The Issue The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's contractor's license based upon the alleged violations of Sections 489.129(1)(h) and (m), Florida Statutes, set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (the "Board") as a certified general contractor having been issued License No. CG C024612. Respondent has been a licensed contractor since 1983. On May 3, 1991, the Board filed a Final Order in Board Case Nos. 89-009986 and 89-013330 imposing a reprimand against Respondent. The Final Order was issued as part of the settlement of an amended administrative complaint filed against Respondent by Petitioner regarding certain unrelated transactions. Respondent was the qualifying agent for Willie William Construction Company, Inc. until October 1985. At that time, as a result of a corporate name change, Respondent became the qualified agent for Ashar Construction Company. On February 21, 1985, the Unsafe Structures Board of the Building and Zoning Department for Dade County advised Ruby Delancy that a hearing would be conducted on March 12, 1985 to determine whether a one story framed residence that Mrs. Delancy owned at 1005 NW 58th Street in Miami (the "House" or the "Property") should be demolished. The Notice indicated that the structure was "open, vacant, vandalized, filled with combustible materials; posing a serious fire hazard. Structure is a danger to human life and public welfare." The Notice estimated the present value of the building at $16,080 and the estimated cost of repairs at $51,120. The County's records indicate that a Notice of Violation regarding the Property had been issued to the owner on October 31, 1984. Facing imminent demolition of the House, Mrs. Delancy began to investigate possible ways to get the House repaired. She filed an application with the City of Miami for a low income, low interest loan that was funded through Federal HUD Community Development Funds. Her efforts to obtain funding to repair the House, delayed the proceedings that had been initiated to demolish the structure. In September of 1985, the City approved Mrs. Delancy for a grant of $10,000 and loan of $20,000 to repair the House. Mrs. Delancy has no other funds to pay for repairs to the Property other than the $30,000 she was obtaining through the City Program. Under the City's program, Mrs. Delancy was responsible for selecting a contractor. Mrs. Delancy contacted Respondent, who inspected the Property and prepared a construction estimate which was submitted to the City. Respondent entered into a contract (the "Contract") dated September 20, 1985 with Mrs. Delancy for home improvement work on the House. The total contract price was $29,870, which was to be paid in two installments: $10,835 on or before December 31, 1985 and a final payment of $19,035 on or before March 3, 1986. The evidence established that Respondent was initially reluctant to enter into the Contract and at least two other contractors refused to undertake the work given the limited funds available. However, Respondent agreed to take the job because of Mrs. Delancy's insistence and because of Respondent's sympathy for Mrs. Delancy's desperate situation in view of the imminent demolition of the House. The evidence also established that Mrs. Delancy requested Respondent to undertake additional work and/or services that were beyond the scope of the Contract. Among the extra items undertaken by Respondent was replacement of the floor in the family room. Additional expenses were also incurred because of unanticipated problems encountered during the renovation. For example one side of the house gave way during the renovation work. Upon investigation, it was discovered that there was no footing. Respondent was required to shore up that side of the House. In addition, the electrician was unable to get a meter because there was an outstanding electric bill for the Property. Respondent paid the old bill in order to get the meter connected. Similarly, she paid the gas company to get the stove hooked up. It does not appear Respondent received any additional compensation for the extra work. Except for $345 that Respondent paid for utilities on behalf of Mrs. Delancy, the evidence at the hearing was insufficient to place a dollar value on these extra services and expenses. The first installment under the Contract of $10,835 was paid to Respondent on or about December 31, 1985. In approximately January of 1986, Mrs. Delancy's son, Gerald Delancy, who had been living out of the state, returned to Miami and became involved in overseeing the construction on behalf of his mother. Gerald Delancy was not pleased with the quality of the construction and a great deal of tension developed between Gerald Delancy and Respondent. The final payment request form was submitted on February 20, 1986. Mrs. Delancy signed a document (the "Certificate of Completeness") indicating that the work was completed and the final payment was made to Respondent by the City on March 3, 1986. Gerald Delancy was present when his mother signed the Certificate of Completeness. She signed this Certificate against the advice of her son. At the time the document was signed, Respondent agreed in principal to complete any remaining work. The City Inspection Form which was posted on the project fails to indicate that a final inspection approval was obtained from the City. In addition, the evidence established that required roof inspections were not obtained prior to the final structural inspection. Gerald Delancy prepared a punch list of items which he felt were incomplete and submitted it to Respondent. It does not appear that this list was prepared until July of 1986. Because of the dispute between Respondent and Gerald Delancy as to what was required under the Contract, a copy of the punch list was also sent to the City. The punch list prepared by Gerald Delancy included a number of items which were beyond the scope of the Contract. For example, with respect to the plumbing, the complaints included the following: the water pressure was to low on the water line, the kitchen sink was too small, and the bathroom vanity was substandard. The Contract did not provide for a bathroom vanity. There were also complaints about ants and roaches and "missing shower rods and towel racks" even though these items were not specifically included within the Contract between Respondent and Mrs. Delancy. The City sent its estimator to the House to review the punch list items. The City's estimator felt that Respondent should provide another coat of paint and should complete some other minor repair work, but the estimator did not concur in many of Gerald Delancy's complaints. The City's rehabilitation estimator met with Respondent and Gerald Delancy at the House on July 15, 1986. At that meeting, Respondent agreed to correct certain matters and asked for one month to complete the work. On August 1, 1986, the work was not completed and Respondent requested an additional 30 days. On August 13, 1986, Respondent stated that she did not have the money to complete the work. According to the City's estimator, the cost to repair the construction deficiencies he noted would be approximately $2,500 to $3,000 as of the date of the hearing. During this period in August, Respondent did send some workers back to the house to complete some additional work. A dispute arose between those workers and Gerald Delancy. The exact nature and reasons for this dispute are not clear. Ultimately, Gerald Delancy refused to allow the workers to perform any work because he did not feel he received adequate answers to his inquiries as to the nature of the work they intended to perform. After the City refused to concur in all of his complaints, Gerald Delancy hired a building inspection company. He paid that company $534 and it rendered a report dated August 4, 1986 which detailed many other deficiencies in the construction. It is not clear whether this report was ever presented to Respondent. On or about November 3, 1986, Mrs. Delancy, at the urging of her son, filed a lawsuit against Respondent. On or about August 8, 1989, Mrs. Delancy obtained a final default judgement against Respondent in the amount of $65,000 plus costs of $102.50. Respondent claims that she was unaware of the lawsuit and the default final judgement until Petitioner's investigator questioned her about it on September 25, 1990. As of the date of the hearing in this case, Respondent has not appealed the judgement nor has she attempted to have it set aside or vacated. In addition to alleged construction defects, the default judgement included claims against Respondent for allegedly mishandling certain household goods and other property owned by Mrs. Delancy. The evidence presented in this case was confusing and inconclusive as to the nature and justification for these claims by the Delancys for property which Respondent was allegedly storing for Mrs. Delancy. Apparently, Respondent agreed to assist Mrs. Delancy by moving some of the furniture out of the house and placing it in storage during construction. The contract did not require Respondent to provide any moving or storage services and there is no evidence that Respondent was paid for this work. Some or all of the property that was moved out of the house was lost, stolen or destroyed. There is a dispute between the parties as to circumstances surrounding the loss of this property. The evidence presented in this case was insufficient to establish what happened to the property, who was responsible for it and/or how much it was worth. It does appear that the default judgement against Respondent includes a very high assessment for the property involved. However, as noted above, that judgement has not been vacated or appealed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Count I of the Administrative Complaint, finding the Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing the following disciplinary action against the Respondent: Imposition of an administrative fine of $1,000. Suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of one year, followed by two years probation under such terms as may be imposed by the Board. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 93-6438 Only Petitioner submitted a proposed recommended order. The following rulings are made with respect to the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4, 11, and 12. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3 through 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14 through 18. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 18. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16 through 18. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore R. Gay, Esquire Dept. of Bus. and Prof. Reg. 401 NW 2nd Ave., Ste N-607 Miami, FL 33128 Agnes Sangster 9925 NW 25th Ave. Miami, FL 33147 Jack McRay Acting General Counsel Dept. of Bus. and Prof. Reg. 1940 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Richard Hickok, Exec. Dir. Construction Industry Licensing 7960 Arlington Expressway, Ste 300 Jacksonville, FL 32211-7467
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offense set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged, inter alia, with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, including Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Pamela Jan Powers, is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0508538. On May 8, 1995, Respondent filed an application with the Department for licensure as a real estate broker. Pertinent to this case, item 9 on the application required that Respondent answer yes or no to the following question: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. . . . Respondent responded to the question by checking the box marked "NO." Following approval of Respondent's application, and her licensure as a real estate broker, the Department discovered a "Court Status" document (the "court document") for the Circuit/County Court, Broward County, Florida, which reflected that Respondent, then known as Pamela Jan Saitta, had been charged with five offenses, as follows: DISORDERLY CONDUCT POSSES/DISPLY SUSP/REVK/FRD DL LICENSE SUSP OR REVOKED2 PERS/INJ/PROT/INS REQUIRE FAIL CHANGE ADDRESS/NAME (Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) The court document further reflected that on May 18, 1990, a plea of nolo contendere was entered to counts 1 and 3, adjudication was withheld, and Respondent was assessed costs of $105.00, but not fined. As for the remaining counts, count 2 was nolle prosequi and counts 4 and 5 were dismissed. After receipt of the foregoing information, the Department undertook an investigation, which included an interview with the Respondent. At the time, Respondent told the investigator that she had no knowledge of the charges, as reflected on the court document. Thereafter, on July 18, 1997, the Department filed the Administrative Complaint at issue in this proceeding, which, based on Respondent's negative response to item 9 on the application, charged that Respondent "has obtained a license by means of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment in violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Fla. Stat." and sought to take disciplinary action against her license. On September 17, 1997, Respondent appeared before the Florida Real Estate Commission in an apparent effort to resolve the complaint informally. At that time, Respondent told the commission, under oath, that she had no recollection of the charges or disposition, as reflected on the court document.3 She acknowledged, however, that the document referred to her, but could offer no explanation. During a recess, the commission's counsel spoke with Respondent, and suggested that she try and secure a copy of the police report, as well as other useful information. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3, page 10.) Respondent, but not the Department, researched the records at the Broward County Police Department, and was able to locate a traffic accident report for February 21, 1990, that apparently related to the charges noted in the court document. (Respondent's Exhibit 1.) No police report was located. The accident report reflects that on February 21, 1990, Respondent's vehicle was struck in the rear by another vehicle. The report reads, in part, as follows: Driver of veh 1 [Respondent] had a suspended D.L. and no proof of insurance. Driver of Veh 1 [Respondent] was subsequently arrested for the suspended D.L. ss 322.34(1) No proof of insurance ss316.646(1) Fail to change address within 10 days ss 322.19 and unlawful Use of License ss 322.32(1). The vehicles were both towed by Dalys towing. There is no mention in the accident report of any disorderly conduct by Respondent or any charge of disorderly conduct against Respondent. Moreover, there is no explanation of record for the disorderly conduct charge made against Respondent, as evidenced by the court document. Regarding the events revealed by the accident report, Respondent acknowledges that these events are most likely the source of the charges that were reflected on the court document. She insists, however, that she has no recollection of receiving any citations at the time of the accident, and denies any knowledge of the court proceeding. In explanation, Respondent avers that, consequent to injuries received at the time, she has no recollection of events immediately following the accident. Regarding the court proceeding or its disposition, Respondent also avers she has no knowledge or recollection of that proceeding and did not appear in court on the charges. The only explanation she can offer for that proceeding or its disposition is that, most likely, her attorney resolved the matter, as he was resolving the civil suit that was brought against the other driver. Given the circumstances of this case, Respondent's averment that she was unaware of the charges or the disposition disclosed on the court document when she submitted the application for a broker's license, and that she was only able to connect the court document to the traffic accident after she had retrieved a copy of the accident report, is credible. In so concluding, it is observed that her testimony was candid and consistent. Moreover, her explanation afforded rational explanation for what, otherwise, would have been an irrational act. In this regard, it is observed that the charges filed against Respondent, as well as their disposition, were not serious and did not reflect adversely on her qualification for licensure as a real estate broker. Consequently, were she aware of the events, there was no rational reason to conceal them from the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1998.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses as set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated June 13, 2000, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent is a licensed Certified General Contractor in the State of Florida. At all times material to this case, Respondent was the qualifying agent for Rivero Construction, Inc. On or about June 20, 1996, Respondent contracted with Manuel Chamizo (Chamizo) to construct a parking lot with drainage at 4735 Palm Avenue, Hialeah, Florida, and to repave the parking lot at 4719 Palm Avenue, Hialeah, Florida, for the total price of $7,090.00. Chamizo paid Rivero Construction, Inc., the full contract price. Respondent constructed the parking lot at 4735 Palm Avenue, but did so in a substandard manner. Specifically, the parking lot flooded and was rendered unusable because Respondent had broken a sewer pipe during construction. After being notified of the problem, Respondent failed to correct it. Respondent failed to perform any of the contracted work at 4719 Palm Avenue. Dissatisfied with Respondent's performance, Chamizo sued Rivero Construction, Inc., for damages in the County Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. On or about August 24, 1998, the lawsuit was concluded in Chamizo's favor with the entry of a final judgment against Rivero Construction, Inc. Respondent has failed to satisfy the final judgment. Respondent has failed to obtain a qualified business certificate of authority. Petitioner has incurred costs of $1,669.09 in the investigation and prosecution of Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated June 13, 2000; ordering that Respondent pay an administrative fine in the amount of $1,250; pay restitution to Manuel Chamizo in the amount of the Final Judgement obtained by Manuel Chamizo; and pay costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this proceeding in the initial amount of $1,669.09, plus costs incurred through the date of final action, which revised affidavit of costs will be submitted to the Board at final action. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Diane Snell Perera, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Manuel Rivero 61 East 16th Street Hialeah, Florida 33010 Suzanne Lee, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact On March 22, 1995, Southern was convicted of the commission of a public-entity crime, as defined within Subsection 287.133(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Southern pled guilty to one count of 18 U.S.C., Section 371, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, in the United States Court for the Middle District of Florida. Pursuant to Subsections 287.133(3)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, Southern made timely notification to DMS and provided details of the convictions. On September 20, 1995, DMS issued a notice of intent, pursuant to Subsection 287.133(3)(e)1., Florida Statutes. On October 3, 1995, pursuant to Subsection 287.133(3)(e)2., Florida Statutes, Southern timely filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing to determine whether it is in the public interest for Southern to be placed on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3., Florida Statutes, establishes factors which, if applicable to a convicted vendor, will mitigate against placement of that vendor upon the Convicted Vendor List. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.d., Florida Statutes, establishes "[p]rompt or voluntary payment of any damages or penalty as a result of the conviction" as a factor mitigating against placement on the Convicted Vendor List. Southern paid restitution, fines and court costs totaling $30,193.00. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.e., Florida Statutes, establishes "[c]ooperation with state or federal investigation or prosecution of any public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. According to Ernest F. Peluso, Assistant United States Attorney, since early in 1994, George Peterson, President of Southern, provided active, accurate and meaningful support to the federal investigation. Mr. Peterson willingly provided documents, records and statements to illuminate the extent of the conspiratorial plan. Mr. Peterson fully cooperated with DMS in connection with its investigation initiated pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.f., Florida Statutes, establishes "[d]isassociation from any other persons or affiliates convicted of the public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. This subsection is not applicable. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.g., Florida Statutes, establishes "[p]rior or future self-policing by the person or Florida affiliate to prevent public entity crimes" as a mitigating factor. Southern retained Michael N. Kavouklis, Esquire, to act as an ombudsman or clearinghouse for the receipt of information pertaining to any wrongdoing involving the solicitation of compensation or gratuities to customers. Each employee has received a copy of a notice directing them to report such actions to Mr. Kavouklis. The notice has also been posted in the work place as a reminder. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.h., Florida Statutes, establishes "[r]einstatement or clemency in any jurisdiction in relation to the public entity crime at issue in the proceeding" as a mitigating factor. Southern was not debarred from contracting with any governmental entity. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.i., Florida Statutes, establishes "[c]ompliance by the person or affiliate with the notification provisions of paragraph (a) or paragraph (b)" as a mitigating factor. Southern provided notice of the public entity crime violation by letter on February 17, 1995. This occurred before its conviction on March 22, 1995. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.j., Florida Statutes, establishes "[t]he needs of public entities for additional competition in the procurement of goods and services in their respective markets" as a mitigating factor. Public entities have a frequent and continuing need for roofing services. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.k., Florida Statutes, establishes "any demonstration of good citizenship" as a mitigating factor. Southern provided numerous documents detailing its involvement in numerous community and charitable activities. This Joint Stipulation provides a full and complete factual basis for determining whether Southern should be placed on the Convicted Vendor List. In light of the facts and criteria set forth in subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.a.-k., Florida Statutes, there are no disputes issues of material fact between DMS and Southern which would require a formal hearing. Both parties concur that it is not in the public interest to list Southern on the Convicted Vendor List, pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a licensing and regulatory agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility and duty of investigating and prosecuting complaints against real estate professionals, including real estate brokers and real estate salesmen. Respondent is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0430387. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker-salesman, in limbo, with a home address of 1127 S. Federal Highway, Lake Worth, Florida. At the times pertinent to these proceedings, Respondent had placed his license with Anderson Realty, Inc., Jupiter, Florida. On June 15, 1989, Terry and Franci Evans met with Respondent to discuss their interest in building a house. Respondent told the Evans that he was a real estate broker and that he would negotiate the purchase of the lot the Evans had selected and would arrange for the construction of the house. On July 9, 1989, Terry and Franci Evans, entered into a contract to purchase a residential building lot and a contract to construct a house on the lot that the Evans had selected. The ADA Group, Inc. (ADA) was identified as the contractor and the Evans were identified as the purchaser/owner. Respondent signed the contract on behalf of ADA and was identified by the contract as being an agent of ADA. There was no explanation of Respondent's relationship with ADA. Although the contract identified the Evans as the purchaser/owner, the Evans had not purchased the subject lot. The owner of the lot was not identified by the contract, and there was no competent evidence as to who owned the lot. On June 15, 1989, the Evans gave Respondent a check in the amount of $1,000.00. On July 9, 1989, the Evans gave Respondent a check in the amount of $1,500.00. Both of these checks were given to Respondent as a deposit on the purchase of the lot and construction of the house for which the Evans contracted with ADA on July 9, 1989. The contract executed by the Evans was contingent upon their receiving financing for the project. The form of the contract Respondent used for the subject transaction had been used by Anderson Realty and had been developed by Anderson Realty's attorney. Article V of the General Conditions of the contract executed by the Evans and Respondent on July 9, 1989, contained the following pertinent provision: ... If this contract is contingent upon financing for the purchaser/owner, then the purchaser/owner understands and agrees that no work shall be commenced until the loan commitment is issued. ... The Evans gave Respondent these two checks because they were lead to believe by Respondent that the checks would be refunded to them if the transaction did not close. At the time these checks were given to Respondent, his licensure was officially placed with Anderson Realty. Anderson Realty had requested in January 1989 that Respondent's license be placed inactive. On July 13, 1989, Respondent's license was placed in an inactive status. At no time did Respondent deposit these checks into the escrow account of Anderson Realty or notify it of the subject transaction. Respondent cashed both checks given to him by the Evans. The Evans attempted to secure financing as required by the contract, but they were unable to do so. The subject transaction with ADA failed because the Evans were denied financing for the project. After they had been denied financing, the Evans asked Respondent to return the money they had given to him. Respondent told the Evans that he had made expenditures from the funds the Evans had deposited with him in anticipation of the closing of the transaction. Respondent offered to return a portion of the money to the Evans, but, as of the date of the hearing, Respondent had refunded none of the money to the Evans. Respondent did not produce any verification as to how he expended the money that the Evans had left with him. There was no competent evidence as to who owned the lot that the Evans had agreed to purchase, and there was no competent evidence as to Respondent's relationship with ADA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order which finds that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which suspends all real estate licenses previously issued Respondent for a period of one year, and which imposes an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,000. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-3748 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-14 and 18-20 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 15 and are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence since these proposed findings are based exclusively on hearsay. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 16 and 21 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire Senior Attorney Florida Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Andrew J. Jalassola 1127 South Federal Highway Lake Worth, Florida 33460 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against based on his race or in retaliation for participation in a protected activity in violation of Chapters 760.10(1)(a) and (7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Charles Rogers, is a Caucasian male. At all times relevant to this Petition, Petitioner was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections as a correctional probation officer. He was supervised by Susan Bissett-Dotson, a Caucasian female. In late August, Petitioner had a person he supervised come into his office to discuss pending warrants for the person's arrest. When advised of these warrants, the probationer ran, causing Petitioner to have to pursue him through the office. On September 6, 2001, as a result of the foregoing incident, Petitioner received a written reprimand for violation of office policies and improper use of force. Petitioner failed to follow a policy requiring notice to others in the office when an offender might be arrested in the office. Adam Thomas, the circuit administrator, reviewed the use of force and determined Petitioner had used force appropriately. Nevertheless, the reprimand from Susan Bissett-Dotson contained reference to improper use of force in addition to failure to follow office procedures. Petitioner filed an internal grievance contesting that portion of the reprimand referencing improper use of force. His grievance was heard and the reprimand was reduced to a record of counseling, deleting any reference to an improper use of force. Petitioner's pay, benefits, ability to be promoted, as well as all other aspects of his employment were not affected either by the original reprimand or the subsequent record of counseling. Petitioner's caseload was reassigned four times within a 14-month period. These reassignments occurred between August 29, 2000, and October 2, 2001. Only one of them took place after his grievance. The reassignments did not involve a physical move to a different office; rather, Petitioner received a new set of offenders to supervise whose files were in various stages of development. The reassignments did not involve any material changes in his duties or responsibilities. There was no amount of greater or less prestige associated with any of the caseloads he received. The reassignments did require him to become familiar with a new area and a new group of persons. Petitioner was required to do extensive work to re-develop these files, which task was onerous. The decision to reassign Petitioner's caseloads was taken in relation to the reassignment of other personnel based upon several factors, including but not limited to: assignments from the judiciary; the geographic location of the various officers vis-à-vis supervised offenders; the officers' expressed willingness to accept a new caseload; the officers' qualifications to handle specialized caseloads; and the equitable distribution of the cases. One of the reassignments was caused when Petitioner was out for more than two weeks, which requires a mandatory reassignment of cases. The desires of Petitioner were not considered, although Ms. Bissett-Dotson gave full consideration to the wants and desires of the others who were moved. Petitioner alleges that he was yelled at in a meeting for having an overdue assignment; he produced an e-mail berating him for a late case; and records were introduced that showed the case was not overdue. Records were introduced about the redistribution of another officer's caseload. Of the 31 cases reassigned, 20 were assigned to Petitioner. This occurred on November 14, 2001. Petitioner complained that he was not allowed to work before 8:00 a.m. Ms. Bissett-Dotson was questioned as to whether she allowed Petitioner to work prior to 8:00 a.m. She stated that she had denied his request to work before 8:00 a.m. because 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. was the standard work day for the office, and it was necessary to have coverage during those hours. Because of various requirements, such as working during court, some officers had to be off during normal hours. Other officers had to be out of the office more than others. All of this affected when and whether one could deviate from standard office hours. On three occasions, Petitioner's firearms locker was accidentally used by other officers. On at least one of these occasions, a camera was locked in the locker along with Petitioner's lock. Petitioner was not subject to any discipline as a result of these incidents and Susan Bissett-Dotson was approached by other probation officers on each of the occasions and informed that each had been a mistake. Ms. Bissett-Dotson was satisfied with these explanations. While only one of the reassignments took place after the grievance, clearly Ms. Susan Bissett-Dotson was not fair and equitable in her treatment of Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order indicating clearly that exercise of career service and other employment rights guaranteed by statute are subject to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, protection, and that the Petition herein is dismissed not because it was not proved, but because it was not properly pled. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2002. Charles Rogers Post Office Box 331 Worthington Springs, Florida 32597 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the discipline imposed on Petitioner, Alisha Fessel, by Respondent, City of Cape Coral (the "City"), was appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Based on the Stipulated Record, the following Findings of Fact are made: The City has the authority to monitor and regulate its employees in accordance with the laws and rules of the State of Florida, the City Charter, and ordinances and rules promulgated under the Charter. Ms. Fessel was employed by the City as an administrative secretary in the City's Police Department, and she was a member of the Union. Ms. Fessel had been counseled and disciplined on several occasions regarding her work performance and behavior pursuant to the City's personal rules and regulations as codified in the City of Cape Coral Code of Ordinances and the Cape Coral Police Department General Orders. All disciplinary proceedings against Ms. Fessel were initiated under the City of Cape Coral Code of Ordinances, Chapter 2, Article III, Division 7, entitled, Discipline of Regular Employees, and pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Union. On September 30, 2011, Ms. Fessel was placed on a 120-day performance improvement plan. On November 2, 2012, Ms. Fessel was suspended for 40 hours. On March 7, 2013, Ms. Fessel was placed on administrative leave with pay. On March 12, 2013, Ms. Fessel remained on paid administrative leave while the City conducted a pre-disciplinary hearing. On April 18, 2013, Ms. Fessel's employment with the City was terminated. The parties have stipulated: The underlying discipline is not being challenged; rather, Petitioner [Ms. Fessel] contends that the suspension with pay during the period March 7, 2013[,] up to and including April 18, 2013, constituted disciplinary action barring any further discipline (i.e., Fessel's termination on or about April 18, 2013) for the same actions.
Findings Of Fact On April 16, 1986, in conjunction with the preparation of plans for widening Southside Boulevard (State Road 115) in Jacksonville, Florida, the Department recorded a Map of Reservation pursuant to Section 337.241(1), Florida Statutes, which encompassed a portion of the Petitioner's property. It was stipulated by the parties that the Department complied with the necessary notice, filing, and approval requirements of Section 337.241(1), Florida Statutes. The property in question is located in Jacksonville, adjacent to the east side of Southside Boulevard at the intersection of Hogan Road. It is zoned commercial, but there is currently no development on the east side of Southside Boulevard in the immediate vicinity of Hogan Road. The west side of Southside Boulevard is developed commercially for its entire length. This property consists of a tract of land approximately 892 feet long by 15 feet deep which lies adjacent to a strip of land approximately 100 feet deep which is immediately adjacent to Southside Boulevard. The Department determined that there existed a need to widen Southside Boulevard from a two lane highway to a four lane, limited access facility accompanied by two one-way, parallel service roads. In designing the widening of this highway, the Department determined that the minimum right-of-way corridor width for the facility should be 250 feet. This minimum width was established by using official rules and criteria established by the Department, as well as the Rules of the American Association of State Highway Officials and those of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. Presently, the Department has a 200 foot wide right-of-way corridor. Because of the requirement for at least 250 feet of width, the Department needed to take steps to assure that the extra 50 feet would be available by use of a Map of Reservation. The Department determined that land should be reserved on the east side of the right-of-way corridor for the needed 50 feet because the east side of Southside Boulevard in the area in question is undeveloped, while the west side is substantially developed. This was an economic decision based upon an alignment of the right-of-way corridor that would have the least economic impact on the acquisition of the additional right-of-way. The Department did not place all of the Petitioner's property under the Map of Reservation. Only the 50 feet required for the widening project is affected by the regulation. The owner of the subject property is an individual, E. W. Mayhew, and a corporation, Beta Development Company, Inc. The property was purchased in 1982 for development as office/warehouse space. The Petitioner E. W. Mayhew knew that the property was affected by a Limited Access Line across the property, which was established by the Department in the 1960's, well before the Petitioner's purchase of this property. Despite the presence of this Limited Access Line, the Petitioner did not realize until 1984 that the Line informed potential buyers that direct access to Southside Boulevard from the subject property would be eliminated eventually. Although it spent more than $43,000 to develop plans to promote its property, the Petitioner had not applied to the City of Jacksonville for any of the permits that are required in order to build its proposed office/warehouse project by the time the Map of Reservation was filed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter its Final Order dismissing the Petition in this case. THIS Recommended Order entered on this 24th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 1986. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-1587 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1.-4. Accepted. 5.-16. Rejected, as irrelevant because the elements of reasonableness and arbitrariness were not proved. 17. Rejected, as not a proposed finding of fact. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1.-9. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Drawdy, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Theresa M. Rooney, Esquire 1550 Florida Bank Tower Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Paul J. Martin, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064
