The Issue Whether or not Respondent's real estate license should be disciplined, because, as alleged, Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises and pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction; failed to place a trust deposit with her employing broker and operated as a broker while licensed as a salesman in violation of Subsections 475.25(1)(b), and (k), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact During times material hereto, Respondent, Barbara B. Wise, was a licensed real estate salesman in Florida, having been issued license number 0484022. The last license issued Respondent was as a salesman, c/o Grover Goheen Realty, Inc., at 414 Twelfth Avenue, North, St. Petersburg, Florida. During October 1988, Respondent, while licensed and operating as a salesman in the employ of her broker, Goheen Realty, Inc., solicited and obtained a lease listing agreement from Michael Riggins. As a result of that listing, Marsha Tenny contacted Respondent and requested assistance in obtaining a seasonal lease for the period January 1989 through April 30, 1989. Ms. Tenny made Respondent aware of her needs respecting a lease property to include wheelchair access as her husband was wheelchair bound. As a result of visiting approximately three available units, Respondent secured a seasonal lease from Michael Riggins for Marsha Tenny. The lease agreement for the Tenny's was the first rental listing that Respondent had obtained and it suffices to say that she was a novice in the area of securing lease agreements. Likewise, her employing broker did very little volume in rentals as her broker was of the opinion that the net commissions were not sufficient to defray the time and effort involved for several reasons including the limited availability of rental properties. As a result, her broker was unable to provide guidance. Pursuant to the aforementioned lease agreement, Respondent named several options by which Marsha Tenny could secure the apartment to include sending a personal check to her and after negotiating it she would in turn pay the rental fees directly to the landlord. Other options included Ms. Tenny sending separate checks to the landlord for the apartment and a check for the commission fees to her employing broker or she could deal directly with the landlord and remit a separate check to her employing broker for fees. Ms. Tenny elected to send a money order in the amount of $1,500.00 to Respondent. After she negotiated the check she received from Marsha Tenny, Respondent retained her commissions and did not pay her broker the pro-rata share that the broker was entitled to. Respondent did not inform her broker of the Riggins/Tenny lease agreement when she received the deposit from the Tennys on or about October 23, 1988. Respondent negotiated the Tenny's deposit check by depositing same into her personal account and drew a check in the amount of $1,100.00 as the rental deposit and remitted it to Mr. Riggins on October 2.1, 1988. Respondent retained the $400.00 balance as her fee. Respondent tendered her employing broker its portion of the commission fees ($174.00) on February 24, 1989. During early February 1989, the Tennys expressed dissatisfaction with the apartment and demanded a refund from Respondent. Respondent wrote the Tennys a letter of apology and submitted a money order to Marsha Tenny in the amount of $50.00 on February 3, 1989. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4.) As stated, Respondent was inexperienced with the rental business in Pinellas County. She was at the time undergoing other family problems, including tending to a sister in Orange County, Florida, who was very ill. At the time, Respondent commuted from Pinellas County to Orange County several times per week to visit with and assist her sister. Additionally, Respondent's office was being relocated and the staff was having to relay messages to her through her husband and other salesman employed with her broker. In addition to sending the Tennys a money order in the amount of $50.00, Respondent agreed to repay the Tennys the entire remaining balance of the finders fee that she received from the Riggins/Tenny leasing agreement as soon as she was financially able to do so. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent be issued a written reprimand and placed on probation for a period of one (1) year. During the probationary period, Respondent shall enroll in an approved post-licensure course and shall satisfactorily complete the same prior to termination of probation. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1990. Steven W. Johnson, Esquire DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Barbara B. Wise 1059 42nd Avenue, N.E. St. Petersburg, Florida 33703 Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Kenneth E. Easley, Esq. Division of Real Estate Department of Prof. Reg. 400 West Robinson Street 1940 North Monroe Street Post Office Box 1900 Suite 60 Orlando, Florida 32802 Tallahassee, FL 32399
The Issue The questions presented here concern the entitlement of the Petitioner or Intervenor to be awarded lease rights under the Respondent's proposed Lease No. 590:8026, in that Petitioner and Intervenor have claimed that entitlement to the exclusion of the other party.
Findings Of Fact Respondent invited bid proposals for the provision of approximately 32,000 square feet of office space for its District VIII operation in Fort Myers, Florida. Petitioner, Chuck Bundschu, Inc., and Intervenor, Walter Lee Johnson d/b/a Walco Leasing Company, responded to the bid proposal by offering to provide the office space. Those responses may be found as part of the Composite Hearing Officer's Exhibit. Following the October, 1981, submittal of bid proposals, a bid evaluation committee was appointed by the Subdistrict Administrator for District VIII to consider the bids. In turn, he afforded guidance to that committee on the subject of the evaluation of the proposed bids offered by Bundschu and Walco, the only bidders for the project. The evaluation committee performed the task of weighing the bid proposals, in keeping with evaluation criteria which are outlined in Respondent's "Facilities, Acquisition and Management Manual" dealing with the procurement of lease space, which criteria are set forth in a form referred to as "HRSM 70-1, page A1-4-8," which is attached to chapter four of the manual. All criteria used for the evaluation process were drawn from that form with the exception of criterion No. 7, related to staff and client marking which was a product of this bid evaluation effort. (A copy of the HRS manual and forms may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. The evaluation committee's summarization utilizing the form criteria and the additional parking criterion may be found as a part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit, which is a replication of the original.) The HRS manual for procuring leased space is a publication of February, 1980, and establishes uniform guidelines by which bid proposals are considered by local officials who are part of Respondent's organization. Nonetheless, the exact weight to be afforded each criterion outlined in the manual is determined by the local evaluation committee. Weighing concerns the subject of awarding numerical values for beach bidder related to the various criteria with a maximum possible score being 100 points. On the basis of the evaluation performed by the committee, the Bundschu total was 88.25 points and the The Walco point total was 82 out of the possible 100 points. Consequently, the evaluation committee recommended that Bundschu be awarded the lease. Mark Geisler, in his capacity as Subdistrict Administrator, for District VIII, concurred in this evaluation as may be seen in his November 6, 1981, transmittal of the bid materials and associated evaluation, which transmittal may be found as pert of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit. The District Administrator, District VII, in the person of Frances Clendenin, who was acting for the District Administrator, Ivor D. Groves, Ph.D., also recommended acceptance of the Bundschu bid. This position was made known by a memorandum of November 16, 1981. A copy of that recommendation is found as a part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit. The recommendations spoken to thus far were made known to Lester C. Missman, an official within the Division of General Services of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. This division was, at the time of the bid proposals, and is now, headed by Dr. Homer Ooten, whose function within Respondent's organization includes the responsibility to evaluate lease proposals involving the Respondent agency and to make a final decision on the question of the lease award, based upon a review of the local subordinate unit's recommendation. By this, it is meant that the lease by Health and Rehabilitative Services as "user agency" is signed by Ooten based upon a delegation of authority to him through the vehicle of correspondence signed by the agency head. Ooten, upon considering the recommendation of the District Administrator's office, the Subdistrict Administrator and the evaluation committee, did not find fault with the criteria nor the point weighing scheme used in the evaluation process. He did question the cost analysis performed by the evaluation committee on the subject of client mileage for those clients receiving services from Respondent in a move from the HRS office in the Bundschu building where they were located at the time, to the building where Walco intended to let property. This was a distance of seven/tenths (7/10) of a mile and based upon the number of clients receiving services, there would be an estimated $100,000.00 in client mileage cost increase. This item was not deemed to be an appropriate consideration by Ooten and was disregarded in his review of the cost analysis performed by the evaluation committee. That cost analysis may be found as part of Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 2, and includes interlineations by Ooten in his opinion on the subject of the cost analysis. That analysis had indicated an overall advantage of approximately $11,000.00 in favor of Bundschu and was premised upon costs related to Item 12 in the criteria, which criterion is cost of moving. It assumed a difference of over $131,000.00 in moving costs, the majority of which costs pertained to client inconvenience ($100,000.00), discounting $120,000.00 plus dollars related to the difference in the bid amount between the Walco and Bundschu bids which bid estimate was in favor of Walco. Ooten's opinion on the subject of the priority of including $100,000.00 plus dollars in clients' travel costs, when considered in the context of point awards under Item 12 in the criteria, lead Ooten to believe that the differential in point awards would not result in a 9.25 value of Bundschu versus a zero value for Walco. In his mind, the differential would be much less. Ooten made his own evaluation of moving costs per se, and through that process determined that approximately $15,600.00 would be necessary for a move into the Walco facility whereas $5,600.00 would be involved in the Bundschu move, which required the expansion of existing space in the Bundschu facility. Based upon an evaluation of the point differential in the rental rate criterion which was a differential of 2, that is 30 points out of a possible 30 for Walco and 28 points out of a possible 30 for Bundschu, Ooten also opined the this was an unreasonable assessment in view of the fact that the Walco bid amount was more than $120,000.00 less than the Bundschu bid. This taken together with the fact that there only existed approximately a $9,000.00 difference on moving costs between Bundschu and Walco, which was in favor of Bundschu, and there having been indicated a 9.25 out of a possible 10 point difference in Item 12 on the question of costs related to moving, led Ooten to believe that the true factual status of criteria Nos. 1 and 12 was not as depicted by the evaluation committee. Per Ooten, with proper assessment Walco would have received a higher point count than Bundschu through the process of applying the bid criteria, as well as being the lower bidder from the point of view of rental rates alone. After several exchanges with the District level personnel of Respondent who had been involved in the lease evaluation process, in which, on two (2) occasions, the local officials continued to support their initial opinion of the propriety of the award to Bundschu, a decision was made at the District VIII level to support the award of the lease to Walco as may be seen in the January 6, 1982, correspondence from the District Administrator to Missman, a copy of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 4, admitted into evidence. On January 6, 1982, Ooten issued a letter to the District VIII Administrative Services Director indicating the authority to award Lease No. 590:8026, formerly referred to as No. 590:1472, for the benefit of Walter Lee Johnson d/b/a Walco Leasing Company. Having learned of this decision and in keeping with the provision Subsection 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, Bundschu, through counsel, indicated opposition to that award on January 12, 1982, followed by a formal petition letter setting forth grounds for the opposition, which petition was filed on January 19, 1982. This series of documents is part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit, through copies. Subsequently, Items 4 and 6 in the petition letter were resolved between the parties without the necessity of a hearing and this is borne out by a copy of the February 1, 1982, correspondence from counsel for the Respondent to counsel to the Petitioner, part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit. The matter was then referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing by correspondence from the Assistant General Counsel for Respondent, dated February 4, 1982, a copy of which may be found as a part of the Hearing Officer's Composite Exhibit. There followed the intervention of Walter Lee Johnson as a party of record and the hearing was held on April 27, 1982. Petitioner's first contention deals with the idea of discounting the lease value based on the value of the "stream of future lease payments." This theory is contended for through Robert Sizemore, C.P.A., expert witness of the Petitioner. He would call for the discount of lease payments on the theory that present dollars will have a discounted value in the future, as the lease period unfolds. Taking into account the method of payment by the Respondent and the vicissitudes involved in attempting to establish the value of today's dollar at a future time, this theory of discounted dollars at a 10 percent or 12 percent rate per annum in succeeding years is not indicated. Assessment through the legislative appropriations process of sufficient funds to meet lease payment demands is not contingent upon the value of the dollar at any given point in the history of the lease. Therefore, the "stream of future lease payments" concept is inapplicable here. Likewise, trying to project the value of today's dollar at some future date is so tenuous as to be an unacceptable method to evaluate the competing lease proposals. Finally, even if this method was used, a 10 percent discount rate for inflation would leave approximately a $67,000.00 difference in the bid proposals and a 12 percent per annum discount rate related to inflation would leave approximately $52,000.00 difference in the bid proposals, in favor of the Walco bid. Petitioner has contended that Respondent failed to properly account for direct moving expenses. In that regard, the calculations made by Ooten on the question of moving expenses as reported above are accepted as fact. As a third claim, Petitioner has alleged the agency s disregard for recommendation of its evaluation committee in making the lease award. While the initial recommendations of the evaluation committee and staff were disregarded, the District Administrator eventually accepted the point of view of the Division of General Services within the Respondent's Department. Moreover, even if the local officials within the Respondent's Department had not accepted Ooten's viewpoint, the initial evaluation committee's development of criteria was flawed and the Ooten perception was correct, leading to a decision in favor of Walco. Finally, the contention by Petitioner that the agency did not seek adequate input from third parties affected by the relocation of the facility was not demonstrated through testimony. The method for review of the proposed lease was acceptable and to the extent that it required an appreciation and response to the needs of others not directly involved in the lease process, it has been amply afforded. Evaluation was in keeping with Respondent's "Facilities, Acquisition and Management Manual, HRSM 70-1, fourth chapter" and the award is based upon concurrence of the Division Director of the General Services Division of HRS pursuant to that chapter. Through argument, counsel for the Petitioner has also referred to the fact that in the initial evaluation process set forth in the sixth criterion, superior points of 2.5 for Walco as opposed to 2.25 for Bundschu had been awarded, when in fact the narrative summary of the reasons for such awards indicate an advantage to Bundschu. Even if the .25 points were allowed in the favor of Bundschu, this would not change the result.
Findings Of Fact Case No. 80-767 Count I In 1976, Ms. Kay E. Davis bought a house from Home America Realty, Inc., and Home America, Inc. at 11700 North 58 Street, Tampa, Florida, the Respondent's principal place of business. On or about May 26, 1976, the Respondent offered to Ms. Davis a color television set in exchange for sending Respondent a referral who would purchase a home. Ms. Davis was and is not registered as a real estate broker or salesman in Florida or any other state. Subsequent to the closing of the purchase by Ms. Davis, one of her friends, Brenda Kelly, purchased a home from the Respondent. Ms. Davis believed that she was responsible for the referral and contacted the Respondent's office concerning the color television. After the closing and over a period of several months, Ms. Davis called Home America to complain about problems with her house. In response to her complaints, the exterior of the house was cleaned and a check for $110.00 was sent to her in settlement of a claim concerning carpeting. During this period of time, a check for $200.00 was sent to Ms. Davis following a telephone conversation between Ms. Davis and the Respondent's secretary. Ms. Davis never received a color television from the Respondent or spoke to him directly about the $200.00 in lieu of a color television set. The $200.00 was not knowingly paid by the Respondent as a referral fee; rather, it was an attempt on the Respondent's part to settle the ongoing problems involving Ms. Davis' home. Count II Prior to the hearing, counsel for the Respondent moved that Count II be dismissed, based upon a letter he received on May 19, 1980, from counsel for the Board of Real Estate informing him that on May 19, 1980, following an investigation the Board dismissed this part of its complaint (CD 18645) against the Respondent. Ruling was reserved on this Motion and the Respondent presented testimony and evidence on this Count. Counsel for Respondent was never informed by the Board that Count II of the complaint was not in fact dismissed as represented in the May 19, 1980, letter until October 23, 1980, the day of the formal hearing. Case No. 80-1225 On November 21, 1977 Mr. and Mrs. Richard Caplano purchased a home at 4611 East Seneca Drive, Tampa, Florida, from Respondents Home America Realty, Inc. and Bekiempis through their salesman, Robert Knisley. At the time Mr. Knisley first showed the Caplanos the property, the site was under construction, unsodded and survey markers were not in place. Although a chain link fence was visible on the east side of the property, it would have been difficult to determine the legal boundary lines because of the condition of the site. The visible fence was 10 feet beyond and parallel to the actual property line. The lot purchased by the Gaplanos was 60 feet in width. The lot directly behind the Gaplanos was 70 feet wide. The Caplanos were furnished with an accurate survey of the property either five days after the contract was signed or at the closing. At the closing, the Caplanos understood that they were purchasing a sixty foot lot and never believed or were told that their lot was 70 feet wide. Prior to closing, the lot was sodded beyond the boundary lines to include easements on both sides of the street and the 10 feet up to the fence line. It was the customary practice of Home America, Inc. , to sod beyond property lines after the completion of construction of a lot to improve the appearance of a neighborhood. Such action was not intended to mislead purchasers as to the location of their property lines. The misunderstanding between the Caplanos and Mr. Knisley arose not out of any attempt by Mr. Knisley to misrepresent or mislead, but rather out of Mr. Knisley's erroneous and unintentional attempt to locate the property lines and survey markers. Case No. 80-789 On or about November 10, 1976, the Respondent contracted with Ronald Faber for the sale of a house and lot located at Lot 1, Allbright Shores Subdivision. At the time Ronald Faber worked for the Respondent as comptroller of Home America, Inc. This house was purchased using conventional financing since the specifications of the house and lot did not meet the requirements of VA financing and, thus, such financing could not be arranged. The contract for purchase of the house called for a down payment of $4,600.00 or 10 percent of the purchase price. A portion of this amount was paid in cash by Mr. Faber and the remainder was paid by way of an employee discount to Mr. Faber as evidenced by the exchange between Mr. Faber and Home America, Inc. of checks for $3,000.00. Mr. Faber received from his employment with Respondent salary income and additional income from managing apartments. Thus, his income was capable of varying during the year and was not calculated as straight salary. The evidence is inconclusive as to what Mr. Faber's actual income was for the year in question. The statement of salary made by the Respondent to the financing bank was substantially correct based upon his interpretation of Mr. Faber's salary and was not intended to mislead the bank. The testimony is contradictory concerning whether the Respondent agreed to pave the road in front of the Faber home beyond that which was already in place. However, no competent testimony or evidence was presented that the Respondent supplied any information to the bank's appraiser concerning the paving of the road. Mr. Faber executed a note and mortgage in favor of Home America, Inc., encumbering the property on November 24, 1976. There is conflicting testimony as to whether the affidavit furnished the bank which stated that no outstanding unrecorded contract for sale, deed, conveyance, or mortgage affecting title existed on the property, was executed by the Respondent on November 24 or November 29. The note and mortgage were delivered to Respondent after the affidavit was executed. The Respondent believed at the time the affidavit was executed that he held a promissory note which was not a valid lien on the property until the mortgage and note were signed and delivered to him.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent’s proposed award of a contract to Intervenor is contrary to statutes, rules, policies, or the specifications, pursuant to Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On February 15, 2002, Respondent advertised for bids for Contract E4D18 (ITB). The ITB requires bidders to submit their bids with a bid bond and power of attorney no later than 11:00 a.m. on March 8, 2002. Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted bids at the specified location. Petitioner’s bid price was $2,094,748.99, and Intervenor’s bid price was $2,095,530.00. Petitioner and Intervenor have standing to participate in this case. In preparing its bid, Petitioner obtained a bid bond and power of attorney from Great American Insurance Company through its local bonding agent, Nielson, Alter and Associates. (All references to bid bonds shall mean the bid bond and accompanying power of attorney.) Nielson, Alter and Associates and its predecessor has provided bid bonds for Petitioner for 12 years. Pursuant to its standard business practice, Petitioner received the bid bond from Nielson, Alter and Associates the day prior to the deadline for submitting bids. The bond was in proper form, duly authorized, and validly executed, so it was enforceable upon delivery from Petitioner to Respondent. If Petitioner in fact delivered the bond with the bid on the following day, Respondent would have no basis to reject Petitioner’s bid as unresponsive. Petitioner’s employee responsible for assembling and delivering Petitioner’s bid has been so employed by Petitioner for three and one-half years. She testified that she placed the bid bond in the package with the bid itself, sealed the package, drove it to the assigned location, and submitted the sealed bid package to Respondent by 10:30 a.m. on March 8, 2002. Respondent’s employees accepted Petitioner’s sealed bid package and, without opening it, placed it in a locked filing cabinet, where they placed the three other timely submitted bids for the subject project. At 11:00 a.m.--the time specified for the opening of bids--one of Respondent’s employees removed the four sealed bid packages and took them to the conference room for the opening of the bids in response to the ITB. At the same time and place, Respondent’s employees were opening 21 other bids in response to five other invitations to bid on projects unrelated to the subject project. The conference room was small and contained a table. On one side of the table sat three of Respondent’s employees, who remained with the bid packages continuously from when they arrived in the conference room until, after they were opened, they were taken upstairs to a data processing center. On the other side of the table sat Petitioner’s employee and a representative of another bidder. The 25 bid packages were in six separate piles, divided by project. One of Respondent’s employees opened each bid and handed it to a second employee who announced the name of the bidder and the amount of the bid. The second employee then passed the bid to the third employee who recorded the bid. As was consistent with Respondent’s past practice, no one announced whether each bid was complete. At the end of the opening of the bids in response to the ITB, Respondent’s employee announced that Intervenor had submitted the lowest bid. Due to a mathematical error in Intervenor’s bid, it appeared from the cover sheets that Intervenor’s bid was the lowest. Only later, after the mathematical error was corrected, did Respondent’s employees discover that Petitioner had submitted the lowest bid. After Petitioner’s employee and the representative of the other bidder had left the conference room, Respondent’s three employees examined the bid packages more closely. They could not find the bid bond in Petitioner’s bid package, nor could they find the bid bond in the bid package of a bidder for one of the other contracts. The first of Respondent’s employees to discover that she could not find the bid bond in Petitioner’s bid package reexamined Petitioner’s bid package in search of the documents. The three employees then checked inside every envelope for the documents that were missing from the bid packages of Petitioner and the other bidder, but they could not find the missing documents. It was highly unusual for a bid bond to be missing from a bid package and probably unprecedented for bid bonds to be missing from two bids for separate jobs opened at the same time. Consistent with their practice then and now, Respondent’s employees separated the bidders’ checks from the bid packages and placed the checks in a secure location. Consistent with their practice then and now, one of Respondent’s employees then delivered the remainder of each bid package to the data processing center upstairs. Consistent with their practice then, but not now, Respondent’s employees did not document that the bid bond was missing for several days after the bid opening. Petitioner contends that Respondent’s employees did not discover that the bid bond was missing until days after the bid opening. Petitioner reasons, in part, that Respondent’s employees were not as attentive to Petitioner’s bid because they thought that it was only the second lowest bid. Petitioner contends that the discovery of the missing bid bond several days after its submittal provides Respondent’s employees with considerable opportunity to mishandle the bid package and inadvertently misplace the bid bond. In support of its contention that Respondent’s employees did not immediately discover the missing bid bond, Petitioner offered the testimony to this effect of its president and proffered similar testimony of another witness. The bases of this testimony were separate statements from the employee who supervised the three employees who opened, announced, and recorded the bids. However, this testimony, even from both witnesses, could not overcome the clear and unequivocal testimony of all three of Respondent’s employees that they discovered that Petitioner’s bid package was missing the bid bond on the day of the bid opening. Any statement to the contrary by Respondent's supervisory employee may have been based on her misrecollection or ignorance of the facts or misunderstanding of the questions posed to her, although it is also possible that both listeners separately misunderstood what she was saying. A bid bond is a crucial component of a bid. Its omission confers a competitive advantage upon a bidder, which, after bid opening, could elect not to cure the omission and thus be relieved of the obligation that it otherwise appeared to have offered to undertake by submitting its bid. Intervenor's post-hearing memorandum adds a perceptive discussion of the dullness of memory when attesting to a matter of routine, as was the testimony of Petitioner's employee who "always" attached bid bonds to bids, compared to the vividness of memory when attesting to a rare deviation from routine, as was the testimony of Respondent's three employees who were startled to find that bid bonds were missing from two bid packages, looked for the missing documents, and could not find them. On the present record, it would be slightly less troubling to find that Petitioner's bid package lacked the bid bond, but, as noted below, the burden of proof is on Petitioner, so it suffices to find that Petitioner has failed to prove that its bid package contained the bid bond.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the bid protest of Petitioner and awarding the contract to Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Barbara Gasper Hines Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Joseph W. Lawrence, II Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. 360 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1130 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 F. Alan Cummings Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP 1004 DeSoto Park Drive Post Office Box 589 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0589
Findings Of Fact Respondent, at all times pertinent, was a registered real estate salesman holding license number 0314085. This license is currently under suspension as a result of disciplinary action by Petitioner. Respondent was, at all times pertinent, the President and a stock holder in D.S.A.E., Inc. D.S.A.E., in turn, was the owner (or co-owner with another corporation) of a tract of land located adjacent to U.S. Highway 27 in Broward County. Respondent, acting in his capacity as a real estate salesman, sought buyers for segments 1/ of the U.S. 27 property. He had made earlier sales of other property to Mrs. Lottie Kay and her son Michael Kay, and contacted the former in October, 1980, regarding the U.S. 27 property. The D.S.A.E. tract was zoned B-3 (business) on that portion which fronted U.S. 27. The rear segments were zoned A-1 (limited agriculture) and did not front U.S. 27. Initially, Respondent mentioned segments being offered for $60,000 and $24,000. However, Lottie Kay indicated that she could not afford the higher priced segments (which were zoned B-3). Lottie Kay asked Respondent to show her the property, and a visit to the general area was made. However, Respondent told her they could not get to the property which he said was located "on the other side of the construction." After visiting the area, she was not aware of the actual location of her property or of its character. 2/ She continued to believe that the property was "right on" U.S. 27. She based this belief on Respondent's original sales presentation rather than her visit to the area. The segment she purchased is about one quarter of a mile from U.S. 27. Lottie Kay was also confused as to the zoning on the property. She believed it was "commercial" and does not recall being told of the agricultural zoning by Respondent until about a year after the purchase. Her son, Michael Kay, who was present during a part of Respondent's initial sales presentation, heard only the B-3 zoning mentioned. Since he was not present throughout the discussion, he could have missed Respondent's reference, which he claims to have made, to the agricultural zoning on the back segments. On October 8, 1980, Lottie Kay, as buyer, contracted with Respondent on behalf of D.S.A.E. and a third party corporation, as sellers, to purchase "Tract 14" for $24,000 on an "agreement for deed." Under the terms of the contract, Lottie Kay paid $4,000 down and was to pay $215.59 per month thereafter beginning in November, 1980. Lottie Kay made the monthly payments through 1983. When she missed her first two payments in 1984, Respondent offered to reduce the contract price by $2,000 if she would resume monthly payments and make up the missing payments. Lottie Kay agreed to this modification of the contract, but discontinued further payments in April, 1984. Lottie Kay bought this property for speculation in reliance on Respondent's claim that its value would increase substantially in the immediate future. Respondent showed her newspaper clippings which supported his claim that the general area was one of future growth. He predicted her segment would be worth at least $30,000 in one year and stated that as to possible appreciation, "The sky's the limit." Respondent did not, however, point out that Lottie Kay's property could not be resold for any use other than agriculture since her segment was too small for even a home site under the existing zoning. Respondent also neglected to advise her that the property was underwater much of the year, and would have to be filled and probably permitted before any development could take place. The testimony of a real estate appraiser called by Petitioner established that the property was worth about $750 when purchased by Lottie Kay in October, 1980. 3/ This valuation was based on the witness' study of nearby land sales over a period of years as well as his inspection of the area in which the Kay segment is located. Respondent attempted to establish a higher market value by producing various warranty deeds whereby he or his affiliates had sold similar segments to other buyers for amounts approximating that agreed to by Lottie Kay. These sales do not establish value but, rather, indicate the gullibility of other buyers in making such purchases. After she fell behind in her payments, Lottie Kay tried to resell her property through Respondent in reliance on his claim at the time of his initial sales presentation that he could resell it for her in one week. When requested to do so he was unable to produce any prospective buyer. Thus, there appears to be no real market for this property, other than that generated by Respondent in his initial sales campaign. Lottie Kay did not consult an attorney or have the land surveyed or appraised prior to contracting for the purchase. Rather, she trusted Respondent who she knew to be a real estate professional. She was also aware that he was an owner of the property, but still believed she could rely on his statements that the current market value of her segment was at least $24,000 and that future profits were assured. Respondent attacks the fairness of these proceedings on the alleged misconduct of Petitioner's investigator, who encouraged Lottie Kay to come forward after she (with the help of her son) had filed a complaint with Petitioner. The investigator made statements to the Kays which indicated his belief that Respondent was engaged in fraudulent land sales, and was a menace to the public. Although the investigator's statements to the Kays were gratuitous and inconsistent with his fact finding role, there is no indication that such statements resulted in any false testimony or other unreliable evidence. Respondent notes that Lottie Kay continued to make payments on her contract with Respondent even after she had filed a complaint with Petitioner and reasons that she must have considered the property a worthwhile investment. Lottie Kay demonstrated through her testimony and recitation of her dealings with Respondent that she is gullible and imprudent in financial matters. Thus, her continued investment of funds in this property indicated lack of prudence rather than an informed belief that the property had any substantial value.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of misrepresenting property value as charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and suspending his license as a real estate salesman for a period of three years to begin upon completion of his current license suspension period. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1984.
The Issue Petitioner and Lyell Hintz protest the Department's intent to award the bid for Lease No. 550-0209 to Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc. Issues derived from the pleadings, the joint prehearing stipulation and the evidence and argument at hearing are: Whether Petitioner has standing to protest the bid award; Whether Petitioner and Lyell Hintz have waived the right to contest evaluation criteria; If not, whether those criteria are valid; Whether the Respondent has properly applied the criteria to the bid proposals; Whether Southeastern's bid was nonresponsive; Whether Southeastern changed its bid after opening; Whether Petitioner's bid was defective for failure to include a waiver of existing lease; Whether the bid should be awarded to Lyell Hintz or Petitioner; and Whether all bids should be rejected and the lease re-bid.
Findings Of Fact The Bid Solicitation On or about January 31, 1991, the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) advertised its request for proposals (RFP) for a full service lease for its District Five, Operations and Planning Office, Public Transportation Office and Construction Office. The RFP is identified as lease #550:0209. Specifications include net square footage of 13,640 + 3% (13,231 - 14,049), divided into 90% office and 10% storage space, to be available by July 1, 1991, or within 30 days of notice of bid award, whichever occurs last. The space is to be available in a northern section of Orange County designated on a map attached to the RFP, in the Winter Park/Maitland/Orlando area surrounding the intersection of Lee Road and I-4. The following evaluation criteria (award factors) are included in the RFP: The successful bid will be that one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated below: Rental, using total present value methodology for basic term of lease... (weighting: 15) Conformance of and susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization and to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid (not to exceed a weight of 10 award factors). (weighting: 10) Provision of the aggregate square footage on a single floor. Proposals will be considered, but fewer points given, which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two floors. (weighting: 25) The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it, on the efficient and economical conduct of Departmental operation planned for the requested space. (not to exceed a weight of 10 award factors) (weighting: 10) Offers providing 100 s.f. of street-level secured storage. (weighting: 10) * * * [deleted criteria given 0 weight and not relevant] Option period rental rate proposed is within projected budgetary restraints of the department. (weighting: 15) Accessibility to an I-4 Interchange. (weighting: 15) total award factors = 100 (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 7 of 10) Paragraph D.1., General Provisions, includes a notice that failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), F.S., constitutes a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, F.S. The notice references an attachment which includes the text of Chapter 90-224, Laws of Florida, requiring posting of a bond at the time of formal written protest. Paragraph D.6.A., General Provisions states: Each proposal shall be signed by the owner(s), corporate officers, or legal representatives(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. If the agent is to execute the lease, the authority must be supported by a properly executed Power of Attorney. If the Bid Submittal is offered by anyone other than the owner or owner's agent, proof of the bidder's authority to offer the facility, i.e., copy of bidder's Option to Purchase, must accompany the proposal. This option must be valid through the validity date established for bids. If a corporation foreign to the State of Florida is the owner of record, written evidence of authority to conduct business in Florida must accompany the Bid Submittal. If there is an existing lease extending beyond the required availability date for all or any portion of the premises being offered to the agency a release of the applicable lease must accompany the Bid Submittal. (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 8 of 10) Paragraph D.8., General Provisions, provides the Department reserves the right to reject any and all bid proposals, waive any minor informality or technicality in bids, to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and in the best interest of the state, and if necessary, to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive proposals. Paragraphs D.12 and 13, General Provisions, establish a March 4, 1991 bid opening and a February 11, 1991 preproposal conference, respectively. On the RFP/Bid Proposal Submittal form, below the bidder's signature space, there is a list of required attachments and notice that failure to include such, if applicable, "...shall render the proposal nonresponsive and such proposal shall be rejected". (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 10 of 10) The relevant attachments include a map with location of the facility, photograph, floor plan, authorization as agent for bidder, and release of existing leases. The RFP/Bid Proposal Submittal Form was furnished to the DOT by the Department of General Services (DGS). As permitted, DOT made some modifications to the criteria to meet the specific needs of the agency. No protests of the bid solicitation were filed by any party. The Bid Responses Four proposals were timely received at the bid opening deadline, March 4, 1991: Clayton's Realty (Petitioner) submitted two proposals, Lyell Hintz submitted one proposal, and Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., submitted one proposal. Clayton's bid for its building at 611 Wymore Road, Winter Park ("Clayton Bldg.") offers 13,984 square feet for $1,136,200.00 for the five-year rental period and $1,398,400.00 for the option years. Some of DOT's offices are already in this building. Clayton's bid for its building at 5600 Diplomat Circle, Orlando, ("Promenade Building") offers 14,049 square feet at $965,868.75 for the 5-year rental term, and $1,229,287.50 for the option period. Both of Clayton's buildings offer space on two floors. Lyell Hintz offers 14,049 square feet at 1241 S. Orlando Avenue, Maitland. The five year rental cost is $895,623.75, and the option period rental is $1,123,920.00. All of the space is offered on a single first floor. Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., offers 14,049 square feet in the Adlee Building at 5151 Adamson Street, Orlando, for $1,009,139.67 for the 5- year rental term and $1,288,012.32 for the option period. Southeastern contends that it is offering 100 square feet of storage space on the first floor and the remainder of space on the second floor. Committee Analysis of the Bids An evaluation committee comprised of four DOT employees met on March 6, and March 12, 1991, to evaluate the bids. Their evaluation included a visit to each site with pre-established questions. The four employees were Nancy Houston, District Five District Director for Planning and Public Transportation; Donna Sovern, Ms. Houston's Administrative Assistant; Jim Hamelin, Resident Engineer in charge of construction in District Five; and Steven J. Nunnery, Office Manager for District Five Construction. The committee had prior experience in the leasing process on only one occasion. In November 1990, this same lease #550:0209 was bid. Lyell Hintz and Southeastern were the bidders. All bids were rejected after it was discovered that Southeastern's bids included typewritten language added by the bidder and in conflict with standard requirements. No protest was filed from that agency decision. In the November bid the committee simply utilized the criteria provided in the DGS packet. Later the Committee learned that criteria could be modified by the individual agency. With this understanding, the Committee changed the criteria for the March 1991 bids to provide that space be offered on no more than two floors, rather than two buildings; that points would be awarded for offers of 100 square feet of street level storage space, rather than all space on the street level; and that accessibility to an I-4 Interchange would be an additional evaluation factor. The committee felt these criteria appropriately addressed agency need to collocate programs and share facilities, to have ground floor storage for heavy samples and equipment, and to provide easy access by field staff and others using I-4 regularly. The committee devised a methodology for awarding points to each bidder in each category described in paragraph 3, above. The methodology is stated in the minutes of the evaluation committee meeting dated March 6, 1991. For item no. 1, the committee awarded 15 points (the highest) to the lowest bid. The percentage of difference between each bid and the lowest bid was multiplied by 15 to determine the point value. Hintz received 15 points; Clayton (Promenade Building) received 14 points; Southeastern received 13 points; and Clayton (Clayton Building) received 12 points. For item no 2, the committee stated it would take into account the design and other factors in the description of this item, including the parking requirement addressed in the invitation to bid. Southeastern received the maximum, 10 points; Hintz received 8 points; and the two Clayton buildings received 6 points each. As part of the November bid process, when the agency initially intended to make the award to Southeastern, Nancy Houston's husband, an architect in private practice, prepared without charge a layout of Southeastern's building to see if Southeastern could meet DOT's needs. At Clayton's and Southeastern's requests, that layout was provided to the bidders, except for Hintz. Since Hintz' building is basically a shell, and he assured DOT he would make the renovations they needed, Ms. Houston did not feel that he needed the floor plan. After the bids were rejected in November, the layout became a public record, available to anyone upon request. However, Ms. Houston opined at hearing that they could not get a good layout that would work for the Hintz building. This contradicts Mr. Hintz' testimony that the suggested floor plan attached to the RFP could easily fit in his building. The floor plan attached to the RFP is not the same floor plan prepared by Ms. Houston's husband for the Southeastern building and the fact that Hintz' building is a shell capable of a vast variety of layouts impeaches Ms. Houston's opinion. Item no. 3 requests aggregate square footage on a single floor, with fewer points for space on two floors. The committee methodology was to give 25 points for space on one floor and "reduction given accordingly" for two floors. (Joint Exhibit #6, attachment A, page 1) Hintz and Southeastern were each granted 25 (maximum) points. Although various committee members testified that two floors should have warranted 1/2 the points, or 13, Clayton's buildings were awarded 16 points each. Southeastern is not proposing to provide all space on one floor, as it is offering storage on the first floor and office space on the second floor. The committee considered this worthy of full points, as all of the office space is on one floor. Item no. 4 is related to environmental factors such as aesthetics of the building and surrounding areas. The committee methodology states that aesthetics of the building and area would be considered along with "...the economical factor relating to the conduct of our everyday activities from and in each space proposed." (Joint Exhibit #6, Attachment A) Southeastern was awarded 10 points (maximum); Clayton's Clayton Building and Promenade Building were awarded 6 and 8 points respectively; and Hintz was awarded 3 points. Item no. 5 relates to provision of 100 square feet of storage on the street level. The committee methodology provides that full ten points will be awarded if this is met; if not, the score would be "adjusted accordingly". Each bid was awarded the full 10 points. The committee members learned that Southeastern was willing to provide street level storage when they made their site visit and inquired. The space was not described in Southeastern's written proposal. Item no. 11 relates to rental cost for the option period. The methodology adopted by the committee for this item is the same as for item no. Hintz, the lowest bidder for the option term, received 15 points; Clayton's Promenade Building received 14 points; Southeastern received 13 points; and the Clayton Building received 12 points. Item no. 12, accessibility to an I-4 Interchange, is worth 15 points maximum. For its methodology the committee devised a formula of granting the closest building a full 15 points. The I-4/Lee Road interchange was selected as the reference hub. The Clayton Building, .2 miles from the interchange, was given 15 points. Southeastern's building .6 miles away, three times as far, was given 1/3 value, 5 points; the Promenade Building, .4 miles away, or twice as far, was given 1/2 full value, or 7.5, rounded to 8 points; and Hintz' building, 2 miles away, or 10 times as far, was given 1.5 points, rounded to 2. The total values thus awarded by the committee were: 86 points to Southeastern; 78 points to Hintz; 77 points to Clayton (Clayton Bldg.); and 76 points to Clayton (Promenade Bldg.). The committee, after meeting on March 6th and making its awards, decided to meet again on March 12th, after obtaining more information on phone service, zoning regulations, crime, and bidder's previous experience in renovations. Although some additional information was obtained and the committee did meet again, it determined that the additional information (not clearly related to any of the seven criteria above) did not warrant changing any of the scores. The committee recommended award of the lease to Southeastern. Southeastern's Bid Allegedly Defective Southeastern's bid is signed by Gilmore E. Daniel, Vice President of Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., as agent for the owner, Cynwyd Investments, a partnership which operates under about 150 different partnerships. The building in issue is owned by an entity designated "Adlee Building, Cynwyd Investments General Partnership". Attached to Southeastern's bid is a letter on Cynwyd Investments letterhead, dated February 7, 1991, addressed to Mr. Gil Daniel, re: Adlee Building, 5151 Adamson Street, Orlando, Florida, stating: As leasing and managing agent for the above captioned property, you are hereby authorized to negotiate on our behalf with the State of Florida in order to procure the Department of Transportation as a tenant in our building. (Joint Exhibit #5) The letter is signed by Stephen Cravitz, CSM. Although the language of the letter is inartful (the agent was not "negotiating" a lease), the intent is plain on its face that the agent procure a lease. This is sufficient to convey authority for Gil Daniel to act on behalf of the owner. The requirement of the RFP, paragraph 6.A. is met. (see paragraph 5, above) There are several tenants currently occupying space proposed to be leased to DOT under lease no. 550:0209. There are three "agreements" attached to Southeastern's bid proposal for three tenants. Each agreement provides the tenant will move by April 15, 1991 "...contingent upon the landlord being the successful bidder for the State of Florida Department of Transportation lease no. 550:0209, and having an executed lease with the State." (Joint Exhibit #5) The tenants have not moved, but neither has the contingency been satisfied; and when or if it is, the tenants will move. These agreements are sufficient "release" to meet the requirements of RFP paragraph 6.A. The remaining tenant does not have a lease. Clayton's Bid Allegedly Defective Clayton's bids did not include any releases from tenants. There is a tenant currently in part of the space offered in the Clayton Building. There is also a lease agreement dated August 28, 1989, between the Claytons and Canam Steel Corporation describing a lease term of three years and termination date of September 14, 1992. Edward Fielding, Jr. is Director of Operations in the Leasing Department for Charles and Malcolm Clayton. He is well aware of the requirements for state leasing as he and the Claytons have been involved for several years in leasing space to state agencies. Canam Steel Corporation provided a letter in April 26, 1990, stating that it is closing its Orlando operation and requesting that its lease be terminated. It still occupies the space, but Edward Fielding is assured that it wishes to leave, and will do so immediately upon approval by Clayton. The lease and release was not included with the bid packet, as Fielding properly determined that it was no longer binding on the landlord. The Clayton Building bid does not violate the requirement of RFP, Paragraph 6.A. F. Alleged Bias of the Committee in Favor of Southeastern and Improper Award of Points Hintz and Clayton contend that the bid process was thoroughly tainted with a bias in favor of an award to Southeastern. Clayton did not respond to the November bid; Hintz did, and did not protest the earlier process, although he apparently brought to DOT's attention the language added to Southeastern's bid response that led to the rejection of all bids and reinitiation of the process. The committee changed its evaluation criteria when it learned that DGS's form criteria are not binding on the agency. The committee's alterations and addition of the I-4 accessibility requirement were intended to better meet the specific needs of the programs that would be using the space. The changes did not specifically benefit Southeastern; it was neither the closest nor next closest building to the I-4 interchange. For those criteria which could be objectively quantified, such as rental rate and proximity to I-4, the committee attempted in good faith to devise formulae. That the point spread for the I-4 criteria was substantially wider than for rental rates does not invalidate those formulae. For those criteria requiring a subjective analysis, the conformance/design and environmental factors, Petitioner and Hintz failed to prove the committee's point awards were patently wrong or fraudulent. One committee member, James Hamelin, admitted that Clayton should have received 13, rather than 16 points for providing space on more than one floor, but that error, if it indeed was an error, inured to the benefit of Petitioner and made no impact on Hintz, the next highest scorer. None of the floor plans presented by the bidders with their proposals are attached to the exhibits received in evidence, and those floor plans are not part of the record in this proceeding. One committee member, Donna Sovern, admitted that all of the square footage proposed by Southeastern was initially on the second floor. When the site visit was made and the committee discussed the space, Southeastern offered 100 square feet of storage on the first floor. (Transcript, pp 200-201) Because of this, Southeastern was awarded the full 10 points for Item No. 5, requiring 100 square feet of street-level secured storage. Allowing Southeastern to change its bid thus provided an advantage of 10 additional points. Assuming that the change was appropriate, Southeastern should not have also received the full 25 points for Item No. 3, provision of aggregate square footage on a single floor, since the remainder of its space is on the second floor. The award of points in these two items by the committee is inconsistent and erroneous. Page 4 of 10 of the RFP describes the space to be included in the 13,640 square feet to be leased. The description includes storage areas. (Joint Exhibit #1) The bidders were on notice that "aggregate" square footage includes storage space. The total number of points awarded to Southeastern must be reduced by either 10 (the after-the-fact storage space on the first floor) or 9 (the difference between the full 25 points and 16, the points awarded to Clayton for space on two floors). This results in a total of either 76 or 77 points for Southeastern. In either case, Hintz becomes the highest scorer, and Clayton and Southeastern are tied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the agency enter its Final Order awarding lease no. 550:0209 to Lyell Hintz. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 12th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 7. - 5. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in paragraph 31. Adopted in summary in paragraph 18. Rejected as immaterial. and 11. Adopted in part in paragraph 5, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Southeastern's name is typewritten. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraph 31, otherwise rejected as immaterial. and 15. Adopted in part in paragraph 33, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Adopted in paragraphs 17 and 18. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in paragraph 19. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraphs 20 and 27, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 21, 26 and 27. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 37. Adopted in part in paragraph 29, otherwise rejected as irrelevant as points were not awarded or subtracted for the additional factors. Rejected as irrelevant. Lyell Hintz' Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 2. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraphs 13, 15, 16 and 21. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraphs 17 and 18. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraphs 31 and 32. - 11. Rejected as immaterial and contrary to the weight of evidence. The letter attached to the bid was sufficient authority. 12. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 13. and 14. 15. Adopted Adopted in in paragraph 25. paragraphs 3 and 25. 16. Adopted in paragraph 38. 17. - 21. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 22. 22. Rejected as argument rather than finding of fact. 23. Rejected as immaterial and unsupported by the evidence. 24. Adopted in paragraph 3. 25. - 34. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 23, 14 and 16. 35. and 36. Adopted in paragraph 38. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 24. - 50. Rejected as immaterial. According to the evidence these factors did not change the committee's evaluation. 51. - 53. Rejected as immaterial and, as to the DGS requirement, unsupported by the record. Respondent and Southeastern's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 17. Adopted in paragraphs 18 and 19. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in part in paragraph 3, otherwise unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 25. Adopted in paragraph 19. Adopted in paragraph 27. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 28. Adopted in paragraph 24. Rejected as contrary to the evidence, specifically the RFP which unambiguously included all storage and office space in the "aggregate." - 19. Rejected as irrelevant or unsupported by the record. Adopted in paragraph 31. Adopted in paragraph 33. Adopted in part in paragraph 34, but the letter requesting its lease be terminated is sufficient release. Adopted in part in paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Marvin L. Beaman, Jr., Esquire 605 North Wymore Road Winter Park, FL 32789 Wings L. Benton, Esquire P. O. Box 5676 Tallahassee, FL 32314-5676 Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Dept. of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire 423 Country Club Drive Winter Park, FL 32789 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. #58 Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Dept. of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence addressed at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The request for sealed bids for the construction of the Project was advertised on October 9, 16 and 23, 1991. There were six addenda to the original bid documents which added, deleted or modified provisions of the original bidding requirements, contract requirements, administrative requirements and technical specifications. The original bid documents plus the six addenda will be referred to herein as the "bid documents". The bid documents required that all bids be in full accord with the contract documents. Sealed bids for the Project were opened on October 30, 1991. Wright submitted the lowest lump sum bid for the Project, with Sovran submitting the second lowest lump sum bid and Kellogg submitting the third lowest lump sum bid. At the time of the bid opening, the bid documents listed only four casework manufacturers that were approved to furnish casework for the Project. Empire Custom Cabinets, Inc. (Empire) was not listed as one of the four approved casework manufacturers in the bid documents. The bid documents did not require the bidder to list the casework manufacturer it intended to obtain the casework from, but only that the bidder name the casework subcontractor. The only work item in the bid documents which requires identifying the name of the manufacturer on the subcontractor's list is the metal roof system. Because Empire's bid on the casework was extremely low compared to other bids received by Wright on the casework, Wright called Empire prior to submitting its bid to confirm that Empire's bid was submitted per plans and specifications. Although Wright did not specifically inquire of Empire at this time as to which manufacturer Empire was obtaining the casework from for the Project, Empire did advise Wright that Empire's bid on the casework was according to plans and specifications. Additionally, Empire did not divulge or advise Wright at this time that the bid was based on Empire manufacturing the casework for the Project. Based on this representation from Empire, Wright listed Empire as its casework subcontractor, and calculated its lump sum bid for the Project using Empire's bid. Although Wright listed Empire as its casework subcontractor in its bid, this did not create an irregularity in Wright's bid since Wright's bid was per plans and specification without exception or exclusion. This would require Wright to furnish casework for the Project manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers listed in the bid documents regardless of which subcontractor Wright listed as the subcontractor for casework. By letter dated November 1, 1991, the Board's architect for the Project requested Wright to have Empire submit written certification by one of the four approved casework manufacturers that its casework was being furnished to Empire for the project. By letter dated November 4, 1991, Empire advised Wright that Empire's bid on the casework for the Project was based on casework to be manufactured by Empire. On the same day, Wright furnished the architect for the Project a copy of Empire's letter of November 4, 1991. In response to a request by the Board, Wright, by letter dated November 7, 1991, advised the Board that Wright would furnish casework manufactured by one of the four approved manufacturers listed in the bid documents for the Project. By letter dated December 3, 1991, Empire advised Wright that Empire would need to withdraw its bid if Empire was required to use casework manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers listed in the bid documents. On that same day, Wright furnished the Board a copy of Empire's letter and requested that the Board allow Wright to remove and replace Empire with Steven Ward and Associates, Inc. (Ward), as the casework subcontractor since Ward would be able to furnish and install casework manufactured by LSI Corporation of America, Inc., one of the four approved casework manufacturers. No Action has been taken on that request. The bid documents provide for a subcontractor to be removed and replaced from the list of subcontractors after the bid is opened if there is a showing of good cause and written approval by the Board and the Project architect is obtained. Although Empire's bid on the casework for the Project submitted to Wright was based on Empire manufacturing the casework, there is competent substantial evidence in the record to establish facts to show that at the time Wright submitted its bid on the Project it had reasonable grounds to believe that Empire's bid on the casework was based on Empire furnishing and installing casework manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers. After determining that Empire could not perform under its bid, Wright obtained a bid from Ward for furnishing and installing the casework for the Project which was less than Ward's original bid submitted to Wright before the bid opening. However, this bid was substantially more than Empire's bid, and if Wright is allowed to substitute Ward for Empire, Wright will have to absorb the additional costs since the bids were lump sum bids. Wright is neither attempting to furnish casework from a manufacturer that is not approved, nor is Wright requesting an increase in the lump sum bid price. The advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project required that all bidders be prequalified by the Board prior to the bid date. Sovran and one other bidder were not prequalified by the Board prior to the bid date in accordance with Advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project. Sovran received the bid documents for the Project approximately one month before the bid date but did not file a Notice of Protest of the prequalification requirement contained in the Advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project. Sovran holds a certificate as a general contractor licensed in the State of Florida in accordance with Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. As a certified general contractor Sovran, pursuant to Section 489.125, Florida Statutes, was authorized to bid on the Project notwithstanding the Board's prequalification requirement. This was explained by the Board's representative at the bid opening. The bid documents required that a subcontractor list be submitted by all bidders, and when submitted with the bid becomes an integral part of the bid. The purpose of the subcontractor list was to prevent bid shopping, and to allow the Board an opportunity to review the subcontractors to determine if any subcontractor on the list had performed unsatisfactorily on previous Board projects. Neither the statutes relating to competitive bidding nor the bid documents prohibit the listing of the general contractor together with a subcontractor on a subcontractor list. The subcontractor list submitted by Sovran indicated "Sovran Constr/Naples" as the name of the subcontractor for the masonry work and "Sovran/Naples" as the name of the subcontractor for the poured-in-place concrete work. "Naples" is Naples Concrete and Masonry Work, Inc. The bid received by Sovran from Naples was for both labor and materials for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran neither requested nor did Naples furnish Sovran a bid to provide labor only for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. There was no agreement between Sovran and Naples whereby Sovran would supply the materials and Naples would furnish the labor for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran did request and receive bids from other companies for furnishing materials only for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran listed itself, the general contractor, along with Naples on the subcontractor list for the purpose of supplying the materials for the poured-in- place concrete and masonry work. Sovran's main reason for supplying the materials was that Naples was not bondable. Without a payment bond from Naples, Sovran would be without protection and could be forced into paying double for the materials in the event Naples failed to pay the material suppliers. Although the Superintendent of the Lee County Schools has recommended to the Board that the Board accept Wright's bid for the Project, the Board has not voted on that recommendation. The fact that Wright used Empire's bid to calculate its lump sum bid in no way excuses Wright for the requirement set out in the bid documents that casework used for the Project (when the time comes) be manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers. Wright gains no economic advantage in this regard since the lump sum bid price remains the same. The advertisement for Sealed Bids on the Project provides that the Board reserves the right to waive any and all irregularities of any bid received.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly RECOMMENDED: That the Board enter a Final Order dismissing the instant bid protest and awarding to Wright the contract for the construction of Elementary School "C", Job No. 91063. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of February, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13 day of February, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 91-7597B1D The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1 - 3(1,2 and 3 , respectively); 4 - 5(6); 6(4); 7 - 9(5); 12(10); 13(11); 15 - 16(12); 17(13); 18 - 19(16); 20(29); 21(18); 23(19); 24 - 25(20); 26(22); 27(23); 28(22); 29 - 30(29); 32 - 33(25); and 34(26). Proposed finding of fact 10 is rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record in that Wright's bid was as per plans and specifications without exceptions or exclusions which included the use of casework manufactured by one of the approved casework manufacturers. Proposed finding of fact 11 is rejected as not being supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record in that the Board knew of Empire's bid being based on nonconforming materials prior to issuing its Notice of Intent. However, the only information the Board had in reference to Wright's bid before issuing its Notice of Intent was that Wright had bid as per plans and specifications and would be installing casework manufactured by one of the approved manufacturers. The only question was whether Empire could furnish casework manufactured by one of the approved manufacturers. Proposed finding of fact 14 is neither material nor relevant. How the Board's architect interpreted Wright's bid is neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed finding of fact 22 is unnecessary to the conclusion reached in the Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 31 is more in the way of an argument than a finding of fact. Proposed findings of fact 35 and 36 are covered in the Preliminary Statement. The timeliness of Kellogg's protest is not an issue and therefore, a finding that it was timely is unnecessary. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent While not specifically adopting proposed finding of fact 1, where material or relevant or necessary to this proceeding, and supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record the stipulated facts have been adopted. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 2(4,5); 3(9); 4 - 5(7); 7 - 8(8); 10(16); 11(14); 12(31); 13(21); and 15(23). Proposed finding of fact 6 is more in the way of an argument than a finding of fact. Proposed finding of fact 9 and 14 are neither material nor relevant. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Intervenor See ruling on Respondent's proposed finding of fact Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 2 - 3(21); 4(24); 5 - 6(21); 13(23); 14(24,28); 15(22); 16 - 17(23,24); and 18(28). Proposed findings of fact 7 through 12 are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Gurley, Esquire Norton, Gurley & Darnell, P.A. 1819 Main Street, Suite 610 Sarasota, FL 34236 Marianne Kantor, Esquire The School Board of Lee County 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, FL 33901 James M. Talley, Esquire Fisher, Rushmer, Werrenrath, Keiner, Wack & Dickson, P.A. Post Office Box 712 Orlando, FL 32802 Karl Engel Superintendent Lee County School Board 2055 Central Avenue Ft. Myers, FL 33901 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400
The Issue Whether the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission’s (“Respondent” or “FWC”) determination that Tallahassee Corporate Center, LLC (“Petitioner” or “TCC”), submitted a nonresponsive reply to FWC’s Invitation to Negotiate (“ITN”) No. 770-0235 is contrary to the Commission’s governing statutes, the agency’s rules or policies, or the solicitation specifications; and, if so, whether it was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on exhibits admitted into evidence, testimony offered by witnesses, and admitted facts set forth in the pre-hearing stipulation. ITN No. 770-0235 and Background FWC is a state agency that seeks office space to be occupied by personnel from six of FWC’s divisions. FWC currently leases office space from TCC, which expires in October 2019. On July 19, 2017, FWC issued ITN No. 770-0235, seeking vendors that could provide 53,000 square feet of office space for lease. FWC anticipates occupying the space by November 1, 2019. Between August 15, 2017, and November 2, 2017, FWC issued four addenda to the ITN, which contained amendments, modifications, and explanations to the ITN. There were no bidders that challenged the terms, conditions, or specifications contained in the ITN or its amendments. TCC and NLH were two of the potential lessors that submitted replies in response to the ITN. FWC seeks to lease either a building that already exists or a non-existing building to be constructed in the future. The ITN describes the proposals requested as follows: Competitive proposals may be submitted for consideration under this Invitation to Negotiate (ITN) for the lease of office space in either an existing building or a non- existing (build-to-suit/turnkey) building. NOTE: All buildings must comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as stated in Attachment A, Agency Specifications, Section 6.D., page 32. OPTION 1 - an ‘existing’ building: To be considered an ‘existing’ building, the facility offered must be enclosed with a roof system and exterior walls must be in place at the time of the submittal of the Reply. OPTION 2 - a ‘non-existing’ building: Offeror agrees to construct a building as a ‘build-to-suit’ (turnkey) for lease to FWC. Each applicant that submitted a proposal in response to the ITN was required to meet the specification in Attachment A of the ITN. The ITN provides as follows: FWC is seeking detailed and competitive proposals to provide built-out office facilities and related infrastructure for the occupancy by FWC. As relates to any space that is required to be built-out pursuant to this Invitation to Negotiate in accordance with this Invitation to Negotiate, see Attachment ‘A’ which includes the FWC Specifications detailing the build-out requirements. The specifications in Attachment A provided the basic requirements for the potential leased space such that proposals offering existing or non-existing building may be compared and evaluated together. The ITN included certain provisions to clarify the rights contemplated by the ITN, and included the following disclaimer: This ITN is an invitation to negotiate and is for discussion purposes only. It is not an offer, contract or agreement of any kind. Neither FWC nor the Offeror/Lessor shall have any legal rights or obligations whatsoever between them and neither shall take any action or fail to take any action in reliance upon any part of these discussions until the proposed transaction and a definitive written lease agreement is approved in writing by FWC. This ITN shall not be considered an offer to lease. The terms of any transaction, if consummated, shall not be final nor binding on either party until a Lease Agreement is executed by all parties. This ITN may be modified or withdrawn by FWC at any time. The ITN also included a provision expressly reserving FWC’s “right to negotiate with all responsive and responsible Offerors, serially or concurrently, to determine the best-suited solution.” The term “Offeror” was defined by the ITN to mean “the individual submitting a Reply to this Invitation to Negotiate, such person being the owner of the proposed facility or an individual duly authorized to bind the owner of the facility.” This reservation of rights placed interested lessors on notice that only responsive lessors could be invited to negotiations. While TCC and NLH were two of the potential lessors that submitted replies in response to the ITN, the bidders submitted different proposals. TCC submitted a proposal for an existing building, and NLH submitted a proposal for a non- existing building. During an initial review of all replies, FWC determined TCC’s reply to be nonresponsive based on TCC’s response to ITN section IV.G (Tenant Improvements) and a statement titled “Additional Response” that TCC submitted with its reply. As a result, FWC did not evaluate or score TCC’s reply. After TCC’s reply was declared nonresponsive, there were no further negotiations with TCC regarding the ITN. NLH’s reply passed the initial responsiveness review and was then evaluated and scored by FWC. FWC ultimately issued an intended award of the contract to NLH after conducting negotiations. Tenant-Improvement Cap The ITN prohibited vendors from proposing conditional or contingent lease rates that included a tenant-improvement cap, or allowance. A tenant-improvement cap reflects the maximum amount the landlord is willing to spend to make improvements to leased space. Mr. Hakimi asserted that the tenant-improvement cap would be an incentive to FWC to enter a lease. However, the tenant-improvement cap would also place a limit on improvements. According to ITN section IV.E, any reply offering a lease rate with a tenant-improvement cap would be deemed nonresponsive: FULL SERVICE (GROSS) RENTAL RATE The Offeror shall provide FWC with a Full Service (gross) lease structure. Therefore, the lease rate must include base rent, taxes, all operating expenses (including, but not limited to, janitorial services and supplies, utilities, water, insurance, interior and exterior maintenance, recycling services, garbage disposal, pest control, security system installation and maintenance, and any amortization of required tenant improvements to the proposed space). There shall be no pass through of additional expenses . . . . Offerors must provide their best, firm lease rates. Lease rates that are contingent, involve a basic rate plus “cap” or “range” for such things as tenant improvements will be deemed nonresponsive. The ITN also provided, in section IV.G, that any current lessor must meet all ITN requirements, including those set forth in ITN Attachment A: TENANT IMPROVEMENTS The State requires a “turn-key” build-out by the Landlord. Therefore, Offeror shall assume all cost risks associated with delivery in accordance with the required specifications detailed in this ITN, including Attachment A (see pages 28-45). Additionally, replies for space which is currently under lease with, or occupancy by, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission does not exclude the Offeror from meeting the requirements specified in this ITN document. Offeror agrees to provide “turn-key” build-out/improvements in accordance with the specifications detailed in this ITN. (use an X to mark one of the following): YES or NO TCC responded “NO” to the statement “Offeror agrees to provide ‘turn-key’ build-out/improvements in accordance with the specifications detailed in this ITN.” Additional Response Not only did TCC include a barred tenant-improvement cap, but TCC also attached an addendum to its proposal, which provided the following: The reality is that as the current Landlord, it would be impossible to ask FFWCC to move out of its existing office space in order to meet the requested Agency Specifications in Attachment A. If this condition makes our response to the Invitation to Negotiate (ITN) “non-responsive”, we stand willing to continue further negotiations with FFWCC. There was no provision in the ITN for additional responses outside what was requested in the ITN. More importantly, the addendum indicated TCC could not comply with the ITN, unless certain conditions were met. Mr. Hakimi confirmed the effect of what was written in the addendum when he testified that TCC is unable to meet Attachment A’s specifications because it presently has a tenant in place (i.e., FWC) that prevents it from constructing the building improvements necessary to comply with ITN Attachment A. Proof of Ownership of Property The ITN also provided that to be responsive, each lessor was required to submit certain documentation demonstrating the lessor’s control of the property proposed for the leased space: Replies must completely and accurately respond to all requested information, including the following: (A) Control of Property (Applicable for Replies for Existing and/or Non- Existing Buildings). For a Reply to be responsive, it must be submitted by one of the entities listed below, and the proposal must include supporting documentation proving control of the property proposed. This requirement applies to: The real property (land); The proposed building(s) (or structure(s); The proposed parking area(s). Control of parking includes the area(s) of ingress and egress to both the real property and the building(s). The owner of record of the facility(s) and parking area(s) – Submit a copy of the deed(s) evidencing clear title to the property proposed. The authorized agent, broker or legal representative of the owner(s) – Submit a copy of the Special Power of Attorney authorizing submission of the proposal. The Special Power of Attorney form was attached to the ITN as Attachment K. TCC’s certification was executed by TCC president, Lyda Hakimi. However, TCC did not execute Attachment K or include an executed power of attorney to demonstrate that TCC has control of the property. The evidence offered at hearing of the property’s ownership contained in TCC’s reply was a deed showing DRA CRT Tallahassee Center, LLC to be the property owner. Respondent argued that although TCC owns DRA CRT Tallahassee Center, LLC, the two are different legal entities. Because these were two different legal entities, TCC was required to provide a copy of Attachment K to its response to be deemed responsive. Broker Commission The ITN required lessors to agree to execute a broker- commission agreement, which was attached to the ITN as Attachment J: Offeror understands FWC is utilizing the services of a Tenant Broker representative for this lease space requirement and the successful Offeror shall execute a Commission Agreement, in coordination with FWC’s Tenant Broker representative, within fifteen (15) business days of notification of Award. Offeror agrees and acknowledges that a Tenant Broker Commission Agreement is a requirement and the successful Offeror shall be required to execute a Commission Agreement as described above. (use an X to mark one of the following): YES or NO The ITN included a schedule for the commission rate based on the total aggregate gross base rent that could be paid ranging from 2.50 percent to 3.50 percent. TCC conditioned its reply by agreeing to pay a two-percent broker commission, which is inconsistent with the commission schedule. By offering a lower commission rate, TCC could save money. TCC would then have a competitive advantage over other bidders. TCC’S Bid was Nonresponsive Based upon the foregoing, TCC’s bid submission added a tenant-improvement cap, failed to comply with the broker commission rate, failed to provide supporting documents to demonstrate proof of property ownership, and added additional conditions regarding compliance with the ITN requirements. The information requested and terms of the ITN were required for TCC’s bid to be responsive. TCC did not file a challenge to the specifications or any of the requirements of the ITN. It is now too late for such a challenge. TCC’s inclusion of a tenant-improvement allowance limits the amount that would pay for improvements. The lower broker commission increases the profit advantage for TCC more than for other bidders, which would be an unfair advantage over other bidders. TCC’s failure to comply with the terms of the ITN and failure to provide the required attachment to show proof of ownership were not minor irregularities, which FWC could waive. Therefore, FWC properly determined that TCC’s bid submission was nonresponsive. Standing TCC submitted a bid proposal that did not conform to the requirements of the ITN and it seeks relief that includes setting aside FWC’s rejection of its proposal. Therefore, TCC has standing to bring this protest. If it is determined that TCC was nonresponsive, NLH has standing to the extent the procurement process could be deemed contrary to competition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission enter a final order dismissing Tallahassee Corporate Center, LLC’s Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 2018.
