The Issue Whether Respondent's real estate broker's license should be disciplined for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in any business transaction, pursuant to Section 475.25(1)(b) Florida Statutes(1983).
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the charges, Respondent Thomas F. Steffan Jr. was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 0402257. Respondent has since been issued a license as a real estate broker, same license number. Mr. and Mrs. Walther Ellis were the owners of certain property located on Windsor Road, Bonita Springs, Florida. Mr. and Mrs. Ellis listed their property for sale with Wesley Brodersen of Gulder Real Estate, Inc. in Bonita Springs, Florida. The Respondent was employed at Gulder Real Estate, Inc. during the time that the Ellises listed said property with Gulder Real Estate, Inc. On or about May 23, 1984, the Respondent solicited and obtained a Catherine A. Griffin as a prospective purchaser of the Ellis' property. Mrs. Griffin submitted a contract for sale and purchase, witnessed by Respondent, which contract for sale and purchase the Respondent in turn submitted to the Ellises. Pursuant to the terms of the May 23, 1984 contract for sale and purchase, Mrs. Griffin had placed down a total deposit of $5,000.00. The Ellises rejected the terms of sale (offer) as expressed in the May 23, 1984 contract for sale and purchase. Thereafter, Mrs. Griffin, as buyer, along with her husband, Donald Griffin, who is not a buyer in the transaction but was intimately involved in the negotiations, continued to express an interest in the property and the Ellises continued to express an interest to sell the property. In July, 1984, contract negotiations were once again begun and Mr. Griffin informed the Respondent what terms would be acceptable to his wife, Catherine A. Griffin. Mr. Griffin further requested that the signatures of Mr. and Mrs. Ellis be obtained first on a new contract for sale and purchase setting out the terms he had dictated to Respondent. Somewhere during this time period, Mr. Griffin directed Respondent to have completed a survey of the property at the Griffins'expense. Respondent next communicated with Mr. Ellis and a new contract for sale and purchase was prepared by the Respondent and signed by Mr. Ellis personally and signed by Mr. Ellis for Mrs. Ellis with Mrs. Ellis' express consent and permission. Subsequent thereto, the Respondent brought the new contract for sale and purchase to the Griffins. In the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Donald Griffin the Respondent presented the offer. Mr. Griffin immediately signed the new contract for sale and purchase in the presence of both Respondent and Mrs. Griffin on the line indicating he was signing as a witness to the buyer's signature/execution. However, as this contract (offer) was physically handed by Mr. Griffin to his wife for formal execution, it was further reviewed by Mr. Griffin, who became aware that the terms of purchase contained in the new contract for sale and purchase were not as he had dictated them to the Respondent. Mr. Griffin advised his wife not to accept the offer, instructed her not to sign, and, in fact, the new contract for sale and purchase was not signed or accepted by Mrs. Griffin. Respondent requested that the Griffins think about the offer for a while longer and they agreed to do so over an extended vacation. While the Griffins were on vacation, the Respondent, apparently believing the offer contained in the second contract for sale and purchase would eventually be accepted, notified Mr. Ellis that the offer had already been accepted. Believing that the offer had been accepted by a bona fide purchaser, Mr. Ellis requested a copy of the signed contract. Due to the fact that the Respondent did not have a contract signed by a bona fide buyer (Catherine A. Griffin) but believing that one would be obtained in the very near future because Donald Griffin had signed the second contract and because Donald Griffin had indicated that he could finance the entire operation by himself, the Respondent caused a photo copy of the signature of Catherine A. Griffin to be placed onto the second contract without the permission , consent, or knowledge of either Donald Griffin or Catherine Griffin. The altered copy of the second contract is apparently no longer in existence and did not come into evidence. The only real point of contention in the parties' respective proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is concerning what representation was made by Respondent to Mr. Walther Ellis concerning who had accepted the second contract. Respondent admits he represented to Mr. Ellis that Mr. Griffin, controlling the transaction for buyers, had accepted the second contract. Mr. Ellis maintained that Respondent represented to him that the second contract had been accepted on his terms but he is not clear·whether Respondent told him Mrs. Griffin accepted it or who accepted it. (Walther Ellis Deposition Page 22). Mrs. Ellis's testimony presents no independent confirmation of any of this as her information in all respects is second-hand. Mr. Brodersen's testimony is that the Respondent's representation to him was that "the Griffins" had accepted the second contract for purchase and sale and that Respondent told Mr. Ellis the same thing in Brodersen's presence and also told Brodersen that the last copy of the signed contract had been mailed to Mr. Ellis by Respondent the day previous to this three-way conversation. Mr. Brodersen thought Mr. Ellis never got the fraudulent contract but testified further that Respondent later admitted to Brodersen that he had altered this copy of the second contract so as to fraudulently reflect Mrs. Griffin's signature and further admitted to Brodersen that he, Respondent, had mailed that fraudulent copy to Mr. Ellis. Mr. Brodersen never saw the fraudulent contract. Mr. Ellis testified to receiving in the mail a copy of the second contract with a suspicious-looking set of signatures which he turned over to his attorney. The parties stipulated the attorney does not now have the contract copy. By itself, the testimony of Investigator Jacobs that Respondent by telephone admitted falsifying Mrs. Griffin's signature onto a copy of the second contract for purchase and sale and further admitted destroying one copy of the fraudulent contract would fail as not having the proper predicate for voice identification. However, in light of Mr. Ellis's and Mr. Brodersen's testimony, Mr. Jacobs' testimony on Respondent's creation of the fraudulent document is accepted as corroborative pursuant to Section 120.58 Florida Statutes. The remainder of his testimony is rejected. At no time did Catherine A. Griffin and/or Donald Griffin as her agent or on his own behalf accept the Ellis' offer contained in the second contract for sale and purchase nor did Catherine A. Griffin nor Donald Griffin ever execute the second contract as a buyer. The transaction was never closed and Mrs. Griffin was returned her deposit money when she requested it in September 1984. Mr. Ellis admits having told Respondent he was not anxious for the deal to close and did not care if the deal failed to go through. Mr. Griffin spoke at length and with considerable feeling at the hearing of his desire that Respondent not receive a permanent record as a result of a single mistake committed while under stress from Respondent's father's medical condition. That Respondent was under such stress when all this occurred was confirmed by Mr. Brodersen.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered whereby Respondent Thomas F. Steffan Jr.'s licenses as a real estate salesman and broker be suspended for a period of one year and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James T. Mitchell, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation-Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas F. Steffan Jr., Pro Se 18645 Sandpiper Road Ft. Myers, Florida Harold R. Huff, Director Department of Professional Regulation-Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 70-54, Pinellas County Code, which prohibits retaliation against a person who has opposed a discriminatory employment practice, by terminating the Petitioner's employment, and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Menz was hired by Dr. Weisel as a receptionist for his dental office located in Tarpon Springs, Pinellas County, Florida, on October 6, 2007. Ms. Menz's job responsibilities included answering the phone, checking patients in and out of the office, collecting co-payments, and entering treatment plans in the record. According to Dr. Weisel, Ms. Menz was a good employee because she was eager to learn, and she was very people orientated. Respondent is a professional association located in Tarpon Springs, Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent employees less than 15 employees and is in the business of providing dentistry services. Respondent is subject to the Pinellas County Code concerning human relations. In June 2008, Dr. Weisel sold his Tarpon Springs dental practice to Dr. Kontos. Dr. Kontos had graduated from dental school in May 2007 and had worked for another dentist office. By January 2008, Dr. Kontos wanted to purchase a dental practice in his hometown, Tarpon Springs. When Dr. Kontos purchased the practice from Dr. Weisel, Dr. Kontos had no experience in owning a business or managing employees. According to Dr. Kontos, he decided to keep all of Dr. Weisel's employees for continuity. Dr. Kontos described Ms. Menz's job duties as opening the practice in the morning, "in-putting insurance," collecting co-payments, and "doing treatment plans." By July 2008, Dr. Kontos had promoted one of the dental assistants, Daniel Mauzerolle (Mr. Mauzerolle), to office manager. During the time that Mr. Mauzerolle worked for Dr. Kontos, they became friends and would socialize together. Ms. Menz testified that she had complained to Dr. Kontos in the past about Mr. Mauzerolle about issues from work. Ms. Sholtes, a former dental hygienist for Dr. Kontos, also testified on Ms. Menz's behalf. She testified that Ms. Menz was a good employee and courteous to patients. By November 2008, Dr. Kontos hired Ms. Marchese to collect aging insurance claims and account receivables, as well as review his office procedures. According to Dr. Kontos, the dental practice had a "phenomenal" amount of outstanding insurance claims, in excess of $20,000.00, which had been denied. Ms. Marchese had worked in the dental field since 1991 and was familiar with software systems used to run dental offices. Further, she was familiar with the submission of insurance forms for dental reimbursement. On May 11, 2009, Ms. Menz opened the office at 7:00 a.m. As she turned on her computer, Ms. Menz noticed the internet web history showed that someone had used her computer the night before. Ms. Menz found that one site had been visited 28 times. Upon visiting the site, Ms. Menz found that the website contained pornographic images. Further, because Mr. Mauzerolle was the only person that worked in the evening in the office, Ms. Menz assumed that Mr. Mauzerolle was the person who had accessed the pornographic site. Ms. Menz credibly testified that she informed Dr. Kontos and told him that Mr. Mauzerolle's actions were unacceptable to her. Ms. Menz credibly testified that she told Dr. Kontos that she could not work under the conditions that she considered to be a hostile workplace environment. Dr. Kontos informed Ms. Menz that he would "take care of it." Dr. Kontos credibly testified that Mr. Mauzerolle, in addition to being the office manager, was his friend and that he was not happy with Ms. Menz reporting the issues concerning the pornography in his office. Two days later, on May 13, 2009, Dr. Kontos terminated Ms. Menz's employment. Ms. Menz credibly testified that at the time of her termination, Dr. Kontos did not provide her a reason for her termination, only stating "nothing personal, but I'm going to have to let you go." Dr. Kontos testified that he had already decided to terminate Ms. Menz's employment before May 11, 2009, when Ms. Menz complained about the pornography. According to Dr. Kontos, Ms. Marchese had informed him since the end of 2008 about errors that Ms. Menz had been making at work that cost the dental practice money. Dr. Kontos indicated that Ms. Menz made errors such as failing to collect co-payments or collecting improper co-payments and failing to fill out the insurance forms correctly. The result was that insurance claims would be denied and the dental office would lose money. According to Dr. Kontos and Ms. Marchese, on or before April 8, 2009, Ms. Menz made an error that almost cost the dental practice $2,000.00. The alleged error involved putting the wrong information concerning an insurance plan for a patient. Based on this error, Dr. Kontos testified that he made a decision with Mr. Mauzerolle and Ms. Marchese to place an advertisement for a receptionist with Craigslist to replace Ms. Menz. Later that day, Mr. Mauzerolle placed the advertisement with Craigslist. On April 9, 2009, potential job applicants began calling Dr. Kontos' office about the receptionist position. Ms. Menz took the phone messages from the applicants, including Ms. Kristen Chase. Ms. Menz credibly testified that based on phone calls that she asked Dr. Kontos about the job advertisement and whether or not she was doing a good job. Ms. Menz credibly testified that Dr. Kontos stated that she was doing a good job and not to worry about the advertisement. Further, Ms. Menz credibly testified that she asked Ms. Marchese about the advertisement. Ms. Menz testified that Ms. Marchese stated that Dr. Kontos was seeking to replace Christina Benzel (Ms. Benzel), a co-worker who worked the front desk with Ms. Menz. Ms. Menz believed Ms. Marchese because Ms. Menz had observed that Ms. Benzel's job responsibilities had been reduced. According to Dr. Kontos, sometime at the beginning of May 2009, he and Mr. Mauzerolle interviewed Ms. Chase for the receptionist job. According to Dr. Kontos, he offered Ms. Chase the job after the interview, and he had decided to replace Ms. Menz. Dr. Kontos's testimony on the point that he offered Ms. Chase the job in early May and had decided to replace Ms. Menz is not credible. Ms. Chase credibly testified that she did not receive the job offer from Dr. Kontos at the interview in early May. Further, Ms. Chase credibly testified that, because she did not hear anything from Dr. Kontos, she had assumed that she had not gotten the job. Further, Ms. Chase credibly testified that she was offered the job on May 14, 2009. Dr. Kontos testified that he had decided to terminate Ms. Menz on April 8, 2009, but that he did not tell her before May 13, 2009, because he "had to build up the nerve to do it." He testified that he felt bad having to terminate her and that he let her go because she made too many mistakes. For support concerning the number of errors made by Ms. Menz, Respondent offered the testimony of Ms. Marchese and numerous exhibits. Ms. Marchese testified that because of the number of errors occurring in the office that she moved her work space to be next to Ms. Menz. According to Ms. Marchese, she was monitoring Ms. Menz and providing "one-on-one training." Further, Ms. Marchese offered testimony that each day she would conduct an "audit trail" of the office and bring errors to Dr. Kontos's attention daily. Ms. Marchese testified that Ms. Menz failed to collect co-payments; entered insurance information incorrectly, resulting in insurance reimbursements being denied; failed to provide adequate information to support insurance billings; and gave patients incorrect estimates on the amount that the patient would owe for different treatments based on the patient's insurance plan. Ms. Marchese testified that she estimated that Ms. Menz had cost the dental office approximately $100,000.00 in lost revenue and made 90 percent of the office errors. Ms. Marchese identified a number of exhibits that supported Respondent's claim that Ms. Menz was terminated for numerous errors. Ms. Marchese further testified that in March 2009 that she told Dr. Kontos and Mr. Mauzerolle that Ms. Menz was "untrainable" and that she should be terminated. According to Ms. Marchese, in April 2009, she discussed with Dr. Kontos and Mr. Mauzerolle the error that nearly cost the practice $2,000.00 and the decision to advertise for the new receptionist. After the advertisement was taken out in Craigslist for the new receptionist, Ms. Marchese remembered being asked by Ms. Menz about the advertisement and about whether or not Dr. Kontos was seeking to replace her. Ms. Marchese testified that she told Ms. Menz that she did not know if Dr. Kontos was seeking to replace her. Ms. Marchese denied telling Ms. Menz that Dr. Kontos was seeking to replace Ms. Benzel. Ms. Marchese, however, admitted that Dr. Kontos had been unhappy with Ms. Benzel based on her internet usage at the office. Ms. Marchese testified that she informed Dr. Kontos about each of these errors daily and testified about a group of exhibits. A review of the exhibits identified by Ms. Marchese, Exhibits 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 41, and 44 shows that the documents are dated December 18 and 21, 2009. When questioned about the dates on the exhibits, Ms. Marchese testified that these exhibits were documentation from the "daily sheets" and that she had "minimized the amount of discovery." Also, she explained that the documents were "printed to condense the information into one page instead of, for instance, on exhibit 25, it would have been over 30 pages." Further, she testified that she had added the notes explaining Ms. Menz's errors to the sheets on or after December 18, 2009. The "daily sheets" were not admitted into evidence. At best, the offered exhibits may be considered summaries. Even considering the documents, the record shows that the offered exhibits show that the documents were compiled to support Ms. Menz's termination after May 13, 2009, and in response to the investigation by Pinellas County. Thus, the exhibits carry little weight in the consideration. Similarly, Exhibits 10, 11, 18, 23, and 24 are all dated after Ms. Menz's termination date of May 13, 2009. A review of Exhibit 10 shows a "Single Patient Ledger" printed up on September 8, 2009. Based on Ms. Marchese's testimony, the document shows that on April 8, 2009, the patient received two dental procedures that cost $1,050.00. According to Ms. Marchese, the patient was told to pay $215.00 for two treatments. Presumably, the balance of the dental bill would be paid by insurance. However, Ms. Marchese testified that the patient did not have dental coverage for the two procedures. Consequently, the dental office lost money on the two procedures because the patient refused to pay, and there was no insurance to bill. Although the testimony shows this event occurred before the termination, the "Single Payer Ledger" is dated after the termination. Further, a hand-written notation from the patient's chart, which is part of Exhibit 10, stating that "Valerie dropped the ball on the correct fee twice" is dated May 14, 2009, the day after her termination. Similarly, a review of Exhibits 23 and 24 shows that they are insurance claims that were denied before May 13, 2009. Ms. Marchese testified that Dr. Kontos was aware of these errors. However, Exhibits 23 and 24 only show that insurance claims were re- submitted after the date of Ms. Menz's termination. The exhibits do not support the finding that the claims were denied because of Ms. Menz or that these errors were considered before terminating her employment. These exhibits were prepared after the termination as a justification for the action as opposed to contemporaneous proof of Ms. Menz's performance. In contrast to the above listed exhibits, Exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9 are examples of errors and notes that were documented before Ms. Menz's termination. A review of these exhibits shows that the complained of errors occurred on January 22, 2009; February 3, 2009; March 2, 2009; and April 27, 2009. Respondent also offered the testimony of other employees from the dental office. Ms. Little, a dental hygienist, testified that she was aware that Ms. Menz made errors in entering codes for different treatment plans. She had spoken to Ms. Menz about the error, and Ms. Menz indicated that she would try to correct the problem. According to Ms. Little, the errors continued, but were not as bad. Finally, Ms. Little testified that Ms. Marchese was responsible for insurance claims with the office. Similarly, Ms. O'Leary, a dental hygienist, testified that she knew that Ms. Menz had some issues with insurance, but that she had a good working relationship with Ms. Menz. Ms. Menz candidly admitted that she made mistakes at her work and credibly testified that she was never told of the many errors that Respondent was claiming she had made or that she had cost Respondent money. Dr. Kontos admitted that that he did not individually counsel Ms. Menz about her errors. Rather than counsel individual employees, Dr. Kontos testified that it was his practice to speak to his employees as a group about errors because he wanted to avoid similar errors. Ms. Menz testified that she earned $10.75 an hour and that she had been out of work for 87 weeks. Ms. Menz agreed with her counsel's question that her calculated damages were $37,410.00. The record also shows that Ms. Menz filed for unemployment compensation, but was unclear about whether or not she received any compensation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered: Finding that Respondent violated section 70-54, Pinellas County Code. Ordering Respondent to pay Ms. Menz the sum of $37,410.00 and interest at the prevailing statutory rate; and Ordering Respondent to pay Ms. Menz reasonable costs and attorney's fees. Jurisdiction is retained to determine the amount of costs and attorney's fees, if the parties are unable to agree to the amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: William C. Faulkner, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756 Jeremy W. Rodgers, Esquire Spector Gadon and Rosen, LLP 390 Central Avenue, Suite 1550 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Matthew K. Fenton, Esquire Wenzel, Fenton, and Cabassa, P.A. 1110 North Florida Avenue, Suite 300 Tampa, Florida 33602 Leon W. Russell, Director/EEO Officer Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue, 5th Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 Peter J. Genova, Jr., EEO Coordinator Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue, 5th Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that all charges against respondent be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Department of Administration Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire Department of Insurance Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dock Blanchard, Esquire Post Office Box 24 Ocala, Florida 32678 The Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a general lines agent should be granted.
Findings Of Fact By application dated July 12, 2002, Ms. Baskinger applied to the Department for a license as a general lines agent. On the application, Ms. Baskinger answered affirmatively to the following question: Have you ever been charged, convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered? On December 27, 2000, a one-count information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit In and For Charlotte County, State of Florida, charging Ms. Baskinger with welfare fraud in violation of Section 414.39, Florida Statutes, a third degree felony. On June 27, 2001, Ms. Baskinger entered a plea of guilty to the crime. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Ms. Baskinger was placed on probation for a period of four years and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $4,869.14. Ms. Baskinger was also required to perform 75 hours of community service. Ms. Baskinger made full restitution, and an Order Terminating Probation was entered on July 3, 2002. On July 12, 2002, Ms. Baskinger applied for licensure as a general lines agent. The Department denied her application for licensure by letter dated August 22, 2002, stating that the application was denied on the basis of Subsections 626.611(1), (7), (14), 626.621(8), and 626.731(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the application of Teresa M. Baskinger for licensure as a general lines agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Teresa M. Baskinger 4461 Ewing Circle Port Charlotte, Florida 33948 Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent should deny Petitioner's application to be licensed as a resident personal lines insurance agent.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing insurance agents in the state pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2004). On October 29, 2004, Respondent received Petitioner's application to be licensed as a resident personal lines insurance agent (insurance agent). On October 13, 2005, Respondent issued a Notice of Denial to Petitioner. Respondent based the denial on several grounds that fall into three categories. The first category is based on Petitioner's prior criminal history. In relevant part, the Notice of Denial denies the application because Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more. The Notice of Denial further states that the crime was one of moral turpitude and that Subsection 626.611(14), Florida Statutes (2004), makes denial of the application compulsory. Even if the crime were not one of moral turpitude, the Notice of Denial states that the plea of nolo contendere provides a discretionary ground to deny the application pursuant to Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2004). The Notice of Denial states a second category of grounds that are also compulsory. The second category of grounds may be fairly summarized as alleging a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. The second category of grounds generally relates to turpitude inherent in the criminal offense and an inaccurate application answer stating that Petitioner had no prior criminal record. The Notice of Denial states that Petitioner lacks one or more qualifications for the license, that Petitioner committed a material misstatement or misrepresentation on her application, and that Petitioner demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance as provided in Subsections 626.611(1), 626.611(2), and 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004). The third category of grounds relates to waiting periods. The Notice of Denial states that Petitioner must wait 17 years from the date she pled nolo contendere before applying for a license as an insurance agent. The waiting period is based on agency rules in Florida Administrative Code Rules 69B-211.042(4)(b) and 69B-211.042(8) that are promulgated pursuant to Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2004). The remaining Findings of Fact address the factual sufficiency of the second category of grounds for denial. The conclusions of law, in relevant part, address the legal sufficiency of the remaining grounds for denial. The criminal record of Petitioner is not disputed. On October 4, 2004, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a third degree felony of grand theft in the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County, Florida, Case No. CRCO4-1177-CFAES. The court withheld adjudication of guilt and imposed fines and costs of $395. Petitioner served 30 days in the Pasco County jail. The court placed Petitioner on supervised probation for 18 months, which Petitioner successfully terminated early on September 27, 2005. Petitioner contests neither the inaccuracy of the application answer stating she had no prior criminal record nor the materiality of the inaccuracy. However, Petitioner does contest the agency's assertion that Petitioner possessed the culpable knowledge or scienter required to misstate, misrepresent, or commit fraud in attempting to obtain a license within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(2), Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner also contests the assertions that she lacks one or more qualifications for licensure and that she lacks fitness or trustworthiness within the meaning of Subsections 626.611(1), 626.611(2), and 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner testified that her employer submitted her application electronically. Petitioner testified that she gave her employer accurate information concerning her application, but she did not review the application before transmission. The trier of fact finds the testimony concerning Petitioner's lack of culpable knowledge to be credible and persuasive. Petitioner testified with extraordinary candor. Her demeanor was frank and unguarded. Her denial of culpable intent to mislead the agency is consistent with the totality of evidence in this proceeding and with Petitioner's demonstrated fitness and trustworthiness after November 2002. After Petitioner gave birth to a son on March 20, 2002, her treating physician advised her to undergo a tubal ligation, and the subsequent surgery was successful. The resulting inability to bear more children, however, led Petitioner into a mental state that was subsequently diagnosed as severe clinical depression. Petitioner returned to work approximately 12 weeks after surgery. From August 2002 through November 2002, Petitioner engaged in an episode of compulsive spending in which she incurred approximately $70,000 in credit card debt that she charged to personal and business credit cards. In order to pay the debt, Petitioner began taking money from her employer. Petitioner describes her hedonistic offense in her own words: [T]his incident occurred when I was suffering from severe depression that was [subsequently] diagnosed by a physician. I have been under the treatment of a psychiatrist and also a psychologist. I still see my psychiatrist quarterly to make sure that all is well with my medications . . . . The psychologist released me from her care because she felt that I can now deal with everyday stress. . . . So in order to fill that void [of no more children] I started shopping. And I would - I would go to the mall in a day and I would spend several thousand dollars on absolute garbage, you know, when you look. I mean. I started buying clothes; I bought furniture. I just was a shopaholic. I would go every Saturday and Sunday and spend time at the mall and just shop like crazy. [M]y husband had no idea of our finances. He just gave the paycheck and said: You do what you need to do. As long as he could have cash he didn't care. So he had no idea. He didn't even know how much money I made; he didn't know how much our mortgage was; he didn't know anything about our finances. And then once I started having all these credit card bills then I was, you know, robbing Peter to pay Paul . . . . And then it just got where I snapped . . . . And . . . unfortunately it looked like the easy way out. It was an answer to my problems and I could continue doing what I needed to do. [T]he attorney [employer] pretty much left me to do what I needed to do. I wrote all of his court motions, and I wrote all of his pleadings, and accountings, and inventories, and he didn't even look at them. He would just sign them. He didn't review them at all. And so when I would give him checks to sign . . . I would just take him the check and say, "I need you to sign a check," and he would sign the check and wouldn't even look to see . . . it was [to me]. Transcript (TR), pages 15 and 24-26. After November 2002, Petitioner voluntarily disclosed her offense to her employer. Petitioner's effort to reclaim her integrity and trustworthiness was both epiphanic and Herculean. The effort is best described in her own words: I started contemplating suicide and said: Oh, well, this will take care of all the problems. But then I had read up and didn't want my kids to grow up without a parent or think that for some reason they caused me to do it. So at that point in time I was just - I didn't know what to do or where to turn. I was just completely lost. And so I hadn't been to church in like a year. For whatever reason the Sunday before the Monday that I went to [an] attorney I went to church and they told a story. And I said: You know, I'm willing to confess to what I've done at whatever cost because I can't - I can't keep going like this, and I can't keep pretending like nothing is wrong, and laying in bed and the couch all day. So I went to [an] attorney the very next day. Q. Do you need a moment? A. I'm okay. * * * In January 2003, I'm sorry. This is hard reliving it. THE COURT: That's okay. Take your time and if you need a recess just let me know. A. This is the first time that I just really said it out loud. THE COURT: Yes. A. In January of 2003, I contacted [an attorney]. I informed him . . . that I had done something wrong and I didn't know where to turn to or who to turn to. At this point in time I hadn't told my family and nobody knew. All they knew is that something was wrong with me. I wasn't myself. I was withdrawn and I stayed in bed . . . all day. The attorney immediately contacted my former employer to advise that there was a problem with his accounting system. Up until this time he had no knowledge of any . . . problems. My attorney also contacted a doctor for me to see immediately because he could tell that something was not right with me. At this time that my attorney contacted my former employer I offered to make immediate restitution, which I did [over time]. At this point in time my employer said that he did not want to contact any authorities because he didn't want the publicity in a small town. And as far as I knew, the situation was taken care of. I was making restitution and I thought it was over. At some point in time my former employer contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). After meeting with the FBI, I agreed to assist them because my former employer was billing my time as the attorney's time in guardianship cases. This would cause clients to run out of money and become eligible for Medicaid and other state governmental services. The federal government ended up dropping the charge against me and I . . . agreed to assist them in any cases against my employer. When things were not moving along in the federal case my former employer also contacted the local authorities. I was arrested on May 1 of 2004. And this was almost - this was almost a year-and-a-half after I had first come forward. And then in September 2004, my attorney was ready to go to trial. At the last minute the State Attorney offered a plea deal. I was told that I could finally put this nightmare behind me by pleading no contest and I would have no criminal record because the court would withhold adjudication. [T]he judge made a point to mention that adjudication was being withheld so I would have no felony criminal record. And also at this time there was no restitution ordered because I had already paid it all back. TR at 15-18. Petitioner paid approximately $85,000 in restitution. Restitution was a Sisyphean effort, as Petitioner explains: I paid back cash. I had taken - I had calculated $40,000. He said that I calculated - that I had taken $60,000 and then he raised it to $80,000 for his time. But I - I paid back $45,000 in cash. The credit card companies, he contacted every credit card company that I paid and they all reversed all of their [charges]. So I ended up owing, you know, another $45,000 back in credit cards that he had . . . all the payments reversed. . . . So I paid a total - it was $85,000. * * * [W]e sold everything we had. . . . We sold our home. I had bought my husband a third vehicle. We sold that. We had a motorcycle that sold. We had a lot of toys. TR at 27-28. The trier of fact is not persuaded that Petitioner would have lied on her license application in October 2005 after voluntarily disclosing her offense in January 2003. When Petitioner exercised a conscious choice to confess her offense, she knew with certainty that shame would follow her exposure to her husband and children. Petitioner also knew that her choice would subject her family to the financial hardship and social upheaval inherent in selling everything they owned to make restitution to her former employer. Petitioner learned a new occupation, contributed to her family's recovery, and testified candidly and frankly about her offense. When the court sentenced Petitioner to 30 days in jail, Petitioner requested that she be allowed to serve the sentence every other weekend. Petitioner worked during the week and did not want to be away from her children all week and every weekend. The judge granted the request. The trier of fact finds that Petitioner neither misstated nor misrepresented her criminal record on her license application. Nor did Petitioner commit fraud in answering the questions on the application within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(2), Florida Statutes (2004). The trier of fact finds that Petitioner does not lack one or more of the qualifications for licensure required in Subsection 626.611(1), Florida Statutes (2004).1 Nor does Petitioner demonstrate a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order determining that Petitioner's license application has been granted by operation of law. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Ideal Security Services, Inc. (“Respondent or Ideal”), retaliated against Petitioner, John Mercurio (“Petitioner”), for exercising his right to file a complaint on an alleged unlawful employment practice pursuant to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2019).1/
Findings Of Fact Ideal is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). While the exact number of employees is not reflected in this record, the evidence established that Ideal employs greater than 15 employees. Ideal provides security officers to different locations for access control and on-site patrol. Petitioner worked for Respondent as a security officer from June 20, 2018, through February 7, 2019. At the time he was hired by Ideal, Petitioner was informed in writing of the company’s “Interchange” practice, which provides: Although employees generally are hired to work at one specific client location or facility, the company (Ideal Services, Inc.) uses its Guard Force INTERCHANGEABLY to meet its needs: In case of cancellation of any accounts, reduction or increase in hours provided, or an employee who may request a transfer. Also Ideal Services, Inc. wishes to point out that they DO NOT guarantee a full 40 hour work week. Overtime is given to employees depending on where the overtime will occur and the availability of employees to work an assignment. Ideal Services, Inc. wishes to also point out that hourly pay rates will depend on job placement as some client assigned jobs will carry higher pay rates than others. It is therefore Ideal Services, Inc.’s policy to inform all individuals who are applying for employment that Ideal Services, Inc. DOES NOT HIRE for only one site at one set pay rate . . . because both of these are subject to change. On the date he was hired, Petitioner signed a copy of the above policy statement, acknowledging that he had read and understood its contents. Petitioner’s first assignment was to provide security at a Krispy Kreme Donuts retail location, an assignment which carried a pay rate of $9.50 per hour. In July 2018, Petitioner was assigned to several other locations, in addition to the Krispy Kreme location. Those new locations were at Daytona Beach Housing Authority apartments, including the Maley, Windsor, and Trails apartment complexes. The public housing assignments carried a pay rate of $8.50 per hour. As of August 2018, Petitioner was no longer assigned to the Krispy Kreme location, but rather was working exclusively at the public housing locations. In December 2018, another Ideal security guard was newly assigned to the same public housing complex as Petitioner. It was clear to Petitioner that this individual was a racist based on his words and actions. While standing next to Petitioner, the new security officer referred to the building residents as "monkeys." It was clear to Petitioner that this remark was made in reference to the African-American residents of the complex. Dan Montrose, the senior security officer and Petitioner’s partner, was also within earshot when the newly assigned officer made the derogatory remark. Petitioner was stunned by the racist comment, especially since Mr. Montrose’s wife is an African-American female. Petitioner also testified that on another occasion, the new officer posted a picture of a Caucasian baby on the common area's fridge with an arrow that said, "Dan" on it, as well as a black finger/arm covering the baby's mouth which said, "Dan's wife." While Petitioner’s first impulse was to report the above racist incidents to his employer, at the request of Officer Montrose he did not immediately do so. However, while the exact date of the conversation is not of record, sometime in the second or third week of December 2018, Petitioner reported the “monkey remark” to Ideal’s Manager and CFO, Diane Cox. Ms. Cox assured Petitioner that she would discuss the racist comment with the offending security guard. Ms. Cox testified that the offending security guard was given a verbal warning for his inappropriate comment, but was not otherwise disciplined because he had worked for the company for many years without incident. When Ms. Cox spoke with the offending security guard about his inappropriate remark, she did not raise the issue of the racist picture that had been posted on the common area refrigerator. According to the testimony of Ms. Cox, this is because she had not been informed by anyone about the existence of the picture, and first became aware of it when she read Petitioner’s Complaint. Ms. Cox testified that had she been informed of the racist picture, disciplinary action would have been taken against the offending employee. Again, while the exact date is not of record, sometime in late December 2018, Petitioner requested a copy of his payroll records from Ms. Cox. While gathering the records for Petitioner, Ms. Cox discovered that Petitioner’s rate of pay had erroneously not been reduced from $9.50 per hour to $8.50 per hour when he was transferred from the Krispy Kreme location to the public housing locations. Upon discovering this accounting error, Ms. Cox informed Petitioner that effective immediately his rate of pay while on duty at the public housing locations would be adjusted to $8.50 per hour, but that Ideal would not be attempting to recoup the overpayments that had been made over the previous months, since the error had been theirs. Respondent offered in evidence payroll records which demonstrated that all Ideal security guards assigned to the public housing locations were paid at the rate of $8.50 per hour. At about the same time as Petitioner’s downward rate adjustment, another Ideal security guard requested that he be assigned an additional eight-hour shift in order to bring him to 40 hours per week. In an attempt to accommodate this request, Ms. Cox contacted several of the Ideal security guards, including Petitioner, to inquire as to whether any wished to relinquish an eight-hour shift. Petitioner advised Ms. Cox that he did not want to give up an eight-hour shift, and that request was honored by Ideal. The timing of Petitioner’s reporting of the racist remarks to Ms. Cox; Petitioner being informed that his hourly rate was being reduced; and Petitioner being invited to give up a work shift; is unfortunate. Because of the temporal proximity of these events, it is understandable that Petitioner concluded that the reduction in his pay rate and attempted reduction in his assigned hours were in retaliation of his reporting the racist remarks. However, the evidence does not prove a causal link between Petitioner's complaint and the adverse action he suffered. Rather, the credible testimony of Ms. Cox established legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for how Petitioner was treated, and there is no evidence that the reasons articulated by Ms. Cox were a pretext for retaliation. Petitioner failed to persuasively prove any incidents of retaliation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Ideal Security Services, Inc. did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2020.
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent's Florida real estate license should be disciplined upon charges that: (1) Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as set forth in Count I of the Administrative Complaint; and (2) Respondent is guilty of having had a registration suspended, revoked, or otherwise acted against in any jurisdiction in violation of Section 475.225(1)(s), Florida Statutes, as set forth in Count II of the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Chapters 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Washington Moises Quinones, is and was at all times material to the Administrative Complaint a licensed Florida real estate salesperson, issued license number 0650737 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Washington Moises Quinones, was also a member of the Florida Bar. On or about August 29, 1997, the Florida Bar petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for an emergency suspension of Respondent's bar license. The petition filed with the Florida Supreme Court reflects that Respondent's "trust records reveal losses which approximate $350,000.00." On or about September 11, 1997, the Florida Supreme Court granted the petition for emergency suspension of Respondent's bar license, and suspended Respondent from the practice of law for the reasons set forth in the Petition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of violation Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and 475.25(1)(s), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and that Respondent's real estate license be revoked in accordance with Section 475.25(1), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. RICHARD A. HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Ghunise Coaxum, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801 Washington Moises Quinones 5119 Agora Street Sebring, Florida 33872 James Kimbler, Acting Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 00390879. The last license issued to Respondent was in 1988 as a salesman with Atlantic Marketing Realty, Inc., 224 Commercial Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308. On July 26, 1984, a Grand Jury indictment was filed against Respondent in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida and was assigned case number 84-67-CR-ORL-18. By Count Two of the indictment Respondent was charged with having sold, transferred, or delivered approximately 1,000 counterfeit Federal Reserve Notes in the denomination of $100 in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 473. On September 28, 1984, Respondent entered into a "Plea Agreement" in which he agreed to plead guilty to Count Two of the indictment filed in case number 84-67-CR-ORL-18. By this Plea Agreement, Respondent acknowledged that he entered into the agreement freely and voluntarily. Respondent acknowledged his understanding of the nature of the offense to which he agreed to plead guilty and the penalties therefor. The factual basis for his plea includes an admission that he knowingly delivered 1000 counterfeit $100 bills to two individuals at a motel in Daytona Beach, Florida, for which he received approximately $15,000. On November 19, 1984, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to Count Two of the indictment, a felony. He was adjudicated guilty of this felony offense and sentenced to three years in prison. Respondent served approximately ten months of the three year sentence at the Federal Correctional Institute in Lexington, Kentucky. Upon his release from federal prison, Respondent spent four months at a halfway house in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Respondent was not incarcerated at the time the Administrative Complaint was filed or at the time of the formal hearing. Respondent contends that he thought that he was working for the federal government when he committed the acts which resulted in his incarceration. This contention is rejected as lacking credibility and as being contrary to the Respondent's Plea Agreement. There is a dispute in the record as to whether Respondent notified Petitioner in writing as to his criminal conviction or his subsequent incarceration within thirty days of those events. Respondent contends that he notified Petitioner verbally and in writing of these events, but he was unable to identify the person he contends he notified verbally, nor did he produce a copy of his alleged written notification. Petitioner's records reflect no written notification from Respondent or from anyone on his behalf. This dispute is resolved by finding that Respondent did not notify Petitioner in writing as to his criminal conviction or his subsequent incarceration.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order which finds that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(b),(f), and (p), Florida Statutes, and which revokes all real estate licenses previously issued Respondent. It is further recommended that no administrative fines be entered against Respondent. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-3568 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioners. The proposed findings of fact contained in paragraph 2 are rejected as being contrary to the evidence. Respondent's licensure is as a real estate salesman, not as a real estate broker. Whether Respondent was licensed as a broker or as a salesman would make no difference in the recommendation made as to the penalty to be imposed. All other proposed findings of fact are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Senior Attorney Florida Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William Richard Rossmeyer 180 Isle of Venice, #125 Post Office Box 7412 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33338 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: In 1980 or 1981, records of a criminal charge involving the petitioner Stephanie D. Grooms were ordered sealed. The attorney representing petitioner in that proceeding was Abe Rigau, now deceased. In late July of 198G, petitioner was charged by a two- count information with the crime of issuing worthless checks. She entered a plea of guilty to the charges and the County Courts in and for Hillsborough County withheld adjudication of guilt and imposed a fine of $35 on August 25, 1982. In the Fall of 1984, petitioner was a candidate for the Office of County Commission of Hillsborough County. During the campaign, a newspaper reporter contacted the petitioner in reference to a criminal charge involving worthless checks. Concerned about the election and the implications a criminal charge would have upon her political aspirations, petitioner telephoned Roger Rigau, an attorney and the son of deceased Abe Rigau, for advice. Roger Rigau recalls that petitioner telephoned his office between September and November of 1984. It was Mr. Rigau's impression that petitioner contacted him because she was concerned that information concerning her previous charges could be politically embarrassing, that she was under the impression that the record had been previously sealed by his father, Abe Rigau, and that she was confused as to how a reporter could have obtained information regarding the prior criminal record which had been sealed. At all times, it was the understanding of Roger Rigau that petitioner was referring to the case which his father had handled for her. He was not aware of any new charges beyond those which were the subject of the record sealed in 1980 or 1981. Roger Rigau expressed surprise to petitioner that a member of the press would be able to obtain information regarding a sealed record. His office file contained paper work indicating that petitioner's record had been sealed by Abe Rigau. Roger Rigau was concerned that something was incorrect, either as a result of his father's error or a court clerk's office error. He told petitioner that he would check into the matter, did so and learned that the case his father had handled had indeed been sealed in 1980 or 1981. He so advised petitioner and also advised her that when a record is sealed, she need not relate to anyone that she had been arrested for or convicted of a crime. Sometime after petitioner submitted her application for licensure as a mortgage solicitor in April of 1985, she again contacted Roger Rigau regarding sealed criminal charges. Roger Rigau again advised petitioner that when records are sealed or expunged, one may properly refuse to acknowledge or may deny the fact that one has been charged with or arrested for a crime. Roger Rigau is knowledgeable about the law concerning the sealing and/or expunction of criminal records. Had he understood that petitioner was, either in 1984 or 1985, ever inquiring about her 1982 charges or record, he would have advised her that it is legally impossible to have more than one criminal record sealed. As noted above, Roger Rigau never had any knowledge concerning the 1982 worthless check charges and his advice to petitioner was, at all times, with reference to her 1980 sealed record. Petitioner has a different recollection of her ., conversations with Roger Rigau. She remembers contacting Roger Rigau in 1984 around election time after a news reporter called her regarding some criminal charges. She states that she asked him if the 1982 charges and record could be expunged and that he replied that he would check into the matter. Sometime thereafter, she called his office and a secretary from his office, not identified or called as a witness in this proceeding, led petitioner to believe that the matter had been taken care of. In March of 1985, petitioner went to work for Cameron- Brown, Co. In April of 1985, she filled out an application to the Comptroller's Office for registration as a mortgage solicitor. The application form requires answers to 18 questions and the signature of the applicant in affirmation under penalty of perjury that the answers provided are true and correct. Question 5 of the application states: "Have you ever been arrested, or indicted for a crime?" Petitioner answered this question "NO." Petitioner recalls that, prior to submitting her application, she telephoned Roger Rigau or a secretary in his office, inquired as to how she should answer question 5 on the application and was advised that since her record had been sealed, she could fail to acknowledge or deny any charges which had been sealed. Petitioner recalls making the following statement to Roger Rigau: "My worthless check charges that your dad had expunged and that you had taken care of for me, can I legally put down there "no," or how can I answer that?" Roger Rigau does not specifically recall talking to petitioner prior to the time she submitted her application, but does recall talking to her either during the time of the respondent's investigation or after petitioner received notice of the respondent's intent to deny her application. In any event, he gave her the same advice he had given her in 1984 -- that she need not acknowledge and may deny a sealed criminal charge. Again, he was not aware that petitioner was involved in any criminal charges beyond that 0th which his father was involved in 1980 or 1981. After the submittal of the petitioner's application, respondent's financial examiner/analyst, Jana Synatschk. conducted a routine investigation, which included a review of Court files. It was discovered that petitioner was the subject of two criminal actions - one in 1980 and one in 1982. The 1980 file was sealed, but the 1982 file was open for review. Ms. Synatschk telephoned petitioner on May 30, 1985, told her she had found two cases against a Stephanie Grooms for worthless check writing and asked petitioner if she was aware of this. Petitioner responded that she had no knowledge of such charges, and Ms. Synatschk required petitioner to submit an affidavit to that effect. After reviewing the notarized affidavit stating "I, Stephanie Grooms, have no knowledge of a record on a check charge mentioned by Jana Synatschk," Ms. Synatschk determined that the social security numbers, driver's license numbers and birth dates of the person involved in the 1982 worthless check charges and the petitioner/applicant were identical. She thereupon turned the case over to her supervisor, Arthur M. James. Petitioner recalls speaking with Roger Rigau prior to submitting the affidavit to the respondent and again receiving the advice that she could properly deny a sealed criminal charge. Mr. Rigau does not recall speaking to the petitioner about the affidavit she was required to submit during the application process. He does recall that petitioner requested him to sign an affidavit after she received notice that her application had been denied. Supervisor Art James telephoned petitioner on June 20, 1985, and asked her specific questions relating to the 1982 criminal charges. After denying that she had written the bad checks, Mr. James told her that the signatures on the checks appeared to be similar to her signatures on the affidavit and on her application. He invited her to come to his office to discuss the matter. She responded that her attorney would get in touch with him. Mr. James waited three or four days and, when he did not hear from petitioner's attorney, the petitioner's file was forwarded to Tallahassee. On July 22 1985, the respondent denied petitioner's application for a mortgage solicitor's license based upon her lack of integrity, truthfulness and honesty as evidenced by her false statement in response to Question 5 on the application. On or about the time of the respondent's denial order, but prior to petitioner's knowledge of the denial, petitioner telephoned the respondent's Tallahassee office to inquire about the status of her application. Joseph Ehrlich, the Assistant Director for the respondent's Division of Finance, informed petitioner that her application was being investigated and asked her about her arrest record. Petitioner denied any such record. It was not until after the respondent's order of denial dated July 22, 1985, that she explained to respondent's personnel that she denied the 1982 worthless check charges because she thought that case had been sealed or expunged and that she accordingly had a legal right to deny all charges in connection with that case.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Stephanie D. Grooms for licensure as a mortgage solicitor be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 8th day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dick Greco, Jr., Esquire Molloy, James & Greco, P.A. Suite 910 501 East Kennedy Blvd. Tampa, Florida 33602 Wendy M. Mitchler, Esquire Greg Cummings, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted by the petitioner and the respondent have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted, below. Petitioner 2 - 3. Rejected to the extent that it implies that petitioner informed Mr. Rigau that she was referring to the 1982 charges. 3. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. 10. . First sentence rejected as to the time petitioner consulted with Mr. Rigau or his office not supported by competent substantial evidence. 15. Rejected, not supported by competent, substantial evidence. 17. Rejected, not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Respondent 13. Rejected, not relevant or dispositive of any issue in this proceeding. 15. Last sentence rejected, not relevant or dispositive of any issue in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Larry C. Abramson, held real estate salesman license number 00400601 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. He currently resides at 830 Southeast Fifth Terrace, Pompano Beach, Florida. On or about July 19, 1984, respondent entered into a negotiated plea of guilty to a one-count information charging a conspiracy to commit securities fraud and mail fraud arising from an insider trading scheme in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371. A violation of the foregoing section carries a maximum sentence of five years and a $10,000 fine. When the violation herein occurred, Abramson was employed as a plant superintendent and manufacturing supervisory staff member for a New York financial printing concern. Documentation received in evidence concerning the charge are (a) a letter of June 15, 1984 executed by respondent and the prosecuting attorney outlining the nature of the plea and Abramson's requirement to fully cooperate with the government, (b) a news release issued by the United States Attorney outlining the guilty plea, (c) a certified copy of Abramson's docket sheet in the U. S. District Court in New York City, (d) a copy of the information filed against respondent, and (e) a certified copy of respondent's waiver of indictment and consent to information. However, respondent has not yet been sentenced by the court, and there is no evidence of record that the plea of guilty has been accepted by the court.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1985.
