The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Which of two competing applications for nursing home beds better meets the statutory and rule criteria to satisfy the numeric need for 79 additional beds in Agency for Health Care Administration District 7, Subdistrict 1, Brevard County.
Findings Of Fact The Agency For Health Care Administration ("AHCA") is the single agency responsible for the administration of certificate of need ("CON") laws in Florida. AHCA published a numeric need for an additional 79 beds in District 7, Subdistrict 1, for Brevard County for the July 1996 planning horizon. There was no challenge to the numeric need determination. After reviewing the applications of Holmes/VHA Long Term Care Joint Venture ("Holmes/VHA") and National Health Corporation d/b/a NHC of Merritt Island ("NHC"), among others, AHCA published its intent to approve the application of NHC and to deny that of Holmes/VHA. The State Agency Action Report ("SAAR") issued on March 13, 1994, for the July 1996 Planning Horizon, summarizes AHCA's review of the applications and the reasons for its decision. Holmes/VHA timely challenged AHCA's preliminary approval of CON 7527 to NHC and denial of CON 7539 to Holmes/VHA. In a pre-hearing stipulation, the parties agreed that the specific statutory criteria at issue, related to the contents of the letter of intent and application are subsections 408.037(2)(a), (2)(c), (4) and 408.039(2)(c), Florida Statutes. The parties also agreed that the CON review criteria at issue are subsections 408.035(1)(a), (b), (d), (e), (h), (i), (l), (m), (n) and (0), and 408.035(2)(e), Florida Statutes. The parties stipulated to the need for 79 additional community nursing home beds in the subdistrict. At the formal hearing the parties also agreed that quality of care is not at issue and that staffing schedules and proposals to fund or finance both projects are reasonable, thereby removing from consideration subsections 408.035(1)(c) and portions of (1)(h). HOLMES/VHA Holmes/VHA, the applicant for CON 7539, is a Florida general partnership formed between Holmes Regional Enterprises, Inc. ("Holmes Enterprises"), a Florida not-for-profit corporation, in Brevard County, Florida, and Vantage Health Systems, Inc., d/b/a VHA Long Term Care ("VHA"). The partnership, Holmes/VHA, owns and operates an existing 120-bed nursing home, Holmes Regional Nursing Center ("Holmes Nursing Center") in Melbourne. VHA is a division of Service Master Diversified Health Services of Memphis, Tennessee, which manages 106 facilities in 30 states. Holmes Enterprises operates Holmes Regional Medical Center ("Holmes Regional"), a 528-bed acute care hospital, with open heart surgery and neonatal intensive care services and approval for 30 skilled nursing beds. Sixty of Holmes Regional's licensed beds are located at Palm Bay Community Hospital in Palm Bay, approximately 8 to 15 miles south of Holmes Regional. Although it is a separate municipality, Palm Bay was described as a suburb of and contiguous to Melbourne. The site for the Palm Bay Center, which is across the street from Palm Bay Community Hospital, is in another community known as Mallibar. VHA has entered into similar partnerships with acute care hospitals in Jacksonville, Florida, and Greensboro, North Carolina, to operate nursing homes in those areas. The Service Master organization provides management and support services, including data processing, legal, personnel, dietary, and architectural and design services for nursing homes. Holmes/VHA, the joint venture general partnership, has a management committee of four people, two from the hospital and two from the VHA company. The management committee, functioning like a board of directors, adopted a resolution authorizing Holmes/VHA to file the Con application. When formed, the joint venture obtained an older 60-bed facility, and then constructed a replacement facility. During the construction, it obtained a 60-bed CON from another company and combined beds to build its existing 120-bed nursing home, Holmes Nursing Center. Holmes Nursing Center is rated superior and offers inpatient and outpatient rehabilitative and restorative services, including a head and spinal cord injury program. The rehabilitative services are directed by Holmes Regional, which is located a block and a half from the nursing home. The original CON for Holmes Nursing Center required that 35 percent of total patient days be provided to Medicaid. The requirement was increased to 45 percent with the 60-bed addition, which Holmes Nursing Center has exceeded. The 120 beds are divided into 20 percent Medicare certified, 50 percent Medicaid certified and 30 percent non-certified or private pay. Holmes Nursing Center also operates a 24-bed subacute unit for persons qualifying under Medicare criteria for skilled nursing care. Patients in the unit receive intensive assessments on each nursing shift and services which include pain, respiratory, and wound management. Holmes Regional Hospice, Inc. ("the hospice") is an affiliate of Holmes Enterprises, for which Holmes Regional holds the CON to take care of hospitalized hospice patients The current hospice census of over 200 patients includes 70 percent cancer, 9 percent AIDS, and 21 percent other terminal illnesses, such as heart disease and Alzheimers. Holmes/VHA applied for a CON to construct the 79-bed Palm Bay Nursing and Rehabilitation Center ("Palm Bay Center") conditioned on the provision of 61 percent of total patient days to Medicaid and the establishment of a 12-bed sub- acute unit, one room for hospice patients, inpatient and outpatient rehabilitative therapy, and respite care. The total gross square footage is 42,691 square feet. The Holmes Enterprises affiliates propose to provide support services for the Palm Bay Center, as they do for Holmes Nursing Center. The estimated total project cost for the Palm Bay Center is $4,732,790, of which the construction cost is $82,720,000 or $63.71 a square foot. An equity contribution of land valued at $420,000, will be provided by the hospital. Service Master will provide the funds or obtain financing for the project. The assumptions in the pro forma, including the expectation that interest may be due for a commercial loan, are reasonable. AHCA's expert's conclusion that the project is financially feasible is accepted. The financing by Service Master can be structured to avoid being treated as a related party transaction, which would adversely affect Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements. Holmes/VHA listed as capital projects three other pending CON and an additional $25,000 in annual capitalized routine expenses for furniture, fixtures and equipment attributable to Holmes Regional Nursing Center. The total of the capital projects listed on Schedule 2 of the application is $13,256,701. NHC National HealthCorp, L.P. ("NHC"), the applicant for CON 7527, began operations in 1986, with 14 nursing homes. Currently, NHC owns or manages 96 nursing homes primarily in the southeast United States. It manages 36 nursing homes in Florida, 6 of which are also owned by NHC. NHC proposes to add 60 beds to National Healthcare Center of Merritt Island ("NHC-Merritt Island"), a superior rated, 120-bed community nursing home on a 7 acre site in Merritt Island, Brevard County. NHC-Merritt Island has a 22-bed Alzheimers' unit. NHC's regional office provides support services, including speech, occupational, and physical therapies, nursing, dietary, and administrative services to NHC-Merritt Island. With the addition of 60 beds, NHC intends to provide respite care, a dedicated 20-bed subacute unit, and an additional 16-bed Alzheimers' unit. Without a subacute unit, NHC already has an average census of 9 subacute patients. NHC will triple the size of the therapy space and more than double the size of the building. The projected total capital expenditure is $3,891,850, with construction costs of $2,955,000, or $85.00 a square foot. To accommodate the addition, NHC has entered into a contract to purchase an additional 1.3 acres, adjacent to the current 7 acres, for a cost of $175,000. For the past few years, NHC has experienced 94 to 100 percent occupancy. Fifty-four people are on NHC's waiting list and an additional 16 are on the waiting list for the Alzheimers' unit. The projected annual fill-up rates for NHC's additional beds are supported by the demand for its service and its historical experience, even though the monthly fill-up rates in the application are not adjusted to reflect the specific number of days in each month. Medicaid resident days are 55 percent to 57 percent of the total at present, below the 60.31 percent average in the subdistrict and the current 60 percent CON condition. If the expansion CON is approved, NHC will commit to providing 60.31 percent Medicaid patient days and will increase the number of Medicaid certified beds from 77 to 108. NHC was profitable in 1992 and 1993, by approximately $100,000 and $250,000, respectively, but currently is not profitable, with an approximate deficit of $8,000. The deficit is attributable to (1) a decline in the Medicaid reimbursement rate, which was initially higher due to start up costs, (2) the expiration of a new provider exemption from Medicare cost limits, and (3) the transfer of assets by NHC, in exchange for stock, to a newly formed subsidiary, from which NHC-Merritt Island is now leased. Lease payments are $517,000 a year whether the facility has 120 or 180 beds, and profits are returned to stockholders, including NHC. Using Medicaid rates, calculated by the state, as inflated forward, and Medicare rates in excess of routine cost limits, based on the current experience of NHC-Merritt Island, NHC reasonably projected its costs and profit margin. NHC-Merritt Island has a positive cash flow and its expenses and revenues are at the goal set by NHC. With a total of 180 beds, the projections are reasonable that NHC-Merritt Island will be profitable. As AHCA's expert opined, NHC's proposal is financially feasible. Subsection 408.035(1)(a) - need in relation to district and state health plans The 1991 District 7 health plan has three preferences related to nursing homes, one favoring a section of Orange County, is inapplicable to the Brevard County applications. A second, for applicants proposing pediatric services, is inapplicable because both proposals in this batch are to provide adult services. The third preference favors applicants proposing to establish units providing psychiatric or subacute services, with emphasis on treating medically complex patients and AIDS/HIV positive patients. Holmes/VHA's health planner considers the subacute care and AIDS/HIV services proposed by Holmes/VHA superior to those proposed by NHC. NHC, however, proposes to provide specialized care in designated units for both subacute and Alzheimers's patients. Although Holmes/VHA argues that Alzheimers' care is required in every nursing home and is, therefore, not a specialized program, the physical design of a separate unit for such patients was shown to enhance their comfort. No AIDS/HIV positive patient has been treated at either Holmes Nusing Center or at NHC-Merritt Island. NHC-Merritt Island has accepted AIDS/HIV positive patients who did not come to the facility. The state health plan has twelve allocation factors for use in comparing nursing home applications. Both applicants comply with the factors favoring locations in a subdistrict in which occupancy levels exceed 90 percent, proposals to meet or exceed that average subdistrict Medicaid occupancy of 60.31 percent, proposals with respite care and innovative therapies, multi- disciplinary staffing, for staffing in excess of minimum state requirements, and which document means to protect residents' rights and privacy. Both Holmes/VHA and NHC also meet the preference for proposing charges that do not exceed the highest Medicaid per diem in the subdistrict. NHC asserted, but failed to demonstrate that its therapy services with in-house staff are superior to those provided to Holmes/VHA by contract staff from Holmes Regional. The state health plan factor number 3, for specialized services, is largely duplicative of district health plan preferences. Neither applicant meets the part of one preference for providing adult day care, or the preference for proposing lower than average administrative costs and higher than average resident care costs. The fifth state allocation factor, for maximizing resident comfort and the criterion of subsection 408.035(1)(m), Florida Statutes, related to the cost and methods of construction, are at issue. NHC questions the adequacy of three acres for the building proposed by Holmes/VHA and the design of the building. Holmes Regional Nursing Center has 120 beds and approximately the same building area as that proposed for Palm Bay Center. The architects of the building have constructed a 163-bed facility on four acres in Jacksonville, and a 240-bed facility in Memphis, Tennessee on approximately six acres. Homes/VHA expects to construct the building in half the time required for completion of NHC's proposed addition. AHCA's architect noted, however, that Holmes/VHA has no Alzheimers unit and that its subacute area is not separated from the areas used by other patients and their families. Holmes/VHA has showers only in the 13 private rooms. By contrast, NHC has an Alzheimers unit with its own lounge and courtyard and a subacute unit at the end of a wing with a separate waiting room. NHC's rooms are larger, with larger windows. NHC's costs are higher than Holmes/VHA's, but not above the high average cost guidelines for construction used by AHCA. NHC has one nursing station for 60 beds, which meets the state requirement while Holmes/VHA is better equipped with two nurses stations for 79 beds. In general, Holmes/VHA established that its building could be built on 3 acres, and that its interior spaces exceed the requirements to be licensed. NHC established that its building and grounds will be larger, higher quality construction with more non-combustible materials, and better meet the preference for maximizing resident comfort. The preference for superior resident care is met by both Holmes/VHA and NHC-Merritt Island. An NHC facility in Stuart was rated conditional for 80 days of the 36 months, prior to the filing of the application. NHC had just purchased the Stuart facility at the time of the conditional rating, and had, in total, many more months of superior operations. In addition, the parties stipulated to quality of care issues at the hearing. Subsection 408.035(1)(b) and (1)(d) - availability, accessibility, efficiency, extent of utilization of like and existing services; alternatives to the applicants' proposals Brevard County is 80 miles long from north to south, 22 miles wide at its widest point, with 62 percent of its population in the southern area of the county. Holmes/VHA contends that its application should be approved based on the greater need for nursing home beds in southern Brevard County. Using ratios of beds in existing or approved nursing homes as compared to the population ages 65 and older, and 75 and older, a need is shown for more beds in the southern area, including Palm Bay. In the central area, there are 31.52 beds per 1000 people over 65, as compared to 26.53 in the southern area of Brevard County. For the population over 75, the ratios are 82.53 in the central and 68.47 in the southern area. The over 75 population is also projected to increase by a greater percentage in the southern as contrasted to the central areas of the county. AHCA claims to reject the use of any "sub-subdistrict" analysis of need, other than the test for geographically underserved areas, as defined by Rule 59C-1.036, Florida Administrative Code. That test which applies to proposed sites more than 20 miles from a nursing home, is not met by Holmes/VHA or NHC. However, AHCA has, in at least one other case, considered geographic accessibility within the planning area in determining which applicant should be approved, without the applicants having to demonstrate that the proposed sites are geographically underserved areas. NHC takes issue with Holmes/VHA's data on bed availability in the southern and central portions of the county. NHC maintains that its central location better serves the entire county. NHC's expert also criticized the methodology used by Holmes/VHA for demonstrating need in the southern area. The comparison of existing beds to population, shows a lack of county-wide parity, but not necessarily need. Other factors related to the need for nursing homes were not presented, such as poverty, migration, mortality and occupancy rates. In addition, NHC's expert questioned Holmes/VHA's experts calculations of bed- to-population ratios. The ratios arguably were skewed by using beds for Wuesthoff Hospital Progressive Care in the central area data, but including the population of the zip code in which Wuesthoff is located in the southern area. Holmes/VHA noted that the majority of the population in the zip code is in the southern area. Subsection 408.035(1)(n) - past and proposed Medicaid/indigent care Holmes/VHA's expert criticized NHC because two of its facilities, Merritt Island and Stuart, have been below the subdistrict average for Medicaid occupancy. For 3 six month periods during the last 4 years, they also were below their CON Medicaid commitments. One other NHC facility, in Hudson, has been below the subdistrict average, but significantly above its CON condition. NHC claims that it treats its Medicaid condition as a minimum, while Holmes/VHA uses its conditions as an artificial ceiling or maximum. Subsection 408.035(1)(e),(1)(o) - cooperative or shared health care resources; continuum of care Holmes/VHA has established linkages to its various related companies to provide cooperative care and shared resources. Palm Bay Nursing Center would enhance the multi-level care provided by the Holmes Enterprises group and provide another integral step in the continuum, particularly in rehabilitative therapies. NHC, however, as an existing provider, is part of a well-established network of health care providers in the community. NHC has also purchased land to build an adult congregate living facility near or adjacent to NHC-Merritt Island. Subsections 408.039(2)(a), (2)(c) and 408.037(4), and Rule 59C-1.008, Florida Administrative Code - capital projects list; board resolutions; and impacts on costs AHCA interprets the requirements for the submission of a board resolution to allow an original resolution accompanying the letter of intent to be treated as a part of the complete application. A board resolution with an application, which the statute requires "if applicable," applies to expedited applications for which a letter of intent would not have been received, according to AHCA. NHC submitted an original board resolution with its letter of intent, and a copy of that resolution with its application for CON 7527. The authority of Holmes/VHA's management committee to authorize the construction of a new nursing home, and the authority to operate a nursing home outside the city of Melbourne was questioned. The testimony that the joint venture agreement authorizes the management committee to adopt a resolution authorizing the filing of CON 7539 was not refuted. In addition, the testimony that operations are restricted to the "Melbourne area" as opposed to some more specifically defined geographic area was not refuted. Repeatedly, witnesses described Palm Bay, although a separate municipal corporation, as a suburb of Melbourne. Holmes/VHA claims that NHC failed to disclose certain capital equipment leases from its schedule 2 list of capital projects and failed to evaluate the impact on costs, as required by subsection 408.037, Florida Statutes. In NHC's annual reports, the costs of capital equipment leases were $204,000 in 1991, $43,000 in 1992, and $88,000 in 1993. In fact, the NHC witness who prepared schedule 2 included a total of $21,653,468 for the category "Renovations (Including Furnishings and Equipment) 1994", taken from the capital expenditure budget of each NHC facility. The listing is consistent with the footnote indicating the budget items "are subject to final approval and cash reserves availability." In addition, $100,000 is also listed under "Other Capitalization" for equipment, for which a footnote explains "[a]mount included in an abundance of caution to cover any items unknown at the time of filing." NHC, according to Holmes/VHA, also failed to provide a detailed evaluation of the impact of the proposed project on the cost of other services it provides, as required by subsection 408.037(2)(c), Florida Statutes. NHC merely states that the impact is "nominal" and "negligible." NHC satisfied the impact analysis requirement in the notes to schedule 2 and in schedules 11, 13 and 14 of the application. The incremental pro forma analysis of the effect on costs with or without the proposed project, and projected financial ratios and costs, give detail support for the statements in the application. Assuming, arguendo, that Holmes/VHA omitted $50,000 in capital costs from schedule 2, the omission is not material or fatal to consideration of the application on the merits. Holmes/VHA's financial expert testified that $50,000 is less than on-half of one percent of the total project expenditures listed on schedule 2 and is, therefore, immaterial. As AHCA concedes, Holmes/VHA and NHC have the resources to establish their projects and to provide the services described in their applications. On balance, the demand for additional beds, the enhancement of a superior, existing physical plant and the expansion of specialized services at NHC outweigh the community linkages demonstrated by Holmes/VHA and the desirability of county- wide parity in the distribution of nursing homes beds, at this time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency For Health Care Administration issue a Final Order approving CON No. 7527 for the construction of an additional 60 community nursing home beds by National Healthcorp, L.P., conditioned on the provision of 60.31 percent of total patient days to Medicaid patients. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2393 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner NHC's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in Findings of Fact 13. Accepted in Findings of Fact 3. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 14-18. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 14-18, except last phrase. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 6 and 10. 6-17. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 30 and conclusions of law. 18-21. Accepted in Findings of Fact 32. 22. Accepted in Findings of Fact 3. 23-30. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 5 and 31. Rejected in Findings of Fact 6 and 31. Accepted in Findings of Fact 33. Rejected in Findings of Fact 33. Accepted in preliminary statement and Finding of Fact 1. 35-36. Accepted in part and rejected in part in Findings of Fact 21-25. 37-38. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. 39. Rejected conclusion in Findings of Fact 20, 23 and 34. 40. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21 and 23. 41. Accepted in Findings of Fact 24. 42. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. 43. Accepted in Findings of Fact 20. 44-45. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. 46-48. Accepted in Findings of Fact 25. 49. Rejected in Findings of Fact 25. 50. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. 51. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21. 52. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. Accepted in Findings of Fact 23. Accepted in Findings of Fact 19. 56-57. Accepted in Findings of Fact 20. Accepted in Findings of Fact 34. Accepted in Findings of Fact 27 and 28. Accepted in Findings of Fact 26 and 27. Rejected in Findings of Fact 26 and 27. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 26 and 27. Accepted in Findings of Fact 19. Accepted in Findings of Fact 19, 26 and 27. Rejected in Findings of Fact 26-27 and conclusions of law. Rejected in Findings of Fact 26-27 and conclusions of law. Accepted in Findings of Fact 2. 68-77. Accepted in part and rejected in part in Findings of Fact 27. Accepted in Findings of Fact 20. Rejected in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. Accepted in Findings of Fact 22. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 9, 10 and 20. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 20. 84-88. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 10, and 20. 89-95. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 15, and 20. 96-97. Accepted in Findings of Fact 10, 15, and 21. 98-100. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21-22. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 15, 16 and 20. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 8 and 15. 104-108. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 13 and 14. 109-110. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 34. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 4. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 34. 113-117. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. Accepted in Findings of Fact 34. Accepted in Findings of Fact 11, 18 and 34. 120-123. Rejected conclusion in Findings of Fact 11. 124-130. Rejected in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 18. 131. Accepted in Findings of Fact 32. 132. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. 133. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. 134-136. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. 137. Rejected first sentence in Findings of Fact 24. 138. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. 139. Rejected as subordinate to Finding of Fact 24. 140. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 15 and 24. 141-150. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. 151. Rejected as not entirely supported by the record. 152-162. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. 163-172. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 21 and 28. 173-175. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 29. 176. Rejected conclusion that "NHC better . . ." in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 29. 177. Accepted. Petitioner Holmes/VHA's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1-3. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 3.. 4. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 3 and 4. 5. Accepted in Findings of Fact 26. 6-8. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 10 and 31. 9. Accepted in Findings of Fact 10. 10. Accepted in Findings of Fact 2. 11. Accepted in Findings of Fact 30 and 31. 12. Rejected in Findings of Fact 30 and 32. 13. Conclusion rejected in Findings of Fact 30 and conclusions of law 37-40. 14. Accepted in Findings of Fact 2. 15. Accepted in Findings of Fact 3 and 31. 16. Accepted in Findings of Fact 26. 17-21. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 26 and 27. 22. Accepted, except last sentence, in Findings of Fact 27. 23-24. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 26 and 27. 25. Conclusions cannot be reached in Findings of Fact 26 and 27. 26-29. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 11. 30-36. Accepted in Findings of Fact 11, 12, 33 and 34. Rejected in Findings of Fact 18 and 34. Rejected in or subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Accepted in Findings of Fact 40. Rejected in Findings of Fact 16. Rejected conclusion in Findings of Fact 18. 43-44. Rejected in Findings of Fact 18. 45-48. Rejected conclusion in Findings of Fact 18. 49-51. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 3-10 and 29. Accepted in Findings of Fact 24. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Accepted in Findings of Fact 20. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 3. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 3 and 24. Accepted in Findings of Fact 29. 58-59. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Accepted in Findings of Fact 29. Accepted in Findings of Fact 19. Accepted in Findings of Fact 20. 63-65. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. Accepted, except conclusion, in Findings of Fact 21 and 28. Rejected conclusions in Findings of Fact 20. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Accepted in Findings of Fact 24. 70-71. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. 72. Accepted as corrected in Findings of Fact 25. 73-74. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. Accepted in Findings of Fact 23. Accepted in Findings of Fact 10 and 21. 77-78. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 28. Rejected conclusion in Findings of Fact 28. Accepted in Findings of Fact 28. 81-89. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 10, 21 and 29. 90-96. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 9 and 10. 97. Accepted in Findings of Fact 20. 98. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. 99. Accepted in Findings of Fact 20. 100. Accepted in Findings of Fact 8. 101. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 20. 102. Accepted in Findings of Fact 8. 103-105. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 20. 106. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 10 and 21. 107-108. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. 109. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 4. 110-112. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 21 and 25. 113-115. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. 116-118. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 20. 119-136. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. 137. Accepted in Findings of Fact 10. 138-143. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 11 and 24. COPIES FURNISHED: P. Timothy Howard, Esquire John F. Gilroy, Esquire Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration 325 John Knox Road, Suite 301 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4131 Darrell White, Esquire Charles Stampelos, Esquire MCFARLAIN, WILEY, CASSEDY & JONES, P.A. 600 First Florida Bank Tower 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert M. Simmons, Esquire 5050 Poplar Avenue 18th Floor Memphis, Tennessee 38157 Gerald B. Sternstein, Esquire Frank P. Rainer, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, et al. Monroe-Park Tower, Suite 815 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Atrium Building, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Jerome W. Hoffman General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration 325 John Knox Road, Suite 301 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact In April, 1984, the Petitioner, Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America d/b/a Heartland of Palm Beach, applied for a certificate of need for 120 community nursing home beds in Palm Beach County, Florida. In July, 1984, the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) gave notice of initial intention to deny the application. HRS Exhibit 5. The instant proceedings are the result of the request of the Petitioner for a formal administrative hearing from that denial. On January 22, 1986, the parties jointly moved for a continuance of the final hearing in this case then scheduled to commence on February 3, 1986, and in paragraphs 3 through 6, represented that the purpose of the requested continuance was to allow the Petitioner to gather data as to two alleged underserved groups: patients suffering from Alzheimer's disease and sub-acute care patients. The Petitioner asserted that such data would support an amended, updated application for certificate of need to be filed by the Petitioner for the purpose of showing need pursuant to the special exception allowed in the rules. In paragraph 8 of the motion, HRS agreed to give serious consideration to the updated application and supporting documents. The motion was granted by order dated February 3, 1986, and at the request of both parties, the final hearing was reset for April 3, 1986. The parties have agreed that all statutory and rule criteria have been satisfied by the Petitioner in this case except for the issue of need as determined by rule 10-5.11(21), Florida Administrative Code, and that question is the sole issue in this case. T. 5; Hearing Officer Exhibit 1. Petitioner's initial application did not mention the intention to provide special services for victims of Alzheimer's disease, and the Petitioner did not amend or update its application with HRS in that respect, except to the extent that it presented such testimony in the formal administrative hearing. T. 104. The application is not in evidence. The initial review of Petitioner's application by HRS did not consider special services to Alzheimer's patients. T. 117; HRS Exhibit 5. HRS has adopted rule 10-5.11(21), Florida Administrative Code, to determine need for additional community nursing home beds. Using a planning horizon of 1987, which is 3 years after the date of application, the rule calculates a net surplus of 511 community nursing home beds for Palm Beach County. Even using the 1989 planning horizon, there is still a net zero bed need using the rule formula for Palm Beach County. T. 100; HRS Exhibit 2; T. 97 and 102. Alzheimer's disease is a degenerative process of the brain characterized primarily by loss of memory and impairment of a variety of routine functions. T. 160-161. Diagnosis of the disease is difficult since there are related degenerative mental disorders. Moreover, positive diagnosis typically requires examination of brain tissue, and the process of obtaining brain tissue is intrusive. T. 162-163. For these reasons, the diagnosis is typically of "senile dementia of the Alzheimer-type," or Alzheimer's disease or related disorders. T. 163. The cause of the condition is not known, although research into possible surgical techniques to ameliorate the effects is being conducted in the Jupiter, Florida, area. T. 73. Alzheimer's disease primarily afflicts elderly persons, although some younger persons may also be victims. T. 163. Person suffering from Alzheimer's disease typically have memory loss, communicative problems, aphasia, trouble understanding, confusion, disorientation, inability to recognize care givers, waking at night, interrupting the care giver's sleep, wandering, mealtime problems, inappropriate sexual activity, incontinence, and social disfunctions. T. 184. Such persons exhibit negative behavior such as resistence to care, demanding, aggression, anger, emotional outbursts due to inability to perform routine tasks, and delusions. Id. Four stages of progressive degeneration are expected with Alzheimer's disease. The first is forgetfulness and loss of ability to perform complex tasks which formerly could be performed. In the second stage, communication problems occur and also loss of memory as to the names of common objects. Wandering and becoming lost also may occur. Stage three is characterized by physical deterioration such as loss of weight, incontinence, and loss of control of other bodily functions. In the fourth stage, a patient will become unable to communicate at all, and may become comatose and bedridden. The course of the disease is from 12 to 16 years or longer and can involve many of the problems described above. T. 217-218. A family member is usually the person first required to provide care for an Alzheimer's victim. T. 165. The responsibilities caused by such care, and the manner in which the symptoms of Alzheimer's disease are exhibited, cause the family care-giver to feel trapped, fatigued, depressed, angry, resentful, and frustrated. T. 167. At times, the family care-giver is elderly and can suffer health problems from the responsibility. T. 82-83. The burden upon the family member can be alleviated by day care, which involves care only during the day, and respite care, which can involve overnight care for several days. T. 167, 147-148. Day care and respite care can also serve the function of establishing a relationship with staff and collection of data and records, both of which become useful for the time when the patient's disease progresses to the point that continuous inpatient care is required. T. 83, 220-223. Alzheimer's patients in a nursing home need special care directed toward their particular disability described above. Of primary concern is that the nursing home be structured to provide an environment that minimizes confusion and compensates for the disabilities of the Alzheimer's disease victim. Separation from other elderly residents, who are not cognitively impaired, is important to prevent confusion of the Alzheimer's patient and to protect the other residents from disruptive intrusions. The physical facility should be constructed and furnished so as to minimize confusion and stimulation. Colors should be subdued, flooring should not mute the sound of footsteps, patterns should not be used, and common appliances should have distinguishing shapes and be clearly identified or labeled. Spaces for quiet and for wandering should be provided. Features to compensate for forgetfulness, such as lights which automatically turn on when a door is opened, should be provided. T. 219- 227, 57-58, 63-64, 81. Staffing must be trained to recognize and help alleviate problems that arise from behavior caused by Alzheimer's disease. T. 74-75, 234- 235, 80, 83-84. Finally, since Alzheimer's disease patients become upset with change due to recognition and memory impairment, continuity of care (staffing and physical surroundings) becomes important. T. 221, 223, 78, 82-83. Alzheimer's disease victims who need inpatient care also need all of the normal forms of skilled nursing care that other elderly persons need. This may occur over a course of years, or may be the results of a sudden injury, such as a broken hip. T. 220-223, 147-148, 79. As discussed above, it is important to be able to provide such care in the same facility since continuity of care is so important, and transfers to new surroundings are disruptive. Any current holder of a certificate of need for community nursing home beds in Palm Beach County may, if it wishes, provide special services to persons suffering from Alzheimer's disease. T. 122. Existing nursing homes in Palm Beach County accept Alzheimer's disease victims, but none provide special services for these patients except perhaps Darcy Hall, which provides adult day care. T. 143, 76, 82, 168-169, 171, 200-201, 210-211. Existing adult congregate living centers and adult day care centers in Palm Beach County similarly do not have special services or programs for victims of Alzheimer's disease. T. 145. Existing nursing homes could provide such services to Alzheimer's patients, though approval of HRS by expedited review to change substructure might be required, but none has done so. T. 154. Alzheimer's patients are often inappropriately restrained, or mixed with non-Alzheimer's disease patients. T. 77. Dr. Eugene Loeser is a physician, board certified in neurology, and is in private practice in Jupiter, Florida. T. 157-158. Dr. Loeser created a list of questions to ask physicians in Palm Beach County to explore the need for special nursing home programs for Alzheimer's disease patients, and that list of questions is HRS Exhibit 8. T. 169, 186-189. Using these questions Dr. Loeser conducted a survey of 36 physicians in Palm Beach County, which included 8 family practitioners, 10 internists, 14 neurologists, 2 neurosurgeons, and 2 psychiatrists. T. 170. There are approximately 1,000 physicians in Palm Beach County, T. 31, and Dr. Loeser admitted that his survey was only of a small percentage. T. 170. Dr. Loeser did not attempt to make the survey statistically valid. T. 178. The physicians contacted were selected from the telephone book from Jupiter in the north to Lake Worth in the south. T. 171, 183. Dr. Loeser attempted to contact representatives of several specialities. T. 181. The specialities were selected as those likely to see Alzheimer's patients. T. 170. Of the 36 physicians contacted, 35 had seen patients having Alzheimer's disease. Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Of these, 27 physicians had "difficulty in finding appropriate placement" for these patients in terms of supervision, care and treatment. Petitioner's Exhibit 5; HRS Exhibit 8. The same number of physicians felt that facilities with appropriate programs for placement of Alzheimer's disease or similar disorder patients were not presently available in Palm Beach County. Id. From the responses, Dr. Loeser estimated that these physicians had seen somewhat more than 600 patients suffering from Alzheimer's disease or related disorders in the last year. T. 171. Dr. Loeser personally estimated that he typically had difficulty finding a treatment and care facility for about 10 Alzheimer's disease patients annually. T. 185. He then estimated from responses received that the physicians surveyed were unable to find an appropriate program for about 135 patients annually. Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Dr. Loeser further estimated that among his own patients, about one or two per week needed some form of day care, T. 185, and from the responses of the physicians in the survey, estimated that such physicians annually had 150 patients needing day care. T. 175. Determination of placement problems for Alzheimer's disease patients from actual patient records or placement orders from physicians would be difficult because these records are confidential. Consent from the patient would be needed, and consent from an Alzheimer patient would be difficult due to the nature of the mental impairment caused by the disease. T. 173. The survey conducted by Dr. Loeser was not unreasonable for failure to contact more physicians. The survey accurately reflects a group of Alzheimer's disease patients treated by the physicians contacted, and does not purport to account for Alzheimer's disease patients treated by other physicians. Thus, the need identified by Dr. Loeser's survey, while underinclusive of total need, is reasonably accurate for the need identified. Palm Beach County currently has at least an estimated 16,597 persons suffering from Alzheimer's disease, and this number is expected to be 18,172 by 1988. T. 24. HRS itself estimates that the number of Alzheimer's victims in Palm Beach County in 1986 to be 27,200. Petitioner's Exhibit 6. It is further estimated that approximately 80 percent of such patients will require some sort of custodial care in the future. T. 76. Based upon the foregoing statistics, as well as the fact that existing Palm Beach County nursing homes do not provide special services or care for Alzheimer's disease patients, there is a need for the Alzheimer facility proposed by the Petitioner. The Petitioner proposes to establish a 120 bed nursing home in Palm Beach County designed and staffed to provide care and treatment to meet the special needs of persons suffering from Alzheimer's disease and related disorders. T. 45. The Petitioner, Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Heartland of Palm Beach, is willing to have any certificate of need issued in this case to be conditioned upon it building, developing, and operating the proposed nursing home limited as it has proposed in this formal administrative hearing. T. 48-49. Thus, findings of fact 18 through 21 which follow relate to the manner in which the Petitioner proposes that a certificate of need may be conditioned and limited. The proposed physical design of the nursing facility is set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit 1. T. 49. The cost is estimated to be $3.7 million. T. The design includes a courtyard to allow patients to wander safely. T. 41. It also includes a shaded porch, an outdoor patio, and a lounge off the patio. Id. Security from wandering is proposed to be provided by a "Wanderguard" system of wristbands and sensing devices that sound an alarm as a patient passes an exit point. Id. Additionally, the proposed facility would have a therapeutic residential kitchen for patients still able to use a residential kitchen. Id. One room would be set aside as a quiet room. T. 42. It is contemplated that such a room will minimize the need for calming drugs. T. 224. Also to be provided are separate dining areas, areas for therapy, and separate nursing wings and sub-acute care wings. T. 42-43. Alzheimer patients would be separated from non-Alzheimer patients, fixtures would have shapes, colors, and labels to facilitate identification; wall and floor coverings would not use patterns, and the flooring would be vinyl or tile instead of carpet. T. 42, 225-228. The proposed plan of the facility contemplates that there be space for all stages of care for Alzheimer's patients: day care, respite care, nursing care, and sub-acute care. Petitioner's Exhibit 1; T. 221-222, 39-40, 56. The Petitioner also proposes to provide individual treatment plans, to include physical therapy, occupational therapy, social work, and recreational therapy. T. 230-231. Support groups for family members of the patient will be provided. T. 233. The Petitioner states that the staff for the proposed facility must be appropriately trained to know Alzheimer's disease and the special needs of these patients. T. 234. Ongoing education for staff is viewed as being imperative. Id. The Petitioner recognizes the need to provide greater staffing for peak periods. T. 235. Monthly in-service training will be provided by the parent corporation. T. 236. Moreover, the parent corporation, Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, will develop and implement a program of staff training specifically for Alzheimer's disease. T. 237. Staff for the proposed facility will be adequately trained to properly deal with the problems of Alzheimer's patients. For a 24 hour period, a staff to patient ratio of 1 to 2.5 will be provided. T. 238. This ratio includes only nursing staff, aides, and activities and occupational rehabilitation staff. Id. The Petitioner proposes to designate and commit its entire facility to Alzheimer's patients. T. 60. But from a fiscal point of view, the Petitioner proposes to not deny admission to persons not having Alzheimer's disease. T. 66-68. At least 60 beds will be dedicated to patients with Alzheimer's disease, and these are expected to fill with persons in stages two and three of the disease. T. 67-68. When these patients reach more advanced stages of their disease, it is expected that they will be treated in the other 60 bed section, which is skilled nursing and sub-acute care. T. 68; Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Thus, the Petitioner expects ultimately to fill its entire facility with Alzheimer's disease patients consistent with its dedication and purpose. The facility proposed by the Petitioner would meet the unique needs of Alzheimer's disease patients and their families, and would be the only facility in Palm Beach County to provide a wide spectrum of care for Alzheimer's disease patients. Petitioner's proposal is consistent with priorities IV, V 3 and 4, and VI, Long Term Care section, District IX Health Plan (1985). T. 150-152. On March 6, 1986, the General Counsel of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services sent a memorandum to "all attorneys" construing and implementing the decision in the Gulf Court case, Gulf Court Nursing Center v. DHRS, 10 F.L.W. 1983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). On the next day, Robert E. Maryanski, Administrator, Community Medical Facilities, Officer of Health Planning and Development, sent the memorandum to his staff and told them to use the opinion as a guideline for the initial review of a CON application settlement and preparation for hearings. HRS Exhibit 6. HRS recognizes that there are three ways that an applicant for a certificate of need for nursing home beds can show need even though the rule shows a zero bed need. The third way is for "equivalent assessments" to be submitted by "attending physician." T. 113; HRS Exhibit 4, rule 10- 5.11(21)(b)10, F.A.C. HRS staff construes rule 10-5.11(21)(b)10, F.A.C., as requiring that each attending physician of each Alzheimer's patient document that his or her patient is in need of specialized services and that the patient is without access to those special services. T. 124. The issuance of certificate of need 4194 to the Joseph L. Morse Geriatric Center was issued pursuant to the special circumstances exception of rule 10-5.11(21)(b)10, F.A.C., since the rule did not show bed need. T. 127. There was nothing in the application in that case to show that elderly Jewish persons were denied access to existing nursing home facilities in Palm Beach County. Id. See also T. 130. There was, however, evidence that a large group of elderly Jewish persons were not being provided kosher dietary services at existing nursing homes. T. 129, 134. This evidence was not presented by attending physicians, however. T. 136. The certificate of need 4194 to the Joseph L. Morse Geriatric Center was also approved using priority VI, long term care section, District 9 local health plan, which provides in the second sentence for consideration of "ethnic- type services including special dietary requirements . . . ." HRS Exhibit 7; T. 134. Due to changes in federal funding, patients needing sub-acute care (less than hospital care, but more than an ordinary nursing home) do not qualify for cost reimbursement. T. 85-88. It appears that about one-half of all nursing home admissions in Palm Beach County are for three months or less. This may be a pool of persons needing sub-acute care. Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Long Term Care Section, page 4; T. 27-28. There was other general testimony that there was a "need for sub-acute care in Palm Beach County, T. 88, 146, and the local health plan, priority V 4, page 31, supports the grant of a certificate of need to an applicant that will provide such care. Petitioner Exhibit 3. There is also a need for sub-acute care in the final stages of Alzheimer's disease to provide continuity of care. T. 221. See also finding of fact 10. No one has petitioned to intervene in this case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, pursuant to Rule 10-5.11(21)(b)10, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 381.494(8)(c), Florida Statutes, issue a certificate of need to Health Care and Retirement Corporation of American, d/b/a Heartland of Palm Beach, for 120 community nursing home beds limited and conditioned upon all such beds being dedicated only to the provision of such services and facilities for victims of Alzheimer's disease as described by the Petitioner in this case and set forth in findings of fact 18 through 21 of this order, with 30 of such beds established for sub-acute care needs of Alzheimer's disease patients. It is further recommended that the certificate of need not contain approval for general community nursing home beds, but be limited to Alzheimer's disease patients. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of July, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 84-3337 Pursuant to section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., the following are specific rulings upon all proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties which have been rejected in this Recommended Order. Findings of Fact Proposed by the PETITIONER: 7. Sentences 3 and 4 have been rejected because the evidence was not sufficiently complete to describe nursing homes in Florida in general, and because the issue in this case is the need in Palm Beach County, thus making these proposed facts not relevant. 10. Sentence 3 is rejected since the testimony did not clearly show that therapeutic kitchens "should be available." 13. Sentences 9 and 10 are rejected because the evidence did not categorically show that it "would not be possible" to use actual physician orders, or that "physicians do not typically arrange their records so that orders of that kind could be extracted from their records." Similarly sentence 12 is rejected for lack of categorical evidence to prove impossibility. 17. Evidence that the entire facility is "completely fenced and enclosed" cannot be located in the record, and thus sentence 7 is rejected. The bulk of the discussion in proposed finding of fact 20 has been rejected because it is argument or conclusions of law. Those portions of this proposed finding which propose a finding that the Respondent's interpretation of rule 10-5.11(21)(b)10, Florida Administrative Code, is wrong or unreasonable are rejected as argument or conclusions of law. Most of the factual statements were adopted. Findings of Fact Proposed by the RESPONDENT: All proposed findings of fact by the Respondent have been adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Harden King, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kenneth A. Hoffman, Esquire G. Steven Pfeiffer, Esquire Laramore & Clark, P.A. 325 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William Page, Jr. Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner Marianna Convalescent Center's licensure rating should be changed from "Standard" to "Conditional" and whether an administrative fine in the proposed amount of $2500.00 should be imposed upon the Petitioner and its facility, based upon an alleged failure to timely consult with a resident's attending or treating physician when there was an alleged significant change in that resident's physical, mental or psycho-social status, etc.
Findings Of Fact The AHCA is the state Agency charged with licensure of nursing homes in Florida, pursuant to Section 400.021(2), Florida Statutes (2001), and the assignment of licensure status, pursuant to Section 400.102, Florida Statutes (2001). The Agency is also responsible for conducting federally-mandated surveys of those long-term care facilities receiving Medicare and Medicaid funds for compliance with federal, statutory and rule requirements. Marianna is a licensed nursing facility located in Marianna, Florida. On August 4, 2001, the Agency conducted an annual Medicare and Medicaid re-certification survey and a state licensure survey, noting its findings on a standard form titled "Statement Deficiencies and Plan of Correction" which is commonly referred to as a "2567" form. A "Tag" identifies the applicable regulatory standard that the surveyors believe has been violated, provides a summary of the violation and sets forth specific factual allegations that the surveyors believe support a violation. It also indicates the federal scope and severity of the non-compliance. The Agency alleged that Marianna was not in compliance with certain federal compliance requirements, one of which is significant in this proceeding: 42 C.F.R. Subsection 483.10(b)(11)(F-157)("Tag F-157"), for allegedly failing to immediately consult with a resident's physician when there was a significant change in the resident's physical, mental or psycho- social status. The Agency contends that this failure resulted in the potential for harm to Resident No. 3. Section 400.23(7) and (8), Florida Statutes, contain the state licensure requirements at issue and Rule 59A-4.1288, Florida Administrative Code, serves as the legal basis by which the AHCA made the initial determination that Marianna, in its view, had failed to comply with the Agency rules. In accordance with the Florida Classification System, the Agency classified the F-157 Non-compliance as a "Class II deficiency" because it compromised the resident's ability to maintain her highest practicable physical, mental and psycho-social well-being " . . . as defined by an accurate and comprehensive resident assessment, plan of care, and provision of services." Based upon the presence of the alleged Class II deficiency, according to the result of the survey, the Agency elected to assign a conditional licensure status to Marianna and impose the disputed administrative fine. The survey team believed it found a violation of 42 C.F.R. Subsections 483.10(b)(11)(i), which states that "a facility must immediately . . . consult with a resident's physician . . . when there is . . . a significant change in the resident's physical, mental or psycho-social status " On July 2, 2001, at approximately 12:45 a.m., a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) summoned Michael Laurie, a Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) to observe Resident No. 3, a resident of the subject facility. Resident No. 3 had complained of some pain in the pubic area and her urine was dark in color and had a strong odor. Resident No. 3's temperature at that time was 104.5 degrees. In response to his observance of that condition, Nurse Laurie, accepted as an expert in the field of nursing, and a long-term care nurse of many years experience, administered Tylenol, pursuant to a pre-existing doctor's order for that patient. He also applied cool compresses to the groin area and to the armpits and continued to observe her. Resident No. 3's temperature was again taken at 3:00 a.m. and registered 101.2 degrees. The temperature registered 104 at 4:00 a.m. Mr. Laurie again applied cool compresses and at 4:30 a.m. administered Tylenol. Resident No. 3 was alert and did not complain of any discomfort after the occasion at 12:45 a.m. The resident's temperature at 6:00 a.m., was 100.4 degrees. Mr. Laurie continued with the cool compresses placed in the armpits and in the groin area. On the night of July 2, 2001, Resident No. 3 slept well exhibiting no signs or symptoms of pain or discomfort, other than the occasion at 12:45 a.m. The resident did not appear in any distress. In fact, Resident No. 3 affirmatively stated at 3:00 a.m. that she did not have any complaints. The nursing interventions referenced above appeared to be reducing the temperature and alleviating discomfort. The attending physician for Resident No. 3 was called by Sonja Sellers, an LPN, at 9:00 a.m., the next morning, July 2, 2001. Repeated attempts were made to contact the physician during that day to no avail, until Dr. Chin was finally contacted, or returned a call, at 2:00 p.m., on July 2, 2001, after being called several times by the nursing home staff. Dr. Chin was responsible for this resident since Dr. Arunakul, her attending physician, was on vacation. Dr. Chin agreed to send Resident No. 3 to the hospital. The nursing expert who was the only witness able to directly observe the presenting symptoms of Resident No. 3, during the early morning hours of July 2, 2001, opined that the patient or resident was not in any particular distress during that night and made the nursing judgment, related in his testimony, that it was appropriate to call the doctor the following morning, which was done by 9:00 a.m. The nursing home staff made repeated attempts to contact the doctor during the morning after 9:00 a.m., and was unable to do so until 2:00 p.m. that day. Nurse Laurie's testimony is accepted at the most credible and as the best evidence, since Nurse Laurie is an expert in the field of long-term care nursing and actually observed the resident and rendered treatment or nursing intervention. The fact that Resident No. 3's urine was dark in color and odiferous does not necessarily mean that one observing that condition should opine or conclude that the resident was suffering from an infection such as urosepsis. There are medications or vitamins or other situations that can cause that color in the urine and make it smell differently. The resident did not appear in any particular distress after the complaint of 12:45 a.m., and indeed ate all of her breakfast the following morning, July 2, 2001. The doctor was called so the nursing home staff could inform the doctor that Resident No. 3 had run a fever during the night. It is the regular policy of Marianna to contact the attending physician if a resident exhibits elevated temperature during the night. It is significant also that Resident No. 3's temperature did not increase during the day on July 2, 2001, before she was transported to the hospital for examination, evaluation and diagnosis by the physician. "Tag F-157" states as a requirement that an attending physician of a resident should be contacted if the resident experiences a significant change in physical, mental or psycho- social status or well-being. Resident No. 3, although ill, did not experience a significant change in her physical, mental or psycho-social status during that night, such that an attending physician should have been called during the night. Dr. Arunakul, based on the resident's condition, opined that it would not be expected that a nurse call him or another physician during the night of July 2, 2001. In other words, his testimony reveals that calling the physician on an "immediate" basis as a requirement was satisfied by the nursing home making the call to the physician by 9:00 a.m. the following morning. A Class II deficiency is one where the resident's ability to maintain or reach the resident's highest practicable physical, mental, and psycho-social well being is compromised. Resident No. 3's ability to maintain her highest practicable physical well-being was not compromised by the nursing home staff's failure to contact the attending physician during the eleven to seven shift on July 1 and 2, 2001, but instead contacting the physician, or attempting to, by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of July 2, 2001 (the following shift). F-157 was classified by the agency in the case with a scope and severity of "G." According to the agency's policy and rules, a Level "G" identifies an isolated incident which involved actual harm. It was not demonstrated by the agency's evidence that Resident No. 3 was actually harmed by any action or inaction of Marianna. Indeed, the nursing interventions tried during the early morning hours from 12:45 a.m. through 9:00 a.m., actually reduced the temperature and discomfort of the patient. Beyond that, it was not shown that any permanent harm of any kind resulted to the patient and, in due course, albeit with delays caused by the doctor failing to contact the nursing home staff, after receiving the calls at his office, the patient was diagnosed and rendered appropriate treatment. No harm occasioned by an action or inaction of Marianna was shown to have occurred merely by the fact that the physician was not called (or the attempt made to reach the physician) until 9:00 a.m. on the morning of July 2, 2001.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the agency for Health Care Administration restoring the standard rating to the Marianna Convalescent Center and that the Administrative Complaint seeking to impose the administrative fine be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan S. Grout, Esquire Goldsmith, Grout & Lewis, P.A. 2180 North Park Avenue, Suite 100 Post Office Box 2011 Winter Park, Florida 32790-2011 Gerald L. Pickett, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 525 Mirror Lake Drive, North Sebring Building, Suite 310H St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
