The Issue The primary issue for determination is whether Respondent's decision to rescind a previous notice of award of a bid to Petitioner First Master Lessors, Inc., on the basis that the original bid was nonresponsive, was appropriate. If rescission of that bid award was proper, a secondary issue is whether Respondent was also justified in rejecting the competing bid submitted on behalf of Petitioner DSJ Realty Company Inc.
Findings Of Fact Respondent issued an Invitation To Bid in order to obtain a leasehold of 15,397 square feet of office space to house operations of its child support enforcement office in Lakeland, Florida, for a term of seven years with an option to renew the lease for two additional three year periods. The Invitation To Bid (ITB) states Respondent's reservation of the right to reject, if in the best interest of the State of Florida, any and all bids. Further, the invitation states a number of conditions that submitting bidders must meet in order for their bids to be deemed responsive. Among the stated conditions is the requirement that bids be submitted on the standardized bid submittal form enclosed in the ITB in compliance with conditions specified on that form. Further, bidders are directed to complete the bid submittal form providing acknowledgements requested by the form. Another stated condition of the ITB is the requirement that a bidder be the owner of record of the facility and parking areas offered for lease; or, if a lessee seeking to sublease, submit with the bid proposal documentation of authority to sublease the facility and parking areas. A further ITB condition requires each bid to be signed by the owner, corporate officers or legal representative of the bidding entity. Corporate, trade or partnership titles of the bidding entity are to be stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature. Bid submissions signed by an agent are required to be accompanied by written evidence from the owner of record documenting the agent's authority. All bid submittal signatures are to be notarized. Page 4 of the standardized bid submittal form enclosed in the ITB requires, in paragraph 11, that any bid offering premises for consideration (including parking areas), which are presently occupied or which will covered by other active leases on the anticipated lease effective date, must be accompanied by documentation executed by those tenants indicating their acknowledgement of the bid and their ability to vacate the premises by the proposed lease effective date. Submitting bidders are required to indicate whether this requirement is applicable to their bid. Page 4 of the standard bid submittal form contains a number of other conditions which require agreement by the submitting bidder. Proof of the bidder's agreement to those conditions is to be documented by the bidder's initials on each page of the bid submittal package and the bidder's notarized signature on page 16, the submittal form's concluding page. Among the conditions on Page 4 of the form is the agreement of the successful bidder to provide leased space to Respondent for exclusive use on a 24 hour basis, seven days per week during the term of any lease resulting from the bid. This condition further explicitly states that the space to be leased will be fully occupied during normal working hours of 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. during the week and may be fully or partially occupied at other times as necessary in Respondent's discretion. Respondent's bid request specified that bidders must offer a minimum of 65 parking spaces in conjunction with premises proposed for lease. Of those spaces, two spaces were required to meet requirements of accessibility for handicapped parking. Of the remaining spaces, 52 spaces were required to accommodate full size automobiles. All parking was required to be provided as part of the lease cost to Respondent and under the "control of the bidder, off street, suitably paved and lined." On May 16, 1989, five bids were opened, including those submitted on behalf of Petitioner DSJ Realty Company Inc. (DSJ), and Petitioner First Master Lessors, Inc. (MASTER). Out of the five bids opened, only the bids of MASTER and DSJ were determined to be responsive. After evaluation of the bids by Respondent's personnel, the bid was awarded to MASTER on July 6, 1989. On July 11, 1989, and in response to the award to MASTER, a notice of intent to protest the award was filed by counsel for Dale S. Jones, as trustee; DSJ; and Elizabethan Development, Inc. (ELIZABETHAN). By letter dated July 12, 1989, Alan Taylor filed a protest of the lease award to MASTER. That letter simply stated its efficacy as a protest with the words "[w]e hereby protest the award of lease # 590:2087 to First Master Lessors, Inc." No particular factual or legal basis for the protest was stated. Taylor is associated with ELIZABETHAN and his letter is typed on stationary of that business entity. Taylor, designated the bidder on page one of the DSJ bid submittal, was authorized to act solely on behalf of DSJ in the submission of its bid by its president, Dale S. Jones, Jr. Documentation of that authority is contained in a May 8, 1989 memorandum attached to the bid package. There is no documentation in the bid submittal package of DSJ that Taylor was empowered to act on behalf of ELIZABETHAN, or that ELIZABETHAN was authorized to act on behalf of any entity in regard to the bid submittal. While not set forth in the bid package, testimony at the final hearing establishes that Jones is the sole owner of DSJ. Subsequent to the filing of the DSJ protest, Respondent determined to reject the bids of MASTER and DSJ as nonresponsive. By letter dated August 28, 1989, Respondent informed both counsel for DSJ and MASTER of this decision. As set forth in the August 28, 1989 letter, Respondent's decision to reject the bid of DSJ was based upon the failure of DSJ's bid submittal to reflect that its agent, Alan Taylor, or the proposed lessee designated in that bid submittal, DSJ Realty Company, had control of the property offered for lease to Respondent. The August 28, 1989 letter also stated Respondent's rejection of MASTER's bid due to a lack of control of the property sought to be leased, specifically control over parking spaces to be provided in conjunction with the premises to be leased. MASTER's bid submittal stated that the bid requirements in paragraph 11 of the bid submittal form requiring documentation of acknowledgements by any existing tenants of the premises (including parking areas) offered for lease, and ability of those existing tenants to vacate the premises, was not applicable. In response to the bid requirement for 65 parking spaces, MASTER's bid proposed 17 "exclusive" spaces on site and 48 "nonexclusive" spaces off site. An attachment to the bid response was a copy of a letter dated June 10, 1983, from the First Christian Church to a predecessor of MASTER, First Bank of Lakeland. The church, located across the street from the site proposed to be leased to Respondent by MASTER, granted "permission to the First Bank of Lakeland to use our parking lot for the convenience of their employees." Subsequent to the opening of bids and receipt of DSJ's bid protest, MASTER provided Respondent with another letter from the church reciting permission for MASTER to use 48 spaces within the church parking lot for the parking of Respondent's employees and clients, provided that the church reserved the right to use those spaces at any time upon the giving of one week's written notice to MASTER. The church also reserved the right to cancel the agreement at any time upon the giving of 60 days written notice. The letter was dated May 15, 1989. Also, as established at the final hearing, yet another letter was sent to MASTER's authorized agent from the church. That letter documents the rejection by the church of any "formalization" of a reciprocal parking arrangement with regard to the premises proposed to be leased by MASTER. However, the letter, dated July 20, 1989, restated the church's consent to the use of the parking lot by tenants of the premises proposed for lease by MASTER in accordance with its previous letter of May 15, 1989. Another letter attached to the bid submittal of MASTER, is also dated May 15, 1989. Directed to Respondent's facilities services manager, this letter is signed by an individual named Geneva Pettus as "[a]gent for First Master Lessors, Inc." The letter signed by Pettus references the 1983 letter from the church and states in pertinent part: We further guarantee your parking requirements during the term of the lease and will accommodate such spaces either within our own building or other locations if changes in the above parking facilities should occur. The MASTER bid submittal contains no documentation of authority of Geneva Pettus to act as agent for MASTER. Further, as established by the proof at final hearing, the vast majority of on site spaces controlled by MASTER are leased to present tenants or their employees. Remaining unencumbered parking spaces are inadequate to meet Respondent's bid requirements. The "guarantee" by Pettus, absent her lack of authorization to act for MASTER, is further invalidated by failure of MASTER to provide acknowledgements, as required by paragraph 11 of the bid submittal form, from the existing lessees of those parking spaces controlled by MASTER which would have to be vacated in order to comply with bid requirements. The proof establishes that MASTER did not have control of a portion of the property submitted for lease consideration by Respondent, specifically the proposed parking areas. Such lack of control is nonresponsive to Respondent's bid requirements. Notably, the May 15, 1989 date of Pettus' letter coincides with the May 15, 1989 letter to MASTER from the church. Respondent's facilities service manager, involved in evaluation of the bid submittals, was understandably concerned that this letter's existence was not disclosed to Respondent's personnel prior to August 17, 1989. The position of the church as reflected in the letter caused Respondent's personnel to reevaluate the issue of whether MASTER's bid demonstrated the requisite control over the property submitted for bid consideration and concluded that such control was absent. The DSJ bid submittal contains the notarized signature of Dale S. Jones, Jr., in the space on page 16 reserved for the signature of the bidder. His signature is followed by the title "PARTNER." That term is not further described, nor is a partnership or connection of that partnership with Jones identified in the bid package. At the final hearing, Jones confirmed his signature. However, the proof fails to establish that the required initials on each page of the DSJ bid package are those of Jones. Jones was unacquainted with the bid package submitted on his behalf, having merely looked through the package before affixing his signature. Further, the bid submittal form, on page 16, has a blank space for insertion of the name of the bidder submitting the bid package. The bid package submitted on behalf of DSJ contains no name in this portion of the submittal form. Page 16 of the bid submittal form also requires that the bidder indicate the name of the entity in whose name the subsequent lease is to be written, if that entity is one other than the bidder. The bid, signed by Jones and submitted by Taylor on behalf of DSJ, contains the statement that any future lease resulting from the bid should be titled in the name of "DSJ REALTY COMPANY as managing and Leasing Agent for Crystal Lake 301 and 302 Joint Venture." Also attached to the DSJ bid submittal package is a copy of an instrument entitled "DEED TO TRUSTEE UNDER TRUST AGREEMENT." By terms of that instrument, the fee simple title to the property and appurtenances of the site of the building proposed to be leased by DSJ, was purportedly conveyed to Dale S. Jones, Jr., as "Trustee under Land Trust Agreement dated June 15, 1987". By terms of the deed, Jones is granted specific authority to convey, lease or otherwise exercise those rights to property which are commensurate with ownership. The grantor of the deed, dated July 7, 1987, is Florida Southern College. The bid package of DSJ contains no documentation that either Jones or DSJ is authorized to act as an agent on behalf of "Crystal Lake 301 and 302 Joint Venture." Further, the bid package of DSJ offers no explanation as to the identity of this entity. As established by Jones' testimony at hearing, the entities "Dale S. Jones, Trustee" and DSJ Realty, Inc., are not interrelated businesses. The DSJ bid submittal further contains no documentation of authority for ELIZABETHAN or Taylor to act as an agent on behalf of "Crystal Lake 301 and 302 Joint Venture." It is found that the bid submittal of DSJ is nonresponsive to the requirements of Respondent's ITB. In response to Respondent's letter rejecting the bids of Petitioners, counsel for both parties filed petitions dated September 8, 1989, protesting the decision and requesting administrative proceedings. The petition filed on behalf of DSJ, ELIZABETHAN, and Dale S. Jones, as Trustee, was entitled "PETITION FOR FORMAL HEARING AND FORMAL BID PROTEST" and alleges the submitting bidder to be ELIZABETHAN. The document, in support of the July 12, 1989 protest of the bid award to MASTER, sets forth specific grounds for that protest. Further, it is alleged in the petition that DSJ was appointed to act as the agent of Dale S. Jones, as trustee, in appointing ELIZABETHAN as his agent. It is found that these allegations, with regard to the identity of the submitting bidder, are not supported by any competent substantial proof; that Dale S. Jones, as trustee was not a submitting bidder; and that ELIZABETHAN was not a submitting bidder. Each petition filed in opposition to Respondent's August 28, 1989 rejection letter, was accompanied by a $5,000 cashier's check payable to Respondent. MASTER subsequently substituted this check with a surety bond. DSJ's July 12, 1989 protest of the bid award was not accompanied by any bond.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the bids of MASTER and DSJ to be unresponsive; finding the cancellation of the award to MASTER to be justified; dismissing ELIZABETHAN and Dale S. Jones, as trustee, as petitioners in this proceeding; and rejecting all bids. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner Master's Proposed Findings. Petitioner MASTER's proposed findings consisted of 21 pages encompassing unnumbered paragraphs dealing with an intertwined mixture of legal conclusions, argument and proposed factual findings. Therefore, MASTER's submission cannot be treated by the Hearing Officer in this appendix on an individualized basis for each proposed finding. However, MASTER's submission has been reviewed and addressed, where possible, by the findings of fact set forth in this recommended order. Otherwise, all disputed issues of material fact have been addressed by the evidence adduced at the hearing held in this cause. Petitioner DSJ's Proposed Findings. Addressed in substance, remainder rejected as unnecessary. Rejected, unsupported by the evidence. Addressed in substance. Rejected, unnecessary to result. 7.-1I. Adopted in substance. Rejected, unsupported by the evidence. Addressed in substance. Adopted by reference. Adopted in substance. 16.-21. Not relevant inasmuch as Jones, in an individual capacity or the legal capacity of trustee or partner, was not a bidder. 22.-23. Adopted in substance. Rejected, legal conclusion, relevancy. Addressed in substance. 26 Rejected, not supported by the evidence. Taylor was authorized to act on behalf of DSJ Realty, Inc., by the corporate president. 27.-28. Rejected, not supported by the evidence; no evidence that Jones was a bidder. 29.-32. Rejected as unnecessary in view of result. 33.-42. Adopted in substance. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1-12. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Farley, Esq. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 4000 West Buffalo Avenue 5th Floor, Room 500 Tampa, FL 33614 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, Esq. General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Bruce Marger, Esq. 1700 66th Street, North Suite 501 St. Petersburg, FL 33710 David H. Simmons, Esq. 120 South Orange Avenue P.O. Box 67 Orlando, FL 32602 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact In May, 1987, the Department contracted with B.P. Associates, then owner of the Bay Plaza facility, to lease space at that facility located in Brandon, Florida. A part of the bid conditions required extensive physical renovations of the facility which were being supervised by Coldwell Banker, a real estate brokerage and management firm serving as property manager and construction supervisor. Construction was begun in December, 1987. Mr. Burrwood Yost was hired by the Department as its Facilities Services Manager for the Tampa Region in March, 1988. Mr. Yost soon became dissatisfied with the work being accomplished under Coldwell Banker's supervision and the company's responsiveness to maintenance problems arising at the facility, which the Department had asked to be corrected. As a result of this dissatisfaction with Coldwell Banker's demonstrated inability to properly perform, Mr. Yost recommended that the bid award to B.P. Associates be withdrawn and that the procurement be relet. On June 17, 1988, the bid award to B.P. Associates was withdrawn. On June 1, 1988, however, shortly before the withdrawal of the prior award, ownership of Bay Plaza was transferred to Northern which immediately substituted a new property manager and construction supervisor for Coldwell Banker. The new management firm was Grubb and Ellis, which took over on September 1, 1988. New bids were solicited by invitation to bid on July 15, 1988 which called for approximately 27,122 square feet of leased space to be available by April 1, 1989. The bid invitation clearly stated that "all bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated in the bid submittal form." This form outlined the bid procedure, listing award factors to be considered and specifying the precise amount of weight each factor would be given. Past performance was not listed as a basis for evaluation on the bid invitation form and Mr. Yost admits that past performance was not to be considered as a factor. Five bids were received of which three were deemed responsive. These were Bidder C, Northern; Bidder D, Turner Development Corporation; and Bidder E, Alderwood B. Northern's bid was the lowest of the three responsive bids by more than $2.00 per square foot over the life of the lease. Alderwood was the second lowest. Each of the bids was evaluated by a bid evaluation committee consisting of seven representatives from the various Department program offices that were to occupy the leased space. The chairman of the committee, Ms. Chipman, was placed thereon at the request of Mr. Yost, and was actually a supernumerary since the committee a originally constituted by Mr. Akridge, the Department's Facilities Services Manager Assistant in Tampa, was made up of only six members. A 100 point bid evaluation scale, which was included in the bid package furnished to each bidder, was to be utilized by the committee to evaluate each bid. Prior to beginning their evaluation duties, the committee members were walked through each proposed site, and in the briefing given by Department authorities, specifically advised that prior performance was not a criteria and should not be considered. When the committee members' evaluations were computed, Northern's bid for Bay Plaza received a score of 83.5. Alderwood's bid for its property was given a score of 87.9. Each evaluator rated Alderwood highest and the evaluation committee concluded that, consistent with the overall criteria which called for the lease to be awarded to the lowest and best bid that met program needs, Alderwood's bid was lowest and best. Consequently, the committee recommended that Alderwood receive the award even though Northern's bid for Bay Plaza was lowest in terms of total dollars involved. The bids were evaluated based on three major evaluation criteria. These were Fiscal Costs, Location, and Facility. The Fiscal Cost element was further broken down into three subcategories; rental rates, renewal rates, and moving costs. Northern received 25 points of the 25 available for rental rates because it offered the lowest rental rate. When reduced to present value, Northern's bid for the entire term of the lease was more than $600,000.00 below the next lowest bid and for the first nine years of the lease alone, was $336,799.00 lower. Alderwood was awarded 21.5 points for its rental rate submission. In the area of renewal rates, Northern was awarded 7 of 7 possible points and Alderwood was awarded 2. These awards were not computed by the committee or assigned by them. Instead, the scores were computed on the basis of a present value analysis accomplished in Tallahassee and were entered on the score sheet by Mr. Akridge, the Department's local supervisor for this procurement. Considering the moving costs, however, Alderwood outscored Northern by 3 to 2.7 points. This difference was attributed to an additional moving cost for the Bay Plaza site as opposed to the one move cost if the Alderwood site were chosen. To have the rehabilitation work done at Bay Plaza would have required a move to another location while the work was being done and another move back when it was finished. In the Alderwood case, the Department would move only once. The "Location" criteria also had three subcategories for consideration. They were, general area, in which both bidders received the maximum 10 points; public transportation at 5 points, and environmental factors at 15 points. In the area of public transportation, Alderwood received the full 5 points with Northern receiving 1.1. Department personnel considered the fact that bus service was available through the site at Alderwood, the stop being within wheelchair and walking distance of the building, as being more significant and of higher value than the proposed bus service envisioned in 1989 for Northern's facility which, at the time of the bidding, was not served by a bus. Bus company officials stated an intention to provide bus service to the area in the future. The environmental factors subcategory related to the physical characteristics of the building and the surrounding area and the effect of these factors on the "efficient and economical conduct of Department operations." In this subcategory, Alderwood received a higher score than did Northern's building because the committee was of the opinion the Alderwood facility would be more energy efficient. Current Department occupants of Northern's facility at Bay Plaza contended that because of the large expanses of glass, there would be more heat generated in the building in the afternoon. No official energy efficiency assessment was done of either building because both occupied less than 20,000 square feet. Consequently, the committee analysis here was based on the experience of some committee members and was neither scientific nor professional. The committee was also concerned with the potential for theft because of the large amounts of glass and was of the opinion that the Bay Plaza layout was "confusing." Neither of these judgements carry much weight, however. Another environmental factor considered by the committee concerned the parking availability at each facility. The committee was of the opinion that the layout at Northern's facility was not good. It was long and extended. Staff also was concerned that the several access doors to the Northern facility could cause clients to become confused. More important, however, was their concern that due to the several entrances to the building, it would be difficult to control entry. Alderwood's facility, on the other hand, provided a central entrance for each building and it was felt this would allow tighter security control for the safety of the building occupants. The committee was also impressed by the fact that Alderwood's facility provided a play area for clients' children, and felt that Alderwood's landscaping was more appealing. The rating of Alderwood's handicap access as high, is important. Turning to the third major bid criterion, Facility, Northern's facility was awarded 16.3 points of a possible 20 for layout/utilization while Alderwood's was awarded 18.7 points. For the subcategory, single building, Northern's facility received 6.7 points out a possible 10 and Alderwood's facility was awarded 8.1. As for the final subcategory, street level, both facilities were awarded 5 points. As for layout/utilization, one committee member, Chipman, awarded Alderwood more points because it provided a separate entrance for each program, because it provided covered walkways for weather protection, and because there was less of a "maze" effect in that facility due to its square configuration. This last factor was of concern to other committee members who rejected the idea of clients having to walk through offices to get to the different programs. The wider hallways and better access for handicapped, as was stated previously, were also considered positive factors for Alderwood. Neither facility offered the single building which was a desired characteristic, Mr. Akridge, however, advised the committee in his preparatory briefing that since neither bidder offered a single building facility, the committee could award points on the layout of the multi-unit facility based on the relationship of the individual components to each other. At least two committee members, Chipman and Collins, rated Alderwood's facility better and awarded more points because they felt the layout of that facility allowed a more advantageous grouping of programs within the units. There is substantial evidence, however, that the information furnished the committee was neither complete nor in all cases accurate. Once the committee completed its evaluation, Mr. Akridge tabulated the scores and prepared a "request for bid award" letter dated September 21, 1988 for transmittal to Department officials in Tallahassee. The letter was prepared to report the committee recommendation for the award to Alderwood and to explain why the recommendation was made to award to that bidder as opposed to the low bidder. Review of this letter clearly reflects that Mr. Akridge and the committee were concerned with past performance at the Bay Plaza facility. When Mr. George Smith, a senior management analyst for the Department in Tallahassee received Mr. Akridge's letter, recognizing the possible appearance of consideration of an improper factor, he requested that Mr. Akridge seek and provide more justification for the committee's findings. While Mr. Smith contends he did this because of his concern over costs, the fact remains that Akridge's letter of September 21 did mention past performance which was an invalid consideration. Mr. Smith asked Mr. Akridge to prepare another memo giving additional information about such things as bus service, the difference in rental rates, the building layouts and locations and those factors which the users of the proposed facility, those individuals who were on the committee from the using organization, felt were important to them in the effective accomplishment of their jobs. Mr. Smith clearly indicated he recognized that past performance is not a valid point for consideration and that it would play no part in his analysis of the bids preparatory to making final recommendation for award. In response to Mr. Smith's direction, Mr. Akridge prepared another memorandum dated September 30, 1988. Though by far the greatest portion of this memo is a detailed comparison of the two facilities and the concerns of the committee regarding them, the first paragraph, (1 A) refers to the failure of the former leasing agent to obtain state fire marshal approval and a reference to concern that in light of the fact that Northern is an absentee owner, there might well be a return to slow response times experienced under the prior management contract. Though Mr. Smith recognized that the September 30 memorandum again made reference to prior performance, experienced as he was in the procurement of facilities, he also recognized that "that was not a part of the evaluation criteria" and "basically, just disregarded that." Thereafter, the award was made to Alderwood. Petitioner contends that whether consciously or unconsciously, past performance of Northern's predecessor in ownership influenced the evaluation and bid review process thereby placing Northern at a competitive disadvantage to Alderwood. There is evidence in the record to indicate this conclusion, may be justified. Mr. Yost, the Facilities Services Manager, admits that he was dissatisfied with the performance of the prior management of the Bay Plaza facility and it was because of this dissatisfaction that the decision was made to recommend withdrawal of the prior award and a new bid invitation. Though he claims he deliberately kept himself out of the re-bid process, the evidence indicates that he oversaw it from the beginning and was present and/or involved in almost every part of it. The invitation to bid utilized his name; he attended the pre-bid conference and injected himself into the process by answering questions of bidders; he personally reviewed each bid upon receipt with Mr. Akridge; and, though he turned the committee selection over to Mr. Akridge, specifically requested that a nominee of his own choosing, Ms. Chipman, be appointed. Ms. Chipman, to whom Mr. Yost had previously spoken regarding his dissatisfaction with the prior Bay Plaza operation, was appointed as the seventh member of a committee originally scheduled to have only six members and served as the chairperson thereof. It is also significant to note that while the committee was in session evaluating the bids, Mr. Yost came into the committee room and met with the members while the deliberation process was going on. This creates a definite appearance of impropriety. After the protest was filed by Northern's agent, on November 8, 1988, Mr. Akridge, on behalf of the Department, met with members of the evaluation committee and representatives of Alderwood. During this meeting, the Department representatives explained to Alderwood how they wanted the layout of the facility to be accomplished and directed the architect who was present to prepare preliminary design plans. This appears to have been in contravention of provisions of a Department rule, (10-13.011(2)(a), F.A.C) which calls for the contract award process to be stopped until the protest is resolved. The evaluation criteria, found on page 16 of 17 of the Bid Submittal Form at subparagraph 1A, states that rental rates for the basic term of the lease, evaluated testing a present value methodology at a discount rate of 8.31 percent, would constitute 25 percent of the total evaluation criteria. This requirement was not appropriately applied in this case. The points included on each committee member's evaluation form for this category do not correlate to the present value rates furnished by the Department. Whereas Alderwood's bid was 21 percent higher than Northern's when reduced to present value, Alderwood received 86 percent of the rental rate points given Northern instead of 79 percent of Northern's points as it should have received. As a result, Northern did not receive the appropriate weight for its rental rates points as compared to it's competitor, Alderwood. In addition to the above, there are several examples indicating that points given by the committee were awarded based on inaccurate assumptions, unreliable information, or speculation. These include a failure to recognize that the windows at Bay Plaza are tinted; an inaccurate belief by one committee member that Alderwood's buildings are closer together than Northern's; a failure to properly apportion points by a committee member in the area of public transportation on the mistaken belief that Northern's facility would not have bus service; a mistaken belief that hallways at the Northern facility could not be widened when, in fact, Northern had agreed to renovate the entire facility including the hallways to whatever design the Department requested, (in this regard, Mr. Akridge properly advised the committee it should assume for the purpose of evaluation, that Northern would widen the Hallways if requested) ; the possible improper award of points for moving costs when no information on actual costs was available; a failure by the committee to recognize that major construction planned for in front of the Alderwood facility would hinder what the committee considered that building's better access; a failure to recognize that bid specifications required a security system be installed in any facility leased which would minimize if not eliminate the theft risk; and a lack of information regarding crime rates, police patrols, night lighting, and the nearness of police facilities to the buildings in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the intent to award lease no. 590:1853 to, Alderwood B. Partners, Limited, be withdrawn; that a new evaluation committee be appointed to review the bids submitted by the responsive bidders; that this committee be properly briefed as to the requirements of their task and the appropriate standards to be applied thereto; and that the Department thereafter issue an award to the lowest and best bidder as determined by this evaluation committee. RECOMMENDED this is 15th day of March, 1989 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalpachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5325BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. BY PETITIONER; Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence accepted and incorporated herein. Balance accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but more in the form of argument than as Finding of Fact. The paragraph is redundant to other evidence already considered. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and as to substance, incorporated herein. BY THE RESPONDENT; & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein with comment. Redundant to 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 17. Accepted and incorporated herein though 17 is redundant to 16. Accepted and incorporated herein as to the fact that bus service is planned for the Bay Plaza facility in 1989. Accepted with the exception of that portion dealing with Mr. Yost's having nothing to do with the evaluation of the bid which is rejected. Accepted but irrelevant. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted with the exception of the disclaimer of Mr. Yost's participation in the selection of committee members. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted with the exception of the last sentence which is not a Finding of Fact but a recitation of testimony. First sentence rejected as a recitation of testimony. The second sentence is accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as a recitation of evidence contained in Mr. Smith's deposition. Not a Finding of Fact. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark A. Brown, Esquire Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith, Cutler & Kent, P.A. Post Office Box 3239 Tampa, Florida 33601 Richard Candelora, Esquire Trenam, Simmons, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye & O'Neill, P.A. Post Office Box 1102 Tampa, Florida 33601 Jack D. Farley, Esquire DHRS District Six Legal Office 400 West Buffalo Avenue, Room, 500 Tampa, Florida 33614 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire DHRS General Counsel 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Respondent HRS published ITB 590:2306 for existing rental space in the central area of Brooksville, Florida. The bid solicitation specified a bid opening time and date of 2:00 p.m. July 17, 1991. Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted sealed bids. They were the only two bidders. Neither they nor anyone else timely filed any protest of the bid specifications, and therefore the specifications are not subject to attack in this proceeding. Petitioner received a notice of intent to award the bid for lease 590:2306 to Intervenor by letter from Respondent dated August 27, 1991 and timely filed its notice of intent to protest and formal bid protest. Petitioner accordingly has standing to bring this proceeding. Intervenor is the intended awardee and as such has standing to intervene. Petitioner submitted the property located at 7348 Broad Street, Brooksville, Florida, and showed in his bid submittal form that his proposed property contained 22,500 net square feet, with future expansion of 2,100 square feet available. When Petitioner submitted his bid, it included a floor plan, site plan, and a PUR 7068 form. A PUR 7068 form is a "Public Entity Crime Certification Statement," a sworn statement under Section 287.133(a) F.S. The ITB included two separate requirements for bidders to establish that they have control over the property that they submit to HRS. HRS' purposes in requiring bidders to demonstrate control are to prevent bids based on total speculation, to establish a reasonable expectation that the bidder can meet his obligations if awarded the bid, and to establish a reasonable expectation that the property can be occupied on time. Item 1 on page 3 provides as follows: Control of property - This pertains to both the structure(s) and proposed parking areas. To submit a responsive bid, a prospective lessor must meet one of the following qualifications: a.) Be the owner of record of the facility and parking areas (submit copy of deed). b.) Be the lessee of space being proposed and present with bid, a copy of lease with documen- tation of authorization to sublease the facility and parking areas through the base lease term and all renewal option periods. c.) Submit documentation of an option to purchase the facility and/or parking areas. d.) Submit documentation of an option to lease the facility with authorization to in turn, sublease. Any lease must encompass the entire time period of the basic lease and any renewal option periods as required the state. e.) Submit form PUR. 7068 Sworn Statement of Public Entity Crimes (Attachment H). Page 12 provides, in part, as follows: In order for a bid proposal to be accepted the items 1 through 6 must be included in the bid proposal. Items 7 through 11 must be included, if applicable. [Items 11 and 13 state:] 11. Documentation showing bidder as controller of property. 13. Public Enemy [sic] Crime Certification Statement A pre-bid conference attended by Petitioner made clear that evidence of control and the PUR 7068 form were two different items. Petitioner testified that he attached the PUR 7068 form as his sole basis for evidencing control of the building and parking spaces he submitted for lease, and acknowledged that, in fact, the form did not provide any information with regard to his control of the buildings or parking spaces offered for lease. Petitioner's assertion that his name on some of his site plans, etc. constitutes evidence of control is not persuasive. Such assertion is not in line with the ITB requirements or even common sense. Petitioner Proctor owned the buildings he offered HRS in his bid submittal. Petitioner offered multiple buildings separated by parking areas and driveways. The property offered by Petitioner was to have built an awning- covered walkway between buildings but the walkway would have to be placed through the driveway area of the property. The expansion area for Petitioner's property designated in its bid submittal was composed of approximately 10 gated warehouse units which would be converted to office space. Petitioner had leased a portion of the same premises to HRS for 15 years, and HRS was still leasing that portion at the time of the bid opening. At the time of the bid opening, another portion of the property Petitioner proposed to be leased to HRS was also already rented to other tenants, including a lease to the Florida Department of Labor which was not scheduled to expire until December 31, 1991, one day prior to HRS' proposed first day of occupancy under the ITB. The space leased to the Department of Labor would require some renovation for HRS' use, at least to connect it on the interior with the rest of the building. The remainder of the second, adjacent, building to be rented under Petitioner's bid would require more extensive renovation to create office spaces to meet HRS' needs. In addition to the Department of Labor, Petitioner was also renting space in the second building to a beauty salon, a book store, an office supply store, a clothing store, and a barber at the time of bid submittal and opening and at the time of the formal hearing. These latter tenants were on month-to-month leases. In order to ensure that there would be time for necessary renovations before January 1, 1992 and further to ensure that the property would be available for occupancy on January 1, 1992, the ITB required in the following unequivocal language that all bidders file tenant acknowledgments of the bid/proposed lease with their bid submittal: Existing Tenants: If the offered space or any portion thereof (including parking areas) is at present occupied or will be covered by an active lease(s) at the stated availability date, written documentation by the tenant indicating acknowledgment of the bid and ability to vacate premises by the proposed date must be included with the bid submittal. [Emphasis added] Petitioner submitted no tenant acknowledgments from any of his tenants with his bid to HRS. Even though Petitioner failed to submit evidence of control in the form of a deed and further failed to submit the required acknowledgments from tenants occupying the premises on the bid date, HRS did not immediately disqualify Petitioner's bid as nonresponsive. Instead, HRS evaluated Petitioner's bid simultaneously with Intervenor TCC's bid. HRS relied on old leases in its files and actual knowledge that monthly rent was paid to Petitioner for its own currently leased space, and HRS ignored the absence of tenant acknowledgments with Petitioner's bid. HRS followed this course of action despite the requirement of the ITB on page 7, item 1 under EVALUATION OF BIDS which unequivocally provides: Bids received are first evaluated to determine technical responsiveness. This includes submittal on bid submittal forms, inclusion of required information, data, attachments, signatures and notarization, etc. Non responsive [sic] bids will be withdrawn from further consideration. The portion of the ITB designated, Documents Required To Be Submitted With Bid Submittal For Existing Buildings on page 12, item 4. required bidders to submit "Scale Floor Plans showing present configurations with dimensions." Page 3 of 22, Item 9.(b) further required that, as a part of the bid submittal, bidders were to provide "A scaled (1/16" or 1/8" or 1/4" = 1'0") floor plan showing present configuration with measurements." Contrary to the ITB requirement, Petitioner submitted a floor plan scaled at 1/20" = 1', which also failed to reflect the present configurations with all measurements. Petitioner's scaled floor plan submitted with his bid was prepared prior to the present addition to one building and contained a hand- drawn configuration without accurate measurements for the northwest corner of one building. The term of the lease as shown on the ITB and Bid Submittal Form was 9 and one-half years with an option to renew for 2-5 year renewal periods. At the time of the bid opening on July 17, 1991, the bid submitted by Petitioner failed to have any proposed rental rates shown for "Renewal Options: Option II years 1 through 5." HRS permitted Petitioner to correct or supplement its bid after the bid opening (same date and place) to cover this material omission. Page 6, item 4 of the ITB provided for the property owner or other bidding entity to sign the bid submission. The pertinent part states: 4. Each bid submitted shall be signed by the owner(s) corporate officers, or legal representative(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. ALL BID SUBMITTAL SIGNATURES MUST BE WITNESSED BY TWO PERSONS. [Emphasis appears in ITB] Petitioner Proctor signed his bid submittal in proper person. TCC's bid submittal was signed by Sharon K. Lane, "Executive Director," of TCC Number 3 Ltd. Inc., Intervenor herein. At all times material, TCC Number 3 Ltd. Inc. has been a Florida corporation. At the time of the bid opening, Ms. Lane was TCC's sole shareholder and "all officers." At the time of formal hearing, Ms. Lane remained the sole shareholder, but others had assumed some of the corporate offices. Her status at the time of the bid submittal was sufficient for her to bid on behalf of the TCC corporation and to execute the PUR 7068 form on that corporation's behalf. Intervenor TCC submitted the required PUR 7068 form, but TCC submitted as sole evidence of control an undated, unrecorded "Contract for Sale and Purchase" by and between Hernando Plaza Ltd. as Seller and Intervenor TCC as Buyer, for the property which Intervenor was offering for lease to HRS. The best date assignable to this document is April 29, 1991. It was executed on behalf of Hernando Plaza Ltd. by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves as general partners of the limited partnership. TCC's obligation to proceed to closing under the foregoing contract was contingent upon TCC's securing an anchor tenant. However, the contract requires TCC to take steps to secure an anchor tenant. By its terms, TCC may purchase the property with or without an anchor tenant, but the contract requires TCC, in seeking an anchor tenant, to set time limits for the lease arrangement with the proposed anchor tenant which do not necessarily accord with the timing of HRS' bid process. HRS accepted TCC's contract to purchase from Hernando Plaza Ltd., as evidence of TCC's control of the premises offered by TCC for lease, believing it to constitute an option to purchase and the necessary evidence of control as required by the ITB. (See, Finding of Fact 6, supra.) At the time of the bid opening, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with a legal entity other than the record title owner of the property, which record title owner was and is the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation (Brown Foundation). See, infra. Up to that date, at least, Hernando Plaza Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as the owner of the property. The ITB did not require that an abstract of title be submitted with the bid, and HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contains provisions for future disclosure from successful bidders. (See, ITB item 5 under Requirements for Bidders to Submit Bids.) Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS attempts to protect itself by requiring successful bidders to put up an irrevocable letter of credit for one-half of one percent of the proposed lease rental obligation over the basic lease term as a penalty in the event a successful bidder cannot perform. (See, ITB page 4, item 10.) Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s certificate from the Florida Secretary of State expired December 31, 1981. That fact was advertised and the certificate cancelled July 16, 1982. At that time, Edward M. Strawgate was listed as a general partner and Harold Brown was listed as a limited partner of Hernando Plaza Ltd. Hernando Plaza Ltd. had been administratively dissolved for failure to file its annual report. Subsequent to the time that Intervenor submitted its bid proposal, but prior to formal hearing, Hernando Plaza Ltd. was reinstated by the Florida Secretary of State. Once reinstated, the limited partnership's ability to act related back and validated its prior actions. At all times material, the record title of the property offered by Intervenor TCC for lease to HRS was owned by "Harold Brown, Lillian Brown and Muriel Kahr as Trustees of the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation." This title is derived from a recorded June 30, 1967 warranty deed from Hernando Plaza Ltd., which deed was admitted in evidence at formal hearing. The warranty deed was not attached to TCC's bid submittal. Neither TCC, the corporation, nor Sharon K. Lane, individually, held any authority as agent to submit a bid to HRS on behalf of the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. There is also in evidence a recorded December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease between the Brown Foundation and City National Bank. That Amendment to Lease also was not attached to TCC's bid submittal to evidence control of the premises TCC was offering to lease to HRS. That Amendment to Lease also recites that Hernando Plaza Ltd. leased back the subject property from the Brown Foundation by a lease dated June 30, 1967. The June 30, 1967 lease was not recorded, was not part of TCC's bid submittal, and is not in evidence. The December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease goes on to recite that Hernando Plaza Ltd. has assigned its lessee interest under the June 30, 1967 lease to City National Bank by a March 14, 1978 assignment. There is also in evidence a recorded March 14, 1978 "Assignment of Lessee's Interest in Lease from Hernando Plaza Ltd. to City National Bank." This assignment was not part of TCC's bid submittal. The December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease goes on to further recite that the Brown Foundation has "agreed to give and grant to [Hernando Plaza Ltd.] an option to purchase the property." The remainder of the December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease details the terms or conditions of the option to purchase granted by the Brown Foundation to Hernando Plaza. For instance, in order to exercise that option to purchase the subject property from the Brown Foundation, Hernando Plaza Ltd., among other requirements, would have to demonstrate that all the terms of the unrecorded June 30, 1967 lease are "in good standing." One may reasonably infer that "in good standing" would at a bare minimum mean that the rents under the lease are paid current at the time the option is exercised, but what the other terms of the lease might be are subject to pure conjecture. TCC's bid submittal did not include documentation that the June 30, 1967 lease was "in good standing." There is also in evidence a recorded June 7, 1989 Trustee's Deed (quitclaim deed of the trustee's interest) from City National Bank's successor bank/trustee to Hernando Plaza Ltd. The Trustee's Deed also was not attached to TCC's bid submittal. On the date of bid submittal/opening neither TCC, the corporation, nor Sharon K. Lane, individually, held any authority as agent to submit a bid on behalf of Hernando Plaza Ltd. or City National Bank's successor. At formal hearing, TCC submitted an October 24, 1991 written hearsay statement by Harold Brown as Trustee of the Brown Foundation to the effect that Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s December 18, 1985 option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation was "in full force and effect" and that the June 30, 1967 lease back from the Brown Foundation to Hernando Plaza Ltd. was "in full force and effect and that the lessee is in good standing thereunder." Assuming these items may be considered in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.58 (1) F.S. as supplementing or explaining direct evidence, they still do not clarify in any way what all the terms of the unrecorded 1967 lease are or that those terms will remain in good standing on the date in the future that Hernando Plaza Ltd. elects to exercise its option, if it elects to exercise its option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation so that Hernando Plaza Ltd. may, in turn, convey the property to TCC, pursuant to Hernando Plaza Ltd. and TCC's April 29, 1991 contract for sale and purchase. Oddly enough, there is further explanatory hearsay that on October 24, 1991, Harold Brown was a trustee of the Brown Foundation and that he also was the sole limited partner of Hernando Plaza Ltd., although TCC's contract with Hernando Plaza for sale and purchase previously indicated Harold Brown was one of two general partners. Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation must be exercised by Hernando Plaza Ltd. before Hernando Plaza Ltd. can honor its contract to purchase/sell to TCC. Since there is no record evidence that the June 30, 1967 lease from the Brown Foundation as lessor to Hernando Plaza Ltd. as lessee will be in good standing on whatever future date Hernando Plaza Ltd. attempts to exercise its option with the Brown Foundation, one may only speculate both as to when and if TCC will be able to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza Ltd. TCC has only an option to become owner of the subject property at some unspecified date conditioned upon Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s first successfully exercising its option from the Brown Foundation and further conditioned upon all the terms of TCC's contract with Hernando Plaza Ltd. Apparently, TCC's only recourse to enforce its contract with Hernando Plaza Ltd. is a Circuit Court action for specific performance. TCC also submitted a site plan and floor plan with its bid submittal. The ITB required that offices on outside walls must provide windows. TCC's plans did not reflect windows in two sides of the building, but given HRS' retaining the right to partially design and locate its own halls and offices during the building's renovation, TCC's failure to show windows in the two outside walls is not, in and of itself, a material, disqualifying deviation from the ITB so as to unilaterally render TCC's bid nonresponsive. HRS staff member Donald J. Cerlanek prepared a bid synopsis of each bid. This involved completing a form from the HRS leasing manual which illustrates the characteristics of each of the bids. The bid requirements included evaluation criteria and a maximum amount of points which could be awarded for each criteria item. Five HRS bid evaluation committee members executed no conflict of interest forms. These were: Thomas C. Little Jr., David Thomley, Sylvia Smoot, Harvey Whitesides, and Mary Hawks. All committee members were given copies of the bid synopsis form to use in evaluating the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Some of the committee members did not obtain or review the actual bid submissions of each of the bidders, but all of them had access to the bid submissions and read the bid synopsis forms for both Petitioner's and Intervenor's bid submittals. The bid evaluation committee members, except for Mary Hawks, made site visits to the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Ms. Hawks essentially acted only as a facilitator or conduit for the evaluations of the other four evaluators as set out infra. The four site evaluators took notes regarding each location. The four site evaluators each assigned numerical weights to each item of evaluation criteria except for the rent and renewal rent portions of the evaluation criteria. Although on their site visits some committee members visiting TCC's site may have seen a color version of an artist's rendering of what TCC's project could look like after renovation was complete, a black and white version of the same artist's rendering was attached to TCC's bid submittal to which all committee members had access, and it is found that this situation in and of itself presented no false or misleading information nor constituted any prejudice to a fair bid process/evaluation. Likewise, although some evaluators discussed expansion prospects with TCC's and/or Proctor's on-site representatives, the evidence is credible and persuasive that each evaluator who visited the sites assessed the projects' respective expansion prospects substantially upon what they saw on each site and had experienced in Proctor's existing facility. The points awarded and reasons for the recommendations of each evaluator who visited the sites were reasonably based on specific needs of HRS. These specific needs of HRS were reasonably articulated by the two evaluators who made on-site inspections and who also testified at formal hearing and were reasonably set out in writing in the written notes of the two other evaluators who did not testify. Thomas C. Little, Jr., testified that he found the Intervenor's property superior as a result of the security problems at Petitioner's locations, the closer proximity of the courthouse, hospital, and health department to Intervenor's property and the superiority of a single building offered by Intervenor versus multiple buildings offered by Petitioner. Additionally, he found the esthetics of Petitioner's buildings lacking and expansion offered by Petitioner limited and was concerned that HRS would outgrow the space due to the fact that their service area is one of the most rapidly growing in Florida. His contemporaneous notes were to the same effect. Sylvia Smoot, also a member of the evaluation committee, testified that she found Intervenor's facility superior based on its proximity to the courthouse, hospitals, and other key locations, and its flexibility of design and concentration of space in one building. She further found Petitioner's location lacking as a result of the three separate buildings, its limited expansion room, and the necessity for redirecting clients between buildings, and the difficulty for elderly and handicapped clients accessing Petitioner's building. Her contemporaneous notes were to the same effect. Evaluators Whitesides and Thomley made substantially similar contemporaneous notes justifying their scoring of the two bidders. Three of the four site evaluators met as a group following the site visits and discussed the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. All four of the site evaluators made recommendations to accept the property for lease proposed by Intervenor, but they did not all confer and jointly develop a single recommendation to the facilities manager. The points assigned by each of the four site evaluators for the properties proposed by Petitioner and Intervenor were as follows: Evaluation Committee TCC Number Member's Names Proctor's Points 3's Points Thomley 75 98 Little 78 93 Whitesides 74 95 Smoot 80 91 307 377 The rent portion of the evaluation criteria was ascertained by applying present value methodology as set forth in the HRS leasing manual to the annual rents offered by the bidders. The discount factor was 8.32 percent. The present value of Proctor's bid was $1,934,038 and the present value of TCC's bid was $2,028,316. The leasing manual is considered advisory only. It advises present values be made, a determination of the difference in amounts be calculated and a comparison of the difference be made to determine a percentage. Thereafter, the percentage is applied to the maximum amount of points allocated for rent in the evaluation criteria. The lowest present value receives the maximum number of points allocated, and, thus, Proctor was awarded 35 points. TCC received 33 points, based upon the fact that its present value of rent was close to the present value submitted by Proctor. No penalty is imposed to a bidder whose rental amounts is higher than the lowest bidder. No benefit is conferred upon the lowest cost bidder over the next lowest bidder. Mary Hawks, Manager for Administrative Services, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, received each of the individual evaluation recommendations from Thomley, Little, Whitesides and Smoot. As a result of travel restrictions placed on the HRS, the four site evaluators and Ms. Hawks, who was also a fifth committee member, did not meet as a group following the site visits although three of the four site evaluators did meet collectively following the site visits. (See Finding of Fact 43-44, supra.) The committee members could have met by telephone conference call but Mary Hawks found it unnecessary to do so because there was such a clear evaluation in favor of Intervenor based on the total composite evaluation scores of 377 for Intervenor and only 307 for Petitioner, out of a total of 400 points. She assigned no points herself but approved their recommendations and forwarded a single recommendation in favor of TCC for ultimate approval by HRS management. Mary Hawks had spoken to the evaluation committee members subsequent to the evaluation and no member had expressed any reservation regarding his/her evaluation or a need to meet to discuss anything additional regarding the bid evaluation. The HRS Intent to Award to TCC subsequently issued. The evaluation process and formula for rent evaluation are not among the more commonly used methods but were reasonable and rational and fairly applied to the bids in this case. No conflict of interest in the evaluation committee members was demonstrated by Petitioner in these proceedings.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order finding that: The bid of TCC Number 3 Ltd. is nonresponsive; The bid of Derick Proctor is nonresponsive; Declining to award the bid for Lease No. 590:2306 to either bidder. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of December, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5963BID The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Proctor's 74 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted, except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the recommended order (RO). Unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative material has not been utilized: 1-3, sentence 1 of PFOF 4, 5-6, 9, 11-12, sentence 1 of PFOF 13, sentence 1 of PFOF 16, 17-26, sentence 1 of PFOF 29, 30-33, 35-36, sentences 1 and 4 of PFOF 38, 39-41, 44-54, 56-57, 60-61, 63. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute a proposed conclusion of law (PCOL) or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: sentences 2 and 3 of PFOF 4, sentence 2 of PFOF 16, 34, 43. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 10, sentence 2 of PFOF 13, 14- 15, sentence 2 of PFOF 29, sentences 2 and 3 of PFOF 38, 55, 58. PFOF 7-8 are accepted as modified because parts are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found and other parts are mere recitations of unreconciled portions of the record and legal argument. The following PFOF are accepted in part but not utilized because parts are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found, and other parts are rejected as immaterial to the dispositive issues herein, although correctly quoted from the record: 68-73. The following PFOF are rejected as immaterial or not dispositive: 27-28, 37, 42, 59, 62, 65, 67, 74. The following PFOF are covered in preliminary material: 64, 66. HRS 21 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the RO. Material unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative has not been utilized: 1-4, 6-8, 11-12, 16-19. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute PCOL or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: 5, 9-10, 14-15, 21. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 20. PFOF 13 is accepted as modified to correctly reflect the credible record evidence as a whole. TCC Number 3 75 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the RO. Material unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative has not been utilized: 1-31, 34-38, 42- 45, 47-48, 56, 58-60, 64-69, 71-75. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute PCOL or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: 32. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 33, 40-41, 53-55, 57, 61-63, 70. The following PFOF are rejected as immaterial or as not dispositive: 39, 46, 49, 51-52. PFOF 50 is not a sentence, but the subject matter is covered in the RO as understood. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas V. Infantino, Esquire Infantino & Berman Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, FL 32790 Ralph McMurphy, Esquire HRS District 3 Legal Office 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32609 B. Gray Gibbs, Esquire Sam Power, Clerk Bette B. Lehmberg, Esquire Department of Health and Suite 800 Rehabilitative Services One 4th Street North 1323 Winewood Boulevard St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Labor and Employment Security, acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in rejecting the bid of the Petitioners to lease office space to the Respondent on the ground that the proposed space was not "dry and measurable" at the time of the bid.
Findings Of Fact The bid specifications in the solicitation by the Respondent, the Department of Labor and Employment Security (DLES) for its Lease No. 540:0977 (office space in Orange County) required that proposed space be in an existing building "dry and capable of being physically measured to determine net rentable square footage at the time of bid submittal." The requirement that proposed office space in response to Lease No. 540:0977 be "dry and measurable," as described in the preceding finding, is a long-standing, standard requirement found in the bid specification form developed by the Department of Management Services (DMS) (formerly the Department of General Services (DGS)) for use by all agencies of the State of Florida. DMS' (and, formerly, DGS') long-standing interpretation of the "dry and measurable" requirement in the standard bid specification form is that the building must have a roof and walls, with windows either in place or covered over so that the building interior stays dry in adverse weather conditions. In response to the DLES solicitation for bids for its Lease No. 540:0977, the Petitioners submitted a bid for space in a former Publix strip shopping mall, formerly known as the Northgate Shopping Center, located at 5023 Edgewater Drive, in Winter Park, Florida. At the time of the bid, the mall was unoccupied and in the process of being renovated and was a designated construction site. The building had been gutted, and the glass in the front of the building had been removed. The glass could be referred to as "windows" but actually would make up the top two-thirds of the front wall of the building. As a result, without the glass, the front "wall" consisted of a three to four foot rise of concrete blocks, and the front of the building was otherwise open. There was a 12-foot, eight-inch overhang over the front "wall," but wind-blown rain could enter the building, and apparently did. (There was standing water on the floor of the gutted building. There also were missing or unsecure doors along the back wall of the building.) When Susan Early, the DLES employee in charge of the bid solicitation, received the Petitioners' bid and saw the photographs of the building required by the bid solicitation, she questioned whether the building was "dry and measurable." To help answer her question, she asked another DLES employee, who was located in the Orlando area, to go to the site, take pictures, and send a report of her findings, together with the photographs. The report and photographs indicated to Early that the building was not "dry and measurable." But, instead of relying on the information she had, she sent another, Tallahassee-based DLES employee to the site and received confirmation of her understanding as to the condition of the building. She then contacted Mary Goodman, the person at DMS who had the most experience in the area of soliciting and evaluating bids of leased office space, and who ultimately would be responsible for approving the DLES lease. Goodman advised Early that the DLES should reject the Petitioners' bid as non-responsive because it was not "dry and measurable." The DLES also rejected, as being non-responsive, the only other bid received in response to the bid solicitation. In the Final Order, The Koger Company v. Div. of Admin. Hearings, DOAH Case No. 88-3357BID, entered September 21, 1988, the Division of Administrative Hearings rejected a bid as not offering "dry and measurable" space because the building "had a roof, a slab, and walls, which comprised 50 percent of the vertical plane from the slab to the roof." The bidder's argument that the building "had a four foot overhang" and that "the overhang prevented rain from entering the building" was rejected as not being credible "given the large amount of window space which was not enclosed." The winning bid, which was upheld as being a "dry and measurable" was an abandoned bowling alley that "had walls, a slab, and portions of the exterior walls were boarded over, possibly in the location of existing windows or window openings. The roof did have a hole, which was approximately three feet in length and allowed water to leak into the building." (Citations to the record omitted.) The facts derived from the Final Order, The Koger Company v. Div. of Admin. Hearings, supra, do not in themselves prove that the DLES acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in rejecting the Petitioners' bid. Although the Petitioners' bid in this case was for a building that once had a certificate of occupancy, the Petitioners' bid in this case is more similar in other respects to the rejected bid than the successful bid in the Koger Company case. For example, like the rejected bid in the Koger Company case, the Petitioners' bid had partial exterior walls. The Petitioners proved that they also submitted a bid for the lease of office space in the Northgate Shopping Center in response to a bid solicitation by the Florida Department of Corrections (Parole and Probation Commission). The bid was evaluated, along with others, and the lease was awarded to another bidder. It can be inferred from this that the Department of Corrections made a determination that the Petitioners' bid was "dry and measurable." However, those facts alone do not prove the DLES, in this case, acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly. They only would prove that the two agencies interpreted the phrase "dry and measurable" differently. There also was evidence that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) interprets the phrase "dry and measurable" differently than DLES does. But it was not proven whether HRS would have accepted a bid for space having the characteristics of the Petitioners' bid. The Petitioners argued persuasively from the evidence presented that the requirement that bid space be "dry," as interpreted by the DMS and the DLES, can be impractical when applied to the real world of building renovations and may exclude possible good lease opportunities. Sometimes, space in a building under construction or substantial renovation can be leased at lower rates. Presumably for that reason, the Department of Corrections (Parole and Probation Commission) and HRS interpret the requirement differently. But, given the requirement that bid space be "dry," it cannot be said that the DLES acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in rejecting the Petitioners' bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Labor and Employment Security, enter a final order rejecting the bid of the Petitioners to lease office space to the Department in Winter Park, Florida, Lease Number 540:0977. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3922BID To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-3. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. It should be noted, however, that the missing "windows" in front made up approximately two-thirds of the front wall of the building. Rejected as not proven, according to the DLES interpretation of the "dry and measurable" requirement, that the bid space was "existing." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. It should again be noted that the missing "windows" in front made up approximately two-thirds of the front wall of the building. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected in part as not proven, in part as argument, and in part as irrelevant. It also should again be noted that the missing "windows" in front made up approximately two-thirds of the front wall of the building. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. In part, rejected as irrelevant and not proven. (Evidence as to the HRS manual and related facts was excluded as being irrelevant.) The rest is accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Irrelevant and unnecessary. (It was established at the hearing that the Petitioners' bid was rejected only because the bid space was not "dry"; DLES does not contend that it was not "measurable.") Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. In part, irrelevant, subordinate and unnecessary (what Mr. Taylor's definition is.) In part, cumulative. In part, rejected as argument. In part, accepted and incorporated (that the requirement that bid space be "dry," as interpreted by the DMS and the DLES, can be impractical when applied to the real world of building renovations and may exclude possible good lease opportunities.) Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. (Assuming it acts consistently from case to case, an agency's choice not to waive technicalities cannot be called "acting fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly.") Rejected as being argument and as not proven. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Except for the number of square feet, which is in error, accepted and incorporated. 2.-5. Accepted and incorporated. 6. Rejected as contrary to the findings of fact and the greater weight of the evidence that there were no walls in front. (They extended only about a third of the way up to the ceiling.) 7.-8. Accepted and incorporated. 9. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan Taylor 170 East Lake Elbert Winter Haven, Florida 33881 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle South East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Shirley Gooding, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle South East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn, Esquire Chief Legal Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle South East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue Whether Respondent, Brenda W. Smith, violated sections 475.25(1)(b) and 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2013),1/ as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute real estate licensees, pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent is licensed by Petitioner as a real estate broker in the state of Florida, license BK 534400. Respondent’s address of record with Petitioner is Post Office Box 15453, Panama City, Florida 32406. Respondent’s brokerage, Spirits Realty, Inc., is a registered for-profit corporation in the state of Florida with its principal place of business listed as 3812 Dolphin Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida 32408, and a mailing address listed as Post Office Box 15453, Panama City, Florida 32406. On May 31, 2012, Respondent, on behalf of her brokerage, Spirits Realty, Inc., entered into a property management agreement (Property Management Agreement) with Ronald W. Roberts to manage the rental of Mr. Roberts’ property located at 3803 Long John Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida 32408.3/ The term of the Property Management Agreement was for one year, beginning May 31, 2012, and provided: THIS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT is made on the 31st day of May 2012 and is effective 31 May 2012 by and between Ronald W. Roberts whose address is 3555 Walden Land, Acworth, Ga 30102, hereinafter referred to as “Owner” and SPIRITS REALTY INC., BRENDA SMITH, LICENSED REAL ESTATE BROKER, Post Office Box 15453, Panama City, Florida 32406, hereinafter referred to as “Agent”. WITNESSETH in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants herein contained, the Owner and Agent agree as follows: The Owner represents to the Agent as follows: (a) The Owner is the sole owner and holder of marketable record title to the following described property: 3803 Long John Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida 32408. The Owner hereby appoints the Agent as the sole and exclusive Agent to Lease and manage the premises known as 3803 Long John Drive. This Agreement is for 1 year beginning 31 May 2012. Agent to enter into an agreement for 1 year lease, $1000 per month rental, tenant to pay Jun/July rent in advance (non-refundable); & $1000 security deposit. The owner agrees to the following: Spirits Realty Inc. Commission of 10% of the rents collected in each calendar month (which shall be deducted from rents collected each month). Spirits Realty Inc., Hancock Bank, holds the security deposit (for liquidated damages) and advanced last months [sic] rent in Escrow. If Agent is not available, Jesse Smith, Admin, is authorized signer. 4. [sic] Owner authorizes the broker to secure tenant; and enter into a 1 year lease. Manage tenant relations collecting, give receipts, holding and disbursing rents to owner, serving notices, initiating eviction & damage actions. Agent will receive and forward $2500 check from tenant to Ron Roberts, for sale agreement of furniture and furnishings, on site. The Property Management Agreement was signed by Ronald W. Roberts and notarized in Cherokee County, Georgia, on May 31, 2012. Notably, the Property Management Agreement does not require advanced notice on the part of the Owner to terminate the Property Management Agreement. On May 31, 2012, Respondent and/or Spirits Realty Inc., ostensibly acting on behalf of Mr. Roberts, entered into a four- page residential lease agreement drafted by Respondent (Lease) with Allen Pridgen and Lori Roark (n/k/a Lori Pridgen), as tenants, for the rental of Mr. Roberts’ property located at 3803 Long John Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida 32408 (the Premises). The term of the Lease was for one year, from June 1, 2012, through June 30, 2013. Curiously, instead of naming Mr. Roberts as the lessor, the first sentence on the first page of the Lease names “Spirits Realty Inc., Brenda Smith, Lic. Real Estate Broker, Agent” as “Lessor.” The bottom of the first page of the Lease states “Page 1 of 1.” In addition, page four of the Lease submitted by Respondent as part of her Exhibit R-7 (which page was not included in the copy of the Lease submitted by Petitioner as part of Exhibit P-2) is signed by Respondent and Spirits Realty, Inc., on and below the signature line labeled “Lessor,” respectively. By comparing the signatures of the “Lessees” on the last page of the Lease (page four) with the signatures on the exhibit entitled “Security Deposit/Advance Last Months [sic] Rent Receipt” (Deposit Receipt), it is apparent that Allen and Lori Pridgen both signed page four of the Lease on May 31, 2012, as Lessees. As documented by the Deposit Receipt, on May 31, 2012, Respondent collected from Allen and Lori Pridgen a $1,000 cash security deposit, plus $1,000 as the last month’s rental payment under the Lease. The Deposit Receipt, signed by both of the Pridgens, as well as Respondent, provides that the monies collected would be held in a “non-interest bearing account Spirits Realty, Inc. Escrow” with Hancock Bank in Panama City Beach, Florida. Mr. Roberts signed a typed statement on May 31, 2012, printed on paper with a fax number, date, and time in the top margin, stating: “The four page Residential Lease on Long John Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida, is hereby agreed upon and approved by the property owner Ronald W. Roberts.” The next year, Respondent prepared a document entitled “Lease Renewal Agreement” (Lease Renewal) for renewal of the Lease for another seven months, from June 1, 2013, to January 1, 2014. The initial paragraph of the Lease Renewal listed the parties as: Lessor4/: Allen Pridgen & Lori [Pridgen] Agent: Spirits Realty Inc., Lic. Real Estate Broker The Lease Renewal kept all terms of the Lease in effect and provided that the Security Deposit and last month’s rent would continue to be held in Hancock Bank. The Lease Renewal also stated: That tenants shall pay a monthly rental of $1,000 for each month by the 1st of each month to Spirits Realty, Inc., for the Renewal Term. Tenants agree to give 60 days written notice prior to vacating property, Or give notice of intent to renew lease for up to one year. According to dates next to their signatures, the Lease Renewal was signed by Alan and Lori Pridgen on May 30, 2013; by Brenda Smith for “Spirits Realty Inc and Brenda Smith, Lic Real Estate Broker” on May 31, 2013; and by Dorothy and Ronald Roberts as “Property Owner” on June 4, 2013. In late 2013, the Roberts decided to terminate the Property Management Agreement and manage the rental of the Premises themselves. The decision to terminate the agreement was made a short time after the tenants had a problem with a water leak and a faulty water heater. Because the tenants considered the problem to be an emergency, they dealt directly with the Roberts, who, as owners, authorized the tenants to pay for the required repairs directly and take the payment off the rent. On December 1, 2013, Mr. Roberts spoke to Respondent on the telephone and advised her that the Roberts no longer wanted to use Respondent’s brokerage, Sprits Realty, Inc., for property management services and that they were going to terminate the Property Management Agreement. Ms. Roberts was present with her husband during the telephone conversation and overheard the discussions. During the conversation, Respondent told Mr. Roberts that they needed to give her at least a 60-day notice of termination, and Mr. Roberts advised Respondent that their termination of the Property Management Agreement would be effective February 1, 2014. The next day, December 2, 2013, the Roberts sent a letter by certified mail to Respondent, at her address, and to Spirits Realty, Inc., at its address. The letter was signed by both Mr. and Ms. Roberts, witnessed and notarized, and stated: Dear Mrs. Smith, Per our conversation on December 1, 2013, please accept this letter as a 60 day formal notification that we wish to terminate the contract we currently have with Spirit Realty for Property Management Services. As of 2/1/2014, we will no longer require your services in handling the property management for 3803 Long John Drive, Panama City, Florida, 32408. Please forward the security deposit that you collected from the tenant, Alan Pridgen in 2012 and are currently holding in an escrow account. You can mail it to Ronald & Dorothy Roberts at 3555 Walden Lane, Acworth, Georgia 30102. We appreciate your time and services since Mr. Pridgen began occupying the property. Although multiple attempts were made to deliver the letters, they were returned unaccepted. The Roberts made additional attempts to contact Respondent by telephone, but were unable to do so. By another letter sent by certified mail to Respondent dated January 16, 2014, Mr. and Ms. Roberts again requested in writing that Respondent forward to them the $2,000 identified in the Deposit Receipt. The letter reiterated the fact that in a telephone conversation on December 1, 2013, Respondent was advised that the Roberts were terminating the Property Management Agreement. The letter was returned unaccepted. Although the Roberts letters to Respondent dated December 1, 2013, and January 16, 2014, were returned unaccepted, Respondent’s own exhibit, a copy of a certified letter that Respondent allegedly sent to the tenants on December 11, 2013, acknowledges that Mr. Roberts called on December 1, 2013, regarding both the Lease and the Property Management Agreement. The first paragraph on the third page of Respondent’s December 11, 2013, letter to the tenants states: 1 Dec 2013 Ron Roberts called SRI [Spirits Realty, Inc.] agent saying Alan [Pridgen] paid over $900 in improvement costs having to do with the air conditioner and hot water heater - & Alan would not be paying rent due 1 Jan 2014 – SRI would not receive a management fee – triggering liquidated damages clause. Breach of lease. Lease – Agreement/relationship of landlord & tenant (real property) or lessor and lessee – specifes [sic] 10% rent compensation. Further, during her cross-examination of Ms. Roberts at the final hearing, Respondent acknowledged that she had spoken on the telephone with Mr. Roberts on December 2, 2013, and that during the conversation the subject of breaking a contract with a real estate person was discussed. While it is found that the telephone conversation occurred on December 1, 2013, as opposed to December 2, 2013, it is evident that the conversation indeed occurred. Based on the evidence, it is found that on December 1, 2013, the Roberts effectively communicated their desire to terminate the Property Management Agreement, effective February 1, 2014. Further, although the certified letters were refused, it is found that the Roberts timely asked Respondent for return of the $2,000 reflected in the Deposit Receipt. In addition to the letters that the Roberts sent to Respondent, after speaking to the Roberts, Ms. Pridgen prepared a letter, at the Roberts’ request, for her husband to send to Respondent, dated December 1, 2013, which stated: Brenda, This letter is to inform you that I no longer wish to continue my contract with you and the Roberts. I have been renting this property since June of 2012, the original contract was for one year. I agreed to rent the property for an additional 6 months which is now up. I no longer wish to continue this contract with Spirits Realty Inc. Thank you Allen D. Pridgen The letter was sent to Respondent by certified mail on December 4, 2013, but Respondent never picked it up. Shortly after her conversation with Mr. Roberts on December 1, 2013, Respondent called the police and tried to have the Pridgens evicted from the Premises. The Roberts explained over the phone to the police officer that they, not Respondent, were the owners of the Premises. The Pridgens were not evicted. Ms. Pridgen’s credible testimony explained that they did not intend to vacate the Premises, but rather planned to continue to rent it directly from the Roberts. As of the date of the final hearing, the Pridgens were still leasing the Premises from Ms. Roberts. To date, Respondent has not returned to Ms. Roberts, as owner with responsibilities over the Lease, either the $1,000 Security Deposit or the $1,000 Advanced Rent she collected from the tenants. Instead, Respondent has retained the entire $2,000 and characterizes the funds as “liquidated damages” for the Roberts’ wrongful termination of the Property Management Agreement. The Property Management Agreement has no specific requirement for the manner in which it is to be terminated. Nevertheless, Respondent transferred the $2,000 reflected in the Deposit Receipt into Spirits Realty, Inc.’s, operating account at Hancock Bank. Respondent argues that she is entitled to retain the $2,000 because Ms. Roberts did not make a timely claim upon the escrow deposit following receipt of Respondent’s expressed intent to keep the escrow monies as “liquidated damages.” Respondent bases her argument on the Roberts’ alleged breach of the Property Management Agreement. As there was no breach and the Roberts’ request for return of the escrow funds was timely made, Respondent’s belief that she is entitled to liquidated damages has no merit. Respondent also suggests that she is entitled to retain the $2,000 reflected in the Deposit Receipt because the tenants failed to give 60 days’ notice of their intent to terminate the Lease. Respondent’s suggestion is premised upon the fact that she and her brokerage are erroneously named as the “Lessor” in the Lease that Respondent drafted. Respondent’s argument evinces that she either has a misunderstanding of her role as agent for the Roberts, or intended to take advantage of her position in a manner inconsistent with her obligations under the Property Management Agreement. Although erroneously listed as the “Lessor” under the Lease, neither Respondent nor her brokerage was a proper party to the Lease. Rather, in accordance with the Property Management Agreement, Respondent and her brokerage were only authorized as agents for Mr. Roberts in dealing with the Premises. Under the circumstances, even if the tenants had breached the Lease (which they did not), Mr. Roberts and his successor in interest, Ms. Roberts, not Respondent and her brokerage, would be entitled to make a claim against the tenants as the owners and actual lessors under the Lease. Incredibly, at the final hearing, Respondent submitted into evidence a copy of a document entitled “Lease Addendum” dated May 31, 2012, which was purportedly signed by the tenants, Alan Pridgen and Lori Pridgen. The purported “Lease Addendum” provides: Lease Addendum 31 May 2012 FS 83.575, 83.595 breach, liquidated damages, and termination FS 83.595(4) Tenant statue [sic] contains two liquidated damages provisions allowing the landlord (Lessor) an opportunity to impose liquidated damages on the tenant for early termination or for failure to give notice of intent not to renew lease. Lessor, Spirits Realty Inc. will receive the $2,000 advance fees, “early termination fee”, out of escrow, if a breach of the lease occurs. X I agree as provided in the lease agreement, $2,000 security (an amount that does not exceed 2 months rent) as liquidated damages or an early termination fee if I elect to terminate the lease agreement and Lessor waives the right to seek additional rent beyond the month in which landlord takes possession. FS 83.575 Lessee is required to give 60 days notice of intent not to renew the lease or Lessor, Spirits Realty Inc will receive the $2,000 advance fees security deposits as “liquidated damages”. Spirits Realty Inc is entitled to 5% real estate fee at close. In addition, Respondent submitted into evidence a second document entitled “Lease Addendum” purportedly signed by the now-deceased Mr. Roberts. That second “Lease Addendum” provides: Lease Addendum 31 May 2012 I agree with the Lease Addendum. Spirits Realty Inc will receive the $2,000 security deposits advanced fees out of escrow if there is a breach in the lease. Spirits Realty Inc will receive 5% real estate fee when the property closes. Lessor is acting as a Transaction Broker to lease/sale property. Ms. Roberts and Lori Pridgen credibly testified during the hearing that neither they nor Mr. Roberts, prior to his death, signed a separate Lease Addendum. Ms. Pridgen testified that she would not have signed any type of document which essentially gave up any and all rights to the escrow monies. Further, Ms. Roberts explained that her late husband, Mr. Roberts, who had an understanding of real estate matters, would not have signed such a document. Moreover, the documents presented as lease addenda are suspect. The type font is remarkably different from other documents obtained on May 31, 2012, in connection with the Lease and Property Management Agreement. Further, the paper signed by Mr. Roberts on May 31, 2012, in which he agreed to the Lease, has a fax number, date, and time at the top, but the purported lease addendum does not. Finally, the signatures on the lease addenda appear to have been copied from other signatures and taped into place. While reviewing the purported lease addendum during her cross-examination by Respondent at the final hearing, Ms. Pridgen testified: Okay. First of all, this is not the –- this has never been seen in our paperwork. The whole time that we’ve been doing paperwork with you for all these years, this was never ever seen till Brande sent it up here in the paperwork she had. And besides that, the print is not the same as any of your paperwork. And also, you can tell by the signature that they have been copied and paste onto the amendment. If the – somebody will just look at them, you didn’t clean up your work under your tape before you put it right there. So you - - you needed to clean your work up when you tape something like that because we’ve done it before. You have to clean up your work, or people can tell it when you look at it. Other than evincing Respondent’s nefarious intent to justify her retention of the $2,000, the purported lease addenda are given no evidentiary value. The evidence does not justify Respondent’s retention of the $2,000. The evidence adduced at the final hearing otherwise clearly and convincingly showed that Respondent wrongfully retained the $2,000 identified in the Deposit Receipt.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, finding that Respondent violated sections 475.25(1)(b) and 475.25(1)(d)1. as charged in the Administrative Complaint, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $3,500, assessing reasonable costs pursuant to section 455.227(3)(a), and revoking Respondent’s license to practice real estate. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2016.
The Issue The issues here concern the decision by the Respondent to reject the bid of the Petitioner and others associated with the solicitation for lease space, Invitation To Bid (ITB) No. 1991:104, in favor of use of property held by the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact As early as March 1991, Respondent began to consider the possibility of leasing space off its campus to accommodate its postal services operation. This was necessitated by a lack of acceptable space on campus. The need to acquire acceptable space led the Respondent to enter into a lease agreement with the Petitioner for the period June 26, 1991 through October 20, 1991 for property located at 148 Four Points Way in Tallahassee, Florida. The expectation by the Respondent was that this emergency lease would be followed by a more permanent lease arrangement through a competitive bidding process. To this end Respondent set about preparing its invitation to bid through ITB No. 1991:104. In doing so Respondent followed all applicable procedures. Petitioner, among others, responded to the invitation and following evaluation of those responses was found to have offered the apparent best bid. The results of the evaluation were posted through a tabulation sheet. The posting took place on September 10, 1991. The preliminary decision by the Respondent was met with the notice of protest by another bidder, Grace H. Dansby. That protest was received on September 12, 1991. Before Respondent received the protest by Dansby on September 10, 1991, Lorilyne Gerato, who had coordinated the bid activities for the Respondent, had notified James Chason, President for Petitioner, of the results of the bid tabulation. Other bidders were also extended this courtesy of notifying them of the outcome of the tabulation. She told Chason that Petitioner was the low bidder, and Chason gained the impression that his company had gotten the bid. Gerato told Chason in this September 10, 1991 conversation that it would be necessary to wait for 72 hours from the time of the posting of bid results to see if a protest was filed and that a letter would be sent to Chason concerning the outcome of the assessment process and that the letter would not be dispatched before the 72 hour protest had expired. Having considered the record, it was not reasonable for Chason to believe that the contact by Gerato constituted a commitment by the Respondent to enter into a lease with Petitioner to the exclusion of rights and opportunities by Dansby to protest the preliminary decision finding Petitioner the best bidder and the Respondent's opportunity to consider its course of action with the advent of that protest. Dansby, in the person of counsel, made complaints about the bidding process to Dr. James Pitts, a vice president with the Respondent in charge of development. Those complaints were made known to John Carnaghi, Vice President for Finance and Administration, for the Respondent, who had overall responsibility for this project. Although Ms. Dansby in addition to being a bidder on this project is a trustee of the Florida State University Foundation, which is associated with the work Dr. Pitts performs for the Respondent, the affiliation between Dansby and the Respondent did not influence Respondent in its intended disposition of this case as a means to benefit the bidder Dansby. Mr. Carnaghi, who was responsible for deciding the course of action, given the Dansby protest, was concerned that the protest would not be resolved in a time sufficient to allow entry into the lease space that Petitioner was offering under the terms of the subject ITB. Knowing that the emergency lease that had been entered into with Petitioner, as described, could not be extended beyond its October 20, 1991 expiration date, he had great concern about where to house the postal services function once the emergency lease expired. He was also mindful that the emergency lease with Petitioner had been entered into after two failed attempts in locating other facilities for the postal services in that the space that he tried to locate in the other two facilities proved to be unavailable. Even before the Dansby protest had been filed, there was mention that it might be forthcoming, and there was the additional concern that Petitioner might protest if its bid was rejected. There was also the concern that the cost for the initial year in the lease period contemplated by the Petitioner was more than Respondent had expected to pay, notwithstanding the fact that the Petitioner's response to the ITB was responsive to the terms set forth in the ITB. Although the Respondent had not conducted a pre-bid estimate concerning lease expenses for the first year with exactitude, the estimate was sufficiently precise to demonstrate that the lease costs for the initial year called for by the Petitioner's response to the ITB was high, being in excess of $60,000 in a circumstance in which the estimate by the Respondent was in the $30,000 range. In the face of these events, it occurred to Carnaghi that he had property known as the Maples property which had come into ownership by the Respondent that might meet the needs for space for the postal services. Carnaghi had first seen this property and its building around September 5 or 6, 1991. The renovation cost to prepare this building to receive the postal services function approximated the initial expense for the first year lease with Petitioner. It was believed that the space could be prepared in time to move the equipment before the expiration of the emergency lease. In fact, the building at the Maples property was sufficiently prepared to allow the function to move into that location on October 17, 1991. In making the decision to reject bids in favor of available space owned by the Respondent, Respondent was aware that the postal operations were not generating revenue in the manner expected, an item of critical concern given that the postal services operation must earn its keep. Thus, the decision was reached to reject all bids in favor of use of space available that belonged to the Respondent. Having made the decision to reject the bids in favor of use of its space, the bidders were notified of this decision on September 16, 1991. Mrs. Dansby did not continue to pursue her protest. The Petitioner did avail itself of the opportunity to protest leading to the hearing and this recommended order. In addition to the individual notices provided to the respective bidders dated September 16, 1991, further posting was given indicating that the bidders had until September 24, 1991 to contest the decision to reject all bids. Gerato had called Chason on September 13, 1991 to tell him of the Dansby protest and the concern that Respondent did not have time to wait for that protest to be resolved and was going to reject the bids. Chason replied that he felt that the Petitioner was in a position to conclude the necessary improvements in the building called for by the specifications set out in the ITB, even if it were necessary to wait out the 10 day protest period, the opportunity given for filing a formal written protest subsequent to the notice of intent to protest dated September 12, 1991. Subsequently Gerato spoke to Chason on the following Tuesday, and Chason tried to convince Gerato that he did not believe that Dansby would follow through with the protest in that Chason did not think there were adequate grounds for Dansby to protest. Chason continued to emphasize that Petitioner was in the position to make the necessary improvements in the time frame specified and was prepared to do so. Gerato made Chason aware of the fact that the Respondent having had a chance to look further at the situation discovered that there was property available to the University unrelated to the responses to the ITB and that the Respondent was going to reject bids in response to the ITB in favor of the property available to the University. Chason had also offered to extend the time for using the Petitioner's property for 30 days beyond the termination of the emergency lease conditioned upon use of that property in the 30 days leading to a lease under the subject ITB as opposed to the use of the property to provide the Petitioner with an opportunity to prepare space other than that offered by the Petitioner. This offer was placed in writing by correspondence of September 20, 1991. Respondent replied to the Petitioner on September 24, 1991 rejecting that opportunity in favor of the Maples property as being the most cost effective alternative. The remarks in the correspondence by Al Gilligan, Director of Business Financial/Auxiliary Services, to the effect that at a future point if operational revenue projections prove accurate that the Respondent might seek considerable increase in space and would consider the building which Petitioner offered in the present bidding process through a future bidding process is not seen as an attempt to favor Ms. Dansby in some future competitive bidding conducted by the Respondent as Petitioner has contended. The fact that the decision to use available space belonging to the Respondent was a considerable reduction from what had been sought through the ITB is not seen as an impropriety by the Respondent in rejecting Petitioner's space in favor of its own.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which dismisses the Petitioner's bid protest and confirms the decision to reject all bids in favor of space owned by the University. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January, 1992. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact by the parties. Petitioner's facts: Paragraph 1 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 2 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 3 through 5 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The First sentence in paragraph 6 is subordinate to facts found. The latter sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 7 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 8 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 9 and 10 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 11 through 17 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 18 is subordinate to facts found, except in its suggestion that Petitioner had "gotten the bid," taken to mean that the rights of Petitioner and Respondent concerning any possible contract had been basically determined subject to finalization through signing of a lease. Paragraph 19 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 20 through 24 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 25 is acknowledged; however, the arrangements to make improvements did not involve the kind of expenditures that would occasion a claim of estoppel. Paragraph 26 constitutes argument. Paragraph 27--See discussion of paragraph 25. Paragraph 28 constitutes a discussion of testimony in its first sentence. The second sentence is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 29 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 30 is rejected as it attempts to describe a contract between Petitioner and Respondent. Paragraph 31 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute nor are paragraphs 32 through 35. Paragraph 36 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 37 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 38 is subordinate to facts found in the first sentence. The remaining sentence is argument. Paragraph 39 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 40 through 42 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 43 through 45 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 46 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 47 through 56 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 57 through 64 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 65 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 66 through 68 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 69 is rejected to the extent that it attempts to show that Mr. Carnaghi acted improperly in rejecting the bids. Paragraph 70 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 71 and 72 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 73 is the correct statement, but does not preclude the University from electing to use available space it had. Paragraph 74 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 75 and 76 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 77 in its first two sentences is subordinate to facts found, and the latter sentence is argument. Paragraphs 78 through 80 are subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 5 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 6 and 7 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 8 and 9 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 10 through 18 with the exception of the last sentence in 18 are subordinate to facts found. That sentence constitutes a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 19 and 20 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 21 and 22 constitute recitation of testimony and argument as does paragraph 23. COPIES FURNISHED: Edgar Lee Elzie, Jr., Esquire McFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly 210 South Monroe Street Post Office Box 82 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Gerald B. Jaski, Esquire Sonja P. Mathews, Esquire William D. Moore, Esquire Florida State University 311 Hecht House Tallahassee, FL 32306-4038 Dale Lick President Florida State University 211 Westcott Building Tallahassee, FL 32306
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Respondent's intended award of a lease for office space to Intervenor, Anthony Abraham Enterprise, is arbitrary and capricious and whether the proposal of the Petitioner, Adlee Developers, the current lessor, is responsive.
Findings Of Fact The parties agreed that on April 7, 1991, the Department issued an Invitation to Bid entitled, "Invitation To Bid For Existing Facilities State Of Florida Lease Number 590:2286, Dade County" This procurement was for the provision of 30,086 net rentable square feet to be used for office space in Dade County. A 3% variance was permitted. The facility was to house the District's Aging and Adult Services office which has been a tenant in Petitioner's building for several years and remained there during the pendancy of this protest process. According to the published advertisement, a pre-proposal conference was to be held on April 22, 1991, with all bids due by the bid opening to be held at 10:00 AM on May 30, 1991. The pre-bid conference was conducted by Philip A. Davis, then the District's facilities service manager and included not only a written agenda but also a review of the evaluation process by which each responsive bid would be examined. Petitioner asserts that the potential bidders were told, at that conference, that annual rental increases for the ten year lease period could not exceed five per cent (5%) and claims that Abraham's bid exceeded those guidelines. Thorough examination of the documentary evidence presented and the transcript of the proceedings, including a search for the reference thereto in Petitioner's counsel's Proposed Findings of Fact, fails to reveal any support for that assertion as to an increase limitation. The ITB for this procurement, in the section related to the evaluation of bids, indicated that pursuant to the provisions of Sections 5-3 and 5-11 of HRSM 70-1, dealing with the procurement of leased space, the responsive bids would be reviewed by an evaluation committee which would visit each proposed facility and apply the evaluation criteria to it in order to determine the lowest and best bidder. The evaluation criteria award factors listed in the ITB defined a successful bid as that one determined to be the lowest and best. That listing of evaluation criteria outlined among its categories associated fiscal costs, location, and facility. As to the first, the committee was to look at rental rates for both the basic term of the lease and the optional renewal period. The rates were to be evaluated using present value methodology applying the present value discount rate of 8.08% and rates proposed were to be within projected budgeting restraints of the Department. The total weight for the rental rate category was to be no more than 40 points with 35 points being the maximum for the basic term and 5 points for the option. Evaluation of the location was to be based on the effect of environmental factors including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the operations planned therefor. This included the proximity of the facility to a preferred area such as a co-location, a courthouse, or main traffic areas. This item carried a maximum weight of 10 points. Also included in location were the frequency and availability of public transportation, (5 points); the proximity of the facility to the clients to be served, (5 points); the aesthetics of not only the building but the surrounding neighborhood, (10 points); and security issues, (10 points). The third major factor for evaluation was the facility itself and here the committee was to examine the susceptibility of the offered space to efficient layout and good utilization, (15 points), and the susceptibility of the building, parking area and property as a whole to possible future expansion, (5 points). In that regard, the Bid Submittal Form attached to the ITB called for the successful bidder whose property did not have appropriate zoning at the time of award to promptly seek zoning appropriate to the use classification of the property so that it might be used for the purposes contemplated by the department within 30 days. In the event that could not be done, the award could be rescinded by the department without liability. The committee could award up to 100 points. The basic philosophy of this procurement was found in paragraph 1 of the Bid Award section of the ITB which provided: The department agrees to enter into a lease agreement based on submission and acceptance of the bid in the best interest of the department and the state. After the bid opening, three of the four bids received, excluding Petitioner's which was initially determined to be non-responsive, were evaluated by the Department's bid evaluation committee according to the above point system which allowed no discretion or deviation from the formula in comparing rental rates between bidders. Once Petitioner's bid was thereafter determined to be responsive, it, too was evaluated by the committee. At this second evaluation session, relating to Adlee's bid only, the committee scored the bid and added its scores to the original score sheets upon which the other three bidders' scores had been placed. Abraham had the lowest rental rates for the basic term of the lease and received the maximum award of 35 points for that category while Adlee received points. Abraham received an additional 2.29 points for the optional period rates while Adlee got 0. In the other categories, "location" and "facility", which comprised 60% of the points, Adlee's facility was routinely rated superior to Abraham's except for the area related to susceptibility for future expansion in which Abraham was rated higher by a small amount. Overall, however, Adlee was awarded 620.41 points and Abraham 571.03 points and as a result, Adlee was rated by the committee to be the lowest and best bidder. RCL, another bidder, was rated second, with Abraham third and DCIC fourth. Thereafter, the committee chairman, Mr. VanWerne, forwarded the new (and complete) evaluation results to the District Administrator on June 14, 1991 by an addendum dated June 27, 1991 which recommended award of the bid to Petitioner, Adlee Developers. No award was made at the time. Several factors not pertinent to the issues here caused that delay. Among the major of these was pending legislation which would have transferred the operation needing this space to another agency. This transfer was never consummated, however. On or before March 20, 1992, the new District Administrator, Mr. Towey, who had been appointed to his office in December, 1991, and who was made aware that this procurement had not been finalized, requested all available material on it so that he could study it and make his decision based on his own review of the submission. As a part of his determination process, he visited and inspected both the Adlee and the Abraham sites. One of the factors he considered was what appeared to be the significant monetary discrepancy between the two pertinent bids. Initial calculations indicated that Abraham's bid was approximately $835,000.00 lower than Adlee's over the ten year basic term of the lease. This amount was subsequently determined to be somewhat lower but the discrepancy is still significant. Nonetheless, because of that difference, Mr. Towey called a meeting with the members of the evaluation committee which had evaluated the bidders and had recommended Adlee. His stated reason for calling that meeting was to allow him to hear their reasons for rating the submissions as they had done and to take that information into consideration when he made his final decision. None of the committee members who testified at the hearing at Petitioner's behest indicated any feelings of pressure or intimidation by Mr. Towey. During his meeting with the committee members, Mr. Towey went over several of the evaluation criteria award factors to determine the committee's rationale. Of major importance was the issue of cost, of the availability of the facility to transportation to and from the building, employee security and the ability to control access to the facility, and the availability of on-site parking without cost to both employees and clients. It appears the Adlee facility is a multistory building with some parking available on site and would be easier to control. In addition, it is closer to public transportation access points. There is, however, some indication that on-site parking for clients would not be free and the closest free parking is some distance away. According to Adlee's representative, this matter would not be a problem, however, as adequate, free on site parking, which apparently was not initially identified as a problem, could be provided in any new lease. The Abraham facility is a one story building surrounded by on-site parking. In that regard, however, at hearing, Petitioner raised the claim that the Abraham site did not, in actuality, provide adequate parking because the zoning requirements of the City of South Miami, the municipality in which the facility is located, did not permit the required number of parking spaces to accommodate the prospective need. Petitioner sought and received permission to depose the Building and Zoning Director for the city, Sonia Lama, who ultimately indicated that the Abraham site was grandfathered in under the old zoning rule and, thereby, had adequate parking available. In any case, had this not been true, under the terms of the ITB, any zoning deficiencies could have been corrected after award, or the award rescinded without penalty to the Department. After the meeting with the committee, Mr. Towey indicated he would probably go against the committee's recommendation. One of his reasons for doing so, as he indicated to them, was the appearance certain amenities in the facility would give. In the period between the time the committee met and Mr. Towey was ready to decide, there were several newspaper articles published in the Miami area which were negative in their approach to Department leasing policies and this publicity had an effect on him. In his response to a reporter's question, in fact, Mr. Towey indicated he would not permit the lease of any property which contained such amenities while he was District Director. There is some evidence that the wet bar referred to here was a sink and counter used by agency employees to make coffee. However, before making his decision, Mr. Towey also met with Herbert Adler of Adlee. Mr. Towey advised him he was concerned about the fact that the Adlee property provided a wet bar, a private bathroom and some other amenities in that suite of offices occupied by the Department. Mr. Towey was adamant in his public and private pronouncements on the subject that there would be no such amenities in HRS offices in his District while he was in charge. At the meeting in issue, Mr. Adler made it very clear he was willing to remove all the offending amenities to bring the space into conformity with Mr. Towey's standards. Mr. Towey obviously took Adler at his word as he did not consider this matter to be an issue when he evaluated the bids. Based on his independent evaluation of the proposals, and considering all the pertinent factors, Mr. Towey decided not to concur with the committee's recommendation and instead recommended to the Department's Office of General Services that the bid be awarded to Abraham. Because his recommendation differed from that of the evaluation committee, under the provisions of Section 5-13, HRS Manual 70-1, he was required to forward additional justification for his position. In his forwarding memorandum dated March 20, 1992 to Mr. King Davis of the Department's Office of General Services, Mr. Towey listed as his reasons for disagreement with the committee's recommendation, (1) the lower term cost of Abraham's bid, (2) his opinion that the one story floor plan of Abraham was more convenient and accessible to clients, and (3) the provision for ample free parking at the Abraham site as opposed to the limited parking at the Adlee building. Petitioner claims that Mr. Towey's justification for disagreement was improper because, (a) the rental difference he cited was not based on the ITB formula and did not consider the difference in square footage offered; (b) the rental rate comparison compared a proposed lease with an existing lease, not with a proposal; and (c) the reference to on-site parking referred to the situation under the existing lease with Adlee and not to what could occur under a new lease. The major factor in Mr. Towey's decision was the price differential between the two offerings. While the difference may not have been as great as presented initially by the department staff, even taken in its most conservative light of about half that amount, and considering the appropriate figures, the difference was still considerable and significant. In the continuing period of budgetary austerity under which state operations have been and must continue to be conducted, the financial consideration loomed large in his thinking. As for the parking situation, no change for the better was provided for in Adlee's proposal and even if it were, it was but one of several factors. When Mr. Towey's March 20, 1992 memorandum in justification of his disagreement was evaluated at the Office of General services, it was determined that his decision was rational and objectively justified. Thereafter, by letter dated April 2, 1992, the Office of General Services authorized District 11 to award the lease to Abraham and this decision was transmitted to all responsive bidders by letter dated April 7, 1992. It was this action which prompted Petitioner's protest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the protest by Adlee Developers, Inc., of the award of procurement No. 590:2286 to Anthony Abraham Enterprises. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-2798 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted that the pre-bid conference was held but reject the finding that a 5% limit was mentioned. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted except for the next to last sentence which is rejected. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but not probative of any material issue. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 30. Rejected. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. - 5. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. & 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 25. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Melinda S. Gentile, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell 200 East Broward Blvd. P.O. Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Paul J. Martin, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol - Suite 1501 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Peter W. Homer, Esquire Greer, Homer & Bonner, P.A. 3400 International Place 100 S.E. 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 John Slye General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk DHRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Petitioner, Division of Real Estate, was the state agency in Florida responsible for the regulation of the real estate profession and for the licensing of real estate professionals. Respondent was, at all times material to the issues herein, a licensed real estate salesman in this state. He was issued salesman's license 0419038 and from August 27, 1990 through September 2, 1991, was an active salesman with Scarlett Faulic & Associates located in Indian Shores, Florida. From September 3, 1991 through September 30, 1991, he was a salesman with Arn Realty Group, Inc., also in Indian Shores. Effective October 1, 1991, his license became inactive due to non-renewal and remained in that status until he renewed it on April 16, 1992 when he affiliated as a salesman with First Gulf Beach Realty, Inc. in Indian Rocks Beach, Florida. From July 28, 1992 to the date of the hearing, he was an active salesman with Bobby Byrd Real Estate, Inc. in Clearwater. Sometime prior to June 13, 1991, Ted Plihcik, presently a resident of Coram, New York and formerly the owner/occupant of the property in issue which is located in Pinellas County, Florida, met the Respondent at a garage sale at Respondent's home. Because Mr. Plihcik intended to move out of the area, he entered into a listing agreement with Respondent on behalf of Arn Realty's predecessor, under which the firm was either to rent or sell the property. This agreement was to expire on December 31, 1991, and there is no evidence it was cancelled prior to expiration. Sometime after Mr. Plihcik moved to New York, he received a telephone call from Respondent in which Respondent said he had a couple to rent the property for the rental amount previously stipulated, $650.00 per month, from which Respondent was to get a commission of 10%. Respondent indicated he would take a deposit from the tenants and that he had a signed lease. Prior to his departure, Mr. Plihcik had started to make some renovations to the property's garage. He had redone the bathroom area and was planning to make another room out of the garage. However, he never got around to completing the job or to putting in the windows. He had decided to change it back into a garage, and in fact the prospective tenants wanted a garage rather than another bedroom, so he directed Respondent to hire someone to finish the reconversion. At Plihcik's request, Respondent got several estimates for the work which Plihcik felt were too high. At that point, Respondent offered to do the work himself. Plihcik agreed and gave Respondent authorization to use the deposit money to pay for necessary materials and consistent with that agreement, on September 14, 1991, by letter, Plihcik authorized Arn Realty Group to release money to Danley for the "alterations and repairs he is doing to my property...." Because the Isabelles did not pay the full two month deposit, Mr. Plihcik later revised the authorization to allow Respondent to use rent money as well, but he did not relieve Respondent from the requirement to turn any money received as rent over to Arn Realty upon receipt and thereafter get payment from the company. It is obvious that Plihcik was under the opinion that the deposit money Danley had received from the tenants had been turned over to the broker, Arn Realty. Mr. Plihcik tried unsuccessfully repeatedly to contact the Respondent requesting a copy of the lease agreement, copies of receipts for materials purchased for the garage work, or anything else pertinent, even sending at least one letter by certified mail, the receipt for which bore what Plihcik recognized as Respondent's signature. He received no responses. Sometime in early August, 1991, Deborah Isabelle and her husband rented Mr. Plihcik's house through Respondent and put up a [portion of the 1st and last month rent. They also signed a lease which called for rent at $525.00 per month but, notwithstanding many requests for one, never received a copy. Each time they asked, Respondent would say he would get them one but he never did. At the time they rented the property, the garage was under repair and, after some negotiation, it was orally agreed upon that the work would be completed by move-in time, September 1, 1991. At one point, Respondent asked the Isabelles to pay the rent in cash because it would be easier for him to buy the things needed for the repair work he was to do. They acceded to this request for a while, writing some checks to the supermarket for cash to pay Respondent, but got only one receipt. Because they were uncomfortable with this cash arrangement, they asked Respondent for the name of the owner of the property and he replied, merely, "Ted." On one occasion, mail for Mr. Plihcik from a real estate agency came to the house. Ms. Isabelle thereafter got Mr. Plihcik's New York address from the County records, contacted him, and asked him if he had received his rent. She received a negative reply. She also asked him about the lease they had signed and he related he had not received one of those, either. In fact, when she called, Mr. Plihcik didn't know who she was he had never heard their name. During that conversation, Ms. Isabelle advised Mr. Plihcik that they had not received any of the things Respondent had promised; that he was also asking them for cash; and was frequently at the house. Mr. Plihcik said he'd take care of it but no more was done. In November, 1991, Ms. Isabelle set up a three way telephone call between the Isabelles, Mr. Plihcik and the Respondent. During that call, Respondent claimed he was doing the work promised; that he had mailed Mr. Plihcik some money in cash several weeks previously and could not understand why it had not been received. The lease agreement, at paragraph 6, dealing with maintenance and grounds upkeep, purports to require the Isabelles "... to help convert 3rd bedroom back to garage in lieu of $650.00 rent." Though Respondent contends the rent was reduced from $650.00 per month, as was called for in the listing agreement, to $525.00, conditioned upon the tenants' help with the work on the garage conversion, there is no evidence that Mr. Plihcik ever agreed to accept less than the $650.00 per month rent. In addition, Ms. Isabelle claims they did not agree to do any work and the lease did not contain that provision at the time they signed it some 2 or 3 weeks after they moved in. It is found that Respondent's contention is without merit even though Mr. Isabelle did take down some 2x4's so he could install his tool bench. Over the period of their occupancy, the Isabelles paid Mr. Danley a total of $1,531.50 by check directly or by check written for cash and turned over, as well as an additional $400.00 in cash. Six hundred dollars of the checks were made payable to Arn Realty, and it appears they were deposited to that company's account. The balance of the checks and the cash were either payable to Respondent directly or, in the case of the Kash & Karry checks, written for cash to give to him. Of the $400.00 Arn Realty check, $300.00 was paid over by company check to Respondent for repairs to the instant property on the same day as the Isabelles' check was deposited to the company account. Respondent admits he received a total of $1,355.00 from the Isabelle's, either directly or indirectly, but claims all of it was used for work on the house. He also claims he is still owed $1,001.00 from Mr. Plihcik which includes $630.00 in real estate commission owed the broker. Nonetheless, Mr. Plihcik claims he received none of the money paid to Respondent, nor has Respondent presented any evidence to show the money was spent on either materials or labor for the garage reconversion. Mr. Arn, the broker supervising Respondent during the time is issue here claims he had no knowledge Respondent had obtained a tenant for Mr. Plihcik before he got Plihcik's letter. His records show a listing agreement for the property which calls for a rental commission in the event the property were leased by the company. In this case, the commission would be paid to the company, not the salesman, and would be deposited to the company's escrow account for later split with the associate involved. At no time would it be appropriate for the sales associate to collect and disburse funds without going through the broker and he would not do it that way. He did not authorize it here. Mr. Arn admits to having written at least one check to Respondent from money's received from the tenant for work to be done on the Plihcik property. He released that money only after he received a letter from Mr. Plihcik authorizing the release of funds to Respondent. All the money he received from the checks he received in August, 1991, in the amount of $600.00, was paid out to Respondent for repair costs. When he subsequently received a letter from Mr. Plihcik regarding cash which Respondent claimed he had mailed directly but which was not received, Mr. Arn replied in writing that he had not authorized Respondent to either receive or disburse funds directly. The Isabelles moved out of the house in either December, 1991 or January, 1992. By that time, Respondent had done very little work on the property. Some building materials were still on the property which Mr. Plihcik said he had left there. They are sure Respondent had not provided it. Mr. Carl Carpenter, a registered contractor and home inspector examined the property in question in March, 1992 for a potential purchaser. At that time, he found the garage in the process of being converted to a room. The framing had been installed as had the windows, and the sheet rock was partially installed. There was also a small bathroom which was not operating properly. It was his opinion that the construction was progressing from garage to room, and not the opposite. Mr. Carpenter was also of the opinion that to convert the room back to a garage would cost somewhere in the range of $600.00 and should take about 2 days. It would about double that to reinstall the bath. The bath he saw on the property was old. Respondent offered an estimate to reconvert the garage from a contractor obtained in August, 1991 which showed a total price of $1,606.00. While this is substantially more than the price cited by Mr. Carpenter, whose estimate seems rather out of line, cost is not the issue. The important part of Carpenter's testimony relates to his belief that the work in progress seemed more of conversion to a room rather than return to a garage and tends to indicate Respondent had done little if any work on the property. Ms. Sutton, the Division's investigator, interviewed Respondent 3 times regarding this matter and found his statements to be inconsistent. While he claimed he had done some work on the property and had not finished it, he could not give her the exact amount he had received from the Isabelles. He also gave her a list of what he had spent the money he had received on, but had no receipts from workers or suppliers to back it up. Mr. Danly claimed he had sent cash to Mr. Plihcik but denied receiving any cash payments from the Isabelles. He claimed he gave them receipts for what they gave him, but they have no memory of receiving any. Mr. Danley takes no issue with the facts as outlined by Ms. Isabelle except as to the remodeling of the garage which he claims is not covered by the restrictions contained in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. He claims that the payments made by the Isabelles were authorized by Mr. Plihcik to be kept by him as compensation for the repair work on the garage and not to be transmitted to Plihcik as owner because the work needed to be done and Plihcik did not have the money to pay to have it done. He also asserts that the lease was signed by the Isabelles with the requirement in it that they would help with the work as a condition of reducing the rent. He delayed starting on the remodeling until he got the money from Mr. Arn, which, at least in part, was as early as August 29, 1991. When he got that check, he started work. Originally, he states, he hired 2 young men to do the dry-wall, but the bathroom had to be framed before the dry wall could be installed. Then the water heater was installed and the power line installed for that, all of which he claims he did himself. The framing and closing up of the old door to the kitchen was done by Respondent with the assistance of a contractor. All of this, he asserts, was done in September and October, 1991, contrary to the Isabelle's claim that the only work done prior to their departure was the installation of some dry wall. Some materials were already in place but some of that had been damaged and had to be replaced. He claims he had 3 helpers to do all this work and paid them in cash. The sink was put back into its original position and he got the material to reinstall the toilet which he was unable to do because of back problems. Mr. Danley denies ever asking the Isabelles for cash or loans. He claims the only payments he received were in the form of checks payable to him or to Arn, and all money received from them was used for the work. He also admits to collecting the rent due in October which, he claims, was used for the restoration project. The only checks introduced into evidence not payable to Arn or Danley are 3 payable to Kash & Karry and of these, two are endorsed by Daniel Isabelle and one bears no endorsement at all. These are the checks which Ms. Isabelle claims were made to provide cash for Respondent at his request. Taken together, the evidence as presented by both sides tends to support Ms. Isabelle's story. Mr. Danley claims he did not finish the work because he could not find a door for the garage. He claims to have called many places but was unable to find a single garage door. A call to a Scotty's building supply store in that area revealed a single garage door was readily available, though by special order. Finally, he bought one from a builder in St. Petersburg for $235.00 which was paid in cash. The price included installation the following morning, and the site was already prepared. However, the builder never showed up with the door and he lost the payment. On balance, Respondent's account of the matter, unsupported as it is by any direct evidence beyond his own testimony, is found to be less than credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, recommended that a Final Order be issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission suspending Respondent, Paul Andrew Danley's license as a real estate salesman in Florida for a period of 3 years under such terms and conditions as are considered appropriate by the Commission; imposing a total administrative fine of $2,000.00; and imposing a reprimand. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-5598 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5. Accepted. 6. - 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. 9. Accepted and incorporated. 10. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. & 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17. Accepted but redundant with 4. 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. - 22. Accepted and incorporated herein. 23. Accepted. 24. & 25. Accepted. 26. Accepted but not material to any issue. 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. 28. - 30. Accepted and incorporated herein. 31. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. 34. Accepted and incorporated herein. 35. Accepted but mot material to any issue. 36. & 37. Accepted and incorporated herein. 38. - 40. Accepted. 41. Accepted and incorporated herein. 42. Accepted and incorporated herein. 43. - 46. Accepted and incorporated herein. 47. Accepted. 48. - 53. Accepted and incorporated herein. 54. - 56. Accepted and incorporated herein. 57. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. A - E. Considered more to be either argumnent on the state of the evidence or conclusions of law. Not accepted as a statement of fact as finally found. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Gilbert P. McPherson, Esquire 1822 Drew Street, Suite 8 Clearwater, Florida 34625 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Willis Phillips, may challenge the specifications of the invitation to bid at issue in this proceeding? Whether the Petitioner has standing to challenge the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' proposed award of lease number 590:2166 to the Intervenor, Rutherford Rentals, Inc.?
Findings Of Fact The Department issued an Invitation to Bid for Existing Facilities, lease number 590:2166 (hereinafter referred to as the "ITB"), seeking to rent office space in Madison, Florida. Responses to the ITB were to be filed with the Department by 2:00 p.m., March 6, 1990. Included as part of the ITB was a map of the City of Madison (hereinafter referred to as the "Map"). Joint Exhibit 1. On page 1, paragraph 3, of the Bid Submittal Form which was included as part of the ITB it was indicated that "[s]pace to be located in Madison, Florida within boundaries depicted in the attached map (Attachment B.) Bidder to mark location of site on map Attachment B." The ITB referred to the Map as a "Map showing bid zone boundaries." See page 4 of the ITB. The Map was labeled as "Attachment B" and included the following language at the bottom of the Map: "WITHIN CITY LIMITS WITH EXCEPTIONS OF UNDESIRABLE LOCATIONS AS INDICATED." The Map included two areas within the City of Madison which were cross- hatched. At the bottom of the Map the word "UNDESIRABLE" had been written in black. This word only appears below the larger of the two cross-hatched areas. The Department intended to exclude any office space located within both of the cross-hatched areas on the Map. The Petitioner spoke by telephone with Robert Smith, a Facilities Services Managers Assistant for the Department, prior to submitting a response to the ITB. The Petitioner initiated the conversation. Based upon this conversation, the Petitioner was aware that property located within either of the cross-hatched areas on the Map was excluded from consideration under the ITB. The property which the Petitioner intended to offer to the Department in response to the ITB is located in the smallest of the two cross-hatched areas on the Map. The Petitioner was informed by Mr. Smith that the property located within the smaller cross-hatched area was excluded as undesirable. Mr. Smith informed the Petitioner that he could not submit a response to the ITB offering to rent property located in the small cross-hatched area. The exclusion from consideration of property located in the areas within the City of Madison which were located in the two cross-hatched areas of the Map could have been more clearly designated. The Department's designation of the excluded areas, however, was not ambiguous. It was clear that the Petitioner's property was located in an excluded portion of the City of Madison and that the Petitioner was aware of the exclusion of his property. Despite the Petitioner's knowledged that his property was located within an excluded area, the Petitioner submitted a response dated March 6, 1990, to the ITB proposing property located in the smaller cross-hatched area. In the Petitioner's response to the ITB he did not indicate the location of his property on the Map. Instead, the Petitioner submitted a different map of a portion of the City of Madison which included his property. Rules 10-13.006 and 10-13.007, Florida Administrative Code, require that protests of the bid specifications of the Department must be filed within 72 hours of receipt of notice of the bid specifications. The ITB did not indicate that persons adversely affected by the ITB could challenge the specifications of the ITB or that any such challenge had to be filed within 72 hours of receipt of notice of the ITB. The following statement appears of the last page of the Bid Submittal Form included with the ITB and submitted by the Petitioner: I hereby certify as owner, officer, or authorized agent that I have read the Invitation to Bid Package and all its attachments, and agree to abide by all requirements and conditions contained therein. . . . This certification was signed by the Petitioner. The Department decided to award the lease to the Intervenor. The Department determined that the Petitioner's bid should be rejected because the proposed property was located in an excluded area. The Petitioner filed a Formal Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on April 23, 1990, with the Department. The Petitioner challenged the Department's proposed award of the lease to the Intervenor and asserted that he was the lowest and best bidder. The Petitioner did not challenge the specifications of the ITB. The Department filed a Motion to Dismiss on Mazy 4, 1990. The Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition and an Amended Formal Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on May 14, 1990. For the first time, the Petitioner challenged the specifications of the ITB.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order granting the Department's Motion to Dismiss and dismissing with prejudice the Formal Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by the Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX The Petitioner and the Department have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1-2 See 9. 3-5 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 6 6-7. 7 and 11 Not relevant. 8-10 and 12-15 These proposed findings are consistent with Ms. Goodman's testimony. Ms. Goodman's opinions, however, are not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although this proposed finding of fact is generally true, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Petitioner was not aware that both cross-hatched areas were excluded areas. See 9. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 2 and hereby accepted. 3 5-8. 4 7. 5 6. 6 12. 7 9. 8 13 and 17. 9 4. 10 12. 11 17. 12 15. 13 16. 14 18 and hereby accepted. 15 20. 21 and hereby accepted. 22 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. Cumulative. Hereby accepted. Copies Furnished To: John C. Pelham, Esquire Gary Walker, Esquire Post Office Box 13527 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3527 John L. Pearce, Esquire District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-2949 Clay A. Schnitker, Esquire Post Office Drawer 652 Madison, Florida 32340 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a licensed real estate salesman with license number 0364554. On or about August 13, 1982, Richard J. and Gav Greco entered into a lease purchase agreement with James C. and Phyllis Waid for residential property located at 1685 Markham Woods Road, Longwood, Florida. The purchase price of the Waid property was $190,000 towards which the Grecos made a $10,000 non-refundable deposit and agreed to pay a monthly rental of $1000. On or about November 14, 1982, the Grecos executed an Agreement with Respondent and his wife by which the Grecos assigned all rights and privileges relating to the lease and purchase of the residence at 1685 Markham Woods Road to the Alvarados. The consideration to be given for this Agreement was a payment of $10,000 by the Alvarados to the Grecos, with $5000 payable upon signing of the Agreement and $5000 payable within six months. The Alvarados, as assignees, agreed to abide by all provisions of the lease purchase agreement and were to make their first $1000 monthly lease payment to the Waids on December 4, 1982. Respondent gave Richard J. Greco a check in the amount of $5000 dated November 14, 1982 and requested that he hold the check for a couple of days before depositing it. Greco complied with the request, but was advised on December 3, 1982 that Respondent's $5000 check had been returned unused by Respondent's bank due to the fact that Respondent's account had been closed. Respondent has never paid the Grecos any part of the $10,000 due them under the assignment executed November 14, 1982. Respondent made no monthly lease payments on the property to the Waids. By letter dated February 25, 1983, James C. Waid notified the Grecos and the Alvarados that the lease purchase agreement was in default and that the $10,000 deposit paid by the Grecos was being forfeited because the rent was in arrears. The Grecos paid the Waids an additional $4000 on March 1, 1983, which represented the unpaid lease payments, for a general release from all obligations under the lease purchase agreement. Respondent and his wife executed a promissory note on March 1, 1983 whereby they agreed to pay the Grecos $10,000 on or before March 16, 1983, but no payments have ever been made pursuant to this promissory note. The Grecos brought suit against Respondent and his wife for damages arising out of this transaction, and obtained a Final Judgment on June 30, 1983 in Case No. 83-1191-CA-03-P, Circuit Court in and for Seminole County, in the amount of $15,101.28. The Grecos have not been able to execute this Final Judgment and therefore no payments on this judgment have been made to them by the Respondent or his wife. At the time of this transaction, the Alvarados were family friends of the Grecos. Richard J. Greco entered into this transaction with Respondent primarily because of the personal acquaintance and not because Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman. However, Greco knew that Respondent was licensed and therefore assumed that he was a man of integrity who would deal fairly with him in this real estate transaction.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final order be issued suspending Respondent's license for a Period of one (1) Year. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Hartmann, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson St. Orlando, Fl. 32802 Ignacio J. Alvarado 5166 Glasgow Avenue Orlando, Fl. 32819 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Fl. 32802 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Fl. 32301
