Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, at times pertinent hereto, was a resident of Scott's Mobile Home Park (Park), located in Duval County, Florida. She lived in the Park with William Scott, the son of the Park owners, their child, and four other children who are Ms. Allen's natural children. The Petitioner, Mr. Scott, and the five children lived in a three-bedroom, double-wide mobile home, at the pertinent time in 1993. It had been provided by Mr. Scott's parents, the owners of the Park. The Department acquired certain property in Duval County, Florida, in 1993, as a result of an inverse condemnation action of which the property known as Scott's Mobile Home Park was a part. The Department, in due course, notified the Park residents that it would be closed and that efforts would be undertaken to relocate the residents. The Department staff obtained information from Ms. Allen and Mr. Scott, as well as from the other Park residents, in order to determine the amount of relocation assistance funds each displaced resident should receive, in accordance with the legal authority cited below. The Allen-Scott family were determined to be "90-day occupants" of the Park, as that term is used in applicable regulatory provisions. In calculating the relocation assistance amount to which the Petitioner may be entitled, the Department follows certain procedures set out in the Code of Federal Regulations, adopted by reference in its own rules and procedures. It must find replacement housing and then pay displaced residents a lump sum equal to 42 months of the difference between the new higher rent, if that be the case, and utility payments and what the displaced residents had been paying for rent and utilities prior to being displaced. The Department initially located replacement housing for the Allen- Scott family on Phillips Highway in Jacksonville, Florida. While the family had been living in a three-bedroom mobile home, the standards adopted by the Department for decent, safe, and sanitary housing for a family of seven required four bedrooms, which is the type residence the Department sought. The rent and utilities amount for the mobile home suitable to those standards, located on Phillips Highway, was $691.00 per month. The Allen-Scott family, however, desired a mobile home on the west side of Jacksonville, Florida. In order to calculate the amount due to the Petitioner, the Department had to subtract from the $691.00 per month figure for the property on Phillips Highway, the rent and utility total amount that the family had been paying at the Park. The evidence shows, however, that the living arrangements under which they occupied that dwelling in the Park were not the result of an arms-length transaction and that, in reality, the family was not paying any rent for the premises. Therefore, the Department had to impute a rental figure for them. Accordingly, Mr. William Kelbaugh, a Property Appraiser for the Department, made that imputed calculation, based upon the square footage of the Allen-Scott mobile home and the amount per square foot paid for other decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings in the same area, or comparable residences. After establishing that the average rent for mobile homes was approximately $.41 per square foot, Mr. Kelbaugh multiplied the square footage of the Allen-Scott family mobile home by that figure and, after making a deduction because of the condition of the Park, in terms of the actual rental value of the premises they had been living in, he arrived at a "market rental" of $375.00 per month. He then reduced the "market rental" figure by 15 percent based upon his observation of the premises, its condition, and his experience of 20 years or more in making such appraisals. The Department also had to include utility payments in its calculation. It received information from two utility companies about the family's utility bill over the prior 12-month period and computed an average monthly utility payment amount of $202.29. The Department also attempted to establish the family's income. It was required to do so because, in calculating the payment to be made for relocation assistance, the Department must subtract from the new rent and utility payment the smaller of the sums equal to the rent paid or, in the Petitioner's case, imputed, or 30 percent of gross monthly family income. In trying to determine their income amount, the Department asked the Petitioner and Mr. Scott to provide income information on its income certification form, which the Petitioner and Mr. Scott signed and dated March 10, 1993. The Petitioner represented that their income came from Aid to Families with Dependent Children and other welfare benefits, which are not considered income for purposes of the Department's calculation of relocation assistance. Mr. Scott represented that he earned $3,764.25 in income and $3,000.00 in "income from rental" for 1992, which is the year used in making the calculation. The Department asked repeatedly for verification of their income figures in the form of tax records, payroll stubs, or statements from employers. Mr. Scott, however, worked for his parents, the former owners of the Park. They were asked to provide pay stubs and other verification of his income but did not do so at any time during 1993. Relocating the family was a protracted affair because the family required a four-bedroom mobile home, and such dwellings for rental are scarce. On September 14, 1993, the Department delivered an updated income certification form, since the one that the Petitioner and Mr. Scott had signed in March 1993 had expired. The Petitioner signed that form on September 14, 1993, and Mr. Scott signed it on September 22, 1993. That form indicated that Mr. Scott's income was certified by him as gross wages and salaries equal to $3,764.25. No verification of this income had been provided, however, so the Department calculated the relocation assistance due the family by using the market rental figure of $375.00, plus $202.29 for utilities. The Petitioner and Mr. Scott refused to accept this figure and appealed the determination to the Department's "central office". While their appeal was pending in the Department's process, the Department, at the Petitioner's request, located another four-bedroom mobile home for rent on Beaver Road in Jacksonville, Florida. This was with the assistance of Robert Scott, Mr. William Scott's father. The Department re- calculated the Allen-Scott family relocation assistance eligibility supplement. The re-calculated amount was $6,161.82. That amount was presented to the Petitioner and Mr. Scott, but they refused to accept it. On December 7, 1993, Mr. Bud Eddleman, the Department's Administrator of Relocation Assistance, made his decision concerning the Petitioner's appeal and concluded that the $6,161.82 sum to be correct. On February 17, 1994, the Department received a handwritten note signed by Vivian Scott, William Scott's mother, stating that William Scott had been paid $842.25 in cash in 1992 and was furnished rent in lieu of salary equal to $3,000.00. (See Exhibit 8 in evidence). The Petitioner, thus, took the position that that was the totality of income of the family during the calculation period in question, as that relates to the calculation of the amount of relocation benefits they felt they should receive. The Department takes the position that this verification is not accurate and acceptable for a number of reasons. The Allen-Scott household had numerous possessions that suggested a lifestyle that could not be supported by a discretionary income of $842.25 annually. The family could apparently afford $202.79 per month as an average utility payment. Further, the family acquired a second car during the time period that Department employees were on the premises in the process of making its calculation and appraisal. The family had the funds to acquire and operate two cars, pay the utilities throughout 1993; and their personal property included certain items of antique furniture, at least four televisions, and three videocassette recorders. The Petitioner contended at hearing that Mr. Scott had no income because of the inverse condemnation proceedings because his work had been as a maintenance man for the operating Park. This is irrelevant in the context of relocation assistance, which concept is not designed to include considerations of whether the displacee is rendered unemployed by the taking of the property involved. It is also irrelevant factually because the year in question was 1992, and the relocation of people from the Park could not begin until 1993. Even then, Mr. Scott's maintenance duties would be needed for a certain period of time. Thirdly, there is also evidence that Mr. Scott worked on projects other than those located in the Park, for which he earned income. Mr. Scott did not provide tax returns, pay stubs, bank records, or a statement from his employer (his parents) despite numerous entreaties by the Department to do so. No more defining, verified evidence of the family income was offered at hearing. Accordingly, the income figures which the Petitioner provided are not credible. The family lifestyle and possessions evidence much more income than Mr. Scott would admit. The only evidence produced to verify Mr. Scott's income was sent from his mother some two months after the Department denied the "appeal". The statement is not credible, as Mrs. Scott alleged that in 1992, her son had been paid $842.25 for his work as a maintenance man. Mr. Scott's parents paid another resident of the Park $4,609.92 for performing the same type of work, at the same time. Further, the Petitioner testified inconsistently at hearing regarding income. She said on the one hand that Mr. Scott's parents "took the rent out of his paycheck", and on the other hand, said that he made approximately $127.00 per week as a maintenance man and Mrs. Scott "sometimes wrote him a check" and "would take out, you know, a little bit each week". This testimony demonstrates that, with the other evidence referenced above, the Allen-Scott family has not been forthcoming concerning its income. The totality of the evidence shows that Mr. Scott and his parents, as his employer, the source of the Petitioner's relevant income, had not been acting in good faith. Accordingly, it is reasonable to compute the relocation assistance payments by ignoring the 30 percent factor and instead merely subtracting the old rent and utilities from the new rent and utilities chargeable at the new premises occupied by the Allen- Scott family. The income figures presented by the Petitioner are simply unverified and are not credible. Another candidate for relocation assistance, Kirk Kostenko, a resident of the Park, refused to provide income verification. In his situation, as in that of the Allen-Scott family, represented by the Petitioner, the income figures presented by the Petitioner were not accepted by the Department. In the Kostenko situation, no relocation assistance was paid. While the Petitioner argued and made reference to other families allegedly receiving much larger sums for relocation assistance from the Park, the Petitioner produced no evidence that different standards or criteria were applied in those situations, as opposed to those applied to her family situation involved in the relocation assistance payment question. She adduced no evidence that would demonstrate that the Department had acted in a manner departing from the standards of its rules and procedures or in a manner aberrant from its normal policy in calculating the relocation assistance payments in the manner found above. The relocation assistance program is not a social welfare program based upon actual financial need of a family or based upon the number of dependents involved. Rather, it is a program to compensate persons forced to find replacement housing because the Department acquires their private property, either through eminent domain or inverse condemnation. The assistance is based upon what the family was paying for its rent and utilities and what it would have to pay for them after relocation. The final figure presented and supported by the Department in this proceeding was calculated by applying the regular, accepted criteria set out in the Department's rules, regulations and procedures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the relocation assistance benefit, which the Department proposes to award the Petitioner in the amount of $6,161.82, is reasonable and should be awarded. The Petition should be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4899 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The Petitioner presented no discreetly set forth proposed findings of fact. Rather, in essence, the Petitioner's post-hearing "pleading", in letter form, consists essentially of argument concerning the quantity and quality of evidence. Therefore, specific rulings on proposed findings of fact cannot be made. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact The Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbers 1-34 are accepted, to the extent consistent with those made by the Hearing Officer. Those proposed findings of fact which are not consistent with those made by the Hearing Officer are rejected as being either not supported by preponderant evidence of record, being irrelevant, immaterial or unnecessary to the resolution of the disputed issues. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Emma Allen 3523-1 Alcoy Road Jacksonville, FL 32221 Thomas H. Duffy, Esq. Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Attn: Diedre Grubbs, M.S. 58 Thornton J. Williams, Esq. General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Triple M Enterprises, Inc., employed persons in the State of Florida without obtaining workers' compensation insurance meeting the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. If Petitioner did not obtain the required insurance, the subsequent issue is the amount of any penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Division is charged with the regulation of workers' compensation insurance in the State of Florida and is responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure workers' compensation insurance for the benefit of their employees. Triple M, is a corporation located at 24393 North 71, Robertsdale, Alabama, and is a framing and drywall contractor. Dwain Sanders and Celina Sanders are principals of Triple M. On June 4, 2004, Triple M was engaged as a subcontractor in the construction of a building on the premises located at 334 Gulf Breeze Parkway, Gulf Breeze, Florida. On June 4, 2004, Patricia Jean Krossman was an investigator employed by the Division. Her duties include ensuring that the employers in the state are in compliance with the requirements of the Workers' Compensation Law. More specifically, she visits work sites, and determines if the workers are covered by workers' compensation insurance. The morning of the aforementioned date, Ms. Krossman visited 334 Gulf Breeze Parkway, in Gulf Breeze, Florida, and observed four men engaged in construction activities, including framing a building. Dwain Sanders, who was at the site, identified himself as the owner and president of Triple M, which was the employer of the four men who were working at the site. Ms. Krossman requested that Mr. Sanders provide her with proof that he had workers' compensation coverage effective in Florida. Mr. Sanders made an immediate effort to supply the requested proof. Pursuant to Mr. Sanders' request, his insurance agent in Montgomery, Alabama faxed a portion of Triple M's policy to the Division's Pensacola office. The documents received by Ms. Krossman caused her to conclude that Triple M had not complied with Florida law because she believed the document did not demonstrate that Florida premium rates were paid, or that Florida class codes were used, or that there was a Florida endorsement in place. Ms. Krossman conducted a database search of the Coverage and Compliance Automated System database and the National Council on Compensation Insurance database. The search did not demonstrate that Triple M had a policy then effective in Florida. Having concluded that the documents produced by Triple M failed to demonstrate coverage in accordance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and after noting the absence of policy information in the databases, Ms. Krossman issued a Stop- Work Order to Triple M on June 4, 2004. The portion of Triple M's policy, provided by Triple M's insurance agent by facsimile, number 748-36-79, which was issued by the American Home Assurance Company to Triple M, had a classifications of operations page which related solely to work to be performed in Alabama. This page provided class codes, the rates, and the premium basis which provided the total estimated annual premium that Triple M was required to pay, based on Alabama law. The faxed document included a policy information page that provided in Item 2, that the policy period ran from January 1, 2004 until January 1, 2005. It provided in Item 3A, as follows: "Workers Compensation Insurance: Part One of the policy applies to the Workers' Compensation Law of the states listed here: AL." The policy information page provided in Item 3C that, "Part Three of the policy applies to the states, if any, listed here:" and lists 44 states, including Florida. The policy provides in Item 4, "Classifications of Operation," a statement of the rating group, and the "total classification premium increase limits," under the heading, "State of Alabama Totals." On June 25, 2004, Ms. Krossman received via facsimile machine, an endorsement to policy no. WC 748-36-79. This was the first time Ms. Krossman had seen this endorsement. It purported to add Florida coverage using Florida premium rates and class codes. It also purported to add the Gulf Breeze Parkway work-site where Ms. Krossman found Triple M engaged in construction activities. The base policy, on its face, indicated a date of January 1, 2004. The issue date of the endorsement was June 16, 2004. This endorsement was not in effect on June 4, 2004, the date of the Stop Work Order. Ms. Krossman served Triple M a "Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation." The Division has the statutory authority to request payroll records from an employer working in Florida and the "Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation" is the vehicle through which those records are sought. The payroll records provide the data required to calculate any penalties for failure to maintain required coverage. Penalties are calculated by determining the premium amount the employer would have paid based on his or her Florida payroll, and multiplying by a factor of 1.5. In response to the "Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation," Triple M provided payroll records. The records indicated that Triple M had employed workers in Florida in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Using the records provided by Triple M, the penalty was calculated by Ms. Krossman. After some interaction with Ms. Celina Sanders, of Triple M, she eventually determined that the proper penalty to be assessed was $36,521.61. The penalty was calculated using Florida premium rates and class codes in accordance with the dictates of Section 440.38, Florida Statutes. The penalty is correct. Triple M depends on its agent, the Goff Group, of Montgomery, Alabama, to provide proper insurance coverage. As noted above, Item 3.A of the policy listed the primary state of coverage as being Alabama. The policy plainly states at "Part Three - Other States Insurance, How This Insurance Applies," in paragraph 1, that "This other states insurance applies only if one or more states are shown in Item 3.C of the Information Page." One of the other states shown is Florida. At paragraph 2, of the section noted immediately above, the policy states, "If you begin work in any one of those states after the effective date of this policy and are not insured or are not self-insured for such work, all provisions of the policy will apply as though that state were listed in Item 3.A of the Information Page." At paragraph 3 of the policy, the following sentence is found: "We will reimburse you for the benefits required by the workers' compensation law of that state if we are not permitted to pay the benefits directly to persons entitled to them." At paragraph 3, the following sentence is found: "If you have work on the effective date of this policy in any state not listed in Item 3.A. of the Information Page, coverage will not be afforded for that state unless we are notified within thirty days." After that language is the following: "B. Notice. Tell us at once if you begin work in any state listed in Item 3.C. of the Information Page." The plain language of the policy reveals that Triple M's employees were covered by the policy, and that the employees would receive the same benefits, in case of injury, as if it were a Florida Policy with Florida rates and classifications, so long as the work at Gulf Breeze Parkway had not been going on for more than thirty days. Ms. Sanders testified under oath that she notified Triple M's carrier within 30 days of the inception of the work at the Gulf Breeze Parkway site. A letter to the Department of Financial Services signed by Dwain and Celina Sanders on behalf of Triple M, dated June 24, 2004, asserted that Triple M had just begun working in Florida, for the first time in 2004, the week that Ms. Krossman entered the work site. Triple M has been in business for 22 years and has never been bankrupt. Triple M has 401K plans for its employees as well as health insurance. Triple M would have difficulty paying the fine proposed by the Division. Triple M believed its workers were covered by workers' compensation insurance and they were covered. The parties agree that American Home Assurance Company is authorized to write insurance in Florida.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Division of Workers' Compensation affirm the Stop-Work Order issued to Petitioner on June 4, 2004, and assess a fine of $36,521.61. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Thompson, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dwain Sanders Triple M Enterprises, Inc. 24393 North 71 Robertsdale, Alabama 36567 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact By letter dated May 31, 1979 Respondent notified Petitioner that it was acquiring part of the property on which Petitioner's office was located and that it would be necessary for him to relocate. At the time Petitioner worked as a real estate appraiser in the office of the Pickens Agency owned by Philip Pickens. Pickens provided work space, telephones, secretary, data bank and supplies. The data bank contained data on real property throughout Florida and was invaluable to the appraisers in getting comparables to use for appraising like property. Due to the acquisition of additional property for the U.S. 90 right-of- way, it was necessary to move the two-story building in which Petitioner's office was located. This required moving out of this building into different quarters. In the building Petitioner's office, located on the second floor, comprised approximately 800 square feet in which he had desk, telephone and work space. The data bank was also located on the second floor. Philip Pickens owned another building in the Immediate vicinity into which Petitioner moved. The data bank was left in the original building which was jacked up in preparation for its move. Thee data bank remained available for use albeit less convenient for those using it. Petitioner had less space in the one-story building into which the Pickens Agency moved and Petitioner's office was located near the back door through which clients visited the Pickens Agency. He shared a telephone with another appraiser and had a smaller desk and less work space. He also experienced interruptions from visitors entering the office through the back door which opened into Petitioner's office space. During the two years immediately preceding the relocation of the office, Petitioner's appraisal work was performed exclusively for DOT. Part of this work was assigned him by the Pickens Agency and in some cases he was contacted directly by DOT for the appraisal . When employed directly by DOT, Petitioner received 50 percent of the appraisal fee and the Pickens Agency received 50 percent. When assigned work by the Pickens Agency, Petitioner received 45 percent of the appraisal fee. During the five months following Petitioner's move into the new quarters his income dropped substantially from what it had been before the relocation. Petitioner filed application for relocation benefits as soon as he moved his office and before any change in income occurred. Normally, there is a lag of three to six months between tile Line the appraisal work is done and payment is received. Petitioner's income during the first nine months of 1980 (January - October) we $10,622.97. For similar periods in 1979, 1978, and 1977 his income was $29,750, $26,382.50 and $22.252.50, respectively. Petitioner testified that he believes the loss of income was due to his inability to turn out as much work in the more restricted space and less privacy in the one-story building than he had before the move. Petitioner moved some 30 yards from his original location kept the same mailing address and the same telephone number. During the latter half of 1979 and the first half of 1980, the Lake City District of DOT had fewer relocation claims than in comparable periods of the two previous years. Relocation claims are related to appraisals which would indicate fewer appraisals were ordered by DOT in Lake City in 1979-80 than in the two previous years. During the period in question, most of Petitioner's work for DOT was generated by the Bartow office. This would require most of Petitioner's appraisal time out of Lake City with the use of the office primarily for the preparation of his appraisal report. No evidence was submitted to show the effect, if any, on the Pickens Agency's business resulting from the move or the business done by the other appraisers who also moved. During the period 1977-1980 the Pickens Agency employed between two and five appraisers and at the time of the relocation employed two appraisers, one of whom was petitioner. (Tr. p. 31). The number of appraisers employed varied with the volume of business coming into the agency. The appraisal work done by the Pickens Agency was statewide and not concentrated in the vicinity of Lake City.
The Issue The amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded to Jerry Ann Winters (Petitioner) based on the Order of the Second District Court of Appeals dated November 8, 2002, and pursuant to Subsection 120.595(5), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner retained attorneys Mark F. Kelly and Robert F. McKee to represent her in an administrative proceeding challenging the proposed termination of her employment by USF and in the appeals that followed the issuance of the Final Orders by USF. Petitioner's Exhibit 1 is an invoice dated December 18, 2002, submitted to the Petitioner by her legal counsel. The invoice contains charges billed to the Petitioner for the period between January 17, 2001, and November 22, 2002. The invoice indicates a total of 339.75 hours expended on her behalf. The invoice contains duplicated entries for November 14, 2002. Discounting the duplication reduces the total hours expended to 339.50. The practice of the Petitioner's counsel is to bill in quarter-hour increments and to round up. According to the invoice, the Petitioner was billed at a rate of $275 per hour. Mark F. Kelly graduated from Vanderbilt Law School in 1976. Since then he has practiced labor and employment law in Florida before state and federal agencies and has a substantial appellate practice. He was previously awarded fees in the range of $250 approximately four years ago. Robert F. McKee graduated from Stetson University College of Law in 1979. He received a Master of Laws degree in Labor and Employment Law from Georgetown University Law Center in 1981. Since then he has practiced labor and employment law in Tampa, Florida. He was previously awarded fees in the range of $250 approximately four years ago. At the hearing, the Petitioner presented the testimony of Steven Greg Wenzel. Mr. Wenzel has practiced law in Florida for more than 30 years and is board-certified in Labor and Employment Law. He has extensive trial experience. He has previously provided expert testimony related to the reasonableness of attorneys' fees in approximately 12 cases. Mr. Wenzel is familiar with the fees charged by attorneys representing employees in employment-related cases in central Florida. Mr. Wenzel's testimony related to the experience, reputation, and ability of Petitioner's attorneys. It also indicated that they have substantial experience in the area of labor and employment law and are well-regarded by their peers. No credible evidence to the contrary was presented during the hearing. Mr. Wenzel's testimony adequately addressed the applicable factors set forth in Rule 4-1.5(b)1 of the Florida Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct to be considered in determining the reasonableness of fees. Mr. Wenzel opined that based on their knowledge and experience, the type and complexity of the case, and the aggressive nature of the litigation; a reasonable hourly rate was $290 ranging to $310. Mr. Wenzel's testimony in this regard is credited. The invoiced rate of $275 per hour is reasonable. Mr. Wenzel also opined that the quarter-hour billing practice was reasonable and, in fact, conservative related to other practices with which he was aware. Mr. Wenzel's testimony in this regard is credited. At the same time that the Petitioner was challenging the proposed employment termination, a civil case involving the Petitioner, a number of the basketball players, and USF was proceeding. In that case, different legal counsel represented the Petitioner. Review of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 indicates that the invoice includes charges related to persons and activities involved in the civil case. Neither Mr. Kelly nor Mr. McKee had any official involvement in the civil case. Mr. Kelly participated apparently unofficially in mediation efforts to resolve the pending disputes. The invoice contains daily total charges for billed activity. On some days, activity was recorded for both the administrative case and the civil case. Charges related to the civil case are not reimbursable in this proceeding. Because the invoice precludes an accurate separation of time spent on the administrative case from the civil case, all billings for dates upon which charges were incurred related to the civil case have been excluded from consideration in this Order. The charges related to conversations with John Goldsmith, who represented the Petitioner in the civil case, are excluded. These charges occurred on March 14, 2001; April 2, 2001; April 6, 2001; September 21, 2001; October 19, 2001; and May 13, 2002, and total 8.25 hours. The charges related to conversations with Jonathon Alpert, who represented the basketball players in the civil case, are excluded. The charges occurred on April 10, 2001, and April 11, 2001, and total 6.75 hours. The charge related to a conversation with Tom Gonzalez, who represented USF in the civil case, is excluded. This charge occurred on April 23, 2002, for .50 hours. The charges related to conversations with Mary Lau, who was a mediator assigned to the civil case, are excluded. These charges occurred on April 24, 2002, and May 8, 2002, and totaled 1.25 hours. The invoice includes a charge for May 15, 2002, related to a telephone conference with "Judge Scriven" regarding settlement. Judge Scriven is otherwise unidentified. The charge, for .25 hours, is excluded. The invoice includes a charge for Mr. McKee's attendance at mediation on May 16, 2002, related to the civil case, for 2.5 hours. This charge is excluded. The sum of the excluded time set forth above is 19.50 hours. Deduction of the 19.50 hours from the properly invoiced total of 339.50 results in a total of 320 hours. Based on Mr. Wenzel's testimony that the invoiced hours were reasonable given the nature and complexity of this case, it is found that the reduced level of 320 hours set forth in the invoice and directly applicable to the administrative case is a reasonable expenditure of time. The invoice also sets forth costs that were billed to the Petitioner. The invoice includes numerous routine office expenses (postage, copying, telephone, and facsimile costs) that are not properly recoverable costs in this proceeding. Other billed costs are set forth without sufficient information to determine the relationship of the cost to the administrative proceeding. A filing fee with the District Court of Appeal was billed on January 15, 2001, preceding the administrative hearing in this case. Further the billed charges include witness fees for several witnesses, only one of which testified in the administrative hearing. The invoice also includes service fees for subpoenas that appear to have been charged subsequent to the completion of the administrative hearing. Based on review of the invoice, properly recoverable costs of $307 are found. This sum includes the following items: witness fee and mileage for Paul Griffin ($7) dated April 5, 2001; service fee for subpoena for Paul Griffin ($50) dated April 11, 2001; and filing fee-clerk, District Court of Appeal ($250) dated October 5, 2001. Petitioner's Exhibit 2 is a "Retainer and Fee Agreement" executed by the Petitioner and her counsel which provides as follows: Partial contingency fee. Client will pay for services rendered at the reduced rate of $110 per hour. To compensate attorney for this reduced rate and the risk involved in undertaking a case on these terms, in addition to the $110 hourly rate, attorney will be entitled to 25% of any settlement money or judgment. In the event attorney's fees are awarded to the client by any court or tribunal and collected, attorney will be entitled to such fee (less any amount paid by client, which will be reimbursed pro rata) or the partial contingency fee, whichever is greater. Attorney requires a retainer deposit from client in the amount of $2,500, to be replenished from time-to-time as required to cover outstanding fees and costs. The Retainer and Fee Agreement is dated December 2, 2002, and the Order of the District Court of Appeal for the Second District, which granted the Petitioner's Motion for fees and costs, is dated November 8, 2002. It is unclear whether a written agreement between the Petitioner and legal counsel existed prior to the December 2, 2002, agreement.
The Issue The issue is whether a request by Reddy Ice for reimbursement of impact fees assessed by the Town of Davie when its ice manufacturing plant was displaced by the Department of Transportation for the construction of Interstate 595 should be granted under the relocation assistance program established pursuant to Section 421.55, Florida Statutes. STIPULATED FACTS 1/ Reddy Ice, Inc., an ice manufacturing company, received relocation assistance and related moving costs from the Florida Department of Transportation (Department) when its plant was moved due to the construction of Interstate 595 in Broward County, Florida. When Reddy Ice relocated its business to the Town of Davie in Broward County, it was paid $108,135.57 in relocation costs by the Department. The Town of Davie had an ordinance which required the payment of impact fees by a business such as Reddy Ice which uses large quantities of water. Payment of the impact fee was a prerequisite to issuance of a certificate of occupancy for the new facility. Reddy Ice was assessed and paid $71,937 as contribution charges to the Town of Davie. The payment was treated as a capital expense in the accounting records of Reddy Ice. The water and sewer service agreement Reddy Ice executed with Town of Davie Utilities Department provided for an upward adjustment of the charges if the actual water flow exceeds the estimated amount. There is no provision in the agreement for a downward adjustment of the impact fee in the event less water is used than was estimated. The impact fees are not reimbursed by the Town if the business moves to another location. Reddy Ice filed a claim with the district office of the Department of Transportation in Fort Lauderdale to recover the impact fees. The district office denied the claim because it was not specifically provided for in the list of eligible move costs categories specified in the Florida Department of Transportation Right-of-Way Policies Manual. See the Manual, Operating Procedures, Relocation Assistance, Section 3-2. The impact fee was considered an additional expense of operating in a new location, which was ineligible for reimbursement under Section 3-3 of the Right-of-Way Manual. The claim was then forwarded to the State relocation office in Tallahassee for review and determination. The State office concurred with the district determination. Because the claim for impact fees presented a relatively unique relocation issue, and federal funds are involved in the repayment of relocation costs for interstate highway construction, a national ruling was requested from the Federal Highway Administration. Ms. Barbara Reichart, Chief, Relocation Division, Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C., advised on May 27, 1987, that the Florida Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration Division Office were correct in their determination that impact fees were ineligible for reimbursement as relocation costs under 49 CFR Section 25.305(f). Impact fees are considered by the Federal Highway Administration to be an additional operating expense incurred by a business because of operating in a new location. Reddy Ice was advised of the final determination and denial of the claim by letter dated August 25, 1987, which resulted in this administrative proceeding.
Recommendation It is recommended that the application of Reddy Ice for reimbursement of contribution charges made by the Town of Davie be denied. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of May, 1988. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9765 Filed with the Clerk of the Division OF Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 1988.
The Issue The issues are whether, pursuant to section 409.910(17)(b), Florida Statutes (17b),1 Petitioner has proved that Respondent's recovery of $535,312 in medical assistance expenditures2 from $5 million in proceeds from the settlement of a personal injury action must be reduced to avoid conflict with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(1) (Anti-Lien Statute)3; and, if so, the maximum allowable amount of Respondent's recovery.
Findings Of Fact On September 28, 2005, Petitioner was born by an unremarkable delivery at 42 weeks' gestation at a hospital in West Palm Beach. On October 1, 2005, from all appearances a healthy infant, Petitioner was discharged to home. However, Petitioner was born with an extremely rare metabolic disorder known as B-ketothiolase deficiency (BKT), which prevents the body from processing a protein building block called isoleucine and impedes the body's processing of ketones. A few weeks after Petitioner's birth, the birth hospital began screening that would have detected this condition and permitted timely management and treatment of this serious condition. Petitioner progressed normally until, at the age of five years, she acquired an infection that caused her to suffer a decompensation attack and guardian," and DOAH Case 20-2124MTR identifies by name a parent, "individually and as parent and natural guardian of A. F., a minor." As to the latter case, the same attorneys represent the petitioner and respondent as represent Petitioner and Respondent. 9 Resp.'s proposed final order, footnote 2. metabolic crisis. Over the span of a few hours, Petitioner suffered irreversible and progressive atrophic changes to her basal ganglia. This brain damage produced, among other permanent conditions, intermittent painful spasms, multiple times during the day and night, that cause Petitioner to thrash her head about wildly, to arch her back into an extreme "U-like position," and uncontrollably to scratch her eyes or mouth until the spasm ends or her arms are secured or become entrapped in the wheelchair. Otherwise, Petitioner's arms and legs are in a permanent state of contracture, so as to be of little use to her, and her head is typically deviated to the left. Unable to walk, Petitioner requires the use of a wheelchair for mobility, but chronic pain, especially in her back, prevents her from remaining in the chair for more than 30 minutes at a time. Unable to maintain any position for very long, Petitioner is unable even to watch television or a movie. Petitioner attends school, where she is assisted by a one-to-one paraprofessional, but, due to pain, she typically finds it necessary to leave, often in tears, prior to the end of the school day. Petitioner is completely dependent on others for all of the activities of daily living. She is fed through a gastrostomy tube. Without respite care, Petitioner's mother is unable to leave her daughter unattended and provides nearly all of the required care. Among many other things, the mother secures Petitioner to her bed, changes her position, stretches her, brushes her teeth, and takes her to appointments, including brain stimulation therapy in Gainesville twice weekly to help with the spasms. The impact of Petitioner's condition upon the family is nearly inestimable. For instance, nearly the entire family must accommodate Petitioner's desire to go to an amusement park, as the mother, Petitioner's father, and the older of their other two children must help to get Petitioner into one ride. Petitioner's ability to speak is limited, and she lacks the means of expressive communication by writing or a keyboard. The frustration of these communication barriers is heightened by the fact that Petitioner is likely to be cognitively intact, meaning that she is substantially "locked in," so as to understand what is going on about her, but is unable to express herself, even by body movement or gesture. No single measure adequately conveys the extensive care required just to maintain, to the maximum extent possible, Petitioner's present, limited functionality. When assessed for a life care plan, Petitioner was being seen by nine different physicians, three therapists, and the school nurse; was taking nine different medications; and was served by or consumed nearly two dozen items of equipment or supplies. In 2013, Petitioner filed a personal injury action in circuit court in West Palm Beach against the birth hospital and its corporate parent. The case presented three major problems in establishing liability. At the time of Petitioner's birth, only two hospitals in the state of Florida provided BKT screening at birth, and the birth hospital was not one of them. However, the corporate parent owns numerous hospitals in other states, and at least some of these hospitals were providing BKT screening at the time. Petitioner's ability to establish a favorable standard of care was thus dependent on keeping the corporate parent in the case, even though its liability was attenuated. Petitioner's task was complicated by a Florida statute that explicitly provides that the failure of a healthcare provider to provide supplemental diagnostic tests is not actionable if the provider acted in good faith with due regard to the prevailing standard of care.10 Lastly, Petitioner was confronted by a causation issue because, when informed of Petitioner's rare metabolic condition, the parents did not immediately obtain a screening for her older brother. In September 2017, the circuit judge ordered the parties to submit to two summary jury trials, in which each side had a little over one hour to present the case to actual jurors for a nonbinding verdict. Each party devoted 10 § 766.102(4). nearly all of its allotted time to a presentation on liability, not damages. One jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the other returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, awarding $23.5 million as follows: the loss of earning capacity and future medical expenses after the age of 18 years--$10.5 million; past and future pain and suffering--$5 million; past and future medical expenses until the age of 18 years--$5 million; and the parents' loss of consortium--$3 million. In the ensuing settlement negotiations, the defendants' counsel did not contest the damages. Significantly, in calculating future medical expenses and loss of earning capacity, both sides chose conservative reduced actuarial values with only four years separating their choices. Additionally, the defendants' counsel did not contend that a timely screening might not have prevented the injuries. Instead, the defendants' counsel argued the above-described liability and causation issues. The plaintiffs' counsel opposed these arguments and, secondarily, argued that the $23.5 million summary jury verdict was too low due to the necessity of counsel's preoccupation with liability during their presentations. Nearly one year after the summary jury verdicts and after extensive discovery and the expenditure of about $200,000 in costs by the plaintiffs, the parties reached the settlement described above. By any standard of proof, Petitioner has proved that the true value of her case was at least $23.5 million, including $535,000 for past medical expenses, and that the $5 million settlement was driven by concerns as to liability and causation, not damages. The only noteworthy damages component in the true value is Petitioner's past and future pain and suffering, which could have supported a larger value based on the Florida Supreme Court's jury instructions on the matter.11 11 Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, Appendix B, Form 2, states in part: What is the total amount of (claimant’s) damages for pain and suffering, disability, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, inconvenience, aggravation of a disease or physical defect (list any other noneconomic damages) and loss The $5 million settlement represents a discount of $18.5 million or 78.7% when compared to the true value of the case. Applying the same discount to $535,312 results in Respondent's recovery of $114,021.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an "in lieu" payment under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4622) as implemented by I. M. 80-1-71 and amended by P. M. 81-1.2.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Florida department of Transportation, because of the proposed widening of State Road 61, Thomasville Road in Tallahassee, Florida, notified Petitioner in the spring of 1974 that the property on which the business was located was to be taken by the Respondent for road purposes. Petitioner was offered, but did not accept, relocation assistance to move his business to another location or to reimburse him in the amount that a never would charge. Other relocation assistance by the Respondent to find sites which would be appropriate for Petitioner's business was offered and four such sites were presented to Petitioner. Petitioner found the sites undesirable and has located a site at which he intends to move his business. Petitioner contends that the location on Thomasville Road is a good location; that he acquires "walk-in" business from time to time; that the sign on the building is of a type consistent with the limited type of advertising available to members of his profession and is beneficial to him; that the building he rents on Thomasville Road has additional space in which he at one time did rent to other interests, but which rental possibilities were foreclosed upon the general public knowledge that the Respondent would widen Thomasville Road and in the process remove the rental building. Petitioner operates his business from the location and shows that the operation of his consultant service is his sole business. The Petitioner filed for in lieu payments after refusing to accept relocation assistance for the moving of his business Petitioner contends: that nothing in the Act states or implies that a displaced person is required to accept relocation assistance if it is economically unsound; that the Respondent failed to sustain the burden of proof that Petitioner is not entitled to "in lieu" payment under the Act. Respondent contends: that the Petitioner failed to show he is entitled to "in lieu" payments under the Act; that the losses such as production costs, rental income, and advertising possibilities are not within the contemplation of the Act.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is the amount payable to Respondent in satisfaction of Respondent's Medicaid lien from a settlement received by Petitioner from a third party, pursuant to section 409.910(17), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 35-year-old female who currently resides in Homestead, Florida. Respondent is the state agency authorized to administer Florida's Medicaid program. § 409.902, Fla. Stat. On or about February 15, 2012, Petitioner was struck by a motor vehicle and severely injured while attempting to rescue her young son, who had run into a busy street in front of her home in Hollywood, Florida. Petitioner suffered a fractured skull and broken leg. She was hospitalized and received medical care for her injuries. Subsequently, she was treated by an orthopedic physician and a neurologist. She estimated that she last received care or treatment from these physicians in August 2013. The Florida Medicaid program paid $35,952.47 in medical assistance benefits on behalf of Petitioner. Petitioner filed a lawsuit against the owners of the vehicle that struck her. On January 11, 2013, Petitioner and the owners of the vehicle that struck Petitioner ("Releasees") entered into a "Release and Hold Harmless Agreement" ("Settlement") under which the Releasees agreed to pay Petitioner $150,000 to settle any and all claims Petitioner had against them. Attached to the Settlement was a document titled "Addendum to Release Signed 1/11/13" ("Addendum"), which allocated liability between Petitioner and the Releasees and provided a commensurate allocation of the Settlement proceeds for past and future medical expense claims. The Addendum stated in pertinent part: The parties agree that a fair assessment of liability is 90% on the Releasor, Mirta B. Agras, and 10% on the Releasees. Furthermore, the parties agree that based upon these injuries, and the serious nature of the injuries suffered by the Releasor, Mirta B. Agras, that $15,000.00 represents a fair allocation of the settlement proceeds for her claim for past and future medical expenses. Petitioner testified that she primarily was at fault in the accident. She acknowledged that the statement in the Addendum that she was 90% at fault for the accident and the Releasees were 10% at fault was an estimate that she formulated entirely on her own, without obtaining any legal or other informed opinion regarding the apportionment of respective fault. Petitioner is not a physician, registered nurse, or licensed practical nurse. There was no evidence presented establishing that she has any medical training or expertise. Thus, there is no professional basis for Petitioner's position that 10% of the Settlement proceeds represents a fair, accurate, or reasonable allocation for her medical expenses. Rather, her position appears to be based on the intent to maximize the Settlement proceeds that are allocated to non-medical expenses, so that she is able to retain a larger portion of the Settlement proceeds. Respondent did not participate in discussions regarding the Settlement or Addendum and was not a party to the Settlement. Petitioner acknowledged that she still receives medical bills related to the injuries she suffered as a result of the accident, and that she still owes money for ambulance transportation and physician treatment. She was unable to recall or estimate the amount she owes. No evidence was presented regarding the actual amount of Petitioner's medical expenses incurred due to her injury. Petitioner has not paid any of her own money for medical treatment, and no entities other than Medicaid have paid for her medical treatment. Since being injured, Petitioner continues to experience medical problems, including pain, dizziness, memory loss, difficulty in walking or standing for extended periods, inability to ride in vehicles for extended periods, balance problems, and difficulty watching television or staring at a computer screen for extended periods. Petitioner claims that, nonetheless, she has not been told that she would need additional medical care or treatment. On or about January 31, 2013, Respondent, through ACS, asserted a Medicaid claim pursuant to section 409.910(17), seeking reimbursement of the $35,952.47 in medical assistance benefits it paid on behalf of Petitioner. Petitioner instead sought to reimburse Respondent $15,000, the amount that Petitioner and Releasees agreed in the Addendum represented a fair allocation of the Settlement proceeds for Petitioner's claim for past and future medical expenses. When Petitioner and Respondent were unable to agree on the amount Petitioner owed Respondent in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien, Petitioner paid ACS the $35,952.47 alleged to be owed Respondent and filed the Petition initiating this proceeding.
The Issue At issue is the amount owing for reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the filing of the claim, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Findings Of Fact The award provisions of the Plan 1. When it has been resolved that a claim is compensable, the administrative law judge is required to make a determination of how much compensation should be awarded. § 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. Pertinent to this case, Section 766.31(1)(c), Florida Statutes, provides for an award of the following expenses: (c) Reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the filing of a claim under ss. 766.301-766.316, including reasonable attorney's fees, which shall be subject to the approval and award of the administrative law judge. In determining an award for attorney's fees, the administrative law judge shall consider the following factors: The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. The time limitations imposed by the claimant or the circumstances. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the claimant. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing services. The contingency or certainty of a fee. Here, Mr. Gustafson's Affidavit as to Reasonable Attorney's Fees, Paralegal Fees and Expenses Incurred in Connection with the NICA claim (Petitioners' Exhibit 1) described the claim for expenses, as follows: I am seeking an award for my attorney's fees totaling $85,680.00, reflecting my reasonable time necessarily expended in pursuit of NICA benefits (285.60 hours) at the reasonable rate of $300.00 per hour. I am also seeking an award of paralegal fees totaling $10,780.00 reflecting my paralegal's reasonable time necessarily expended in pursuit of NICA benefits (107.8 hours) at the reasonable and uncontested rate of $100.00 per hour. The reasonable hourly rate reflects the complexity of the case, the contingent nature of the fee, the substantial risk of non-recovery, and the other factors set forth in section 766.31(1)(c)(1-6), Florida Statutes. The time reasonably expended in pursuit of this NICA claim is set forth supra in this Affidavit [by date and activity], as well as in Exhibit 2.[2] I am also seeking an award for expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection with the filing of Petitioners' claim and pursuing NICA benefits under sections 766.301 - 766.316, Florida Statutes. The total of the expenses reasonably incurred in pursuit of NICA benefits is $22,102.16. The itemized expenses incurred in pursuit of NICA benefits are attached and made a part of Exhibit 2 to this Affidavit. The expenses set forth in Exhibit 2 are an accurate accounting of the expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred in pursuit of NICA benefits for Petitioners. Proof of these expenses are attached as Exhibit 3 to this Affidavit.[3] In response to Petitioners' claim, Respondent, through its expert (Respondent's Exhibit 1), initially accepted 198.8 hours of attorney time and 97.1 hours of paralegal time, as reasonably expended, and specifically identified those hours that should be deducted.4 Centex-Roony Construction Co., Inc. v. Martin County, 725 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)("Although the fee applicant has the burden of establishing its entitlement to an award of attorney's fees, . . . the opponent of the fee award has the burden of pointing out with specificity which hours should be deducted."). However, the parties further agreed that, if appropriate, any time or expense identified at hearing as associated with the notice issue should be deducted.5 Here, it should not be subject to serious debate that any time or expense associated with the notice issue should be deducted. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Carreras, 633 So. 2d 1103, 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)("Plainly, the exploration of the possibility of opting out of NICA through the 'bad faith' exception or otherwise is not, as the statute requires, work performed 'in connection with the filing of a claim . . . .'"). See also Braniff v. Galen of Florida, Inc., 669 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)("The presence or absence of notice will neither advance nor defeat the claim of an eligible NICA claimant who has decided to invoke the NICA remedy . . .; thus, there is no reason to inquire whether proper notice was given to an individual who has decided to proceed under NICA. Notice is only relevant to the defendants' assertion of NICA exclusivity where the individual attempts to invoke a civil remedy."). Accord, O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, 757 So. 2d 624, 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)("We recognize that lack of notice does not affect a claimant's ability to obtain compensation from the Plan."). The claim for attorney's fees The initial step in deriving a reasonable attorney's fee is to determine the number of hours reasonably expended to pursue the claim. Here, Petitioners claim 285.60 hours6 were dedicated to the claim, which they chose to identify in three phases: 18.7 hours claimed to investigate the claim (assemble the necessary records, consult with experts, legal research) and prepare the petition for NICA benefits (July 12, 2002 - June 17, 2005); 252.6 hours claimed following the filing of the petition through the entry of the Order on Compensability and Notice (July 28, 2006), and discussions related to that Order (June 22, 2005 - August 4, 2006); and 14.3 hours claimed identifying, calculating, and substantiating the nature and amount owing for expenses previously incurred (August 8, 2006 - September 25, 2006) Addressing first the 18.7 hours claimed for the period of July 12, 2002 - June 17, 2005, it is apparent, as noted by NICA, that the time which preceded the abatement of the civil action (5.8 hours, through "8/ /03") was dedicated to the civil lawsuit and not the NICA claim.7 However, the time was related to acquiring the medical records related to Lily's birth, which were required to file a NICA claim, and should be compensated. The hours claimed from December 2, 2003, through April 21, 2005 (3.9 hours) were, with the exception of .6 hours claimed for December 6, 2003 (.3 hours) and January 6, 2004 (.3 hours), relevant to the investigation of the claim, including the assembly of medical records and expert consultation. Finally, the hours claimed from June 9, 2005, through June 17, 2005 (9.0 hours) for research and drafting the NICA petition are reasonable and related to pursuing the claim, with the exception of time researching the notice issue and drafting that portion of the petition which raised the notice issue. Therefore, the hours claimed are reduced by 1.2 hours (.6 hours for June 9, 2005, and .6 hours for June 10, 2005) to eliminate any time associated with the notice issue.)8 Overall, 16.9 hours were reasonably attributable to pursuing the NICA claim from July 12, 2002, through June 17, 2005. Regarding the 252.6 hours of attorney time claimed for the period of June 22, 2005, through August 4, 2006, it must be resolved that the hours claimed are in many cases excessive, and do not reflect the time and labor reasonably and necessarily incurred to pursue the claim. In so concluding, it should be noted that in drafting the Order on Compensability and Notice, entered July 28, 2006, all the evidence of record was reviewed a number of times, and that in preparation of this Order the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings (all documents that were docketed) was reviewed, and the evidence offered at the hearing on compensability and notice (including depositions) re- reviewed, as necessary. Moreover, the testimony of Mr. Gustafson has been carefully weighed, and compared with the record, as were the affidavits of Mr. Hinkle and Mr. Pierce. Having done so, it is apparent that Mr. Pierce spent considerable time analyzing the hours claimed for reasonableness, and Mr. Hinkle did not. It is further apparent that when one critically evaluates the hours claimed, they are excessive, and that for the period of June 22, 2005, through August 4, 2006, no more than 188.25 hours of attorney time was reasonably and necessarily expended in pursing the claim.9 The 14.3 hours of attorney time claimed for the period of August 8, 2006, through September 25, 2006, was reasonable and necessary.10 Therefore, the total time and labor reasonably expended to pursue the claim was 219.45 hours. The next consideration in establishing a reasonable fee is the determination of the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, when the fee basis is hourly billing for time worked. Carreras, 633 So. 2d at 1108. Here, Petitioners' expert, Mr. Hinkle, opined that "the customary charge in this community for an attorney of Mr. Gustafson's ability is no less than $300 per hour." However, in Mr. Gustafson's Affidavit as to Reasonable Attorney's Fees, Paralegal Fees and Expenses Incurred in Connection with the NICA Claim (Petitioners' Exhibit 1), he describes his claim to a rate of $300.00 per hour as an enhanced rate, which "reflects the complexity of the case, the contingent nature of the fee, the substantial risk of non-recovery, and the other factors set forth in section 766.31(1)(c)(1-6), Florida Statutes." The parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation and Mr. Gustafson's testimony at hearing were of a similar nature. (Transcript, pages 78-81, and 96) Stated otherwise, absent enhancement, Mr. Gustafson was of the opinion that a reasonable fee for his services was less than $300.00 per hour.11 In contrast, Respondent's expert, Mr. Pierce, described "a range of hourly rates for this type of work between $75.00 an hour and $190.00 an hour," and that, given "the level of experience of Petitioners" counsel and his education," "$150.00 an hour was a reasonable rate for Mr. Gustafson's time.12 Here, given the nature of the expertise and legal skills required, for what may be described as a moderately complex case, the proof supports the conclusion that the "market rate" (a rate actually being charged to paying clients) is $170.00 an hour. A reasonable fee under the methodology established by Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985) and Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Carreras, supra, is determined by multiplying the hours reasonable expended by the reasonable hourly rate. The results produce the "lodestar figure" which, if appropriate, may be adjusted because of the remaining factors contained in Section 766.31(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Applying such methodology to the facts of this case produces a "lodestar figure of $37,306.50 (219.45 hours x $170.00 per hour). Upon consideration of the facts of this case, and the remaining criteria established at Section 766.31(1)(c), Florida Statutes, there is reason, based on the contingency nature of Mr. Gustafson's fee arrangement with Petitioners, to adjust the "lodestar figure."13 Given the nature of the claim, the risk of non-recovery was significant and warrants an adjustment of the fee award to $48,498.45 (an enhancement of thirty percent). The claim for paralegal fees Pertinent to the claim for paralegal fees, the affidavit of Mr. Gustafson (Petitioners' Exhibit 1) seeks compensation for 107.80 hours of paralegal time expended by Bonnie Stark between October 24, 2005, and September 25, 2006. Respondent disputed only 10.7 hours of Ms. Stark's time, and the parties stipulated that an hourly rate of $100.00 was reasonable for paralegal time. The affidavit of Mr. Pierce (Respondent's Exhibit 1) identified the following time entries which he resolved should be excluded as a matter of law because they included a conference between Mr. Gustafson and Ms. Stark, which Mr. Pierce felt was "duplicate time" and not recoverable under Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Carreras, 633 So. 2d at 1110: 2/5/06 -4.0 (block billing with an unreimbursible conference - see Carreras) 5/12/06 -.3 (Unreimbursible conference - see Carreras) 5/17/06 -5.1 (block billing with an unreimbursible conference - see Carreras) 8/23/06 -.5 (Unreimbursible conference - see Carreras) 8/31/06 -.3 (Unreimbursible conference - see Carreras) 9/20/06 -.5 (Unreimbursible conference - see Carreras) However, communication between counsel and paralegal, regarding her duties, is not comparable to "duplicate time involved in communications between co-counsel," as proscribed by Carreras. Moreover, the discussions in this case were not excessive. Accordingly, it is resolved that 107.8 hours of paralegal time was reasonably expended, which at the agreed rate of $100.00 per hour produces an award of $10,780.00. The claim for other expenses Finally, Petitioners' counsel incurred certain expenses in his representation of Petitioners for which he seeks recovery. Such costs total $22,352.19,14 and NICA disputed $11,310.59 of those expenses.15 The disputed expenses were identified as follows: DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS AND OTHER NICA PETITION EXPENSES: Research Book: "Maternal-Fetal $51.60 Medicine: Principles and Practice Westlaw charges-legal research on NICA issues of compensability, notice, elements of claim, elements of damage, service, filing 197.14 Postage charges since 6/16/05, date of filing Petition for Benefits 75.96 Federal Express charges since 6/16/05 date of filing of Petition for Benefits 246.56 Facsimile transmittal charges since 6/16/05, date of filing of Petition for Benefits 214.00 Postage charges incurred in preparing NICA award and obtaining NICA award support documentation 7.59[16] Phone charges incurred in preparing NICA award and obtaining NICA award support documentation 179.88[17] Fax charges incurred in preparing NICA award and obtaining NICA award support documentation 62.56[18] AT&T Teleconference charge 127.52 Total $1,162.81 EXPERT WITNESS EXPENSES AND FEES Dr. Andrea Morrison's Expert Witness Fees[19] 12/17/02 Initial Fee $2,000.00 4/25/05 Review of records in preparation of expert opinions 600.00 (2 hours @ $300/hour) 3/27/06 Review medical records in preparation of expert opinions 900.00 (3 hours @ $300/hour) 5/2/06 Preparation for deposition including review of medical records (6 hours @ $500/hour) 3,000.00 Total $6,500.00 Dr. Mary Edwards-Brown's Expert Witness Fees[20] 1/13/03 Review of records and conference (1 hour) $350.00 4/26/06 File review in preparation of expert opinions (1 hour @ $400/hour) 400.00 4/13/06 File review and pre-depo conference in preparation of expert 1,000.00 opinions for deposition (2.5 hours @ $400/hour) Total $1,750.00 DEPOSITION COSTS Robin Batdorf taken on 5/23/06 (original and 1 copy of transcript) 32 pages @ 4.50/page $ 144.00 Exhibits: 6 pages at .50/page 3.00 Court Reporter's per diem 55.00 Total $ 202.00 TRAVEL AND RELATED EXPENSES FOR COUNSEL (JWG) 2/1/06 Attorney expenses for trip to $233.72 Daytona Beach for deposition of Tammy Linton(meals and mileage) 2/2/06-2/3/06 Attorney expenses for 490.45 travel from Daytona Beach to Jacksonville for deposition of Michael Linton, and return to Tallahassee (meals, mileage and lodging) 4/11/06 Attorney expenses for travel from Houston to Los Angeles for meeting with Dr. Morrison 750.83 Total $1,475.00 TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR PETITIONERS 5/30/06 Lodging expense for Tammy Linton (one night stay in Tallahassee for attendance at Final Hearing 5/30/06) $110.39 5/30/06 Lodging expense for Michael Linton (one night stay in Tallahassee for attendance at Final Hearing 5/30/06) 110.39 Total $220.78 In the parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation, NICA addressed its dispute regarding such expenses, as follows: As to the expenses incurred with respect to their NICA claim, the Petitioners must offer proof substantiating such expenses. Absent such proof, it would be speculative to concede they were reasonable in amount or necessarily incurred in pursing this claim. Moreover, the cost of postage (or Federal Express), research and copying (generally considered as part of office overhead) and the cost of travel (including "air, hotel, meals") are generally not taxable. Finally, with respect to expert witnesses, only a reasonable fee for deposition testimony and costs of preparation of any court ordered report are taxable. See Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Statewide Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs in Civil Actions. Notably, while issues were raised about the necessity and reasonableness of the experts' fees, Petitioners failed to offer expert testimony regarding the services performed and the reasonable value of those services, as required to support an award for expert witness fees. Pertinent to an award of expenses, the Statewide Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs in Civil Actions, effective January 1, 2006, provide: Purpose and Application. These guidelines are advisory only. The taxation of costs in any particular proceeding is within the broad discretion of the trial court. The trial court should exercise that discretion in a manner that is consistent with the policy of reducing the overall costs of litigation and of keeping such costs as low as justice will permit . . . . Litigation Costs That Should Be Taxed. * * * Expert Witnesses A reasonable fee for deposition and/or trial testimony, and the costs of preparation of any court ordered report. Litigation Costs That May Be Taxed as Costs. * * * B. Reasonable Travel Expenses * * * Reasonable travel expenses of witnesses. Litigation Costs That Should Not Be Taxed as Costs. A. The Cost of Long distance Telephone Calls with Witnesses, both Expert and Non- Expert (including conferences concerning scheduling of depositions or requesting witnesses to attend trial). * * * Travel Time Travel time of attorney(s). Travel time of expert(s). Travel Expenses of Attorney(s) Also pertinent to an award of expenses are the following decisions: Miller v. Hayman, 766 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(recognizing that in the absence of exceptional circumstances, travel expenses for attorney to attend depositions should not be taxed as costs); Department of Transportation v. Skidmore, 720 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(recognizing that postage, long distance calls, fax transmissions, delivery service, and computer research are overhead and not properly taxable as costs); Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So. 2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)("[U]pon specific objection to the setting of an expert witness fee without an evidentiary hearing, the prevailing party will have to present testimony concerning the necessity and reasonableness of the fee."); Gray v. Bradbury, 668 So. 2d 296, 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)("The prevailing party's burden, at an evidentiary cost hearing, to recover an expert witness fee is 'to present testimony concerning the necessity and reasonableness of the fee.'"); Powell v. Lorenza, 629 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)(recognizing that evidence to support an award for expert witness fees must come from witnesses qualified in the areas concerned); Gray v. Bradbury, supra, page 298 (Testimony of "a trial attorney and an insurance casualty claim manager, who were not shown to have proficiency in the various fields of expertise at issue (ranging from accident reconstruction to neurosurgery)," was not competent to support an award for expert witness fees.); Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Carreras, 633 So. 2d 1103, 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)("[T]he exploration of the possibility of opting out of NICA through the 'bad faith' exception or otherwise is not, as the statute requires, work performed 'in connection with the filing of a claim. '"). Here, it must be resolved that Petitioners failed to establish their entitlement to the disputed expenses. Consequently, Petitioners' recovery is limited to $11,041.60 ($22,352.19 - 11,310.59).
