The Issue Whether the Respondent, the Florida Department of the Lottery, discriminated against the Petitioner, Oscar Jacobs, on account of his race in denying him equal opportunity for training, compensation, use of new equipment, time off from work, leave, retention and advancement?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Oscar Jacobs, is an Afro-American. His race is black. The Respondent, the Florida Department of the Lottery (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. District 2 of the Department. In the fall of 1987 the Department created a district office in Panama City, Florida. The Panama City office of the Department was part of District 2 (hereinafter referred to as the "District"). The District consisted of Bay, Calhoun, Gulf, Jackson, Holmes and Washington Counties. Steve Sumner was hired as the District Manager for the District in October of 1987. Mr. Sumner hired the staff of the District in November of 1987. The District had the following type of positions: District Manager. The District Manager was in charge of the District office and was the immediate supervisor of the employees in the District. Among other things, the District Manager was responsible for: (1) the assignment of the geographic areas LSRs were responsible for including the designation of retailers located therein that the LSRs were to service; (2) the approval of leave; and (3) the assignment of vans. Lottery Sales Representative II (hereinafter referred to as an "LSR II"). LSR IIs were responsible for inventorying lottery ticket stock sold at retail locations, settling accounts with retailers for all lottery tickets sold, ordering lottery ticket books, reviewing settlement calculations, training retailers, completing paperwork necessary for retailers to become a lottery outlet, completing paperwork upon the termination of a retailer as a lottery outlet, ensuring that retailers operated within Department rules, soliciting, conducting and monitoring retailer promotions and recruiting new retail accounts. See Petitioner's exhibit 4 for a complete description of an LSR II's job description. Lottery Sales Representative I (hereinafter referred to as an "LSR I"). LSR Is were responsible for delivering lottery tickets, picking up redemption envelopes from retailers and comparing them with issuance/settlement forms, assisting retailers, maintaining paperwork and daily activity reports and filling in for, and assisting, LSR IIs. See Petitioner's exhibit 4 for a complete description of an LSR I's job description. Each LSR I was assigned to work with one particular LSR II. Storekeepers. Storekeepers were responsible for receiving, verifying and sorting incoming orders for lottery tickets, receiving and verifying ticket redemption envelopes and ticket returns, and insuring that materials were distributed. See Petitioner's exhibit 4 for a complete description of a Storekeeper's job description. A Receptionist. An Accountant I. An Administrative Assistant I. Clerical positions. Relevant History of Mr. Jacobs' Employment at the District. In November of 1987, Mr. Sumner hired three LSR IIs (Sandra Doll, Linda Gray and Debra Chason). All three are white. Mr. Sumner also hired two LSR Is. On November 15, 1987, Mr. Sumner hired the Mr. Jacobs as an LSR I. John Stevens was the other LSR I. Mr. Stevens is white. Danny Edwards was hired in 1987 as the Storekeeper, and Mary Jane Silcox was hired as an Administrative Assistant. Mr. Edwards and Ms. Silcox are white. At the time that Mr. Jacobs was hired, he was married. Mr. Jacobs' wife's race is white. Although Mr. Jacobs subsequently separated and eventually obtained a divorce from his wife, Mr. Sumner was not aware of these events until sometime after he had hired Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Sumner was responsible for evaluating Mr. Jacobs' performance. For the fiscal years November 16, 1987 to November 16, 1988, November 16, 1988 to November 16, 1989 and November 1989 to November 1990, Mr. Sumners rated Mr. Jacobs' performance with an overall rating of "Exceeds At Least One Standard." The possible ratings, from lowest to highest, were "Below Standards," "Achieves Standards," "Exceeds at Least One Standard," "Exceeds Most Standards," and "Sustained Superior Performance." In April of 1988, Mr. Edwards was promoted by Mr. Sumner from Storekeeper to LSR I. In May of 1988, Larry Kissinger was hired by Mr. Sumner as the Storekeeper. Mr. Sumner also hired Hannah Davis as an LSR I. Mr. Kissinger and Ms. Davis are white. In March of 1990, one of the LSR IIs, Sandra Doll, went on maternity leave. Mr. Sumner selected Mr. Jacobs to fill the LSR II position of Ms. Doll during her absence. Mr. Jacobs was selected out of the three LSR Is then working for the District. Mr. Sumner arranged for Mr. Jacobs to receive a 10 percent increase in pay. The increase in pay was to be payable while Mr. Jacobs temporarily filled the LSR II position. At about the same time that Ms. Doll went on maternity leave, another LSR II, Ms. Gray, resigned. Mr. Sumner assigned Ms. Gray's duties jointly to one of the other LSR Is, Ms. Davis, and the Storekeeper, Mr. Kissinger. Ms. Davis and Mr. Kissinger did not receive any increase in pay for their services. During the time that Mr. Jacobs served as a temporary LSR II, he performed satisfactorily, with assistance from other District staff. Prior to August of 1990, Ms. Doll resigned. In August of 1990, Mr. Sumner decided to promote Mr. Jacobs permanently to the position of LSR II. The Department's Personnel Office, however, informed Mr. Sumner that Mr. Jacobs did not appear to meet the minimum qualifications for the position. Therefore, Mr. Sumner assisted Mr. Jacobs to supplement his resume by expanding the description of his prior sales experience in order for Mr. Jacobs to meet the minimum requirements. Mr. Jacobs was subsequently determined to be qualified and Mr. Sumner's decision to promote Mr. Jacobs was accepted. Mr. Jacobs' salary was reduced to the amount he had been paid before he was given the temporary 10 percent increase. Mr. Sumner recommended, and Mr. Jacobs received, a permanent 7 percent increase, the maximum pay increase he could be awarded upon his permanent promotion to LSR II. As of August of 1990, Mr. Jacobs became the highest paid LSR II in the District. Mr. Jacobs remained the highest paid LSR II while he was employed as an LSR II and as an LMR. Mr. Kissinger, the Storekeeper, was promoted in August of 1990 to fill the LSR I position vacated by Mr. Jacobs. Ms. Davis was promoted in September of 1990 to fill the other LSR II position. Ms. Silcox, the Administrative Assistant, was promoted to fill Ms. Davis' LSR I position in September of 1990. Charles Frederick, whose race is black, was hired by Mr. Sumner in February of 1991, as the Storekeeper. In December of 1990, Mr. Jacobs remarried. The woman that Mr. Jacobs married in December of 1990 was white. From the time that Mr. Sumner hired Mr. Jacobs until approximately May of 1991, Mr. Sumner was satisfied with Mr. Jacobs' performance. In March of 1989 Mr. Sumner nominated Mr. Jacobs to the Department as the District employee of the month. In approximately May of 1991, however, Mr. Sumner began to lose faith in Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Jacobs believes that Mr. Sumner's attitude toward him began to change in 1991 and he attributes this change to the fact that he had married a white woman in December of 1990. Mr. Jacobs' belief is not, however, supported by the record. In light of the fact that Mr. Jacobs was married to a white woman when Mr. Sumner initially hired him and during at least part of the time that Mr. Sumner found Mr. Jacobs' performance to be satisfactory, Mr. Jacobs' belief is unfounded. A more logical explanation for the change in the relationship of Mr. Sumner and Mr. Jacobs is Mr. Jacobs' decline in performance and Mr. Sumner's criticism of Mr. Jacobs' performance as an LSR II. After being promoted to the permanent LSR II position, Mr. Sumner found Mr. Jacobs' performance to be lacking. In September of 1990, Mr. Sumner wrote four critical memorandums to Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Jacobs, based upon these memoranda and other comments from Mr. Sumner, began to believe that Mr. Sumner was treating him unfairly. This combination of lesser performance and criticism at least contributed to the rift between Mr. Sumner and Mr. Jacobs. By approximately May of 1991 Mr. Sumner concluded that Mr. Jacobs' performance had noticeably deteriorated and he seemed to lose interest in his job. In September of 1991 Mr. Jacobs and his wife became foster parents of two infants. The infants both suffered from severe medical problems. Mr. Jacobs' relationship with Mr. Sumner became more strained as a result of the stress on Mr. Jacobs caused by the children's condition. In the summer of 1991, a new sales director for the District was hired by the Department. SEE 23. For the November, 1990 to November, 1991 fiscal year, Mr. Sumner evaluated Mr. Jacobs' performance as "Achieves Standards." This rating was one rating lower than the previous ratings Mr. Jacobs had received from Mr. Sumner. The rating was for Mr. Jacobs' first full year as an LSR II and reflected the drop in his performance as an LSR II. The following comment, among others, was made by Mr. Sumner on the evaluation: Over the past years Jake has been an enthusiastic and productive worker. This previous year has seen a deterioration of skills that he is normally capable of doing. I feel this maybe [sic] in part to environmental pressures outside of work. Many changes have been made to improve work environment, yet employee doesn't appear to enjoy his work. This change became more evident after first full year as an LSR II. Petitioner's exhibit 11. At the time of the 1990-1991 evaluation of Mr. Jacobs, Mr. Sumner was not aware that changes in the number of LSR positions in the District would be made by the Department in 1992. Effective January 1, 1992, the Department eliminated the LSR I and LSR II classifications. A single classification, Lottery Marketing Representative (hereinafter referred to as "LMR"), was created. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner was involved in the decision to make this change. Mr. Jacobs, Ms. Chason and Ms. Gray were reclassified from LSR II to LMR. Mr. Edwards, Mr. Kissinger and Ms. Silcox were reclassified from LSR I to LMR. In March of 1992 Mr. Sumner was notified by the Department that the sales staff of the District was being reorganized. As a consequence, the District LMR positions were to be reduced from six positions to four. As a part of the reorganization, the District was to receive one new position: a Telemarketing Representative, a newly created employee classification. As a result of the reorganization, Mr. Sumner was faced with reclassifying/demoting one LMR and possibly terminating one LMR. Mr. Sumner was only given two weeks to make the changes. In order to minimize the impact of the reorganization on employees of the District, Mr. Sumner successfully convinced the Department to locate the new Telemarketing Representative position at the District office. Mr. Sumner informed the LMRs of the reorganization and sought volunteers to take the Telemarketing Representative position in a meeting of all LMRs. Ms. Silcox subsequently volunteered to take the Telemarketing Representative position. At the time that Mr. Sumner was deciding how to comply with the Department's reorganization, the Administrative Assistant position in the District became vacant. Ms. Silcox subsequently agreed to take the Administrative Assistant position when Mr. Sumner asked her to. As a result of Ms. Silcox taking the Administrative Assistant position, Mr. Sumner did not have to terminate any LMR. The person in the other LMR position eliminated could move into the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Sumner spoke to the remaining four LMRs seeking a volunteer to take the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Edwards indicated that he would consider taking the position but delayed a decision over night. Mr. Jacobs did the same. Ultimately, none of the remaining five LMRs volunteered to take the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Sumner was required to select one of the five LMRs (Ms. Chason, Mr. Edwards, Ms. Gray, Mr. Jacobs or Mr. Kissinger) to be placed in the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Sumner decided that Mr. Jacobs should be reassigned/demoted to the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Jacobs was informed of the decision and was given the choice of accepting the Telemarketing Representative position with no reduction in salary or moving to Gainesville or Tampa as an LMR. Mr. Jacobs elected to take the Telemarketing Representative position so that he would not have to move. Mr. Jacobs was placed in the Telemarketing Representative position and continued to be paid the same salary he was receiving as an LMR. Mr. Jacobs received no reduction in pay or benefits. The Basis for Mr. Sumner's Decision to Reassign/Demote Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Sumner's decision to place Mr. Jacobs in the Telemarketing Representative position was based on his perception of the performance of the four other remaining LMRs (after Ms. Silcox had agreed to take the Administrative Assistant position) under Mr. Sumner's supervision compared to Mr. Jacobs' performance. Mr. Sumner took into account the past performance of each of the five LMRs and their progress in the various positions they had held under Mr. Sumner's supervision. Mr. Sumner did not base his decision on or consider seniority. Mr. Sumner selected Mr. Jacobs based upon the decline in Mr. Jacobs' performance since being promoted to LSR II, and his perception of the relatively slower development of Mr. Jacobs' abilities as an LSR II when compared with the other LMRs. All of the LMRs (while employed in the various positions under Mr. Sumner's supervision) had experienced problems in their performance and had been criticized by Mr. Sumner. There were no exceptions. Except for Mr. Jacobs, all of the LMRs had received consistently high evaluations of "Exceeds at Least One Standard" or "Exceeds Most Standards" each year while under Mr. Sumner's supervision. These ratings were based on their overall performance and the evidence failed to prove that the ratings were not reasonable. Only the rating given to Mr. Jacobs for his last evaluation period prior to his assignment to the Telemarketing Representative position had declined below those ratings. Two of the five LMRs had held LSR positions for a shorter period of time than Mr. Jacobs: Mr. Edwards: Storekeeper from 1987 to April of 1988, LSR I from April of 1988 to January of 1992, and LMR from January of 1992; and Mr. Kissinger: Storekeeper from May of 1988 to August of 1990, LSR I from August of 1990 to January of 1992 and LMR from January of 1992. Mr. Edwards and and Mr. Kissinger were not selected to be placed in the Telemarketing Representative position because of their consistently high evaluations and because they had both continued to progress and improve in their performance consistently after being employed in the District. Mr. Jacobs had not continued to progress and improve. The Impact of Routes on Mr. Jacobs' Performance. In the fall of 1987, the District was divided into three geographic areas (hereinafter referred to as "Routes"), by Mr. Sumner. Each LSR II was assigned to one of the three Routes and was responsible for servicing the retailers located therein. Each of the three Routes contained a part of Panama City, the largest city in the District, and a part of the rural areas of the District. Ms. Doll was assigned the eastern portion of the District, Ms. Gray was assigned the western portion and Ms. Chason was assigned the rest. Mr. Jacobs was assigned to work with Ms. Chason on the Route assigned to her. When Ms. Doll left the District and Mr. Jacobs was temporarily assigned to replace her, Mr. Jacobs took over Ms. Doll's Route plus a part of Ms. Gray's Route. Mr. Jacobs satisfactorily performed his duties as an LSR I on Ms. Chason's Route and while temporarily replacing Ms. Doll as an LSR II on Ms. Doll's Route. These Routes did not adversely affect Mr. Jacobs' performance. In September of 1990, when Mr. Jacobs was permanently promoted to LSR II and Ms. Davis was promoted to an LSR II position, the Routes were restructured by Mr. Sumner. Mr. Jacobs continued to serve the eastern portion of the District previously serviced by Ms. Doll and by him as a temporary LSR II, Ms. Chason was assigned Panama City Beach and the accounts along part of the Florida border with Georgia and Alabama, and Ms. Davis was assigned the western portion of the District. All three Routes continued to include portions of the greater Panama City area (Lynn Haven, Parker, Callaway and Springfield). The accounts on Panama City Beach were more productive during the summer months. The accounts along the Florida border also tended to be more productive. Ms. Chason was assigned these more productive accounts because she had evidenced greater skills in sales/marketing than the other LSR IIs. Not because she was white. The Routes were not totally restructured again until the January, 1992 consolidation of LSR positions. Prior to January of 1992 changes were, however, made to the Routes. These changes were made because of frequent changes in retailers participating in lottery sales and, on a few occasions, when Mr. Sumner was requested to make changes by the LSR IIs, including Mr. Jacobs. The Route assigned to Mr. Jacobs in September of 1990 was more rural than the other Routes and Mr. Jacobs was required, on average, to drive more miles than the other LSR IIs. The last relevant restructuring of Routes took place in January of 1992 after the consolidation of LSR I and II positions. At that time, the three Routes served by the LSR IIs were divided essentially in half, creating six Routes, one for each LMR. Each LSR II was allowed to select the half of the Route he or she was previously responsible for and the other half was assigned to the LSR I that had previously been assigned to the Route. Immediately prior to January of 1992, Mr. Jacobs was assisted by Ms. Silcox. When their Route was divided, Mr. Jacobs selected the half of the Route he desired and Ms. Silcox was assigned the other half. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner's evaluation of Mr. Jacobs was unfairly affected by the Route he was assigned to or that Mr. Sumner treated Mr. Jacobs unfairly in the assignment of Routes based upon his race. Sales figures contained on evaluations performed by Mr. Sumner were not always seen by Mr. Sumner when he completed an evaluation. In at least one year, those figures were added to the evaluation after Mr. Sumner completed his part of the evaluation. The suggestion that Mr. Jacobs' Route adversely impacted his evaluations was contradicted by the fact that for three years, Mr. Jacobs and Ms. Chason, who allegedly had the most favorable Route, received the same overall evaluation: "Exceeds at Least One Standard." In the first full year that Mr. Jacobs served as an LSR II, although his overall evaluation declined, the "Other Category," which included Route statistics, on Mr. Jacobs' evaluation was rated "Exceeds at Least One Standard." The suggestion that some LSRs were able to dictate their Routes was also not supported by the evidence. All of the LSRs had some input into the Routes that they handled. For example, Mr. Jacobs and Ms. Davis both requested the assignment of retailers near the Florida border. These requests were honored by Mr. Sumner. Mr. Jacobs was assigned Bascom and Malone, Florida, and Ms. Davis was assigned Campbellton, Florida. Mr. Jacobs accepted the new accounts despite the fact that the mileage he was required to travel increased. All of the LSRs were also allowed to choose between half of their prior Routes in 1992. These incidents did not prove that white LSRs were allowed to select their Routes. Sales generated in each Route had minimal impact on Mr. Sumner's evaluation of Mr. Jacobs or the other LSR's performance. No sales quotas were established and LSRs were not compensated on the basis of their sales during the period of time relevant to this proceeding. While sales had to be taken into account to some extent, performance was evaluated based upon each person's general marketing skills and efforts. Sales goals were established during the summer of 1991 by the new sales director. Each LSR was assigned a sales quota based upon a percentage increase from their last year sales figures. If an LSR failed to meet the quota, there was no consequence. Employees were commended if they did achieve their quota. LSRs were given quotas of new retailers they were to attempt to add each month. All LSR Is were given a quota of one new retailer and all LSR IIs were given a quota of two new retailers. Recruitment of retailers was not necessarily a product of the length of a Route. See Petitioner's exhibit 36. The evidence failed to prove that the Routes assigned to Mr. Jacobs adversely impacted Mr. Sumner's evaluation of his ability to recruit. Based upon the weight of the evidence, Mr. Jacobs failed to prove that the assignment of Routes was made in a discriminatory manner or that Mr. Jacobs' Routes adversely affected his performance because of difficulty caused by the Routes in meeting sales or recruitment quotas. Leave Policies. Mr. Sumner's policy concerning requests for annual leave made was that District employees should request approval at least two weeks in advance of when the employee intended to be off work. The two week notice policy was well known to all employees, including Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Sumner issued several memoranda setting out the policy. Mr. Sumner also notified employees that a telephone call was all that was necessary to take annual leave if there was an emergency. Mr. Sumner's policy concerning giving two weeks notice was not strictly adhered to or enforced. Mr. Sumner recognized there were reasonable circumstances when an employee was not able to request permission to take annual leave two weeks or more in advance. As long as an employee made a reasonable effort and the operation of District would not, in Mr. Sumner's opinion, be harmed by an employee's absence, Mr. Sumner approved leave even when two weeks notice was not given. The two week notice requirement was waived for virtually every employee, including Mr. Jacobs. On one occasion Mr. Sumner denied a request by Mr. Jacobs for annual leave. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner denied the request without just cause or based upon Mr. Jacobs' race. During the period between April of 1990 and April of 1992, Mr. Sumner approved approximately 400 hours of leave, annual and sick, for Mr. Jacobs. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Jacobs was treated differently because of his race with regard to leave requests he made while employed by the Department. Part of the leave taken by Mr. Jacobs was attributable to the illness of his two foster care infants. Mr. Jacobs had taken time off on numerous occasions due to their poor health. Mr. Jacobs had been required to take annual leave, rather than sick leave, for the infants because the Department's personnel office had informed Mr. Sumner and Mr. Jacobs that State leave policies did not allow sick leave for foster care children. Mr. Sumner did not strictly enforce the notice policy for annual leave when Mr. Jacobs took annual leave for the foster care children. Nor did Mr. Sumner give Mr. Jacobs any reasonable reason to expect that Mr. Sumner would not approve the use of annual leave when the children were ill because Mr. Jacobs had not given two weeks advance notice. Nor was it reasonable for Mr. Jacobs to not realize that a simple telephone call to the office to inform the office of an emergency with the children would not be sufficient. Between March 17, 1992 and March 18, 1992, one of Mr. Jacobs' foster care infants became extremely ill. This was not the first time that the child had experienced the type of problem experienced at that time, but the problem was more severe. Although Mr. Jacobs could have simply telephoned the office the next morning and reported that there was an emergency, Mr. Jacobs reported to work. Mrs. Jacobs took the infant to a hospital where it was to be determined whether the child would be admitted to the hospital. After arriving at the office, Mr. Jacobs, who was visibly shaken, spoke with Mr. Sumner. What took place during that discussion was disputed by Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Sumner. Mr. Jacobs testified that Mr. Sumner was clearly informed that he wanted to go to the hospital to be with the child but was told he had to attend to his Route first. Mr. Sumner testified that Mr. Jacobs did not specifically request time off, that he had indicated he might be require to go to the hospital sometime during the day, and that Mr. Sumner told Mr. Jacobs to service his five biggest accounts scheduled for that day and then take the rest of the day off even if it was not necessary for him to go to the hospital. Shortly after the conversation between Mr. Sumner and Mr. Jacobs, and after Mr. Jacobs had left on his Route, the child died. Mr. Jacobs was informed at his first stop and he left for the hospital. Based upon the weight of the evidence, it is concluded that Mr. Jacobs, who was tired from the events of the night before and under a great deal of stress because of his concern for the child, was not denied approval of leave by Mr. Sumner to immediately go to the hospital and was not told that he had to complete his Route. At most, there appears to have been an unfortunate miscommunication between Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Sumner about the urgency of the situation. Mr. Sumner's belief that the matter was not as urgent as it turned out to be was supported by the fact that the infants had experienced similar difficulties in the past; the fact that the child had not been taken to the hospital earlier; the fact that Mr. Jacobs had come to the office that morning instead of telephoning; and the fact that Mr. Mr. Jacobs did not insist on going to the hospital immediately. Assignment of Department Vehicles. LSRs were assigned Department vehicles, (vans) for use in servicing Routes. In approximately November of 1987, the District was temporarily assigned one less van than needed. Mr. Jacobs volunteered to drive his personal vehicle, for which he was reimbursed by the State. Mr. Jacobs drove his personal vehicle until approximately December 24, 1987, when he received a new van. Other LSRs were required to use their personal vehicles on occasion, for which they were also reimbursed by the State. Pursuant to a replacement schedule instituted by the Department, 1/3 of all vans were to be replaced every year. In this way, every van would be used a maximum of three years. This schedule was based upon estimates of the time necessary for vans to have accumulated sufficient mileage (80,000 miles) to warrant replacement. To insure that a van was ready for replacement at the end of three years, it was Department policy to assign vans with lower mileage after a year or two years use to high mileage drivers. In November of 1991, five vans in the District exceeded 80,000 miles and were to be replaced with new vans. The District, however, only received three new vans. The other two vans were replaced with two lower mileage vans scheduled to be replaced the next fiscal year. Consistent with Department policy Mr. Sumner was suppose to assign the new vans to persons who drove less miles and the older vans should have been assigned to persons who drove greater miles. In November of 1991, the mileage driven in the previous year by each LSR was as follows: Silcox 16,327 miles Chason 16,426 miles Davis 21,000 miles Jacobs 23,717 miles Edwards 24,000 miles Kissinger 30,000 miles Pursuant to Department policy, the new vans should have been assigned to Ms. Silcox, Ms. Chason and Ms. Davis. The new vans, however, were assigned to Ms. Chason, Ms. Davis and Mr. Kissinger. The vans assigned to Ms. Chason and Ms. Davis were assigned consistent with Department policy. Ms. Silcox, Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Edwards were assigned older vans. The assignment of an older van to Ms. Silcox was inconsistent with Department policy. The assignment of older vans with less mileage to Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Edwards was consistent with Department policy. Had Department policy been followed completely and the third new van had been assigned to Ms. Silcox and not Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Jacobs would still not have received a new van. Mr. Sumner asked Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Edwards if they would drive to another district to pick up two vans. Mr. Sumner indicated that one of the new vans would be assigned to one of them if they agreed. They agreed, and Mr. Sumner awarded a new van to Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Sumner did not give Mr. Jacobs or Ms. Wilcox the opportunity to pick up the two vans located in another district. Marketing Promotions. LSRs, as part of their marketing responsibility, could conduct various types of promotions at retailers intended to increase sales of lottery tickets. LSRs were expected to conduct promotions. Quotas were assigned to each LSR II. They were expected to conduct one promotion per month. Promotions generally did not require much of a financial investment by the retailer and smaller retailers were generally as interested in conducting promotions as larger retailers. The evidence failed to prove that the Route assigned to Mr. Jacobs adversely affected his ability to conduct promotions. The evidence also failed to prove that Mr. Sumner's evaluations of Mr. Jacobs' performance while supervised by Mr. Sumner were adversely impacted by a lack of promotions caused by Mr. Jacobs' Route. Mr. Sumner believed that Mr. Jacobs performed a sufficient quantity of promotions but that he was slow about doing them. Conducting some promotions required overtime. Overtime, however, was required to be requested and approved in writing. Approval of overtime came from the Department and not Mr. Sumner. Mr. Jacobs was aware of this requirement. In December of 1991, Mr. Jacobs requested permission to conduct a promotion which involved the giving away of coffee mugs with the Department logo on them to each customer that bought a minimum number of lottery tickets. This promotion did not involve overtime and none was requested by Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Jacobs claimed that the promotion was changed to one that would require overtime, and that he was told by Mr. Sumner that approval would be obtained from the Department. The weight of the evidence failed to support this claim. In August of 1991, Ms. Chason sought approval to conduct a promotion at a seafood festival to be held in October of that year. The festival required overtime for two employees plus Ms. Chason. Ms. Chason asked for volunteers and accepted the first two persons. Mr. Jacobs did not volunteer and, consequently, was not one of the two persons selected by Ms. Chason. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner was involved in the failure to select Mr. Jacobs, that the failure to select Mr. Jacobs was somehow unfair or that Mr. Jacobs was not selected by Ms. Chason because of his race. Mr. Jacobs also claimed that he was not given credit for two new retailers he obtained because the forms signing up the retailers were lost. The evidence, however, proved that, although the retailers were lost as Department customers, Mr. Jacobs was given credit for signing them up by Mr. Sumner. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner was involved with the loss of the forms signing up the retailers or that they were lost to cause Mr. Jacobs to fail to meet his quota for new retailers. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner or the Department awarded bonuses or that Mr. Jacobs was denied bonuses because of his race. Miscellaneous Charges. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Jacobs was denied training provided to white employees because of his race. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Jacobs was denied the use of new equipment provided to white employees because of his race. Mr. Jacobs' Charge of Discrimination. Mr. Jacobs filed a Charge of Discrimination against the Department with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Mr. Jacbos alleged that he had been discriminated against based upon his race. On March 29, 1993, the Commission issued a "Determination: No Cause" finding "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred " Mr. Jacobs filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission requesting a formal administrative hearing. In the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission Mr. Jacobs alleged, in response to questions 3, 4 and 5 on the Petition for Relief, the following: Respondent has violated the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, in the manner specifically described below: My supervisor, Steve Sumner has systematically and intentionally denied me equal opportunities because of my race (black) for training, compensation, use of new equipment, time off from work, leave and retention and advancement in my position as an LSR. See the attached charge of discrimination incorporated herein. The disputed issues of material fact, if any, are as listed below: Mr. Sumner allowed every other LSR (all who are white) to pick their own routes which were the best routes, leaving the most difficult to me. He has also allowed other LSR's to work for bonuses during promotions but has not allowed me to do so. Mr. Sumner has misplaced some new applications for lottery retailers that I obtained so that my quotas of achievement would be lower. Mr. Sumner retained a coworker in the LSR position when he had been promoted to LSR long after me. Mr. Sumner denied my taking leave when one of my foster children was critically ill and the child died while I was at work. The ultimate facts alleged and entitlement to relief are as listed below: I wish to have a formal post-investigative proceeding. I wish to be reinstated in my LSR position with seniority back to the date of my demotion or receive adequate compensation for the harms I have suffered and reasonable attorneys fees and costs. I am a member of a protected class and Mr. Sumner has singled me out for arbitrary and negative treatment based on my race (black). All the responses Mr. Sumner has provided are pretextual or simply not true. The Commission requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a Hearing Officer to conduct the hearing requested by Mr. Jacobs. At the commencement of the proceeding, Mr. Jacobs indicated that he was seeking a "general injunction", an apology from the Department, monetary compensation for damages in the form of payment for pain and suffering, attorney fees and reinstatement as an LSR II. Alleged Race Discrimination. The evidence in this case failed to prove that any action of Mr. Sumner or the Department was based upon Mr. Jacobs' race. He was not held to any standard or requirement based upon his race and he was not treated in a manner different from the treatment afforded employees of other races. The evidence proved that Mr. Sumner had hired Mr. Jacobs, that Mr. Sumner had given him high evaluations for the first three years he worked, he had temporarily promoted Mr. Jacobs to a higher position with a temporary increase in pay not afforded white employees, he had promoted him with a permanent increase in pay which made Mr. Jacobs the highest paid employee in his class at the District, and he had assisted Mr. Jacobs in insuring that he was qualified for the promotion. Only after Mr. Jacobs' performance began to decline did Mr. Sumner take actions which were somewhat adverse to Mr. Jacobs. Those actions did not take place until after three years of working together. The reasons for taking those actions were reasonably explained by Mr. Sumner and the Department. Mr. Jacobs was unable to explain the foundation for his belief that Mr. Sumner began treating him differently in 1991 on the basis of his race.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, H. Fleischer, has filed a claim against the bond for $648.95 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. On an undisclosed date in 1991, petitioner responded to a newspaper advertisement promoting a five-day, four-night cruise to the Bahamas for $99.00 per person. After calling a toll-free number, petitioner was told that in order to take the trip, he must purchase a video for $198.00 plus $11.95 postage, or a total of $209.95. Petitioner agreed to purchase the video in order to take advantage of the trip. The advertisement was being run by a telemarketeer in Tennessee who had been authorized to sell Passport's travel certificates. As such, it was acting as an agent on behalf of Passport. In June 1991, the assets and liabilities of Passport were assumed by Incentive Internationale Travel, Inc. (Incentive). Even so, any travel described in certificates sold after that date under the name of Passport was still protected by Passport's bond. Within seven days after receiving the video and other materials, which carried the name, address, logo and telephone number of Passport, petitioner returned the same to the telemarketeer along with a request for a refund of his money. When he did not receive a refund, he filed a complaint with the Department. In response to a Department inquiry, in December 1991 Incentive declined to issue a refund on the ground the video was purchased from a Tennessee firm, and not Passport, and Passport had never received any money from the telemarketeer. Incentive offered, however, to honor the travel certificate by allowing petitioner to purchase a trip to the Bahamas under the same terms and conditions as were previously offered. On July 6, 1992, petitioner accepted Incentive's offer and paid that firm $439.00 for additional accommodations, meals, fees and taxes. Shortly after July 24, 1992, petitioner received a letter from Incentive advising that his trip had been cancelled and that the firm had filed for bankruptcy protection. To date, petitioner has not received a refund of his money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted, and he be reimbursed $648.95 from the bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Fleischer 15 Wind Ridge Road North Caldwell, NJ 07006 Michael J. Panaggio 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, FL 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
The Issue Has Respondent Try Fresh Produce, Inc. (Try Fresh) made proper accounting to Petitioner Green Grassing Company, Inc. (Green Grassing) in accordance with Section 604.22(1), Florida Statutes, for agriculture products delivered to Try Fresh from November 13, 1994, through December 9, 1994, by Green Grassing to be handled by Try Fresh as agent for Green Grassing on a net return basis as defined in Section 604.15(4), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Green Grassing was in the business of growing and selling "agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statute, and was a "producer" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Try Fresh was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, as evidenced by license number 8839 issued by the Department, supported by bond number BD 0694273 in the amount of $75,000, written by Florida Farm Bureau General Insurance Company with an inception date of September 23, 1994, and an expiration date of September 22, 1995. Green Grassing delivered certain quantities of agricultural products (squash) to Try Fresh during the fall and winter growing season of 1994-95. However, it is the accounting of the squash that was delivered between November 13, 1994, and December 9, 1994, inclusive, that is in dispute. It was verbally agreed between Try Fresh and Green Grassing that Try Fresh would act as Green Grassing's agent in the sale of the squash delivered to Try Fresh for the account of Green Grassing on a net return basis. There is no dispute as the quantity of squash or size of squash delivered by Green Grassing to Try Fresh during the above period of time. Furthermore, there is no dispute as to the charges made by Try Fresh for handling the squash, including but not limited to the commission charged by Try Fresh. There is some disagreement concerning the quality of the squash delivered by Green Grassing. However, none of the witnesses had personal knowledge as to the quality of the squash delivered by Green Grassing. Upon delivering the squash to Try Fresh, Green Grassing was given a numbered delivery receipt listing Green Grassing as owner of the squash showing the number of cartons delivered, the date delivered, the initials of the employee receiving the squash and the kind and size of squash delivered. On most of these receipts there were four blank squares located just above the line for the date on the receipt. Starting from the left side of the receipt, the squares represent average, below average, poor and very poor quality, respectively. It was the responsibility of the employee receiving the squash for Try Fresh to place a check mark in one of the squares to indicate the quality of the squash upon delivery. Only the accounting for the squash from delivery receipt ticket numbers 086 dated November 13, 1994; 005 dated November 15, 1994; 017 dated November 16, 1994; 047 dated November 17, 1994; 451 dated November 18, 1994; 463 dated November 19, 1994; 500 dated November 23, 1994; 501 dated November 25, 1994; 397 dated December 5, 1994, and 329 dated December 9, 1994, is being contested in this proceeding. The delivery receipts being contested are included in Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 and Respondent's composite exhibit 1. A compilation of those delivery receipts is attached to the Complaint in Petitioner's composite exhibit 2. Once Try Fresh found a market for the squash, a pre-numbered billing invoice was prepared by Try Fresh showing its customer's name and the quantity, description and price of the squash sold. In any given sale, the quantity of the squash sold may include squash furnished by Green Grassing and other producers. Therefore, under description on the billing invoice Try Fresh would show the size and type of squash being sold, the initials of the producer, the quantity of squash being sold for that producer and the producer's receipt number for example, med. s/n GGI 68/086. In its accounting to Green Grassing, Try Fresh prepared a statement which included the delivery receipt number, the quantity of squash sold, description of the product, i.e. med, s/n squash, the price per carton of squash and the total amount for the quantity sold. The statements also noted when a certain quantity of a squash had been transferred to another ticket number or if a trouble memo number (T number) was involved in a particular sale. Payment for the squash was made by Try Fresh to Green Grassing from these statements. Sometimes payment was for only one delivery receipt while at other times for several delivery receipts for different dates. The statements are included as part of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5. Petitioner's composite exhibit 4 is the Florida Vegetable Report, Volume XIV, Nos. 21 - 25 and 27 - 39, dated November 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, 1994 and December 1, 2, 5 - 9, 1994, which establishes prices paid during this period of time for small and medium straight neck squash. The report does not list prices paid for large straight neck squash. There is no evidence that the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh by Green Grassing during this period of time was the same quality of squash from which the prices in the report were derived. On November 13, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 32 cartons of small, straight neck squash (sm s/n squash), 145 cartons of medium, straight neck squash (med s/n squash), and 42 cartons of large, straight neck squash (lg s/n squash) to Try Fresh as reflected in delivery receipt number 086 dated November 13, 1994, showing Green Grassing as owner of the squash. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of delivery receipt number 086 to indicate the quality of the squash at the time of delivery to Try Fresh on November 13, 1994. There is no dispute as to accounting of the 145 cartons of medium, straight neck squash reflected on delivery receipt 086. Try Fresh's statement of accounting to Green Grassing dated November 25, 1994 (page 5 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5) indicates that the 32 cartons of small , s/n squash listed on receipt number 086 were transferred to receipt number 258 with the price left open and no payment made to Green Grassing. The next entry concerning these 32 cartons of squash appears on a statement dated December 2, 1994 (page 13 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5) with the price left open and no payment made to Green Grassing. The next entry concerning these 32 cartons of squash appears on an undated statement (page 21 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5) with reference made to trouble memo (T number 0040) with the price is left open and no payment made to Green Grassing. There is no further reference to these 32 cartons of squash (delivery receipt 086, ticket 258 or T number 0040) in the statement of accounting. There is no evidence that Green Grassing was paid for the 32 cartons of sm s/n squash as reflected by delivery receipt number 086. There is no indication on billing invoice number 065562 that the 32 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 086 were included in the 240 cartons of sm, s/n squash shipped to Georgia Vegetable Co. as was the normal practice by Try Fresh as set out in Finding of Fact 7. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to show that the 32 cartons of squash were found to be below quality by a federal inspection (Certificate No. M-460187-8) on November 17, 1994, which resulted in Try Fresh receiving a reduced price of $1.71 per carton as shown on T number 0017 (trouble memo). This amount was paid to Green Grassing as shown by statement of accounting dated December 23, 1994, (see page 28 Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). However, those 32 cartons of squash were identified as transfer ticket number 259 which relates to delivery receipt number 005 dated November 15, 1994, not delivery receipt number 086 (see pages 9 and 13 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). Try Fresh has failed to account to Green Grassing for the 32 cartons of sm, s/n squash delivered on November 13, 1994, as reflected by delivery receipt number 086. Based on the prices Try Fresh billed and was paid for sm, s/n squash by its customer (including sm s/n squash belonging to Green Grassing) during this period, a price of $8.00 per carton would be reasonable price. Try Fresh owes Green Grassing for 32 cartons of sm s/n squash at $8.00 per carton for a total of $256.00. Try Fresh's statement of accounting dated November 25, 1994, (page 5 Petitioner's composite exhibit 5) shows 10 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 086 as being transferred to ticket number 258 with a note of trouble memo (T number 0036) with the price left open and no payment to Green Grassing. The same page of the statement shows 21 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 086 being dumped due to poor quality without payment to Green Grassing. The same page shows 11 cartons of lg, s/n squash being transferred to ticket number 258 without any explanation or payment to Green Grassing. These 11 cartons are accounted for at $2.00 per carton for a total of $22.00 on page 21 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5. There is no evidence (testimony, trouble memo or federal inspection) to show why the 11 cartons of squash brought only $2.00 per carton when lg s/n squash from delivery ticket number 086 were billed out at $8.00 per carton on November 19, 1994 (see billing invoice number 065593). Likewise, there was no evidence as to who purchased these squash. Try Fresh's billing invoice number 065593 shows 50 cartons of lg, s/n squash being billed to G & B at 8.00 per carton which included 10 cartons of lg, s/n squash belonging to Green Grassing from delivery receipt number 086. Trouble Memo (T number 0036) shows a problem with the 50 cartons of lg, s/n squash shipped to G & B Produce on November 19, 1994, and reported on November 23, 1994, which resulted in the price being reduced to $2.50 per carton. Although sketchy, Respondent's accounting for the 10 cartons of squash on T number 0036 and the 21 cartons of squash dumped is sufficient. However, there is insufficient accounting for the 11 cartons of squash. Try Fresh owes Green Grassing $6.00 per carton, the difference between the billed price of $8.00 per carton and the $2.00 per carton paid, for 11 eleven cartons of squash for a total of $66.00. On November 15, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 198 cartons of med, s/n squash and 118 cartons of sm, s/n squash to Try Fresh as evidence by delivery receipt number 005 dated November 15, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of delivery receipt number 005 to indicate the quality of the squash at the time of delivery to Try Fresh on November 15, 1994. There is no dispute as to 98 cartons of med, s/n squash and 9 cartons of sm, s/n squash. Try Fresh paid $1.00 per carton for the balance of 100 cartons of med, s/n squash listed on delivery receipt number 005 that is in dispute on February 3, 1995, by check number 2217 (see pages 35 and 36 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). However, there is no evidence to show that at the time these med, s/n squash were received by Try Fresh's customer, who allegedly reduced the price to Try Fresh, that the squash was of inferior quality and would demand a price of only $1.00 per carton when those same squash brought an average of $11.00 per carton from other Try Fresh customers. Try Fresh has failed to make a proper accounting for the 100 cartons of med, s/n squash. Try Fresh owes Green Grassing the difference of $10.00 per carton for 100 cartons of squash for a total amount of $1,000.00. The 99 cartons of sm, s/n squash reflected on delivery receipt number 005 that are in dispute were paid for by Try Fresh at the rate of $10.40 per carton for 77 cartons and $1.71 per carton for 32 cartons. Although 77 cartons were billed out at $12.00 per carton (see billing invoice number 065592), there is sufficient evidence (T number 0022) to support the reduction in price to $10.40 per carton. However, there is insufficient evidence to show the reduction in price to $1.71 per carton for the 32 cartons. Try Fresh has failed to make proper accounting for the 32 cartons. Try Fresh owes Green Grassing $8.69 per carton, the difference between $10.40 per carton that was paid for the 77 cartons and the $1.71 paid for the 32 carton for a total amount of $278.08. On November 16, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 64 cartons of med, s/n squash and 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected by delivery receipt number 017. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of delivery receipt number 017 to indicate the quality of the squash at the time of delivery to Try Fresh on November 16, 1994. On November 25, 1994, Try Fresh paid Green Grassing $12.00 per carton for 21 cartons of med, s/n squash and $12.00 per carton for 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash by check number 1447 as shown on pages 4 through of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5. However, page 28 of Petitioner's composite exhibit shows a zero amount for 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash reference to delivery receipt number 017. This is apparently an error, as is T number 0033 (Trouble Memo). Try Fresh also paid $12.00 per carton for the 43 cartons of med, s/n squash by check number 2009 dated January 6, 1995 (see pages 31 and 32 of Petitioner's composite exhibit number 5). There has been proper accounting by Try Fresh of the squash reflected by delivery receipt number 017. On November 17, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 93 cartons of sm, s/n squash and 161 cartons of med, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected by delivery receipt number 047. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of delivery receipt 047 to indicate the quality of the squash at the time of delivery to Try Fresh on November 17, 1994. Only the accounting of the 93 cartons of the sm, s/n squash is disputed. On November 18, 1994, Try Fresh billed out 13 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 047 to Georgia Vegetable on billing invoice number 065592 at $12.00 per carton. Try Fresh was advised by Georgia Vegetable of a problem. Trouble memo (T number 0022) was prepared by Try Fresh which indicated that after working with Georgia Vegetable a price of $10.40 per carton was agreed upon. Green Grassing was paid $10.40 per carton (see page 30 of Petitioner's composite exhibit number 5). Try Fresh has made proper accounting of these squash. On November 19, 1994, Try Fresh billed out 80 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 047 to Phil Lucks on billing invoice number 65596 at an undetermined price (the price had been redacted on the billing invoice). Although trouble memo (T number 0032) indicates a problem (brown & decay) with 100 cartons of sm, s/n squash shipped on November 22, 1994, there was no evidence that these were the same squash billed on billing invoice number 065596. Try Fresh has failed to present sufficient evidence to show why these squash did not bring the same price the other sm, s/n squash on delivery receipt number 047 brought. Try Fresh has failed to properly account for these 80 cartons of squash. Therefore, Try Fresh owes Green Grassing $10.40 per carton for 80 cartons of squash for a total of $832.00. On November 18, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 33 cartons of lg, s/n squash, 41 cartons of med, s/n squash and 20 cartons of sm, s/n squash to Try Fresh as evidenced by delivery receipt number 451 dated November 18, 1994. The delivery receipt indicates that the squash was of very poor quality when delivered. The 20 cartons of sm, s/n squash was billed to T & M at $6.00 per carton. Although there is a trouble memo (T number 0025), it appears that Green Grassing was paid $6.00 per carton for these 20 cartons of squash. There is no evidence that these squash were of the same quality as those referenced in the Florida Vegetable Report for this period of time which could demand a price of $12.00 per carton as argued by Green Grassing. Furthermore, Green Grassing has produced no evidence that Try Fresh received $12.00 per carton for these squash. Try Fresh has made proper accounting of the 20 cartons of sm, s/n squash reflected in delivery receipt number 451. The 33 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery ticket number 451 required re-grading by Try Fresh. After re-grading, 16 cartons were not fit for sale. The 17 cartons of lg, s/n squash remaining after re-grading were sold by Try Fresh for $6.00 per carton. This amount was paid to Green Grassing by check number 1812 dated December 23, 1994, (see pages 27 and 28 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). Try Fresh has made proper accounting for the 33 cartons of squash reflected in delivery receipt number 451. The 41 cartons of med, s/n squash from delivery ticket number 451 was invoiced at an undetermined price (priced appeared to be redacted from the invoice) on billing invoice number 065582. Trouble memo (T number 0033) indicates that the 41 cartons of med, s/n squash from billing invoice number 065582 were brown and decayed and were rejected by Lucks. Try Fresh has made proper accounting of these 41 cartons of squash reflected in delivery receipt number 451. On November 19, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 32 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 54 cartons of med, s/n squash and 3 lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected by delivery receipt number 463. The delivery receipt indicates that the squash were of poor quality when delivered to Try Fresh on November 19, 1994. There is no dispute as to the accounting of the 54 cartons of med, s/n squash. On December 2, 1994, by check number 1568, Try Fresh paid Green Grassing $16.00 per carton for 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 463 for a total of $400.00 (see pages 12 and 15 Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). On January 5, 1995, by check number 2009, Try Fresh paid Green Grassing $4.00 per carton for 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 463 for a total of $100.00 (see pages 31 and 32 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). On December 2, 1994, by check number 1568, Try Fresh paid Green Grassing $1.00 per carton for 7 cartons of sm, s/n squash for a total of $7.00 from delivery ticket number 463. Try Fresh has paid Green Grassing a total of $507.00 for the sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 463. However, thirty two cartons of sm, s/n squash at $16.00 per carton would total $512.00. Since there is no evidence to support a price less than the $16.00 per carton paid by Try Fresh on December 2, 1994, Try Fresh owes a Green Grassing a balance of $5.00. There is sufficient evidence to show that the 3 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 463 were re-graded and none were salvaged. Other than the $5.00 above, Try Fresh has made proper accounting of the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 463. On November 23, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 16 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 44 cartons of med, s/n squash and 5 cartons of lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected in delivery receipt number 500 dated November 23, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of the delivery receipt to indicate the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh on November 23, 1994. There is no dispute as to the 16 cartons of sm. s/n squash or the 44 cartons of med, s/n squash. The 5 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery receipt 500 were sold to American Growers by Try Fresh for $4.00 per carton as reflected in billing invoice number 065628 dated November 25, 1994. Green Grassing was paid this amount by Try Fresh (see pages 19 and 23 Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). Try Fresh has made proper accounting of the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 500, notwithstanding the prices listed in the Florida Vegetable Report for this period of time. On November 25, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 18 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 68 cartons of med, s/n squash and 5 cartons of lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected in delivery receipt number 501 dated November 25, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of the delivery receipt to indicate the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh on November 25, 1994. There is no dispute as to the accounting for the 18 cartons of sm, s/n squash or the 68 cartons of med, s/n squash. The 5 cartons of lg, s/n squash were sold to American Growers for $4.00 per carton by Try Fresh as reflected in billing invoice number 065628 dated November 25, 1994. Green Grassing was paid this amount by Try Fresh (see pages 19 and 23 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). Try Fresh has made proper accounting of the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 501, notwithstanding the price listed in the Florida Vegetable Report for this period of time. On December 5, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 2 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 68 cartons of med, s/n squash and 16 cartons of lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected in the delivery receipt number 397 dated December 5, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of the delivery receipt to indicate the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh on December 5, 1994. The 2 cartons of sm, s/n squash were sold on December 6, 1994, at $8.00 per carton as reflected in billing invoice number 065749 dated December 6, 1994. Sixteen cartons of the med, s/n squash were sold on December 6, 1994, to K & M South for $8.00 per carton as reflected in billing invoice number 065003 dated December 6, 1994. Twenty seven cartons of the med, s/n squash were sold to Tom Lange Co. for $10.00 per carton as reflected in an unnumbered billing invoice dated December 9, 1994 with customer order no. 23- 4020. Twenty five cartons of the med, s/n squash were sold to G & B for $10.00 per carton as reflected in an unnumbered billing invoice dated December 10, 1994, with customer order number 8130. Sixteen cartons of lg, s/n squash were sold to Erenbaum for $5.00 per carton as reflected in an unnumbered billing invoice dated December 6, 1994 with customer number 9472. Although these prices are below prices quoted in the Florida Vegetable Report for December 6 - 9, 1994, for small and medium s/n squash (no prices quoted for large, s/n squash), the prices are consistent with prices Try Fresh was receiving during this same period for small, medium and large s/n squash that it handled for other producers. Try Fresh has made proper accounting for the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 397, notwithstanding the prices listed in the Florida Vegetable Report for this period of time. On December 9, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 2 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 31 cartons of med, s/n squash and 17 lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected in delivery receipt number 329 dated December 9, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of the delivery receipt to indicate the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh on December 9, 1994. There is no dispute as to the accounting of the 2 cartons of small and 31 cartons of medium squash. The 17 cartons of large, s/n squash were billed to Erenbaum in billing invoice number 065035 dated December 9, 1994. It appears that the price originally billed to Erenbaum's was redacted and zero per carton written on billing invoice. A federal inspection was called for and the squash were found to be below quality. This resulted in a zero return on the squash. Try Fresh has made proper accounting for the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 329. From a review of Try Fresh's records placed into evidence that its accounting to Green Grassing was not always in accordance with Section 604.22(1), Florida Statutes. Particularly, there was no record of the quality of the squash, no explanation of the adjustments to the original price, or if an explanation was given, it was not clear and no record of when payment was received by Try Fresh from the purchaser making it difficult to determine the timeliness of the accounting of the sales and payment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent Try Fresh Produce Co., be ordered to pay Petitioner Green Grassing Co., Inc. the sum of $2,437.08. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1532A The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted jointly by the Respondents Aetna and Naples in this case. Both Petitioner Green Grassing Co., Inc. and Respondent Try Fresh Produce, Co. elected not to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as allowed under Section 120.57(1)(b)(4), Florida Statutes. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Ragon Barnett, III 6 East Broadway Street Ft. Meade, Florida 33841 Hank Cord Post Office Box 995 Zolfo Springs, Florida 33890 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether American Airlines committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the employment discrimination charges filed by Petitioners and, if so, what relief should Petitioners be granted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the extensive factual stipulations set forth in the parties' February 23, 2006, Corrected Joint Prehearing Stipulation2: Petitioners are both Hispanic. Hispanics represent a substantial portion of the workforce in American's maintenance department at Miami International Airport (MIA). Among these Hispanic employees in the maintenance department are those who occupy supervisory positions. American’s Vice-President for Maintenance, Danny Martinez, is Hispanic. As aviation maintenance technicians for American, Petitioners' job duties, as set forth in the written job description for the position, were as follows: In addition to the work specified for the Junior Aviation Maintenance Technician, an Aviation Maintenance Technician's responsibility also includes the following: troubleshooting, individually or with Crew Chief, management or professional direction, disassembly, checking and cleaning, repairing, replacing, testing, adjusting, assembling, installing, servicing, fabricating, taxing or towing airplanes and/or run-up engines, de-icing aircraft, required to maintain the airworthiness of aircraft and all their components while in service or while undergoing overhaul and/or modification. Certifies for quality of own workmanship, including signing mechanical flight releases for all work done on field work. In those work positions where stock chasers are not utilized and/or available at the time may chase own parts. May have other Mechanic personnel assigned to assist him/her in completing an assignment. Works according to FAA and Company regulations and procedures and instructions from Crew Chief or supervisor. Completes forms connected with work assignments according to established procedures and communicates with other Company personnel as required in a manner designated by the Company. Performs the following duties as assigned: cleaning of aircraft windshields; connection/removing ground power and ground start units; pushing out/towing of aircraft and related guideman functions, fueling/defueling, de-icing of aircraft. At all times material to the instant cases, Petitioners were members of a collective bargaining unit represented by the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) and covered by a collective bargaining agreement between American and the TWU (TWU Contract), which contained the following provisions, among others: ARTICLE 28- NO DISCRIMINATION, AND RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND COMPLIANCE The Company and the Union agree to make it a matter of record in this Agreement that in accordance with the established policy of the Company and the Union, the provisions of this Agreement will apply equally to all employees regardless of sex, color, race, creed, age, religious preferences, status as a veteran or military reservist, disability, or national origin. The Union recognizes that the Company will have sole jurisdiction of the management and operation of its business, the direction of its working force, the right to maintain discipline and efficiency in its hangars, stations, shops, or other places of employment, and the right of the Company to hire, discipline, and discharge employees for just cause, subject to the provisions of this Agreement. It is agreed that the rights of management not enumerated in this Article will not be deemed to exclude other preexisting rights of management not enumerated which do not conflict with other provisions of the Agreement. * * * Copies of the Peak Performance Through Commitment (PPC) Program will be available to all employees upon request. Any changes to the PPC Program will be provided and explained to the TWU prior to implementation. ARTICLE 29- REPRESENTATION * * * The Union does not question the right of the Company supervisors to manage and supervise the work force and make reasonable inquiries of employees, individually or collectively, in the normal course of work. In meetings for the purpose of investigation of any matter which may eventuate in the application of discipline or dismissal, or when written statements may be required, or of sufficient importance for the Company to have witnesses present, or to necessitate the presence of more than the Company supervisor, or during reasonable cause or post accident drug/alcohol testing as provided in Article 29(h), the Company will inform the employee of his right to have Union representation present. If the employee refuses representation, the supervisor's record will reflect this refusal. At the start of a meeting under the provisions of Article 29(f), the Company will, except in rare and unusual circumstances, indicate the reason that causes the meeting and then provide an opportunity for the employee and his Union representative to confer for a reasonable period of time. Following that period, the 29(f) meeting will be reconvened and continue until concluded by the supervisor. Before written notification of discipline or dismissal is given, an employee will be afforded the opportunity to discuss the matter with his supervisor. If he desires, he will have a Union representative in the discussion. . . . * * * ARTICLE 30- DISMISSAL An employee who has passed his probationary period will not be dismissed from the service of the Company without written notification of that action. The notification will include the reason or reasons for his dismissal. Appeal from dismissal will be made, in writing, by the employee within seven (7) calendar days after receiving the notification and will be addressed to the Chief Operating Officer, with a copy to the appropriate Human Resources Office. The Chief Operating Officer will fully investigate the matter and render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than twelve (12) calendar days following his receipt of the appeal, unless mutually agreed otherwise. A copy of the written decision will be provided to the Union. * * * If the decision of the Chief Operating Officer is not satisfactory to the employee, the dismissal and decision will be appealed in accordance with Article 30(c), provided, however, the appeal must be submitted within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of the decision rendered by the Chief Operating Officer. An appeal from the decision of the Chief Operating Officer will be submitted to the appropriate Area Board of Adjustment in accordance with Article 32. . . . * * * ARTICLE 31- GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE An employee who believes that he has been unjustly dealt with, or that any provision of this Agreement has not been properly applied or interpreted, or against whom the Company has issued written disciplinary action, may submit his grievance in person or through his representatives within seven (7) calendar days. The grievance will be presented to his immediate supervisor, who will evaluate the grievance or complaint and render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than seven (7) calendar days following his receipt of the grievance. . . . If the written decision of the immediate supervisor is not satisfactory to the employee whose grievance is being considered, it may be appealed within ten (10) calendar to the Chief Operating Officer, with a copy to the appropriate Human Resources Office. The Chief Operating Officer will fully investigate the matter and will render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than twelve (12) calendar days, unless mutually agreed otherwise, following his receipt of the appeal. . . . If the decision of the Chief Operating Officer is not satisfactory to the employee, the grievance and the decision may be appealed to the System Board of Adjustment, as provided for in Article 32. * * * ARTICLE 32- BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT * * * Area Board of Adjustment, Discipline and Dismissal Cases * * * (2) Each Area Board will be composed on one member appointed by the Company, one member appointed by the Union, and a neutral referee acting as Chairman. . . . * * * Procedures Generally Applicable to the Boards * * * Employees and the Company may be represented at Board hearing by such person or persons as they may choose and designate. Evidence may be presented either orally or in writing, or both. The advocates will exchange all documents they may enter and the names of witnesses they may call in their direct case not later than ten (10) calendar days prior to the date set for hearing. Nothing in this paragraph will require either advocate to present the documents or the witnesses provided above during the course of the hearing. The advocates will not be restricted from entering documents or calling witnesses that become known subsequent to the ten (10) ten calendar day exchange, provided a minimum of forty-eight (48) hours notice is provided to the other party and a copies are submitted to the other party prior to the presentation of the direct case. The party receiving the late document or witness has the option to postpone the hearing in light of the new document or witness. Upon the request of either party to the dispute, or of two (2) Board members, the neutral referee will summon witnesses to testify at Board hearing. The Company will cooperate to ensure that all witnesses summoned by the board will appear in a timely fashion. Reasonable requests by the Union for employee witnesses will be honored. The requests for witnesses will normally not be greater than the number, which can be spared without interference with the service of the Company. Disputes arising from this provision will be immediately referred to the Director of the Air Transport Division and the Vice President-Employee Relations, or their respective designees, for resolution. A majority of all members of a Board will be sufficient to make a finding or a decision with respect to any dispute properly before it, and such finding or decision will be final and binding upon the parties to such dispute. . . . * * * ARTICLE 36- MEAL PERIODS Meal periods will be thirty minutes, except when a longer period is agreed upon between the parties. Meal periods will be scheduled to begin not earlier than three (3) hours after commencement of work that day and not later than five hours after commencement of work that day. The commencement of work is from the start of the employee's regular shift. If an employee is not scheduled for a meal period within the foregoing time span, the meal period will be provided immediately before or after it. In the event that a meal period has not been provided in accordance with the foregoing, the employee is then free, if he so desires, to take his meal period. At all times material to the instant cases, American had Rules of Conduct for its employees that (as permitted by Article 28(b) of the TWU Contract) were applicable to TWU- represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners. These Rules of Conduct provided, in pertinent part, as follows: As an American Airlines employee, you can expect a safe and productive workplace that ensures your ability to succeed and grow with your job. The rules listed below represent the guidelines and principles that all employees work by at American. Attendance * * * During your tour of duty, remain in the area necessary for the efficient performance of your work. Remain at work until your tour of duty ends unless you are authorized to leave early. * * * 17. Work carefully. Observe posted or published regulations. * * * Personal Conduct * * * 34. Dishonesty of any kind in relations with the company, such as theft or pilferage of company property, the property of other employees or property of others entrusted to the company, or misrepresentation in obtaining employee benefits or privileges, will be grounds for dismissal and where the facts warrant, prosecution to the fullest extent of the law. Employees charged with a criminal offense, on or off duty, may immediately be withheld from service. Any action constituting a criminal offense, whether committed on duty or off duty, will be grounds for dismissal. (Revision of this rule, April 10, 1984) * * * Violations of any of the American Airlines Rules of Conduct (listed above) . . . could be grounds for immediate termination depending of the severity of the incident or offense and the employee's record. . . . At all times material to the instant cases, American had a Peak Performance Through Commitment Policy (PPC Policy) to deal with employee performance and disciplinary problems. The policy, which (as permitted by Article 28(b) of the TWU Contract) was applicable to TWU-represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners, provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Peak Performance Through Commitment (PPC) is a program that fosters ongoing communication between managers and employees. It encourages managers . . . to regularly recognize outstanding performance and to work together with employees to address and correct performance issues fairly. For the few employees whose performance does not respond to regular coaching and counseling, the following steps advise them that continued performance problems have serious consequences, ultimately leading to termination: -First Advisory for employees with problem performance or conduct who do not respond to coaching or counseling. -Second Advisory for employees whose performance fails to respond to initial corrective steps. -Career Decision Advisory for employees whose problem performance or conduct warrants termination. They are given a paid Career Decision Day away from work to consider their future and continued employment with American Airlines. -Final Advisory for employees whose problem performance or conduct requires termination, or those who have failed to honor the Letter of Commitment signed after their Career Decision Day. Please note that steps can sometimes be skipped, in instances where the nature of the conduct is very serious. It is your responsibility as an employee to know the company's rules of conduct and performance standards for your job, and to consistently meet or exceed those standards. In the event that your performance does not measure up to the company's expectations, your manager will work with you to identify the problem and outline steps to correct it. * * * SERIOUS INCIDENTS OR OFFENSES Some violations of our guiding principles and rules of conduct will result in immediate termination. For example, insubordination, violating our alcohol and drug policy, abusing travel privileges, aircraft damage, violations of the work environment policy, and job actions could be grounds for immediate termination, depending on the severity of the incident and the employee's record. Hate-related conduct and dishonesty will always result in termination. In cases when immediate termination may be appropriate but additional information is needed, the employee may be withheld from service while an investigation is conducted. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioners' regular shifts were eight and a half hours, including an unpaid, thirty minute "meal period" (to which TWU-represented bargaining unit members were entitled under Article 36 of the TWU Contract). Although they were paid to perform eight hours of work during their eight and a half hour shifts, TWU-represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners, were, in practice, allowed to take up to an hour for their meals, without penalty. TWU-represented bargaining unit members "clocked in" at the beginning of their shift and "clocked out" at the end of their shift. They were expected to remain "on the clock" during their "meal periods" (which, as noted above, were to be no longer than one hour). During his eight and a half hour shift which began on July 30, 2004, Petitioner Castellanos was assigned to perform a "routine 'A' [safety] check" on a Boeing 757 aircraft, an assignment it should have taken a "well qualified [aviation maintenance technician] working quickly but carefully" approximately four hours to complete. At the time he left MIA that evening to go to the Quench nightclub, Mr. Castellanos was two hours and 15 minutes into his shift. During his eight and a half hour shift which began on July 30, 2004, Petitioner Pena was assigned to perform "PS checks" on two Boeing 737 aircraft, an assignment it should have taken a "well qualified [aviation maintenance technician] working quickly but carefully" at least six hours to complete. At the time he left MIA that evening to go to the Quench nightclub, Mr. Pena was three hours and 45 minutes into his shift. Walter Philbrick, an investigator in American's corporate security department, covertly followed Petitioners when they left MIA that evening and kept them under surveillance until their return almost four hours later. Petitioners did not clock out until following the end of their shifts on July 31, 2004. In so doing, they effectively claimed full pay for the shifts, notwithstanding that, during the shifts, they had been off the worksite, engaged in non-work- related activity, for well in excess of the one hour they were allowed for "meal periods." Mr. Philbrick prepared and submitted a report detailing what he had observed as to Petitioners' movements and conduct during the time that they had been under his surveillance. Mike Smith is American's maintenance department station manager at MIA. He is "responsible for the entire [American] maintenance operation in Miami." Mr. Smith assigned his subordinate, Anthony DeGrazia, a day shift production manager at MIA, the task of looking into, and taking the appropriate action on behalf of management in response to, the matters described in Mr. Philbrick's report. Neither Mr. Smith nor Mr. DeGrazia is Hispanic. Mr. DeGrazia met separately with both Mr. Pena and Mr. Castellanos. The meetings were held in accordance with the provisions of Article 29(f) of the TWU Contract. Before conducting the meetings, Mr. DeGrazia had reviewed Mr. Philbrick's report. Mr. Castellanos stated, among other things, the following in his meeting with Mr. DeGrazia: on the evening in question, he was trying to complete his assignment as fast as possible because he wanted to have an alcoholic beverage; that evening, he was "away from work" for approximately four hours, which he knew was wrong; and he and Mr. Pena had engaged in similar activity on perhaps six or seven previous occasions. Mr. Pena stated, among other things, the following in his meeting with Mr. DeGrazia: on the evening in question, he was "off the field" for three to four hours, which he knew was not "okay"; this was something he had done "sometimes" in the past; and American was a "great company" to work for. Based on his review of Mr. Philbrick's report and the information he had obtained from Petitioners, Mr. DeGrazia concluded that Petitioners had committed "time clock fraud" in violation of Rule 34 of American's Rules of Conduct and that they therefore, in accordance with American's policy that "dishonesty will always result in termination" (as expressed in the PPC Policy), should be terminated. Before taking such action, Mr. DeGrazia consulted with Mr. Smith and "someone" from American's human resources department, who both "concurred" with Mr. DeGrazia that termination was the appropriate action to take against Petitioners. On August 12, 2004, Mr. DeGrazia issued Final Advisories terminating Petitioners' employment. The Final Advisory given to Mr. Castellanos read, in pertinent part, as follows: On Friday, July 30, 2004, your scheduled tour of duty was 2230-0700. During your scheduled shift you were assigned to complete an A-check on a 757 aircraft. At approximately 0045, Corporate Security observed you leaving the premises and going into a nightclub in Coconut Grove. While there, you were observed at the bar drinking from a plastic cup. You were observed leaving the nightclub at 0315 and driving towards the airport. By your own account, you returned to the airport approximately 0400. During a company investigation, you admitted to leaving the premises, during your scheduled tour of duty and going to a restaurant/bar. Further, you admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages. Additionally, when asked how it was possible for you to complete your assignment in such a short amount of time you stated that you were, "trying to complete the job as fast as I can because I was getting the urge of getting a drink." Based on the above information I have concluded that your actions fall far short of that which may be reasonably expected of our employees and are a direct violation of American Airlines' Rules of Conduct, Rules 3, 4, 17, and 34 . . . . In view of the above rule violations your employment with American Airlines is hereby terminated effective today, August 12, 2004. * * * The Final Advisory given to Mr. Pena read, in pertinent part, as follows: On Friday, July 30, 2004, your scheduled tour of duty was 2100-0530. During your scheduled shift you were assigned to complete two PS-checks on 737 aircraft. At approximately 0045, Corporate Security observed you leaving the premises and going into a nightclub in Coconut Grove. While there, you were observed at the bar drinking from a plastic cup. You were observed leaving the nightclub at 0315 and driving towards the airport. By your own account, you returned to the airport approximately 0400. During a company investigation, you admitted to leaving the premises, during your scheduled tour of duty and going to a restaurant/bar. Further, you admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages. Additionally, when you[] were asked if it is acceptable to go to lunch for 3-4 hours you stated, "no, according to Company Rules, it's not OK." Based on the above information I have concluded that your actions fall far short of that which may be reasonably expected of our employees and are a direct violation of American Airlines' Rules of Conduct, Rules 3, 4, and 34 . . . . In view of the above rule violations your employment with American Airlines is hereby terminated effective today, August 12, 2004. * * * That Petitioners were Hispanic played no role whatsoever in Mr. DeGrazia's decision to terminate them. Mr. DeGrazia terminated Petitioners because, and only because, he believed that they had engaged in dishonesty by committing "time clock fraud." Mr. DeGrazia has never encountered another situation, in his capacity as a production manager for American, where an aviation maintenance technician over whom he had disciplinary authority engaged in conduct comparable to the conduct for which he terminated Petitioners. No one has ever reported to him, nor has he ever observed, any aviation maintenance technician other than Petitioners taking "meal periods" that were longer than an hour while remaining "on the clock." Petitioners both grieved their terminations pursuant to Article 31 of the TWU Contract. Neither of them advanced any allegations of anti-Hispanic discrimination in his grievance. Petitioners' grievances were ultimately denied on September 9, 2004, by William Cade, American's managing director for maintenance. Petitioners appealed the denial of their grievances to the American and TWU Area Board of Adjustment for Miami, Florida (Board), in accordance with Article 32 of the TWU Contract, which provided for "final and binding" arbitration of disputes arising under the contract. A consolidated evidentiary hearing was held before the Board on April 28, 2005. At the hearing, Petitioners were represented by counsel. Through counsel, they called and cross- examined witnesses, submitted documentary evidence, and presented argument. Neither of them testified. The Board issued a decision on June 27, 2005, denying Petitioners' grievances. The TWU Board member dissented. The Discussion and Opinion portion of the decision read, in pertinent part, as follows: There is no dispute that the rule violations by grievants['] actions on July 30, 2004 constituted time card fraud and violation of rules relating to remaining at work. This was not some minor taking of time, such as overstaying lunch for a shortened period. It was a well-planned event. They had with them a change of clothes - in effect "party clothes" apropos to a late night-early morning South Florida nightclub. They had even done this several times before. Once at this nightclub they actually drank very little. Grievant Pena had two drinks and grievant Castellanos appeared to have just one. In fact, when he was later tested after his return to work almost five hours later, the result was negative for drugs and alcohol. Clearly, they failed to remain at work for their tours of duty in violation of Rules 3 and 4. These rules, however, do not by themselves call for immediate discharge nor do any of the Company documents relating to rules, such as its PPC, refer to them as serious violations that would incur discharge. The seriousness here concerns the grievants' badging out after their eight-hour tour and being paid for eight hours, almost five of which they did not work. There is no question that this is time card fraud and as such it involves dishonesty that is covered by Rule 34's "dishonesty of any kind." Numerous arbitrators for the parties have found such conduct to be violative of Rule 34 and have concluded that stealing time from the Company is dishonesty that requires immediate dismissal. * * * [T]he grievants engaged in this misconduct on multiple occasions that involved more than half of their shift being spent at a nightclub. And they knew it was wrong as they readily admitted when finally caught. Mitigation based on the grievants' EAP involvement is insufficient to overcome and reduce in any fashion their core responsibility to be honest employees and abide by all Company rules and regulations. The Company made this clear enough in its current Drug and Alcohol policy, and, as seen, other Boards have found it reasonable, as does this Board. To all of this the Union argues that there are other mitigating factors - seniority, disparate treatment, failure to consider employment records and a common practice permitting employees to extend lunch breaks. As to the latter, there is no evidence that any employee has been allowed to stay away from work for almost five hours with the knowledge or consent of management at any level. There is some evidence of employees overstaying the break by 30 minutes, of employees going for food for the crew and arriving back late and even some two-hour absences. None of this is comparable to the grievants' conduct. Nor is the evidence concerning supervisor Delgadillo enough to warrant the finding of a practice. She was not Pena's supervisor. She called grievant Castellanos' cell, but that alone does not mean that she knew he was off several hours at that point socializing and drinking in Coconut Grove on July 30 or at other times. She may have gone out with them while she was a mechanic, but the evidence does not show that she went for these long journeys to drink and socialize at a night club. Most importantly, the grievants never claimed a practice existed but instead readily admitted at the 29(f)s that their conduct was wrong and they violated Company rules. As to the disparate treatment incidents, although the dishonesty issue appears similar, different treatment only becomes disparate when the employees being compared also have factual situations and records that are similar. The comparators here did not leave work on more than one occasion, or on any occasion, for four hours or more to drink and socialize in a nightclub. Thus, Mora's 45-minute late punch-in resulted from his retrieving his drivers' license; he then immediately informed management of what he did. He did not have to be put under security surveillance for this type of conduct occurring in the past. Although his 30-minute extended lunch was part of the practice referred to above, it hardly qualifies as like conduct when compared to the grievants' activities. The claim by Vizcaino that he was sick when he used his Company travel privilege is the type of violation referred to the Travel Abuse Committee under a rule penalizing employees by suspending their travel privileges. The facts of that incident and the reasoning of this committee are not known to make any clear and relevant comparison. Even if accepted as a valid comparison, it is only one employee incident that by itself is insufficient to show that management disparately treated these grievants. Nor is their any proof that Rule 34 was involved in either of these situations. Manager DeGrazia disclosed that he did not consider the grievants' prior record or their seniority. He explained that the seriousness of their conduct was sufficient for his decision. The Board fully recognizes that the grievants cooperated during the investigation, had no prior discipline, and had seniority from 1989 and 1996. Each of these factors is significant in assessing the suitability of the penalties. But it is well established by the parties and even in arbitration cases involving outside parties, that in light of the gravity of time card fraud, these factors need not be evaluated. The Chairman notes nonetheless, that seniority and work records cannot be entirely ignored. But here, the grievants' propensity in the past to engage in this same outlandish conduct, and to do so undetected, significantly minimized, for mitigation purposes, much of their good record and seniority. Petitioners subsequently filed employment discrimination charges with the FCHR, alleging for the first time that their terminations were products of anti-Hispanic discrimination. There has been no persuasive showing made, in support in these allegations, that the decision to terminate them was motivated by anything other than legitimate business considerations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding the American not guilty of the unlawful employment practices alleged by Petitioners and dismissing their employment discrimination charges. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2006.
The Issue Has Respondent Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. (Fancy Farms) made proper accounting to Petitioner Lonnie Pearce in accordance with Section 604.22(1), Florida Statutes, for agriculture products delivered to Fancy Farms from October 28, 1994, through December 10, 1994, by Lonnie Pearce to be handled by Fancy Farms as agent for Lonnie Pearce on a net return basis as defined in Section 604.15(4), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Lonnie Pearce was in the business of growing and selling "agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes, and was a "producer" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Fancy Farms was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, as evidenced by license number 8453 issued by the Department, supported by bond number 57 92 20 in the amount of $75,000, written by Gulf Insurance Company with an inception date of September 1, 1994, and an expiration date of August 31, 1995. Beginning October 28, 1994, and continuing through December 10, 1994, Lonnie Pearce delivered certain quantities of an agricultural product (zucchini) to Fancy Farms. It is the accounting for these zucchini (zukes) that is in dispute. It was stipulated by the parties that Fancy Farms was acting as agent in the sale of the zukes delivered to Fancy Farms for the account of Lonnie Pearce on a net return basis. There is no dispute as the quantity or size of the zukes delivered by Lonnie Pearce to Fancy Farms during the above period of time. Furthermore, there is no dispute as to the charges made by Fancy Farms for handling the zukes, including but not limited to the commission charged by Fancy Farms. The agreed upon commission was ten per cent (10 percent) of the price received by Fancy Farms from its customers. There is no evidence that Fancy Farms found any problem with the quality of the zukes delivered to Fancy Farms by Lonnie Pearce during the above period of time. Upon delivering the zukes to Fancy Farms, Pearce was given a prenumbered receiving ticket showing Lonnie Pearce as Grower number 6 and containing the following additional information: (a) date and time of delivery; (b) produce number, i.e., 37 indicating fancy zukes and 38 indicating medium zukes; (c) description of the produce, i.e., zukes, fancy; (d) a lot number containing number of delivery ticket, grower number and produce number, i.e. 2074-6-37 and; (e) the number of units of zukes received by Fancy Farm. The accounting for the zukes from the following delivery receipt ticket numbers is being contested in this proceeding: (a) 2074 dated October 28, 1994, lot nos. 2074-6-37 and 2074-6-38; (b) 2078 dated October 31, 1994, lot nos. 2078-6-37 and 2078-6-38; (c) 2086 dated November 3, 1994, lot nos. 2086-6-37 and 2086-6-38; (d) 2103 dated November 4, 1994, lot nos. 2103-6-37 and 2103-6-38; (e) 2128 dated November 8, 1994, lot nos. 2128-6-37 and 2128-6-38; (f) 2144 dated November 10, 1994, lot nos. 2144-6-37 and 2144-6-38; (g) 2162 dated November 12, 1994, lot nos. 2162-6-37 and 2162-6-38; (h) 2180 dated November 15, 1994, lot nos. 2180-6-37 and 2180-6-38; (i) 2241 dated November 29, 1994, lot nos. 2241-6-37 and 2241-6-38; (j) 2253 dated December 1, 1994, lot nos. 2253-6- 37 and 2253-6-38; (k) 2266 dated December 3, 1994, lot nos. 2266-6-37 and 2266- 6-38; (l) 2290 dated December 7, 1994, lot nos. 2290-6-37 and 2290-6-38 and; (m) 2314 dated December 10, 1994, lot nos. 2314-6-37 and 2314-6-38. Once Fancy Farms found a customer for the zukes, Fancy Farms prepared a prenumbered billing invoice. Additionally, a bill of lading and load sheet was prepared and attached to the invoice. The bill of lading and load sheet would have the same number as the invoice. Basically, the invoice and bill of lading contained the customer's name and address, produce number, description of produce, number of units ordered, number of units shipped and the price per unit. The load sheet contains the customer's name, produce number, description of produce, units ordered, units shipped and the lot number for the units that made up the shipment. On numerous occasions Fancy Farms made adjustments to the selling price after the price had been quoted and accepted but before the invoice was prepared. Fancy Farms did not make any written notations in its records showing the adjustments to the price or the reasons for the adjustments to the price. Salvatore Toscano testified, and I find his testimony to be credible, that this usually occurred when there was a decrease in the market price after Fancy Farms made the original quote. Therefore, in order to keep the customer, Fancy Farms made an adjustment to the price. Pearce was never made aware of these price adjustments. In accounting for the zukes delivered by Pearce, Fancy Farms prepared a Grower's Statement which included the delivery receipt number, the date of delivery, the lot number, grower number, produce number, description of the produce, quantity (number of units), price per unit and total due. Payment for the zukes was made to Lonnie Pearce from these statements by Fancy Farms. On occasions payment was for only one delivery receipt while at other times payment was for several delivery receipts for different dates. Petitioner's exhibit 2 is the Florida Vegetable Report (Market Report), Volume XIV, Nos. 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 31, 33, 35, 37 and 40, dated October 28, 31, 1994, November 3, 4,8, 10, 14, 15, 29, 1994, and December 1, 5, 7, 12, 1994, respectively. The Market Report is a federal-state publication which reports the demand (moderate), market (steady), volume sold and prices paid for numerous vegetables, including zucchini, on a daily basis. The prices quoted for zucchini is for 1/2 and 5/9th bushel cartons and includes palletizing. The average cost for palletizing in the industry is 65 per carton. Fancy Farms receives and sells zukes in one-half (1/2) bushel cartons. Fancy Farms does not palletize the cartons for handling at its warehouse or for shipment. From October 28, 1994, through November 8, 1994, Pearce delivered a combined total of 431 units of fancy and medium zukes which included all lot numbers listed on delivery receipt ticket numbers 2074, 2078, 2086, 2103 and 2128. Pearce was paid $1,715.70 by Fancy Farms for those zukes as evidenced by Pearce's Grower Statement dated November 17, 1994 (Petitioner's exhibit 1). Fancy Farms sold this combined total of 431 units of zukes for $1,901.36 as evidenced by invoice nos. 3755, 3777, 3806 and 3814. The commission earned on these sales is $190.14 (0.10 x 1901.36 = 190.14). The amount owed by Pearce after deducting the amount paid by Fancy Farms ($1,715.70) and the commission ($190.14) is: $1,901.36 - $1,715.70 - $190.14 = -$4.48. The Market Report shows a much higher price being paid on the market for both fancy zukes (mostly $10.00 on 10/28/94 and mostly $8.00 on 10/31/94) and medium zukes (mostly $8.00 on 10/28/94) and mostly $6.00 on 10/31/94) than was allowed Pearce for zukes delivered on the same dates to Fancy Farms. However, the zukes delivered on October 28 & 31, 1994, were not sold by Fancy Farms until November 1, 1994. There is no Market Report for November 1, 1994, included in Petitioner's exhibit 2. The Market Reports for November 3, 4, 8 and 10, 1994, included in Petitioner's exhibit 2, show fancy zukes selling for $4.00 - $6.65 and medium zukes selling $2.25 - $4.65. The prices ($5.00 - $6.00 for fancy zukes and $3.50 to $4.14 for medium zukes) received by Fancy Farms for those zukes delivered to Fancy Farms by Pearce beginning October 28 through November 11, 1994, are in line with the Market Report. Therefore, the prices received by Fancy Farms have been used to calculate the amount due Pearce. From November 10, 1994, through November 15, 1994, Pearce delivered a combined total of 645 units of fancy and medium zukes to Fancy Farms which included delivery receipt ticket numbers 2144, 2162 and 2180. Pearce was paid $2,461.15 by Fancy Farms for those zukes as evidenced by the Grower Statement dated November 25, 1994 (Petitioner's exhibit 1). Fifty-three units of medium zukes on delivery receipt no. 2144 (lot no. 2144-6-38), 128 units of fancy zukes on delivery ticket 2162 (lot no. 2162-6-37), 30 units of medium zukes on delivery ticket no. 2180 (lot no. 2180-6-38) and 66 units of fancy zukes on delivery ticket no. 2180 (lot no. 2180-6-37) were not accounted for by invoice. Therefore, the price established in the Market Report of $5.00, $8.00, $6.00 and $8.00, respectively were used to calculate the amount owed Pearce for those zukes. The total amount calculated as owed to Pearce for the zukes represented by delivery receipt ticket nos. 2144, 2162 and 2180 is $3,513.00. The net difference due Pearce after deducting the amount paid to Pearce and the commission is: $3,513.00 - $2,461.15 - $351.30 = $700.55 On November 29, 1994, Pearce delivered 79 units of fancy zukes and 48 units of medium zukes for a combined total of 127 units and was paid $5.00 per unit for the fancy zukes and $3.00 per unit for the medium zukes for a total of $539.00. From invoice no. 3941 it appears that Fancy Farms made an adjustment for its customer in the price per unit for fancy zukes that was not reflected in the price per unit paid to Pearce. The price per unit of $5.00 for fancy zukes paid Pearce is more in line with the price established in the Market Report and is the price used to calculate the amount due Pearce. Invoice no. 3927 indicates that Fancy Farms was paid $3.00 per unit for medium zukes. Therefore, the amount due Pearce is: $5.00 per unit x 79 units = $ 395.00 $3.00 per unit x 48 units = $ 144.00 Total $ 539.00 Less: Ten per cent commission $ 53.90 Amount received by Pearce $ 539.00 Balance Owed by Pearce -$ 53.90 From December 1, 1994, through December 7, 1994, Pearce delivered 181 units of fancy zukes represented by lot nos. 2253-6-37, 2266-6-37 and 2290-6-37 and 160 units of medium zukes represented by lot nos. 2253-6-38, 2266-6-38 and 2290-6-38 for a combined total units of 341 units and was paid $1,385.00 for those zukes by Fancy Farms as evidenced by Pearce's Grower Statement dated December 15, 1994. The price per unit paid by Fancy Farms to Pearce was $5.00 fancy zukes and $3.00 for medium zukes. Other than 73 units of fancy zukes represented by lot no. 2253-6-37 which were billed out by Fancy Farms at $4.25 per unit, there was no evidence of the price per unit received by Fancy Farms for the balance of the fancy zukes and the medium zukes. On December 1, 1994, the Market Report shows the price per unit for fancy and medium zukes to be mostly $8.65 and mostly $6.65 per unit, respectively. Pearce should received a price of $4.25 per unit for 73 units of fancy zukes; $8.65 per unit for 30 units of fancy zukes and $6.65 per unit for 33 units of medium zukes delivered on December 1, 1994. The per unit price of $6.00 and $3.50 for fancy and medium zukes respectively, received by Fancy Farms as indicated on invoice nos. 3946 and 4049 falls within the per unit price reported in the Market Report for the dates of December 5 & 7, 1994. Therefore, Pearce should receive: $4.25 per unit x 73 units = $ 310.25 $8.65 per unit x 30 units = $ 259.50 $6.65 per unit x 33 units = $ 219.45 $6.00 per unit x 78 units = $ 468.00 $3.50 per unit x 127 units = $ 444.50 Total $1,701.70 Less: Ten percent commission $ 170.17 Amount received by Pearce $1,385.00 Amount owed Pearce $ 146.53 On December 10, 1994, Pearce delivered 39 units of medium zukes and 32 units of fancy zukes to Fancy Farms and was paid $3.50 per unit for medium zukes and $5.50 per unit for fancy zukes for a total $312.50 by Fancy Farms. There is no invoice or other evidence to show what Fancy Farms received for the above 71 units of zukes. However, the Market Report reflects that fancy zukes were selling mostly for $7.00 to $8.00 per unit and medium zukes were selling mostly for $6.00 per unit. Therefore, Pearce should receive: $7.50 per unit x 32 units = $ 240.00 $6.00 per unit x 39 units Total $ 474.00 = $ 234.00 Less: Ten percent commission $ 47.40 Amount received by Pearce $ 312.50 Amount owed Pearce $ 114.10 November 17, 1994 -$ 4.48 November 25, 1994 $ 700.55 December 7, 1994 -$(-53.90) December 15, 1994 $ 146.53 December 23, 1994 $ 114.10 SubTotal Less: Positive Adjustment/ $ 906.80 The net amount owed to Pearce by Fancy Farms: From Grower Statements dated: Grower Statement dated December 25, 1994. $ 127.00 Balance owed Pearce $ 779.80
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. be ordered to pay Petitioner Lonnie Pearce the sum of $779.80. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2559A The parties elected not to file any proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Lonnie Pearce 1676 CR 731 Venus, Florida James A. Crocker Qualified Representative Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. 1305 W. Dr. M. L. King, Jr., Blvd. Plant City, Florida 33564-9006 Gulf Insurance Company Legal Department 4600 Fuller Drive Irving, Texas 75038-6506
The Issue The issue in this case concerns the application of Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, to a claim for payment of a $5,000.00 lottery prize where the winning lottery ticket was purchased by two individuals, one of whom has a substantial court-ordered child support arrearage, one of whom does not, and the prize claim form is submitted by the individual who owes child support. The Petitioners contend that only half of the prize should be subject to the outstanding child support debt. The Respondents contend that the entire prize should be subject to the outstanding child support debt. Shortly after the filing of the request for hearing in this case, the Office of the Comptroller filed a Motion To Join Indispensable Parties, by means of which it sought to join the Department of the Lottery and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services as parties to this case. Both of the last mentioned agencies agreed to being joined as parties and neither Petitioner objected to the joinder. Accordingly, the Department of the Lottery and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services were joined as parties respondent. At the hearing both Petitioners testified and also offered exhibits. The Respondents presented the testimony of several witnesses and also offered several exhibits. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties were allowed ten days within which to submit proposed recommended orders. All parties filed post-hearing submissions containing proposed findings of fact. All proposed findings of fact are specifically addressed in the appendix to this recommended order.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits received in evidence at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Shortly after the Florida Department of the Lottery began selling lottery tickets, the two Petitioners, Lawrence R. Lindbom and Donald Johnston, began the regular practice of buying lottery tickets together. They agreed that they would make equal contributions to the cost of the lottery tickets and that they would share equally in the proceeds of any lottery prizes resulting from their co-purchased lottery tickets. On January 26, 1988, consistent with the foregoing agreement, Petitioner Lindbom purchased four instant game lottery tickets. Petitioner Johnston had contributed funds to pay half of the cost of the four tickets. Lindbom retained two of the tickets and gave the other two tickets to Johnston. At Johnston's place of employment, Lindbom scratched the two lottery tickets he had retained. One of the two was a $5,000.00 winning ticket. At the suggestion of some third party, Lindbom wrote his name on the winning ticket. He then showed the ticket to Johnston, and the other people present congratulated the two of them on their good fortune. The two Petitioners agreed that Lindbom would submit the ticket for payment in both of their names. On January 27, 1988, Lindbom traveled to the Jacksonville District Office of the Department of the Lottery, where he inquired about filling out a claim form in two names. He also inquired as to whether any money would be deducted from the prize. Upon being advised that only one name could be placed on the claim form and that no money would be deducted from the prize, Petitioner Lindbom called Petitioner Johnston to advise him of what he had been told at the Jacksonville District Office. Johnston told Lindbom to go ahead and file the claim in Lindbom's name and they would split the prize when it was received. Thereupon, Petitioner Lindbom filled out a Florida Lottery Winner Claim Form. The information he placed on the claim form included information about the lottery ticket and Lindbom's name, address, telephone number, and social security number. At the bottom of the claim form, Lindbom signed a printed statement reading as follows, in pertinent part. "Under penalty of law, I swear that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the name, address, and social security number correctly identify me as the recipient of this payment." The claim form and winning ticket were submitted to the Tallahassee office of the Department of the Lottery for validation and payment in accordance with that Department's procedures. The Department of the Lottery provided the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services a list of $5,000.00 winners which contained the name of Lawrence Lindbom. DHRS determined from its records that there was an arrearage in child support payments by Lawrence Lindbom in the amount of $12,014.65. On February 1, 1988, DHRS certified the child support arrearage to the Department of the Lottery in accordance with Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes (1987). On February 5, 1988, the Department of the Lottery forwarded the entire $5,000.00 claimed by Lindbom to the Office of the Comptroller of the State of Florida. On February 8, 1988, the Office of the Comptroller notified Lindbom by certified mail of its intention to apply the entire $5,000.00 prize toward Lindbom's unpaid court-ordered child support, with the result that no payment would be made to Lindbom. Following receipt of the letter from the Office of the Comptroller, Lindbom and Johnston jointly wrote a letter to the Comptroller protesting the proposed disposition of the prize and requesting a hearing. At all times material to this case, the Department of the Lottery had in effect Rule No. 53ER87-43, F.A.C., titled "Procedure for awarding prizes." That rule reads as follows, in pertinent part: (6) Until such time as a name is imprinted or placed upon the back portion of the lottery ticket in the designated area a lottery ticket shall be owned by the physical possessor of such ticket. When a name is placed on the rear of the ticket in the designated place, the person whose name appears in that area shall be the owner of the ticket and shall be entitled to any prize attributable thereto.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Office of the Comptroller issue a final order in this case providing for payment to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services of the entire $5,000.00 prize originally claimed by Petitioner Lindbom. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1176 The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings proposed by the Petitioners The Petitioners' proposal consisted of a letter in which they assert three specific reasons that entitle them to the relief sought. The factual aspects of those three reasons are addressed below. The legal aspects have been addressed in the conclusions of law. Reason 1. Accepted as finding of fact. Reason 2. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Reason 3. Rejected as constituting argument rather than facts. Findings proposed by the Respondents The Respondents filed a joint proposed recommended order. The paragraph references which follow are to the paragraphs of the Findings of Fact section of the Respondents' proposed recommended order. Paragraphs 1 and 2) Accepted in substance, with the exception of the implication that the Petitioners were not co- purchasers of the lottery tickets. Paragraph 3: First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inconsistent with the evidence. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7: Accepted. Paragraph 8: Omitted as unnecessary procedural details covered by introduction. Paragraph 9: Accepted. Paragraph 10: Accepted in substance. First unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details. Second unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: Accepted. Third unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: Rejected as irrelevant. Fourth unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate and unnecessary details. Fifth unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: First sentence accepted. The reminder is rejected as argument rather than proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Lawrence R. Lindbom 3542 Tiara Way, West Jacksonville, Florida 32217 Mr. Donald Johnston 12888 Beaubien Road Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Jo Ann Levin, Esquire Senior Attorney Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Chriss Walker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue Has Respondent Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. (Fancy Farms) made proper accounting to Petitioner Wayne Sullivan in accordance with Section 604.22(1), Florida Statutes, for agriculture products delivered to Fancy Farms from November 8, 1994, through December 10, 1994, by Wayne Sullivan to be handled by Fancy Farms as agent for Wayne Sullivan on a net return basis as defined in Section 604.15(4), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Wayne Sullivan was in the business of growing and selling "agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes, and was a "producer" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Fancy Farms was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, as evidenced by license number 8453 issued by the Department, supported by bond number 57 92 20 in the amount of $75,000, written by Gulf Insurance Company with an inception date of September 1, 1994, and an expiration date of August 31, 1995. From November 8, 1994, through December 10, 1994 Wayne Sullivan delivered certain quantities of an agricultural product (zucchini) to Fancy Farms. It is the accounting for these zucchini (zukes) that is in dispute. It was stipulated by the parties that Fancy Farms was acting as agent in the sale of the zukes delivered to Fancy Farms for the account of Wayne Sullivan on a net return basis. There is no dispute as the quantity or size of the zukes delivered by Wayne Sullivan to Fancy Farms during the above period of time. Furthermore, there is no dispute as to the charges made by Fancy Farms for handling the zukes, including but not limited to the commission charged by Fancy Farms. The agreed upon commission was ten per cent (10 percent) of the price received by Fancy Farms from its customers. There is no evidence that Fancy Farms found any problem with the quality of the zukes delivered to Fancy Farms by Wayne Sullivan during the above period of time. Upon delivering the zukes to Fancy Farms, Sullivan was given a prenumbered delivery receipt ticket (delivery ticket) showing Wayne Sullivan as Grower number 116 and containing the following additional information: (a) date and time of delivery; (b) produce number, i.e., 37 indicating fancy zukes and 38 indicating medium zukes; (c) description of the produce, i.e., zukes, fancy; (d) a lot number containing number of delivery ticket, grower number and produce number, i.e. 2074-116-37 and; (e) the number of units of zukes received by Fancy Farm. The accounting for the zukes from the following delivery receipt ticket numbers is being contested in this proceeding: (a) 2127 dated November 8, 1994, lot nos. 2127-116-37 and 2127-116-38; (b) 22145 dated November 10, 1994, lot nos. 2145-116-37 and 2145-116-38; (c) 2181 dated November 15, 1994, lot nos. 2181-116-37 and 2181-116-38; (d) 2242 dated November 29, 1994, lot nos. 2242- 116-37 and 2242-116-38; (e) 2254 dated December 1, 1994, lot nos. 2254-116-37 and 2254-116-38; (f) 2289 dated December 7, 1994, lot nos. 2289-116-37 and 2289- 116-38 and; (g) 2313 dated December 10, 1994, lot nos. 2313-116-37 and 2313-116- 38. Once Fancy Farms found a customer for the zukes, Fancy Farms prepared a prenumbered billing invoice. Additionally, a bill of lading and load sheet was prepared and attached to the invoice. The bill of lading and load sheet would have the same number as the invoice. Basically, the invoice and bill of lading contained the customer's name and address, produce number, description of produce, number of units ordered, number of units shipped and the price per unit. The load sheet contains the customer's name, produce number, description of produce, units ordered, units shipped and the lot number for the units that made up the shipment. On numerous occasions Fancy Farms made adjustments to the selling price after the price had been quoted and accepted but before the invoice was prepared. Fancy Farms did not make any written notations in its records showing the adjustments to the price or the reasons for the adjustments to the price. Salvatore Toscano testified, and I find his testimony to be credible, that this usually occurred when there was a decrease in the market price after Fancy Farms made the original quote. Therefore, in order to keep the customer, Fancy Farms made an adjustment to the price. Sullivan was never made aware of these price adjustments. In accounting for the zukes delivered by Sullivan, Fancy Farms prepared a Grower Statement which included the delivery ticket number, the date of delivery, the lot number, grower number, produce number, description of the produce, quantity (number of units), price per unit and total due. Payment for the zukes was made to Wayne Sullivan from these statements by Fancy Farms. Sometimes payment may be for only one delivery ticket while at other times payment would be for several delivery tickets for different dates. A portion of Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 is the Florida Vegetable Report (Market Report), Volume XIV, Nos. 19, 21, 23, 31, 33, 37 and 40, dated October 28, 31, 1994, November 8, 10, 15, 29, 1994, and December 7, 12, 1994, respectively. The Market Report is a federal-state publication which reports the demand (moderate), market (steady), volume (units) sold and prices paid per unit for numerous vegetables, including zucchini, on a daily basis. The prices quoted for zucchini is for 1/2 and 5/9th bushel cartons and includes palletizing. The average cost for palletizing in the industry is 65 per carton. Fancy Farms receives and sells zukes in one-half (1/2) bushel cartons. Fancy Farms does not palletize the cartons for handling at its warehouse or for shipment. On November 8, 10, 15, 1994, Sullivan delivered a combined total of 130 units of fancy zukes and a combined total 206 units of medium zukes represented by delivery receipt ticket nos. 2127, 2145 and 218l, for a combined total of fancy and medium zukes of 336 units for which Fancy Farms paid Sullivan the sum of $1,171.00 as evidenced by the Grower Statement dated November 25, 1994. Forty eight units of fancy zukes represented by lot no. 2127-116-37 was billed out by Fancy Farms to P. H. Lucks, Inc. for $5.00 per unit. Without an explanation, Fancy Farms reduced the price to $2.50 per unit. However, Fancy Farms paid Sullivan $5.00 per unit for the 48 units of fancy zukes. Five units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2145-116-38 were not accounted for by invoice. Thirty two units of fancy zukes represented by lot no. 2181-116-37 were not accounted for by invoice. Nineteen units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2242-116-38 were not accounted for by invoice. Where there is no invoice the price quoted in the Market Report is used to calculate the amount due Sullivan. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated November 25, 1994, is: Lot No. 2127-116-37: $5.00 per unit x 48 units (Invoice 3814) = $ 240.00 Lot No. 2127-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 45 units (Market Report) = $ 157.50 $3.50 per unit x 35 units (Invoice 3783) = $ 122.50 Lot No. 2145-116-37: $5.00 per unit x 12 units (Invoice 3818) = $ 60.00 $5.00 per unit x 38 units (Invoice 3822) = $ 190.00 Lot No. 2145-116-38: $3.00 per unit x 13 units (Invoice 3820) = $ 39.00 $3.00 per unit x 22 units (Invoice 3822) = $ 66.00 $3.00 per unit x 5 units (Market Report) = $ 15.00 Lot No. 2l81-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 32 units (Market Report) = $ 256.00 Lot No. 2181-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 86 units (Invoice 3778) = $ 301.00 Total owed to Sullivan = $1,447.00 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $1,171.00 Ten per cent commission = 144.70 Net due Sullivan = 131.30 On November 29, 1994, Sullivan delivered 53 units of fancy zukes and 69 units of medium zukes as represented by delivery ticket no. 2242 for a combined total of 112 units for which Sullivan was paid $472.00 by Fancy Farms as represented by the Grower Statement dated December 7, 1994. The prices of $3.25 and $3.00 as indicated by invoice nos. 3941 and 3947, respectively are not indicative of the market for fancy zukes as established by the Market Report for December 1, 1994. The Market Report established an average price of $8.00 per unit for fancy zukes. Likewise, the price of $3.00 per unit for medium zukes as indicated by invoice no. 3927 is not indicative of the market for medium zukes as established by the Market Report for December 1, 1994. The Market Report established an average price of $6.00 per unit for medium zukes. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated December 7, 1994, is: Lot no. 2242-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 53 units (Market Report) = $ 424.00 Lot no. 2242-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 69 units (Market Report) = $ 414.00 Total owed Sullivan = $ 838.00 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $ 472.00 Ten Percent Commission = $ 83.80 Net due Sullivan = $ 282.20 On December 1, 7, 1994, Sullivan delivered a combined total of 51 units of fancy zukes and a combined total of 87 units of medium zukes for a combined total of 138 units of fancy and medium zukes represented by delivery ticket nos. 2254 and 2289 and was paid $516.00 for these zukes by Fancy Farms as represented by the Grower Statement dated December 15, 1994. There was no invoice for lot nos. 2254-116-37 or 2254-116-38. The Market Report established a market price of $8.00 and $6.00 per unit for fancy and medium zukes, respectively. The amount due Sullivan from the Growers Statement dated December 15, 1994, is: Lot No. 2254-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 39 units (Market Report) = $ 312.00 Lot No. 2254-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 20 units (Market Report) = $ 120.00 Lot No. 2289-116-37: $6.00 per unit x 12 units (Invoice 4049) = $ 72.00 Lot No. 2289-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 67 units (Invoice 3946) = $ 234.50 Total owed Sullivan = $ 738.50 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $ 516.00 Ten Percent Commission = $ 73.85 Net due Sullivan = $ 148.65 On December 10, 1994, Sullivan delivered 27 units of fancy zukes and 18 units of medium zukes for a combined total of 45 units as represented by delivery ticket no. 2313 and was paid $211.50 for those zukes by Fancy Farms as represented by Growers Statement dated December 23, 1994. The 18 units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2313-116-38 are not covered by an invoice. The Market Report established a unit price of $6.00 for the fancy zukes. Invoice no. 4075 billed the fancy zukes at zero without any explanation. Fancy Farms paid Sullivan $5.50 per unit for the fancy zukes. The Market Report established a per unit price of $8.00 for the fancy zukes which is more in line with the market than is the $5.50 per unit paid by Fancy Farms. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated December 23, 1994, is: Lot No. 2313-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 18 units (Market Report) = $ 108.00 Lot No. 2313-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 27 units (Market Report) = $ 216.00 Total owed Sullivan = $ 324.00 Less: Ten percent commission = $ 32.40 Amount received by Sullivan = $ 211.50 Net due Sullivan = $ 80.10 The net amount owed to Sullivan by Fancy Farms: From Grower Statements dated: November 25, 1994 $ 131.30 December 7, 1994 $ 282.20 December 15, 1994 $ 148.65 December 23, 1994 $ 80.10 Total owed to Sullivan $ 642.25
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. be ordered to pay Petitioner Wayne Sullivan the sum of $642.25. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3015A The parties elected not to file any proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Wayne Sullivan 49 Myrtle Bush Lane Venus, Florida 33960 James A. Crocker Qualified Representative Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. 1305 W. Dr. M. L. King, Jr., Blvd. Plant City, Florida 33564-9006 Gulf Insurance Company Legal Department 4600 Fuller Drive Irving, Texas 75038-6506
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues considered at this hearing, Respondent, Dale's Package Store and Lounge, Inc., was issued 6-COP alcoholic beverage license No. 20-0012, which permits the on-premises consumption or sealed package sales of beer, wine, and liquor and the carry out sales of open malt or vinegar spirits, but not mixed drinks. On May 13, 1983, Investigator Robert W. Cunningham visited the licensed premises based on an anonymous phone call he had received at home to the effect that a lottery was being conducted there. When he entered the lounge, he saw a poster sitting on the first table inside the door. This poster contained a list of items of merchandise or services to be given as prizes and a notation of the prices for tickets. While he was looking at this display, he was approached by a patron, Edward Hanson, who asked if Cunningham wanted a ticket. When Cunningham said he did, Hanson went to the bar, where he spoke with Cindy, the bartender, and came back with a large roll of tickets, telling Cunningham to take as many as he wished. Cunningham took three and paid the $2 which the poster indicated was the price for the tickets. Half of each ticket was put in the box for the drawing. After the ticket transaction, Cunningham went up to Cindy and asked her who was in charge. When told it was Mickey (Naomi Hunt), he went into the back room, where he found her and told her it was an illegal lottery that had to stop. He also talked at that time with Susan Roberts, a representative of the local Multiple Sclerosis Foundation chapter for whom the lottery was being conducted. Ms. Roberts advised Cunningham she had discussed the matter with one of the local assistant state attorneys, who said it was all right, but she could not recall his name. Cunningham had advised Naomi Hunt to call Mr. Eggers initially, and Eggers said he would come down. Cunningham also called his district supervisor, Capt. Caplano, because, due to the size of the crowd in the bar at the time, between 200 and 250 people, he felt he needed a backup. Caplano agreed to come down to the lounge, as well. Caplano also advised Cunningham that the procedure was an unlawful lottery and the tickets and money should be seized. When Eggers got there, he told Cunningham that the entire activity was for the benefit of the Multiple Sclerosis Foundation and that his employees had been out soliciting the donation of the prizes for months. Respondent admits the conduct of the operation as the Roadhouse Inn's participation in the fund-raising campaign of the North Florida Chapter of the Multiple Sclerosis Foundation. Respondent has been approached by that agency with a kit of fund-raising activities and ideas. Before participating in the lottery, Mr. Eggers asked and was advised by both Ms. Hunt, his employee, and Ms. Roberts of the Foundation that they had inquired into and were advised of the project's legality. If the law was violated, it was done without criminal intent and without malice. A well-intentioned effort to do some good was in error. It should be noted, however, that in January 1977, this licensee was cited by Petitioner's Agent R. A. Boyd for operating a bowling machine on the premises. If the customer bowled a high score on the machine, he or she would win something, such as a drink or a snack. This was considered gambling by Petitioner, however; and upon issuance of the citation, Respondent immediately stopped the activity. No charge was laid against the licensee for that activity. Several days after Cunningham closed down the lottery, on May 19, 1983, Beverage Officer Reeves went to the licensed establishment based on a complaint received that alcoholic beverages were being served by the drink at the curb. He went to the drive-in window of the Inn and ordered a scotch and water from Naomi. She brought him a drink in a plastic cup. From his experience, he recognized the substance as scotch and water. After getting the drink, he parked the car and went inside, where he talked with Naomi and Eggers. They indicated they did not know it was illegal to sell a drink this way. Eggers indicated at the hearing that he thought that since he could sell open beer drinks out the drive-in window, he could do the same with mixed drinks. He does not have any copy of the beverage laws, thought he was operating legally, and has been doing it without objection since 1977. Since Reeves' visit, the sale of distilled spirits by the drink through the window has ceased.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Petitioner, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering is the state agency charged with the administration and enforcement of the pari-mutuel wagering laws of the state of Florida. Respondent, Ronald F. Kilbride, is an individual who frequents pari- mutuel facilities in the state of Florida for the purpose of wagering. On September 26, 1992, the Respondent was present at the Sarasota Kennel Club and placed several bets on races to be run at the Calder Race Track. On that same day, Respondent placed several bets on races to be run at the Sarasota Kennel Club. On September 26, 1992, at approximately 2:45 p.m., a pari-mutuel wagering ticket, number 42 BOB C22A82A4 (the Ticket), was purchased at Sarasota Kennel Club for a wager on a horse race (race number 5) being run at Calder Race Track. The Ticket was a winning ticket for that race. At approximately 2:55 p.m. on September 26, 1992, Respondent presented what he claimed to be the Ticket, to James Ollie, Mutuel Clerk, Sarasota Kennel Club, at window number 6414 for payment. Ollie accepted the ticket presented by Respondent for payment but did not pay or explain to Respondent why he was not paying for the ticket. After a period of time had elapsed without receiving payment, the Respondent became agitated and asked for, and received, the ticket back from Ollie. There is no evidence that the ticket handed to Ollie by the Respondent at that time was in two pieces or taped together or altered in any fashion. Subsequent to his attempt to cash what Respondent claimed to be the Ticket, Respondent wrote a letter, dated September 27, 1992, to Patrick Mahony, Vice President Mutuels, for Calder Race Course, Inc., enclosing what Respondent claimed to be the Ticket and explaining the circumstances surrounding the attempt to cash that ticket. Before enclosing the ticket referred to in Finding of Fact 7 in the letter mailed to Mahony, Respondent made a copy of the letter and imposed a copy of the ticket mailed to Mahony on the bottom left hand corner of the copy of the letter (Respondent's exhibit 1). The copy of Respondent's exhibit 1 was furnished to John Foley, Investigator, Bureau of Investigation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, at the time the original letter was mailed to Mahony. The copy of the ticket shown on Respondent's exhibit 1 is a copy of the ticket mailed to Mahony by Respondent by letter dated September 27, 1992. The envelope containing the letter and the two ticket parts indicated that Mahony received the envelope in a damaged condition. Mahony's letter of October 6, 1992 advised Respondent that the ticket was received in two sections which were taped together by an employee of Calder Race Course, Inc. who handled mailed out tickets. After taping the two pieces of the ticket together and attempting to process the taped together ticket, it was discovered by an employee of the mutuel department at Calder Race Course, Inc. that the records indicated the ticket had previously been cashed at Sarasota Kennel Club. The taped together ticket was returned to Respondent. The Respondent made a complaint to the Division concerning his treatment at the Sarasota Kennel Club. As a result of that complaint, the Division commenced an investigation. As a result of that investigation, the ticket that Respondent had received back from Mahony (Petitioner's exhibit 3) was taken as evidence in the investigation. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) was requested by the Division to assist in the investigation by reviewing the ticket to determine if it had been altered, other than it being cut and taped back together. In comparing Petitioner's exhibit 3 with other Autotote tickets, FDLE found that the horizontal bars on the back side of Petitioner's exhibit 3 that had been cut were shorter than the horizontal bars in the same position on other Autotote tickets that had not been cut. It was the testimony of the FDLE expert that cutting a similar Autotote ticket across the horizontal bars in the same place and taping the two pieces back together would not affect the length of horizontal bars that had been cut. It is clear from the unrebutted testimony of the FDLE expert that Petitioner's exhibit 3 had been altered by cutting two Autotote tickets in a similar fashion and taping the opposite pieces of the two cut Autotote tickets together. The copy of the ticket shown on Respondent's exhibit 1 is a copy of a whole Autotote ticket that has not been cut in that there is no line indicating that the ticket has been cut and taped back together before copying or copied as two pieces not taped together. A line indicating where the ticket parts are taped to together is evident on Petitioner's exhibit 3 and the blowup of that same ticket by FDLE (Petitioner's exhibit 8). There are a series of vertical bars under the words AUTOTOTE at the top of each ticket and at the bottom of each ticket which are printed on the ticket at the time of purchase. In comparing the copy of the ticket shown in Respondent's exhibit 1 with the ticket identified as Petitioner's exhibit 3 and the blown up copy of that ticket identified as Petitioner's exhibit 8, the vertical bars at the bottom of each of the above-referenced exhibits appear to be identical. The vertical bars at the top of each of the above-referenced exhibits under the words Autotote appear to be identical starting at the top right hand side and moving left to the vertical bar under the letter "E" in the word Autotote on top left hand side. However, there are two vertical bars on the top left hand side under the letters "O" and "T" in the word AUTOTOTE on the top left hand side of the copy of the ticket shown on Respondent's exhibit 1 that do not appear on either the ticket mailed back to Respondent by Mahony (Petitioner exhibit 3) or the blowup of that ticket (Petitioner's exhibit 8). Other than the two vertical bars referred to in Finding of Fact 16, the information printed on the ticket shown on Respondent's exhibit 1 is the same as printed on the front side of the ticket returned to Respondent by Mahony and identified as Petitioner's exhibit 3 and the blow up of the front side of Petitioner's exhibit 3 identified as Petitioner's exhibit 8. Comparing the copy of the ticket shown on Respondent's exhibit 1 with the ticket identified as Petitioner's exhibit 3, it is clear that if the Respondent had somehow come into possession of the Ticket and cut off the left hand portion of the Ticket as shown in Petitioner's exhibit 3 and replaced it with a similar cut off portion from another ticket that had not been cashed, then the two vertical bars would still appear on the ticket identified as Petitioner's exhibit 3. A one page computer printout allegedly generated by the Autotote Hub entitled "Content of: Daily Ticket Cashed File" for September 26, 1992 list the Ticket as being sold at Window 6410 by Teller 5774 at a cost of $150.00 with a dividend value of $3425.00. This document does not list the window number at which the Ticket was cashed or the teller cashing the Ticket or the time the Ticket was cashed. There was no witness from Autotote to testify as to the significance of this computer printout. However, Mr. Snyder testified that the Ticket was cashed by James Ollie, Mutuel Clerk, at Window 6414, on September 26, 1992, but there was no evidence as to the time of day the Ticket was cashed. Mr. Ollie testified that the Ticket was presented to Ollie for cashing by a Mr. Dean who was referred to as "Santa Claus", for the obvious reasons of giving gifts to individuals, including employees of the track. Mr. Ollie also testified that he misplaced the Ticket after it was cashed and that he was suspended for a period of time by the Sarasota Kennel Club for carelessness. When a winning ticket is cashed by a teller or mutuel clerk the number of the window where the ticket is cashed and the amount won by the ticket holder is stamped on the blank space on the far left hand side of the ticket (the blank area to the left of information printed on the ticket at the time of purchase). This is referred to as a brand which signifies that the ticket has been cashed. After a ticket is cashed it is required that the track keep the ticket on file for, among other things, accounting purposes to the state of Florida and Internal Revenue Service. There is competent substantial evidence in the record to establish facts to show that the ticket Respondent received back form Mahony had been altered. Likewise, there is competent substantial evidence in the record to establish facts to show that the ticket Respondent mailed to Mahony was not altered at the time Respondent mailed the ticket to Mahony. The Respondent did not communicate with Thomas Hughes on September 27, 1992 by telephone or any other mode of communication at any time relevant to this proceeding for the purpose of discussing how to alter a ticket that had already been cashed and branded so that the ticket could be cashed again and did not verbally, or in any other manner, threaten Hughes with bodily harm for disclosing the alleged conversation, notwithstanding the testimony of Hughes and Shirley Griffon to the contrary. Such testimony lacks credibility. The Respondent did not verbally, or in any other manner, threaten James Ollie with bodily harm at any time relevant to this proceeding, notwithstanding the testimony of Shirley Griffon, Dwight Holloman and James Ollie and the Report of Private Ejection to the contrary. Such evidence lacks credibility. The Respondent may have been loud at times and his manner considered offensive by some of the employees at Sarasota Kennel Club. However, the Division has failed to present competent substantial evidence to establish facts to show that Respondent verbally, or in any other manner, threatened any employee of the Sarasota Kennel Club with bodily harm at any time relevant to this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order dismissing or rescinding Petitioner's Order of Patron Exclusion and Notice of Right to Hearing filed against the Respondent. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of October, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1403 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. The following proposed finding of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Findings of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1(1); 2(4, except date is September 26, 1992 not 1993); 3(22-24); 4(7-9,15); 5-11(10,11,11,11,12,12,and 25, respectively) Proposed finding of fact 12-15 are not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record, but see Findings of Fact 29 - 31. Proposed finding of fact 16 and 17 are more argument than Findings of Fact. Proposed finding of fact 18 - 20 are rules and statutes and are more appropriately placed in the conclusions of law. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent elected not to submit any proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph M. Helton, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Ronald F. Kilbride, pro se 5681 Westwind Lane Sarasota, Florida 34231 Jack McRay, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William E. Tabor, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Respondents hold license 23-3237 COP and at all times here relevant were so licensed. On 7 November, 1977, Respondent, Juan Rodriguez, sold less than five grams of marijuana to Rocco Delio, an undercover policeman, on the licensed premises. Delio paid Rodriguez $11 for the marijuana and two beers. When arrested in December 1977 on a warrant charging him with the sale of marijuana, Rodriguez had an old lottery ticket in his possession as well as a list of numbers which the arresting officers thought to be lottery numbers. Rodriguez testified that the lottery ticket was an old one he bad obtained in Puerto Rico and that he had forgotten the ticket was in his wallet. He further identified the list of numbers as measurements he had taken for a building. Rodriguez denied ever selling any lottery tickets. At his trial on the charge of possession and sale of marijuana and possession of lottery paraphernalia Rodriguez pleaded guilty, upon the advice of counsel, to unlawful sale of marijuana, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. (Exhibit 1). Rodriguez testified that he paid a $300 fine and was told by his attorney that the plea and subsequent withholding adjudication of guilt would not affect his business. At this hearing Rodriguez denied selling marijuana to the policeman who had testified to the contrary. The Petitioner's witness is deemed a much more credible witness and it was this testimony, plus the guilty plea entered in Circuit Court that resulted in the finding that Respondent possessed and sold marijuana on the licensed premises. No evidence was submitted with respect to Counts 3, 4 and 7 of the Notice to Show Cause. The admissions of Respondent with respect to the facts alleged in Counts 5 and 6 were rebutted by Respondent's testimony, which was not contradicted by Petitioner's witness, that the lottery ticket was old and that the list of numbers found on Rodriguez' person was not a list of lottery numbers.
