Findings Of Fact Mini-Warehouses At Kendall, Ltd., d/b/a A+ Mini-Storage (Petitioner) is a business located in Dade County, engaged primarily in the rental of storage space. Petitioner employs 20 to 21 employees and has been operating for 13 to 14 years. Petitioner's property on which its business is located consists of approximately four acres and abuts property owned by the Florida Department of Transportation (Respondent), known as Parcel 0739, which contains approximately .0986 acres. On June 28, 1985, Petitioner executed a written lease agreement leasing Parcel 0739 from Respondent. The lease terms provided that it was a year-to- year lease, automatically renewable yearly until terminated by either party upon a 30-day notice, and that the yearly rental cost was $2,400 plus tax. Petitioner leased Parcel 0739 from Respondent because the parcel provides better access to Petitioner's property from the rear and prevents water from encroaching onto Petitioner's property. The same lease agreement was renewed yearly until 1991. In 1991, prior to the expiration of the lease, Respondent notified Petitioner that a new lease form would have to be executed. Respondent provided Petitioner with its Lease Agreement Form 225-080-03, OGC-00031, dated 7/92 (Form Lease) for execution. The Form Lease was developed by Respondent's Office of General Counsel and the General Counsel of each of its Districts, so that there would be a standard lease form statewide with minimal review by Respondent. The Form Lease contains blanks to be completed by Districts to comport with their specific situations. The Form Lease dramatically changed the terms and conditions of leasing Parcel 0739. Petitioner attempted to modify Paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Form Lease, but Respondent refused to agree to any modifications. Paragraph 6 of the Form Lease provides: 6. Indemnification. Lessee shall indemnify, defend, save and hold Lessor, its agents and employees, harmless of and from any losses, fines, penalties, costs, damage, claims, demands, suits and liabilities of any nature, including attorneys fees (including regulatory and appellate fees), arising out of, because of, or due to any accident, happening or occurrence on the leased land or arising in any manner on account of the exercise or attempted exercise of Lessee's rights hereunder, whether the same regards person or property of any nature whatsoever, regardless of the apportionment of negligence, unless due to the sole negligence of Lessor. Lessee's obligation to indemnify, defend, and pay for the defense or at the Department's option, to participate and associate with the Department in the defense and trial of any claim and any related settlement negotiations, shall be triggered by the Department's notice of claim for indemnifica- tion to Lessee. Lessee's inability to evaluate liability or its evaluation of liability shall not excuse Lessee's duty to defend and indemnify within seven days after such notice by the Department is given by registered mail. Only an adjudication or judgment after the highest appeal is exhausted specifically finding the Department solely negligent shall excuse performance of this provision by Lessee. Lessee shall pay all costs and fees related to this obligation and its enforcement by the Department. Department's failure to notify Lessee of a claim shall not release Lessee of the above duty to defend. Under Paragraph 6, Respondent intended to limit lessee's liability to its (lessee's) own negligence or damages it causes. Paragraph 8 of the Form Lease provides: 8. Eminent Domain. Lessee acknowledges and agrees that its relationship with Lessor under this Lease is one of Landlord and Tenant and no other relationship either expressed or implied shall be deemed to apply to the parties under this Lease. Termination of this Lease for any cause shall not be deemed a taking under any eminent domain or other law so as to entitle Lessee to compensation for any interest suffered or lost as a result of termination of this Lease, including but not limited to (i) any residual interest in the Lease, or (ii) any other facts or circumstances arising out of or in connection with this Lease. Lessee hereby waives and relinquishes any legal rights and monetary claims which it might have for full compensation, or damages of any sort, including but not limited to special damages, severance damages, removal costs or loss of business profits resulting from its loss of occupancy of the leased property specified in this Agreement, or adjacent properties owned or leased by it, when any or all such properties are taken by eminent domain proceedings or sold under the threat thereof. This waiver and relinquishment applies whether (i) this Lease is still in existence on the date of taking or sale; or, (ii) has been terminated prior thereto. Under Paragraph 8, Respondent did not intend for the lessee to waive any of its eminent domain rights or relinquish such rights subsequent to the termination of the lease, which would be improper. Presently, Respondent refuses to lease the Parcel to Petitioner unless Petitioner executes the Form Lease without modification. However, at hearing Respondent admitted that it has no intention of requiring Petitioner to agree to Paragraph 8 of the Form Lease. Rule Chapter 14-19, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth Respondent's rules on right-of-way property management. Rule 14-19.002 provides that the purpose of Chapter 14-19 is to set forth standardized methods for, among other things, the leasing of surplus property owned by Respondent. In 1992, the Form Lease was incorporated by reference in Rule Chapter 14-19. Rule 14-19.0012 specifically provides that the Form Lease is one of the forms incorporated by reference in and made a part of Chapter 14-19. Moreover, Rule 14-19.013 requires the Form Lease to be used for short term leasing. Chapter 14-19 is silent as to whether the Form Lease must be used in any of Respondent's other lease situations. Rule 14-19.013, Florida Administrative Code, does not apply to the circumstances of this case. Respondent has a Right Of Way Manual (Manual) for statewide use. Chapter 10, Section 6 of the Manual, entitled "Right of Way Property Leases" and effective January 21, 1993, provides in its "Purpose" section that the purpose of Section 6 is to establish uniform procedures for leasing property owned by Respondent. Also, the Manual's "Procedure" section mandates the use of the Form Lease for all of Respondent's leases. Prior to this mandate, Respondent had no standard lease form for its leases. In October 1992, Respondent required the Form Lease to be used in surplus property leases. The Form Lease is applicable statewide and implements procedures and policies involved in leasing surplus property. Parcel 0739 is considered by Respondent to be surplus property. The Manual is silent as to whether the Form Lease may be modified. Since the implementation of the Form Lease for surplus property, Respondent's District Offices have modified the Form Lease but rarely. In the rare instances when modification has been made, it has been on a case-by-case basis and only with approval of the District General Counsel. Respondent's Office of the Right-Of-Way Administrator under which the responsibility for leasing falls has no authority to approve or disapprove modifications made to the Form Lease by District Offices. However, Respondent's Office of General Counsel does have such authority, but it has not exercised its authority in any of the District situations in which the Form Lease has been modified. Even though there have been modifications to the Form Lease by Respondent's District Offices, although rare, no District Office has modified Paragraphs 6 or 8. Respondent admits that Petitioner has standing in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact In November, 1990, the Respondent, the Department of State, sought proposals for the lease of office space for its Division of Licensing. On or prior to December 7, 1990, the proposal opening date, at least six proposals were received by the Respondent. Those proposals were designated by the Respondent as "Tallahassee Associates" (the Petitioner's proposal), "Crossland Agency" (the Intervenor's proposal), "Woodcrest A", "Woodcrest B", "T.C.S." and "DeVoe". On January 2, 1991, the Respondent posted a standard form Bid Tabulation indicating that the following scores had been awarded to the following proposals: Proposal Score Woodcrest A 82 Woodcrest B 82 Tallahassee Associates 73 Crossland Agency 85 DeVoe 54 The proposal of T.C.S. was not evaluated by the Respondent because it was determined to be non-responsive. The Respondent also posted a copy of a memorandum dated January 2, 1991, with the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation. The memorandum was from John M. Russi, Director of the Division of Licensing, to Ira Chester, Chief of the Bureau of General Services. Mr. Russi indicated in the memorandum that the Intervenor would be awarded the lease. Attached to Mr. Russi's January 2, 1991, memorandum was a Lease Evaluation Worksheet which indicated the scores which had been awarded by the evaluation committee to the responsive bidders for each of the criteria to be considered in determining the winning bidder. Printed at the top-center of the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation was the following notice: FAILURE TO FILE A PROTEST WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 120.53(5), FLORIDA STATUTES, SHALL CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER CHAPTER 120, FLORIDA STATUTES. . . . The January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation was posted at 1:00 p.m., January 2, 1991. Therefore, pursuant to Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, any bidder desiring to contest the Respondent's proposed award of the lease was required to file a notice of protest with the Respondent no later than 1:00 p.m., January 5, 1991, and a formal written protest on or before January 15, 1991. T.C.S. filed a notice of protest and a formal written protest to the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation within the time periods prescribed by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. T.C.S. contested the Respondent's determination that it was not responsive. The Petitioner did not file a notice of protest or a formal written protest to the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation within the time periods prescribed by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, the Respondent reviewed the formal written protest filed by T.C.S. and agreed that T.C.S. was responsive. After agreeing that T.C.S. was responsive, the Respondent evaluated T.C.S.'s proposal and awarded points for each of the criteria to be considered. Toward the end of January, 1991, after deciding that T.C.S.'s proposal was to be evaluated, the Respondent notified all other bidders of its decision in a document titled Posting of Notice of Agency Decision. The Posting of Notice of Agency Decision was signed by the Respondent's General Counsel and was addressed to "All Responsive Bidders". The Posting of Notice of Agency Decision provided, in pertinent part: Notice is hereby given that the Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing, is reviewing the bid tabulation which was posted at 1:00 P.M., January 2, 1991 for Lease No. 450:0070. The revised bid tabulation will be posted at 8:00 A.M. on February 4, 1991 at the Purchasing Office of the Department of State . . . . Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Any person interested in the new tabulation should contact . . . after the posting time listed above. The Petitioner filed a notice of protest and a formal written protest challenging the Posting of Notice of Agency Decision within the times prescribed by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. The Respondent dismissed this formal written protest by final order dated February 22, 1991. On or about January 31, 1991, more than four weeks after the posting of the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation, Ocie Allen spoke by telephone with Phyllis Slater, the Respondent's General Counsel. Ms. Slater told Mr. Allen that all proposals would be reevaluated as a result of T.C.S.'s protest. Mr. Allen was a lobbyist for the Petitioner in January, 1991. On February 4, 1991, the Respondent posted another standard form Bid Tabulation indicating that the following scores had been awarded to the following proposals: Proposal Score Crossland Agency 83 Woodcrest A 80 Woodcrest B 80 Tallahassee Associates 71 T.C.S. 71 DeVoe 51 The differences in the scores of the proposals which had been listed on the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation, which are reflected in the February 4, 1991, Bid Tabulation were caused by automatic changes in the scores resulting from the addition of T.C.S. and the fact that T.C.S. had the lowest priced bid. The points awarded for the "rental" criterion, which was worth up to 25 points, were determined by a mathematical formula by which the scores of each bidder are calculated based upon the proposed rental charges of all bidders. The award of points for this criterion was determined objectively based upon the mathematical formula. By adding another bidder, T.C.S., the points awarded to all the proposals automatically changed. The scores of the proposals which had been listed on the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation, were not otherwise changed. Nor were the proposals of any bidder reevaluated. The Respondent also posted a copy of a memorandum dated January 24, 1991, with the February 4, 1991, Bid Tabulation. The memorandum was from John M. Russi, Director of the Division of Licensing, to Ira Chester, Chief of the Bureau of General Services. Mr. Russi indicated the following in the memorandum: Pursuant to the settlement stipulation signed by Counsel for T.C.S. Associates on January 23, 1991, in reference to the Bid Protest filed January 11, 1991, the attached "Lease Evaluation Work Sheet" is provided for you to re-post. After reevaluating six bid proposals, the evaluating committee concludes that Crossland Agency should be awarded this bid. Each bidder needs to be notified by certified mail of this action. . . . . Attached to Mr. Russi's January 24, 1991, memorandum was a Lease Evaluation Worksheet which indicated the scores of the responsive bidders which had been awarded by the evaluation committee for each of the criteria to be considered in determining the winning bidder. On February 6, 1991, the Petitioner filed a notice of protest to the February 4, 1991, Bid Tabulation. The Petitioner filed a Formal Written Protest, Request for Formal Hearing and Motion for Stay with the Respondent on February 18, 1991. These documents were filed within the time periods specified in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner's Formal Written Protest was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Respondent on February 28, 1991. Crossland Agency, Inc., was allowed to intervene in the proceeding. On March 1, 1991, the Respondent and Intervenor filed a Motion to Dismiss. A motion hearing was conducted on March 6, 1991, to consider the Motion to Dismiss.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Respondent granting the Motion to Dismiss and dismissing this case, with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 3, 5 and 9. 2 12-13. 3 15-16 and 18-21. See 14. 15. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the scores of the bidders for the "option period" criterion reflected on the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation were modified or reconsidered on the February 4, 1991, Bid Tabulation. The suggestion that "the department had discretion to change scores in any of the remaining eight categories" is a conclusion of law and is rejected. These proposed facts are not relevant to the issue raised in the Motion to Dismiss. Nor was any evidence presented to support these proposed findings. 12. The last sentence is a conclusion of law and is rejected. Proposed Findings of Fact of the Respondent and Intervenor Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1-2. 3 and 7. 5-6 and hereby accepted. 4 8-12. 5 See 14. 6 15 and 17. 18. The last sentence involves an issue not raised in the Motion to Dismiss or at the motion hearing. Nor was any evidence presented to support these proposed findings. See the Preliminary Statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda G. Miklowitz, Esquire 1589 Metropolitan Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Benjamin E. Poitevent Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The questions presented here concern the entitlement of the Petitioner or Intervenor to be awarded lease rights under the Respondent's proposed Lease No. 590:8026, in that Petitioner and Intervenor have claimed that entitlement to the exclusion of the other party.
Findings Of Fact Respondent invited bid proposals for the provision of approximately 32,000 square feet of office space for its District VIII operation in Fort Myers, Florida. Petitioner, Chuck Bundschu, Inc., and Intervenor, Walter Lee Johnson d/b/a Walco Leasing Company, responded to the bid proposal by offering to provide the office space. Those responses may be found as part of the Composite Hearing Officer's Exhibit. Following the October, 1981, submittal of bid proposals, a bid evaluation committee was appointed by the Subdistrict Administrator for District VIII to consider the bids. In turn, he afforded guidance to that committee on the subject of the evaluation of the proposed bids offered by Bundschu and Walco, the only bidders for the project. The evaluation committee performed the task of weighing the bid proposals, in keeping with evaluation criteria which are outlined in Respondent's "Facilities, Acquisition and Management Manual" dealing with the procurement of lease space, which criteria are set forth in a form referred to as "HRSM 70-1, page A1-4-8," which is attached to chapter four of the manual. All criteria used for the evaluation process were drawn from that form with the exception of criterion No. 7, related to staff and client marking which was a product of this bid evaluation effort. (A copy of the HRS manual and forms may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. The evaluation committee's summarization utilizing the form criteria and the additional parking criterion may be found as a part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit, which is a replication of the original.) The HRS manual for procuring leased space is a publication of February, 1980, and establishes uniform guidelines by which bid proposals are considered by local officials who are part of Respondent's organization. Nonetheless, the exact weight to be afforded each criterion outlined in the manual is determined by the local evaluation committee. Weighing concerns the subject of awarding numerical values for beach bidder related to the various criteria with a maximum possible score being 100 points. On the basis of the evaluation performed by the committee, the Bundschu total was 88.25 points and the The Walco point total was 82 out of the possible 100 points. Consequently, the evaluation committee recommended that Bundschu be awarded the lease. Mark Geisler, in his capacity as Subdistrict Administrator, for District VIII, concurred in this evaluation as may be seen in his November 6, 1981, transmittal of the bid materials and associated evaluation, which transmittal may be found as pert of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit. The District Administrator, District VII, in the person of Frances Clendenin, who was acting for the District Administrator, Ivor D. Groves, Ph.D., also recommended acceptance of the Bundschu bid. This position was made known by a memorandum of November 16, 1981. A copy of that recommendation is found as a part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit. The recommendations spoken to thus far were made known to Lester C. Missman, an official within the Division of General Services of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. This division was, at the time of the bid proposals, and is now, headed by Dr. Homer Ooten, whose function within Respondent's organization includes the responsibility to evaluate lease proposals involving the Respondent agency and to make a final decision on the question of the lease award, based upon a review of the local subordinate unit's recommendation. By this, it is meant that the lease by Health and Rehabilitative Services as "user agency" is signed by Ooten based upon a delegation of authority to him through the vehicle of correspondence signed by the agency head. Ooten, upon considering the recommendation of the District Administrator's office, the Subdistrict Administrator and the evaluation committee, did not find fault with the criteria nor the point weighing scheme used in the evaluation process. He did question the cost analysis performed by the evaluation committee on the subject of client mileage for those clients receiving services from Respondent in a move from the HRS office in the Bundschu building where they were located at the time, to the building where Walco intended to let property. This was a distance of seven/tenths (7/10) of a mile and based upon the number of clients receiving services, there would be an estimated $100,000.00 in client mileage cost increase. This item was not deemed to be an appropriate consideration by Ooten and was disregarded in his review of the cost analysis performed by the evaluation committee. That cost analysis may be found as part of Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 2, and includes interlineations by Ooten in his opinion on the subject of the cost analysis. That analysis had indicated an overall advantage of approximately $11,000.00 in favor of Bundschu and was premised upon costs related to Item 12 in the criteria, which criterion is cost of moving. It assumed a difference of over $131,000.00 in moving costs, the majority of which costs pertained to client inconvenience ($100,000.00), discounting $120,000.00 plus dollars related to the difference in the bid amount between the Walco and Bundschu bids which bid estimate was in favor of Walco. Ooten's opinion on the subject of the priority of including $100,000.00 plus dollars in clients' travel costs, when considered in the context of point awards under Item 12 in the criteria, lead Ooten to believe that the differential in point awards would not result in a 9.25 value of Bundschu versus a zero value for Walco. In his mind, the differential would be much less. Ooten made his own evaluation of moving costs per se, and through that process determined that approximately $15,600.00 would be necessary for a move into the Walco facility whereas $5,600.00 would be involved in the Bundschu move, which required the expansion of existing space in the Bundschu facility. Based upon an evaluation of the point differential in the rental rate criterion which was a differential of 2, that is 30 points out of a possible 30 for Walco and 28 points out of a possible 30 for Bundschu, Ooten also opined the this was an unreasonable assessment in view of the fact that the Walco bid amount was more than $120,000.00 less than the Bundschu bid. This taken together with the fact that there only existed approximately a $9,000.00 difference on moving costs between Bundschu and Walco, which was in favor of Bundschu, and there having been indicated a 9.25 out of a possible 10 point difference in Item 12 on the question of costs related to moving, led Ooten to believe that the true factual status of criteria Nos. 1 and 12 was not as depicted by the evaluation committee. Per Ooten, with proper assessment Walco would have received a higher point count than Bundschu through the process of applying the bid criteria, as well as being the lower bidder from the point of view of rental rates alone. After several exchanges with the District level personnel of Respondent who had been involved in the lease evaluation process, in which, on two (2) occasions, the local officials continued to support their initial opinion of the propriety of the award to Bundschu, a decision was made at the District VIII level to support the award of the lease to Walco as may be seen in the January 6, 1982, correspondence from the District Administrator to Missman, a copy of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 4, admitted into evidence. On January 6, 1982, Ooten issued a letter to the District VIII Administrative Services Director indicating the authority to award Lease No. 590:8026, formerly referred to as No. 590:1472, for the benefit of Walter Lee Johnson d/b/a Walco Leasing Company. Having learned of this decision and in keeping with the provision Subsection 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, Bundschu, through counsel, indicated opposition to that award on January 12, 1982, followed by a formal petition letter setting forth grounds for the opposition, which petition was filed on January 19, 1982. This series of documents is part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit, through copies. Subsequently, Items 4 and 6 in the petition letter were resolved between the parties without the necessity of a hearing and this is borne out by a copy of the February 1, 1982, correspondence from counsel for the Respondent to counsel to the Petitioner, part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit. The matter was then referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing by correspondence from the Assistant General Counsel for Respondent, dated February 4, 1982, a copy of which may be found as a part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit. There followed the intervention of Walter Lee Johnson as a party of record and the hearing was held on April 27, 1982. Petitioner's first contention deals with the idea of discounting the lease value based on the value of the "stream of future lease payments." This theory is contended for through Robert Sizemore, C.P.A., expert witness of the Petitioner. He would call for the discount of lease payments on the theory that present dollars will have a discounted value in the future, as the lease period unfolds. Taking into account the method of payment by the Respondent and the vicissitudes involved in attempting to establish the value of today's dollar at a future time, this theory of discounted dollars at a 10 percent or 12 percent rate per annum in succeeding years is not indicated. Assessment through the legislative appropriations process of sufficient funds to meet lease payment demands is not contingent upon the value of the dollar at any given point in the history of the lease. Therefore, the "stream of future lease payments" concept is inapplicable here. Likewise, trying to project the value of today's dollar at some future date is so tenuous as to be an unacceptable method to evaluate the competing lease proposals. Finally, even if this method was used, a 10 percent discount rate for inflation would leave approximately a $67,000.00 difference in the bid proposals and a 12 percent per annum discount rate related to inflation would leave approximately $52,000.00 difference in the bid proposals, in favor of the Walco bid. Petitioner has contended that Respondent failed to properly account for direct moving expenses. In that regard, the calculations made by Ooten on the question of moving expenses as reported above are accepted as fact. As a third claim, Petitioner has alleged the agency s disregard for recommendation of its evaluation committee in making the lease award. While the initial recommendations of the evaluation committee and staff were disregarded, the District Administrator eventually accepted the point of view of the Division of General Services within the Respondent's Department. Moreover, even if the local officials within the Respondent's Department had not accepted Ooten's viewpoint, the initial evaluation committee's development of criteria was flawed and the Ooten perception was correct, leading to a decision in favor of Walco. Finally, the contention by Petitioner that the agency did not seek adequate input from third parties affected by the relocation of the facility was not demonstrated through testimony. The method for review of the proposed lease was acceptable and to the extent that it required an appreciation and response to the needs of others not directly involved in the lease process, it has been amply afforded. Evaluation was in keeping with Respondent's "Facilities, Acquisition and Management Manual, HRSM 70-1, fourth chapter" and the award is based upon concurrence of the Division Director of the General Services Division of HRS pursuant to that chapter. Through argument, counsel for the Petitioner has also referred to the fact that in the initial evaluation process set forth in the sixth criterion, superior points of 2.5 for Walco as opposed to 2.25 for Bundschu had been awarded, when in fact the narrative summary of the reasons for such awards indicate an advantage to Bundschu. Even if the .25 points were allowed in the favor of Bundschu, this would not change the result.
Findings Of Fact Prior to April 1987, the Department of Corrections (DOC) determined that it needed 2,300 square feet of office space for its parole and probation office in Santa Rosa County, Milton, Florida. Since the desired square footage of the office was more than 2,000 square feet, DOC was required to seek competitive bids for the proposed office. Towards that end, Wendell Beall, Region I Budget Manager for the Department, prepared a Request for Proposal and Bid Proposal Submittal Form package on lease number 700:0378. This package contained various specifications for the type building DOC wished to lease, as well as weighted, bid evaluation criteria and the numerical points given to each of those criteria. The desired initial term of the lease was five years with an option to renew the lease at the end of the primary term for three years. On April 2, 1987, DOC held a pre-proposal conference for lease number 700:0378 in the Probation and Parole Office in Milton, Florida. The purpose of the meeting was to hand out the Request for Proposal and Bid Proposal Submittal Form package and to answer any questions interested parties may have regarding the bid and bid package. Both Petitioner and Jay Mortgage Co. (the ultimate successful bidder) were present through their representatives. At the pre-proposal conference, the area within which the leased premises must be located was questioned. Specification A.3 defined the area for the leased premises by referring to a map of Santa Rosa County. Normally, such a map would have the acceptable area delineated by a circle or a boundary line drawn on the map. No such delineation was on the Santa Rosa map. Therefore, a more precise definition of the mandatory acceptable area was sought by the potential bidders. Mr. Beall explained that the meaning to be attributed to specification A.3 was that any building within five to ten minutes of the courthouse would be acceptable, i.e., responsive. At this time, no mention of the relative points to be given a location closer to the Courthouse vis. a location farther away was discussed. The enumerated bid evaluation criteria allowed ten points for "location as to clients served" and zero points for "location as to other Department activities." Also at the preproposal conference Mr. Beall reminded those present of the importance of complying with the handicapped requirements. Handicap compliance was stressed because the present landlord could not meet those requirements. He also cautioned all bidders to initial all applicable spaces on the bid submittal form. He further explained that the weighted evaluation criteria in the bid submittal form were the means of ranking the proposals on a point system for purposes of comparison of the respective bids to be submitted. Mr. Beall described the ranking system he preferred as an example of how the individual bid committee members might evaluate the bids. That system was to take the total number of points for a given evaluation criteria, divide by the number of proposals submitted to yield the deduction to be given a building of lesser quality under that criteria. The bids submitted were to be reviewed and graded by a lease committee. The lease committee was not bound by Mr. Beall's preference in awarding or deducting points under a given bid criteria. The individual members could develop their own ranking system based on their best judgment. On April 16, 1987, three bids were received by DOC. The bids were opened at the Probation and Parole Office in Milton, Florida. At that time, Mr. Beall checked the last page of each of the three bids timely submitted, read the first year rental rate per square foot, checked for the bidder's signature and the required attachments on each. The bids were submitted by Jay Mortgage Co., the apparent low bidder, Northrup Building Partnership, the apparent second lowest bidder, and D & C Partners, the apparent third lowest bidder. Mr. Beall accepted the three bids and stated that they appeared to be in order and that he would present them to the lease committee who would then make the final award. On May 14, 1987, the Region I lease committee met. The committee consisted of T. H. Young, Dura Williams, and W. E. Beall. Prior to said meeting, Wendell Beall reviewed all of the bids and transferred appropriate information to a Bid Synopsis sheet. On the synopsis sheet he proposed preliminary point assignments for the three bids under the evaluation criteria set forth in the bid package. Further, Mr. Beall reflected on the synopsis sheet that Petitioner had failed to initial Specification A.12(a), acknowledging the requirement that the leased premises comply wish the State's requirements for Handicapped Facilities. At the lease committee meeting, each of the bid packages were reviewed. The committee decided that the Petitioner's bid and the D & C Partners bid were non-responsive because of the bidders failure to acknowledge (initial) certain bid specifications. Beyond a rudimentary discussion of the rejected bids they were not considered further by the lease committee. The point awards proposed by Mr. Beall were not utilized. Only the Jay Mortgage bid was determined responsive by the committee. Jay Mortgage, therefore, was deemed to be the lowest and best responsive bid by default and was awarded the lease. Petitioner's bid was found to be nonresponsive because Petitioner had inadvertently failed to initial Item A.12(a). The committee felt that Petitioner's failure to initial Specification A.12(a) was material and could not be waived as a non-material item even though some of the committee members were aware that Petitioner's proposed building already had handicap facilities in place at the time the members inspected Petitioner's property. The evidence demonstrated that it was the lack of the initials and not the actual compliance with the specification that the committee found material. The committee felt it could not look to outside evidence or promises of compliance from Petitioner. However, the committee did accept such promises from Petitioner regarding the floor to ceiling walls which did not exist at the time of inspection, but were promised by Petitioner. It is difficult to see how the committee may look behind the bid proposal in one instance and refuse to look behind the bid proposal in another instance. Such inconsistency can be nothing but arbitrary on the part of DOC. This is especially true since the lack of initials was an oversight on Petitioner's part, and the absent floors and ceilings were promised but not present and the handicap facilities were a concrete reality. Moreover, petitioner had initialed in no less than two other places in the bid package specifications requiring compliance with all federal and state requirements and any space requirements of DOC. 1/ The redundancy of the bid package in this regard renders the lack of initials on specification A.12(a) immaterial. In essence, the department was assured at least twice that continuing compliance with the State's handicap requirements would occur. To refuse to waive such a minor deficiency on these facts is arbitrary and capricious. Such an immaterial item should have been waived by DOC and the Petitioner's bid should have been considered and compared to the Jay Mortgage bid. Since the bids submitted by Petitioner and Jay Mortgage, Co., were not compared by the lease committee, but were challenged as to who submitted the lowest and best bid, that comparison is now ripe for decision in this de novo review of DOC's action. The first relevant bid evaluation criterion deals with the comparative rental value for the initial term of the lease on the two bidders' properties, reduced to present value. Seventy points were awardable for this criteria. In this case, Petitioner was the lowest bidder on the initial lease term by 78 cents per square foot. The victory in the primary term was only achieved by Petitioner in the first three years of that term. In the last two years of the primary term, Jay Mortgage Co. was lower, but not by enough to offset Petitioner's lead. Petitioner was, therefore, lower by at least a minimal amount and to that extent would be the better bid. The difference, however, should only be reflected in a minimum deduction of two points from Jay Mortgage Co. /2 The awarded points should, therefore, be seventy points for Petitioner and 68 points for Jay. The second relevant criterion was the conformance of the building space to efficient utilization and layout. Two points were awarded for this criterion. Both bidders adequately met this criterion. Therefore, the maximum of two points should be awarded to each bidder. The third relevant criterion was for street level parking space. Ten points were awardable under this criterion. In this instance, a minimum of fifteen off-street parking spaces were required by DOC. Both bidders met this minimum requirement. However, the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner offered considerably more parking space at its location. The evidence further demonstrated that DOC experienced periods when it conducted an unusual amount of business with its clients, requiring more parking than usual. In that respect, Petitioner offered the better property. However, the probation offices unusual requirements occurred about once a month for only two or three days. Therefore, a minimum difference of one point should be deducted from Jay Mortgage. The awarded points should, therefore, be ten points for Petitioner and nine points for Jay. The fourth relevant criterion was the proximity of the lease site to the clients served by the parole and probation office. In this regard, the evidence clearly demonstrated that Petitioner had the better location for the county-wide area serviced by Petitioner. Respondent's main business was the supervision of probationers and community controllees. Most of this "service" is conducted by DOC at its office or county-wide in the field. Petitioner clearly has easier and better access to its location than the downtown location offered by Jay Mortgage, Co. Therefore, Petitioner's location would be far more proximate and convenient to the probation offices clients than would the downtown location offered by Jay Mortgage. At the hearing, DOC felt that the preferential location under the fourth criterion was the location closest to the courthouse because some of the probation officer's work must be done at the courthouse and an officer may be summoned to the courthouse at any time by a judge. Therefore, a building within walking distance of the courthouse such as Jay Mortgage's building was more convenient for the probation office's personnel as compared to one which requires driving to the courthouse, such as Petitioner's building. The reasons given by DOC for their selection of Jay Mortgage under the fourth criterion at the hearing do not fall within a reasonable interpretation of "proximity to clients served by the Department." DOC's reasons would fall under another separate evaluation criterion. The criterion which would approximately cover DOC's reasons deal with the proximity of the offered space to the other activities of the Department. These "other" activities would include attendance at court for probation revocation hearings or for sentencing of offenders. "Convenience for the personnel" is relevant under these other activities and there is no question that "convenience for the office personnel" is a valid reason for distinguishing between bidders. However, the evaluation criterion which covers these reasons was assigned zero points. DOC cannot go outside its bid criteria. Therefore, no distinction can be made between the bids based on the above grounds. The only points awardable are the ten points assigned under the fourth relevant criterion outlined in paragraph 14 above. DOC's reasons do not fall within the fourth criterion. No other evidence was presented by Respondent to support a preference for Jay Mortgage Co. over Petitioner under the fourth criterion proximity to clients. Petitioner presented evidence which clearly demonstrated that it was the better bid under the fourth criterion. The difference between the bids is significant since client service is the DOC's main business. The only formula available for rating the value of the difference is Mr. Beall's. Therefore, utilizing Mr. Beall's methodology, the points awardable for the fourth relevant criterion should be ten points for Petitioner and seven points for Jay. The fifth relevant criterion was for moving costs. No evidence was submitted by Petitioner or Respondent as to this criterion. Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn about the effect of such costs. No points should be awarded under this criteria. The sixth relevant criterion dealt with the option period rental rate. Six points were awarded for this criterion. Jay Mortgage Co. was the lower of the two bids. The actual difference between the two bids was approximately 25 cents a square foot. That difference appears in the last year of the option term. 3/ In the first two years of the option term the bidders reflect the same rental rate. Since 25 cents is a minimal difference only a minimum deduction of one point should be made. 4/ Therefore, the points awardable for the sixth relevant criterion should be six points for Jay and five points for Petitioner. The overall result would be as follows: CRITERIA PETITIONER JAY MORTGAGE CO. 1. Basement 70 68 2. Space 2 2 3. Parking 10 9 4. Clients 10 7 5. Moving Costs 0 0 6. Option Rent 5 6 TOTAL 97 92 As can be seen from the above table, Petitioner submitted the lowest and best responsive bid under a consideration of all the weighted evaluation criteria established by DOC. Petitioner should, therefore, be awarded the bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner be awarded the lease contract as the lowest and best responsive bid. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of December 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December 1988.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Willis Phillips, may challenge the specifications of the invitation to bid at issue in this proceeding? Whether the Petitioner has standing to challenge the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' proposed award of lease number 590:2166 to the Intervenor, Rutherford Rentals, Inc.?
Findings Of Fact The Department issued an Invitation to Bid for Existing Facilities, lease number 590:2166 (hereinafter referred to as the "ITB"), seeking to rent office space in Madison, Florida. Responses to the ITB were to be filed with the Department by 2:00 p.m., March 6, 1990. Included as part of the ITB was a map of the City of Madison (hereinafter referred to as the "Map"). Joint Exhibit 1. On page 1, paragraph 3, of the Bid Submittal Form which was included as part of the ITB it was indicated that "[s]pace to be located in Madison, Florida within boundaries depicted in the attached map (Attachment B.) Bidder to mark location of site on map Attachment B." The ITB referred to the Map as a "Map showing bid zone boundaries." See page 4 of the ITB. The Map was labeled as "Attachment B" and included the following language at the bottom of the Map: "WITHIN CITY LIMITS WITH EXCEPTIONS OF UNDESIRABLE LOCATIONS AS INDICATED." The Map included two areas within the City of Madison which were cross- hatched. At the bottom of the Map the word "UNDESIRABLE" had been written in black. This word only appears below the larger of the two cross-hatched areas. The Department intended to exclude any office space located within both of the cross-hatched areas on the Map. The Petitioner spoke by telephone with Robert Smith, a Facilities Services Managers Assistant for the Department, prior to submitting a response to the ITB. The Petitioner initiated the conversation. Based upon this conversation, the Petitioner was aware that property located within either of the cross-hatched areas on the Map was excluded from consideration under the ITB. The property which the Petitioner intended to offer to the Department in response to the ITB is located in the smallest of the two cross-hatched areas on the Map. The Petitioner was informed by Mr. Smith that the property located within the smaller cross-hatched area was excluded as undesirable. Mr. Smith informed the Petitioner that he could not submit a response to the ITB offering to rent property located in the small cross-hatched area. The exclusion from consideration of property located in the areas within the City of Madison which were located in the two cross-hatched areas of the Map could have been more clearly designated. The Department's designation of the excluded areas, however, was not ambiguous. It was clear that the Petitioner's property was located in an excluded portion of the City of Madison and that the Petitioner was aware of the exclusion of his property. Despite the Petitioner's knowledged that his property was located within an excluded area, the Petitioner submitted a response dated March 6, 1990, to the ITB proposing property located in the smaller cross-hatched area. In the Petitioner's response to the ITB he did not indicate the location of his property on the Map. Instead, the Petitioner submitted a different map of a portion of the City of Madison which included his property. Rules 10-13.006 and 10-13.007, Florida Administrative Code, require that protests of the bid specifications of the Department must be filed within 72 hours of receipt of notice of the bid specifications. The ITB did not indicate that persons adversely affected by the ITB could challenge the specifications of the ITB or that any such challenge had to be filed within 72 hours of receipt of notice of the ITB. The following statement appears of the last page of the Bid Submittal Form included with the ITB and submitted by the Petitioner: I hereby certify as owner, officer, or authorized agent that I have read the Invitation to Bid Package and all its attachments, and agree to abide by all requirements and conditions contained therein. . . . This certification was signed by the Petitioner. The Department decided to award the lease to the Intervenor. The Department determined that the Petitioner's bid should be rejected because the proposed property was located in an excluded area. The Petitioner filed a Formal Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on April 23, 1990, with the Department. The Petitioner challenged the Department's proposed award of the lease to the Intervenor and asserted that he was the lowest and best bidder. The Petitioner did not challenge the specifications of the ITB. The Department filed a Motion to Dismiss on Mazy 4, 1990. The Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition and an Amended Formal Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on May 14, 1990. For the first time, the Petitioner challenged the specifications of the ITB.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order granting the Department's Motion to Dismiss and dismissing with prejudice the Formal Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by the Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX The Petitioner and the Department have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1-2 See 9. 3-5 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 6 6-7. 7 and 11 Not relevant. 8-10 and 12-15 These proposed findings are consistent with Ms. Goodman's testimony. Ms. Goodman's opinions, however, are not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although this proposed finding of fact is generally true, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Petitioner was not aware that both cross-hatched areas were excluded areas. See 9. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 2 and hereby accepted. 3 5-8. 4 7. 5 6. 6 12. 7 9. 8 13 and 17. 9 4. 10 12. 11 17. 12 15. 13 16. 14 18 and hereby accepted. 15 20. 21 and hereby accepted. 22 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. Cumulative. Hereby accepted. Copies Furnished To: John C. Pelham, Esquire Gary Walker, Esquire Post Office Box 13527 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3527 John L. Pearce, Esquire District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-2949 Clay A. Schnitker, Esquire Post Office Drawer 652 Madison, Florida 32340 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a licensed real estate salesman with license number 0364554. On or about August 13, 1982, Richard J. and Gav Greco entered into a lease purchase agreement with James C. and Phyllis Waid for residential property located at 1685 Markham Woods Road, Longwood, Florida. The purchase price of the Waid property was $190,000 towards which the Grecos made a $10,000 non-refundable deposit and agreed to pay a monthly rental of $1000. On or about November 14, 1982, the Grecos executed an Agreement with Respondent and his wife by which the Grecos assigned all rights and privileges relating to the lease and purchase of the residence at 1685 Markham Woods Road to the Alvarados. The consideration to be given for this Agreement was a payment of $10,000 by the Alvarados to the Grecos, with $5000 payable upon signing of the Agreement and $5000 payable within six months. The Alvarados, as assignees, agreed to abide by all provisions of the lease purchase agreement and were to make their first $1000 monthly lease payment to the Waids on December 4, 1982. Respondent gave Richard J. Greco a check in the amount of $5000 dated November 14, 1982 and requested that he hold the check for a couple of days before depositing it. Greco complied with the request, but was advised on December 3, 1982 that Respondent's $5000 check had been returned unused by Respondent's bank due to the fact that Respondent's account had been closed. Respondent has never paid the Grecos any part of the $10,000 due them under the assignment executed November 14, 1982. Respondent made no monthly lease payments on the property to the Waids. By letter dated February 25, 1983, James C. Waid notified the Grecos and the Alvarados that the lease purchase agreement was in default and that the $10,000 deposit paid by the Grecos was being forfeited because the rent was in arrears. The Grecos paid the Waids an additional $4000 on March 1, 1983, which represented the unpaid lease payments, for a general release from all obligations under the lease purchase agreement. Respondent and his wife executed a promissory note on March 1, 1983 whereby they agreed to pay the Grecos $10,000 on or before March 16, 1983, but no payments have ever been made pursuant to this promissory note. The Grecos brought suit against Respondent and his wife for damages arising out of this transaction, and obtained a Final Judgment on June 30, 1983 in Case No. 83-1191-CA-03-P, Circuit Court in and for Seminole County, in the amount of $15,101.28. The Grecos have not been able to execute this Final Judgment and therefore no payments on this judgment have been made to them by the Respondent or his wife. At the time of this transaction, the Alvarados were family friends of the Grecos. Richard J. Greco entered into this transaction with Respondent primarily because of the personal acquaintance and not because Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman. However, Greco knew that Respondent was licensed and therefore assumed that he was a man of integrity who would deal fairly with him in this real estate transaction.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final order be issued suspending Respondent's license for a Period of one (1) Year. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Hartmann, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson St. Orlando, Fl. 32802 Ignacio J. Alvarado 5166 Glasgow Avenue Orlando, Fl. 32819 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Fl. 32802 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Fl. 32301
Findings Of Fact This case concerns what is-called a "Turnkey Lease". The program was developed by the State of Florida in 1971. It encompasses a situation where by agencies seeking space for their operations may, after a specific need is determined that cannot be filled by existing adequate space, solicit competitive bids from developers for the provision of land and the construction of a building thereon sufficient to-meet the agency's needs, for lease specifically to the agency requesting it. The Bureau of Property Management within DGS was given the initial responsibility to develop the guidelines, promulgate the rules, and seek statutory authority for such a program. The Bureau's current role is to work with agencies requesting this program. The agency certifies the need to the Bureau in addition to the fact that there is no available existing space present. The Bureau then determines agency needs and gives the agency the authority to solicit the bids for the turnkey project. Once the bids are then received, evaluated, and a recommendation for an award is forwarded by the agency to DGS, DGS reviews the supporting documents required by the provision of the Florida Administrative Code and either concurs or does not concur in the recommendation. If DGS concurs, the submitting agency is notified and is permitted to then secure the lease. Once the lease has been entered into; it is then sent back to DGS for review and approval as to the conditions; and thereafter the plans and specifications for the building are also referred to DGS for review and approval as to the quality and adequacy as well as code compliance. Section 255.249 and Section 255.25, Florida Statutes, set forth the requirements for soliciting and awarding bids for lease space in an amount in excess of 2,500 square feet. This provision requires that an award of this nature be made to the lowest and best bidder, and DCS utilizes that standard in evaluating and determining whether or not it will concur with an agency's recommendation. In the instant case, DHRS advertised for bids for the construction of office space in Palatka, Florida for its District III facilities. Before seeking to solicit bids, the District III staff conducted a search for other possible existing space within a five mile radius of the downtown area and located no adequate facilities. Thereafter, a Certification of Need was processed for a solicitation of proposals and approval was granted by DGS to follow through with the solicitation. A preproposal conference was advertised and held on October 14, 1983, and after project review by those present at the conference, bid opening date was set for November 22, 1983. Thirty-two bid packages were distributed and twelve bidders submitted proposals. The public bid opening was held as scheduled at 2:00 p.m., on November 22, 1983, in Palatka, Florida by Robert E. Litza, Facilities Services Coordinator for DHRS District III. Of the bids submitted by the twelve bidders, the lowest hid was rejected because of the failure of the bidder to comply with the requirements of the bid package. Of the remaining eleven bids, the four lowest were evaluated with the understanding that additional higher bids would be evaluated if the four lowest bids were found to be unacceptable. Among the four bids considered were bids of Chuck Bundschu, Inc., Kenneth R. McGurn, one of the Intervenors (McGurn submitted five prices scheduled for his bid and of these, only one was considered); Elizabethan, Petitioner herein; and TSU. Only three bids are pertinent to the discussion here. They are #8-C (McGurn); #11 (Elizabethan); and #12 (TSU). In pertinent particulars, these bids provided as to rental costs: 8-C 11 12 1st yr $14.00/$220,808 $8.95/$ 61,916.10 S 7.16/$ 49,532.88 2nd yr 14.00/ 220,8088 8.95/ 141,159.40 7.35/ 115,924.20 3rd yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 7.62/ 120,182.64 4th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 8.08/ 127,437.76 5th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 8.33/ 131,380.76 6th vr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 8.59/ 135,481.48 7th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 8.86/ 139,739.92 8th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 9.19/ 144,944.68 9th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 9.58/ 151,095.76 10th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 10.09/ 159,139.48 Renewal Option 1st yr3.00/47,316 9.93/ 156,615.96 10.51/ 165,763.72 2nd yr3.00/47.316 9.93/ 156,615.96 10.99/ 173,334.28 3rd yr3.00/47.316 9.93/ 156,615.96 11.48/ 181,062.56 4th yr3.00/47.316 9.93/ 156,615.96 11.99/ 189,106.28 5th yr3.00/47.316 9.93/ 156,615.96 12.51/ 197,307.72 Total Basic Overall Lease 1-15 yrs $1,971,500 $2,115,430.50 $2,181,434.12 Average Sq.Ft. for 15 yrs $8.60 $9.20 $9.58 A recommendation by the evaluation committee which met at DHRS District III, that McGurn's bid be selected, was forwarded to DGS in Tallahassee through the Director of DHRS's General Services in Tallahassee on December 22, 1983. The terms of the successful bid and the reasons for its being considered lowest and best are discussed below. The successful bid for the lease in question, lease number 590:8030, upon completion of the committee's evaluation was also evaluated by Ms. Goodman in the Bureau of Property Management of DGS. She also considered the McGurn bid to be the lowest and best of the eleven non-disqualified bids. In that regard, not only Mr. McGurn's bid but all of the twelve bids received were considered and reviewed not only at the local level but at DHRS and DGS headquarters as well. In her evaluation of the proposal and the bids, Ms. Goodman considered the documentation submitted by DHRS. This included a letter of recommendation supported by a synopsis of all proposals, the advertisement for bids, and any information pertinent to the site selection process. In determining the McGurn's bid was the lowest as to cost of all the bids, Ms. Goodman compared the average rate per square foot per year for each. This did not take into con- sideration pro-ration of costs per year, but strictly the average over the fifteen year probable term of the lease (ten years basic plus five year option). According to Ms. Goodman, this same method of calculating cost has been used in every lease involving a turnkey situation and in fact in every lease since 1958 - as long as she has been with DGS. This particular method, admittedly, is not set forth in any rule promulgated by DGS. However, the agencies are instructed by DGS to advertise and bidders to bid on an average square foot basis, the basis utilized by Ms. Goodman and her staff in analyzing the bids submitted. In that regard, the request for proposals does not, itself, indicate how the calculation of lowest cost would be made by DHRS and DGS but it does tell prospective bidders what information to submit. This procedure has been followed exclusively in situations like this for may years and many of the bidders here have bid before using this same system. All bidders are considered on the same footing in an evaluation. They are notified of what information will be considered along with that of all the other bidders. Further, anyone who inquires as to the basis for evaluation will be given a straight and complete answer as to the method to be used. Petitioner contends that McGurn's bid does not conform to either the normal bidding procedure followed by contractors in this type of procurement over the past years or to the normal bidding procedures adopted by Respondent, DHRS. It urges that the questioned bid is non-responsive and front-end loaded to the detriment of DHRS. With regard to the front-end loading objection, Mr. Taylor, testifying for Petitioner, attempted to indicate by graphic evidence that Elizabethan's bid, which he claims is not front-end loaded, is cheaper to the State than that of McGurn. Due to the large rental cost of the McGurn bid in the opening years of the lease, the State would have to borrow money to make the large rental payments; the interest cost of which, when added to the $3.00 cost in the option years, raises the cost considerably and makes the bid not the lowest. Though Mr. Taylor testified to this he failed to produce any independent evidence to support it. In addition, Taylor urges, under the McGurn schedule, McGurn would recoup his entire construction debt (approximately $423.00 plus interest) in the first four years of the lease: Comparing the two bids, it appears that the State would pay McGurn approximately $494,500.00 more than it would pay Elizabethan for the same period during the first seven years of the lease. Considering this, it is Taylor's belief that McGurn's profit after the fourth year is excessive. He contends also that when, after the tenth year, McGurn's rental rate drops to $3.00 per square foot for the remaining five years which constitutes the option period of the lease, the State could not afford to leave the low figure and as a result, the ten year lease is converted to a l5 year lease which is unresponsive. Further, the $3.00 figure for the last years, which would ostensibly show a loss to McGurn, is misleading in that there would be sufficient income from the advance profit garnered in years 5 to 10, when invested, to cover the soft costs and more in these later years. Admitting that because of its involvement in other turnkey projects in Florida, Elizabethan is aware of the State policy on cost evaluation, Taylor contends that while his bid does not violate State policy, McGurn's bid does because it would be fiscally irresponsible for the State to pay so much up front. This conclusion is his opinion, however, and not supported by any independent evidence. Both expert witnesses, Respondents Scott and Perry, who testified for the Intervenor, TSU, agree that the present value of money should be considered in evaluating rental costs. Their major point of difference is in the percentage of discount rate to be applied. Dr. Perry urges that use of the 10% rate mandated by the U. S. Government in its procurements of this nature. Dr. Scott, on the other hand, considers this to be too high and urges a rate in the area of 3% be used. The significance of this is that at the lower of the range spread, McGurn's bid is lowest. At the higher end, TSU's bid is lowest. From 5.7% up to below 6%, Petitioner's bid is lowest. Whichever would be appropriate, the State has not adopted the present value of money methodology and the policy followed by the State is not to consider that methodology in analyzing costs. State policy is to use only the average rental methodology. There is, in addition, no prohibition against front- end loaded bids encompassed within this policy. By the same token, there is nothing in the bid package issued to all prospective bidders that in any way stipulates the method of computing lease costs or prohibits from loaded bids. DGS zone rates, criteria stipulating the maximum agencies can send on rent without approval by DGS, are not part of the bid package and do not constitute a factor in determining whether a bid is conforming or not. These zone rates may be waived by DGS at the time the proposed award is submitted for DGS approval. In practice, within the memory of Joseph Lambert, HRS' Administrator of Facilities Services, who administers the Department's leasing program, he cannot recall DGS ever denying a DHRS request for waiver of the maximum zone rate in any case where it was pertinent. In this case, since the lease payments at-least in the second through tenth years-of the McGurn bid exceed the zone limits, the award would have to be approved by the Governor and Cabinet in addition to DGS. It has not yet been placed on the Cabinet agenda because of the protests filed. As was stated before, there are no rules governing the evaluation of bids for leases of this nature. Oral instructions given to each agency, when applied here, reveal that the McGurn bid, as was seen above, has an average cost of $8.86 per square foot per year. TSU's bid costs $9.58 per square foot per year, and Elizabethan's bid costs $9.29 per square foot per year. These same calculations are followed on all turnkey and non- turnkey leases in the State. The reason the State uses this process instead of the present value of money methodology is that it is easy. DGS statistics indicate that at least 50% of the landlords in the approximately $32,000,000 worth of leases presently existing with the State are "Mom and Pop" landlords. These people are not normally trained lease evaluators. By using the straight average rental rate method, there are no arbitrary variables. It has always worked because people can understand it and all agencies which lease property in the State follow this procedure. In the opinion of Ms. Goodman, the costs involved in utilizing the present value of money methodology would far outweigh the paper savings to be gained, notwithstanding the testimony of Dr. Perry to the contrary. With regard to the option issue, it was the position of DGS in reviewing the proposals that the very low $3.00 lease cost per square foot in the last five years (the option period) did not make the McGurn bid unresponsive. There were no limits imposed upon the bidders except that a five year option to a ten year lease be included. Were it not there, the bid would be unresponsive. DGS would issue approval for a ten year lease with a five year option but not a fifteen year lease. Ms. Goodman cannot recall a situation in which an option was not exercised by it if the need for the space continued though there have been some instances where option costs have been renegotiated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore; RECOMMENDED THAT DHRS License Number 590:8030 be awarded to Kenneth R. McGurn. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of September, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkwav Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood 8Oulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Morgan Staines, Esquire 2204 East Fourth Street Santa Ana, California 92705 Thomas D. Watry, Esquire 1200 Carnegie Building 133 Carnegie Way Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Steven W. Huss, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald W. Thomas, Executive Director Department of General Services 115 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary J. Anton, Esquire P.O. Box 1019 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Harden King, Agency Clerk Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 406 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (BOT) should charge Respondent with lease payments and fine him for unauthorized use of sovereignty submerged lands under the Halifax River in Daytona Beach.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns residential property on the Halifax River in Daytona Beach. In 2004, he entered into a Sovereignty Submerged Lands Lease with BOT to allow him to construct a single-family dock structure into the Halifax River from his property. In 2007, he entered into a Modification to Increase Square Footage (Modified Lease). The Modified Lease covered 2,714 square feet, required an annual lease fee of $423.89, and expired on November 16, 2008. The Modified Lease provided for a late charge equal to interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the due date until paid on any lease fees not paid within 30 days from their due dates. There was no evidence that any lease fee under the Modified Lease was not paid or paid late. In August 2008, BOT attempted to have Respondent enter into a Lease Renewal. He did not renew his lease, and the Modified Lease expired on November 16, 2008. Respondent paid no lease fees for 2008/2009. In September 2009, BOT again attempted to have Respondent enter into an updated Lease Renewal at an annual lease fee of $436.78 and pay current and past due lease fees. BOT placed Respondent on notice that his failure to do so could be considered a willful violation of Chapter 253, Florida Statutes, which could subject Respondent to administrative fines of up to $10,000 a day. Respondent did not renew his lease or pay any lease fees. Instead, he complained (as he claims to have since 2005) that a stormwater outfall structure installed by the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) in 1998 approximately 100 feet to the north (upriver) of his dock structure, at the end of Ora Street, was not functioning properly and was allowing silt to enter the river, shoaling the water in the area of Respondent’s dock structure (and elsewhere in the vicinity) and eventually making it impossible for Respondent to moor his boat at his dock structure and navigate to the Intracoastal Waterway (ICW). The DOT outfall structure at Ora Street has been in existence since the 1950’s. In 1998, DOT added a silt box, which is not functioning properly and is allowing silt to enter the river. The evidence is not clear whether silt from the DOT outfall structure was entering the river before 1998. In 2010, BOT informed Respondent by certified mail that it had contacted the DOT at Respondent’s request and determined that DOT was planning to clean and monitor the outfall structure after August 2010 but had no plans to dredge sediment from the river. BOT also placed Respondent on notice that he was in violation for not renewing his lease and paying all current and past due fees, and that he would be fined and required to remove his dock structure if he did not come into compliance. This certified letter was designated an NOV. The evidence was not clear when the letter was sent to Respondent, but it is clear that Respondent has continued to refuse to renew the lease, or pay any fees, and has not removed his dock structure. BOT takes the position in this case that Respondent must pay: the Lease Renewal annual lease fee of $436.78 for 2008/2009, plus the Lease Renewal late charge equal to interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum from November 30, 2010; and an annual lease fee of $448.49 for 2009/2010, plus a late charge equal to interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum on the $448.49 from November 29, 2009. The evidence did not explain how the annual lease fees for the years 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 were determined. (But see Florida Administrative Code Rule2 18- 21.011(1)(b)10.b., set out in Conclusion of Law 24, which may explain how the annual lease fees were determined.) Invoices in evidence charge Respondent a total of $1,283.22 through July 30, 2010: $436.78, plus tax, for a total of $465.17 for the year 2008/2009; $448.49, plus tax for a total of $477.64 for the year 2009/2010; and $36.18 of interest on the $448.49. BOT also takes the position that Respondent must either: enter into a lease for the year 2010/2011 and beyond; remove part of his dock structure so that he will preempt only 1,150 square feet of sovereignty submerged land (so as not to require a lease, but only a cost-free consent of use); or remove the entire dock structure. BOT also seeks the imposition of an administrative fine under Rules 18-14.002 and 18-14.005(5). In its First Amended NOV, BOT sought a fine in the amount of $2,500; in its PRO, BOT seeks a fine in the amount of $2,500 for the first offense and $10,000 per day from the issuance of the NOV for repeat offenses. Respondent believes he should not be required to pay any lease fees or fines because of his inability to use his dock structure due to the shoaling of the river caused by the malfunctioning DOT outfall structure. Respondent believes it is DEP’s responsibility to require DOT to remove the silt from the river and make the outfall structure work properly. He believes this is required by the state and federal constitutions, statutes, and rules, and by an unspecified “federal bond issue” or “federal bond agency.” DEP takes the position that the silting from the outfall structure and its adverse impact on Respondent’s ability to use his dock structure is irrelevant because the requirement of a lease is based on preemption of sovereignty submerged land, not on the lessee’s use of the land. DEP also believes that, under an operating agreement among governmental agencies, the St. Johns River Water Management District (SJRWMD), not DEP, is the agency responsible for enforcing the applicable environmental laws and permit conditions against DOT. DOT has indicated to the parties that it is in the process of modifying the outfall structure so that it functions properly but that it does not have the money to remove silt from the river. DEP personnel visited the site at approximately 11:00 a.m. on July 16, 2010, and measured the water in the vicinity of the terminal platform and slips of Respondent’s dock structure to be approximately 36 inches deep, which is deep enough for navigation. DEP did not take measurements in the slips of the dock structure, between the terminal platform and Respondent’s property, or between the vicinity of the terminal platform and the ICW. The evidence was not clear what the tide stage was at the Respondent’s dock structure when DEP measured the water depth. DEP called the tide stage low, or near low, based in part on tidal charts for Ormond Beach and the Halifax River indicating that the tide was low at 11:21 a.m. and high at 4:10 p.m. on July 16, 2010. However, the persuasive evidence was that the tidal chart applied to locations at the beach, and there is a difference in the tides at Respondent’s dock structure and at the beach. It does not appear that the tide was dead low or near dead low at Respondent’s dock structure at 11:00 a.m. on July 16, 2010; it probably was between low and slack, possibly a half foot higher than dead low. Regardless of the measurements taken by DEP on July 16, 2010, Respondent testified that he is not able to operate his boat from his dock structure consistently due to shoaling from the silt. He testified that, as a result, he kept his boat at a marina for a year at a cost of $7,000 but cannot afford to continue to do so.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that BOT enter a final order: (1) that, within 10 days, Respondent sign the appropriate lease renewal and send it, along with $1,283.22 in past due lease fees and interest owed BOT, plus the lease payment for 2010/2011, by cashier’s check or money order made payable to the “Internal Improvement Trust Fund,” with a notation of OGC Case No. 10-1948, sent to 3319 Maguire Boulevard, Suite 232, Submerged Lands and Environmental Resource Program; or (2) that, within 20 days, Respondent remove his dock structure or at least enough of it to preempt no more than 1,150 square feet of sovereignty submerged; and (3) that, within 30 days, Respondent pay BOT a fine in the amount of $2,000, by cashier’s check or money order made payable to the “Internal Improvement Trust Fund,” with a notation of OGC Case No. 10-1948, sent to 3319 Maguire Boulevard, Suite 232, Attention David Herbster, Program Administrator, Submerged Lands and Environmental Resource Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Respondent HRS published ITB 590:2306 for existing rental space in the central area of Brooksville, Florida. The bid solicitation specified a bid opening time and date of 2:00 p.m. July 17, 1991. Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted sealed bids. They were the only two bidders. Neither they nor anyone else timely filed any protest of the bid specifications, and therefore the specifications are not subject to attack in this proceeding. Petitioner received a notice of intent to award the bid for lease 590:2306 to Intervenor by letter from Respondent dated August 27, 1991 and timely filed its notice of intent to protest and formal bid protest. Petitioner accordingly has standing to bring this proceeding. Intervenor is the intended awardee and as such has standing to intervene. Petitioner submitted the property located at 7348 Broad Street, Brooksville, Florida, and showed in his bid submittal form that his proposed property contained 22,500 net square feet, with future expansion of 2,100 square feet available. When Petitioner submitted his bid, it included a floor plan, site plan, and a PUR 7068 form. A PUR 7068 form is a "Public Entity Crime Certification Statement," a sworn statement under Section 287.133(a) F.S. The ITB included two separate requirements for bidders to establish that they have control over the property that they submit to HRS. HRS' purposes in requiring bidders to demonstrate control are to prevent bids based on total speculation, to establish a reasonable expectation that the bidder can meet his obligations if awarded the bid, and to establish a reasonable expectation that the property can be occupied on time. Item 1 on page 3 provides as follows: Control of property - This pertains to both the structure(s) and proposed parking areas. To submit a responsive bid, a prospective lessor must meet one of the following qualifications: a.) Be the owner of record of the facility and parking areas (submit copy of deed). b.) Be the lessee of space being proposed and present with bid, a copy of lease with documen- tation of authorization to sublease the facility and parking areas through the base lease term and all renewal option periods. c.) Submit documentation of an option to purchase the facility and/or parking areas. d.) Submit documentation of an option to lease the facility with authorization to in turn, sublease. Any lease must encompass the entire time period of the basic lease and any renewal option periods as required the state. e.) Submit form PUR. 7068 Sworn Statement of Public Entity Crimes (Attachment H). Page 12 provides, in part, as follows: In order for a bid proposal to be accepted the items 1 through 6 must be included in the bid proposal. Items 7 through 11 must be included, if applicable. [Items 11 and 13 state:] 11. Documentation showing bidder as controller of property. 13. Public Enemy [sic] Crime Certification Statement A pre-bid conference attended by Petitioner made clear that evidence of control and the PUR 7068 form were two different items. Petitioner testified that he attached the PUR 7068 form as his sole basis for evidencing control of the building and parking spaces he submitted for lease, and acknowledged that, in fact, the form did not provide any information with regard to his control of the buildings or parking spaces offered for lease. Petitioner's assertion that his name on some of his site plans, etc. constitutes evidence of control is not persuasive. Such assertion is not in line with the ITB requirements or even common sense. Petitioner Proctor owned the buildings he offered HRS in his bid submittal. Petitioner offered multiple buildings separated by parking areas and driveways. The property offered by Petitioner was to have built an awning- covered walkway between buildings but the walkway would have to be placed through the driveway area of the property. The expansion area for Petitioner's property designated in its bid submittal was composed of approximately 10 gated warehouse units which would be converted to office space. Petitioner had leased a portion of the same premises to HRS for 15 years, and HRS was still leasing that portion at the time of the bid opening. At the time of the bid opening, another portion of the property Petitioner proposed to be leased to HRS was also already rented to other tenants, including a lease to the Florida Department of Labor which was not scheduled to expire until December 31, 1991, one day prior to HRS' proposed first day of occupancy under the ITB. The space leased to the Department of Labor would require some renovation for HRS' use, at least to connect it on the interior with the rest of the building. The remainder of the second, adjacent, building to be rented under Petitioner's bid would require more extensive renovation to create office spaces to meet HRS' needs. In addition to the Department of Labor, Petitioner was also renting space in the second building to a beauty salon, a book store, an office supply store, a clothing store, and a barber at the time of bid submittal and opening and at the time of the formal hearing. These latter tenants were on month-to-month leases. In order to ensure that there would be time for necessary renovations before January 1, 1992 and further to ensure that the property would be available for occupancy on January 1, 1992, the ITB required in the following unequivocal language that all bidders file tenant acknowledgments of the bid/proposed lease with their bid submittal: Existing Tenants: If the offered space or any portion thereof (including parking areas) is at present occupied or will be covered by an active lease(s) at the stated availability date, written documentation by the tenant indicating acknowledgment of the bid and ability to vacate premises by the proposed date must be included with the bid submittal. [Emphasis added] Petitioner submitted no tenant acknowledgments from any of his tenants with his bid to HRS. Even though Petitioner failed to submit evidence of control in the form of a deed and further failed to submit the required acknowledgments from tenants occupying the premises on the bid date, HRS did not immediately disqualify Petitioner's bid as nonresponsive. Instead, HRS evaluated Petitioner's bid simultaneously with Intervenor TCC's bid. HRS relied on old leases in its files and actual knowledge that monthly rent was paid to Petitioner for its own currently leased space, and HRS ignored the absence of tenant acknowledgments with Petitioner's bid. HRS followed this course of action despite the requirement of the ITB on page 7, item 1 under EVALUATION OF BIDS which unequivocally provides: Bids received are first evaluated to determine technical responsiveness. This includes submittal on bid submittal forms, inclusion of required information, data, attachments, signatures and notarization, etc. Non responsive [sic] bids will be withdrawn from further consideration. The portion of the ITB designated, Documents Required To Be Submitted With Bid Submittal For Existing Buildings on page 12, item 4. required bidders to submit "Scale Floor Plans showing present configurations with dimensions." Page 3 of 22, Item 9.(b) further required that, as a part of the bid submittal, bidders were to provide "A scaled (1/16" or 1/8" or 1/4" = 1'0") floor plan showing present configuration with measurements." Contrary to the ITB requirement, Petitioner submitted a floor plan scaled at 1/20" = 1', which also failed to reflect the present configurations with all measurements. Petitioner's scaled floor plan submitted with his bid was prepared prior to the present addition to one building and contained a hand- drawn configuration without accurate measurements for the northwest corner of one building. The term of the lease as shown on the ITB and Bid Submittal Form was 9 and one-half years with an option to renew for 2-5 year renewal periods. At the time of the bid opening on July 17, 1991, the bid submitted by Petitioner failed to have any proposed rental rates shown for "Renewal Options: Option II years 1 through 5." HRS permitted Petitioner to correct or supplement its bid after the bid opening (same date and place) to cover this material omission. Page 6, item 4 of the ITB provided for the property owner or other bidding entity to sign the bid submission. The pertinent part states: 4. Each bid submitted shall be signed by the owner(s) corporate officers, or legal representative(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. ALL BID SUBMITTAL SIGNATURES MUST BE WITNESSED BY TWO PERSONS. [Emphasis appears in ITB] Petitioner Proctor signed his bid submittal in proper person. TCC's bid submittal was signed by Sharon K. Lane, "Executive Director," of TCC Number 3 Ltd. Inc., Intervenor herein. At all times material, TCC Number 3 Ltd. Inc. has been a Florida corporation. At the time of the bid opening, Ms. Lane was TCC's sole shareholder and "all officers." At the time of formal hearing, Ms. Lane remained the sole shareholder, but others had assumed some of the corporate offices. Her status at the time of the bid submittal was sufficient for her to bid on behalf of the TCC corporation and to execute the PUR 7068 form on that corporation's behalf. Intervenor TCC submitted the required PUR 7068 form, but TCC submitted as sole evidence of control an undated, unrecorded "Contract for Sale and Purchase" by and between Hernando Plaza Ltd. as Seller and Intervenor TCC as Buyer, for the property which Intervenor was offering for lease to HRS. The best date assignable to this document is April 29, 1991. It was executed on behalf of Hernando Plaza Ltd. by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves as general partners of the limited partnership. TCC's obligation to proceed to closing under the foregoing contract was contingent upon TCC's securing an anchor tenant. However, the contract requires TCC to take steps to secure an anchor tenant. By its terms, TCC may purchase the property with or without an anchor tenant, but the contract requires TCC, in seeking an anchor tenant, to set time limits for the lease arrangement with the proposed anchor tenant which do not necessarily accord with the timing of HRS' bid process. HRS accepted TCC's contract to purchase from Hernando Plaza Ltd., as evidence of TCC's control of the premises offered by TCC for lease, believing it to constitute an option to purchase and the necessary evidence of control as required by the ITB. (See, Finding of Fact 6, supra.) At the time of the bid opening, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with a legal entity other than the record title owner of the property, which record title owner was and is the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation (Brown Foundation). See, infra. Up to that date, at least, Hernando Plaza Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as the owner of the property. The ITB did not require that an abstract of title be submitted with the bid, and HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contains provisions for future disclosure from successful bidders. (See, ITB item 5 under Requirements for Bidders to Submit Bids.) Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS attempts to protect itself by requiring successful bidders to put up an irrevocable letter of credit for one-half of one percent of the proposed lease rental obligation over the basic lease term as a penalty in the event a successful bidder cannot perform. (See, ITB page 4, item 10.) Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s certificate from the Florida Secretary of State expired December 31, 1981. That fact was advertised and the certificate cancelled July 16, 1982. At that time, Edward M. Strawgate was listed as a general partner and Harold Brown was listed as a limited partner of Hernando Plaza Ltd. Hernando Plaza Ltd. had been administratively dissolved for failure to file its annual report. Subsequent to the time that Intervenor submitted its bid proposal, but prior to formal hearing, Hernando Plaza Ltd. was reinstated by the Florida Secretary of State. Once reinstated, the limited partnership's ability to act related back and validated its prior actions. At all times material, the record title of the property offered by Intervenor TCC for lease to HRS was owned by "Harold Brown, Lillian Brown and Muriel Kahr as Trustees of the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation." This title is derived from a recorded June 30, 1967 warranty deed from Hernando Plaza Ltd., which deed was admitted in evidence at formal hearing. The warranty deed was not attached to TCC's bid submittal. Neither TCC, the corporation, nor Sharon K. Lane, individually, held any authority as agent to submit a bid to HRS on behalf of the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. There is also in evidence a recorded December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease between the Brown Foundation and City National Bank. That Amendment to Lease also was not attached to TCC's bid submittal to evidence control of the premises TCC was offering to lease to HRS. That Amendment to Lease also recites that Hernando Plaza Ltd. leased back the subject property from the Brown Foundation by a lease dated June 30, 1967. The June 30, 1967 lease was not recorded, was not part of TCC's bid submittal, and is not in evidence. The December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease goes on to recite that Hernando Plaza Ltd. has assigned its lessee interest under the June 30, 1967 lease to City National Bank by a March 14, 1978 assignment. There is also in evidence a recorded March 14, 1978 "Assignment of Lessee's Interest in Lease from Hernando Plaza Ltd. to City National Bank." This assignment was not part of TCC's bid submittal. The December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease goes on to further recite that the Brown Foundation has "agreed to give and grant to [Hernando Plaza Ltd.] an option to purchase the property." The remainder of the December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease details the terms or conditions of the option to purchase granted by the Brown Foundation to Hernando Plaza. For instance, in order to exercise that option to purchase the subject property from the Brown Foundation, Hernando Plaza Ltd., among other requirements, would have to demonstrate that all the terms of the unrecorded June 30, 1967 lease are "in good standing." One may reasonably infer that "in good standing" would at a bare minimum mean that the rents under the lease are paid current at the time the option is exercised, but what the other terms of the lease might be are subject to pure conjecture. TCC's bid submittal did not include documentation that the June 30, 1967 lease was "in good standing." There is also in evidence a recorded June 7, 1989 Trustee's Deed (quitclaim deed of the trustee's interest) from City National Bank's successor bank/trustee to Hernando Plaza Ltd. The Trustee's Deed also was not attached to TCC's bid submittal. On the date of bid submittal/opening neither TCC, the corporation, nor Sharon K. Lane, individually, held any authority as agent to submit a bid on behalf of Hernando Plaza Ltd. or City National Bank's successor. At formal hearing, TCC submitted an October 24, 1991 written hearsay statement by Harold Brown as Trustee of the Brown Foundation to the effect that Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s December 18, 1985 option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation was "in full force and effect" and that the June 30, 1967 lease back from the Brown Foundation to Hernando Plaza Ltd. was "in full force and effect and that the lessee is in good standing thereunder." Assuming these items may be considered in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.58 (1) F.S. as supplementing or explaining direct evidence, they still do not clarify in any way what all the terms of the unrecorded 1967 lease are or that those terms will remain in good standing on the date in the future that Hernando Plaza Ltd. elects to exercise its option, if it elects to exercise its option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation so that Hernando Plaza Ltd. may, in turn, convey the property to TCC, pursuant to Hernando Plaza Ltd. and TCC's April 29, 1991 contract for sale and purchase. Oddly enough, there is further explanatory hearsay that on October 24, 1991, Harold Brown was a trustee of the Brown Foundation and that he also was the sole limited partner of Hernando Plaza Ltd., although TCC's contract with Hernando Plaza for sale and purchase previously indicated Harold Brown was one of two general partners. Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation must be exercised by Hernando Plaza Ltd. before Hernando Plaza Ltd. can honor its contract to purchase/sell to TCC. Since there is no record evidence that the June 30, 1967 lease from the Brown Foundation as lessor to Hernando Plaza Ltd. as lessee will be in good standing on whatever future date Hernando Plaza Ltd. attempts to exercise its option with the Brown Foundation, one may only speculate both as to when and if TCC will be able to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza Ltd. TCC has only an option to become owner of the subject property at some unspecified date conditioned upon Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s first successfully exercising its option from the Brown Foundation and further conditioned upon all the terms of TCC's contract with Hernando Plaza Ltd. Apparently, TCC's only recourse to enforce its contract with Hernando Plaza Ltd. is a Circuit Court action for specific performance. TCC also submitted a site plan and floor plan with its bid submittal. The ITB required that offices on outside walls must provide windows. TCC's plans did not reflect windows in two sides of the building, but given HRS' retaining the right to partially design and locate its own halls and offices during the building's renovation, TCC's failure to show windows in the two outside walls is not, in and of itself, a material, disqualifying deviation from the ITB so as to unilaterally render TCC's bid nonresponsive. HRS staff member Donald J. Cerlanek prepared a bid synopsis of each bid. This involved completing a form from the HRS leasing manual which illustrates the characteristics of each of the bids. The bid requirements included evaluation criteria and a maximum amount of points which could be awarded for each criteria item. Five HRS bid evaluation committee members executed no conflict of interest forms. These were: Thomas C. Little Jr., David Thomley, Sylvia Smoot, Harvey Whitesides, and Mary Hawks. All committee members were given copies of the bid synopsis form to use in evaluating the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Some of the committee members did not obtain or review the actual bid submissions of each of the bidders, but all of them had access to the bid submissions and read the bid synopsis forms for both Petitioner's and Intervenor's bid submittals. The bid evaluation committee members, except for Mary Hawks, made site visits to the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Ms. Hawks essentially acted only as a facilitator or conduit for the evaluations of the other four evaluators as set out infra. The four site evaluators took notes regarding each location. The four site evaluators each assigned numerical weights to each item of evaluation criteria except for the rent and renewal rent portions of the evaluation criteria. Although on their site visits some committee members visiting TCC's site may have seen a color version of an artist's rendering of what TCC's project could look like after renovation was complete, a black and white version of the same artist's rendering was attached to TCC's bid submittal to which all committee members had access, and it is found that this situation in and of itself presented no false or misleading information nor constituted any prejudice to a fair bid process/evaluation. Likewise, although some evaluators discussed expansion prospects with TCC's and/or Proctor's on-site representatives, the evidence is credible and persuasive that each evaluator who visited the sites assessed the projects' respective expansion prospects substantially upon what they saw on each site and had experienced in Proctor's existing facility. The points awarded and reasons for the recommendations of each evaluator who visited the sites were reasonably based on specific needs of HRS. These specific needs of HRS were reasonably articulated by the two evaluators who made on-site inspections and who also testified at formal hearing and were reasonably set out in writing in the written notes of the two other evaluators who did not testify. Thomas C. Little, Jr., testified that he found the Intervenor's property superior as a result of the security problems at Petitioner's locations, the closer proximity of the courthouse, hospital, and health department to Intervenor's property and the superiority of a single building offered by Intervenor versus multiple buildings offered by Petitioner. Additionally, he found the esthetics of Petitioner's buildings lacking and expansion offered by Petitioner limited and was concerned that HRS would outgrow the space due to the fact that their service area is one of the most rapidly growing in Florida. His contemporaneous notes were to the same effect. Sylvia Smoot, also a member of the evaluation committee, testified that she found Intervenor's facility superior based on its proximity to the courthouse, hospitals, and other key locations, and its flexibility of design and concentration of space in one building. She further found Petitioner's location lacking as a result of the three separate buildings, its limited expansion room, and the necessity for redirecting clients between buildings, and the difficulty for elderly and handicapped clients accessing Petitioner's building. Her contemporaneous notes were to the same effect. Evaluators Whitesides and Thomley made substantially similar contemporaneous notes justifying their scoring of the two bidders. Three of the four site evaluators met as a group following the site visits and discussed the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. All four of the site evaluators made recommendations to accept the property for lease proposed by Intervenor, but they did not all confer and jointly develop a single recommendation to the facilities manager. The points assigned by each of the four site evaluators for the properties proposed by Petitioner and Intervenor were as follows: Evaluation Committee TCC Number Member's Names Proctor's Points 3's Points Thomley 75 98 Little 78 93 Whitesides 74 95 Smoot 80 91 307 377 The rent portion of the evaluation criteria was ascertained by applying present value methodology as set forth in the HRS leasing manual to the annual rents offered by the bidders. The discount factor was 8.32 percent. The present value of Proctor's bid was $1,934,038 and the present value of TCC's bid was $2,028,316. The leasing manual is considered advisory only. It advises present values be made, a determination of the difference in amounts be calculated and a comparison of the difference be made to determine a percentage. Thereafter, the percentage is applied to the maximum amount of points allocated for rent in the evaluation criteria. The lowest present value receives the maximum number of points allocated, and, thus, Proctor was awarded 35 points. TCC received 33 points, based upon the fact that its present value of rent was close to the present value submitted by Proctor. No penalty is imposed to a bidder whose rental amounts is higher than the lowest bidder. No benefit is conferred upon the lowest cost bidder over the next lowest bidder. Mary Hawks, Manager for Administrative Services, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, received each of the individual evaluation recommendations from Thomley, Little, Whitesides and Smoot. As a result of travel restrictions placed on the HRS, the four site evaluators and Ms. Hawks, who was also a fifth committee member, did not meet as a group following the site visits although three of the four site evaluators did meet collectively following the site visits. (See Finding of Fact 43-44, supra.) The committee members could have met by telephone conference call but Mary Hawks found it unnecessary to do so because there was such a clear evaluation in favor of Intervenor based on the total composite evaluation scores of 377 for Intervenor and only 307 for Petitioner, out of a total of 400 points. She assigned no points herself but approved their recommendations and forwarded a single recommendation in favor of TCC for ultimate approval by HRS management. Mary Hawks had spoken to the evaluation committee members subsequent to the evaluation and no member had expressed any reservation regarding his/her evaluation or a need to meet to discuss anything additional regarding the bid evaluation. The HRS Intent to Award to TCC subsequently issued. The evaluation process and formula for rent evaluation are not among the more commonly used methods but were reasonable and rational and fairly applied to the bids in this case. No conflict of interest in the evaluation committee members was demonstrated by Petitioner in these proceedings.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order finding that: The bid of TCC Number 3 Ltd. is nonresponsive; The bid of Derick Proctor is nonresponsive; Declining to award the bid for Lease No. 590:2306 to either bidder. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of December, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5963BID The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Proctor's 74 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted, except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the recommended order (RO). Unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative material has not been utilized: 1-3, sentence 1 of PFOF 4, 5-6, 9, 11-12, sentence 1 of PFOF 13, sentence 1 of PFOF 16, 17-26, sentence 1 of PFOF 29, 30-33, 35-36, sentences 1 and 4 of PFOF 38, 39-41, 44-54, 56-57, 60-61, 63. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute a proposed conclusion of law (PCOL) or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: sentences 2 and 3 of PFOF 4, sentence 2 of PFOF 16, 34, 43. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 10, sentence 2 of PFOF 13, 14- 15, sentence 2 of PFOF 29, sentences 2 and 3 of PFOF 38, 55, 58. PFOF 7-8 are accepted as modified because parts are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found and other parts are mere recitations of unreconciled portions of the record and legal argument. The following PFOF are accepted in part but not utilized because parts are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found, and other parts are rejected as immaterial to the dispositive issues herein, although correctly quoted from the record: 68-73. The following PFOF are rejected as immaterial or not dispositive: 27-28, 37, 42, 59, 62, 65, 67, 74. The following PFOF are covered in preliminary material: 64, 66. HRS 21 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the RO. Material unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative has not been utilized: 1-4, 6-8, 11-12, 16-19. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute PCOL or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: 5, 9-10, 14-15, 21. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 20. PFOF 13 is accepted as modified to correctly reflect the credible record evidence as a whole. TCC Number 3 75 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the RO. Material unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative has not been utilized: 1-31, 34-38, 42- 45, 47-48, 56, 58-60, 64-69, 71-75. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute PCOL or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: 32. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 33, 40-41, 53-55, 57, 61-63, 70. The following PFOF are rejected as immaterial or as not dispositive: 39, 46, 49, 51-52. PFOF 50 is not a sentence, but the subject matter is covered in the RO as understood. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas V. Infantino, Esquire Infantino & Berman Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, FL 32790 Ralph McMurphy, Esquire HRS District 3 Legal Office 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32609 B. Gray Gibbs, Esquire Sam Power, Clerk Bette B. Lehmberg, Esquire Department of Health and Suite 800 Rehabilitative Services One 4th Street North 1323 Winewood Boulevard St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Labor and Employment Security, acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in rejecting the bid of the Petitioners to lease office space to the Respondent on the ground that the proposed space was not "dry and measurable" at the time of the bid.
Findings Of Fact The bid specifications in the solicitation by the Respondent, the Department of Labor and Employment Security (DLES) for its Lease No. 540:0977 (office space in Orange County) required that proposed space be in an existing building "dry and capable of being physically measured to determine net rentable square footage at the time of bid submittal." The requirement that proposed office space in response to Lease No. 540:0977 be "dry and measurable," as described in the preceding finding, is a long-standing, standard requirement found in the bid specification form developed by the Department of Management Services (DMS) (formerly the Department of General Services (DGS)) for use by all agencies of the State of Florida. DMS' (and, formerly, DGS') long-standing interpretation of the "dry and measurable" requirement in the standard bid specification form is that the building must have a roof and walls, with windows either in place or covered over so that the building interior stays dry in adverse weather conditions. In response to the DLES solicitation for bids for its Lease No. 540:0977, the Petitioners submitted a bid for space in a former Publix strip shopping mall, formerly known as the Northgate Shopping Center, located at 5023 Edgewater Drive, in Winter Park, Florida. At the time of the bid, the mall was unoccupied and in the process of being renovated and was a designated construction site. The building had been gutted, and the glass in the front of the building had been removed. The glass could be referred to as "windows" but actually would make up the top two-thirds of the front wall of the building. As a result, without the glass, the front "wall" consisted of a three to four foot rise of concrete blocks, and the front of the building was otherwise open. There was a 12-foot, eight-inch overhang over the front "wall," but wind-blown rain could enter the building, and apparently did. (There was standing water on the floor of the gutted building. There also were missing or unsecure doors along the back wall of the building.) When Susan Early, the DLES employee in charge of the bid solicitation, received the Petitioners' bid and saw the photographs of the building required by the bid solicitation, she questioned whether the building was "dry and measurable." To help answer her question, she asked another DLES employee, who was located in the Orlando area, to go to the site, take pictures, and send a report of her findings, together with the photographs. The report and photographs indicated to Early that the building was not "dry and measurable." But, instead of relying on the information she had, she sent another, Tallahassee-based DLES employee to the site and received confirmation of her understanding as to the condition of the building. She then contacted Mary Goodman, the person at DMS who had the most experience in the area of soliciting and evaluating bids of leased office space, and who ultimately would be responsible for approving the DLES lease. Goodman advised Early that the DLES should reject the Petitioners' bid as non-responsive because it was not "dry and measurable." The DLES also rejected, as being non-responsive, the only other bid received in response to the bid solicitation. In the Final Order, The Koger Company v. Div. of Admin. Hearings, DOAH Case No. 88-3357BID, entered September 21, 1988, the Division of Administrative Hearings rejected a bid as not offering "dry and measurable" space because the building "had a roof, a slab, and walls, which comprised 50 percent of the vertical plane from the slab to the roof." The bidder's argument that the building "had a four foot overhang" and that "the overhang prevented rain from entering the building" was rejected as not being credible "given the large amount of window space which was not enclosed." The winning bid, which was upheld as being a "dry and measurable" was an abandoned bowling alley that "had walls, a slab, and portions of the exterior walls were boarded over, possibly in the location of existing windows or window openings. The roof did have a hole, which was approximately three feet in length and allowed water to leak into the building." (Citations to the record omitted.) The facts derived from the Final Order, The Koger Company v. Div. of Admin. Hearings, supra, do not in themselves prove that the DLES acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in rejecting the Petitioners' bid. Although the Petitioners' bid in this case was for a building that once had a certificate of occupancy, the Petitioners' bid in this case is more similar in other respects to the rejected bid than the successful bid in the Koger Company case. For example, like the rejected bid in the Koger Company case, the Petitioners' bid had partial exterior walls. The Petitioners proved that they also submitted a bid for the lease of office space in the Northgate Shopping Center in response to a bid solicitation by the Florida Department of Corrections (Parole and Probation Commission). The bid was evaluated, along with others, and the lease was awarded to another bidder. It can be inferred from this that the Department of Corrections made a determination that the Petitioners' bid was "dry and measurable." However, those facts alone do not prove the DLES, in this case, acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly. They only would prove that the two agencies interpreted the phrase "dry and measurable" differently. There also was evidence that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) interprets the phrase "dry and measurable" differently than DLES does. But it was not proven whether HRS would have accepted a bid for space having the characteristics of the Petitioners' bid. The Petitioners argued persuasively from the evidence presented that the requirement that bid space be "dry," as interpreted by the DMS and the DLES, can be impractical when applied to the real world of building renovations and may exclude possible good lease opportunities. Sometimes, space in a building under construction or substantial renovation can be leased at lower rates. Presumably for that reason, the Department of Corrections (Parole and Probation Commission) and HRS interpret the requirement differently. But, given the requirement that bid space be "dry," it cannot be said that the DLES acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in rejecting the Petitioners' bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Labor and Employment Security, enter a final order rejecting the bid of the Petitioners to lease office space to the Department in Winter Park, Florida, Lease Number 540:0977. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3922BID To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-3. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. It should be noted, however, that the missing "windows" in front made up approximately two-thirds of the front wall of the building. Rejected as not proven, according to the DLES interpretation of the "dry and measurable" requirement, that the bid space was "existing." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. It should again be noted that the missing "windows" in front made up approximately two-thirds of the front wall of the building. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected in part as not proven, in part as argument, and in part as irrelevant. It also should again be noted that the missing "windows" in front made up approximately two-thirds of the front wall of the building. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. In part, rejected as irrelevant and not proven. (Evidence as to the HRS manual and related facts was excluded as being irrelevant.) The rest is accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Irrelevant and unnecessary. (It was established at the hearing that the Petitioners' bid was rejected only because the bid space was not "dry"; DLES does not contend that it was not "measurable.") Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. In part, irrelevant, subordinate and unnecessary (what Mr. Taylor's definition is.) In part, cumulative. In part, rejected as argument. In part, accepted and incorporated (that the requirement that bid space be "dry," as interpreted by the DMS and the DLES, can be impractical when applied to the real world of building renovations and may exclude possible good lease opportunities.) Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. (Assuming it acts consistently from case to case, an agency's choice not to waive technicalities cannot be called "acting fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly.") Rejected as being argument and as not proven. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Except for the number of square feet, which is in error, accepted and incorporated. 2.-5. Accepted and incorporated. 6. Rejected as contrary to the findings of fact and the greater weight of the evidence that there were no walls in front. (They extended only about a third of the way up to the ceiling.) 7.-8. Accepted and incorporated. 9. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan Taylor 170 East Lake Elbert Winter Haven, Florida 33881 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle South East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Shirley Gooding, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle South East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn, Esquire Chief Legal Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle South East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
