The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs in accordance with Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed an application for a real estate sales license on January 22, 1991. Respondent denied Petitioner's application on April 25, 1991, thereby initiating agency action. The sole basis for the denial of Petitioner's application was the fact that Petitioner was named as a defendant in multiple civil lawsuits filed in United States District Court. The law suits arose from the failure of Centrust Savings Bank ("Centrust"). Petitioner was President of Centrust from February, 1988, to sometime in July, 1989. He served on the Board of Directors of Centrust from August, 1987, until sometime in July, 1989. Prevailing Party Petitioner was the prevailing party in the underlying proceeding. A Recommended Order was entered on January 23, 1992, recommending that Respondent grant Petitioner's application. Shealy v. Florida Real Estate Commission, DOAH Case No. 91-3147. Respondent entered a Final Order on February 21, 1992, adopting ". . . all Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation . . ." Respondent granted Petitioner's application for license upon successful completion of the written examination. Petitioner successfully completed the written examination and was licensed as a real estate sales agent on March 27, 1992. Since October 7, 1992, Petitioner has been employed as an independent real estate agent with the firm of Real Estate Transactions, Inc., in Miami, Florida ("RET"). Small Business Party Petitioner became self-employed as a financial consultant in January, 1991. From January 17, 1991, through October 6, 1992, Petitioner conducted his financial consulting business in corporate form through WDS Investment, Inc. ("WDS"). WDS was a small business corporation wholly owned by Petitioner and his wife. 1/ Petitioner intended to utilize his real estate license, and a mortgage broker's license he obtained in the Summer of 1991, as an integral part of the financial consulting business he conducted through WDS. In response to a question asking Petitioner to explain his use of the term "self employed," Petitioner stated: I had started WDS Investments. . . . I was unemployed in the tradition[al] sense having been employed for years more as a professional in the financial services field In essence, I was going to try to build a consulting practice. I wanted to get my real estate license and my mortgage brokers license. Transcript at 20. Petitioner and WDS were one and the same entity. Petitioner was the sole managing shareholder and officer in WDS. Petitioner was the only person active in WDS and had exclusive management control of the corporation. Petitioner regarded WDS as his corporation, regarded himself as self employed, and operated WDS as his corporation. Petitioner is the party claiming fees and costs and the prevailing party in the underlying proceeding. After Respondent initiated agency action on April 25, 1991, Petitioner had other business activities in addition to his financial consulting business. Petitioner obtained his mortgage broker license in the Summer of 1991. From that time through October 6, 1992, Petitioner worked as an independent mortgage broker and loan consultant with Financial Monitors, Inc. ("Monitors"). Petitioner was an independent contractor and not an employee of Monitors. Petitioner had no ownership interest in Monitors. Petitioner was employed by Securnet Financial Corporation ("Securnet") from August 1, 1991, to the end of 1991. Petitioner was employed as a manager and had no ownership interest in Securnet. Petitioner's employment with Securnet did not begin until after Respondent initiated agency action on April 25, 1991. His employment with Securnet terminated prior to the commencement of this proceeding on May 26, 1992. Petitioner became employed as an independent sales agent with RET on October 7, 1992. Petitioner's status as an employee with RET began after agency action was initiated on April 25, 1991, and after this proceeding was initiated on May 26, 1992. Petitioner is a small business party within the meaning of Section 57.111(3)(d)1., Florida Statutes. Petitioner is domiciled in Florida and has been so domiciled since before this proceeding began on May 26, 1992. The principal office of WDS has been located in the state since January 17, 1991. Petitioner conducted his financial consulting business in corporate form on April 25, 1991. Since January, 1991, Petitioner has had no more than 25 employees and a net worth of no more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments, either directly or by attribution from his wife, WDS, and his other business activities. Not Substantially Justified Respondent was not substantially justified in denying Petitioner's license application. Respondent had no reasonable basis in law or fact to deny Petitioner's application. Respondent cited no legal authority to support its denial of Petitioner's application solely on the basis of Petitioner's status as a defendant in civil litigation. Respondent presented no evidence that it undertook an independent determination of the truthfulness or credibility of the allegations in the litigation, no independent evidence to support such allegations, and no evidence to support any other factual basis for Respondent's denial of Petitioner's application. Respondent presented no evidence of Petitioner's lack of qualification to be licensed as a real estate sales agent. Petitioner made a full and timely disclosure on his application that he was a defendant in civil litigation. Respondent presented no evidence that the allegations in the civil lawsuits were anything other than allegations against numerous officers and directors of Centrust. Respondent presented no evidence of an adjudication of Petitioner's guilt. Respondent presented no evidence to rebut or refute Petitioner's showing that Petitioner is honest, truthful, trustworthy, of good moral character, and has an impeccable reputation for honesty and fair dealing in the business community. Fees And Costs The attorney fees and costs claimed by Petitioner are reasonable and necessary. Petitioner presented credible and persuasive expert evidence that the attorney fees and costs are reasonable and necessary.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Raul Romaguera, is a small business party within the meaning of Subsection 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1985). When the underlying action herein occurred, he was licensed as a medical doctor by respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners (Board). On October 27, 1986, respondent filed an administrative complaint against Dr. Romaguera alleging that he had violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (1985), by committing gross malpractice or failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The alleged violation related to Dr. Romaguera's inspection and diagnosis of a patient's tissue in December, 1980 while supervising a pathology department at a Lake Worth hospital. After an evidentiary hearing was conducted on March 24 and 25, 1987, a Recommended Order was entered by the undersigned on May 12, 1987, finding that the charge was unsubstantiated and recommending that the complaint be dismissed. The Recommended Order was adopted by the Board in its entirety by Final Order dated June 19, 1987. A timely petition for attorney's fees and costs was thereafter filed by petitioner on August 18, 1987. The parties have stipulated that, as a result of the Board's Final Order, Dr. Romaguera is a prevailing small business party within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1985). They have also stipulated that, in order to defend against the agency's action, Dr. Romaguera incurred at least $15,000 in attorney's fees and costs. There is no evidence as to what information, oral or written, the probable cause panel had before it when voting to initiate this action. The agency does stipulate that, at some point in the probable cause phase of the proceeding, the panel requested more information on the matter before taking a vote. This is corroborated by an agency memorandum dated April 8, 1986 and introduced into evidence as petitioner's exhibit 1. At the final hearing on the merits of the administrative complaint, the agency presented a number of expert witnesses who concurred in the Board's assessment that Dr. Romaguera had failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment required of a reasonably prudent similar practicing physician in the Lake Worth area. Doctor Romaguera also presented the testimony of an expert who disagreed with this assessment. Hence, the validity of the charges turned on the credibility and weight to be given the various experts by the undersigned.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is a prevailing small business party as defined by law.
Findings Of Fact The administrative complaint in Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine v. Beltran J. Pages, DOAH Case No. 87-4157, DPR Case No. 30291, was filed on September 23, 1987. This case was consolidated with another case then pending against Dr. Pages, DOAH Case No. 87-1882. On October 15, 1987, an order was entered which denied Dr. Pages' request to dismiss Case No. 87-4157. The hearing for both cases was conducted on January 26-27, 1988. Pertinent to this cause is the following finding of fact reached in the Pages' order: Respondent is a board certified psychiatrist who has practiced in the Palm Beach County area since July, 1981. Respondent left private practice in September, 1985, and is currently employed at the South Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center, an HRS facility for the criminally insane. An exception was not filed to the finding of fact described in paragraph 4.
Findings Of Fact Sutton is a "small business party" incorporated under the laws of Florida and has its principal office located at 3054 Skyview Drive, Lakeland, Florida with less than 25 employees and a net worth of less than $2 million dollars. The Department previously initiated action against Sutton by denying an application for renewal of its license to operate a group home in Lakeland, Florida. A timely request for a hearing on the denial was filed by Sutton, and the matter transferred by the Department to the Division of Administrative Hearings where it was assigned Case Number 90-2928. The final hearing was held in Lakeland, Florida, on August 16, 1990, before K. N. Ayers, Hearing Officer, and thereafter a Recommended Order was filed on August 30, 1990, which recommended that Department enter a Final Order granting Sutton a license to operate a group home. The Department approved and adopted this recommendation in its Final Order entered on October 17, 1990, by the terms of which Sutton prevailed in the prior action initiated by the Department. The Department was not a nominal party to the prior proceedings, and there is nothing in the record to show that the Department was substantially justified in denying Sutton's application for renewal of license to operate a group home, or that any special circumstances exist which would make an award of fees and costs unjust. On December 24, 1990, a Motion For Attorney's Fees and Costs was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by Sutton. The authority cited for the award was Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Therefore, the motion was treated as a petition under Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Statutes, and by order of January 16, 1991 was dismissed for failure to comply with that rule, with leave to amend within twenty days. On January 24, 1991, an Amended Motion For Attorney's Fees and Costs was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by Sutton. The motion is accompanied by an affidavit and supporting documents which are uncontroverted, and which establish that Sutton incurred legal fees in the amount of $3,945.00 and costs of $369.72, as a result of the prior proceedings in Case Number 90-2928. No evidentiary hearing was requested by either Sutton or the Department. The Department was advised by order dated January 16, 1991 that if Sutton filed an amended petition the Department would have twenty days from the date that Sutton filed the amended petition to file its response in accordance with Rule 22I-6.035(5), Florida Administrative Code, and that failure to timely respond would result in the waiver of the opportunity to dispute the allegations contained in the petition. No responsive pleading of any kind has been filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on behalf of the Department to the Amended Motion For Attorney's Fees and Costs.
Findings Of Fact This cause originated in a disciplinary action resulting from an administrative complaint filed by the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate against the Petitioners herein, Malcolm Lewis Hardy and Aquatic Realty, Inc. The Petitioners herein were the Respondents in the licensure disciplinary proceeding. That proceeding was resolved in their favor by the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer and by the Final Order filed April 15, 1988 by the Department of Professional Regulation. They have accordingly filed a request for attorney's fees and costs on the ground that the prosecution involved in the underlying case was not "substantially justified." The cause came on for a brief hearing. The parties elected to dispense with calling witnesses at the hearing because they entered into a factual stipulation whereby all germane facts were placed of record. It was thus established that Petitioners Malcolm Lewis Hardy and Aquatic Realty, Inc. (hereafter Hardy) were the Respondents in a licensure disciplinary action brought against them by the above-named Respondent. That disciplinary action was resolved by Final Order filed April 15, 1988 by the Department of Professional Regulation. The Respondents in that case, the Petitioners herein, were totally absolved of any wrongdoing with regard to the charges in the administrative complaint in that proceeding. A copy of that Final Order was mailed by the agency to "Diane Cleavinger, Esquire, 300 East 15th Street, Panama City, Florida 32405." Ms. Jan Nelson, a secretary at that address, and employed by Ms. Cleavinger's former law firm, received a copy of that order and executed the return receipt appearing on the envelope on April 18, 1988. Ms. Nelson was not Ms. Cleavinger's secretary, but rather the secretary of Ms. Fitzpatrick, one of Ms. Cleavinger's former law partners. In any event, Ms. Nelson executed the return receipt on April 18, 1988, but Ms. Cleavinger never received the Final Order nor notification of its filing or receipt by Ms. Nelson. Mr. Hardy never became aware of or received a copy of the Final Order either, until the agency sent another copy to him on September 12, 1988. The affidavit and request for attorney's fees was filed within sixty days of that date. Ms. Cleavinger had left her law firm on January 1, 1988 to become a Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Mr. Hardy only learned of the Order when he made a direct contact with the Department of Professional Regulation and they learned that he had not received the Final Order. It was thus mailed to him on September 12, 1988 and received on September 14, 1988. That Order dismissed all claims against Hardy and Aquatic Realty, Inc. and thus those parties are in fact "prevailing, small business parties," within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. It was stipulated at hearing, as well, that these Petitioners are small business, prevailing parties and that they incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $1,642.04 for services rendered by Ms. Cleavinger when she represented them in the underlying case-in-chief and that costs amount to $333.71. Additionally, Mr. Hardy further incurred attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $500 in connection with the pursuit of this fee claim by attorney Whitton. It was stipulated that that amount is reasonable. Additionally, the Department accepted its burden of establishing that its action was "substantially justified," within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and have stipulated that they have not done so. Thus the only issue for resolution concerns whether the claim of Hardy was time-barred.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to certification as a minority business enterprise.
Findings Of Fact By application dated February 6, 1998, Petitioner requested certification as a minority business enterprise. Respondent received the application on May 20, 1998, and denied the application on July 31, 1998. In denying the application, Respondent cited several reasons, including various rules, for why it was denying Petitioner's request for minority business certification. The letter cites Rules 38A-20.001(8) (statutory definition of "minority business enterprise") and (15) (lack of real control); and 38A-20.005(2) (ownership tests) and (3)(a) (control subject to restrictions), (b) (determining quorum of board of directors), (c) (minorities must be sufficiently capable and responsible to maintain control), and (d) (control may not be distributed among non-minority family members so that minority lacks dominant responsibility for management and daily operations, including purchase of inventory and equipment and financial control). Respondent does not dispute that Darlene S. Maki is a minority--i.e, female--and that Petitioner is a "small business concern." The application discloses that Petitioner is a Florida corporation in business as a machine shop. The application discloses that the only minority associated with the corporation is Ms. Maki, who at all times has owned 51 percent of the stock and serves as the president and treasurer. Initially, Mr. Maki's husband owned 14 percent of the shares; Mr. Rodhe owned 12.5 percent of the shares; Ms. Maki's other son, Michael Gritton, owned 12.5 percent of the shares; and Ronald Maki owned 10 percent of the shares. The application states that the initial board of directors consisted of three persons: Ms. Maki; her husband, Mark Maki; and one of Ms. Maki's sons, Randy L. Rodhe. In fact, the original board of directors consisted of Ms. Maki, her husband, her two sons, and Ronald Maki, the brother of Ms. Maki's husband. Petitioner is a family-owned and -operated business. Originally, Ms. Maki's husband served as vice-president, and Mr. Rodhe as secretary. The owners have had varying degrees of involvement in the corporation, ranging from Ms. Maki, who has been most involved, to Ronald Maki, whose involvement has been limited to his initial investment of $25,000. The only other persons to contribute cash for their shares were Ms. Maki and her husband. According to the application, Ms. Maki contributed $18,500, and her husband contributed $8000. The application understates their cash contributions. Individually, Ms. Maki contributed $32,000 in cash, which she raised by liquidating her Section 401(k) plan ($20,000) and bonds ($12,000). Individually, Ms. Maki's husband contributed $8000 in cash. Jointly, Ms. Maki and her husband contributed another $60,000 in cash, consisting of $30,000 in loan proceeds from a mortgage on their jointly owned home and $30,000 in charges on their joint credit cards. Prior to incorporating Petitioner in August 1997, Ms. Maki, who is 56 years old, had 20 years' experience working in a machine shop operating noncomputerized drill presses. She also worked five years as an assistant vice-president of a bank, supervising mortgage loan operations. Although Ms. Maki does not know how to operate the newer computer-assisted machines, her background would permit her to learn to do so with minimal training. However, due to a progressively debilitating disease that struck her in 1989, Ms. Maki is confined to a wheelchair and lacks feeling in her hands. Thus, she cannot efficiently operate the older manual machines or newer computer-assisted machines used in machine shops. Ms. Maki's husband lacks any experience in machining tools. He has worked over 25 years as an automobile mechanic. His brother has no experience in machining tools; he is in the construction business in Miami. Ms. Maki's sons have considerable experience in machining tools, including training and 14 and 20 years' experience in using the newer, more complicated computer-assisted equipment, which Petitioner owns. They received their stock in return for their agreement to work for wages well below what they could have earned elsewhere. Given the minimal cash flow and concerns about jeopardizing her Social Security disability payments, Ms. Maki did not withdraw money from Petitioner. However, her husband received a salary of an undisclosed amount until September 1998. Her sons also received a salary, but only about $100 weekly, mostly to cover their expenses. In May 1998, Mr. Rodhe terminated his involvement with Petitioner. At that time, he transferred his stock to Petitioner, apparently without any payment to him. The effect of this transfer was to increase Ms. Maki's percentage ownership of Petitioner. At the time of Mr. Rodhe's departure, his brother replaced him as secretary, and the board of directors were reduced to four members. These are the present officers and directors of Petitioner. Pursuant to the articles of incorporation, the board of directors directs the affairs of Petitioner. Nothing in the articles of incorporation overrides the provisions of Section 607.0824(1), Florida Statutes, which provides that a majority of directors constitute a quorum, or Section 607.0808(1), Florida Statutes, which provides that the shareholders may remove directors without cause. Ms. Maki and her husband are each authorized signatories of checks drawn on Petitioner's checking account. Each check requires only one signature. However, Mr. Maki does not typically sign the checks, consistent with his relatively little involvement with Petitioner. Someone at the bank suggested to Ms. Maki that Petitioner should authorize her husband to sign checks in case anything happened to Ms. Maki. Ms. Maki and her husband are the guarantors on a lease for a major piece of equipment used by Petitioner. In a later lease, the lender allowed only Ms. Maki to sign as a guarantor. Business has slowly been building. In July 1998, Petitioner hired a machinist and purchased another machine. When confronting a major decision, such as purchasing a new machine, Ms. Maki presents the issue to the board of directors, which then makes the decision. Ms. Maki solely handles hiring, firing, payroll, purchasing material, bidding, and scheduling jobs. She is present at the shop every workday from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM and supervises all of the activities in the shop.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Minority Business Advocacy and Assistance Office enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for certification as a minority business enterprise. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene Maki Qualified Representative RGM Precision Machine, Inc. 18923 Titus Road Hudson, Florida 34667 Joseph L. Shields Senior Attorney Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Hartman Building, Suite 307 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Mary B. Hooks Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Edward A. Dion General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulated record submitted by the parties, the following Findings of Facts arc made: Following the issuance of its October 13, 1989, jeopardy assessment against Petitioner, Respondent began its efforts to recover the monies allegedly owed by Petitioner. Collectable assets were identified. These identified assets included a bank account at Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A. (Account No. 1595012259) in the name of John M. Brumley Racing Engines, Inc. (Corporation) with a balance of $176.29 and real property that appeared to be owned by the Corporation. Respondent gave written notice of its October 13, 1989, jeopardy assessment against Petitioner to Barnett Bank. In the notice, Respondent requested that the bank not transfer nor otherwise dispose of the funds in Account No 1595012259 without Respondent's consent. Subsequently, the bank notified Respondent that it had taken measures to comply with Respondent's request.
The Issue As the parties have stipulated, the issue in this case is whether Respondent Florida Housing Finance Corporation (the “Corporation”) properly interpreted Rule 67-48.032(2), Florida Administrative Code, and the corresponding provisions on the same subject found in paragraph 2, at page 2, of the Corporation’s 2000 Qualified Allocation Plan (collectively, the "Instructions"), when it applied the Instructions to determine the substantial interests of Petitioners and Intervenors.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Corporation and Its Duty to Allocate Federal Income Tax Credits The Corporation is a public corporation that administers governmental programs relating to the financing and refinancing of housing and related facilities in Florida. It is governed by a nine-member board composed of eight persons whom the governor appoints plus the Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs, sitting ex-officio. Among other things, the Corporation is the state's designated "housing credit agency" as defined in the Internal Revenue Code. As such, the Corporation has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures necessary for the allocation and distribution of low-income housing federal tax credits, which are created under and governed almost entirely by federal law. These tax credits, which are designed to encourage the development of low-income housing for families, provide a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the holder’s federal income tax liability and can be taken each year, for up to ten years, that the low-income housing project for which the credits were awarded continues to satisfy Internal Revenue Code requirements. Housing tax credits are allotted annually to the states on a per capita basis and then awarded, through state-administered programs, to developers of rental housing for low-income and very low-income families. Once awarded, there is a market for these tax credits; consequently, a developer may sell them at a discount to obtain immediate cash for its project. As a populous state, Florida receives between $18 million and $18.5 million in federal tax credits each year. The Corporation allocates the state's share of tax credits to eligible recipients pursuant to a Qualified Allocation Plan ("QAP") that federal law requires be prepared. The QAP, which must be approved by the governor, is incorporated by reference in Rule 67-48.025, Florida Administrative Code. In accordance with the QAP, the Corporation employs various set-asides and special targeting goals that play a substantial part in determining which applicants will receive tax credits in a particular year. While targeting goals are "aspirational" in nature, set-asides are relatively inflexible. Thus, special targeting goals may be met if credits are available. In contrast, credits that were reserved (or "set- aside") for specific project types will be awarded to applicants whose developments fall within the defined set-aside. The set-asides that have spawned the instant dispute are the Geographic Set-Asides and the Non-Profit Set-Aside. The Geographic Set-Asides require that a pre-determined portion of the available tax credits be awarded to applicants in each of the following county groups: Large County, Medium County, and Small County. In 2000, the allocation percentages for these groups were 64%, 26%, and 10%, respectively. The Non-Profit Set-Aside, which is a function of federal law, requires that at least 12% of the credits be awarded to non-profit applicants. None of the other set-asides is either at issue here or affects the analysis or outcome. The same is true of the special targeting goals. For simplicity's sake, therefore, special targeting goals will be ignored in the discussion that follows, and it will be assumed, unless otherwise stated, that the Geographic and Non-Profit Set-Asides are the only factors (besides merit) that affect the Corporation's award of tax credits. The Petitioners and Intervenors (Collectively, "Petitioners") Lakesmart is a Florida limited partnership which has as one of its general partners a non-profit corporation. In the 2000 application cycle, Lakesmart applied to the Corporation for an award of tax credits from the Medium County allocation. Lakesmart is a "Non-Profit Applicant" for purposes of the Non- Profit Set-Aside. RPK is a Florida limited partnership. In the 2000 application cycle, RPK applied to the Corporation for an award of tax credits from the Large County allocation. For purposes of the Non-Profit Set-Aside, RPK is a "for-profit Applicant." Meadow Glen and Coral Village are Florida limited partnerships. Each has a non-profit corporation as one of its general partners. Both applied to the Corporation in the 2000 application cycle for an award of tax credits from the Medium County allocation. Each is considered a "Non-Profit Applicant" for purposes of the Non-Profit Set-Aside. Evaluation, Ranking, and the Tentative Funding Range To distribute the finite amount of tax credits available each year, the Corporation has designed a competitive process whereby potential recipients file applications that the Corporation grades according to selection criteria set forth in the QAP. Points are assigned based on compliance with these criteria. At the end of the evaluation process, each applicant that met the threshold requirements will have earned a final score that determines its rank in terms of relative merit, with higher-scored projects being "better" than lower-scored projects. Because of the set-asides, however, credits are not awarded simply on the basis of comparative scores. Instead, the Geographic Set-Asides require that the applicants be sorted and ranked, according to their scores, within the Large County, Medium County, and Small County groups to which they belong and from whose credit allocations the successful applicants will be funded. As a result, therefore, if the several applicants with the three highest scores in the entire applicant pool were all in the Large County group and the applicant with the fourth highest score were in the Small County group, for example, then the latter applicant would be ranked first in the Small County group. This means, to continue with the example, that if the first- and second-ranked projects in the Large County group were to exhaust the credits allocated to that group, then the applicant with the third highest score overall would not be funded, while the applicant with the fourth highest score in the applicant pool (but ranked first in a county group) would be funded. 16/ After the Corporation has sorted the applicants by county group and ranked them, within their respective groups, from highest to lowest based on the applicants' final scores, it draws a tentative funding line within each group. Applicants above these lines are within the tentative funding range and thus apparently successful. Conversely, an applicant below the tentative funding line in its county group will not receive tax credits unless, to satisfy a set-aside or fulfill a special targeting goal, it is moved into the funding range. In the 2000 application cycle, a preliminary outcome which had occurred only once before, in 1997, happened again: the aggregate of credits requested by the non-profit applicants within the tentative funding range did not amount to the Non- Profit Set-Aside percentage — 12% in 2000 — of total available credits. Therefore, the Corporation needed to elevate as many apparently unsuccessful non-profit applicants into the funding range — and concomitantly to remove as many apparently successful for-profit applicants from the funding range to make room for the favored non-profit applicant(s) — as necessary to fulfill the 12% quota. An Aside on Categorical Ranking The separation of applicants into three groups according to the Geographic Set-Asides, and the effect that has on determining which applicants will receive credits, was mentioned above. To better understand the parties' dispute regarding the procedure for satisfying the Non-Profit Set-Aside when, as in 2000, it is necessary to award credits to a putatively unsuccessful non-profit applicant at the expense of a putatively successful for-profit applicant, a second, more detailed look at the implications of categorical ranking will be helpful. Because of the Non-Profit Set-Aside, the set of all qualified applicants ("Applicant Pool") is divided into two classes: non-profit and for-profit corporations. As will be seen, the class of non-profit corporations is further separated, for purposes of the Non-Profit Set-Aside, into two subclasses: domestic non-profits and out-of-state, or foreign, non-profits. Finally, to repeat for emphasis, all qualified applicants, regardless of class or subclass (if applicable), fall within one of three groups according to the Geographic Set-Asides: Small County, Medium County, and Large County. The following chart depicts the relevant classification of applicants within the Applicant Pool: Applicant Pool Non-profits For-profits Domestic Foreign Small County Medium County Large County Because, as the chart shows, each applicant fits into several categories, applicants may be ranked in order of their comparative scores in a variety of combinations, depending on how they are sorted, e.g. all applicants, all Large County for- profits, all foreign non-profits, etc. Once the Corporation has drawn the tentative funding lines (which, recall, are county group-specific) and determined preliminarily which applicants will receive funding and which will not, two additional categories exist: applicants within the funding range and applicants below (or outside) the funding range. Owing to the nature of the instant dispute, however, the only non-profits discussed below are those outside the tentative funding range, unless otherwise stated, and the only for-profits considered are those within the tentative funding range, unless otherwise stated. 1/ The above makes clear, it is hoped, that a reference to the "highest scored" applicant, without more, may describe many applicants, such as the highest scored domestic non-profit, the highest scored non-profit in the Small County group, the highest scored foreign non-profit in the Large County group, and so on. More information is needed to pinpoint a particular entity. For ease of reference, and to facilitate the discussion and disposition of the present dispute, the following abbreviations will be used in this Recommended Order as shorthand descriptions of applicants’ defining characteristics: Abbreviation Meaning NP Non-profit applicant FP For-profit applicant High- highest scored Low- lowest scored D domestic entity (i.e. organized under Florida law) F foreign entity (i.e. organized under the law of a state other than Florida) S, M, and L Small, Medium and Large County, respectively ! highest or lowest scored within the indicated category; e.g. High- NP(S!) means highest scored non- profit within the Small County group; Low-FP(S!) means lowest scored for-profit in the Small county group x, y variables Combining these abbreviations provides an increasingly precise description, as more information is added. For example: Combination Description High-NP Highest scored non-profit in some, unknown category High-NP[D!] Highest scored domestic non- profit, unknown group; is not necessarily the highest scored non-profit in the class of non- profits High-NP[F!] Highest scored foreign non-profit, unknown group; is not necessarily the highest scored non-profit in the class of non-profits High-NP[D!](S) Highest scored domestic non- profit, located in the Small County group; not the highest scored non-profit within the Small County group High-NP[D](S!) Highest scored non-profit in the Small County group; is a domestic corporation but is neither the highest scored non-profit nor highest scored domestic non-profit High-NP[D](S) Highest scored domestic non-profit in the Small County group; is neither the highest scored non- profit, the highest scored domestic non-profit, nor the highest scored non-profit in the Small County group Low-FP! Lowest scored for-profit in the class of for-profits Low-FP(M!) Lowest scored for-profit in Medium County group; is not necessarily the lowest scored for- profit in the class of for-profits The Controversy: Gored Oxen and Leapt-Over Frogs The solution to the problem that arose in the 2000 application cycle when an insufficient number of non-profit applicants wound up initially within the tentative funding range is found in two places: Rule 67-48.032, Florida Administrative Code, and the 2000 QAP. Although the language of the two is not identical, the parties agree that the rule and the pertinent QAP provisions have the same meaning, despite their differences in wording. The undersigned has concluded, however, that the differences, though subtle, substantially affect the outcome of this case. It is necessary, therefore, to read them carefully. Rule 67-48.032(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part: To ensure that the minimum 10% is set aside, the Corporation has determined that an initial allocation of 12% to qualified Non- Profits will be met. In order to achieve the initial 12% set aside, Applications from Applicants that qualify or whose General Partner qualifies as a Non-Profit entity pursuant to Rule 67.48.002(71), F.A.C., HUD Regulations, Section 42(h)(5)(c), subsection 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) of the Code and organized under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes, or organized under similar state law if organized in a jurisdiction other than Florida and meet scoring threshold requirements shall be moved into the funding range, in order of their comparative scores, with Applicants whose Non-Profit entity is organized under Florida law receiving priority over Non-Profit entities of other jurisdictions, until the set-aside is achieved. The last Non-Profit Development that is moved into the funding range in order to achieve the 12% initial set-aside shall be fully funded even though that may result in a higher Non-Profit set-aside. This will be accomplished by removing the lowest scored Application of a for-profit Applicant from the funding range and replacing it with the highest scored Non- Profit Application below the funding range within the applicable Geographic Set-Aside pursuant to the QAP. This procedure will be used again on or after October 1, if necessary, to ensure that the Agency allocates at least 10% of its Allocation Authority to qualified Non-Profit Applicants. Any for-profit Applicant so removed from the funding range will NOT be entitled to any consideration or priority for the receipt of current or future Housing Credits other than placement on the current ranking and scoring list in accordance with its score. Binding Commitments for Housing Credits from a future year will not be issued for Applicants so displaced. Paragraph 2, at page 2, of the Corporation’s 2000 QAP states: [The Corporation] has determined that an initial allocation of 12% to qualified Non- Profits will ensure that the 10% requirement will be met in the event that all Developments included in the initial 12% do not receive an allocation. In order to achieve the initial 12% set-aside a tentative funding line will be drawn. Then, Applications from Non-Profit Applicants that meet scoring threshold requirements shall be moved into the tentative funding range, in order of their scores with Applicants whose Non-Profit entities are organized under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes, having priority, until the 12% set-aside is achieved. This will be accomplished by moving the lowest scored Application of a for-profit Applicant in the funding range down in ranking so it is ranked below the lowest Non-Profit Applicant within the funding range and moving the highest scored Non-Profit Applicant organized under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes below the funding range within the applicable Geographic Set- Aside pursuant to the QAP up in ranking so it is ranked one ranking space above the for-profit Applicant that was moved down in ranking. If no such Applicant exists, the highest Non-Profit Applicant organized under similar statutes from another state which is below the funding range within the applicable Geographic Set-Aside pursuant to the QAP, will be moved into funding range in the same manner as stated in the previous sentence. This procedure will be used again on or after October 1, 2000, if necessary, to ensure that the [Corporation] allocates at least 10% of its Allocation Authority for 2000 to qualified Non-Profit Applicants. Any for-profit Applicant so removed from the funding range will NOT be entitled to any consideration or priority for the receipt of current or future housing credits other than placement on the current ranking and scoring list in accordance with its score. Binding Commitments for housing credits from a future year will not be issued for Applicants so displaced. The last Non- Profit Applicant moved into the funding range, in order to meet the initial 12% set- aside or in order to meet the minimum 10% set-aside after October 1, 2000, will be fully funded contingent upon successful credit underwriting even though that may result in a higher Non-Profit set-aside. After the full Non-Profit set-aside amount has been allocated, remaining Applications from Non-Profit organizations shall compete with all other Applications in the HC Program for remaining Allocation Authority. The Corporation's interpretation of Rule 67-48.032, Florida Administrative Code, and paragraph 2 of the 2000 QAP (collectively, the "Instructions") to determine the procedure for satisfying the Non-Profit Set-Aside in connection with the 2000 application cycle has caused considerable controversy — and led to this proceeding. The controversial interpretation was publicly manifested on September 15, 2000, when the Corporation published a preliminary ranking sheet on its web site which reflected adjustments that its staff had made to fulfill the Non-Profit Set-Aside. Within days, adversely affected applicants were complaining that the Corporation's staff had misinterpreted the Instructions. The Corporation's staff had construed the Instructions to mean that when it is necessary to displace a for-profit within the tentative funding range to satisfy the Non-Profit Set-Aside, the following procedure must be followed: Remove Low-FP!(x!) and replace it with High- NP[D](x). 2/ If there is no domestic non- profit in county group x, then replace Low- FP!(x!) with High-NP[F](x!). 3/ This construction permits High-NP[D!], if there is one, High- NP![F!] if not, to remain outside the funding range, because it might not be in county group x. In practice, the process that the Corporation’s staff had settled upon operated, in the circumstances presented, to the detriment of Petitioners. Here is how it worked. After the tentative funding range was established, the lowest scored for- profit in the class of for-profits was in the Small County group. 4/ There were no non-profits, domestic or foreign, in that group to elevate, however, and so Low-FP!(S!) could not be removed; the fall-back procedure was followed. See endnote 4. As it happened, RPK was Low-FP(L!) and had a lower score than Low-FP(M!). Thus, under the Corporation's staff's interpretation of the Instructions, as revealed by the rankings posted on September 15, 2000, High-NP[D](L!) was moved into the funding range in the place of RPK, even though High-NP[D](L!)'s final score was lower than that of Lakesmart — which was High- NP. (Coral Village and Meadow Glen were the second- and third-ranked domestic non-profits, respectively, in the Medium County Group. Sorted by class, Lakesmart, Coral Village, and Meadow Glen would be ranked first, second, and sixth in the class of non-profit applicants.) 5/ The second lowest-scored for-profit in the class of for-profits was also in the Large County group. Thus, it became Low-FP!(L!) after RPK was removed. It, too, was replaced by the Large County non-profits that became, in turn, High-NP[D](L!) as the next highest-ranked non-profit in that group was moved up into the funding range to satisfy the 12% Non-Profit Set-Aside. In all, the Corporation's staff proposed to elevate — and hence award tax credits to — four non-profit applicants whose final scores were lower than Lakesmart's and Coral Village's. One of those four putative beneficiaries had a lower final score than Meadow Glen's. Lakesmart and others who disagreed with the Corporation’s staff advanced an alternative interpretation of the Instructions. In their view, to ensure that the Non-Profit Set-Aside is met requires the following maneuver: Remove Low-FP(x!) and replace it with High- NP[D!](x). 6/ If there is no domestic non- profit outside the funding range, then replace Low-FP(x!) with High-NP. 7/ This interpretation admits the possibility that Low-FP! might remain in the funding range, because it might not be in county group x. Under this interpretation, favored by all Petitioners, Lakesmart and Coral Village would be elevated into the funding range, rather than being "leap-frogged" by lower-scored non- profits, and RPK would not be displaced. (Of course, Petitioners' interpretation would require that some other for- profit ox be gored — one having a higher score than RPK's.) These competing interpretations of the Instructions were presented to the Corporation's board for consideration at its public meeting on September 22, 2000. After a discussion of the issues, in which members of the public participated, the board voted unanimously to accept the interpretation that the staff had acted upon in preparing the September 15, 2000, rankings. Later in the same meeting the board adopted final rankings, which were prepared in accordance with the approved interpretation, that resulted in the denial of Petitioners' applications for tax credits. The 1997 Awards: Precedent or Peculiarity? Petitioners maintain that their interpretation of the Instructions is supported by a supposed precedent allegedly set in 1997 that, they say, was binding on the Corporation in 2000. In the 1997 cycle, it so happened that after drawing the tentative funding lines, the sum total of credits sought by non-profits within the preliminary funding range failed to reach the then-required threshold of 10%. Thus, for the first time, the Corporation faced the need to replace higher-scored for- profits (that were apparently in line for funding) with lower- scored non-profits that otherwise would not have received credits. The QAP that governed the 1997 awards provided for the Non-Profit Set-Aside but was silent on the procedure for satisfying it: The Agency will allocate not less than 10% of the state’s allocation authority to projects involving qualified, non-profit Applicants, provided they are non-profits organized under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes, and as set forth in Section 42(h)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and Rule Chapter 9I-48, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 8. Rule 9I-48.024(3), Florida Administrative Code (1997), did contain directions for carrying out the required substitution. It prescribed the following procedure for elevating non-profits: If 10% of the total Allocation Authority is not utilized by Projects with Non-Profit Applicants, Applications from Non-Profit Applicants that meet scoring threshold requirements shall be moved into the funding range, in order of their comparative scores, until the 10% set-aside is achieved. This will be accomplished by removing the lowest scored Application of a for-profit Applicant from the funding range and replacing it with the highest scored Non-Profit Application below the funding range within the applicable Geographic Set-Aside pursuant to section (2) above. Petitioners' Exhibit 1. These provisions will be referred to hereafter as the "1997 Directions," to distinguish them from the Instructions. Gwen Lightfoot was the Corporation's Deputy Development Officer in 1997. In that capacity, she was directly responsible for implementing the rules relating to the award of low-income housing tax credits. To satisfy the Non-Profit Set- Aside, Ms. Lightfoot followed the 1997 Directions as she understood them. In so doing, she sorted the eligible non- profits by class (i.e. without regard to their respective county groups) and ranked them in score order, from the highest scoring project to the lowest scoring project. 8/ Then, Ms. Lightfoot moved the highest scoring non-profit in the class of non-profits to a position immediately above the for-profit with the lowest score in the same geographic set-aside as the favored non-profit so that the non-profit project would be fully funded. That is, she replaced Low-FP(x!) with High-NP!(x!). This process was repeated, moving the next highest ranked non-profit to a position immediately above the lowest-ranked for-profit in the same geographic set-aside as the elevated non-profit, until the Non-Profit Set-Aside was met. Although the Corporation presently argues that its board was not fully informed in 1997 as to the procedure that Ms. Lightfoot followed in fulfilling the mandate of the Non- Profit Set-Aside, a preponderance of evidence established that Ms. Lightfoot's actions were within the scope of her authority and taken in furtherance of her official duties; that the board was aware of what she had done; and that the board took no action to change the results that followed from Ms. Lightfoot's interpretation and implementation of the 1997 Directions. Ms. Lightfoot's application of the 1997 Directions, in short, was not the unauthorized act of a rogue employee. Rather, as a matter of fact, her action was the Corporation's action, irrespective of what any individual board member might subjectively have understood at the time. In the years following the 1997 awards, Rule 9I- 48.032, Florida Administrative Code, was re-numbered Rule 67- 48.032 and amended three times, the most recent amendment becoming effective on February 24, 2000. As a result, the 1997 Directions evolved into the language of Rule 67-48.032(2) which, though not identical, retains the essential meaning of its predecessor. During the same period, the QAP was also amended three times, the version controlling the 2000 application cycle having been approved by the governor on December 16, 1999, and adopted by reference in the Florida Administrative Code on February 24, 2000. Unlike the revisions to Rule 9I-48.032(3), however, the changes in the QAP that relate to the issue at hand are significant, because the 2000 QAP sets forth a procedure for fulfilling the Non-Profit Set-Aside when the collective amount of credits sought by non-profits in the tentative funding range falls short of the mandated mark, whereas the 1997 QAP did not.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Corporation enter a final order dismissing the petitions of Petitioner Lakesmart, Petitioner RPK, and Intervenors Meadow Glen and Coral Village. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2001.
