petitioner and Respondents V.T.S Video, Inc., and Rose Richard the day before the final hearing in this cause provides that Respondent V.T.S. Video, Inc., will pay to Petitioner the sum of $10,000 in civil penalties plus the sum of $15,000 for attorney's fees in this action.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent Bill Lacek guilty of the allegations in the Complaint filed against him; Ordering Respondent Bill Lacek to cease and desist from all violations of Chapter 501, Part II, Florida Statutes, and of Chapter 2-9, Florida Administrative Code; Assessing against Respondent Bill Lacek a civil penalty in the amount of $1,500,000; and Denying Petitioner's claim for reimbursement of its attorney's fees and costs against Respondent Bill Lacek. DONE and ENTERED this ,7th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 88-0505 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 5, 7-15, and 17 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 6 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 16 has been rejected as not being supported by the record in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda G. Lapin, Esquire Andy Itzkovits, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General Suite N921 401 N.W. Second Avenue Miami, Florida 32128 James S. Telepman, Esquire 340 Royal Palm Way Post Office Box 2525 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 (Last known address for Respondent Bill Lacek) Honorable Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was terminated from his position with the Respondent in retaliation for reporting an unlawful employment practice that occurred in June 1995.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an "employer" within the definition found in Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. Petitioner was an "employee" of the Respondent as defined in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes, and was employed by Respondent for approximately two years. Aaron Rents, Inc., is a national furniture rental and sales company which does business in some locations, including locations in Florida, as Aaron's Rental Purchase. Petitioner, Jerome Carter, was employed by the company at an Aaron's Rental Purchase store in Kissimmee, Florida, from approximately August 2, 1993, until August 19, 1995. Petitioner was initially hired as a delivery driver and progressed to Assistant Credit Manager, Credit Manager, and finally Sales Manager of the Kissimmee store. In August 1995, Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Store Manager Steven Liberti. Liberti reported to District Manager Leonard Alonzo, who was supervised by Florida Regional Manager Joseph Fedorchak. As the Sales Manager, one of Petitioner's most important job duties was greeting and interacting with customers. He typically had the first contact with each customer as they walked into the store, and his demeanor, as he greeted them, influenced whether they felt comfortable and were likely to make a purchase. Petitioner, however, was not appropriately welcoming and friendly. Petitioner's attitude was withdrawn and not very cordial. Petitioner himself admitted that he "never look[s] happy." Petitioner's sullen demeanor was the topic of numerous discussions with his supervisors. In an effort to address the Petitioner's concerns and improve his work performance, the District Manager initiated a conversation to elicit any complaints the Petitioner might have. Petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with his position as a Credit Manager and the length of time since his last raise. As a result, Alonzo transferred the Petitioner to the Sales Manager position and gave him a pay increase. After the transfer, however, Petitioner's demeanor did not brighten. Concerned, the District Manager again inquired about the cause of the Petitioner's apparent unhappiness. Petitioner merely acknowledged that his attitude needed improvement and promised that he would "straighten up" and "be more outgoing." Each time they had that discussion, however, Petitioner's behavior would improve for only a short time, then return to his previous melancholy. The Store Manager also talked to Petitioner at least twice about his attitude toward his job, telling him that he needed to smile more often. Although the Petitioner's behavior would temporarily change after these discussions, Liberti observed that the improvement lasted only about 24 hours. In August 1995, sales at the Kissimmee store were at an all-time low. Petitioner's supervisors attributed the location's failure to meet its sales goals at least in part to the Petitioner's inability to interact with customers and make sales. After their repeated discussions with him did not result in lasting improvement, the Managers felt they had no choice but to terminate Petitioners employment. Fedorchak concurred that, because the Petitioner could not seem to display an appropriate attitude and demeanor for a Sales Manager, his services were no longer needed. Petitioner admits that when he was discharged, the reason that he was given was that he "did not look happy." Approximately two months before Petitioner left the Kissimmee store, one incident with racial overtones was brought to the Store Manager's attention. In June 1995, store employees Mark Mars and/or Jesus Rivera reported to Liberti that another store employee, Michael Flowers (who is white), had used the term "nigger" during a discussion with store employee Kenny Tatum (who is black). Liberti informed Alonzo about the complaint and an investigation was conducted. When the Managers spoke with Tatum, he explained that Flowers had used the expression "nigger, please," which was slang for "you've got to be kidding," during a conversation between the two men. He assured them that he had not been offended. Nevertheless, because Alonzo and Liberti felt it was highly inappropriate for Flowers to use such language in the store, they gave him a reprimand and warning. In his deposition testimony, Petitioner recalled learning about the occurrence from several other employees. Petitioner did not personally witness it or hear Flowers use the offensive term, but merely claimed to have reported to Liberti what he had been told. According to Petitioner, Liberti responded to this information by affirming that such behavior would not be tolerated. Petitioner admits that he was never told, and had no reason to believe, that Aaron's authorized, encouraged, or instructed Flowers to use racially derogatory language in the store or that he had done so on Aaron's behalf. When Petitioner allegedly reported the occurrence to Liberti, he only believed that a co-employee had made an inappropriate comment at work. The incident involving Flowers and Tatum was unrelated to Petitioner's discharge. None of the three individuals involved in the decision to discharge Petitioner associated him with the incident or any opposition to it. Liberti does not recall discussing the incident with Petitioner, and neither Alonzo nor Fedorchak knew that Petitioner even claimed to have had some involvement in reporting it until after he was discharged. Moreover, none of the conversations among the three about their decision to terminate Petitioner included any reference to Flowers' comment or the subsequent events. No one who opposed the incident suffered any adverse consequences. Rivera and/or Mars reported the comment, and neither of them experienced any unfavorable employment actions as a result.
Recommendation Based upon the testimony and evidence submitted on the record in the formal hearings on this matter and by application of the relevant or governing principles of law to the findings of facts established on such record, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order which dismisses the Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerome L. Carter, Sr. 2188 McClaren Circle Kissimmee, Florida 34744 Daniel F. Piar, Esquire Kilpatrick Stockton LLP 1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, Georgia 30309-4530 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawfully discriminatory employment practice against Petitioner on the basis of race and religion, and retaliated against him, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA").
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Lawrence N. Brown, III, is an African- American male and is of the Christian faith. Petitioner has been employed with Respondent since April 14, 2014, at its store located at 3800 Oakwood Boulevard, Hollywood, Florida (hereafter, the "Store"). As of the final hearing, Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent at the Store. Respondent is a corporation doing business in Florida. Respondent owns and operates the Store at which Respondent was employed at the time of the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory actions. Employment Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief Petitioner filed an Employment Charge of Discrimination ("Discrimination Charge") with FCHR on or about March 10, 2016.4/ The pages attached to the Discrimination Charge form (which apparently was filled out in typewritten form by FCHR staff) were prepared by Petitioner. On or about July 18, 2016, Respondent issued a Determination: No Reasonable Cause, determining that Petitioner had not shown reasonable cause to believe that Respondent had committed unlawful employment practices against him. On or about August 16, 2016, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief requesting a hearing to determine whether Respondent committed unlawful employment practices against him. The Petition for Relief alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful discrimination against him on the basis of both his race and religion, and also alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful retaliation. These charges, as specifically set forth in the Petition for Relief, are the subject of this de novo proceeding.5/ In the Petition for Relief, Petitioner claims that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race by failing to promote him into supervisory or managerial positions for which he claims he was qualified; by giving him lower scores on his employment evaluations than were given to a white employee working in the same position (part-time hardlines merchandiser); by not paying him as much as they paid that same white employee; and by retaining that same white employee as a part-time hardlines merchandiser in the Toy Department, while moving Petitioner to another position as cashier. Petitioner also claims that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by scheduling him to work on Christmas Day 2015, while giving other employees that day off. Additionally, Petitioner claims that Respondent retaliated against him for complaining to Respondent's corporate legal department about having to work on Christmas Day 2015, by removing him as a hardline merchandiser in the Toy Department and reassigning him to a cashier position, then subsequently effectively "terminating" (in his words) his employment. Petitioner seeks an award of $5,000,000 in damages in this proceeding. Background Events As noted above, Petitioner was hired by Respondent on or about April 14, 2014. Petitioner initially was hired in a part-time position as a part-time overnight hardlines replenishment associate. In this position, Petitioner's work scheduling availability was between 10:30 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. When Petitioner was hired, Alberto Rodriquez was the Store manager. In his position as a part-time employee with Respondent, Petitioner was not guaranteed any specific number of weeks or hours of employment in any given calendar year, nor was he guaranteed that he would attain full-time employee status. The number of work hours Petitioner was assigned was dependent on the company's business needs and on Petitioner's ability to meet the applicable job performance standards. Petitioner acknowledged these and the other conditions of his employment as evidenced by his signature on the Pre-training Acknowledgment Summary dated April 14, 2014. As a result of the elimination of the overnight replenishment associate position, on or about October 26, 2014, Petitioner was transferred to another position as a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser. In this position, his work scheduling availability was between 6:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. As a hardlines merchandiser, Petitioner was responsible for stocking store shelves with merchandise, straightening merchandise on store shelves, putting returned merchandise on shelves, and generally keeping the hardlines departments neat and the shelves fully stocked. The Toy Department at the Store was one of several departments that were categorized as "hardlines" departments. In his duties as a hardlines merchandiser, Petitioner was not assigned to any specific hardlines department, and his responsibilities entailed working in any hardlines department as needed. However, as a practical matter, due to the work demand, Petitioner worked mostly, if not exclusively, in the Toy Department until he was reassigned to the cashier position after Christmas 2015. David Leach became the Store manager in April 2015. At some point before Christmas Day 2015, the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was posted. Petitioner was scheduled to work on Christmas Day, December 25, 2015. Petitioner did not volunteer, and had not otherwise requested, to work on Christmas Day 2015. The Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, which was a paid holiday for Respondent's employees. On or about December 23, 2015, Petitioner contacted Respondent's corporate legal department, requesting to be removed from the work schedule for Christmas Day 2015. Pursuant to a directive from Respondent's corporate office, Petitioner was removed from the work schedule for that day. Petitioner was not required to work on Christmas Day 2015, and he did not work that day. Petitioner was paid for the Christmas Day holiday. Although the Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, some Store employees were scheduled to work, and did work, that day on a volunteer basis, for which they were paid. On December 28, 2015, Leach presented Petitioner with a Request for Religious Accommodation form to sign. Petitioner signed the form. The form was marked as showing that Respondent "granted" the religious accommodation. Also on December 28, 2015, Leach informed Petitioner that he had eliminated the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position. He offered Petitioner other part-time positions, either as a cashier or in making pizza at the Little Caesar's pizza station in the Store. Leach did not offer any other positions to Petitioner at that time. Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, but informed Leach that he was unable to stand in a single place for long periods of time due to injuries he previously had sustained while working on the overnight shift. Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, effective January 3, 2016.6/ Petitioner's hourly wage did not change when his position changed to cashier. He continued to make the same hourly wage that he had made as a daytime hardlines merchandiser. At some point on or after December 28, 2015, Petitioner signed a Personnel Interview Record form that reflected his revised work hours associated with his position change to cashier. The form stated his availability to work between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The evidence is unclear as to whether Petitioner did (or did not) call in to inform the appropriate Store personnel that he would not be working on Tuesday, December 29, or on Thursday, December 31, 2015. Regardless, the persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner worked on Monday, December 28, 2015; did not work on Tuesday, December 29, or Thursday, December 31, 2015; and worked on Saturday, January 2, 2016. The work schedule for the week of January 3 through 10, 2016, was computer-generated some time during the week of December 27, 2015, through January 3, 2016. If an employee does not report to work when scheduled and does not call in to be excused from work on those days, this situation is termed a "no call-no show," and the employee will not be scheduled to work the following week. This is to ensure that there are cashiers available as needed to work on upcoming dates. Regardless of whether Petitioner did or did not call in to inform Respondent he would not be working on Tuesday, December 29, or Thursday, December 31, 2015, the posted work schedule for the week of January 3 through 10, 2016, showed Petitioner as not being scheduled to work that week. However, the evidence shows that Petitioner did, in fact, work a total of 15.90 hours the week of January 3 through 10, 2016. The work schedule posted as of Saturday, January 9, 2016, also showed Petitioner as not being scheduled to work the week of January 10 through 16, 2016. However, the evidence shows that Petitioner worked a total of 15.41 hours the week of January 10 through 16, 2016. At some point between January 13 and January 26, 2016, Petitioner was moved from the cashier position to the Store's date code specialist position. The date code specialist position also is a part-time position, for which Petitioner is paid the same hourly wage as he was paid as a daytime hardlines merchandiser. As of the final hearing, Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent, working as the Store's date code specialist. Race Discrimination Claims As previously noted, Petitioner began working for Respondent at the Store on April 14, 2014. His initial employment position was as a part-time overnight replenishment associate. In October 2014, he moved to a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position. In both positions, he was responsible for stocking and restocking merchandise in all hardlines departments, so was not assigned exclusively to the Store's Toy Department. However, as noted above, due to work demand in the Toy Department, Petitioner did most, if not all, of his work in that department until he was moved to the cashier position in late December 2015.7/ Petitioner contends that starting in mid-2014,8/ he periodically requested to be promoted to "Toy Lead" or to another supervisory or managerial position. He testified that he had undertaken many activities and implemented various systems to improve the efficiency and productivity of the Toy Department and other departments at the store, and had documented these activities and transmitted that information to the Respondent for inclusion in his personnel file. He testified that rather than promoting him to a supervisory position in the Toy Department, Respondent instead hired a non-African-American person to fill that position.9/ Petitioner additionally testified that he periodically would request to be transferred or promoted to other supervisory positions, but that Respondent did not grant these requests. He contends that since he was qualified for these positions, the only basis for Respondent's decision to fill those positions with other employees was discrimination against him on the basis of his race. In response, Leach testified that there was no formal "Toy Lead" position at the Store; rather, the person supervising the Toy Department is an assistant store manager, a position that entails supervising other hardlines departments besides the Toy Department. Further, Leach testified that in his view, Petitioner was not qualified to occupy certain supervisory positions because of his lack of experience in those areas and his relatively short period of employment with Respondent. Leach also testified that Petitioner had not ever formally applied for a promotion through Respondent's online application process. Petitioner further asserts that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race because he was not paid the same amount as Corey Harper, a white male hardlines merchandiser who also often worked part-time in the Toy Department on the afternoon or evening shift, even though he worked harder and received higher evaluation scores than did Harper.10/ However, Leach credibly testified that Respondent does not currently base its pay rate for part-time employees on job performance evaluation scores, but instead pays them a set hourly pay rate. According to Leach, Respondent has not given an hourly pay rate raise to part-time employees since 2009, so that any pay differential depended on whether employees were hired before or after 2009. Leach credibly testified that Harper has been employed by Respondent since 2004, so had received hourly pay rate raises between 2004 to November 2008; this would result in his hourly pay rate being higher than Petitioner's, even though both are part-time employees. Petitioner testified that when he was moved from the daytime hardlines merchandiser position to the cashier position after Christmas 2015, he made it clear that he wanted to remain in the Toy Department; however, Respondent transferred him out of that department while allowing Harper to remain in a hardlines merchandiser position, which entailed work in the Toy Department. Petitioner also made clear that he wished to return to the hardlines merchandiser position in the Toy Department when such a position became available; however, at some point, Leach reassigned Carol Yaw, who was white, from her previous office manager job to a hardlines merchandiser position. Petitioner asserts that Respondent's actions in allowing Harper to remain as a part-time hardline merchandiser and reassigning Yaw to a hardlines merchandiser position constituted discrimination against him on the basis of his race. However, Leach credibly testified that the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position that Petitioner had occupied was eliminated because of the lack of work in that position, primarily due to declining Toy Department sales after the holiday season. Additionally, immediately after Christmas 2015, Leach consolidated the overnight merchandise unloading and daytime shelf stocking positions and moved the overnight unloading employees to the day shift, where their duties consist of unloading merchandise from trucks and stocking shelves.11/ Leach credibly testified that Harper was not moved from his position because Leach had specifically decided not to move others unaffected by this reorganization out of their existing positions, and that Harper was an afternoon/evening hardlines merchandiser. Leach also credibly testified that he had moved Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser position after her office manager position was eliminated because she was a 25-year employee of Respondent, and he felt that she deserved that position out of loyalty for being a long-term employee of Respondent. Petitioner also contends that Respondent's evaluation of his job performance was unfair because it was conducted by an assistant store manager, Marjorie McCue, who was not his direct supervisor. Specifically, he contends that McCue was unfamiliar with his job performance, so did not appropriately consider, in his evaluation, improved Toy Department sales performance and efficiency that were due to measures that he had implemented. Petitioner also contends that McCue initially deliberately gave him an inaccurately low job performance evaluation in an effort to create a record to support terminating his employment, but that when he complained, those lower scores were changed to higher scores. The only performance evaluation regarding Petitioner's job performance that was admitted into evidence is a document titled "Employee Review" that was dated January 31, 2015; Petitioner received a 3.10 overall performance score on this performance evaluation.12/ The Employee Review for Harper dated January 31, 2015, also was admitted into evidence; Harper's overall performance score was 3.00. Upon careful consideration of the competent substantial evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden13/ to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by Respondent on the basis of his race. To do so, Petitioner must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was subject to adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified to do the job; and (4) his employer treated similarly-situated employees outside of his protected class more favorably than he was treated.14/ It is undisputed that Petitioner, as an African- American, is a member of a protected class. However, the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner was subject to adverse employment action. With respect to his assertion that Respondent failed to promote him on the basis of his race, Petitioner needed to show that, in addition to being a member of a protected class, he applied for and was qualified for a promotion; that he was rejected despite his qualifications; and that other equally or less-qualified employees outside of his class were promoted.15/ While Petitioner frequently sent email correspondence to Respondent's corporate legal office requesting to be promoted, the evidence does not show that he followed Respondent's formal online application process for applying for promotions.16/ Further, although the evidence indicates that Petitioner is very hard-working, energetic, bright, and detail-oriented, he did not demonstrate that those characteristics necessarily qualified him for the supervisory positions about which he inquired. He also did not demonstrate that Respondent filled the positions about which he had inquired with less-qualified non-African-American employees. In fact, Petitioner acknowledged, in testimony at the final hearing and in email correspondence with Respondent's corporate legal office, that in his view, some of the individuals who had been promoted were qualified for the positions to which they had been promoted. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not demonstrate adverse employment action by Respondent by failing to promote him on the basis of his race. Petitioner also did not show that he received a lower pay rate and lower evaluation scores than did other similarly- situated employees who were not members of his protected class. The only comparator to which Petitioner referred was Harper, the other part-time hardlines merchandiser that sometimes worked in the Toy Department. However, as discussed above, the evidence showed that Harper actually scored lower than did Petitioner on the January 31, 2015, evaluation.17/ Further, Harper was not similarly situated to Petitioner with respect to pay rate because Harper is a longer-term employee who had received hourly pay rate raises in 2005 through 2008, before Respondent ceased giving raises of hourly pay rates in 2009, but Petitioner was hired in 2014, after Respondent ceased giving hourly pay raises. Petitioner also did not show, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Leach discriminated against him on the basis of his race by electing to reassign him, rather than Harper, to a cashier position after Christmas 2015, and by later reassigning Yaw to fill a full-time hardlines merchandiser position that included responsibilities of working in the Toy Department. As discussed above, when Leach decided to eliminate the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position, he chose not to reassign other employees who were not directly affected by the elimination of that position. The evidence shows that Leach did not reassign Harper to a cashier position because Harper's position was not directly affected by the elimination of the daytime hardlines merchandiser position——not because Leach favored Harper over Petitioner due to race. Also as discussed above, Leach reassigned Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser position after her office manager position——also a full-time position——was eliminated. Because Yaw was a full-time employee, she did not fill a position for which Petitioner was eligible as a part-time employee; furthermore, under any circumstances, she was not similarly situated to Petitioner because of her longer term of employment with Respondent. For these reasons, neither Harper nor Yaw are similarly situated to Petitioner for purposes of being comparators. For these reasons, it is found that Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination against him by Respondent on the basis of his race. Further, even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of race, Respondent articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions with respect to Petitioner. As discussed above, Respondent did not promote Petitioner because he did not go through Respondent's formal application process for seeking promotions, and also because Leach determined, on the basis of Petitioner's lack of experience and employment longevity, that Petitioner was not qualified for supervisory positions at that time. Additionally, Leach's decisions regarding reassigning Petitioner to a cashier position while retaining Harper and reassigning Yaw to hardlines merchandiser positions were management decisions based on business needs and requirements, rather than on the basis of race. Petitioner did not present evidence showing that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination against him on the basis of his race. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of his race, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a). Religious Discrimination Claim As previously discussed, shortly before Christmas Day 2015, the employee work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was posted in the Store. This schedule showed Petitioner as being scheduled to work from 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Christmas Day, which fell on a Friday in 2015. The Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, which was a paid employee holiday; however, employees could work that day on a voluntary basis and they would be paid time-and-a-half for doing so. As noted above, Petitioner did not volunteer or otherwise indicate that he was willing to work that day. Upon seeing that he was scheduled to work on Christmas Day, Petitioner contacted Respondent's corporate legal department, which then contacted Leach. Leach had Petitioner removed from the work schedule for December 25, 2015. Petitioner was not required to work that day, did not work that day, and was paid for the Christmas Day 2015 holiday. Petitioner claims that by scheduling him to work on Christmas Day, Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion. Petitioner asserts, as evidence of Respondent's discriminatory intent, that there are others who worked in the Toy Department who were not of the Christian faith, so that if someone was needed to work on Christmas Day, one of those individuals could instead have been scheduled. As previously noted, on December 28, 2015, Leach presented Petitioner with a Request for Religious Accommodation form to sign. Leach credibly testified that the purpose of having Petitioner sign the form was to have a written record of Petitioner's religion so that Petitioner would not again be assigned to work on a Christian religious holiday. Petitioner signed the form, but protested being required to do so, because, in his view, Respondent already was on notice that he is of the Christian faith because he always had Sundays off of work. Petitioner testified that when he was hired in April 2014 (notably, before Leach became Store manager) he had verbally requested Sundays off, effectively placing Respondent on notice that he is of the Christian faith. On this basis, Petitioner asserts that Leach and other managers and supervisors at the Store knew that he is Christian and that they nonetheless intentionally scheduled him to work on Christmas Day. Petitioner acknowledged that he never heard Leach make any comments with respect to his (Petitioner's) religion. Leach credibly testified that before he was contacted by Respondent's corporate office regarding Petitioner's concerns about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015, he did not know that Petitioner was Christian, and he had not inferred that from the fact that Petitioner did not work on Sundays.18/ Leach testified, credibly and persuasively, that Petitioner was scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 by mistake. He explained that the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was generated using a pre-populated "template" method. This method, which is a method by which the Store sets its weekly work schedules, entails week-to-week copying of the regular——i.e., "template"——work schedule for all Store employees, then modifies that schedule as needed to address changes to individual employee work schedules. Leach explained that in using this method to establish the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, Respondent had inadvertently scheduled employees who had not volunteered to work on Christmas Day. He surmised that this was a possible explanation for why Petitioner mistakenly was scheduled to work that day. As noted above, Petitioner was not the only Store employee scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. Upon consideration of the competent substantial evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by Respondent on the basis of his religion. To do so, Petitioner must show that he: (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) informed Respondent of this belief; and (3) suffered adverse employment action as a result of failing to comply with the employment requirement that conflicted with his belief. It is undisputed that Petitioner falls within a protected class for purposes of a discrimination claim on the basis of religion. However, Petitioner did not prove the existence of the other two elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of religion. Specifically, Petitioner did not prove that Respondent knew that he was Christian or that his Christian faith prohibited him from working on Christmas Day. As noted above, Petitioner was hired at the Store before Leach became Store manager. Further, because Petitioner had not been required to complete a written religious accommodation form when he was hired in April 2014, Respondent did not have any written notice in its possession that would have informed Leach that Petitioner was Christian or that Petitioner needed certain Christian holidays, such as Christmas Day, off of work. As noted above, Leach credibly testified that he did not know that Petitioner was Christian until Respondent's corporate legal office contacted him regarding Petitioner's religion-based complaint about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. The evidence also shows that Petitioner did not suffer any adverse employment action. As soon as Respondent was informed of Petitioner's complaint, Petitioner was removed from the work schedule for Christmas Day 2015, did not work that day, and was paid for that holiday. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not establish, by the greater weight of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination by Respondent against him on the basis of his religion. However, even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, Respondent produced credible, persuasive evidence showing a legitimate, non- discriminatory basis for its action——that is, that through the Store's use of the template work scheduling system, Petitioner was mistakenly scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. As noted above, as soon as Petitioner complained to Respondent, Respondent immediately accommodated his request by removing him from the Christmas Day 2015 work schedule. Petitioner did not present any evidence showing that Respondent's proffered reason for scheduling him to work on Christmas Day 2015 was a pretext for discrimination on the basis of his religion. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a). Retaliation Claim Petitioner claims that Respondent retaliated against him for complaining to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 by reassigning him from his position as a daytime hardlines merchandiser——a position that he clearly liked and at which he believed he excelled——to a cashier position——a position that he clearly considered demeaning and that also was physically difficult for him to perform due to a previous injury. Petitioner was informed that he was being reassigned to a cashier position only five days (and the first workday) after he complained to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day.19/ Petitioner testified that Leach told him that the part- time daytime merchandiser position had been eliminated due to the lack of work demand, particularly in the Toy Department, after the Christmas season was over. Petitioner testified that when he asked Leach about available positions in to which he could transfer, Leach told him that only cashier or pizza-making positions were available. Petitioner provided evidence that a softlines customer service job, which he claims he would have preferred, was open at the time he was reassigned and that Leach did not inform him of that opening or offer him that position. Petitioner also disputes that the part-time daytime merchandiser job that he had occupied had been eliminated. As evidence, he contends that Harper continued to occupy that position, and also that Leach subsequently reassigned Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser rather than transferring him back into a hardlines merchandiser position, as he had requested. The part-time cashier position to which Petitioner was transferred was the same level of employment position in Respondent's employment hierarchy as was the part-time daytime merchandiser position that he previously held. Additionally, as discussed above, as a part-time cashier, Petitioner continued to receive the same hourly pay rate and work scheduling availability as he had received when he was employed as a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser. As discussed above, on or before January 26, 2016, Petitioner was reassigned to the Store's date code specialist position. According to Leach, that position came open after Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, and Leach believed that the date code specialist position would play well to Petitioner's strengths of being methodical and detail- oriented. Petitioner bears the burden, by the greater weight of the evidence, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Respondent. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Petitioner must show that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.20/ For the following reasons, it is found that Petitioner did not satisfy his burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. It is determined that Petitioner engaged in a "protected activity" when he complained to Respondent's corporate legal office, by email dated December 23, 2015, that he had been scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. The email stated: Attn: Legal My schedule states that I am scheduled for Christmas day. I am a Christian I exercise religious right no work on a high religious day. Christmas is the day I celebrate the birth of Christ thus the name Christmas day. A Jewish person was assigned to my department (toys) and was allowed to have off all the Jewish holidays. I was told that is his right and approved, I said fine, I don't know who was arguing this but this was fine with me, because I have many Jewish friends, so I understand. Easter which falls on a Sunday and Christmas are my holidays. I am requesting off. I am requesting Christmas day off with holiday pay as my religious day, just like I requested Sundays off. Only I can change my religious day and work on Sunday, which I might have to when promoted. If management tells me I cannot be promoted because I exercise my religious right not to work on the seventh day, then I will have to do as Jewish people have done for centuries, they are released from the commandment that they may only eat Kosher. If captured by the enemy they may eat to survive. So if I can only be manager if I give up my religious right not to work on Sunday, then I will do what management says is a requirement. Thank you. Lawrence Brown Kmart-Hollywood, Fl Oakwood Plaza To be a "protected activity," the activity giving rise to the alleged retaliatory action must, at the very least, communicate to the employer that the complainant believes the employer is engaging in discrimination against him. Petitioner's email can be read broadly to inform Respondent that he believed he was being discriminated against on the basis of his religion by being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. To that point, Petitioner specifically compared his circumstances to those of a Jewish employee who had requested and been allowed to have all Jewish holidays off of work. While not specifically using the word "discrimination," Petitioner's email can be reasonably read to place Respondent on notice that Petitioner believed he was being treated differently than a similarly-situated employee who was not a member of Petitioner's protected class and who had been excused from work on the holidays observed by his religion. Additionally, Leach was aware that Petitioner had complained to Respondent's corporate legal department about being scheduled to work on a Christian holiday. Accordingly, it is determined that Petitioner has established the "protected activity" element of his retaliation claim. However, Petitioner did not show that he suffered a materially adverse employment action as a result of having engaged in protected activity. His reassignment to the part-time cashier position effectively was a lateral transfer that did not affect his hourly pay rate or hours of work scheduling availability. Although Petitioner subjectively considered the cashier position to be demeaning and below his skill level21/ and although his job responsibilities changed, the evidence shows that Petitioner was not reassigned to an objectively less prestigious or otherwise inferior employment position. Furthermore, in any event, approximately three weeks after Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, Respondent reassigned him to a position as the Store's date code specialist——a position that he has officially held since January 26, 2016, and from which he has not requested to be transferred. In this position, Petitioner earns the same hourly wage and has the same number of hours of work availability as he did in the hardlines merchandiser and cashier positions. He is solely responsible in the Store for ensuring that date-coded merchandise on the shelves has not exceeded its expiration date—— a position that entails significant responsibility and, as Leach put it, is "very important." The evidence also does not support Petitioner's assertion that his removal from the work schedule in early January meant that he was effectively terminated. Although the evidence does not clearly show what days Petitioner did not work during the week after Christmas in 2015, or whether he did (or did not) call in to notify Respondent that he would be absent, the evidence does clearly establish that Petitioner was not scheduled to work the first week of January 2016, and it is also clear that management personnel at the Store did not believe that he had called in to notify them of his absence. Leach explained that if an employee does not report to work when scheduled and does not call in to notify the Store of his or her absence, the employee will not be scheduled to work the following week; this is to ensure that there are enough cashiers available as needed to work in the upcoming week. In any event, when Petitioner noticed that he had not been scheduled to work, he contacted the Store's human relations manager, who told him to come back to work. In fact, Petitioner worked the first and second weeks of January 2016, and thereafter, and he continues to be employed at the Store. Further, Petitioner was never told or otherwise notified, formally or informally, that his employment with Respondent had been terminated. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not suffer a materially adverse employment action by being reassigned for a short period of time from a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser to a part-time cashier position. Petitioner also did not demonstrate the existence of a "causal link" between a protected activity and adverse employment action. As discussed above, Petitioner's sending an email to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 constituted a "protected activity." However, as discussed above, it is determined that Respondent did not engage in an adverse employment action; thus, Petitioner's engagement in protected activity did not "cause" Respondent to take any material adverse employment action against him. Furthermore, in any event, Respondent articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for reassigning Petitioner to a cashier position shortly after Christmas Day 2015—— specifically, that the part-time daytime merchandiser position that Petitioner had held was eliminated due to seasonal workload decline and other business management decisions reallocating hardlines merchandise-related tasks between the overnight and daytime shifts. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Respondent retaliated against him for engaging in a protected activity, in violation of section 760.10(7). Damages Petitioner has requested an award of damages in the amount of $5,000,000. However, section 760.11(6), which governs the award of remedies in administrative proceedings brought under the FCRA, does not authorize DOAH to award damages. Further, the evidence establishes that Respondent did not engage in any unlawful employment practices with respect to Petitioner, and, in any event, Petitioner did not present any evidence to support his entitlement to an award of damages in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2017.
The Issue Whether there is probable cause for petitioner to bring an action against respondents for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?
Findings Of Fact Rita Smith who, a friend testified, has "got to be" 90 years old, has owned the house at 1210 Alcaniz Street in Pensacola, Florida, at least since her husband died on March 20, 1982. Before he died, he gave her money to fix up the house, which she has rented. It needed a new roof, among other things. She spoke to respondent M. T. Motes after getting an advertisement for Mike's Painting & Contracting Company in the mail. It read: Painting -- Carpentry -- Remodeling Addition Carports Residential Specialist Prompt FREE Estimates (904)968-5912 ALL WORK GUARANTEED MIKE'S PAINTING & CONTRACTING CO. Post Office Box 261 Gonzalez, Florida 32560 Respondent himself--she knew him as "Mike"--seemed like he wanted to work so she sent him to take a look at what was involved. First she misdirected him to 1012 Alcaniz Street but the people who lived there told him there must be some mistake. The second time Mrs. Smith got the address right, and respondent Motes looked things over at the right house. They eventually agreed on a price of $2800, of which $1500 was to be paid in advance. On April 11, 1983, Charlie Freeman went down to the bank with Mrs. Smith to help her get the money and was present when it changed hands. Among the things Mr. Motes agreed to do in exchange for the $2800 was put on a new roof. As respondent's counsel conceded at hearing, there never was a written contract, but M. T. Motes did acknowledge in writing receiving "$1500 deposit toward repair of rental unit" from Rita Smith. He signed the receipt without mentioning Mike's Painting & Contracting Company. Respondent Motes and at least one helper worked on the house on April 12, 1983, and again on April 13, 1983. They patched the porch floor, put in some new rafters on the porch, and did some patching of the porch roof, replacing bad wood with good. After he had Mrs. Smith's $1500, Mr. Motes told Mr. Freeman that, although he was not a roofer, he would arrange for a roofer to do the roofing work, but the roof was never recovered. A. L. Cooper, an investigator for the Escambia County Construction Competency Board, inspected the house at 1210 Alcaniz Street on October 25, 1983, at petitioner's request. What had been accomplished there a man and a helper could do easily in two days. The going price for a job like the one Mr. Motes did ranges from $450 to $525. Mr. Motes, who is not licensed as a residential contractor, never obtained a building permit for the work he did for Mrs. Smith, which included "quite a few code violations." Mrs. Smith reached Mrs. Motes by telephone but did not succeed in her efforts to track down Mr. Motes. She made no payments beyond the initial one.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner find probable cause to initiate judicial proceedings against respondent M. T. Motes pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981). That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint filed against Mike's Painting and Contracting Company. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: William P. White, Jr., Esquire Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Bruce A. McDonald, Esquire Emmanuel, Sheppard & Condon Post Office Drawer 1271 Pensacola, Florida 32596 Curtis A. Golden, State Attorney First Judicial Circuit of Florida Post Office Box 12726 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32501
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether Petitioner filed her complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations within 365 days of the alleged discriminatory event; and (2) whether Petitioner requested an administrative hearing within 215 days of the filing of her complaint.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Earlene Johnson, is an African-American. Prior to December 1996 Ms. Johnson filed a grievance when Respondent, Chautauqua Office of Psychotherapy and Evaluation (hereinafter referred to as "Chautauqua"), failed to promote her. On December 4, 1996, Ms. Johnson was terminated from employment with Chautauqua. At some time after her termination, Ms. Johnson engaged legal counsel with the intent of filing a complaint of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"). Toward this end, Ms. Johnson signed an Intake Questionnaire and an Affidavit on October 30, 1997. No copy of the Intake Questionnaire or Affidavit was provided by the Commission to Chautauqua within five days of their receipt. On May 4, 1998, more than one year after the alleged acts of discrimination, Ms. Johnson was sent a Charge of Discrimination by Joe Williams, an Intake Counselor for the Commission. Mr. Williams instructed Ms. Johnson of the following in the cover letter which accompanied the Charge of Discrimination: In order for the Commission to proceed further with this matter, you must: Review the complaint; Sign the complaint in the designated spaces in the presence of a notary public; Return the signed complaint to this office in the enclosed self-addressed envelope. Because a complaint of discrimination must be filed within the time limitation imposed by law (in most cases the limitation is 365 days from the date of the alleged discriminatory act), I urge you to complete these three steps as soon as possible. . . . . Ms. Johnson signed the Charge of Discrimination sent to her by Mr. Williams on the date it was sent, May 4, 1998. Ms. Johnson's Charge of Discrimination was not, therefore, filed within 365 days of the date of the last act of discrimination alleged by Ms. Johnson: Ms. Johnson's termination from employment on December 4, 1996. When the Commission failed to complete its investigation of Ms. Johnson's Charge of Discrimination within a reasonable period of time, Ms. Johnson requested an administrative hearing by letter dated August 3, 1999. Ms. Johnson's request for hearing was made one day short of one year and three months after the Charge of Discrimination was filed with the Commission. The Commission filed Ms. Johnson's request for hearing with the Division of Administrative Hearing on September 14, 1999. Chautauqua filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition. An Order to Show Cause was entered after Ms. Johnson failed to respond to the Motion. Ms. Johnson was ordered to answer the following questions: Did the events that Petitioner believes constitute discrimination occur on or before December 4, 1996? If not, when did the events take place? Did Petitioner file a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on or about May 4, 1998 (a copy of a Charge of Discrimination which appears to have been filed by Petitioner is attached to this Order.) If not, when was it filed? If the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations was filed more than one year after the events which Petitioner believes constitute discrimination occurred, why wasn't the Charge filed sooner. Petitioner should provide a detailed answer to this question. Ms. Johnson responded to the questions asked in the Order to Show Cause as follows: The events that petitioner believe [sic] constitutes discrimination occurred before and on December 4, 1996. Petitioner signed a complaint of Discrimination which was signed on October 30, 1997 which was filed by Petitioner's former Lawyer. Which a copy is attached [sic]. Petitioner's Lawyer filed a charge of Discrimination less than one year before the events which the Petitioner believes constitutes [sic] Discrimination. Which a copy is attached [sic]. Petitioner's former Lawyer [sic] address and phone number is [sic] attached. Attached to Ms. Johnson's response to the Order to Show Cause was a copy of an Affidavit and an Intake Questionnaire signed October 30, 1997, a letter dated January 10, 1998, from Ms. Johnson's legal counsel, and the May 4, 1998, letter from Mr. Williams asking Ms. Johnson to sign a Charge of Discrimination. It is clear from Mr. Williams' letter that no Charge of Discrimination was filed by Ms. Johnson with the Commission until more than 365 days after the alleged act of discrimination, December 4, 1996.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the complaint of discrimination filed in this case by Earlene Johnson. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Earlene Johnson 185 Cook Avenue DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32433 Robert P. Gaines, Esquire Beggs & Lane Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576-2950 Sharon Moultry, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Raymond Howard Hildebrand, Jr., telephoned A. C. "Art" Murph in response to a newspaper ad, and, on November 17, 1981, signed an agreement with Mr. Murph under which, in exchange for title to and possession of the Hildebrands' 1979 Dodge Leisure Craft, Mr. Murph agreed to make specified monthly payments to Pen Air Federal Credit Union (PAFCU) until he could sell the recreation vehicle, and to satisfy the PAFCU lien with the sale proceeds, when it was sold. Under their agreement, Mr. Murph was to retain any sale proceeds in excess of what was needed to satisfy PAFCU's lien, as a commission on the sale. Mr. Hildebrand left the recreation vehicle with respondent on November 17, 1981. When the December payment on the loan PAFCU had made to the Hildebrands, the loan respondent had undertaken to repay, was overdue, Mr. Hildebrand got a notice to that effect. He got a similar notice in January. Respondent made these payments belatedly. On December 10, 1981, respondent sold the Hildebrands' vehicle to a third party who at that time paid respondent, in full, a price that exceeded the amount owed PAFCU by almost $2,000. Mr. Hildebrand happened to see the motor home parked at a neighbor's house on January 25, 1982, and, on inquiring, learned of the preceding month's sale. In a conversation with respondent on January 27, 1982, he was told everything would be straightened out in 10 to 14 days. Respondent told him somebody else had written respondent a bad check so that he needed the proceeds of the sale of the Hildebrands' motor home for some other purpose. Only after the Hildebrands engaged counsel and incurred legal fees did respondent pay PAFCU what was owed, more than a year later. It took that long for the new owner to receive title, as well. Sylvia Galloway's parents placed a motor home with respondent on consignment last May, and respondent sold it in June of 1982. Also in June, Ms. Galloway's parents received a check representing their agreed share of the sale proceeds. Only several months later, however, did the financing institution receive the moneys owed it, and it was Christmas before the new owners got title.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner find probable cause to institute judicial proceedings against respondents pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William P. White, Jr. Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Art Murph and Art's Motor Homes 6813 Pine Forest Road Pensacola, Florida 32504 Curtis Golden, State Attorney First Judicial Circuit of Florida Post Office Box 12726 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32501
The Issue Whether Respondent, Superior Optical Shop (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Sections 760.01– and 509.092, Florida Statutes, by subjecting Petitioner, Janice Jennings (Petitioner), to discrimination in employment and by discharging Petitioner in retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s discriminatory employment practices.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Respondent is a corporation with its corporate headquarters located in Ocean Springs, Mississippi. Respondent operates an optical shop in a Veteran’s Administration (V.A.) Hospital located in Lake City, Florida. At its Lake City location, Respondent fills prescriptions written by eye physicians at the V.A. Hospital, assists patients with choosing frames, and fits patients with their prescription eye glasses. Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City is fast-paced, with a constant stream of patients, averaging 50-to-60 patients a day. If the optical shop is running behind schedule, it is problematic because often physicians at the V.A. Hospital are waiting to see the patients served by the optical shop. In 2009, Petitioner interviewed for a position at Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City, Florida. During her interview, Petitioner advised Respondent that she had competent computer skills and significant experience working in an office environment and with eye doctors. On May 27, 2009, Respondent hired Petitioner as a part- time clerk at the optical shop. Petitioner was terminated prior to working 90 days for Respondent. When Petitioner was hired, two full-time employees worked at the optical shop: office supervisor, Jean Hartup, and optician, Kathleen Denton. Ms. Hartup has been employed with Respondent for approximately five years. Ms. Denton has been with the optical shop for approximately two and a-half years. As office supervisor, Ms. Hartup can be distant with employees and “hard” at times. She can also be “direct” when speaking to employees. Ms. Hartup demonstrates these traits with all of the employees at the optical shop. Ms. Hartup has written up Ms. Denton in the past and the two have had personality conflicts. Both Ms. Hartup and Ms. Denton assisted with training Petitioner. Evidence indicated that Petitioner received adequate training to perform the tasks she was assigned to perform as a clerk. She often had to be re-trained on the same tasks. Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City is a very small room, approximately ten-feet by ten-feet square inside the V.A. Hospital. There are two small desks in the shop and it is very crowded. Petitioner was aware of the small working environment at the time she accepted employment with Respondent as a part- time clerk. Past and present employees at the optical shop have had to share desk space. Sometimes work has to be performed in the hallway because of the small office space. All new hires for Respondent are subjected to a 90-day probationary period. As explained in Respondent’s “Employee Handbook of Office Policies and Benefits,” of which Petitioner was aware: There will be a 90-day probationary period during which time the employer may terminate the employee at any time for any reason or for no reason regardless of any other provision of these policies. Sick leave and personal days are accrued but cannot be used during this period. Respondent’s Employee Handbook of Office Policies and Benefits also provides: [Respondent] does not and will not tolerate any employee discriminating against their work peers for any reason i.e., race, color, religion, sex, national origin or handicap. Any known verifiable discrimination will be grounds for immediate termination. Once on the job, Petitioner was not proficient on the computer and, despite repeated training, failed to show any improvement and was slow in performing her job duties. Because of this, service to patients at the optical shop slowed down and the optical shop was frequently behind, resulting in physicians having to wait for patients being served by the optical shop. Ms. Hartup became frustrated with Petitioner’s unsatisfactory job performance and the resulting delays. In addition, Petitioner began to show a lack of interest in her job and even stated that she “didn’t really need a job; she just wanted to be out of the house.” Despite repeated training and opportunities to improve her work performance, Petitioner failed to improve. Petitioner was given a notebook with information from the American Board of Opticians for review but she failed to read it or return it to Respondent. Prior to the end of her employment with Respondent, Petitioner called Respondent’s corporate headquarters in Mississippi and spoke to Mary Walker. Petitioner complained to Ms. Walker that Ms. Hartup was being too hard, was impatient, and was expecting too much of her. Petitioner did not raise concerns with Ms. Walker that she was being discriminated against based on her race, or that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment because of her race. In fact, there is no evidence that Petitioner ever complained of race discrimination or a hostile work environment based on race discrimination while she was still employed by Respondent. During that first telephone conversation with Petitioner, Ms. Walker suggested to Petitioner that she should talk to Ms. Hartup about the problems. Petitioner assured Ms. Walker that she would. Two days later, Ms. Walker called Ms. Hartup and inquired whether Petitioner had discussed her concerns with Ms. Hartup. Petitioner, however, had not spoken to Ms. Hartup about her complaint. Ms. Walker gave Ms. Hartup the authority to run the optical shop at Lake City, including making hiring and firing decisions. Ms. Walker did not discipline Ms. Hartup because of Petitioner’s complaints. Rather, Ms. Walker told Ms. Hartup to handle the situation regarding Petitioner’s complaints. Ms. Hartup then met with Petitioner and they spoke about Petitioner’s concerns that Ms. Hartup was being too harsh and about Petitioner’s poor work performance. As a result of that meeting, Ms. Hartup felt the situation had been resolved. Petitioner subsequently advised both Ms. Denton, as well as Ms. Walker at Respondent’s headquarters, that the conversation with Ms. Hartup had gone well and that their issues had been resolved. Petitioner’s work performance, however, did not improve. Prior to the end of her 90-day probationary period of employment, Respondent terminated Petitioner from employment for poor work performance, for failing to reach her capabilities as an employee, and because her poor work performance was a detriment to Respondent’s Lake City optical shop. Petitioner testified that, from her point of view, she truly felt as though she had been discriminated against because of her race. That testimony, however, was without further support and was unpersuasive, especially in view of the fact that there is no evidence that Petitioner ever mentioned to anyone during her employment with Respondent that she believed she was being discriminated against. There was otherwise no evidence presented at the final hearing that would support a finding that Respondent’s decision to terminate Petitioner was in retaliation for Petitioner’s complaint against Ms. Hartup. Further, the evidence produced at final hearing does not support a finding that either the manner in which Petitioner was treated during her employment with Respondent, or her termination from that employment, was based on Petitioner’s race. Respondent filled the position of part-time clerk left vacant after Petitioner’s termination by hiring a Native- American male.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on November 12, 2013.
Findings Of Fact On or about November 12, 2007, Respondent hired Petitioner to work as a full-time installation technician. Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment on or about December 19, 2012. Petitioner, who is of Puerto Rican descent, alleges, in his Charge of Discrimination filed on November 12, 2013, the following: My termination from Bright House Networks is clearly a pretext. As a benefit of being an employee I received complimentary cable. In June 2012, I relocated and connected the complimentary cable to my new residence. I was never informed upon hire that I could not connect my complimentary cable if I relocated. In November 2012 I advised a manager that my route was too far from my residence and he told me to update my address with the company. Shortly after I did so I was terminated. I feel I was treated adversely as similarly situated employees have relocated and connected their own cable. Based on the foregoing actions of Bright House Networks described herein, I believe that I have been discriminated against including my unlawful termination, based on my national origin in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, [and] Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Due to my unlawful termination, I have suffered and continue to suffer severe financial and emotional damages. Respondent’s policies and procedures provide in part that “[a]ll full and part-time Bright House Networks employees are entitled to free cable television service as long as their home is located within an area served by Bright House Networks.” The policies and procedures also provide that “[f]ree cable service is not transferable to another person’s residence.” Respondent’s procedures also provide that “[c]omplimentary service is provided for viewing, monitoring, and product knowledge by the employee at his/her own personal residence [and] [t]his benefit is not in any way transferable to another party or residence.” According to Christopher Kranert and Brinkley Ruffin, the intent of the policies and procedures governing free cable television is to allow employees to receive free cable television service at a single residential address. This is a reasonable interpretation by Respondent of its policies and procedures. When initially hired by Respondent, Petitioner resided at 1203 Arrowsmith Avenue, Orlando, Florida (Arrowsmith), and this is the address of record for Petitioner that Respondent maintained in its database of employee addresses. In June 2012 Petitioner moved out of the Arrowsmith property and relocated to 4413 Kirkman Road, Apartment F205 (Kirkman), which is also in Orlando, Florida. Petitioner did not initially inform Respondent that he had moved to the Kirkman address. Both the Arrowsmith and Kirkman addresses are in areas where Respondent provides cable television service. 7 During Petitioner’s term of employment, Respondent assigned Petitioner a truck that was equipped with a GPS device which allowed Respondent to approximate the whereabouts of the vehicle at all times. As an efficiency measure, Respondent, at the beginning of each workday, assigns service calls to its individual technicians based on a customer’s proximity to the technician’s home address of record. In furtherance of this efficiency measure, Petitioner, at the end of each workday, was authorized to drive his assigned vehicle to his home so that the following workday he could leave directly from home and report to his assigned service call(s). Petitioner noticed, at some point after June 2012, that the locations for his daily work assignments were a significant distance from his Kirkman address. This meant that not only did Petitioner have to wake-up earlier, and drive further, each morning in order to timely arrive for his service calls, but it also meant that he drove further when returning home at the end of each workday. Petitioner complained to Respondent about the distance that he was travelling to and from his daily service calls. In investigating Petitioner’s complaint, Respondent pulled the GPS data log for the truck assigned to Petitioner. The GPS data revealed that at the beginning and end of each workday, the truck was parked at a location other than Petitioner’s home address of record (Arrowsmith) and that this apparent anomaly had been happening for a significant period of time. Armed with this information, Respondent sent two of its employees to the Arrowsmith address for the purpose of finding out if cable service remained active. The employees confirmed that cable service for the Arrowsmith address was active and that the service was listed in Petitioner’s name. Next, Respondent identified the location where Petitioner’s assigned truck was parked at the end of each workday (Kirkman). Respondent sent employees to the Kirkman address and determined that the address was receiving cable television service and that the address was not listed as an active account in Respondent’s billing system. Respondent reasonably concluded that Petitioner was receiving unauthorized cable service at the Kirkman address while simultaneously receiving authorized cable service at the Arrowsmith address. Petitioner believes that his actions complied with company policy because, according to Petitioner, the policy authorizes him to activate service when moving to a new address without having to notify Respondent. While Respondent’s policies do not prohibit Petitioner from personally connecting cable service at his residence, the policies do prohibit Petitioner from doing so without first notifying Respondent. After consulting with Petitioner’s immediate supervisor Victor Gomez and Brinkley Ruffin, Chris Kranert terminated Petitioner’s employment with Respondent. Petitioner alleges that Respondent treated him differently from another employee that engaged in the exact same conduct that resulted in Petitioner’s termination from employment. Petitioner’s only evidence in support of this allegation is a conversation that he overheard between his former supervisor Allen Summers and Bright House employee M.S., who is African-American. According to Petitioner, Allen Summers asked M.S. if he was simultaneously receiving free cable service at more than one address. M.S. answered the question in the affirmative and explained to Allen Summers that he (M.S.) forgot to fill out the paperwork that would have informed Bright House about the transfer of cable service to M.S.’s new address. According to Petitioner, Respondent did not discipline M.S. for his violation of company policy. Petitioner relies on the conversation between M.S. and Allen Summers to prove that the facts asserted in the conversation are true. The referenced statements attributed to M.S. and Allen Summers are hearsay. Respondent denies having knowledge of any instance where M.S. was allowed to receive free cable service at multiple addresses. Respondent did, however, offer evidence where two former employees were terminated as a result of theft of cable television services.2/ Petitioner offered no evidence that his national origin played a role in Respondent’s decision to terminate his employment.3/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, Bright House Networks, did not commit an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, Manny Rolon, and denying Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2014.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Wal-Mart Stores East, LP (“Walmart”), discriminated against Petitioner, Ramon Santiago Lopez (“Petitioner”), based upon his national origin or age, and/or terminated his employment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016).1/
Findings Of Fact Walmart is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Walmart is a national retailer. Petitioner is a Cuban (Hispanic) male. He was 62 years old when he was hired by Walmart in November 2005 and was 72 years old at the time of his dismissal. Petitioner was initially hired to work at a store in Jacksonville, but transferred to Tampa. In June 2010, Petitioner requested a transfer back to Jacksonville and was assigned to Store 4444 on Shops Lane, just off Philips Highway and I-95 in Jacksonville. The store manager at Store 4444 was Scott Mallatt. Mr. Mallatt approved Petitioner’s transfer request and testified that he “very much” got along with Petitioner. Petitioner confirmed that he never had a problem with Mr. Mallatt. Petitioner testified that when he first started at Store 4444, he had no problems. After about four months, however, he began reporting to a supervisor he recalled only as “Lee.” Petitioner described Lee as “kind of a maniac.” Lee would harass Petitioner and give him impossible assignments to accomplish. Petitioner testified that he complained repeatedly to Mr. Mallatt about Lee’s abuse, but that nothing was ever done about it. Eventually, Petitioner gave up complaining to Mr. Mallatt. Mr. Mallatt testified that Petitioner never complained to him about being discriminated against because of his national origin or age. Petitioner apparently did complain about being overworked, but never tied these complaints to any discriminatory intent on the part of Lee. Petitioner testified that Lee no longer worked at Store 4444 in January 2016. From 2010 to 2015, Petitioner worked from 1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. in various departments, including Grocery, Dairy, Paper, Pet, and Chemical. In 2015, Petitioner spoke with Mr. Mallatt about working at least some day shifts rather than constant nights. Mr. Mallatt approved Petitioner’s request. In August 2015, Petitioner was moved to the day shift in the Maintenance department. As a day associate, Petitioner typically worked from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Assistant Store Manager April Johnson transferred to Store No. 4444 in October 2015. Petitioner reported directly to Ms. Johnson. On January 14, 2016, Petitioner was scheduled to work from 8:30 a.m. until 5:30 p.m. He drove his van into the parking lot of Store No. 4444 at approximately 7:58 a.m. He parked in his usual spot, on the end of a row of spaces that faced a fence at the border of the lot. Petitioner liked this spot because the foliage near the fence offered shade to his vehicle. Closed circuit television (“CCTV”) footage, from a Walmart camera with a partial view of the parking lot, shows Petitioner exiting his vehicle at around 8:00 a.m. Petitioner testified that he could see something on the ground in the parking lot, 50 to 60 meters away from where his van was parked. The CCTV footage shows Petitioner walking across the parking lot, apparently toward the object on the ground. Petitioner testified there were no cars around the item, which he described as a bucket of tools. Petitioner stated that the bucket contained a screwdriver, welding gloves, a welding face mask, and a hammer. The CCTV footage does not show the bucket. Petitioner crosses the parking lot until he goes out of camera range.3/ A few seconds later, Petitioner returns into camera range, walking back toward his car while carrying the bucket of tools. When Petitioner reaches his van, he opens the rear door, places the bucket of tools inside, then closes the rear door. Petitioner testified that after putting the tools in the back of his van, he went to the Customer Service Desk and informed two female African American customer service associates that he had found some tools and put them in his car. Petitioner conceded that he told no member of management about finding the tools. Walmart has a written Standard Operating Procedure for dealing with items that customers have left behind on the premises. The associate who finds the item is required to take the item to the Customer Service Desk, which functions as the “lost and found” for the store. Mr. Mallatt and Ms. Johnson each testified that there are no exceptions to this policy. Petitioner was aware of the Standard Operating Procedure. On prior occasions, he had taken found items to the Customer Service Desk. Petitioner conceded that it would have been quicker to take the bucket of tools to the Customer Service Desk than to his van. However, he testified that he believed that he could have been fired if he had taken the tools to the desk before he had clocked in for work. Petitioner cited a Walmart policy that made “working off the clock” a firing offense. It transpired that the policy to which Petitioner referred was Walmart’s Wage and Hour policy, which states in relevant part: It is a violation of law and Walmart policy for you to work without compensation or for a supervisor (hourly or salaried) to request you work without compensation. You should never perform any work for Walmart without compensation. This language is plainly intended to prevent Walmart from requiring its employees to work without compensation. Petitioner, whose English language skills are quite limited, was adamant that this policy would have allowed Walmart to fire him if he performed the “work” of bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk before he was officially clocked in for his shift. Therefore, he put the tools in his van for safekeeping and informed the Customer Service Desk of what he had done. Petitioner was questioned as to why he believed it was acceptable for him to report the situation to the Customer Service Desk, but not acceptable for him to bring the tools to the desk. The distinction he appeared to make was that the act of carrying the tools from the parking lot to the desk would constitute “work” and therefore be forbidden, whereas just stopping by to speak to the Customer Service Desk associate was not “work.” The evidence established that Petitioner would not have violated any Walmart policy by bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk before he clocked in. He could have been compensated for the time he spent bringing in the tools by making a “time adjustment” on his time card. Mr. Mallatt testified that time adjustments are done on a daily basis when associates perform work prior to clocking in or after clocking out. Petitioner merely had to advise a member of management that he needed to make the time adjustment. Mr. Mallatt was confident that the adjustment would have been granted under the circumstances presented in this case. Petitioner did not go out to retrieve the tools after he clocked in. Mr. Mallatt stated that employees frequently go out to their cars to fetch items they have forgotten, and that Petitioner absolutely would have been allowed to go get the tools and turn them in to the Customer Service Desk. Later on January 14, 2016, Ms. Johnson was contacted by a customer who said tools were stolen off of his truck.4/ Ms. Johnson had not heard anything about lost tools. She looked around the Customer Service Desk, but found no tools there. Ms. Johnson also called out on the store radio to ask if anyone had turned in tools. Finally, the customer service manager at the Customer Service Desk told Ms. Johnson that Petitioner had said something about tools earlier that morning. Ms. Johnson called Petitioner to the front of the store and asked him about the missing tools. Petitioner admitted he had found some tools in the parking lot and had placed them in his vehicle. Ms. Johnson asked Petitioner why he put the tools in his vehicle. Petitioner told her that he was keeping the tools in his car until the owner came to claim them. Ms. Johnson testified that Petitioner offered no other explanation at that time. He just said that he made a “mistake.” Ms. Johnson explained to Petitioner that putting the tools in his vehicle was not the right thing to do and that he should have turned them in to “lost and found,” i.e., the Customer Service Desk. Petitioner was sent to his van to bring in the tools. After this initial conversation with Petitioner, Ms. Johnson spoke with Mr. Mallatt and Mr. Cregut to decide how to treat the incident. Mr. Cregut obtained approval from his manager to conduct a full investigation and to interview Petitioner. Mr. Cregut reviewed the CCTV footage described above and confirmed that Petitioner did not bring the tools to the Customer Service Desk. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cregut spoke with Petitioner for approximately an hour to get his side of the story. Petitioner also completed a written statement in which he admitted finding some tools and putting them in his car. Mr. Cregut described Petitioner as “very tense and argumentative” during the interview. As the interview continued, Mr. Cregut testified that Petitioner’s reaction to the questions was getting “a little bit more hostile [and] aggressive.” Mr. Cregut decided to try to build rapport with Petitioner by asking him general questions about himself. This tactic backfired. Petitioner volunteered that he was a Cuban exile and had been arrested several times for his opposition to the Castro regime. Petitioner then claimed that Mr. Cregut discriminated against him by asking about his personal life and prejudged him because of his activism. Mr. Cregut credibly testified that he did not judge or discriminate against Petitioner based on the information Petitioner disclosed and that he only asked the personal questions to de-escalate the situation. Mr. Cregut’s only role in the case was as an investigative factfinder. His report was not colored by any personal information disclosed by Petitioner. At the conclusion of the investigation, Mr. Mallatt made the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. The specific ground for termination was “Gross Misconduct – Integrity Issues,” related to Petitioner’s failure to follow Walmart policy by bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk. Mr. Mallatt testified that his concern was that Petitioner intended to keep the bucket of tools if no owner appeared to claim them. Mr. Mallatt credibly testified that had Petitioner simply taken the tools to the Customer Service Desk, rather than putting them in his vehicle, he would have remained employed by Walmart. Walmart has a “Coaching for Improvement” policy setting forth guidelines for progressive discipline. While the progressive discipline process is used for minor and/or correctable infractions, such as tardiness, “serious” misconduct constitutes a ground for immediate termination. The coaching policy explicitly sets forth “theft” and “intentional failure to follow a Walmart policy” as examples of serious misconduct meriting termination. Petitioner conceded that no one at Walmart overtly discriminated against him because of his age or national origin. He testified that he could feel the hostility toward Hispanics at Store 4444, but he could point to no particular person or incident to bolster his intuition. Petitioner claimed that his dismissal was in part an act of retaliation by Ms. Johnson for his frequent complaints that his Maintenance counterparts on the night shift were not adequately doing their jobs, leaving messes for the morning crew to clean up. Ms. Johnson credibly testified that Petitioner’s complaints did not affect her treatment of him or make her want to fire him. In any event, Ms. Johnson played no role in the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner’s stated reason for failing to follow Walmart policy regarding found items would not merit a moment’s consideration but for Petitioner’s limited proficiency in the English language. It is at least conceivable that someone struggling with the language might read the Walmart Wage and Hour policy as Petitioner did. Even so, Petitioner was familiar with the found items policy, and common sense would tell an employee that he would not be fired for turning in customer property that he found in the parking lot. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner had been working at Walmart for over 10 years. It is difficult to credit that he was completely unfamiliar with the concept of time adjustment and truly believed that he could be fired for lifting a finger to work when off the clock. Walmart showed that in 2016 it terminated three other employees from Store 4444 based on “Gross Misconduct – Integrity Issues.” All three were under 40 years of age at the time their employment was terminated. Two of the employees were African American; the third was Caucasian. Petitioner offered no evidence that any other employee charged with gross misconduct has been treated differently than Petitioner. At the hearing, Petitioner’s chief concern did not appear to be the alleged discrimination, but the implication that he was a thief, which he found mortally offensive. It could be argued that Mr. Mallatt might have overreacted in firing Petitioner and that some form of progressive discipline might have been more appropriate given all the circumstances, including Petitioner’s poor English and his unyielding insistence that he never intended to keep the tools. However, whether Petitioner’s dismissal was fair is not at issue in this proceeding. The issue is whether Walmart has shown a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Petitioner’s employment. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner offered no reasonable explanation for his failure to follow Walmart policy. Mr. Mallatt’s suspicion regarding Petitioner’s intentions as to the tools was not unfounded and was not based on any discriminatory motive. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Walmart for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Walmart’s stated reasons for his termination were a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s age or national origin. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that his termination was in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity. The employee who was allegedly retaliating against Petitioner played no role in the decision to terminate his employment. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Walmart discriminated against him because of his age or national origin in violation of section 760.10.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2018.