Findings Of Fact Charles D. and Winnie R. Rice owned and occupied a three bedroom, one bath, frame dwelling located on U.S. 29 in Century, Florida, consisting of 1,283 total square feet. This dwelling had no carport or garage. The Department of Transportation needed a right-of-way where their dwelling was located for a highway construction project. Mr. Rice first became aware of the Department's need for his property in 1977. Acquisition of the right-of-way in Mr. Rice's area commenced around 1980. Replacement housing is part of the Relocation Assistance Program administered by the Department of Transportation for persons displaced by the acquisition of real property for the construction of highway projects. The purpose of the Replacement Housing Program is to provide people with comparable replacement housing when they are displaced because of any type of federally funded project. Comparable replacement housing is that which is substantially equal to the housing occupied prior to acquisition. When persons who are displaced buy an established home on the market, any extra features in the existing home that were not in the old one are not considered in determining eligibility payments. When the choice is to build a new structure instead of buying an existing house, the Replacement Housing Program permits the Department to participate only in the cost of a structure of comparable size and similar features to the house being replaced. Cmparable housing in the local market is examined in order to determine what is available for sale in the area. The first comparable housing for sale in the area in this case was priced in the amount of $42,000, and this was selected as the first comparable figure for compensation purposes. A household survey was made of the Rice dwelling on February 4, 1982, to determine the number of rooms, area of living space, age and type of construction, so as to establish the level of eligibility in the Department's Relocation Assistance Program. On July 20, 1982, the Rice dwelling was inspected in order to confirm the information in the February household survey. The inspector measured the rooms and talked with Mr. Rice about the Relocation Program, but there was no discussion about monetary amounts. A Statement of Eligibility was prepared based on the first comparable housing amount of $42,000 which had been selected. This first comparable amount was used in the preparation of the Statement of Eligibility, wherein the approved appraisal for acquisition of the Rice's original dwelling ($19,240) was subtracted from the first comparable amount of $42,000, leaving a balance of $22,760. This figure was shown on the Statement of Eligibility as the maximum amount payable. (Exhibit 4) The Department's first contract with Mr. and Mrs. Rice when money was discussed was on August 19, 1982. The amount of the approved appraisal for the Rice property was discussed, as were subjects such as moving costs, replacement housing, and the Statement of Eligibility showing a maximum amount of $22,760. In addition, Mr. and Mrs. Rice were given a copy of the Department's publication called Your Relocation, which Mr. Rice read. He became familiar with the statement on page 5 about comparable replacement housing. The Rices were instructed to contact the Department before they signed any contract for construction. Mr. and Mrs. Rice signed a contract with Barney E. Seymour on September 29, 1982, to construct for them a three bedroom, two bath, brick veneer residence on their property, consisting of 1,731 square feet for $43,600. Article 4 of the agreement indicated the Department of Transportation was to pay $22,760 upon completion of the construction. However, the Department was not a party to this contract, did not review it, approve it, or indicate concurrence. No representative from the Department was present when the contract was executed. Mr. and Mrs. Rice relied on the contractor to provide copies of the contract and the construction plans to the Department, and he delivered a copy of the contract and a set of the plans to the Department's office. However, the builder had no receipt or acknowledgment to show the date delivery was made. Sometime during the first part of October, 1982, a representative of the Department discussed with the builder on the telephone the matter of the amount of money the Department would pay to the Rices, but during this conversation, there was no discussion about the size of the dwelling or the type of the construction. During the first part of November, 1982, the Department was provided with a copy of the contract between the Rices and the builder, and the plans for the dwelling. A review of these plans disclosed to the Department that there were 448 square feet of additional floor space in the replacement dwelling, and an additional bathroom, that were not in the acquired dwelling. A revised Statement of Eligibility was computed on November 16, 1982, based on the square foot cost of the replacement dwelling. The amount of $400, shown as an estimate from a plumbing supplier in the plans, was subtracted from the contract price of $43,600, for the extra bathroom, leaving an amount of $43,200. This was divided by the 1,731 square footage of the new house, amounting to a cost per square foot of $24.96. This square foot cost was multiplied by the additional 443 square feet, to establish an additional cost of $11,182.08. This amount was subtracted from the contract price less the extra bathroom ($43,200) resulting in an amount of $32,017.92 allotted for the replacement dwelling. Additional allowable costs of $1,473.50 for a replacement lot and $312 for landscaping were added to $32,017.92, increasing this amount to $33,803.42. Deducting the amount of the approved appraisal of the old Rice residence ($19,240) from $33,803.42 resulted in an adjusted entitlement of $14,563.42 for replacement housing. The Rices executed the necessary documents, and they were paid this adjusted amount of eligibility. Mr. Rice contends that he was due the full amount of $22,760 (the difference between the first comparable housing figure set at $42,000, and the approved appraisal figure of $19,240), and that after his payment of $14,563.42 he is still entitled to receive an additional $8,196.58.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter its Order that the proper amount for replacement housing benefits payable to Charles D. Rice and Winnie R. Rice is $14,563.42, and disallowing their claim for an additional amount of $8,196.58. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 16th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary B. Lane, Esquire Post Office Box 12331 Pensacola, Florida 32581 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Paul A. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent's proposed amendment to the Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP), specifically paragraph 16 of the proposed 2012 QAP allowing Respondent to allocate certain tax credits by means of Request for Proposals (RFPs), adopted by and incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.002(94), constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Allapattah Housing Partners, LLC, is a Florida limited liability company whose address is 1172 South Dixie Highway, Suite 500 Coral Gables, Florida 33146. Petitioner Tower Road Gardens, Ltd., is a limited partnership whose address is 5709 NW 158 Street, Miami Lakes, Florida 33014. Petitioner City River Apartments, Ltd., is a limited partnership whose address is 1666 Kennedy Causeway, Ste. 505, North Bay Village, Florida 33141. Respondent is a public corporation created by section 420.504, Florida Statutes, to administer the governmental function of financing or refinancing affordable housing and related facilities in Florida. Respondent's statutory authority and mandates appear in Part V of chapter 420, Florida Statutes. See §§ 420.501 through 420.55, Fla. Stat. Respondent is governed by a Board of Directors consisting of nine individuals appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. Respondent's address is 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. In the July 1, 2011, Florida Administrative Weekly (FAW), Volume 37, No. 26, pages 1831 through 1872, Respondent gave notice of the proposed amendments to Florida Administrative Code Chapter 67-48 and to forms and instructions that make up the Universal Cycle Application Package, incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.004(1)(a). The July 1, 2011, Notice of Proposed Rule indicated that a public hearing would be held at Respondent's office in Tallahassee, Florida, on Tuesday, July 26, 2011, at 10:00 a.m. The Amended Petition was filed within ten days of the final public hearing and, thus, is timely pursuant to section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes. Under federal law memorialized in Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC or the Code), each state is given an amount of federal Low-Income Rental Housing Tax Credits (Housing Credits) based upon its population. In 2011, each state is entitled to $2.15 per capita of Housing Credits. Florida is entitled to receive approximately $40,422,817.00 in 2011 Housing Credits. These Housing Credits are then allocated to specific qualifying housing projects and can be utilized by project investors each year for a ten-year period. Accordingly, the 2011 Florida Housing Credits entitlement will represent a total value of $404,228,170.00 ($40,422,817.00 each year for ten years) in Housing Credits. Developers typically sell the tax credits to investors to generate equity investments in such projects. For example, an equity "price" of 90 cents for each dollar of the 2011 allocation of Housing Credits would generate approximately $360 million in investor equity for the statewide allocation. More than seven million seven hundred thousand dollars ($7,700,000.00) of 2011 Housing Credits remain unallocated by Respondent. The amount of Housing Credits available for 2012 will not be known until the Internal Revenue Service publishes its state population estimates in early 2012. As in 2011, the amount will be the product of Florida's population multiplied by $2.15. Section 42 of the Code requires that each state designate a "housing credit agency" which is responsible for the proper allocation and distribution of Housing Credits in compliance with the criteria and guidelines of section 42. Respondent's rules incorporate section 42 of the Code at Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.002(71). Respondent is designated as Florida's housing credit agency by section 420.5099, Florida Statutes, and, as such, is responsible for the allocation and distribution of Housing Credits. Respondent administers various federal and state affordable housing programs, including the Housing Credit Program, pursuant to section 420.5099 and chapter 67-48. Respondent's rulemaking authority to implement this process is set forth in section 420.507(12), Florida Statutes. Under federal law, Respondent must distribute Low- Income Rental Housing Tax Credits to applicants pursuant to a specific QAP. IRC § 42(m)(l)(A)v. The QAP must contain certain criteria mandated by federal law, referred to as "Selection Criteria." IRC § 42(m)(l)(B). The Code further provides that a state's federal Housing Credit award will be deemed to be zero if its QAP fails to include a complete plan setting forth (a) selection criteria, (b) preferences for lowest income, longest terms and development in qualified census tracts, and (c) procedures for monitoring and reporting a project's non- compliance. IRC § 42(m)(l)(A). Respondent's QAP must be approved by its Board of Directors and by the Governor and must be adopted as a rule. IRC § 42(m)(A)(i); § 120.56. Typically, each year, Respondent embarks on a public rule-making process to adopt the applicable rule and QAP which control the complex and critical processes for evaluation, review, notice, opportunity to be heard, and, ultimately, ranking and approval of developments to receive allocations of Housing Credits for that year. Because the demand for allocation of Housing Credits exceeds that which is available under the Housing Credit Program, applicants of qualified affordable housing developments must compete for this funding. Applicants apply for funding, under various affordable housing programs, through Respondent's Universal Cycle application process, which is set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rules 67-21.002 through -21.00351 and 67-48.001 through -48.005. Applicants for tax credits provide information as required by the forms and instructions of the Universal Cycle Application Package, which is adopted by and incorporated into rule 67-48.004(1)(a). To assess the relative merits of proposed developments, Respondent has established a competitive application process known as the Universal Cycle. Fla. Admin. Code Chapter 67-48. Respondent scores and competitively ranks the applications to determine which applications will be allocated Housing Credits. Respondent's scoring and evaluation process for Housing Credit applications is set forth in rule 67-48.004. Under these rules, the applications are evaluated and scored based upon factors contained in the Universal Cycle Application Package and Respondent's adopted rules. Respondent then issues preliminary scores to all applicants. Fla. Admin. Code R. 67- 48.004(3). Following release of the preliminary scores, competitors can alert Respondent of alleged scoring errors in other applications by filing a written Notice of Possible Scoring Error (NOPSE) within a specified time frame. Respondent reviews the NOPSE and notifies the affected applicant of its decision by issuing a NOPSE scoring summary. Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-48.004(4). Applicants then have an opportunity to submit "additional documentation, revised pages and such other information as the Applicant deems appropriate ('cures') to address the issues" raised by preliminary or NOPSE scoring. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-21.003 and 67-48.004(6). In other words, within parameters established by the rules, applicants may cure certain errors and omissions in their applications pointed out during preliminary scoring or raised by a competitor during the NOPSE process. After affected applicants submit their "cure" documentation, competitors can file a Notice of Alleged Deficiency (NOAD) challenging the sufficiency of an applicant's cure. Respondent considers the challenged cure materials and reviews the NOADs, then issues final scores for all the applications. Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-48.004(9). Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.005 establishes a procedure through which an applicant can challenge the final scoring of its application. The Notice of Rights that accompanies an applicant's final score advises an adversely affected applicant of its right to appeal Respondent's scoring decision in a proceeding conducted under chapter 120. Ultimately, Respondent ranks each application and allocates available Housing Credits based on such rankings. The last time the QAP in the State of Florida was promulgated and adopted as a rule was in 2009, which allocated 2009 Housing Credits. During 2010, there were no new amendments to Respondent's rules or the QAP. At the end of 2010, Respondent drafted a 2011 QAP, which was signed by the Governor, but never adopted as a rule. The draft 2011 QAP allocated Housing Credits in accordance with a Universal Application Cycle, but Respondent did not adopt the QAP as a rule pursuant to chapter 120.56. The 2011 Cycle did not take place. On June 26, 2011, Respondent's Board authorized publication of proposed rule amendments to chapter 67-48. The proposed rule amendments adopt and incorporate the 2012 QAP by reference at proposed rule 67-48.002(94). Proposed rule 67-48.002(94) provides: "QAP" or "Qualified Allocation Plan" means, with respect to the HC Program, the 2012 Qualified Allocation Plan which is adopted and incorporated herein by reference, effective upon approval by the Governor of the state of Florida, pursuant to Section 42(m)(1)(B) of the IRC and sets forth the selection criteria and the preferences of the Corporation for Developments which will receive Housing Credits. The QAP is available on the Corporation's Website under the 2011 Universal Application link labeled Related References and Links or by contacting the Housing Credit Program at 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000, Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329. The 2012 QAP proposed rule purports to govern the process and allocation for both 2011 and 2012 Housing Credits. The only mention in the 2012 QAP proposed rule of the allocation of 2011 Housing Credits is contained in Paragraph 16 of the 2012 QAP proposed rule, which states in its entirety: "Any available 2011 Housing Credit Allocation Authority may be awarded by the FHFC [Respondent's] Board by means of Request for Proposals based on criteria approved by the FHFC [Respondent's] Board." Petitioners challenge proposed rule 67-48.002(94) (which incorporates by reference the 2012 QAP proposed rule) and those portions of the 2012 QAP proposed rule which purport to govern the allocation of 2011 Housing Credits. It is undisputed that Petitioners have standing to initiate and participate in this rule challenge proceeding. § 120.56(1)(a).
The Issue The two issues raised in this proceeding are: (1) whether the basis and reason Respondent, Vestcor Companies, d/b/a Madalyn Landings (Vestcor), terminated Petitioner, Carlos Gomez's (Petitioner), employment on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for Petitioner's protected conduct during his normal course of employment; and (2) whether Vestcor committed unlawful housing practice by permitting Vestcor employees without families to reside on its property, Madalyn Landing Apartments, without paying rent, while requiring Vestcor employees with families to pay rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, and Chapter 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness while testifying, exhibits offered in support of and in opposition to the respective position of the parties received in evidence, stipulations of the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (2002), and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant, material, and substantial facts are determined: Petitioner filed charges of housing discrimination against Vestcor with the Commission on August 30, 2002. Petitioner alleged that Vestcor discriminated against him based on his familial status and his June 28, 2002, termination was in retaliation for filing the charge of discrimination. Vestcor denied the allegations and contended that Petitioner's termination was for cause. Additionally, Vestcor maintained Petitioner relinquished his claim of retaliation before the final hearing; and under oath during his deposition, asserted he would not pursue a claim for retaliation. Petitioner was permitted to proffer evidence of retaliation because Vestcor terminated his employment. The Commission's Notice was issued on January 7, 2005. The parties agree that Petitioner was hired by Vestcor on June 25, 2001, as a leasing consultant agent for Madalyn Landing Apartments located in Palm Bay, Florida. Petitioner's job responsibilities as a leasing consultant agent included showing the property, leasing the property (apartment units), and assisting with tenant relations by responding to concerns and questions, and preparing and following up on maintenance orders. Petitioner had access to keys to all apartments on site. At the time of his hire, Petitioner was, as was all of Vestcor employees, given a copy of Vestcor's Employee Handbook. This handbook is required reading for each employee for personal information and familiarity with company policies and procedures, to include the company requirement that each employee personally telephone and speak with his/her supervisor when the employee, for whatever reason, could not appear at work as scheduled, which is a basis and cause for termination. The parties agree that Vestcor's handbook, among other things, contains company policies regarding equal employment; prohibition against unlawful conduct and appropriate workplace conduct; procedures for handling employee problems and complaints associated with their employment; and procedures for reporting illness or absences from work, which include personal notification to supervisors, and not messages left on the answering service. Failure to comply with employment reporting polices may result in progressive disciplinary action. The parties agree that employee benefits were also contained in the handbook. One such employee benefit, at issue in this proceeding, is the live-on-site benefit. The live-on- site benefit first requires eligible employees to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, and be a full-time employee. The eligible employee must pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the live-on-site unit. Rent-free, live-on-site benefits are available only to employees who occupy the positions of (1) site community managers, (2) maintenance supervisors, and (3) courtesy officers. These individuals received a free two-bedroom, two-bathroom apartment at the apartment complex in which they work as part of their employment compensation package. The rent-free, live-on-site benefit is not available for Vestcor's leasing consultant agent employees, such as Petitioner. On or about July 3, 2001, Petitioner entered into a lease agreement with Vestcor to move into Apartment No. 202-24 located at Madalyn Landing Apartments. The lease agreement ended on January 31, 2002. The lease agreement set forth terms that Petitioner was to receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, which became effective on September 3, 2001. Although he was eligible for the 25-percent monthly rental concession, to have given Petitioner the full 25 percent of his monthly rental cost would have over-qualified Petitioner based upon Madalyn Landing Apartment's tax credit property status. Petitioner and Vestcor agreed he would receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, thereby qualifying him as a resident on the property. Petitioner understood and accepted the fact that he did not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. Petitioner understood and accepted Vestcor's $50.00 monthly rental concession because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. The rental concession meant Petitioner's regular monthly rental would be reduced by $50.00 each month. On September 1, 2001, Henry Oliver was hired by Vestcor as a maintenance technician. Maintenance technicians do not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Oliver did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Oliver was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 13, 2001, Michael Gomez, the brother of Petitioner (Mr. Gomez), commenced his employment with Vestcor as a groundskeeper. Groundskeepers did not meet the qualifications for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Gomez did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Gomez was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 21, 2001, 81 days after his hire, Mr. Oliver commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 203-44 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Mr. Oliver's leasing consultant agent was Petitioner in this cause. Like other eligible Vestcor employees and as a part of the lease application process, Mr. Oliver completed all required paperwork, which included, but not limited to, completing a credit check, employment verification, and income test to ensure that he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Fifteen days later, on November 28, 2001, Mr. Gomez commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. As part of the leasing process, Mr. Gomez, as other eligible Vestcor employees who intend to reside on Vestcor property, completed all necessary paperwork including, but not limited to, a credit check and employment verification and income test to ensure he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Included in the paperwork was a list of rental criteria requiring Mr. Gomez to execute a lease agreement to obligate himself to pay the required rent payment, consent to a credit check, pay an application fee and required security deposit, and agree not to take possession of an apartment until all supporting paperwork was completed and approved. Mr. Gomez's leasing consultant was Petitioner. On December 28, 2001, Petitioner signed a Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 206-24, effective February 1, 2002. The Notice to Vacate was placed in Vestcor's office files. Petitioner's reasons for vacating his apartment stated he "needed a yard, garage, more space, a big family room, and some privacy." Thirty-four days later, February 1, 2002, Mr. Gomez moved into Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments without the approval or knowledge of Vestcor management. On January 9, 2002, a "Corrective Action Notice" was placed in Petitioner's employee file by his supervisor, Genea Closs. The notice cited two violations of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Specifically, his supervisor noted Petitioner did not collect administration fees from two unidentified rental units, and he had taken an unidentified resident's rental check home with him, rather than directly to the office as required by policy. As a direct result of those policy violations, Ms. Closs placed Petitioner on 180 days' probation and instructed him to re-read all Vestcor employees' handbook and manuals. Petitioner acknowledged receiving and understanding the warning. At the time she took the above action against Petitioner, there is no evidence that Ms. Closs had knowledge of Petitioner's past or present efforts to gather statements and other information from Mr. Gomez and/or Mr. Oliver in anticipation and preparation for his subsequent filing of claims of discrimination against Vestcor. Also, on January 9, 2002, Petitioner was notified that his brother, Mr. Gomez, did not qualify to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments because of insufficient credit. Further, Petitioner was advised that should Mr. Gomez wish to continue with the application process, he would need a co-signer on his lease agreement or pay an additional security deposit. Mr. Gomez produced an unidentified co-signer, who also completed a lease application. On January 30, 2002, the lease application submitted by Mr. Gomez's co-signor was denied. As a result of the denial of Mr. Gomez's co-signor lease application, Vestcor did not approve Mr. Gomez's lease application. When he was made aware that his co-signor's application was denied and of management's request for him to pay an additional security deposit, as was previously agreed, Mr. Gomez refused to pay the additional security deposit. As a direct result of his refusal, his lease application was never approved, and he was not authorized by Vestcor to move into any Madalyn Landing's rental apartment units. At some unspecified time thereafter, Vestcor's management became aware that Mr. Gomez had moved into Apartment No. 206-24, even though he was never approved or authorized to move into an on site apartment. Vestcor's management ordered Mr. Gomez to remove his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24. Subsequent to the removal order, Mr. Gomez moved his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24 into Apartment No. 103-20. Mr. Gomez's move into Apartment No. 103-20, as was his move into Apartment No. 206-04, was without approval and/or authorization from Vestcor's management. Upon learning that his belonging had been placed in Apartment No. 103-20, Mr. Gomez was again instructed by management to remove his belongings. After he failed and refused to move his belongings from Apartment No. 103-20, Vestcor's management entered the apartment and gathered and discarded Mr. Gomez's belongings. As a leasing contract agent, Petitioner had access to keys to all vacant apartments. His brother, Mr. Gomez, who was a groundskeeper, did not have access to keys to any apartment, save the one he occupied. Any apartment occupied by Ms. Gomez after his Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 103-20 was without the knowledge or approval of Vestcor and in violation of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Therefore, any period of apartment occupancy by Mr. Gomez was not discriminatory against Petitioner (rent-free and/or reduced rent), but was a direct violation of Vestcor's policies. On February 10, 2002, Mr. Oliver signed a one-year lease agreement with Vestcor. Mr. Oliver's lease agreement reflected a 25-percent employee rental concession. Throughout Mr. Oliver's occupancy of Apartment No. 203-64 and pursuant to his lease agreement duration, Mr. Oliver's rental history reflected his monthly payment of $413.00. There is no evidence that Mr. Oliver lived on site without paying rent or that Vestcor authorized or permitted Mr. Oliver to live on site without paying rent, as alleged by Petitioner. On June 2, 2002, Ms. Closs completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal report. Performance ratings range from a one -- below expectations, to a four -- exceeds expectations. Petitioner received ratings in the categories appraised as follows: Leasing skills -- 4; Administrative skills -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork, computer updating, and policy adherence; Marketing skills -- 4, with comments that Petitioner had a flair for finding the right markets; Community awareness -- 3, with no comment; Professionalism -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork reporting; Dependability -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in attendance; Interpersonal skills -- 3, with no comments; Judgment/Decision-making -- 3, with no comments; Quality of Work -- 2, with comments that work lacked accuracy; Initiative -- 4, with no comment; Customer service -- 3, with no comments; Team work -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in the area of resident confidence; Company loyalty -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in adherence to company policy and procedures; and Training and development -- 3, with no comments. Petitioner's Overall rating was 2.5, with comments that there was "room for improvement." On June 27, 2002, while on 180 days' probation that began on January 9, 2002, Petitioner failed to report to work and failed to report his absence to his supervisor, Ms. Closs, by a person-to-person telephone call. This conduct constituted a violation of Vestcor's policy requiring all its employees to personally contact their supervisor when late and/or absent from work and prohibited leaving messages on the community answering service machine. On June 28, 2002, Petitioner reported to work. Ms. Closs, his supervisor, informed Petitioner of his termination of employment with Vestcor for failure to report to work (i.e. job abandonment) and for probation violation, as he had been warned on January 9, 2002, what would happen should a policy violation re-occur. It was after his June 28, 2002, termination that Petitioner began his personal investigation and gathering of information (i.e., interviews and statements from other Vestcor employees) in preparation to file this complaint. Considering the findings favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Vestcor, when they terminated his employment on June 28, 2002. Considering the findings of record favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of housing and/or rental adjustment discrimination by Vestcor, based upon familial status of himself or any other employer. Petitioner failed to prove Vestcor knowingly and/or intentionally permitted, approved, or allowed either Mr. Gomez or Mr. Oliver to live on site without a completed and approved application followed by appropriate rent adjustments according to their employment status and keeping within the tax credit requirement, while requiring Vestcor employees with families (or different employment status) to pay a different monthly rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Petitioner failed to prove his termination on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for his actions and conduct other than his personal violation, while on probation, of Vestcor's policies and procedures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Florida Commission on Human Rights enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief alleging discrimination filed by Petitioner, Carlos Gomez. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the documentary evidence and the testimony taken at the hearing, the following relevant facts were uncontroverted: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondents National Home Realty, Inc. and Philip Marzo were licensed real estate brokers and Respondent Steve Mishkin was a licensed real estate salesman holding license numbers 0210856, 0056147 and 0151878, respectively. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, National Home Realty, Inc. was qualified by Philip Marzo, a licensed real estate broker. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, National Home Realty, Inc. was engaged in the business of negotiating rental contracts and in furnishing for an advance fee, rental information as to available residential rentals to prospective tenants. In connection therewith, the company used Service Agreements of which Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 are accurate examples. The Service Agreements do not comport with Rule 12V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, which requires a specific refund notice to be placed on any such contract, nor do the contracts comply with Section 475.453(1), Florida Statutes, which provides for full refund in the event the rental information provided by the broker or salesman to a prospective tenant is not current or accurate in any material respect. In October of 1980, Grace Pasquale, as a prospective tenant, signed a rental service agreement with National Home Realty, Inc., on a form supplied by National Home Realty, and paid to National Home Realty a $65 cash advance fee for the specified rental services. During a period of approximately 25 days after the date of the contract, Pasquale was not able to locate a residential rental to meet her requirements, as set forth in her rental contract, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, from the list of alleged available rentals supplied to her by National Home Realty. As a result, Pasquale made written demand within 30 days of the date of the contract for 75 percent of her advance fee, all as provided for by Section 475.453(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 12V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. That on or about June of 1981, after intervention by the Department of Professional Regulation, Grace Pasquale received a refund. On or about February 16, 1981, prospective tenant Bruce Blair paid to National Home Realty a $75 cash advance fee, for agreement for rental services including a list of available rentals to meet the specific requirements of prospective tenant Bruce Blair. Only one listing was supplied to Blair and this did not meet Blair's requirements as set forth in his agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit 6. Failing and unable to obtain a rental by and through National Home Realty, Blair located a rental through his own efforts unconnected with the services of National Home Realty. Within 30 days of the date of his agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit 6, Blair made written demand on National Home Realty for a 75 percent refund of his advance fee, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 12V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. In response to his demand, National Home Realty issued check number 1735, dated March 25, 1981, to the order of Bruce Blair on the account of National Home Realty, Inc. at the Barnett Bank for $18.75 being only 25 percent of the advance fee paid and, therefore, contrary to the provisions of the above stated rule. When Blair presented the check for payment, it was not honored due to the account having been closed. In April of 1981, Respondent paid Blair in cash for the balance due on his refund. Respondent Marzo, the qualifying broker who worked in the office, never personally refused a 75 percent refund to anyone who requested the same within 30 days from the date of a service contract. However, while he was qualifying broker, certain salesmen in the office ignored demands for refunds. Marzo was unaware that this was occurring until it was brought to his attention through the Department's direct intervention. When Marzo realized there was a problem with the salesmen making timely refunds, he instituted an unwritten policy that anyone who requested a refund should be given one. Despite this directive, salesmen continued to refuse or delay refunds due to the manner in which commissions were paid by the office. Respondents Marzo and Mishkin never met either Grace Pasquale or Bruce Blair. Although Respondent Mishkin never denied a refund to anyone who requested one, he would harass or make a person who asked for a refund "feel pretty bad" for doing so. (See Transcript at 37)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered revoking the license of National Home Realty, Inc., suspending the license of Philip Marzo for a period of six (6) months and dismissing the charges against Steve Mishkin. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 Kristin Building 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Brian Hal Leslie, Esquire 1795 North East 164th Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33160 Carlos B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation Old Courthouse Square Building 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the intended decision of Florida Housing Finance Corporation (Respondent/Florida Housing) to fund the application of West River Phase 2, LP (West River/Intervenor), based on the scoring of its application, is contrary to Respondent’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or solicitation specifications.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida limited liability corporation based in Tampa, Florida, in the business of providing affordable housing. Intervenor is a Florida limited partnership based in Tampa, Florida, in the business of providing affordable housing. Respondent is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes (2017).1/ Its purpose is to promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Pursuant to section 420.5099, Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code and has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures for allocating and distributing low-income housing tax credits. The low-income housing tax credit program was enacted to incentivize the private market to invest in affordable rental housing. These tax credits are awarded competitively to housing developers in Florida for rental housing projects which qualify. These credits are then normally sold by developers for cash to raise capital for their projects. This has the effect of reducing the amount that the developer would have to borrow otherwise. Because the total debt is lower, a tax credit property can (and must) offer lower, more affordable rents. Developers also covenant to keep rents at affordable levels for periods of 30 to 50 years as consideration for receipt of the tax credits. Tax credits are not tax deductions. For example, a $1,000 deduction in a 15-percent tax bracket reduces taxable income by $1,000 and reduces tax liability by $150, while a $1,000 tax credit reduces tax liability by $1,000. The demand for tax credits provided by the federal government exceeds the supply. Florida Housing allocates housing tax credits and other funding by means of request for proposals or other competitive solicitation as authorized by section 420.507(48). Housing tax credits are made available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of an RFA. An RFA is equivalent to a “request for proposal” as indicated in Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-60.009(4). The RFA at issue here is 2016-113, Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas Counties. The RFA was issued on October 28, 2016, a modification to the RFA was issued on November 10, 2016, and responses were due December 30, 2016. A challenge was filed to the terms, conditions, or requirements of the RFA by parties not associated with the instant case, but that challenge was ultimately unsuccessful. Through the RFA, Florida Housing seeks to award up to an estimated $14,669,052 of housing tax credits to qualified applicants to provide affordable housing developments. A review committee made up of Florida Housing staff reviews and scores each application. These scores are presented in a public meeting and the committee ultimately makes a recommendation as to which projects should be funded. This recommendation is presented to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors (Board) for final agency action. On May 5, 2017, Petitioner and all other participants in RFA 2016-113 received notice that the Board had determined which applications were eligible for consideration for funding and that certain applications were selected for awards of tax credits, subject to satisfactory completion of the credit underwriting process. Such notice was provided by the posting of two spreadsheets, one listing the “eligible” and “ineligible” applications and one identifying the applications which Florida Housing proposed to fund. Florida Housing announced its intention to award funding to seven developments, including Intervenor. Petitioner’s application was deemed eligible and scored the maximum number of points, but it was not selected for funding due to having a higher lottery number than Intervenor. If Intervenor’s application had been deemed ineligible, Petitioner’s would have been selected for funding. In this proceeding, Petitioner alleges that Intervenor’s application is ineligible for two reasons. First, Petitioner asserts that Intervenor failed to include all “principals” for its designated developer entity as required by the RFA. Next, Petitioner asserts that Intervenor failed to provide sufficient documentation to establish that its designated developer entity, and specifically the identified “principal” of the developer entity, had the requisite developer experience required by the RFA. Disclosure of the Principals of the Developer The RFA at section Four (A)(3)(d) requires the disclosure of information as follows: Principals Disclosure for the Applicant and for each Developer. The Application must include a properly completed Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form (Form Rev. 08- 16) (“Principals Disclosure Form”) that was uploaded as outlined in Section Three above. The Principals Disclosure form must identify the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) as of the Application Deadline and must include, for each applicable organizational structure, ONLY the types of Principals required by subsection 67-48.002(93), F.A.C. A Principals Disclosure Form that includes, for any organizational structure, any type of entity that is not specifically included in the Rule definition of Principals, will not be accepted by the Corporation to meet the Mandatory requirement to provide the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form. The term “principal” is defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.002(93)(b) with respect to a developer, and provides as follows when the developer entity is a limited liability company: A limited liability company, at the first principal disclosure level, any manager or member of the Developer limited liability company, and, with respect to any manager or member of the Developer limited liability company that is: A corporation, at the second principal disclosure level, any officer, director or shareholder of the corporation, A limited partnership, at the second principal disclosure level, any general partner or limited partner of the limited partnership, or A limited liability company, at the second principal disclosure level, any manager or member of the limited liability company. Florida Housing offers a pre-approval of the principals disclosure form to all potential applicants. The pre-approval process verifies that the disclosure form has been completed properly as to form. However, its purpose is not to determine the accuracy of the information provided by the applicant. Intervenor utilized the pre-approval process and its principal disclosure forms were pre-approved. In response to this RFA and rule requirement, Intervenor identified WRDG Boulevard, LLC, as its developer. On the principal disclosure form included within its application, Intervenor further identified Banc of America Community Development Corporation (BOACDC) as the “managing member” and the Housing Authority of the City of Tampa as “member” of WRDG Boulevard, LLC. The principal disclosure form submitted by Intervenor for its developer entity lists approximately 62 individuals that are principals of BOACDC and identifies them as officers, directors, and shareholders. However, two officers who met the definition of principal were omitted from Intervenor’s principals disclosure form for the developer entity. The evidence establishes that the annual report filed by BOACDC with the Florida Secretary of State’s office on March 31, 2016, lists four officers and directors for BOACDC. The listed officers and directors include Mr. Jason Pritchard as senior vice president and Mr. Nathan Barth as secretary. Neither Mr. Pritchard nor Mr. Barth is listed on the principals disclosure form submitted to Florida Housing by Intervenor. Intervenor concedes that the principals disclosure form is missing these two principals, but asserts that neither Mr. Barth nor Mr. Pritchard had actual authority to bind BOACDC or had any direct involvement with the proposed project. Intervenor further points out that neither Mr. Pritchard nor Mr. Barth is listed on Respondent’s past due report dated April 5, 2017, which was the most recently published past due report prior to the RFA review committee meeting on April 25, 2017. Intervenor also asserts that there is no specific language in the RFA that prohibits waiving this admitted deviation. Accordingly, Intervenor alleges that the failure to include these two principals should be waived as a minor irregularity. The RFA requires that principals be listed and does not include qualifiers or exemptions to these requirements in instances where the omitted principal is either not on the latest arrears list or does not have the authority to bind the designated entity. Mr. Reecy testified that while Respondent has waived other failures to submit certain information, it did so only when the missing information could be found elsewhere in the application. In the present case, there is no other place in the application where a list of the principals of the developer could be found. The evidence establishes that the accurate and complete disclosure of principals is important in the RFA process for several reasons. First, Respondent uses the disclosure of principals to determine if any individuals associated with a proposed development are in arrears or indebted to Florida Housing in connection with other developments previously funded by Florida Housing. A Florida Housing staff member, during the review process, checks each principal listed for arrearages and reports back to the review committee accordingly. Second, Respondent uses the information to determine if any principal associated with a proposed development is ineligible to participate in any Florida Housing program due to prior illegal acts or misconduct. Mr. Reecy testified as to several recent instances where individuals have been subject to “timeouts” due to misrepresentations made to Florida Housing. Mr. Reecy credibly testified that Florida Housing must know who it is dealing with for each applicant and developer entity, and that to not know this information would harm the basic structure of the RFA application process, which resultantly would adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing and the public. Developer Experience Chart Section Four, 4(a)(3) of the RFA provides, in part, as follows: General Development experience (5 Points): To be eligible to be awarded 5 points for General Development Experience, the Prior General Development Experience chart must meet the requirements of (a) below. At least one Principal, which must be a natural person, of the Developer entity, or if more than one Developer entity, at least one Principal, which must be a natural person, of at least one of the Developer entities, must meet the General Development Experience requirements in (i) and (ii) below. General Development Experience: A Principal, which must be a natural person, of each experienced Developer entity must have, since January 1, 1996, completed at least three (3) affordable rental housing developments, at least one (1) of which was a Housing Credit development completed since January 1, 2006. If the experience of a natural person Principal for a Developer entity listed in this Application was acquired from a previous affordable housing Developer entity, the natural person Principal must have also been a Principal of that previous Developer entity as the term Principal was defined by the Corporation at that time. Prior General Development Experience Chart: The Applicant must provide, as Attachment 4 to Exhibit A, a prior experience chart for each natural person Principal intending to meet the minimum general development experience reflecting the required information for the three (3) completed affordable rental housing developments, one (1) of which must be a Housing Credit development. The RFA requires that at least one principal of the designated developer entity have completed at least three affordable rental housing developments since January 1996. If the designated principal is using experience from a previous developer entity, the named principal must have been a principal of that entity as the term principal “was defined by the Corporation at that time.” Intervenor submitted a general development experience chart as part of its application in accordance with the RFA. This chart listed Eileen M. Pope as its principal with the required developer experience, and specified three developments for which Ms. Pope was identified as a principal of the developer. Based upon this chart, Intervenor was awarded five points by the scoring review committee. One of these developments was First Ward Place Phase I, which was listed as being completed in 1998. In 1998, Ms. Pope was employed as a regional property manager for the Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA). She was not an officer, director, or shareholder of the CHA. The RFA in this case requires an applicant to state the name of each developer, including all co-developers. It is thus relatively easy for applications submitted to Florida Housing in 2017 to determine whether or not a particular entity is considered a “co-developer” of a project. Unfortunately, it is not so easy to make this determination with respect to developers of projects located in North Carolina in 1998. There is no evidence directly identifying CHA as a “co-developer” of First Ward Place Phase I. However, Ms. Pope identified it as such, and there is evidence in the record that the CHA was in partnership with NationsBank Community Development Corporation (NBCDC), and that NBCDC was the developer of the project. The available evidence does not demonstrate that the CHA should not be considered a co-developer of First Ward Place Phase I. Whether Ms. Pope should be considered a principal of a co-developer, however, is another matter. The evidence is uncontroverted that she was employed by the CHA as a regional property manager. The CHA was governed by a board of directors along with several officers (president, CEO, CFO), any of whom would have been considered a principal of the CHA. Ms. Pope was not a director, officer, or shareholder of the CHA; for the First Ward Place Phase I project, she “worked on the development team middle-to-back-end piece.” She considered herself a member of the “senior management” of the CHA and part of the “development team.” She testified that the CHA was, to some extent, a regulatory agency, and that part of her job was to oversee compliance issues and to track how certain funds were being spent. She testified that it was her understanding that a “principal” was “a person in authority” and, thus, she considered herself to be a “principal.” However, she also testified that she did not claim to be a principal: I disagree with your first part of the comment in that you said that I said I was a principal of the housing authority. I didn’t say I was a principal. I said there were no principals, and I was asked if I viewed myself as a principal, and I said I don’t understand what the definition of the principal would be, that a principal is somebody in authority. So, if you’re asking me that, yes, I would have viewed myself as a principal. I never claimed to be a principal of the housing authority. (Jt. Ex. 8, pg. 53) Mr. Reecy testified that Ms. Pope was “an employee, but not a principal in any way that Florida Housing has ever defined principal in any regard.” Mr. Reecy also testified that Florida Housing had never considered a person other than an officer, director, shareholder, or managing member to be a principal of either an applicant or a developer. In fact, Mr. Reecy compared Ms. Pope’s position with the CHA to his own position with Florida Housing, in that both had a high level of responsibility, and both were integral to the operation of the entity, but that neither could be considered a principal. As noted above, the RFA requires that in order to gain points for developer experience, the natural person principal must have also been a principal of that previous developer entity as the term principal was defined by the Florida Housing “at that time.” There is no dispute that Respondent’s rules in effect in 1998 did not explicitly define a principal of a developer. Both Florida Administrative Code Rules 9I-48.002(69) and 67-48.002(77) defined “principal” to include only officers, directors, shareholders or general partners, but these rules specifically applied only to applicants. Nonetheless, the evidence shows that it has been Respondent’s position and practice that a principal did not include all employees of an applicant or developer, even those in positions of authority, but instead, included only the officers, directors, shareholders, or general partners of an applicant or developer. The greater weight of the evidence shows that Ms. Pope had some degree of experience. As Mr. Reecy indicated, however, simply having experience is only part of the equation; Ms. Pope must also have been a principal. There is no evidence establishing that Ms. Pope was an officer, director, or shareholder of either NBCDC or the CHA in conjunction with the First Ward Place Phase I development. It is, therefore, found that Ms. Pope was not a principal of either entity, and the award to Intervenor of five points for its developer experience was clearly erroneous.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued finding that Florida Housing’s initial scoring decision regarding the West River application was erroneous, concluding that the West River application is ineligible for funding, and awarding funding to Blue Broadway. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence received at the final hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At approximately 9:30 A.M. on February 10, 1984, petitioner, a black female, telephoned a number listed in the newspaper to inquire about a duplex for rent. She was informed that an apartment was available and that she would need to bring $410.00 which included $200.00 for a security deposit and a monthly rental fee of $210.00. Petitioner informed the lady on the telephone that she would be there to see the apartment around 11:30 A.M. Petitioner went to the bank to get the $410.00 and then drove to the Highlands Apartments rental office. When she drove up in the driveway, a lady came running out and introduced herself as Evelyn Massey. According to the petitioner, Ms. Massey said "I told you on the phone that I had an apartment for you, but I don't have." She went on to explain that another lady had previously paid a deposit on the apartment and had not come back; but, between the time of talking to petitioner that morning and then, the lady had come back and paid the rest of the money and thus had the apartment. Ms. Massey also informed the petitioner that that unit was the only apartment available and that she had no other vacancies. After this incident, petitioner telephoned Laurie J. Turner between 12:30 and 1:00 P.M., told her what had happened and requested her to call the same telephone number petitioner had called and to inquire about an apartment. Ms. Turner, a white female, did call the number given her by petitioner, a gentleman answered the telephone, she inquired about the availability of the apartment in the newspaper and he told her, according to Ms. Turner, that it was still available. Ms. Turner then related this information to petitioner. In response to petitioner's contact with the EOO on February 10, 1984, Jeanette Fenton, the Equal Opportunity Assistant/Fair Housing Administrator, began her investigation and made several telephone calls to the Highlands Apartments on that same day. According to Ms. Fenton, "various responses, contradictory responses, were received as to the availability of apartments there." Ms. Fenton also decided to send a black female and a white female as testers to determine the type of treatment that would be received at the Highlands Apartments. On February 10, 1984, Ms. Fenton called Jeanese Wells, a black female, explained that she had a complaint of discrimination against the Highlands Apartments and requested her to go out there and inquire about an apartment. Ms. Wells telephoned the Highlands Apartments on February 11, 1984, spoke to a woman who did not identify herself and inquired if there was a unit available for rent. The woman indicated that there was and gave Ms. Wells directions to the apartments. When Ms. Wells arrived, a woman named Evelyn showed her an apartment and told her that the charges and terms would be a $350.00 deposit, a $35.00 application fee and a one-year lease. Ms. Wells was also informed that her credit references and previous residences would be checked. When Ms. Wells inquired as to whether anyone else was interested in the apartment, Evelyn replied that she had had several phone calls on it, but no firm commitments. According to Ms. Wells, Evelyn showed no reluctance to lease the apartment to her and "there was no negative interaction between the two of us." Ms. Wells did not describe the apartment she inspected. On the same day, February 11, 1984, Ms. Fenton, a white female, telephoned the number listed in the newspaper, spoke with a female named Evelyn, was informed that a unit was available and was given directions to the Highlands Apartments. Ms. Fenton drove out there and inspected a one-bedroom unit, accompanied by Evelyn. According to Ms. Fenton, Evelyn informed her that the requirements for renting the unit would be a $200.00 deposit, rental payments in the amount of $60.00 a week or $210.00 a month, and a six month's lease. No application fee would be required, but there was an application form which required information regarding employment, credit references and landlord references. Ms. Fenton was told, however, that she could move into the unit that day if she wished, that there were no other apartments that were vacant and that the one-bedroom apartment she was viewing was the one that was advertised in the newspaper. Petitioner submitted her formal housing discrimination complaint to the EOO on February 15, 1984. By letter dated March 1, 1984, the EOO informed Roy Hansen that a complaint involving the Highlands Apartments had been filed and transmitted a copy of the complaint to him. The EOO continued to investigate the matter, found probable cause that a violation of the Fair Housing Ordinance had occurred and attempted conciliation. Petitioner Shorter left Hillsborough County for six to eight months between February 15, 1984 and June of 1985. During the conciliation process, petitioner no longer wished to lease a unit at the Highlands Apartments and desired to settle her complaint for an amount of $10,000.00 in damages as compensation. Mr. Hansen was willing to settle the complaint for $200.00 to avoid the expense of attorney's fees. Petitioner rejected Mr. Hansen's counter- offer and requested a hearing by letter dated June 19, 1985. Ms. Evelyn Massey left the State of Florida shortly after the events which occurred on February 10 and 11, 1984. She did not testify in this proceeding and her whereabouts are unknown. Mr. Ron Massey left Florida around November of 1984 and his whereabouts are likewise unknown. Roy Hansen is a professor of sociology at the University of South Florida, a private consultant and a part- owner of the Highlands Apartments, which contains several complexes and includes 104 separate units. He employed a manager, Ron Massey, to care for the apartments on a day-to-day basis and to handle rentals. One of the reasons Mr. Massey was hired was because he had had prior experience in managing a predominantly black rental complex. In February of 1984, Ron Massey was married to Evelyn Massey and they lived together in one of the Highlands Apartment units which was also utilized as the rental office. While Evelyn Massey did answer the telephone in that office and did show apartments to potential tenants, only Ron Massey was employed as the manager and only he received a salary therefor. Mr. Hansen instructed the Masseys to apply equal criteria to all potential tenants. Out of 104 units, approximately 17 are rented to minorities. The normal deposit required at the Highlands Apartments was $200 or $350 if the tenant had a pet.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the housing discrimination complaint filed by Julia M. Shorter on February 15, 1984, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 11th day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Julia M. Shorter 8307 Bahia Street Tampa, Florida 33619 George W. Phillips P. O. Box 270504 Tampa, Florida 33688 Amelia G. Brown Assistant County Attorney P. O. Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601 Robert W. Saunders, Director Equal Opportunity Office P. O. Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601 APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted by the respondent and the intervenor have been approved and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Respondent 3. Rejected, contrary to the evidence of record. Intervenor 1. No substantial evidence that Ms. Shorter applied for a "one bedroom apartment." 8. Rejected, not supported by competent substantial evidence.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is the amount of replacement housing payment that the Petitioners should receive as a result of their being displaced by a highway construction project. The parties agree that Petitioners are entitled to benefits, but disagree as to the appropriate amount.
Findings Of Fact In 1979, Petitioners owned and lived on property located in Hillsborough County, Florida. The property included slightly more than two acres of land and a one-story frame dwelling. The dwelling contained three bedrooms, a living-dining room, a kitchen, and two open porches. Petitioners' property was condemned by the Florida Department of Transportation in order to obtain right-of-way for Interstate Highway 75. The value of the land and dwelling structure was $60,950, and Petitioners were awarded this amount through a Final Judgment entered in a condemnation proceeding. The value of the Petitioners' dwelling structure was approximately $33,794, and the value of their property was approximately $27,206. The fact that these amounts do not coincide with the condemnation award is not material. Department of Transportation personnel located a comparable piece of property that included a dwelling structure. This dwelling structure was slightly larger and included some amenities that the Petitioners' condemned dwelling structure did not include. The structure was on three acres of land, more than the land included in the condemned parcel. The selling price of this comparable property and structure was $70,500. Petitioners decided against purchasing the comparable property and structure located by the Department. Instead, Petitioners decided to purchase property located near to Live Oak, Florida, and to build a new dwelling structure on the property. The parcel that Petitioners purchased is 41 acres in size and includes frontage on the Suwannee River. The Petitioner Mrs. Fred Anderson has contracted to construct a dwelling structure on a portion of the purchased property. The price of the dwelling is $35,000. The structure which Mrs. Anderson has contracted to build contains some amenities beyond those that were included in the condemned dwelling structure. Nonetheless, the Department has conceded that the structure, now under construction, is comparable to the condemned structure. The Department has conceded that Petitioners are entitled to receive the difference between the value placed on the condemned structure and the cost of building the new, comparable structure as a part of their replacement housing payment. This amounts to $1,206 ($35,000 minus $33,794) In making a determination as to the amount of replacement housing payment that Petitioners are entitled to receive in connection with their property acquisition, the Department determined to place a value on three acres of the 41-acre tract that Petitioners purchased. Three acres were chosen because the comparable property located by the Department included three acres. The Department's personnel concluded that the three acres surrounding the dwelling structure site had a value of $8,597 per acre. The total value of the three-acre homesite was thus placed at $25,791. This amount is less than the $27,206 that was determined to be the fair value of the Petitioners' condemned land. The Department's personnel therefore concluded that Petitioners were entitled to no relocation assistance benefits for the property acquisition since they had received more money in the condemnation proceeding than the value of the three-acre homesite. In determining a fair value to be placed on the property purchased by Petitioners near Live Oak, it is not appropriate to consider the price of the entire 41-acre tract. The 41-acre tract cannot fairly be compared to the condemned tract that was less than three acres in size. Petitioners should receive compensation only for a comparable tract. Petitioners paid a total of $58,000 for the 41-acre tract. It would not be appropriate to place a value on the three acres surrounding the Petitioners' dwelling under construction by simply dividing 41 into the total purchase price. The three acres surrounding the homesite includes river frontage. It is the most valuable portion of the 41-acre tract. While the three acres surrounding the dwelling structure under construction include amenities that the Petitioners' condemned land did not include, it is fairly comparable. The fair value of the three acres is $10,782 per acre, or a total of $32,346. It thus cost the Petitioners more than the amount they received for their condemned land ($27,206) to obtain a comparable homesite. The Department's calculations which led to a value of $8,597 per acre were erroneous. During the course of negotiations between the Petitioner Mrs. Anderson and personnel of the Department of Transportation, Mrs. Anderson came to an understanding that she would receive $9,550 (the difference between the price of the comparable property located by the Department and the Petitioners' condemned property) in replacement housing payments. She relied on this understanding in contracting to have a dwelling structure constructed on her newly acquired property. The new dwelling structure has not been completed because Mrs. Anderson was relying upon receipt of the replacement housing payments to pay for construction. While it is clear that Mrs. Anderson had this understanding, it does not appear that the Department misrepresented any facts so as to lead her to that conclusion. Communications forwarded by the Department to Petitioners advised them that the maximum benefits they could receive would be determined by subtracting the value of their property as determined in a condemnation proceeding from the cost of comparable property. Petitioners concede that that amount is $9,550. The Department's communications clearly indicated that if Petitioners decided to purchase other property or to build a new dwelling structure, other compensation formulas would be utilized, but that the maximum possible benefit would remain $9,550. While Mrs. Anderson's new dwelling structure was being constructed, she had difficulty contacting the Department's officials, who were located in Tampa and Bartow. The difficulty in communication was in part the fault of Mrs. Anderson and in part the fault of the Department's officials. Mrs. Anderson went to a Department office near Live Oak and discussed the matter. The Live Oak officials, of course, had no knowledge of the details of the matter, but helped to communicate with officials in Tampa and Bartow. During these discussions, the officials in Live Oak assumed that Mrs. Anderson was entitled to receive the amount that she related to them ($9,550). No representations were made to her, however, that would properly lead her to a conclusion that she was entitled to receive that amount. The contractor who was building Mrs. Anderson's dwelling structure also contacted Department personnel. He, too, came to the conclusion that Mrs. Anderson would be receiving $9,550. Based on that understanding, he engaged in construction activities that Mrs. Anderson could not afford. While it is apparent that the contractor reached this understanding, it does not appear that anyone at the Department directly represented to him that Mrs. Anderson would be receiving $9,550 in replacement housing payments.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Jan Partin (Partin), during all times relevant to this proceeding, was the administrative assistant to the executive director of the Winter Haven Housing Authority, in Winter Haven, Florida. In that capacity she exercised responsible administrative, supervisory and technical management functions in assisting the executive director. In the absence of the executive director, she was totally responsible for the operation of the housing authority. Oswald and Leah Carrerou, husband and wife, owned rental property in Winter Haven, and in 1989 and 1990 were landlords in the housing authority's Section 8 program, a program funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to provide rental assistance to eligible tenants. The Carrerous were the second landlords brought into the authority's program, and in late 1989, early 1990, had more tenants than other landlords in the program. As Section 8 landlords, the Carrerous received monthly checks from the housing authority. In January and February 1990, those checks were $3,512.00 and $3,810.00, respectively, representing approximately sixty percent of the Carrerou's total rental income at that time. The Carrerou's primary staff contact with the housing authority with regard to the Section 8 Program was Jan Partin. This included contacts regarding tenants, leases, landlord/housing authority contracts, and rental payments. As it was a new program, the contacts were frequent, several times a week, by telephone and in person at the housing authority office. As executive director, Ash Ahmad was the formal administrator of the Section 8 Program. Ahmad trained Partin and another staff person in the program and Partin's contacts with the Carrerous were part of her routine functions. The Carrerou's perception that she had some control over their continued participation and receipt of rents was reasonable, even if not technically nor legally correct. In early 1990, Partin called Oswald Carrerou and asked if he would consider making a loan to a person who was very important to the housing authority, a witness in a federal case involving a tenant. Partin said the person needed money to pay his lawyer in a child custody dispute. Carrerou was concerned about the appearance and legitimacy of the transaction. He was not in the business of making personal loans, except in the context of his buying and selling real estate, in which cases the loans were secured by a mortgage. When he asked about collateral, Partin said something about a CD coming due and that he would be paid off then. Partin suggested that a note would be prepared, but did not say who would sign the note. Reluctantly, and with the concern that he had little choice, given his financial circumstances and reliance on the Section 8 rents, Carrerou agreed to the loan. Timothy Keaton was the person who was to receive the loan. Keaton met Partin in 1988 when his girlfriend, April Marshall, was living in a Winter Haven Housing Authority housing project. Keaton lived with Marshall off and on without being included in the lease; the couple had two children together. Keaton and Partin developed a close personal relationship and they began dating; Partin loaned and gave him money. Partin became involved in a custody dispute regarding the Keaton/Marshall children, a case which also involved the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Partin urged Keaton to hire a lawyer to get custody away from Marshall and she recommended a lawyer to him. This was the lawyer to whom the loan money was to be paid. At the same time that the custody dispute was pending, the housing authority was sued in federal court by Keaton's sometime girlfriend, Marshall, and other plaintiffs who were contesting their evictions. Partin was the legal liaison for the housing authority and worked closely with Sylvia Ibanez, the attorney for the housing authority in the Marshall lawsuit and other litigation. Keaton agreed to testify against Marshall and on behalf of the housing authority in the federal case. He gave a deposition attended by Partin, Attorney Ibanez and Marshall's attorney. This was around the same time that Partin sought the loan to pay Keaton's lawyer. Keaton and another man appeared at Carrerou's office with a note signed by Keaton's mother, Oreatha K. Ogletree, dated February 16, 1990. The note stated that she would be responsible for the loan of $1200 to her son, and that she would make the payment in March 1990, when her CD matured. After assuring himself that the lawyer was indeed representing Keaton, and that Oreatha K. Ogletree was Timothy Keaton's mother, Oswald Carrerou gave Keaton a check for $1200 payable to Robert Doyel, the attorney. The check is dated February 16, 1990. Carrerou had never met nor seen Keaton before that day. Because of cash flow problems, Carrerou borrowed the $1200 from his wife's VISA credit card account at 18 percent interest in order to make the loan to Keaton. Keaton did not sign the note, although there was a space on the note for his signature and social security number. Moreover, instead of taking the check to the lawyer's office that afternoon as was arranged, he tore it into three pieces. He did not want to be responsible for the money and did not want his mother to be responsible either. Sometime later, but before the end of February 1990, Partin called Leah Carrerou and told her that the Keaton children had spilled something on the check or had torn it, and that another check was needed immediately. Keaton had an appointment with the lawyer that afternoon and the lawyer would not see him without the check. Partin said she would send someone over to pick it up, and someone from the Housing Authority did come to get the check from Mrs. Carrerou. Later, Mrs. Carrerou realized her check was written on the wrong account and, after speaking to the lawyer's secretary for approval, she mailed a substitute check for $1200, dated February 28, 1990, to Robert Doyel. The Carrerous were never repaid their $1200. After the end of thirty days, Leah Carrerou called Partin, who assured that she would get her money. After about five or six subsequent similar calls, the Carrerous sued Oreatha Ogletree on the note. A final judgement in favor of Oswald Carrerou was entered on July 9, 1990, by Polk County Judge, Harvey A. Kornstein. Later, Oswald Carrerou filed a satisfaction of that judgement when he learned that Timothy Keaton had torn up his original check to avoid binding himself or his mother. Keaton believed that Jan Partin had come up with the money for the lawyer. Keaton did not know that Partin had obtained another check from the Carrerous. The federal case was eventually settled without the need for Keaton to testify at a trial. Meanwhile, Keaton got back together with April Marshall and appeared at the custody hearing on her side. Commonly, and within the Housing Authority's function of providing services to tenants or other members of the public, housing authority staff make referrals to other social services agencies or resources. The referral of Timothy Keaton to a landlord in a housing authority program was not within the scope of that appropriate function. The greater weight of evidence established that it was Partin's romantic relationship with Keaton, rather than any eleemosynary impulse that motivated her misguided efforts on his behalf.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Ethics enter its final order finding that Jan Partin violated section 112.313(6), F.S., and recommending restitution in the amount of $1200 and a civil penalty of $5000. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Claire D. Dryfuss, Esquire Acting Advocate Commission on Ethics Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Robert H. Grizzard, II, Esquire Post Office Box 992 Lakeland, Florida 33802-0992 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact In March, 1982, the Petitioner, Eleanor R. Booth, and her husband, Fred E. Booth, owned and lived upon a tract of land located at 4721 State Road 84, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The tract was taken by the Department of Transportation for road right- of-way, and the issue in this case is whether the Department of Transportation, pursuant to its policies, has properly calculated the amount to be paid to the Petitioner. Mr. Booth is now deceased. Mr. and Mrs. Booth lived on the property for thirty-four years. T. 48. The total tract was 19,593 square feet, which is somewhat less than one-half acre. T. 18, 21; P. Ex. 1. On or about October 15, 1982, which was the date of the appraisal of the property, there were seven trailers or mobile homes on the property. Two trailers were designated by the appraiser as storage and workshop, respectively. One trailer was designated by the appraiser as the mobile home of Mr. and Mrs. Booth. The others were not designated. The appraisal parcel sketch also showed a shed, a restroom, and a laundry. The shower and toilet (restroom) building was made of concrete and contained 58 square feet. A one story frame building of about 215 square feet was used as a laundry. The shed was a metal and frame shed measuring 8.5 by 8.0 feet. The appraiser considered the shower/toilet building and the laundry building to be real property improvements. The trailers were considered to be personal property. P. Ex. 1. The Department of Transportation selected as the comparable replacement dwelling a 1972 mobile home containing about 500 habitable square feet, 750 total square feet, and consisting of a total of 5 rooms, with 2 bedrooms and 1 bathroom. R. Ex. 2; T. 18, 23. The selling price was $29,500. R. Ex. 2. The primary issue in this case is whether the replacement dwelling described above is comparable. This in turn depends upon an analysis of the manner in which Mr. and Mrs. Booth used the various trailers and buildings located on their property. The mobile home which contained the kitchen, bedroom, and bathroom primarily used by Mr. and Mrs. Booth had about 322 habitable square feet and 390 total square feet. R. Ex. 2. It consisted of 4 rooms in total, 1 bedroom, 1 living room, 1 kitchen, and 1 bathroom. T. 71. The only evidence submitted by the Department of Transportation concerning the nature of the "dwelling" of Mr. and Mrs. Booth or the manner in which the additional trailers and other out buildings were used is the household survey, P. Ex. 1, which was signed on March 30, 1982, by Mr. Booth and B.A. Davis for the Department. This form was intended to identify the social and economic status of the family and to identify the number of rooms, number of baths, number of people, and similar data concerning the household, but the evidence shows that in part it was filled out incorrectly. P. Ex. 1 characterizes the "subject dwelling" as a mobile home consisting of 3 rooms, with 1 bedroom and 1 bathroom. Mr. Davis did not testify, and Mr. Booth is deceased. Tracy Graff, who was called by the Department as its only witness, made it clear that he did not personally know the status of uses of the out buildings and trailers, but simply concurred with what he thought was the conclusion drawn by Mr. Davis on P. Ex. 1 as to what was the "dwelling" of Mr. and Mrs. Booth. See T. 35, 39, 41, 42. Mr. Graff did not testify that the tract of land was or had been used as a commercial trailer park with trailers for rent to the public, and neither did any other witness. Mr. and Mrs. Booth routinely used the laundry building, the toilet and shower building, and the shed located on the property for their personal, domestic use. T. 50, 67, 68. Mr. Booth was rarely in the mobile home when visited by his daughter, but was elsewhere on the property working. T. 59. Mr. Booth primarily kept tools, lawn equipment, paint, and other maintenance materials in the shed. T. 62, 68, 75. Two other trailers were used by Mr. and Mrs. Booth for storage of personal belongings. T. 62, 68. This was necessary because there was not room enough in the one mobile home for storage of personal property. T. 64. 68. Mr. Booth "had a flea market." T. 62. Some of the "flea market" materials were stored in the trailers. T. 63, 64, 76. Some of the "flea market" materials may have been stored in the shed but most of the "flea market" materials were stored under canvas covers adjacent to the shed. T. 73-74. There is no evidence in the record to explain the nature of the "flea market" activities of Mr. and Mrs. Booth. It is uncertain where the flea market was. In 1982, Mr. and Mrs. Booth were living on the property. The niece of the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Booth and her husband and two children, and the sister of the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Booth were also residing on the property in 1982. T. 54. Additionally, a nephew of the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Booth had a camper trailer parked on the property, and may have lived in it from time to time. T. 56, 61, 63. Finally, in 1982 Mr. and Mrs. Booth rented a space to a John Schneider to park his trailer, but apparently Mr. Schneider did not live on the property. T. 55. Thus, all of the persons residing on the property in 1982 were relatives of Mr. and Mrs. Booth. Id. Prior to 1982, one of the other trailers in which relatives lived in 1982 was used by Mr. and Mrs. Booth as a bedroom for their daughter, and as a place to live for their son and his two children. T. 64, 65. These family members were not restricted from using the laundry or toilet and shower buildings, T. 55, 56, and at times used these facilities. T. 71. When Mr. and Mrs. Booth moved from the property, they needed a three bedroom, two bath house and a shed measuring 54 by 25 feet (1350 square feet) to house all of the personal property moved to the new house and which they had had in storage and used in the trailers and shed on the original property. T. 65. Mr. and Mrs. Booth and their daughter considered the trailers to be part of their dwelling because they had pictures, books, and other personal item stored in them, T. 64, 65. The Respondent has adopted as policy the Right of Way Operating Procedures found in P. Ex. 2 and set forth in conclusions of law 4, 5, 6, and 8.
Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter its final order recalculating the replacement housing purchase additive due Eleanor Booth by reference to a comparable replacement dwelling the same as the comparable replacement dwelling initially identified by the Respondent, but having the major exterior attribute of another bathroom. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following are rulings upon findings of fact proposed by the parties which have been rejected in this Recommended Order. The numbers correspond to the numbers of the proposed findings of fact as used by the parties. Findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: None. Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: 1. The second and third sentences are rejected because there is no competent evidence in the record that the trailers were rented to other parties or that the tract of land was operated as a "mobile home park." See finding of fact 8. COPIES FURNISHED: James M. Earls Arrow Consultants 3910 N. 65th Avenue Hollywood, Florida 23024 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Florida Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye H. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents have discriminated against Petitioners based on Petitioners' national origin.
Findings Of Fact On August 28, 2009, Ms. Greene was a loan officer employed by CenterState Home Loans, LLC. The office where Ms. Greene worked was located inside CenterState Bank, N.A., located at 6930 Gall Boulevard in Zephyrhills, Florida. The office is separate from CenterState Banks, Inc. There is signage on a glass wall of her office stating, "CenterState Home Loans, LLC." Ms. Greene is paid by CenterState Home Loans, LLC. She is paid by commission. Thus, there is no incentive not to complete loan applications. CenterState Home Loans, LLC, is a separate corporation from CenterState Banks, Inc., and CenterState Bank, N.A. Both CenterState Banks, Inc., and CenterState Bank, N.A. are interest holders in CenterState Home Loans, LLC, but are not the managing members of CenterState Home Loans, LLC. Platinum Home Mortgage Corporation is the managing member of CenterState Home Loans, LLC. As the managing member, Platinum Home Mortgage manages the quality control and integrity of CenterState Home Loans, LLC. CenterState Home Loans, LLC, is not authorized to do Federal Housing Association (FHA) loans. Any FHA loans originated by CenterState Home Loans, LLC, are assigned to Platinum Home Mortgage. On August 28, 2009, Petitioners, Mr. Velez's mother, and Petitioners' young daughter came to Ms. Greene's office to discuss the possibility of obtaining a loan through CenterState Home Loans, LLC, and a loan through the Pasco County Home Buyers Program. The purpose of the Pasco County Home Buyers Program is to aid qualified home buyers in purchasing their primary residences. Initially, Petitioners were interesting in applying for an FHA loan. Prior to the meeting, Mr. Velez had telephoned Ms. Greene and asked what types of information would need to be submitted. Ms. Greene stated that he would need W-2 forms, paystubs, bank statements, and anything that showed proof of any assets or debts. Petitioners brought some of the documentation to the meeting. At the meeting, Petitioners supplied information to Ms. Greene, who typed the information into her computer using loan software entitled "Loan Soft." The information was placed on a Uniform Residential Application, which is called a Form 1003. No property was identified on the Form 1003 because Petitioners did not have a sales contract for a specific piece of property. They indicated that the property they wanted to purchase would be approximately $140,000. Mr. Velez told Ms. Greene that he was anticipating a 50 percent loan from Pasco County Home Buyers Program, which would leave approximately $70,000 to be financed plus closing costs. When Ms. Greene input the information into the computer program, it automatically calculated the approximate closing costs. The interest used to do the calculations was based on the interest rate on August 28, 2009, and was not a guaranteed rate. With Petitioners' permission, Ms. Greene pulled a credit report on each of them during the meeting on August 28, 2009. The credit report showed that there were some debts in collection and that there was an outstanding judgment against Ms. Guerrero. Additionally, based on CenterState Home Loan, LLC, guidelines, the credit scores did not qualify Petitioners for a second mortgage, which included a Pasco County Home Buyers Program loan. On August 28, 2009, Ms. Greene needed additional asset information from the Petitioners and requested that they provide her with information concerning checking, savings, or money market accounts for at least a two-month period. Mr. Velez did present a bank statement at the meeting, which showed a current balance of less than $200. Ms. Greene told Petitioners that the debts in collection and the outstanding judgment needed to be resolved. Additionally, Ms. Guerrero was an authorized signer on some of her mother's credit cards, and a statement would have to be provided that Ms. Guerrero was not responsible for the debts associated with those credit cards. The software program that Ms. Greene used automatically completes a page in the application titled, "Pre- Approval Cover Sheet and Check List." The program put "completed" by a number of items which had not been completed, such as the Form 1003 and current asset statements. Petitioners had supplied some pay stubs and some bank statements at the August 28, 2009, meeting. The Form 1003 did not indicate that Petitioners had been pre-approved for a loan. The meeting ran near to the time CenterState Home Loans, LLC, was closing and could not be completed before closing time. Ms. Greene printed out a copy of the Form 1003, with the information that had been completed, and gave it to Petitioners. Petitioners were to complete, sign, and return the Form 1003 to Ms. Greene. Additionally, Petitioners were to provide evidence that the debts had been paid and the judgment satisfied, along with evidence of current assets. Because the application was not completed and additional information was needed, Ms. Greene could not fully analyze the application. Sometime after the August 28, 2009, meeting, Ms. Greene reviewed the information that had been supplied to her by Petitioners and discussed the information with Mr. Velez on the telephone. Mr. Velez wanted to schedule a meeting to discuss the application. She advised him that, based on the credit scores and the limited funds in his bank account, he could not qualify for a loan with a second lien by the Pasco County Home Buyers Program. Thus, there would be no need to meet. Mr. Velez told her that he wanted to continue with the process. Petitioners set about paying off the debts in collection and satisfying the judgment against Ms. Guerrero. Mr. Velez had received a disability settlement and placed some money in a bank account. Petitioners did not supply updated information to Ms. Greene. Sometime in October or November 2009, Mr. Velez called Ms. Greene and requested that she send a realtor a pre-approval letter. Ms. Greene replied that she could not do that because she did not have the supporting documents to be able to give a pre-approval letter. Mr. Velez became very angry and demanded the documents he had previously provided at the August 28, 2009, meeting. Ms. Greene had only copies of the documents that he provided, but she placed them in an envelope and left them for Mr. Velez to pick up. Petitioners stated in Form 1003 that their ethnicity was Hispanic or Latino. Mr. Velez stated at the final hearing: My basis for my racial discrimination was the fact that she [Ms. Greene] denied us the opportunity to turn in updated information when stated that she would allow us to do so. Ms. Greene never stated that she would not take additional information because Petitioners were Hispanic. She has processed loans for other Hispanics which involved the Pasco County Home Buyers Program, and she has closed loans for other minorities. Ms. Greene never discussed Petitioners national origin with them. She did not base any decision regarding their loan application on their national origin. After Petitioners were advised by Ms. Greene that they would not qualify for a loan involving the Pasco County Home Buyers Program, they applied for loans at two other lending institutions and were turned down on the basis of too many inquiries or insufficient credit scores. They finally received a loan from Manhattan Mortgage.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing Petitioners' Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2010.
