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TOXICOLOGY TESTING SERVICE, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 92-001779BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 19, 1992 Number: 92-001779BID Latest Update: Jun. 04, 1992

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the decision of the respondent, Department of Corrections (Department), to award the subject bid to intervenor, Doctors and Physicians Laboratories, Inc. (Doctors), comported with the essential requirements of law.

Findings Of Fact Background On October 16, 1991, the Department of Corrections (Department) issued invitation to bid number 91-CO-5369 (hereinafter "the ITB"), which sought to secure appropriate services to perform drug tests on certain applicants for employment and existing employees of the Department. The deadline for submitting bids was established as 11:00 a.m., November 7, 1991. At the time of the deadline, the Department had received four bids, including those of petitioner, Toxicology Testing Service, Inc., and intervenor, Doctors and Physicians Laboratories, Inc. (Doctors). Petitioner's bid was $372,000, and Doctors' bid was $315,491.60. Based on its evaluation, the Department ranked Doctors first and petitioner second, with composite scores of 91.67 and 90.38, respectively, and proposed to award the contract to Doctors. Petitioner filed a timely formal written protest to contest the Department's decision, and charged that the Department materially departed from the evaluation criteria contained in the ITB. The Invitation to Bid Pertinent to this case, section 4.7 of the ITB established the evaluation criteria to be used in determining the acceptability of the bids as follows: 4.7 Evaluation Criteria Criteria Point Value 1. References 5 2. Firm Profile 5 3. Firms Qualifications 15 Understanding of Scope of Services 25 Bid Price 50 100 And, section 4.7.5 of the ITB established the following methodology to be utilized in awarding points for the bid price criteria: The award for bid price shall be determined as follows: The Bidder who submits the lowest bid price will be awarded 50 points. All others bidders will be awarded points based on the following formula: Bid Price Points = 50 X [1-A/B] where: A = the difference between the percentage of the bid being evaluated and the low bid(s). B = the low bid. The lowest bid price will be computed by multiplying the unit prices for Items 1, 2 and 3 for all three years by the estimated quantity. The estimated quantity is for bidding purposes only and is not a guarantee. The total annual cost for Items 1 and 2 for all three years will be added to determine the Total Cost for all three years. The vendor with the lowest Total Cost will be awarded the 50 points. Negative points will not be awarded. Pursuant to the provisions of section 5.13 of the ITB, the contract was to be awarded to the bidder that received the highest overall point total under the criteria established by section 4.7 of the ITB. The Department's evaluation and the protest Based on its evaluation of the bids, the Department's evaluation committee awarded petitioner 49.34 points for its technical proposal (items 1-4 of the evaluation criteria) and Doctor's 41.67 points for its technical proposal. Bid price points were then established through a preexisting computer program, which derived 41.04 points for petitioner and 50 points for Doctors. When totalled, petitioner received 90.38 points and Doctors received 91.67 points. Accordingly, the Department proposed to award the contract to Doctors. Petitioner filed a timely protest to contest such award. The gravamen of that protest is petitioner's contention that the Department applied a methodology other than that established by the ITB to derive the bid price points and that had it utilized the methodology established by the ITB petitioner would have received the most points and been the prevailing bidder. 1/ Consistent with petitioner's contention, the proof demonstrates that the computer program used to derive the bid price points and the methodology established by the ITB to derive such points differed with regard to the definition of A in the formula, discussed supra. In the computer program, factor A was defined as the difference between the price of the bid being evaluated and the low bid. In the ITB, factor A was defined as the difference between the percentage of the bid being evaluated and the low bid. The Department was not, however, aware of this dichotomy until the subject protest, believing that its ITB conformed with the methodology it had previously programed for its computer, and, at hearing, offered proof, which is credited, that use of the word "percentage" in the definition of A was a typographical error which should have read "price." Notably, the Department heavily weighed price (50%) in its ITB, and it is apparent the Department intended to use a formula that would create a difference in price scoring that was relative to any difference in the bid prices. Use of the formula, as correctly defined in its computer program, would accomplish such goal. Use of the formula, as incorrectly defined by the ITB and interpreted by petitioner in these proceedings, would not accord any meaningful weight to price. 2/ Under such circumstances, it cannot be reasonably concluded that the Department departed from the essential requirements of law when it declined to apply the methodology as interpreted by petitioner to award the contract. Moreover, for the reasons that follow, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Department's decision to stand by its award based on the correctly defined methodology departed from the essential requirements of law. Here, the proof demonstrates that petitioner, upon receipt and review of the ITB, was well aware that the formula for awarding points based on price was nonsensical, and most likely, in error. 3/ Notwithstanding, petitioner took no action under the provisions of general condition 6 and special condition 4.4 of the ITB to raise any question or seek any clarification or interpretation of the formula from the Department. 4/ Rather, petitioner submitted its best price offer, more likely than not, without reliance on the erroneous formula set forth in the ITB. 5/ Under such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the Department's award of the contract, based on an application of the correct definition of factor A, accorded any bidder an unfair advantage or otherwise departed from the essential requirements of law.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered dismissing the subject bid protest. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of May 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May 1992.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68287.057
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JAMES P. GILLS AND MARGARET R. GILLS vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 86-003504BID (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003504BID Latest Update: Dec. 15, 1986

The Issue Whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in determining to award the bid for its district office to Koger Properties, Inc. (Koger) and whether the petitioner submitted the lowest and best bid under the terms of the bid specifications.

Findings Of Fact GENERAL BACKGROUND - STIPULATED FACTS Petitioners received a formal Invitation to Bid on Lease No. 590:1784 from HRS, District V. The purpose of the ITB was to obtain competitive proposals for the leasing of office space by HRS within a specifically defined area. Petitioners timely submitted their bid in response to the ITB. All timely received bids were first evaluated to determine technical responsiveness. Petitioners' bid was determined to be responsive to the technical requirements of the ITB. Responsive bids were then presented to a bid evaluation committee for comparison and formulation of a recommendation for award. In comparing the various responsive bids and formulating a recommendation for award, the members of the bid evaluation committee were required to visit each proposed facility and to apply the evaluation criteria as contained in the ITB package. By memorandum dated July 30, 1986, the bid evaluation committee recommended that the bid be awarded to Koger although petitioners submitted the lowest rental price. On or about August 5, 1986, petitioners received notice from HRS of its intent to award Lease No. 590:1784 to Koger. By letter dated August 6, 1986, petitioners notified HRS of their intent to protest the intended award of Lease No. 590:1784 to Koger. The Notice of Intent to Protest was timely filed pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 10- 13.11, Florida Administrative Code. Thereafter, the petitioners timely filed their formal written protest. Petitioners are substantially affected by the decision of HRS to award the lease to Koger. THE BIDDING PROCESS The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issued an Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form (ITB) seeking approximately 39,968 net rental square feet of office space in Pinellas County, Florida, to be used as the district administrative offices. The ITB set forth the method in which the bids would be evaluated as follows: EVALUATION OF BIDS Bids received are first evaluated to determine technical responsive- ness. This includes submittal on bid submittal form, inclusion of required information and data, bid signed and notarized, etc. Non responsive bids will be withdrawn from further consideration. Responsive bids are presented to a bid evaluation committee for com- parison and formulation of a recom- mendation for award. This is accomplished by a visit to each proposed facility and application of the evaluation criteria. The committees recommendation will be presented to the department's official having award authority for final evaluation and determin- ation of successful bidder. EVALUATION CRITERIA The successful bid will be that one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated in the bid submittal form. The ITB also provided that "the department agrees to enter into a lease agreement based on submission and acceptance of the bid in the best interests of the department and the state." In accordance with the ITB a pre-bid conference was held on April 29, 1986; however, neither petitioners nor any representative of petitioners attended the pre-bid conference. Further, petitioners made no oral or written inquiries concerning the ITB or the evaluation criteria to be utilized. Bids received from the following providers were determined to be responsive and presented to the bid evaluation committee for comparison and formulation of the recommendation for award: James P. & Margaret R. Gills (1100 Building) Koger Properties, Inc. (Koger) LTBCLH Partnership (Justice Building) Procacci Real Estate Management Co., Inc. (ICOT Building) Elizabethan Development, Inc. (Handy City Building). BID EVALUATION COMMITTEE The bid evaluation committee was composed of the following people who, along with their staffs, would occupy the leased property: Robert Withrow, Chairman of the Committee and District Administrative Services Director; Samuel Kinsey, Financial and Accounting Director for District V; Patricia Bell, Program Manager for Aging and Adult Services; Fredrick M. O'Brien, General Services, Manager for District V; and Pegi Hollingsworth, Personnel Officer. Each member of the evaluation committee received a bid package consisting of the bid specifications and the bids submitted. Each member also received a bid evaluation sheet which was used to rate each bidder. They received no other instructions with regard to the evaluation criteria. Although each specific evaluation criterion was weighted, i.e., given a comparative value, the committee members were not specifically instructed as to how points should be assigned for each category. The evaluation committee went to each of the proposed buildings for the purpose of making a comparative evaluation based on the evaluation criteria provided. However, the primary focus was on the Koger Building and the petitioners' 1100 Building because they had submitted the lowest rental rates of the five bidders considered. After the viewing process, the members of the committee, except Mr. Withrow, discussed the factors that should be considered in applying each of the evaluation criterion. Although the committee members had not formulated the evaluation criteria to be used, they were uniquely qualified to apply the evaluation criteria provided to the specific needs and requirements of the HRS offices that would occupy the building. Though the committee members were in agreement as to the various factors to be included in each of the criterion listed, they did not discuss the points that would be awarded to each facility. Each member independently assigned points to each facility based on his or her own evaluation of the facility's comparative value in each of the listed categories. Koger received the best evaluation from all five committee members with point totals of 98, 98, 98, 98 and 99 out of a possible 100 points. Petitioners' building was ranked last of the five buildings evaluated by four of the members, with point totals of 75, 77, 71 and 75, and fourth by Mr. Withrow with a total of 81 points. Based on the comparative evaluation of the buildings, the committee recommended that the bid be awarded to Koger. By letter dated July 30, 1986, the District V office received authorization from the HRS Director of General Services to award the bid to Koger as being in the best interest of the department and state. THE EVALUATION CRITERIA The ITB included the evaluation criteria list used by the committee to ascertain the relative value of each building. At the top of the page it is stated: The successful bid will be that one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated... The evaluation criteria are divided into three general areas: (1) Associated Fiscal Costs, (2) Location, and (3) Facility. Each general area includes subcategories, with each subcategory being given a total maximum value. Each of the criteria disputed by petitioners is discussed below. 1(a) Rental rates for basic term of lease. (Weighting: 45) All of the bids received by HRS were within the rental limits established by the Department of General Services and also much lower than expected. Even the highest bid was lower than anticipated, and Koger's and petitioners' bids were considered especially desirable. The bids received, listed at present value for the ton year basic lease period, are as follows: BIDDER TOTAL COST AMOUNT MORE THAN LOW BID 1100 BUILDING $1,881,690.1 KOGER 1,993,131.4 $111,441.3 JUSTICE 2,473,559.8 591,869.7 ICOT 2,655,306.1 773,616.0 HANDY CITY 3,223,202.0 1,341,511.9 Rental rates for the basic term of the lease were given a weighted value of 45. All of the committee members gave petitioners 45 points, as the low bidder, and all gave Koger 44 points as the next low bidder. However, four of the members simply agreed that the low bid would receive the maximum amount of points with each subsequent low bidder receiving one less point than the one before it, which resulted in the high bidder receiving 41 points even though its bid was 1.7 times greater than the low bid. Only Mr. Withrow made an attempt to prorate the points based on the differences in the amount bid, thus resulting in the high bidder receiving only 20 points. However, even Mr. Withrow awarded Koger 44 points based on the minimal difference between the Koger bid and the petitioners' bid. Both Mr. Withrow and Mr. Kinsey explained the award of 44 points to Koger by comparing the difference in the amounts bid to the HRS District V budget or the budgets of the entities using the facilities. However, the purpose of the evaluation was to compare each facility to the other facilities. Thus, the award of points for rental rates should have been based on a comparison of the rates offered. Although it was reasonable to assign the maximum number of points to petitioners, as the low bidders, the amount of points assigned to the remaining bidders should have been based on a comparison of the amount of each bid to the low bid. This would have made a significant difference in the points awarded to Justice, ICOT, and Handy City; however, even using a strict mathematical computation would not significantly affect the points awarded Koger due to the minimal difference in Koger's bid and petitioners' bid. Koger would receive no less than 42 points, only 2 points less than awarded, regardless of the method of mathematical computation used. 1/ 2(a) Proximity of offered space in central or preferred area of mad boundaries (Weighting: 5) All the members of the committee agreed that Koger is in the most preferred area because its location is more accessible to the employees and the persons who visit the office than any of the other buildings. Koger is in northeast St. Petersburg, minutes from the interstate. The 1100 Building is located in a more congested area in downtown Clearwater on the extreme northern boundary of the designated area. In making a comparison Of the building locations, all of which were located within the map boundary, the committee jusifiably determined that the building that was the most strategically located, in terms of accessibility, would be considered to be in the most preferred area. Thus, Koger was awarded five points by all committee members. The 1100 Building received 2, 0, 1, 3 and 1 points. Although all committee members awarded Koger the highest points, only one committee member resided closer to the Koger Building than the other buildings. Mr. Withrow, who lives closer to the 1100 Building than Koger, gave the 1100 Building only 1 point because it was more inaccessible to the district clients and employees. Further, the District Administrator, who approved the lease to Koger, resides closer to the 1100 Building. 2(b) Frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation within proximity of the offered space (Weighting: 5) Both Koger and the 1100 Building received the maximum of five points in this category except from Mr. Withrow who gave the 1100 Building four points. The committee members felt that the bus transportation as about the same for each building. Although the 1100 Building had more buses passing the facility due to its location in downtown Clearwater, the committee considered the destination of the buses and concluded that a person would wait the same length of time for a bus to take him to his destination from either the Koger Building or the 1100 Building. Mr. Withrow differed on the points awarded because he considered the Koger location to be better due to its proximity to the airport. The district office has a large number of people that visit from Tallahassee and other districts in the state. 2(c) The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it, on the efficient and economical conduct of departmental operations planned for the requested space. (Weighting: 3) Koger received the maximum of 3 points from every committee member in this category; the 1100 Building received 0 points from every member. Although this category is listed within the general area of "Location", the committee members followed the category requirement and considered all environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building. In the 1100 Building, committee members noted problems with the air conditioning system and the elevators. The building was not maintained well, and the bathrooms were small and poorly ventilated. The HRS parking at the 1100 Building was not conveniently located. To get to the parking lot from the building an employee would have to cross a parking lot adjacent to the building, cross an intersection and then walk up to a block to get to his or her car. Many of the office employees work late and would be walking to their cars after dark, and there was concern expressed for employee safety considering the parking arrangement offered by petitioners. Koger had none of the problems observed at the 1100 Building. Further, Koger was better suited for the handicapped because there was no need to use a ramp as there was at the 1100 Building. 3(a) Conformance of space offered to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid. (Weighing: 10) 3(b) Susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization. (Weighting: 10) 3(c) Provisions of the aggregate square footage in a single building. Proposals will be considered, but fewer points given, which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two locations...within 100 yards of each other. (Weighting: 10) Koger's bid is for a two-story building containing approximately 39,000 square feet. The 1100 Building is a 15-story building. It would provide approximately 39,000 square feet on the second, fourth, fifth, part of the eighth, part of the ninth, and twelfth floors. The space allocation in the 1100 Building, spread over 6 floors, would provide a major problem in efficiently locating the staff. Certain offices could not be placed on certain floors because of space restrictions, and related offices could not be placed in close proximity to each other. Offices that needed to be on the same floor could not be located on the same floor. Because the space offered by petitioners is spread over 12 floors, accessibility to related offices would be much more difficult. Further, the limited space per floor makes it more difficult for HRS to properly utilize the space provided. None of the testimony provided by the committee witnesses related the "conformance of the space offered to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid" (e.s.) The ITB lists the offices and rooms required, giving sizes for each. Other than the total square footage, which petitioners met, there were no other specific requirements contained in the ITB. None of the committee members compared the conformance of the space offered to the specific room and office requirements. Indeed, the testimony of the committee members indicate that accessibility of the space was considered under criteria 3(a) rather than the conformance of the space to the ITB. Since the space offered by petitioners apparently complied with the requirements of the ITB, petitioners should have received 10 points for that category. The points awarded under 3(b) and 3(c), however, were proper. The space offered by the 1100 Building is not susceptible to an efficient layout or good utilization of the space offered. Further, the committee legitimately differentiated between the single buildings offered by each bidder, under 3(c), by considering where the space was located within the building. Obviously, factor 3(c) reflects a concern that the space offered not be too separated. It clearly provides that proposals for space in two separate buildings will get fewer points than single building proposals, and there is no indication that all single building proposals should receive the same maximum points. This factor clearly relates to the proximity of the spaces offered to one another, with contiguous space getting the most points. 3(d) Offers providing street-level space (Weighting: 2) Approximately half of the space offered by Koger is street-level space. Koger received two points. The 1100 Building provides no street-level space; it received no points in this category. Petitioners do not contend that they should have gotten any points, but assert Koger should only have gotten one point because not all its space was street-level space. THE COMPARATIVE EVALUATION The evaluation committee members were very conscientious in comparing the relative values of the buildings offered based on the criteria provided and their observations. Their evaluations were not made arbitrarily, but based upon the factors set forth in the evaluation criteria. Although errors were made in calculating the values awarded for categories 1(a) and 3(a), these errors were not due to arbitrary action by the committee members. Further, should the appropriate points under 3(a) be added to petitioners evaluations and three points be subtracted from Koger's evaluations (two points for 1(a) and one point for 3(d)), petitioners evaluations would be 79, 80, 76, 80 and 84, and Koger's would be 95, 95, 95, 95 and 96. The strategic plan for HRS, 1986-1991, Goal 12, is to enhance employee morale and job satisfaction in several ways, one of which is to replace or upgrade 90 percent of substandard physical work environments by December 31, 1990. The testimony and evaluations show, and the committee members found, that the Koger Center would provide a better work environment than the petitioners' 1100 Building. Based on the criteria set forth in the ITB, the Koger bid is the "lowest and best" bid.

Florida Laws (4) 120.53120.57255.249255.25
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WESTON INSTRUMENTS, INC. vs. HARRIS CORPORATION, HATHAWAY INSTRUMENTS, INC., AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 75-002110BID (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-002110BID Latest Update: Oct. 05, 1977

Findings Of Fact In August, 1975, the Department of General Services invited competitive bids for the purchase of supervisory and control equipment and revenue metering equipment for expansion of primary electric utilities in the Capitol Center, a project known as State Project No. DGS-6026/6424, AEP File No. 74288-003. Plans and specifications for the project were developed by the department's consulting architect/engineers Reynolds, Smith and Hills. The Department of General Services (hereinafter Department) and Reynolds, Smith and Hills (hereinafter Reynolds) conducted formal bid opening on September 25, 1975. Bid proposals were received from petitioner, Weston Instruments, Inc. (hereinafter Weston), and from Respondents, Harris Corporation (hereinafter Harris) and Hathaway Instruments, Inc. (hereinafter Hathaway). The amount of the bids were as follows: CONTRACTOR BASE BID ALTERNATE NO. 1-ADD TOTAL Harris 332,000.00 28,649.00 360,649.00 Weston 338,991.00 20,965.00 359,996.00 Hathaway 343,429.00 33,224.00 376,653.00 Hathaway's bid as submitted was responsive to the specifications and other requirements of the bid invitation. Weston's bid was responsive to the specifications and requirements of the bid invitation with the following exception. Specification B-2, in its second paragraph, states: "In order to facilitate the execution of the Agreement, the Bidder shall submit with his proposal a list of and brief description of similar work satisfactorily completed, with location, date of contracts, together with names and addresses of Owners." Weston did not submit that information with its bid but did submit that information on October 9, 1975. The Harris bid as submitted was not responsive to the specifications and requirements of the bid invitation. The material deviations from the specifications found in the Harris bid are as follows: Paragraph 16755-13(c) of the specifications states that data logger equipment by Teletype, Lear Siegler or General Electric will be considered. The Harris bid proposed a data logger manufactured by Practical Automation, Inc. and noted that if Harris was required to conform to the specifications by furnishing a data logger manufactured by one of the three specified manufacturers, its base bid would have to be increased by $635.00. Paragraph 16755-18 of the specifications requires a specific number of supervisory functions at each of the nineteen locations. The Harris bid met the requirements of the specifications at only one of the nineteen locations. At each of the other eighteen locations the Harris bid was from one to three supervisory points deficient. According to the evidence presented it would cost between $250 to $300 per location to furnish the supervisory points left out of Harris' bid. Paragraph 16755-13(d) of the specifications requires that the data logger shall log an uninitiated (alarm) change of status in red lettering. Harris' bid states that the equipment they have chosen is not available with red ribbon printout and that they therefore propose that all changes normally logged in red would instead have an asterisk in the first column. This specification requiring logging in red of an alarm change of status was included by the specifications writer of the architect/engineers as a safety feature. Paragraph 16755-13(e) of the specifications requires that the log shall contain time in a 24 hour format to a tenth of a minute. The Harris bid proposes that the log shall be in seconds rather than tenths of a minute. The specifications require equipment delivery to the job site and substantial completion within 180 calendar days after receipt of Notice To Proceed. The specifications further provide for liquidated damages of $100 per day for each day the contractor fails to meet the above completion date. The Harris bid requested that the liquidated damages clause and the required time for completion be modified to provice that the 180 day period would not commence until all drawings had been approved by the architect/engineers. The architect/engineers, Reynolds, Smith and Hills, calculated that the required drawing time was approximately 60 days. Therefore, the Harris bid proposes that Harris would have 240 days instead of 180 days in which to deliver the equipment to the site and substantially complete the contract. The Harris bid proposed a deviation from the warranty provision of the specifications. The specifications in paragraph E-17 placed the final determination of the need for repairs or changes under the guarantee clause of the specifications with the architect/engineers and the owner. Harris proposes to alter those specifications and place the right of final determination as to the existence and cause of any claim defect with Harris. Harris' bid contained information setting forth their experience with the Micro II System, which is the system they proposed in their bid. That information shows that the Micro II System had been in use no more than two and one-half years at the time of the bid letting. In its evaluation of the bidders' proposals, based upon the data contained in the original bid packages, Reynolds calculated that the deviation from the specifications by Harris gave Harris at least a $10,135 advantage in its bidding (See Petitioner's Exhibit 8). That evaluation did not include a dollar value for the deviation from the specification concerning the warranty. In that evaluation Reynolds noted the failure of Harris to meet the supervisory point requirements. They calculated that this would add $3,900 to Harris' bid based on twelve locations at $300 per location. In fact, Harris failed to meet the requirements at eighteen locations, which at $300 per location, would add $5,400 to Harris' bid. Thus, using the evaluation figures of Reynolds, it appears that Harris' deviations from the specifications gave them at least an $11,635 advantage in the bidding. On October 9, 1975, Reynolds held a conference with each of the three bidders. At that conference Weston provided a list of three names, with addresses of customers for whom Weston had completed work similar to that proposed in its bid. Reynolds did not receive any material information from these references until after October 31, 1975. At least two of the references commented favorably on Weston's performance in letters to Reynolds dated January 13, 1976 and January 20, 1976, respectively. By letter dated October 31, 1975, Reynolds' project manager for this project conveyed the architect/engineers' recommendation for award to the Department. That recommendation was that the contract be awarded to Hathaway Instruments, Inc., for the base bid item only. The recommendation noted that the alternate should be rejected because the bids for the alternate were excessively high. As stated in the letter of recommendation, Reynolds rejected Harris' bid because "there were several major exceptions taken to the specification (sic), the most serious of which was their not being able to meet the delivery schedule." Also, as stated in the letter of recommendation, Weston's bid was apparently rejected because they "could not meet the experience qualifications as specified." Harris, at the time of the bid letting, had five years experience with its Micro I equipment but had only two and one-half years experience with its Micro II equipment. The two lines of equipment constitute two generations of equipment. Neither Harris nor Weston had five years experience with the specific equipment proposed in their bids. Both, however, have had five years experience with the general type system and equipment proposed with Harris being the more experienced of the two. Based upon the evidence presented Weston and Harris are both responsible bidders. In November, 1975, the Department directed Reynolds to contact Harris and determine whether Harris would conform their bid to the specifications. The project manager for Reynolds so contacted Harris and by letter dated November 17, 1975 (Petitioner's Exhibit 4), notified the Department that Harris stated they would deliver the equipment within the time required by the specifications. That letter reiterated Reynolds' recommendation of Hathaway as contained in their letter of October 31, 1975. Reynolds did not retreat from their recommendation of Hathaway and at the final hearing again stated that recommendation. Thereafter, the Department proposed to award the contract to Harris and set the matter for final decision on December 2, 1975. Harris' bid was a responsible offer but was not in full compliance with the bid specifications and conditions. The bids of Weston and Hathaway were responsible offers and were in full compliance with the bid specifications and conditions except as noted in paragraphs 4, 7 and 19 herein. Paragraph B-18 of the Specifications and Contract Documents (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) states that "No bid modification will be accepted after the close of bidding has been announced." Section A of the same document states that bids would be received until 2:00 p.m. EDST, on September 25, 1975. No evidence was presented which would show that the time for receiving bids was extended beyond that set forth above. Therefore, the close of bidding appears to have been at 2:00 p.m., EDST, September 25, 1975. The agreement by Harris to conform their bid to the specifications and conditions constituted a material modification of their bid. This modification occurred in November, 1975, after the close of bidding, and was therefore not allowable under the terms of the Specifications and Contract Documents set forth above. The lowest base bid and alternate bid of those responsible offers received in full compliance with the bid specifications and conditions was that of Weston. No evidence was presented which would show that the Department submitted its complete File on this matter to the Division of Purchasing along with its reasons for recommending a bid other than the low bid meeting specifications, as required by Section 13A-1.02(a), F.A.C.

Florida Laws (2) 287.012287.042
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FAIRCHILD CORPORATION vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 90-003122BID (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 23, 1990 Number: 90-003122BID Latest Update: Jul. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact State Project No. 46090-3511 (the project) is for construction of the West Bay Bridge on State Road 79 in Bay County, Florida. Competitive bids on the project were solicited in February, 1990. The bid letting on the project was held in March, 1990. The Petitioner, Fairchild, the Hardaway Company and ten other contractors bid on the project. The Hardaway Company submitted the lowest bid on the project in the amount of $9,487,258.17. Fairchild submitted the next lowest bid in the amount of $9,835,279.34. Divergent Unit Prices and Imbalances. The part of the Hardaway Company's bid relating to construction of the foundation for the approaches to the bridge (the "structural bid") is obviously below reasonable cost in several respects. The contract specifications require the use of sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid (biaxial type 2), and Class III (seal) concrete. The Hardaway Company's unit prices for these items were, respectively, one dollar per cubic yard for the sand fill, fifty cents per cubic yard for the shell fill, twenty-five cents per square yard for the reinforcement grid, and ten cents per cubic yard for the Class III seal concrete. As a result, the Hardaway Company's bid for these items is obviously significantly below reasonable cost and approximately $95,500 below what Fairchild bid for the same portion of the contract. In contrast to the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid and Class III concrete, the Hardaway Company's bid on some of the other parts of the structural bid were relatively high. The reinforcing steel for the substructure (Item 415-1-5) was bid at approximately twice reasonable cost (80 a pound versus, e.g., 42 in Fairchild's bid), resulting in $609,936.80 attributable to that part of the bid versus, e.g., $320,216.82 for Fairchild. The statistical average (the DOT's so-called "average 2") for the other serious bidders under this item also was 42 a pound. The Hardaway Company also bid obviously in excess of reasonable cost for the lump sum item of mobilization for pile installation--$600,000 versus $125,000 in Fairchild's bid and less in the bids of several of the others bidders. (The statistical average for the other serious bidders under this item was $225,000.) But the Hardaway Company bid only $60,000 for the lump sum item for removal of existing structures (versus $160,000 in Fairchild's bid) and only $30,000 for the lump sum item for removal and disposal of fender system (versus $110,000 in Fairchild's bid). The portion of the Hardaway Company's bid attributable to mobilization for the roadway work is significantly less than the Fairchild bid under this item ($200,000 versus $375,000) and partially counterbalances the excess in the part of the Hardaway bid for mobilization for the pile installation. The portion of the Hardaway Company's bid attributable to clearing and grubbing also was high, at $20,000 an acre versus a statistical average of $4,200 an acre for the other serious bidders, resulting in $216,000 for the Hardaway Company bid versus, e.g., $32,400 for the Fairchild bid and the $45,360 statistical average. DOT Review Procedures. Section 2-6 of the DOT's Standard Specifications applicable to the project provides: 2-6 Rejection of Irregular Proposals. A proposal will be subject to being considered irregular and may be rejected if it shows omissions, alterations of form, additions not called for, conditioinal or unauthorized alternate bids, or irregularities of any kind; also if the unit prices are obviously unbalanced, either in excess of or below the reasonable cost analysis values. The DOT is in the process of formulating a policy on the use of the Technical Review Committee in the bidding process. A proposed procedure has been developed, which has not yet been made final and has not yet been signed by the Secretary of the DOT, under which the Technical Review Committee would review the low bid on each contract, among other things not applicable to this case, for "any significant irregularities in unit bid prices" and for "unbalanced bidding." The DOT has not yet defined "any significant irregularities in unit bid prices" or "unbalanced bidding" for purposes of defining the event that triggers review by the Technical Review Committee. The DOT Director of the Office of Construction, Robert Buser, is of the opinion that the unit prices the Hardaway Company bid for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the Class III seal concrete are "significant irregularities in unit bid prices." On the other hand, the DOT's Preliminary Estimates Engineer, Robert Griner, who, unlike Buser, is a member of both the Technical Review Committee and its Preliminary Technical Subcommittee, and is of the opinion that the Hardaway bid for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the Class III (seal) concrete are "mathematical imbalances," not "significant irregularities in unit bid prices," which he would define as bids that omit a unit price, whose numerical values do not match words used to express the values, or that are not signed. Under Griner's approach, which was followed in this case, the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee looks at "mathematical imbalances" to see if they are "material imbalances." If the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee decides that it is not a "material imbalance," it simply reports this finding at the outset of the meeting of the Technical Review Committee, which accepts the finding and does not itself consider the matter any further. Only if the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee reports a "material imbalance" does the Technical Review Committee further consider the question. Front-end Bidding. Under the DOT contract for the project, like other items in the specifications, mobilization and land clearing and grubbing are paid in installments as the work proceeds. But, unlike the other items, all of the portion of the contract attributable to mobilization and land clearing and grubbing is paid by the time the entire project is half completed. Similarly, a contractor is paid for reinforcement steel (substructure) when it is delivered to the site. As a result, by shifting dollars in a bid to these "front-end," lump sum items, a contractor can manipulate the bid process and contract to reasonably insure himself of early payment of these inflated items regardless what may happen to the project later. In analyzing these front-end, lump sum items, Griner treated them (along with the unreasonably low bids on the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grids and C III seal concrete) as "mathematical imbalances." Following the guidance of a Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) memorandum, dated May 16, 1988, on the subject of "Bid Analysis and Unbalanced Bids," Griner analyzed the Hardaway bid to be sure it would not be susceptible to cost overruns (it was not) and to be sure the quantities were correctly estimated (they were). He also analyzed the additional cost to the DOT of paying the Hardaway Company early (by the half way point of the project) for the inflated front-end items to determine whether the "mathematical" imbalance was "material," i.e., whether "the mathematically imbalanced bid will result in the lowest ultimate cost to the Government." Based on a twelve percent interest rate, Griner calculated that the inflated front-end items would cost the DOT approximately an additional $98,000, 1/ still much less than the difference between the low Hardaway bid and any other bid. Based on this calculation, Griner concluded that the "mathematical imbalance" in the Hardaway bid was not a "material imbalance" and did not require the award of the bid to Fairchild or one of the other bidders. Griner overlooked and did not apply another portion of the method of analysis in the FHWA memorandum on "Bid Analysis and Unbalanced Bids" that states: There are numerous reasons why a bidder may want to unbalance his/her bid on a contract. One reason is to get more money at the beginning of the project. The bidder does this by overpricing the work done early in the project. This is called "front loading" the contract. The leading case in the "front loading" area is Matter of: Riverport Industries, 64 Comp. Gen. 441 (1985). Here the Comptroller General held that if the bid is front loaded, regardless if it is the lowest bid, it "should be viewed as materially unbalanced since acceptance of the bid would result in the same evils as an advance payment. An advance payment is prohibited by law." The "front loading" may also be materially unbalanced due to the cost of money that must be paid out early versus over the normal construction fo the project. Under the Hardaway Company bid, the pile mobilization, the land clearing and grubbing, and the reinforcement steel (substructure) parts of the bid are "front-ended." 2/ Under the method of analysis suggested by the FHWA memorandum, the Hardaway Company would be paid approximately $428,000 in "advance payments" under these two items if it is awarded the contract. Approximately $375,000 in pile mobilization, $183,600 in land clearing and grubbing, and $289,700 in the reinforcement steel were shifted to these front- end items from the unbalanced sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid, and Class III (seal) concrete items. These dollars The shifted dollars are estimated by taking the difference between the statistical average for these items and the Hardaway bid on them. Since roiughly half of the shifted dollars would be paid earlier than they would be paid if they were bid under the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid and Class III (seal) concrete items, the amount of "advance payment," under the FHWA analysis would be approximately $428,000. Griner did not explain why he only followed part, but not all, of the method of analysis suggested by the FHWA memorandum, other than to say he overlooked it. But he also testified that it is common practice for contractors to submit mathematically unbalanced bids, and the DOT always analyzes them the way he did in this case. Indeed, in the March, 1990, bid letting, Griner found "mathematical imbalances" in 21 of the 29 low bids but no "material imbalances." The Fairchild bid also contains "mathematical imbalances." It also "front-ends" several items. The total dollar value of the "front-ending" in the Fairchild bid (including roadway mobilization) closely approximates that found in the Hardaway bid and, under the FHWA analysis, would result in approximately the same amount of advance payment. Under Section 101-2.2 of the DOT's Standard Specifications for this project, contractors are limited to a maximum of ten percent of the total contract for mobilization. The Hardaway Company's total mobilization bid is within the maximum under the specifications. Notwithstanding the imbalances in the Hardaway bid, and the so-called "advance payments" that would result from the "front-ending" in the Hardaway bid, the Hardaway bid remains the lowest and best bid on the project, and it is the best interest of the DOT and the public to award the contract to the Hardaway Company. Even if the Hardaway Company had bid the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid, and Class III (seal) concrete items exactly as Fairchild did, Hardaway still would be low bidder. "Value Engineering" and Alleged Alternative or Contingent Bidding. Inferences reasonably could be drawn from the evidence that the Hardaway Company may intend to propose to the DOT that the approach to the bridge be re-engineered so as to eliminate the need for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the C III (seal) concrete. If the DOT accepts such a proposal, the contract between the DOT and the Hardaway Company would have to be modified. If the re-engineered project were to allow the Hardaway Company to do the job for less than its bid price, half (or, if the proposal is innovative or unique, up to 80%) of the savings would be paid to the Hardaway Company under what the DOT calls "value engineering." Under DOT procedures, "value engineering" proposals are not made or evaluated until after the original contract is signed with the successful bidder. It is not an alternative bid or a contingent bid.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Transportation, enter a final order dismissing the bid protest filed by W. R. Fairchild Construction Company, Ltd., and awarding State Project No. 46090-3511 to the Hardaway Company. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ALFAIR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 89-000006BID (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000006BID Latest Update: Mar. 28, 1989

The Issue The issues presented here concern the propriety of the Respondent's action in its decision to reject all bids submitted for Project 72906-9109, Duval County, thereby excluding the bid of the Petitioner which was the apparent low bid in this process.

Findings Of Fact Alfair Development Company, Inc. (Alfair), is a company owned by Maggie Alford. This company is certified as a "Disadvantaged Business Enterprise" under the terms of Chapter 337, Florida Statutes. This recognition is for benefit of contractual work done for the State of Florida, Department of Transportation. Alfair, together with two other companies who are "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises," responded to a bid opportunity from the Department of Transportation identified as Project No. 72906-9109, Duval County. The other two bidders were ILA Construction Company, Inc., of Daytona Beach, Florida, and Highway Valets, Inc., of Norwalk, Ohio. This project was for the construction of concrete sidewalks and curb cut ramps, installation and repair. The contract was for competition solely among contractors who had been certified as "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises" by the Office of Minority Programs within the Department of Transportation. As such, it is referred to as a "set-aside" job. In a "set-aside" project, bids are accepted from these "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises" in furtherance of the requirements of Section 339.0805, Florida Statutes, which mandates that not less than 10% of the amounts expended from the State Transportation Trust Fund shall be expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. When the bids were opened related to Project No. 72906-9109, Duval County, Alfair was the apparent winner having offered the lowest bid among the three competitors. However, there was a problem with the bid submission by Alfair and the others, in that Alfair's bid was 70% above the pre-bid estimate of the Department of Transportation concerning the expected price that the agency would have to pay for this project. The other two bidders were even higher, but within the range of the 70% above the pre-bid estimate. The pre-bid estimate had been derived by resort to a manual at the Department of Transportation referred to as the Contract Maintenance Administration and Inspection Manual. Within that manual the pre-bid estimate is found, as it was here, by examining historical workload and/or work needs survey information and development of that information and retention of that information through a computation book. That book includes appropriate forms, square yards, per linear feet, etc., for each item of activity to be paid for in the contract. The form to be used in this process shows the project number, the county, the section number of the roadway to be worked, the method of calculating estimated quantities and specific project location, if known. In this arrangement prior contracts of a similar sort to that contemplated in this instance are reviewed in trying to anticipate the contract costs on this occasion. That approach was followed in making the pre-bid estimate in this project. When the comparison was made of those figures it was a comparison to the immediately preceding years' contract for similar work against the work called for in the subject project at hand. In addition, the Department of Transportation contacted concrete companies to make sure that the concrete cost had remained the same. It also verified that minimum wage requirements had not changed from the prior year to the year in question. At hearing, the only rebuttal which the Petitioner offered to this approach of pre-bid estimate was the attempt to present certain documents which were denied admission as evidence in that the representative of the Petitioner, James D. Alford, III, husband to Maggie Alford, was not shown to be sufficiently apprised of contracting matters to explain those exhibits and show how they would tend to rebut the method of pre-bid estimate by the Department of Transportation. The exhibits standing alone did not lend themselves to the interpretation that they were competent rebuttal. When the degree of difference between the pre-bid estimate and the quotes by the bidders was examined by employees within the Department of Transportation, the belief was expressed that the bids were so out of keeping with the pre-bid estimate as to put to question the advisability of contracting with the apparent low bidder, Alfair. The Department felt that it needed to make certain that its pre-bid estimate was not flawed in some fashion and a determination was made to undergo reevaluation of the initial perception held about the bids offered before making a decision. Nonetheless, the impression was created in the mind of Barry D. Bunn, District Contract Administrator for District II, Department of Transportation, that he was expected in his employment to notice that the bids had been rejected. As a consequence on October 25, 1988, the bidders were advised that all bids were rejected for the project. On that same date, an advertisement was placed in the local newspaper that the project was being resolicited for bid purposes and through the advertisement the "set-aside" was deleted. This meant that for purposes of the re-advertisement of October 25, 1988, a general class of bidders could respond, to include "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises." Having been made mindful of this error, Bunn contacted the newspaper where the advertisement had been placed and told them to take that advertisement out of circulation. This occurred on October 26,1988. On that same date further correspondence was directed to the bidders, to include Alfair, in which it was stated that the bids had not been rejected, identifying that the bids were undergoing a reevaluation process. That reevaluation process did not change the initial impression by the Department of Transportation concerning the quotations received as being too far in excess of the Department's pre-bid estimate. Consequently, on November 1, 1988, a further notice of bid rejection was dispatched. That notice did not describe the reason for the rejection, but upon inquiry Mr. Alford was informed that the basis of the rejection was that the bid quotations were too costly when compared to the pre-bid estimate. Under inquiry the Department of Transportation did not identify the details of that explanation in the sense of saying what items they resorted to for drawing that conclusion and the Alfair company did not seek to gain a further explanation of their reasoning through prehearing discovery. The Department of Transportation had refused to give any further information to the Petitioner about this in the course of the telephone conversation between Mr. Alford and an employee in the Lake City, Florida Office of the Department of Transportation based upon the Department's belief that Section 337.168, Florida Statutes exempts it from having to state the pre-bid cost estimate until a contract has been entered into concerning the project. Nonetheless, it was revealed in the course of the hearing what the difference between the bid quotation of Alfair and the pre-bid estimate had been, as well as identifying the methods for deriving that difference. When Alfair received the notice of rejection of its bid it filed a timely notice of protest followed by a timely petition in protest. In addition, the Petitioner posted the appropriate amount of bond under Section 337.11(3)(b), Florida Statutes, to allow it to pursue this case. The pleadings by the Petitioner are not particularly informative but the sum and substance off the allegations as demonstrated in those pleadings and as set forth by remarks of the representative at hearing, identify the belief held by the Petitioner that the Department of Transportation in rejecting the Alfair bid has been unjust, illegal, dishonest and arbitrary. Moreover, Alfair through its representative found fault with the refusal to reveal to him over the phone the methods of arriving at the pre-bid estimate and the general belief that the Department allows the participation in the bidding process and in the award of contract related to "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises" of persons who are not registered or licensed as contractors through the offices of the Department of professional Regulation within the State of Florida. None of these claims were shown to be meritorious through the proofs submitted at hearing. The Department of Transportation seeks the award of costs under the provisions of Section 337.11(3)(b), Florida statutes. The evidence in this hearing reveals that the salaries of the two witnesses who testified for the Department of Transportation, namely Russell O. Davis and Barry D. Bunn, were $125.80 and $130.00, respectively, per day. These employees were involved in the hearing process for one day. In addition to salary costs the State had to pay these employees $62.50 each for per diem allowance in that the witnesses were from out of town. The cost of attendance at hearing by the court reporter is $67.50.

Recommendation In consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that Final Order be entered which rejects all bids and allows the re-advertisement of Project No. 72906-9109, Duval County. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner has submitted a Memorandum in which an indication is given concerning the Project 72906-9109, Duval County, as to the scope of that project-and an explanation in the mind of the representative of Petitioner as to the reason for "set-aside" projects. An accusation is made that the Department of Transportation has tried to avoid bringing black businesses into the mainstream of Florida economy. This is not borne out by the proof. An accusation is made which was not proven at hearing and is not relevant to the resolution of this dispute concerning the contributions to the Florida tax base made by the black community and businesses. This contention together with the allegation that the Department of Transportation is using tactics to deny a small percent.age of tax dollars to recirculate into the black community for economic development and by such arrangement promotes institutional slavery was not proven. Reference to rejection of all bids on October 18, 1988 is at odds with the facts of this case. Further, there is no indication in the facts of this case that for the first time in history a black-owned company was going to cross economic a threshold within the district in terms of gaining business and that the agency rejected the bids to avoid this. Further reference to the procedural history of this case and the fact that corrections had to be made to the process of notification of rejection of all bids is not sufficient reason to overturn the decision to reject all bids. Reference within the Memorandum/Argument to the need to post a bond as being done because it would cause an economic hardship on a black-owned company is rejected as a grounds of argument in that the requirement of bond is a matter of law imposed upon all companies black or otherwise. The fact that office holders within the State Legislature were called upon by the Petitioner to ascertain the status of this project and that the Department of Transportation went through the process of correcting "the initial rejection of bids in favor of a reevaluation phase, has been explained in the fact finding elated to the sequence of events and the procedures involved in rejecting all bids. Reference to the failure to describe the reasons for rejection beyond the fact that the bids were too high has been described in the- fact finding. No evidence was shown that the refusal to indicate the reason in detail or to refer to the source of the data was in the interest of somehow favoring white prime contractors over black contractors. There is some other indication within this Memorandum concerning the meeting of goals for "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises" and the concern that the Department of Transportation is using minority individuals instead of minority businesses to meet those goals. There was no indication that the Department of Transportation acted inappropriately in its attempts to gain a contract in this case, or that it generally has participated in a process which the Petitioner refers to dualism in preferring minority persons who are not licensed by the Department of Professional Regulation to engage in the construction business over those who are. Moreover, Section 489.103(1), Florida Statutes, states that the license provisions of Florida law, do not pertain to contractors who are working on bridges, roads, streets and highways and services incidental to that work. Comments about training and apprenticeship found within the Memorandum were not proven in the course of the hearing and are not sufficiently relevant to the inquiry at hand; that they need be considered in resolving this dispute. The suggestion that the Department of Transportation intends to put the contract back out for award in some arrangement other than a "set-aside" is correct in the sense of the intentions expressed in the ad of October 25, 1988; however, that advertisement was not carried forward and the oral indication was made by an official of the Department of Transportation at hearing, that the contract would remain "set- aside" if the Department were allowed to readvertise at some point beyond the outcome of this hearing. Finally, the suggestion that if the second bidder in this case had been a non-black company or individual, the Department would have awarded the project to that entity was not borne out in the proof. Respondent's facts are subordinate to the facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Alford, III 1348 Davis Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Marilyn McFadden, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S.-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (6) 120.53120.57337.11337.168339.0805489.103
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DUVAL FORD vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 93-006790BID (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 23, 1993 Number: 93-006790BID Latest Update: Mar. 31, 1994

Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Section 287.042(2), Florida Statutes, the Department of Management Services (DMS), lets various Invitations to Bid (ITB) for the benefit of state agencies, cities, counties and other local government agencies so that these entities may purchase a variety of goods and services. On August 24, 1993, DMS issued Invitation To Bid #28-070-700-P. The bid was one of 225 Invitations to Bid issued by DMS in 1993. The bid was for the purchase of medium and heavy trucks. The bid which is the subject of this case involves truck #150. The truck #150 bid has thirteen pages with forty- seven options plus base truck bid blanks. General Condition 1 of the Invitation to Bid requires that "all corrections made by bidder to his price must be initialed." Other documents provided by the Department to interested bidders as part of the bid package reiterate the requirement that all price changes must be initialed. These documents include the "Checklist," a document entitled "Common Problems That Result in Bid Being Rejected" and the document entitled "Medium and Heavy Trucks Index." The requirement in General Condition I of the Invitation to Bid, that all price changes must be initialed, contains no printed exceptions with respect to "nonpreselected" options. The purpose of the requirements of General Condition 1 of the Invitation to Bid is to protect both the State of Florida as well as competing vendors. The reason for the requirement that all price changes or alterations be initialed by the vendor is to protect both the State of Florida against a successful bidder later inserting higher option prices and charging the state agencies those prices, and the vendor against the State later inserting lower prices and attempting to hold the vendor to those prices. General Condition 13 of the bid document states: LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: Applicable provisions of Federal, State and Local law and all ordinances, rules, and regulations shall govern development, submittal and evaluation of all bids received in response hereto and shall govern any and all claims and disputes which may arise between persons(s) submitting a bid response hereto and the State of Florida, by and through its officers, employees and authorized representatives, or any other person, natural or otherwise; and lack of knowledge by any bidder shall not constitute a cognizable defense against the legal effect thereof. . . (Emphasis added.) General Condition 13 incorporates Rule 60A-1.001(3), Florida Administrative Code, which permits the State to waive minor irregularities in the conformance of a bid proposal to the formal bid requirements. The lowest bidder is determined by two factors. The first factor is the price for the base truck. The base truck is the minimum truck which can be ordered in this contract with no options. It is basically a chassis with an engine. The second factor involves additions to the truck called preselected options or predetermined options. All of the other options for the particular vehicle are deemed nonpreselected options. Preselected options are generally the most frequently ordered additions to the base truck along with some other less frequently ordered options. The preselected options can vary from bid to bid; however, DMS always determines the preselected options before opening the bids. The price of any option cannot exceed retail price. There is, therefore, a ceiling for the prices of preselected and nonpreselected options. The preselected options are not announced until after the bid is posted to prevent dishonestly low prices on preselected options and to promote competitive prices throughout the contract document. The bidders therefore do not know which options are preselected when they are composing their bids. There is nothing to be gained by a bidder loading a particular option with a high markup, because the bidder cannot guarantee that the option will not be preselected. The bid evaluation price is the base truck price plus the price of the combined chosen preselected options. DMS received numerous bids on the ITB, including a bid from Petitioner and Intervenor. Atlantic Ford bid a combined price of $38,737.00, and was the apparent low bidder; Duval Ford bid a combined price of $39,944.00 and was the apparent second low bidder. Upon receipt of the bids from the bidders, the bids were held in a locked room until the bid opening. After the bid opening, the purchasing specialist assigned to this bid reviewed each bid for conformity to the general non-technical specifications. Only the Bureau of Procurement is responsible for the nontechnical review although other Bureaus or Divisions may review and have input into the review process. However, these other Divisions' input is not binding. In the nontechnical review the purchasing specialist reviewed each bid's signatures, whether or not the bid was signed in ink, and numerous other requirements. The purchasing specialist also reviewed the bids to determine if all base bid blanks and price blanks for preselected options were filled in and that no corrections were made to those prices without a bidder's initials acknowledging the change. The bids which failed to meet the general conditions of the bid for base bid items and preselected options were rejected as nonresponsive bids. After the initial nontechnical review, the bids were sent to the Division of Motor Vehicles and Watercraft for a technical evaluation. However, since each bid document contains bids for several trucks, there may be a mixture of responsive and nonresponsive bids for various trucks in the same document and the Division of Motor Vehicles and Watercraft may receive responsive and nonresponsive bids for technical review. John Bevins of the Division of Motor Vehicles and Watercraft reviewed the technical parts of the bid. This information included manufacturer's codes for options and base truck features as well as the manufacturer's retail price which no bidder can exceed. After John Bevins completed his review, he filled out a bid rejection recommendation form. John Bevins chose to include nontechnical items in his recommendation, although this was beyond the scope of his review. Mr. Bevins indicated on his bid evaluation form that Atlantic Ford failed to initial a typewritten correction on option 8206 of truck 150. Mr. Bevins returned the reviewed bids to the purchasing specialist along with his recommendation that Atlantic Ford's bid was not responsive since it failed to initial the typewritten correction on option 8206. The purchasing specialist discussed the failure of Atlantic Ford to initial the typewritten correction on option 8206 with H. P. Barker, Jr., the Bureau Chief of Procurement. H. P. Barker, Jr. has the final authority within the Bureau of Procurement to decide if a bid is responsive. He is the customary agency decision-maker on these matters. After careful consideration and discussion, H. P. Barker, Jr., determined that the failure of Atlantic Ford to initial the typewritten correction on a credit is a minor irregularity according to the Department's purchasing rules, since option 8206 was a nonpreselected option and did not effect the total bid price for determining the lowest bidder. Barker's decision was based on the State's interest in obtaining trucks at the lowest price, thereby obtaining the most goods per contracting dollar. Duval Ford conceded that the typewritten correction was faint and does not appear on photocopies of the bid. Barker testified that DMS accepts photocopies of bids. If Atlantic Ford had submitted a photocopy of its bid, as it could have legally done, then the typewritten correction would probably not have been noted by the Department or the other bidders. Barker also testified that bids are not rejected if nonpreselected option blanks are not filled in. Dealers can choose not to offer all nonpreselected options. Finally, in this case option 8206 was a credit. Even if a purchaser under the contract orders option 8206, it will pay six dollars ($6.00) less for the overall truck from Atlantic Ford than if the truck was ordered from Duval Ford. Duval Ford offered evidence from 1991, that DMS had rejected a bid of another dealer for failure to initial a price change on a nonpreselected option. However, Nelson Easom, Duval Ford's manager had not been able to discover any similar rejections in the subsequent two years. Barker testified that the policy regarding noninitialed nonpreselected options changed three years ago. DMS then decided to treat them as minor irregularities. The policy change was based on the public policy to award the lowest bid whenever possible and to prevent minor deviations in bids from causing the state to pay higher prices for goods and services. Moreover, the evidence did not show any abuse of the bid process which would occur should price changes not be initialed. The alleged "protection" afforded to bidders by requiring every change to be initialed is at best tenuous since any fraudulent price changes could easily be recognized by the party against whom the change was made. Given these facts, this case over initials appears to be much ado about nothing, and the failure of Atlantic Ford to initial its price change on a nonpreselected option is a minor irregularity and waiveable by DMS. DMS therefore did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner by waiving the irregularity and awarding the bid to Atlantic Ford.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a Final Order in this case dismissing Petitioner's formal protest and awarding the contract for the Project to Atlantic Ford. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-6790BID The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, and 19, of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. Paragraphs 15 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact was legal argument. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 13, 17, 18, 21 and 24 of the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 11 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were immaterial. The facts contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. 9. The facts contained in paragraphs 22 and 23 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were not shown by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Cook Howell, III Howell, O'Neal & Johnson Suite 1100 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Cindy Horne Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Kerri L. Barsh Attorney at Law Greenberg Traurig et al. 1221 Brickell Avenue Miami, FL 33131 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services 312 Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 William H. Lindner Secretary Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57287.042 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60A-1.001
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KELLY SERVICES vs. BAY COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 88-003768BID (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-003768BID Latest Update: Sep. 13, 1988

The Issue The issue is whether Kelly Services is the lowest responsive bidder on Bid No. 89-23 and should be awarded the bid.

Findings Of Fact On June 2, 1988, the School Board of Bay County issued Bid Request No. 89-23 for garbage collection services at thirteen locations. A quotation sheet was included in the bid package. The quotation sheet indicated the thirteen locations with a blank next to each location and a dollar sign in front of each blank where each bidder was to indicate its average monthly total charge for each location. There was also a quotation schedule where the bidder was to indicate the calculations which went into the total bid for each location. The bid request provided: The Board reserves the right to waive formalities and to reject any and all bids or to accept any bid or combination of bids deemed in the Board's best interest and the decision of the Board will be final. Bidders desiring that their bid be considered on an all-or-none basis, either in whole or part, shall so indicate. It is the intent of this bid request to secure prices and establish contracts for garbage collection services for the twelve schools specified herein and the District Maintenance Department. Awards will be made by location and will be based on an average monthly total charge as calculated on the quotation sheet. The bids were opened at 10:00 am., June 13, 1988, at the offices of the Bay County School Board. Three completed bid packages were submitted. Kelly Services, Argus and M&O each submitted a completed bid quotation sheet containing the bid for each location. M&O also submitted a letter which stated: We would like to submit this bid on an all- or-nothing basis as specified in paragraph four of the cover letter to the bid. For an estimated cost of $3,391.84. The quotation sheet and quotation schedule submitted by M&O did not reflect the all-or-nothing bid amount. Instead, the quotation sheet and quotation schedule showed a total bid of $3,738.24 when calculated by location. Based on the bids submitted by each bidder as shown on the quotation sheet add quotation schedules, Kelly Services was low bidder on five locations (Callaway, Tyndall, Waller, Southport, and Cedar Grove) ; Argus was low bidder on six locations (Parker, Hiland, Haney, Mosley, Beach and Merritt Brown); and M&O was low bidder on two locations (West Bay and the District Maintenance Department). Prior to the deadline for submitting bids, John Harrison, Purchasing Agent for the Board, responded to an inquiry from M&O by advising M&O that it could submit two bids, one as specified in the Bid Request by location and one as an all-or- nothing bid. No other bidders were advised that they could submit two bids. At the bid opening, M&O did not submit a quotation sheet or schedule for its all-or-nothing bid. A bid which did not have a breakdown per dump per container per facility would not be acceptable to the Board and does not meet the specifications in the Bid Request. The breakdown per dump per container per location is necessary to verify proper invoicing for specific locations on months when there is a change in the number of dumps or containers at that location. After opening the bids, the Board compiled the low bid for each location and then totaled that list. That total of $3,606.09 was greater than the all-or-nothing bid by M&O. Because M&O's all-or-nothing bid failed to meet the specifications by not having a location breakdown the Board contacted M&O to determine if its "estimated" bid was firm and to request a breakdown on the quotation schedule form for the all- or-nothing bid. On June 15, 1988, two days after the bid opening, M&O submitted a letter to the Board clarifying that its all-or- nothing bid was a firm bid for each location and M&O submitted a quotation schedule for each location per dump per container (see page 7 of Joint Exhibit 1 and the last page of Joint Exhibit 2). The charge for each location in this quotation schedule is different than the quotation schedule submitted by M&O at the bid opening and is for the most part lower per location than either M&O's first quotation schedule or the low bids taken from the quotation schedules submitted at the bid opening. Based on the letter and all-or-nothing quotation schedule filed by M&O on June 15, 1988, the Board determined to award the bid for garbage collection services to M&O for the all- or-nothing bid of $3,391.84.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that The School Board of Bay County enter a Final Order rejecting all bids and readvertising the bid request for garbage collection services as specified in Bid Request No. 89-23. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 1988. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-3768BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Kelly Services: 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-3(1-3); 4-6(3); 7-11(7-11); and 12 (9) Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, School Board of Bay County: Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(2); 3(10&11); and 5(8). Proposed findings of fact 6, 7, and 9 are irrelevant. The first sentence of proposed finding of fact 2 is unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. The remainder of proposed finding of fact 2 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 3. Proposed finding of fact 4 is rejected as being unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. The last sentence of proposed finding of fact 5 is rejected as being argumentative, conclusory and unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. Proposed finding of fact 8 is unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Intervenor, Argus Services, Inc.: Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-4(1-3); 6-8(5); 9 & 10(6) 11(3); and 12(11). Proposed findings of fact 1 and 5 are unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 13-17 are rejected as constituting argument and not findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey P. Whitton Attorney at Law Post Office Box 1956 Panama City, Florida 32402 Franklin R. Harrison Attorney at Law 304 Magnolia Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 Scott W. Clemons Attorney at Law Post Office Box 860 Panama City, Florida 32402 School Board of Bay County Post Office Drawer 820 Panama City, Florida 32402-0820 M&O Sanitation, Inc. 266 N. Star Avenue Panama City, Florida 32404

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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BUTLER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 93-003971BID (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 22, 1993 Number: 93-003971BID Latest Update: Sep. 15, 1993

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In March of 1993, the Department issued an Advertisement for Bids (hereinafter referred to as the "Advertisement") through which it solicited the submission of bids on a construction project (Department Project No. NV-30A, which is hereinafter referred to as the "Project") involving the expansion of the water treatment facility at the Martin Correctional Institution. The Advertisement, along with the other bid documents issued in conjunction with the Advertisement, including, but not limited to, the Instructions to Bidders (hereinafter referred to as the "Instructions") and the Proposal Form, were compiled in a two-volume Specifications Manual (hereinafter referred to as the "Manual") that was made available for public inspection. Section B of the Manual's first volume contained the Instructions. Section B-2 2.A.(11) thereof provided that "Section 01420 as contained in the Technical Specifications must be submitted and the qualifications listed therein must be satisfactory to the Owner and the Engineer. " "Section 01420 as contained in the Technical Specifications" was a "Bidder's Qualification Form, Reverse Osmosis Treatment System Component" (hereinafter referred to as the "R.O. Form"), on which the bidder was to provide "R.O. [Reverse Osmosis] System Supplier" information. The R.O. Form repeated the directive that the bidder was to "[r]eturn [the] [c]ompleted [R.O.] Form [w]ith [its] proposal." Section B-14 of the Instructions addressed the subject of "preparation and submission of bids" and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Each Bidder shall copy the proposal form on his own letterhead, indicate his bid prices thereon in proper spaces, for the Base Bid and for alternates on which he bids. . . . Proposals containing . . . . items not called for or irregularities of any kind may be rejected by the Owner. Section B-16 of the Instructions addressed the subject of "disqualification of bidders" and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: More than one bid from an individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association under the same or different names will not be considered. Reasonable grounds for believing that a Bidder is interested in more than one proposal for the same work will cause the rejection of all proposals in which such Bidders are believed to be interested. The subject of "contract award" was addressed in Section B-21 of the Instructions, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . The recommendation for contract award will be for the bidder qualified in accordance with Section B-2 and submitting the lowest bid provided his bid is responsible and it is in the best interest of the Owner to accept it. The qualified bidder submitting the lowest bid will be that bidder who has submitted the lowest price for the base bid, or the base bid plus additive alternates or less deductive alternates, taken in the numerical order listed in the bid documents in an amount to be determined by the Owner. The Order of the alternates may be accepted by the Owner in any sequence so long as such acceptance does not alter the designation of the low bidder. The Owner reserves the right to waive any informality in bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the Owner. Section C of Volume I of the Manual contained the Proposal Form that all bidders were required to use to indicate their bid prices. The following statement appeared at the bottom of the second page of the Proposal Form: There is enclosed: A certified check, cashier's check, treasurer's check, bank draft or Bid Bond in the amount of not less than five (5) percent of the Base Bid payable to the Department of Corrections, as a guarantee. An executed Trench Excavation Safety Certification, Section F-13. An executed Experience Questionnaire and Contractor's Financial Statement and Public Entity Criminal Conviction Form, Section L. An executed Bidder's Qualifications Form (Reverse Osmosis), Technical Specification Section 01420. While one completed R.O. Form had to accompany each bid, there was no provision in any of the bid documents issued by the Department requiring a bidder to submit only one such completed form and no more. Petitioner, McMahan and R.J. Sullivan Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Sullivan") were among the contractors that timely submitted bids in response to the Advertisement. McMahan's and Sullivan's bids were each accompanied by more than one completed R.O. Form. Petitioner, on the other hand, provided the Department with only one completed R.O. Form along with its bid. Of the bids submitted, McMahan's was the lowest, Sullivan's was the second lowest and Petitioner's was the third lowest. McMahan's base bid price was $857,000.00. Petitioner's was $905,000.00. McMahan's total price, including the nine additive alternates accepted by the Department, was $948,000.00. Petitioner's was $1,032,600.00, $84,600.00 more than McMahan's. By letter dated July 1, 1993, the Department advised McMahan of its intent "to award the contract [for Department Project No. NV-30A] to [McMahan] as the lowest responsive bidder." On July 9, 1993, Petitioner filed a formal written protest of the preliminary determination to award the contract to McMahan alleging that McMahan was not a responsive bidder inasmuch as McMahan "submitted Reverse Osmosis ("R.O.") Qualifications Forms for more tha[n] one vendor." According to Petitioner, "[t]his [was] not in conformance with the Bid Documents and gave [McMahan] an unfair advantage."

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a final order finding Petitioner's bid protest to be without merit and awarding McMahan, as the lowest responsive and qualified bidder, the contract for Department Project No. NV-30A. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of September, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 1993.

Florida Administrative Code (3) 60D-5.00260D-5.00760D-5.0071
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NELSON P. DAVIS vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 88-003868BID (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-003868BID Latest Update: Sep. 28, 1988

Findings Of Fact The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services currently leases approximately 22,000 square feet of space from Nelson P. Davis. The space is contained in two separate buildings, both located at 417 Racetrack Road, Ft. Walton Beach, Florida. The Department and Davis were involved in a legal dispute involving the currently leased premises, which concluded in 1986 with the entry of judgment in Davis' favor. While some antagonism remains between the parties related to the legal action instituted by Davis, Davis has been an acceptable landlord in all other respects. The current lease expires February 1, 1989. Davis has been aware, since late February or early March of 1988, that the Department would need space in excess of the currently occupied 22,000 square feet, but was not aware of the actual additional space requirements until the issuance of the invitation to bid. In general, the Department's space requirements have increased annually. In response to the anticipated need for additional space, Davis initiated plans for design of a third Racetrack Road building that could meet the additional need, but did not construct the facility. In response to the space requirements of previous years, Davis has constructed additional space. The Department has occupied the additional space in such proportions as to avoid the competitive bidding process, however, the current need for additional space exceeds the maximum which can be leased without competitive bidding. The Department on May 11, 1988, issued an invitation to Bid for approximately 26,165 square feet of space in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida. (HO #1) In response to the invitation, Davis submitted a bid proposal. The Davis proposal, the sole proposal received by the Department, was disqualified by the Department as non-responsive. On June 23, 1988, the sole bid was opened by Joseph Pastucha, HRS District One Facilities Manager, who initially reviewed the Davis bid. Mr. Pastucha identified items of concern related to the responsiveness of the bid and then provided the information to his supervisor, who in turn provided the information to Mr. James Peters. The Department did not contact Davis for further information or to provide the opportunity to correct any defects. James Peters, HRS's District One Manager for Administrative Services has expressed on at least one occasion a desire to avoid entering into business arrangements with Nelson P. Davis. The bases for Peters' opinion is the earlier litigation between the parties. Peters was on the committee which was to have evaluated bids submitted in response to the invitation. However, Peters has stated that his personal opinion would not influence his participation in the bid solicitation process. The evidence did not indicate that Peters based his opinion regarding the Davis bid submission solely on the earlier litigation or that any other person involved in the agency's action permitted personal opinions to affect the decisional process. Davis' bid proposal included the two buildings constituting approximately 22,000 square feet located at 417 Racetrack Road which the Department currently occupies, plus a third building of approximately 4,000 square feet. The proposed square footage and lease cost were acceptable. The third building was to be either a planned, unconstructed building located at the 417 Racetrack Road location or an existing building located "7/l0ths of a mile southeast of the present HRS offices," (the off-site building). However, a memorandum attached to Davis' submission stated that he did not intend to use the off-site building for HRS purposes, (HO #2). Further, Davis had previously indicated in conversation with the HRS manager of the 417 Racetrack Road offices that he planned to utilize the off-site space otherwise. On page one of the bid submittal form Davis indicated the address of the proposed location as 417 Racetrack Road. By letter dated July 5, 1988, the Department notified Davis that his bid offering was deemed non-responsive and that the Department expected to readvertise for space in Ft. Walton Beach. The letter made no mention of any opportunity to protest the determination. The statement, "[f]ailure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes," which is required to be included in the notice of agency decision by Section 120.53(5)(a), Florida Statutes, was omitted by the Department. (HO #3) On or about July 7, 1988, Davis contacted the Department of General Services to express his dismay regarding the disqualification of his submittal. A meeting, held on or about July 19, 1988, between Davis and Department representatives, did not alter the Department's position. On or about July 25, 1988, the written notice of protest and request for hearing was filed. The Department forwarded the request to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The letter dated July 5, 1988, advising Davis that his bid was deemed non-responsive enumerated five reasons for the Department's decision. The reasons stated were: No photograph of the proposed facility was submitted as requested; No floor plan of the facility was submitted as requested; A substituted site was submitted Proposed space was not an existing building and was not measurable; Three buildings in bid proposal constitute three locations and are unacceptable. The letter was signed by Chuck Bates, DHRS Deputy District Administrator, District One. The letter was drafted by James Peters. (HO #3) Mr. Bates relied upon Peters and Pastucha to provide information sufficient to justify the disqualification of the bid, and was satisfied that the action was justified prior to signing the letter. Examination of the bid submittal package reveals that Davis failed to acknowledge by initial the requirements of page seven, but that he did, on that page, appropriately respond to questions related to proposed parking spaces being bid. The Department did not base the disqualification of the bid on the failure to acknowledge the page and did not include the failure to initial the page in the stated reasons for deeming the bid non-responsive. Paragraph 9(a) of the bid submittal form requires the submission of a clear photograph of the exterior front of the building. (HO #2) Davis submitted no photographs. Paragraph 9(b) of the bid submittal form requires the submission of a scaled floor plan showing present configurations with measurements. (HO #2) Davis submitted floor plans for the proposed-to-be-constructed building and for the off-site building, but failed to submit floor plans for the two buildings which the Department currently occupies. The bid also failed to include calculations of net rentable square footage related to the omitted floor plans. The letter to Davis stated that an additional reason for disqualification of his bid from further consideration was the submission of a substituted site, (HO #3). The "substituted site" refers to Davis' inclusion of the off-site building not identified in the bid submission other than by the statement that the building was located seven-tenths of a mile southeast of the present HRS office location. No map, street address, legal description, or other identifying information was submitted. The proposal submitted by Davis included plans to construct a third building at 417 Racetrack Road, which was rejected as not measurable. The invitation to bid states that to be considered, the space must be existing, dry and physically measurable, at the time of bid submitted. (HO #1) The proposed third building clearly fails to meet this requirement. While the Department may permit the correction of minor deficiencies, the deficiencies were adjudged by the Department to be more than minor. The proposal's inclusion of nonexisting space (Racetrack Road building #3) or in the alternative a building, the location of which can not be determined from the bid information and which the bidder apparently intends not to provide, is non- responsive to the specifications of the invitation. As to the fifth enumerated reason for disqualification of the bid (three buildings/three locations) the Department and Petitioner presented extensive testimony related to paragraph 3(b) of page 15 of the bid submittal form. Page 15 of the bid submittal form is titled "Evaluation Criteria" and contains a list of weighted factors which were to be used in the evaluation of bids. (HO #2) Paragraph 3(b) states, as one factor for consideration in evaluation, whether the bid provides for the required aggregate square footage in a single building, and continues, "[p]roposals will be considered, but fewer points given, which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two locations provided the facilities are immediately adjacent to or within yards of each other." (HO #2) The space left for the specification of maximum yardage was erroneously left uncompleted by the Department and the Department did not learn of the error until the bid was submitted. The Department's disqualification of the bid on this basis relies on the Department's assertion that the three buildings included in the Davis proposal constitute three locations and that a responsive bid may contain not more than two locations. The Department's position is that "location" and "building" are synonymous and that paragraph 3(b) of the evaluation criteria prohibits consideration of a bid submission including more than two buildings. The Department's position is rejected as arbitrary. The bid package does not state that proposals including more than two buildings will be disqualified. The sole reference to the number of buildings in a responsive bid submission is as stated and contained on the page of "Evaluation Criteria", wherein it is identified with a weighting factor of five percent of total possible points.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order dismissing Case No. 88-3868BID. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-3868BID The following constitute rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner: Accepted in part. The use of the word "required in the fourth sentence is rejected. The referenced section relates to evaluation factors, not specific requirements. Accepted. Accepted in part. The third building was proposed as either the off-site building or the planned, non-existent space. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as restatement of testimony. Other testimony indicated that Petitioner planned to use the off-site location for non-HRS purposes. Rejected, immaterial. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted as modified. Accepted in part. The use of the word "technical" is rejected. Accepted. Accepted as modified. Accepted as modified. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted as modified. Accepted as modified. Accepted as modified. The change between the two invitations to bid was to clarify the obvious confusion related to the use of terms "location" and "building" and was made not to the bid specifications but to evaluation criteria. Rejected as restatement of testimony. Rejected, conclusion of law. Accepted so far as relevant. While the Davis bid was disqualified as non-responsive, the right to reject any and all bids encompasses the disqualification of a bid as non-responsive to the specific requirements of an invitation to bid. Respondent: Rejected, conclusion of law. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Floor plan of the off-site building was submitted showing that the building is essentially a hollow, box-like structure. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, irrelevant. While the usual distance may be 100 yards, the actual bid specifications do not state such. Further the sole reference to the distance between "locations" was contained in evaluation criteria. At no time prior to the June 23, 1988 bid opening did the Department attempt to identify the preferred distance between locations. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce A. McDonald, Esquire Post Office Box 887, Suite 105 151 Mary Esther Cutoff Mary Esther, Florida 32569 Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire Acting District One Legal Counsel Post Office Box 8420 Pensacola, Florida 32505-8420 Joseph J. Pastucha 3300 North Pace Boulevard Room 109 Town & Country Plaza Pensacola, Florida 32505 Jan Kline 417 Racetrack Road Ft. Walton Beach, Florida 32548 James V. Peters Department of General Services 160 Governmental Center Fourth Floor, Room 412 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Tom Batchelor Staff Director House HRS Committee The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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BAXTER`S ASPHALT AND CONCRETE, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 84-003151 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003151 Latest Update: Mar. 02, 1987

The Issue The issues to be considered in the course of this Recommended Order concern the question of whether Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. or White Construction Company, Inc. should be accepted as a successful bidder on State Project No. 53050-3514, Jackson County, Florida, as advertised by the State of Florida, Department of Transportation.

Findings Of Fact The State of Florida, Department of Transportation, (DOT), advertised for bids on State Project No. 53050-3514, Jackson County, Florida. This was a project in which DOT had determined that 10 percent of the funding within the State Department of Transportation Trust Fund, as allotted for the project, would be devoted to economically disadvantaged individuals, also referred to as Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE). This decision was in keeping with Section 339.081, Florida Statutes. Consequently, interested bidders were called upon to submit bids reflecting a DBE participation of a minimum of 10 percent of the bid submitted. Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. (Baxter) and White Construction Company, Inc. (White) responded to the bid opportunity. The bids were opened on July 25, 1984, and Baxter's bid was the apparent low bid. The bid amount was $882,641.25. White was the second low bidder offering a bid of $928,353. Both bids were within the DOT estimate of construction costs. When the bids were reviewed, Baxter's bid was rejected by DOT based upon the belief that the bid failed to meet the DBE 10 percent requirement or to offer explanation of good faith attempts by Baxter to comply with the DBE contract requirement amount. See Section 14-78.03(2)(b)4., Florida Administrative Code. No other claim of error was made by DOT on the subject of the acceptability of the Baxter bid. The White bid is conforming. In preparing the bid, bidders are required to use DBE Utilization Form No. 1 to reflect the amount of DBE participation as a percentage of the overall bid estimate. In submitting its form as part of its bid blank, Baxter indicated that the total project cost was $884,000, and indicated that Ozark Striping, a DBE subcontractor, would be given $20,000 of that work or 3 percent, and that Glenn Powell, DBE subcontractor, would be afforded 7 percent of the total contract in the amount of $55,000. The total percentage according to Baxter is 10 percent, thus meeting the required DBE participation. This form is found as part of the joint Exhibit No. 1 offered by the parties. In fact, the Ozark Striping participation was 2.26 percent, and the Glenn Powell participation was 6.22 percent, for a total of 8.48 percent of the estimate reflected in the Form No. 1. Contrasted against the actual estimate of $882,641.25, these projections constitute 8.49 percent of that estimate. Thus, they are less than the 10 percent required. Given the fact that this DBE projection is less than the 10 percent, and in the absence of any attempt to offer a good faith explanation why Baxter failed to comply with the requirement, the bid was rejected for this irregularity. The Contract Awards Committee of DOT, when confronted with the irregularity of the Baxter bid, then determined to recommend the rejection of all bids. This was in keeping with the fact that the difference between the unsuccessful apparent low bid, with irregularities, and the second low bid exceeded 1 percent of the contract amount. At the time of this decision to reject all bids, DOT felt that the difference would justify re-advertising the bids. That policy position had been abandoned at the point of final hearing in this cause, wherein DOT expressed the opinion that it would be better served to accept the bid of White, and not re-advertise, again for cost reasons. In the face of the initial action to reject all bids and in accordance with Section 120.53, Florida Statutes, Baxter and White appealed that decision and by that appeal requested recognition as a successful bidder. This led to the present Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes hearing. Baxter has never attempted to offer a good faith explanation of its non-compliance. It chooses to proceed on the theory that the mistake in computation can be rectified by allowing Baxter to submit a supplemental Form No. 1, bringing its total above the DBE requirement. In its contention, Baxter indicates that Glenn Powell could have provided $126,000 of the DBE goal, which is in excess of the 10 percent requirement. Baxter also alludes to the fact that it had contacted other DBE enterprises, such as Oglesby and Hogg, Michael Grassing, and J.E. Hill. All told, Baxter indicates that if given the opportunity, it would allow $146,000 of DBE participation to include $126,000 by Glenn Powell, and $20,000 by Ozark. This comment is suspect, given the lack of compliance in the initial bid response, and the realization that within that bid response on the item related to Glenn Powell, the original amount of work attributed to Glenn Powell was $100,000, and was struck through in favor of the $55,000, leaving a fair inference that Baxter was attempting to meet the DBE goal with a projection as close to the 10 percent as could be achieved. They fell short because in adding the $20,000 for Ozark, and the $55,000 for Glenn Powell, the addition in the Form No. 1 showed $85,000, which is more than 10 percent of the $884,000 shown on the form, when in fact the two amounts were $75,000, and less than the 10 percent required. Baxter characterizes its mistake in computation as a technical error, which can be remedied without harm to the bid process. The Baxter position must be examined in the context of action by DOT relating to compliance with DBE requirements. Prior to June 1984, a time before the subject July 25, 1984 bid opening, bidders had been allowed to amend the Form No. 1 to show compliance with the DBE requirements or demonstrate good faith efforts of compliance. That amendment as to compliance through listing of the DBE subcontractors or submission of good faith effort documentation had to be offered within 10 days per former Section 14-78.03, Florida Administrative Code. Beginning with the June 1984 bid-lettings, all documentation had to be submitted with the bid, reflecting compliance or describing good faith efforts at compliance per Section 14-78.03(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, effective May 1984. This change was brought about to prevent the apparent low bidder, as indicated at the point of bid-letting, from shopping the quotations by the DBE's found in its original quote against other quotes from DBE's not listed in the bid documents initially submitted, and by amendment to the DBE statement prejudicing the former DBE group. The change was also made to avoid the possibility that the apparent low bidder could evade his bid by rendering it non-conforming, in the sense of refusing to submit the required documentation of compliance with DBE requirements or to the offer of a good faith explanation of non-compliance after the bid-letting. The change of May 1984, removed the possibility of bid shopping and bid avoidance. Both versions of Section 14-78.03, Florida Administrative Code, pre and post May 1984, indicate that failure to satisfy the DBE requirements or offer a showing of a good faith attempt at compliance, would result in the contractor's bid being deemed non-responsive, and cause its rejection. Baxter has been able to comply with the DBE goals of DOT in its bidding prior to the present controversy.

Florida Laws (5) 120.53120.57337.11339.081641.25
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