The Issue Whether the Petitioner was discriminated against based upon his race when he was disciplined for absenting his post contrary to Chapter 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Willie B. Smith, is an African-American male. He is now and was at the time of the incidents involved in his complaint employed by the Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services, at Florida State Hospital as a guard in the forensic (prison) unit. The Petitioner is part of a bargaining unit that is represented by the Florida Police Benevolent Association. On November 15, 2001, at approximately 1:05 a.m., the Petitioner contacted his Shift Supervisor, Jimmie Williams, an African-American male, and requested to leave his assigned post in Tower B and go to Unit 3 at the hospital and pick up food from a fish fry. Williams approved the Petitioner’s leaving his post to get the food and to return to his post after getting the food. At 2:35 a.m., Williams was contacted on the radio by the Control Room Officer, Johnny Smith, who indicated that the Petitioner wanted to talk to him on the telephone. Williams provided Johnny Smith a telephone number at which the Petitioner could reach him, and the Petitioner called Williams a short time later. The Petitioner informed Williams that he had spilled diesel fuel on his uniform and asked permission to take the remainder of the shift off. Williams asked the Petitioner where he was, surprised that the Petitioner was some place other than at his post. The Petitioner refused to identify where he was, and Williams denied his request for leave. Realizing that the Petitioner was not at his post, Williams proceeded to Tower B and manned that post until the Petitioner arrived there at 3:04 a.m. When he arrived at Tower B, Williams asked the Petitioner where he had been, and the Petitioner stated he had been at the Florida State Hospital gas station. Williams had checked the Florida State Hospital gas station looking for the Petitioner and was aware that the Petitioner had not been there. At this point, angry words were exchanged and the Petitioner admitted that he had not been at the gas station. Williams wrote up an incident report that initiated a formal investigation into the Petitioner's having absented himself from his post while on duty without proper authorization. The Petitioner was advised of the investigation, and he requested that the PBA represent him in the investigation pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. At the Petitioner's specific request, Steve Mears, from the Tallahassee Office of the PBA, represented the Petitioner in this matter. During the course of a break in a meeting held with regard to the investigation, the Petitioner mentioned to Mears voluntarily changing duty stations, and Mears raised this request with representatives of the Respondent, including William T. Parker, now Chief of Security. As a result, the Petitioner was re-assigned from the forensic unit to the central forensic unit because this was the only place where there was a vacancy. His shift and days off remained the same, which did not constitute a transfer under the terms of the contract. Such a re-assignment was not subject to being grieved under the terms of the bargaining agreement. See testimony of Parker and Mears. The Petitioner's days off changed from the first and third weeks of the month to the second and fourth weeks of the month, but the days of the week remained the same. Although the evidence supports a finding that this move was voluntary, it is not material because, under terms of the bargaining agreement, such a re-assignment was not subject to a grievance. The investigation established sufficient cause for the Respondent to issue an official letter of reprimand to the Petitioner for absenting his post without permission. Pursuant to internal policy, the Petitioner's new supervisor, Roger Howell, who had had nothing to do with the incident upon which the reprimand was based, issued the letter. See testimony of Howell and Bryant. The Respondent introduced the Employee's Handbook, dated Mary 29, 2001, which the Petitioner had received. The book contains the Standards for Disciplinary Action, which include absences without authorized leave. This provision provides that for the first occurrence of Absence Without Authorized Leave, the section under which the Petitioner was disciplined, the violator can be given a range of punishments from a written reprimand to dismissal. See testimony of Bryant. Evidence was received that these penalties have been imposed upon employees of the Respondent without regard to race or gender. See testimony of Williams. At the hearing, the Petitioner expressed his concern that his reprimand had been signed by someone who had no knowledge of the incident, and stated that he felt he had permission to leave his post. He also introduced a doctor's excuse (Petitioner's Exhibit 2); however, the date of the doctor's visit did not relate to the date of the incident. The supervisor who signed the letter of reprimand and the personnel specialist who prepared the letter testified that it was policy for an employee's supervisor to sign the reprimand, even if he or she personally did not have knowledge of the events. Mr. Williams testified regarding his authorization to the Petitioner to leave his post to get food. He was very credible. He expected the Petitioner, in accordance with regular procedure, to leave his post, get his food, and return to the post immediately, being absent from the Tower for approximately 30 minutes. This was the normal process for getting food during a shift. The Petitioner was gone for two hours, and gone for over an hour without Williams being aware that Tower B was not covered. There was significant evidence introduced that none of the actions complained of by the Petitioner were motivated by racial animus. The disciplinary action taken by the Petitioner was at the lower end of penalties that could have been imposed. The complainant, Williams, was also an African-American. The PBA representative, whom the Petitioner specifically requested over the regular one at the hospital, testified regarding the events leading up to the Petitioner's re-assignment. The Petitioner sought a change of assignment and voluntarily accepted the change. See the testimony of Mears and Parker. There was no evidence adduced to show pretext.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief filed by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Anita L. Davis, Qualified Representative 708 Brag Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Jacqueline H. Smith, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Human Relations Commission 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Dentistry, filed an Administrative Complaint in DPR Case Number 00-52375 against the Petitioner's license to practice dentistry on May 13, 1986. The Petitioner did not dispute the facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the Board of Dentistry held an informal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, on September 13, 1986. On October 2, 1986, the Board of Dentistry issued a Final Order suspending the Petitioner from the remunerative practice of dentistry for a period of ten (10) years and advised the Petitioner of his right to appeal the Board's Final Order. The Petitioner did not appeal the October 2, 1986 Final Order of the Board of Dentistry. On or about May 1, 1987, and/or May 2, 1987, the Board of Dentistry met to consider correspondence from the Petitioner seeking a determination of compliance with the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order for his proposal to do volunteer community service dental work at "St. Catherine Laboure Manor" in Jacksonville, Florida. The Board of Dentistry requested further clarification from the Petitioner and took no further action with respect to the Petitioner's request. On June 10, 1987, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's request to allow him to provide volunteer community service dental work under indirect supervision, and on June 26, 1987, the Board of Dentistry issued an Order Denying the Modification. The Petitioner did not appeal the June 26, 1987, Order of the Board of Dentistry. On or about March 9, 1988, the Petitioner submitted his second request to the Board of Dentistry for modification of its October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner identified the following reasons as why the Board of Dentistry should grant his request: My obligation to the people of the State of Florida was fully satisfied on September 28, 1987 (enc.). My civil rights were restored on February 25, 1988 (enc.). The fine imposed by the Board of Professional Regulation ($2000.00) has been paid in full. Since July 1987 I have been treating patients in St. Catherine Laboure' Manor under the direct supervision of Owen Boales D.D.S., as required by order of the Board (enc.). I am currently 64 years of age and need gainful employment. My wife and I are currently surviving primary on her earnings as an employee of the Florida Community College at Jacksonville. My mentally disabled son was admitted to The Northeast Florida State Hospital approximately one month after my arrest. His condition would be benefited by whatever personal attention and care my wife and I may be able to provide. The ten year suspension order now in effect is tantamount to lifetime punishment. This long suspension does not benefit the public but severely obstructs rehabilitative effort. It minimizes the opportunities for professional public service and prevents professional employment. It reduces the available options to demonstrate reliability and observable conformity to the profession's ethical standards. It will continue to impede all my effort to becoming a self sustaining productive and worthy member of society. On April 23, 1988, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's second request for modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order. After discussion and consideration of the evidence and arguments of the Petitioner, the Board of Dentistry on July 13, 1988, issued an Order Denying Modification of Final Order. The Petitioner did not appeal the Board's July 13, 1988 Order denying his second request. On or about June 5, 1990, the Petitioner through his attorney submitted his third request to the Board of Dentistry for a modification of the October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner's third Motion for Modification of Final Order submitted to the Board on or about June 5, 1990, did not contain information or circumstances that were substantially different from those known to the Board at the time the Final Order of October 2, 1986, was entered, at the time the first order was entered denying the modification request, or that were known to the Board when it had previously heard and denied Petitioner's second request in 1988. On July 28, 1990, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's third request for modification of the October 2, 1986 Final Order. After discussion of the parties and upon the advice of legal counsel, the Board of Dentistry on August 13, 1990, issued an Order Denying Modification of Final Order. The Petitioner timely sought an appeal of the Board's August 13, 1990 Order in the First District Court of Appeal, Case Number 90-2369. On September 4, 1991, the First District Court of Appeal issued its opinion where they found the August 13, 1990 Final Order to be ambiguous, vacated the August 13th Final Order, and remanded the case back to the Board of Dentistry for further proceedings. On October 8, 1991, the First District Court of Appeal issued its Mandate to the Board of Dentistry to hold further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. On or about October 15, 1991, the Petitioner submitted an Amended Motion for Modification alleging for the first time that "there had been material changes in circumstances since his suspension was entered and/or since the previous rulings as to his suspension." On November 8, 1991, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's third request for modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order, the Amended Motion for Modification of Final Order, and the Opinion and Mandate of the First District Court of Appeal. After discussion and consideration of the Petitioner's requests for modification, the Opinion and Mandate of the First District Court of Appeal, and the evidence presented, on December 12, 1991, the Board of Dentistry issued a Final Order on Remand granting the Petitioner's Amended Motion for Modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner is a sole proprietor of a professional practice of dentistry. His principal office and domicile are located in Jacksonville, Florida. He has fewer than twenty-five (25) full-time employees, and his net worth, at the time of filing, was less than two million ($2,000,000) dollars. The Petitioner incurred appellate attorney's fees in the amount of $8,990.00 and costs in the amount of $323.92. The Respondent did not dispute the reasonableness of the fees and costs in this case.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. During times material herein, Petitioner was employed as a Unit Treatment Shift (UTR) Supervisor at South Florida State Hospital, Hollywood, Florida. Her duties included setting up medications; dispensing and administering medications, charting medications and taking patients from the ward for meals. Petitioner also performed related duties such as writing medical reports and keeping the ward areas clean. On October 3, 1980, Petitioner was injured while on duty at South Florida State Hospital. Petitioner suffered a back injury which required two back operations during 1981 and 1982 (laminectomies). Petitioner suffered a previous back injury during 1976, a herniated disc and, as a result thereof, had two disc operations wherein discs were removed. Petitioner remained under the treatment and care of Dr. George Crane until December 6, 1983. Dr. Crane determined that Petitioner had reached maximum medical improvement on August 11, 1983 and confirmed that Petitioner was employable as of approximately March, 1983. That release was confirmed by letter dated October 20, 1983 from Dr. George Crane, M.D. Prior to that time, Petitioner had been determined unable to sit, stand, lift, push or carry objects without severe pain. Also, during the period 1980 when she was injured through the time of her release by Dr. Crane, Petitioner had endured substantial pain requiring that she spend a great deal of her time in bed. She had, on occasion, left groceries in the store due to excruciating pain. (Testimony of Petitioner) Although Dr. Crane considered that Petitioner was employable as early as March of 1983, he suggested during August of 1983 that Petitioner attend a one week's visit to the Pain Center in Miami, Florida. Evidence reveals that while Dr. Crane suggested that Petitioner visit the Pain Center, he did not consider that her condition rendered her unemployable. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) Bradford Drake, 1/ a Benefits Coordinator employed by Respondent as a Personnel Technician I, contacted Dr. Crane's office and confirmed his release of Petitioner to return to work. Armed with that confirmation, Mr. Drake contacted Petitioner and advised her of Dr. Crane's release of her to return to work. By letter dated December 7, 1983, Petitioner was advised by Barbara Nickels, Personnel Officer, that "This will serve to officially inform you that you are to return to your UTR Shift Supervisor position, Dade/Collier Ward, on Monday, December 12, 1983 at 8:00 a.m. Failure to report to your position after three days from December 12, 1983 will be considered abandonment of position and resignation from the State of Florida career service at South Florida State Hospital. This action is pursuant to the State of Florida rules and regulations, Section 22A-7.10(2)." (Respondent's Exhibit 4) Additionally, by letter dated December 19, 1983, Petitioner was advised by Robert A. Burton, hospital Administrator, that effective the close of business December 19, 1983, Petitioner was considered to have abandoned her position and resigned from the State of Florida career service at South Florida State Hospital. Petitioner was familiar with Respondent's Employee Handbook including the Employee Standards of Conduct and had received a copy of HRS Pamphlet 60-1 on May 18, 1979. Contained in that pamphlet is an employee policy concerning absences. An employee absent for three consecutive days without authorization may be considered to have abandoned that position and resigned. Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2 and Section 22A-7.10(2), Florida Administrative Code. During January of 1984, Petitioner was under the care and treatment of Dr. Paul Wand, a neurologist. Respondent, through employees of the personnel office, was not familiar with the treatment procedures to Petitioner by Dr. Paul Wand. To allow the Petitioner the benefit of doubt, Mr. Drake arranged for Dr. Crane to see the Petitioner during December of 1983 and Dr. Crane noted no change in the Petitioner's maximum medical improvement and considered her employable at that time. (Testimony of Bradford Drake and report of Petitioner's office visit to Dr. Crane dated December 6, 1983, Petitioner's Exhibit 3) In an instance where an employee, as Petitioner, tenders documentation that she is being treated by another physician, such a physician is called and the treatment is verified by staff and the personnel office of Respondent. In such instances, latitude is given that employee to tender documentation which would be considered in determining whether or not an employee is employable based on the opinion of the "other" physician. However, as noted earlier herein, Petitioner was primarily treated by Dr. Crane.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended: That the Secretary of the Department of Administration enter a Final Order finding that, based on Petitioner's failure to report to her position as UTR Shift Supervisor after three days from December 12, 1983, Petitioner abandoned her position of employment and resigned from the State of Florida career service at South Florida State Hospital. 2/ RECOMMENDED this 11th day of December, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1984.
The Issue Whether petitioner should be removed from the Florida Retirement System, as of July 1, 1979, on grounds of ineligibility.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a licensed attorney, practices law in Clewiston, Hendry County, Florida. Since at least September 1, 1970, he has continuously engaged in the private practice of law in Clewiston. On September 1, 1970, the Glades County School Board ("School Board" or "Board") hired him as the School Board attorney, a position which he continues to hold. This is a part-time position, since the Board has no need for a full-time attorney. The School Board is headquartered at Moore Haven, 16 miles northwest of Clewiston, in neighboring Glades County. The terms and conditions of petitioner's employment with the School Board have remained virtually unchanged since he was originally hired. Each year, the School Board sets his salary consisting of a monthly retainer or salary, plus a fixed amount per hour for any additional professional services or litigation required by the School Board. For the 1979-80 school year, the Board set his salary or retainer--terms which the School Board used interchangeably-- as shown by the Minutes of the July 11, 1979, meeting: 3. SALARY/SCHOOL BOARD ATTORNEY - 1979-80 Chairman Hilliard opened the floor for discussion on the salary for the school board attorney for the 1979-80 school year. After some discussion between the board and Mr. Potter, the board proposed a retainer of $750.00 per month. (annual salary of $9,000.00) plus $50.00 per hour for additional pro fessional services or litigation required by the board. ON MOTION by Sapp, seconded by Johnson, the board approved this pro- posal for school board attorney for the 1979-80 school year. (Vote: Arnold, yes; Johnson, yes; Taylor, yes; Sapp, yes; Hilliard, yes.) His salary is paid from the School Board's regular employee salary account. But as the School Board's attorney, unlike other School Board employees, he does not accrue annual leave, sick leave, or pay during vacations, holidays or illness, though when he is sick or on vacation, there is no adjustment to his salary. He is reimbursed for work-related travel and meals at the rates provided by Section 112.061, Florida Statutes (1983), and is covered by the School Board's group health and life insurance, and Workers' Compensation. Since 1970, the Board has withheld his Social Security contributions from his fixed monthly salary payments; has paid the employer's Social Security contributions on his salary payments; and has annually reported his monthly salary payments on Internal Revenue Service Form W-2. To this extent, the School Board considered him an employee and treated him the same as it treated its other employees. The legal services which he furnished the School Board are described in his employment agreement and the School Board's job description for the position: TYPICAL DUTIES: Attend all regular Board meetings and such special meetings as deemed advisable by Board Chairman or Superintendent. Be available for routine telephone or personal consultations with Board Chairman, Superintendent and Staff members. Perform legal research. Prepare or approve leases or agreements prior to execution by Board. Prepare and prosecute law suits in behalf of Board and defend law suits against Board, including any actions against Superintendent, Staff or other school district employees allegedly arising etc., unless special counsel is deemed necessary by Board Attorney with Board's concurrence. Attend the quarterly seminars/meetings of Florida School Board Attorneys Association; and any other approved by Board. Represent Board and/or Superintendent in personnel matters where appropriate, as well as student discipline matters. School Board meetings, held monthly, last approximately one and one-half hours. Litigation, although described as a typical duty, is considered extra work, and an hourly rate is charged over and above the monthly salary. Petitioner agrees that he would not knowingly accept any new clients which would cause a conflict of interest with his School Board employment. Although he has been free to turn down work assigned by the School Board, he never has--at least through 1976. As explained by Mr. Strope, Superintendent of Schools from 1968 to 1976, although petitioner was free to turn down work, he "shouldn't have." Petitioner is not required to maintain any set office hours, and his monthly salary does not vary with the number of hours' work. He is not furnished office space by the School Board. The majority of his legal work for the Board is performed at his private law office, in Clewiston. The cost of operating his law office is not a budget item in the School Board's budget. Under his employment arrangement with the School Board, he furnishes all personnel, equipment, and facilities needed to perform his services. He is responsible for supervising the secretaries who work in his private office. Occasionally, when he is at School Board headquarters in Moore Haven he will ask a School Board employee to type a document. At his request, however, the School Board will furnish him pencils, legal pads, legal periodicals and stationery. It also pays for his travel; for per diem expenses incurred while attending legal seminars or meetings; and for long distance telephone calls made in connection with his School Board employment. He is neither responsible for, nor supervises, any employee of the School Board. The School Board does not furnish him any legal secretaries or part-time attorney assistants. He has not shown what percentage, or amount, of his working hours are devoted to performing legal services for the School Board, as opposed to legal services which he performs for his other clients. Other than assigning specific legal tasks, the School Board exercises no more control over the means, methods, and manner by which petitioner performs the legal work given him than is ordinarily exercised by any client over an attorney. Because of ethical constraints and the nature of legal work, petitioner must exercise independent professional judgment. Since September 1, 1970 2/, petitioner has been enrolled in the FRS. This was accomplished by his filling out a prescribed form which the School Board then filed with the Division. The Board then began reporting him on its employee rolls. There is no evidence that the initial FRS entry form, filed with the Division, described petitioner's work duties or the nature of his employment with the School Board. Both the Board and the Division enrolled him in the FRS, believing that he was eligible for membership. The Division did not question or investigate the nature of his employment relationship with the Board until 1983. From his initial enrollment until January 1, 1975, when FRS became a non-contributory system, petitioner contributed one-half of the the required FRS contribution, while the School Board contributed the other half. Since January 1, 1975, the School Board has contributed 100 percent of his contributions to FRS. During the 1970s petitioner's membership in the FRS prevented him from participating in any other tax sheltered retirement plan. 3/ Since July 1, 1979, the Division has, by rule, given notice that consultants and other professional persons contracting with public employers are, ordinarily, ineligible for membership in the FRS. All public employers, including the School Board, have been asked to remove such persons from their retirement payrolls. Since at least July 8, 1981, petitioner was on notice that his status as an employee, and his eligibility for continued membership in the FRS, were in question. Both the parties stipulate that part-time electricians, plumbers, painters, combustion engine mechanics, air conditioning mechanics, janitors or sewage plant operators (and even other occupations) employed in 1983 by the Glades County School Board on a year-round salary basis (i.e., at least 10 consecutive months), and paid out of the School Board's regular salary and wage account, would be mandatory members of FRS by statute. (Prehearing Stip., para. E. 6)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter an order removing petitioner from membership in the Florida Retirement System, as of July 1, 1979; and That the Division return to petitioner and the School Board their respective FRS contributions, mistakenly made to his account. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1984.
