The Issue Whether Development Order 13-87 issued by the Monroe County Planning Commission on January 21, 1988, granting major conditional use approval to a project known as Residence Inn Resort should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Wigwam, Inc., is the present equitable owner of the subject parcel of land, is the successor to the development authorizations for a proposed hotel and marina known as Residence Inn Resort to be constructed on that parcel, and is the developer of the project. Respondent Peter Louis Edwards is the legal owner of the subject parcel of land. The subject parcel is a tract of land located at Mile Marker 52.4 on U.S. 1, on a portion of Government Lot 2, in Section 6, Township 66 South, Range 33 East on Key Vaca, Marathon, Monroe County, Florida. The site plan prepared for Ocean Resort now know as Residence Inn Resort, Marathon, Florida, by Kris Mihelich, Inc., last revision 9/3/87, pages SD-1 to SD-6 is the site plan approved by Monroe County for the subject parcel. The subject parcel consists of 4.82 acres of land above water located between U.S. 1 and the Atlantic Ocean. The subject parcel includes within its boundaries a dredged harbor at least 8 feet deep below mean sea level at mean low tide. The current Monroe County Land Use Maps show the land use designation for the subject parcel as Destination Resort (hereinafter "DR") for the oceanward three-quarters of the parcel and Suburban Residential (hereinafter "SR") for the landward one-quarter of the parcel adjacent to U.S. 1. The companion case, Residence Inn Resort v. Department of Community Affairs, DOAH Case No. 88-3469RGM (Final Order issued simultaneously herewith), is a challenge to a proposed rule of the Department of Community Affairs rejecting a portion of a Monroe County ordinance which would change the designation of the "SR" portion of the parcel to "DR" so that the entire parcel would be designated "DR." That rule challenge has been dismissed in the Final Order issued simultaneously with this Recommended Order. Accordingly, the designations for the subject parcel remain "DR" for the oceanward portion and "SR" for the landward portion. Even if the rule challenge had been successful thereby allowing the entire parcel to be designated "DR," the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law contained within this Recommended Order would remain the same. The Development Order under appeal in this cause, Planning Commission Resolution No. 13-87, would approve a major conditional use for the subject parcel. That Development Order would allow construction of a 96-unit hotel resort and would allow the harbor located within the property to be used as a marina. The 96-unit density is computed by including 24 transferrable development rights known as TDRs purchased by Wigwam, Inc., which increase the density on the subject parcel to 96-units. The maximum permittable density for this parcel designated "DR" in part and "SR" in part is not sufficient to allow a 96-room hotel. The maximum permittable density if the entire parcel were designated "DR," or as the parcel is now designated as partially "DR" and partially "SR," will not allow the development of 96 permanent dwelling units. Section 3-101.P-4. of the Monroe County Land Development Regulations provides that "permanent residential unit means a dwelling unit that is designed for, and capable of, serving as a residence for a full housekeeping unit which includes a kitchen composed of at least a refrigerator and stove." Section 3-101.T-2 of the Monroe County Land Development Regulations provides that "temporary residential unit means a dwelling unit used for transient housing such as a hotel, motel or guestroom that does not contain a kitchen " The 96 hotel rooms approved by Monroe County in the Development Order under review herein each include a kitchen. If each unit of the proposed Residence Inn Resort is constructed with a kitchen, as Resolution 13-87 would allow, each of the 96 units would be a permanent unit. The Institute of Transportation Engineering (hereinafter "ITE") Trip Generation Manual is a compilation of traffic data that has been accumulated over a number of years by transportation engineers on many types of land uses. The data has been categorized by land use and summarized in terms of average number of trips generated by each individual type of land use. The ITE studies of trip generation rates are performed by placing a standard traffic counter with a pneumatic hose at the entrances and exits to the land use in question. The traffic counter records both hourly and daily summaries of vehicle trips over the traffic counter. The ITE trip generation rate for hotels and motels is 10.189 daily trips per occupied room. The ITE trip generation rate for hotels is 8.7 trips per room on a weekday basis. The ITE definition of a hotel for the purpose of that trip generation rate is a place of lodging, providing sleeping accommodations, restaurants, a cocktail lounge, meeting and banquet rooms with convention facilities, and other retail and service shops. The only significant difference between the proposed Residence Inn Resort and the typical hotel studied in the ITE Trip Generation Manuel is that the proposed Residence Inn Resort has a marina. All of the other proposed amenities are typically found in ordinary hotels. The proximity of the proposed Residence Inn Resort to an airport is also not unusual for hotels. As discussed hereinafter, the marina, which is the only real distinguishing feature between hotels and the Residence Inn Resort, does not qualify for approval as part of this project since it is not in compliance with the Monroe County Land Development Regulations. A hotel providing 50 or more rooms is permitted as a major conditional use in a destination resort district only if the applicant has demonstrated through a traffic impact study prepared by a qualified professional that traffic generated by the use will not exceed 50% of the trips generated by a hotel or motel as shown in the Institute of Transportation Engineering Trip Generation Manual. Section 9-213.B.1.c., Monroe County Land Development Regulations. Prior to the issuance of the subject Development Order by Monroe County, Respondent Wigwam, Inc., prepared a transportation study for the proposed development. That transportation study did not demonstrate, and made no attempt to demonstrate, that the traffic generated by the proposed Residence Inn Resort would not exceed 50% of the trips generated by a hotel or motel as shown in the ITE Trip Generation Manual. On the contrary, the transportation report submitted to Monroe County simply utilized the same trip generation rates that appear in the third edition of the ITE Trip Generation Manual. A June 21, 1988, letter directed to Monroe County from Post, Buckley, Shuh and Jernigan after the Development Order under appeal in this cause had already issued indicates that Monroe County simply assumed that the proposed Residence Inn Resort would have a trip generation rate 50% less than the trips generated by a hotel or motel as shown in the ITE Trip Generation Manual. No traffic impact studies submitted to Monroe County prior to the issuance of the Development Order under review in this case support such a conclusion. Respondent Wigwam, Inc., presented the testimony of two experts in the field of transportation engineering, Dan Hoyt and Richard Mercer. Both Mr. Hoyt and Mr. Mercer had prepared transportation reports subsequent to the issuance of the Development Order under review in this cause, which concluded that the traffic generated by the proposed Residence Inn Resort would not exceed 50% of the trips generated by a hotel or motel as shown in the ITE Trip Generation Manual. Both believed that the number and type of amenities included in the proposed Residence Inn Resort would be so attractive that the hotel guests would not want to leave the premises. However, Mr. Hoyt's opinion is based upon a list of amenities significantly larger than the amenities actually approved for the Residence Inn Resort. A large part of Mr. Mercer's opinion is based on the assumption that the type of people that will be guests at the proposed Residence Inn Resort simply will not want to leave the hotel, and not upon any particular merit to the amenities planned for the hotel. Both experts testified that their conclusions were based upon their overall professional judgment rather than upon specific empirical data. The Department presented the testimony of one transportation expert, Rick Hall. Mr. Hall testified that there are two methods of demonstrating an "internal trip capture rate" (the retention of guests on-site due to the number of amenities which guests would normally have to travel to off-site) that is greater than what is normally expected. The first and best method is to take empirical measurements of similar types of facilities that are already constructed. In the case of Residence Inn Resort, an existing hotel or motel with a marina located in Monroe County would be a similar facility for purposes of taking traffic generation measurements. No one has performed such an empirical study for the proposed Residence Inn Resort. The second method of demonstrating a greater internal capture rate is to move into the theoretical realm, as was attempted by Mr. Hoyt and Mr. Mercer. However, when the internal capture rate predicted by Mr. Hoyt and Mr. Mercer is tested with common sense, as was ably done on cross-examination, it is apparent that the amenities of the proposed Residence Inn hotel are not sufficient to keep 50% of the average number of trips on-site. For example, 112 trips per day would have to be assigned to the 5-table barbecue picnic area, 50 trips per day assigned to the small beach, and numerous trips to the other small amenities. Messrs. Hoyt and Mercer did not increase the number of trips off-site for persons to purchase those items necessary to utilize the barbecue/picnic area or for preparing meals and snacks in the kitchens provided in each unit, did not consider the fact that the small beach anticipated to keep the guests of the 96- room hotel on-site would only be approximately 50 feet by 150 feet once constructed, and considered no data regarding actual use by hotel guests of the proposed small sports court based upon such usage at similar facilities. A more reasonable internal trip capture rate for the Residence Inn Resort is 20% of the ITE Trip Generation Manual rate. However, this 20% is attributed to the marina proposed for the project, which marina is disapproved in this Recommended Order as set forth below. The dredged harbor within the subject parcel is at least 8 feet deep. Just oceanward of the project boundary, the undredged ocean bottom shoals to less than 4 feet at mean low tide. This area is more than 4 feet deep measured from mean sea level. A marina is permitted as a major conditional use in a destination resort district provided that "the parcel proposed for development has access to water of at least 4 feet below mean sea level at mean low tide." Section 9- 213.B.2.a., Monroe County Land Development Regulations. The Land Development Regulations define the phrase "water of at least 4 feet below mean sea level at mean low tide" to mean locations that will not have a significant adverse impact on off-shore resources of particular importance. For the purposes of this definition, off-shore resources of particular importance shall mean ... shallow water areas with natural marine communities with depths at mean low tide of less than four (4) feet ... Section 3-101.W-1., Monroe County Land Development Regulations. The shallow water area just oceanward of the project boundary is comprised of a natural marine community of seagrass beds. The dominant species is turtle grass, also known as Thallassia. Monroe County Development Order No. 13-87 was rendered to the Department on April 7, 1988, and no earlier. The Department timely filed the Notice of Appeal and Petition in this cause. There is no basis for application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in this proceeding, requiring the Department of Community Affairs and the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission to approve the Development Order issued by Monroe County which is the subject matter of this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission issue a Final Order: Denying the proposed 96-unit Residence Inn Resort and marina as preliminarily approved by Monroe County in the Development Order appealed herein; Providing that the proposed hotel without marina may be approved if: None of the hotel rooms contain kitchens; The density is reduced to comply with the current "DR" and "SR" land use designations; and Wigwam, Inc., is able to demonstrate a 50% reduction in trips from the motel and hotel rate as shown in the ITE Trip Generation Manual. Providing further that a different project may be approved so long as it complies with the Monroe County Land Development Regulations. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of October, 1989. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 88-3450 Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 1-24 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent Wigwam, Inc.'s, proposed Findings of Fact numbered 1-3, 5, and 7-12 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent Wigwam, Inc.'s, proposed Findings of Fact numbered 4 and 6 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues under consideration herein. Respondent Wigwam, Inc.'s, proposed Findings of Fact numbered 13 and 21-25 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting statements of a party's position. Respondent Wigwam, Inc.'s, proposed Findings of Fact numbered 14-20 and 26-32 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Respondent Wigwam, Inc.'s, proposed Finding of Fact numbered 33 which is 2 1/2 pages long has been rejected primarily because it is contrary to the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondent Wigwam, Inc.'s, proposed Finding of Fact numbered 34 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: David Jordan, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 William J. Roberts, Esquire Roberts, Egan and Routa 217 South Adams Street Post Office Box 1386 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Fred Tittle, Esquire Tittle & Tittle, P. A. Post Office Drawer 535 Tavernier, Florida 33070 Lucien Proby, Esquire Monroe County Attorney 310 Fleming Street Key West, Florida 33040 Thomas G. Pelham, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Larry Keesey, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Patty Woodworth, Director Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Planning and Budgeting Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol, PL-05 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A.
Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030 (b) (1) (C) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS PILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. FINAL ORDER NO. DCA09-GM-291 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct copies have been furnished by U.S. Mail to ea of the persons listed below on this f day of , 2009. Paula Ford pp raency Clerk The Honorable Bram D. E. Canter Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 By U.S. Mail Geoffrey T. Kirk, Assistant County Attorney Hernando County Attorney's Office 20 North Main: Street, Suite 462 Brooksville, FL 34601-2850 By Hand Delivery Lynette Norr Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs
The Issue Whether Sugarloaf Shores Section C Extension is a "major development" as defined by Section 6-222, Monroe County Code, and (in connection with Intervenor's amended plat proposal and dredge and fill application) should undergo major development review pursuant to Chapter 6, Article VII, Monroe County Code.
Findings Of Fact Sugarloaf Shores Section C Extension is a subdivision located in Section 2, Township 67 South, Range 27 East, Sugarloaf Key, Monroe County, Florida. (Prehearing Stipulation, Para. (e), No. 1). The plat of Sugarloaf Shores Section C Extension, shows 76 residential building lots and five deadend canals (connecting to Upper Sugarloaf Sound or Cross Key Channel) and a canal of approximately 900 feet paralleling the mean high water line of Upper Sugarloaf Sound; it was approved by Monroe County on July 5, 1972, and is recorded in Monroe County Plat Book 6, page 93. The subdivision contains 38.9 plus acres. (Prehearing Stipulation, Para. (e), No. 2; Joint Exhibit No. 1). Lloyd A. Good, Jr., purchased Sugarloaf Shores Section C Extension on October 8, 1973, and is the current owner and developer of the subdivision. (Prehearing Stipulation Para. (e), No. 3). At the time of his purchase, the land had been cleared. An east-west canal of approximately 600' in length and 50' in width had been excavated but unopened to Upper Sugarloaf Sound. A north-south canal or borrow pit of approximately 200' in length and 50' in width had also been excavated. Fill obtained from these excavations had been placed on the property. He subsequently placed approximately 800 yards of additional fill on the Southeast corner of the property. (Testimony of Good) The platted subdivision is landward of the mean high water line and contains a mixture of upland and wetland vegetation. A berm rises along the front of the property between Allamanda Drive and the existing (plugged) canal. The northern part of the property contains white, black, and red mangroves, red grape, a hardwood hammock, and a salt water marsh characterized by key grass, salicornia, and white and black mangroves. The western part of the property contains fresh water wetlands characterized by spike rush. The area south of the existing canal contains more mangroves and is permeated by transitional wetland or fresh water wetland plant species, with the higher elevations containing Lower Keys hardwood hammock species such as poison wood, black tooth and Jamaican dogwood. The salt marsh and black mangroves are subject to inundation from tidal exchange; the fresh water wetlands are subject to rain water flooding. (Testimony of Dennis) In 1973, Lloyd Good was familiar with regulatory restrictions on the use of wetland areas. As a Philadelphia attorney, he had "practiced in wetland areas in New Jersey . . . and . . . knew that the concept of deadend canals at that time was not feasible." (TR.65) He had decided to amend the original plat (and change the development plan) even before he purchased Sugarloaf Shores Section C Extension because he believed that under existing environmental laws the platted deadend canals would not be permitted. (TR.65) So he hired engineers to design a development plan acceptable to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and other governmental agencies having regulatory jurisdiction over dredge and fill activities in wetland areas. Because of other business interests, he temporarily halted work on the project between late 1973 and 1975. From 1975 to 1980, he worked with permitting officials from federal, state, and local regulatory agencies in an effort to devise a development plan for Section C Extension which would meet regulatory standards. In 1980, he hired a consultant to obtain the necessary federal, state, and local permits needed to carry out his revised development plan. Monroe County permitting officials told him not to apply for any local dredge and fill, or land clearing permits until he first obtained the required federal and state permits. (Testimony of Good) In 1980, Lloyd Good applied for a joint U.S. Army Corps of Engineers/Florida Department of Environmental Regulation permit to perform the dredging and filling necessary to carry out his revised development plan. In 1983, after extensive negotiation, both agencies issued him the required dredge and fill permits. The Department of Environmental Regulation permit was conditioned on Mr. Good obtaining Monroe County approval of an amended plat of Sugarloaf Shores Section C Extension conforming to the federal and state permits. (Joint Exhibit No. 21, Testimony of Good) During his initial discussions with Monroe County officials in 1981, Lloyd Good proposed rezoning the property to permit multiple-family residences; if rezoned, he expected that the project would be required to undergo "major development" review as defined by the Monroe County Code. But after meeting with members of the Sugarloaf Property Owners Association and discovering that they were violently opposed to multi-family development," (TR.73) he decided to retain the single-family nature of the original development and not seek a zoning change. Monroe County officials told him that by retaining the original zoning his development activities would not be subject to the "major development" review process. (Testimony of Good) On May 10, 1983, Lloyd Good submitted an application to Monroe County for authorization to dredge 42,400 plus/minus cubic yards of submerged lands, wetlands and uplands for roads and fill needed to develop residential lots within the Sugarloaf Shores Subdivision in accordance with his newly revised development plan. His application conformed to the federal and state permits already issued. (Prehearing Stipulation Para. (e) No. 4; Joint Exhibits No. 2 and 6) Mark Robinson, the county biologist assigned to review the dredge and fill application and prepare a biological report, asked Lloyd Good to have the state and federal permits amended to address several of his concerns. Mr. Good obtained the requested permit amendments, then asked that the biological report be completed. (Testimony of Good) On August 25, 1983, Dr. Jeffrey M. Doyle, Director of the Monroe County Planning and Zoning Department, issued an administrative ruling declaring Sugarloaf Shores Section C Extension to be a "major development" under the Monroe County Code. As grounds, he cited Section 6-222(1), which defines a "major development" project as a subdivision containing five acres or more of land or water, and Section 6-222(7)(b), which grants discretionary authority to zoning officials and the County Commission to designate an activity or use as a "major development" project if it "reflects sufficient scope, scale and size to justify its being designated . . . in order to ensure its reasonable implementation, if approved, and its proper review prior to such approval." Under his administrative ruling, the dredge and fill application would be subject to the comprehensive review procedures which apply to "major developments." (Joint Exhibit Nos. 32, 5) On September 21, 1983, Lloyd Good appealed Dr. Doyle's administrative ruling to the Monroe County Board of Adjustment. The issue before the Board of Adjustment (and subsequently before the County Commission) was whether Mr. Good's proposed dredge and fill activity (for the purpose of constructing the revised subdivision) was a "major development" as defined by the Monroe County Code, and whether compliance with "major development" review procedures was required before county dredge and fill permits could be issued. (Prehearing Stipulation, Para. (e) No. 6; Joint Exhibit No. 8). On November 2, 1983, the Monroe County Board of Adjustment upheld Dr. Doyle's decision and determined that the Section C Extension subdivision (to be created by the dredging and filling) was a "major development" under Chapter 6- 222(7)(b), Monroe County Code. (Prehearing Stipulation, Para. (e) No. 7; Joint Exhibits No. 11 and 12). On November 23, 1983, Lloyd Good appealed the Board of Adjustment's decision to the County Commission. (Prehearing Stipulation, Para. (e) No. 8; Joint Exhibit No. 13). On January 27, 1984, the County Commission, sitting as the Board of Appeals, adopted Resolution No. 042-1984, reversing the Board of Adjustment's decision of November 2, 1983. The resolution (giving no specific reasons for the reversal) remanded the matter to the County Planning and Building Department for normal processing of the related dredge and fill permits. It did not grant or deny any development or dredge and fill permit; it simply ordered that Lloyd Good's dredge and fill application would be reviewed under normal permitting procedures, not the more comprehensive procedures applicable to "major development" projects. (Prehearing Stipulation, Para. (e), No. 9; Joint Exhibit No. 14) The DCA did not appeal this resolution to a circuit court (within 30 days of its adoption) or to the FLAWAC (within 45 days of its transmission). The DCA did not challenge or question the County Commission's decision (that the proposed dredge and fill activities would not undergo "major development review") until it appealed the Commission's subsequent resolution granting the dredge and fill permit. (Testimony of Good, Dennis) On June 4, 1984, Lloyd Good submitted to the Monroe County Building Department 13 copies of a proposed amended plat for the Sugarloaf Shores Section C Extension. The amended plat incorporated his new development plan and reflected the dredging and filling approved by state and federal permits. (Prehearing Stipulation, Para. (e), No. 10; Joint Exhibit Nos. 18 and 21). On July 13, 1984, the County Commission adopted Resolution No. 195- 1984 approving Lloyd Good's application to dredge and fill. The resolution was transmitted to the DCA on July 27, 1984, which appealed it to the FLAWAC by notice filed September 10, 1984. 1/ The appealed resolution directs that the applied-for permit be issued subject to Lloyd Good's subsequent filing of an amendment to the Sugarloaf Shores Section C Extension plat. (Prehearing Stipulation, Para. (e), Joint Exhibit No. 19) Thereafter, on September 7, 1984, the County Commission adopted Resolution No. 224-1984, approving an "Amended Plat for Sugarloaf Shores Section C Extension." The DCA also appealed this resolution to FLAWAC by separate notice filed October 31, 1984. (Prehearing Stipulation, Para. (e), No. 12; Joint Exhibit Nos. 21, 22) The amended plat approved by Resolution No. 224-1984, replaces the original plat with a fundamentally new and different development plan. It alters the location of roads; eliminates the proposed deadend canals (except for the existing "plugged" canal); provides for wetland preservation areas in Tracts A, B, C, D, and F, and for the construction of a six-acre boat basin fronting the property on Upper Sugarloaf Sound; and reduces the number of single family residential lots from 76 to 55. RU-1 zoning is retained. The new development plan is preferable to the original plan in terms of environmental impact. The amended plat was processed in the same manner as all new plats in Monroe County. (Joint Exhibits No. 1, 21; Testimony of Dennis) The record is devoid of any documented expenditures made by Lloyd Good in reliance on County Commission approval of the original or amended plat.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing it is RECOMMENDED that pursuant to Section 380.07(4), Florida Statutes (1983), the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter an order: Reversing Resolution Nos. 195-1984 and 224-1984, because these resolutions approved development activities prior to their undergoing the "major development" review required by Section 6-222(1) and (6), Monroe County Code, as incorporated by Rules 27F-9.06 and 27F-9.17, Florida Administrative Code; Declaring the proposed Sugarloaf Shores Section C Extension a "major development" within the meaning of Section 6-222(1) and (6), Monroe County Code, and requiring the two development activities which would create it to undergo "major development" review prior to any approval; and Declaring that after undergoing the required "major development" review, these development activities would be eligible for approval, but that the disposition of the appeals in the instant cases does not reach the substantive issue of whether the proposed development should ultimately be approved, or disapproved. See, Section 380.08(3), Florida Statutes (1983). DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1986.
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be paid to the Department of Economic Opportunity (“DEO”) by Respondents.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Thomas and Mr. Shine were the agency attorneys who worked on the appeal. Ms. Thomas reviewed the record on appeal, reviewed the papers filed in the appellate court, filed a notice of appearance, researched legal issues associated with the agency’s Notice of Limited Joinder in Answer Brief, and discussed the case with other attorneys. Ms. Thomas spent seven hours working on the case. Mr. Shine reviewed the record on appeal, reviewed the papers filed in the appellate court, filed a notice of appearance, researched legal issues associated with the agency’s answer brief, and discussed the case with other attorneys. Mr. Shine spent six hours working on the case. Ms. Thomas and Mr. Shine did not file a brief or participate in oral argument. DEO is demanding payment of $3,900 as the total of its reasonable attorney’s fees, which was computed by multiplying 13 hours by an hourly rate of $300. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, the criteria listed in Rule 4-1.5 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar must be used to determine the reasonable attorney’s fees in this case. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)A The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)A is “the time and labor required, the novelty, complexity, and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.” The legal work was not complex, but it required specialized skill in land use law. DEO claims the standing issue in the case on appeal was complex. To the contrary, the First District Court of Appeal awarded attorney’s fees to the appellees because the court determined that appellants and their counsel knew or should have known that no material facts provided a basis for Respondent’s standing. Likewise, the agency’s counsel knew or should have known. The evidence presented did not show that the labor of both Ms. Thomas and Mr. Shine was required. Their work was, in large part, redundant. Furthermore, Ms. Thomas had only a vague recollection of much of her work. The work of Mr. Shine, alone, would have been sufficient to accomplish the agency’s purposes and efforts in the appeal. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)B The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)B is “the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.” There was no evidence presented regarding this criterion to be considered in determining reasonable fees. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)C The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)C is “the fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged in the locality for legal services of similar nature.” DEO presented the testimony of Joseph Goldstein, a land use lawyer who practices in the Miami offices of the law firm of Holland and Knight. It was Mr. Goldstein’s opinion that the customary hourly rate in the Tallahassee area at the relevant time was $300.1/ Respondents did not present expert testimony to refute Mr. Goldstein’s opinion. There is no other evidence in the record regarding a reasonable hourly rate. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)D The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)D is “the significance of, or amount involved in, the subject matter of the representation, the responsibility involved in the representation, and the results obtained.” The case on appeal had moderate significance and the responsibility involved was moderate. The results obtained were not unusual. The novelty in the appellate case was the award of attorney’s fees, but the agency attorneys had nothing to do with the award. In fact, they opposed the award. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)E The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)E is “the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances and, as between attorney and client, any additional time demands or requests of the attorney by the client.” There was no evidence presented regarding this criterion that should be considered in determining reasonable fees. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)F The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)F is “the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.” There was no evidence presented regarding this criterion to be considered in determining reasonable fees. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)G The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)G is “the experience, reputation, diligence, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the service and the skill, expertise, or efficiency of the effort reflected in the actual providing of such service.” The agency lawyers had specialized skill in land use law, but the case did not require unusual diligence or effort. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)H The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)H is “whether the fee is fixed or contingent, and, if fixed as to amount or rate, whether the client’s ability to pay rested to any significant degree on the outcome of the representation.” The fee was fixed because it was based on fixed salaries, but it did not rest on the outcome of the appeal.
The Issue The issue is whether to approve Petitioners' application for a beneficial use determination (BUD) on their property in Key Largo, Florida, and if approved, to determine the type of relief that is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners purchased their property in September 2006 for $60,000.00 (or at the peak of the Florida housing boom). The parcel is located at the corner of Meridian Avenue and Lycaloma Avenue, mile marker 94.5, on the Gulf of Mexico side of U.S. Highway 1 in Key Largo. It is also identified as Block 9, Lot 1, Section 3 of the Bay Haven Subdivision, an older, partially-developed subdivision comprised of four sections and several hundred lots. Since September 15, 1986, the subdivision, including Petitioners' lot, has been zoned Suburban Residential (SR), which allows only one residential unit per two acres. No challenge to that action was taken by any person, and no contention has been made that the County failed to follow the established procedure for adopting its LDRs. A challenge to the validity of the LDRs is now barred by the statute of limitations.1 See § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. The Bay Haven Subdivision is located in South Key Largo and was first platted after World War II. Building permits for all existing homes in the subdivision were applied for before the zoning change became effective in September 1986. Due to the SR restrictions, around 250 lots remain vacant at this time, including 99 in Section 3 where Petitioners' lot is located. Many of these vacant lots have been deeded by their owners to the County for conservation purposes in exchange for points that can be used with a Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO)2 allocation to develop other property in the County. Petitioners' corner lot lies at the intersection of two streets and has an irregular shape with a large radius at the intersection. It is bordered on two sides by single-family homes, measures 8,276 square feet, or around 0.19 acres, and is somewhat larger than the typical subdivision lot size of 5,000 square feet. Mr. Beauchamp, who resides in Wisconsin, testified that he purchased the property with the expectation of building a home when he retired as an air traffic controller. Before purchasing the property, he assumed that it was zoned Improved Subdivision (IS) because this was the zoning incorrectly shown on the multiple listing service sheet provided by his realtor. Neither Mr. Beauchamp nor his realtor was familiar with County zoning classifications or permissible uses for the parcel.3 Sometime in 2006 they visited a County office to secure further information. Mr. Beauchamp says they spoke with two unidentified "planners," who told them that a single-family home could be built on the property. However, nothing was confirmed in writing, and there is no record of the meeting. Other than this meeting, neither Mr. Beauchamp nor his realtor took any other steps to verify the zoning on the property and/or any development restrictions that might apply. Based solely on the oral advice given by these two unnamed County employees, the Beauchamps purchased the lot. According to Petitioners' expert, Robert Smith, before purchasing a vacant lot in the Keys, normal due diligence would require a prospective purchaser to arrange a pre-application conference with Planning Department staff and secure a written Letter of Understanding confirming the rights of the property owner. See § 110-3, M.C.C. However, Petitioners (and their realtor) did not complete appropriate due diligence; they simply checked with an unidentified County employee and without any other assurance purchased the property.4 In May 2012, Petitioners' agent, Randy Wall, a builder and former Planning Commissioner but not an attorney, met with a representative of the County Building Department to begin the process of securing approval to build a single-family residence on the property. Mr. Wall was advised that the zoning on the property was SR, which allows only one dwelling unit per two acres. This was confirmed in an email dated July 13, 2012, from the Assistant Director of Planning, which stated as follows: The parcel has a zoning designation of SR which requires Two (2) acres per residential unit. As noted by planning staff, this parcel does not have sufficient land area for the zoning and associated density. At the meeting, Mr. Wall also inquired about the possibility of changing the zoning on the property from SR to IS (which would allow construction of a single-family home), but decided not to pursue that option because he recognized the poor prospects of securing a zoning change for a single lot in a large subdivision, when scores of other lots were subject to the same restriction. He assumed, probably correctly, that this might invite a spot zoning challenge. Other than having a discussion with County representatives, Mr. Wall did nothing more. He did not file an application for a residential dwelling unit allocation under the County's ROGO process, or any other formal application for relief, such as a change in the zoning district or land use designation, a variance, or an exception. Believing that the County staff would "fix the problem" because the County had made "a mistake" in reclassifying the entire subdivision as SR, Mr. Wall prepared and filed a BUD application, which was eventually deemed to be complete on September 27, 2013. The BUD process is intended "to provide a means to resolve a landowner's claim that a [LDR] or comprehensive plan policy has had an unconstitutional effect on property in a nonjudicial forum." § 102-103(a), M.C.C. An applicant for a BUD must include a statement "describing the [LDR], comprehensive plan policy, or other final action of the county, which the applicant believes necessitates relief under this division." § 102-105(b)(5), M.C.C. The application at issue simply stated that "the adoption of the land use designation of SR for the subdivision of Bay Haven constituted a compensable taking." The application did not refer to any comprehensive plan policy or final action taken by the County. As relief, the application requested that the County take one of the two following actions: (a) change the Future Land Use Map and zoning designations to allow a residence to be built on the lot; or (b) notwithstanding the SR zoning, issue a permit for development. The BUD process requires applicants to state whether they are alleging a facial or as-applied regulatory taking as the basis for administrative relief. See § 102-104, M.C.C. Unless a landowner asserts that a LDR or comprehensive plan provision, on its face, has caused a taking of his property, relief is permitted only after "the landowner has received a final decision on development approval applications from the county, including building permit allocation system allocations, appeals, administrative relief pursuant to section 138-54, and other available relief, exceptions, or variances." Id. Mr. Wall did not formally apply for any type of development approval and received no final decision, as contemplated by the Code. However, Mr. Wall testified that he "understood" the County was waiving that requirement in this instance. He also stated in the application that "Joe Haberman contracted [sic] the Beauchamps and informed them that staff had deemed this phase unnecessary and to move directly to submitting a [BUD] application." Other than this assertion, there is no evidence to confirm this understanding, and the County's Principal Planner testified that a waiver had not been granted. She also confirmed that no development approval application had been filed, and no final decision had been made, both required by the Code in order to seek relief under an "as applied" theory. Therefore, rightly or wrongly, as plainly stated in the application, Petitioners' basis for relief is that the LDR on its face constitutes a taking of their property.5 Besides a single-family home, which is impermissible here due to size limitations of the lot, two other uses are permitted as of right in the SR district: community parks and beekeeping. See § 130-94, M.C.C. Also, a property owner may apply for a minor conditional use, subject to approval by the Planning Director. Permissible minor conditional uses include public or private community tennis courts and swimming pools; public buildings and uses; parks and community uses; institutional uses; and churches, synagogues, and houses of worship. Id. However, Mr. Beauchamp testified that he is not interested in any of these uses since he believes most, if not all, would be offensive to a residential neighborhood or simply impractical due to the size of his lot. The property can also be sold to the owners of adjacent Lot 11 to be used as a side yard, its use before being purchased by Petitioners. Finally, the Principal Planner testified that there are transferable development rights (TDRs) on the property, whose value at this time is unknown. See § 130-160, M.C.C. Therefore, the Beauchamps are not deprived of all economically beneficial use of their property. Cf. § 102-110(c), M.C.C. ("[t]he highest, common, or expected use, is not intended as an appropriate remedy, unless expressly required by applicable statute or case law"). There was no evidence from a property appraiser on the fair market value of the parcel, as encumbered by the regulation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of County Commissioners deny Petitioners' application for relief under the BUD Ordinance. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2014.
