The Issue The issues to be determined in this appeal are whether the decision of the Community Development Board (Board) to approve Flexible Development Application FLD2017-07012 filed by Gulfview Lodging, LLP (Gulfview), cannot be sustained by substantial competent evidence before the Board, or that the decision of the Board departs from the essential requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact The 0.59-acre project site is located at the northeast corner of South Gulfview Boulevard and Fifth Street and wraps around the McDonald’s parking lot and Frenchy’s Beach Café (Frenchy’s) to the west. The project site includes two parcels owned by Gulfview, and 2,195.09 square feet of the South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way, which will need to be vacated by the City. Gulfview’s proposal is to demolish all structures currently on the project site and build a seven-floor hotel with 150 units per acre, which would be 88 rooms if the City vacates the 2,195.09 feet of right-of-way. Gulfview’s application for development approval was filed with the City on July 28, 2017, including design plans. The subject property is zoned Tourist (T) District with an underlying Future Land Use Plan (FLUP) category of Resort Facilities High (RFH). The subject site is located in the Beach Walk district of Beach by Design.2/ The maximum permitted density for the site pursuant to Beach by Design is 150 units per acre. The application contemplates a subsequent vacation process for the 2,195.09 square feet of City right-of-way. On July 20, 2017, the City Council approved the allocation of up to 59 units from the Hotel Density Reserve under Beach by Design (Case No. HDA2017-04001) and adopted a resolution to the same effect (Res. No. 17-19). Preston’s attorney admitted that he attended the July 20, 2017, City Council hearing that resulted in the July 28, 2017, Hotel Density Reserve Development Agreement (Development Agreement) between Gulfview and the City. Preston’s attorney attended the July 20 City Council hearing on behalf of Frenchy’s, but conceded to the Board and at oral argument that Frenchy’s is located on the land owned by Preston, as trustee, and Preston is the sole shareholder of Frenchy’s. The Development Agreement was recorded in Book 19727, Page 2465-2503 of the Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida, on August 2, 2017. The Development Agreement includes Exhibit “B”-- the same set of design plans that were filed with Gulfview’s July 28, 2017, application for development approval. Section 6.2.4 of the Development Agreement specifically states: The overall number of proposed units density provided for by this Agreement (88 units) is contingent upon the proposed vacation of the 2,195.09 square feet of South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way within the Beach Walk district. The City shall process a right-of- way vacation ordinance to vacate the 2,195.09 square feet of South Gulfview Blvd. right of way within the Beach Walk district conditioned upon submission of a complete set of building plans for construction of the improvements shown on Exhibit “B”. Regardless of whether or not the vacation is granted the maximum permitted density of the property may not exceed 150 units per acre. Gulfview’s application requires a Level Two approval. Under Section 4-206 of the Community Development Code, a Level Two approval requires mailing of a notice of application to owners of properties “within a 200-foot radius of the perimeter boundaries of the subject property.” The notice mailed by the City identifies both the north parcel and the south parcel by address and parcel number. The notice also describes the quasi-judicial public hearing process before the Board and ends with an invitation “to discuss any questions or concerns about the project and/or to better understand the proposal and review the site plan” with the assigned planner. The City Clerk mailed notice of Gulfview’s application to owners of parcels located within 200 feet of the two parcels identified in the notice, including Preston. Preston does not dispute receiving the notice. Section 4-206 of the Community Development Code also requires the posting of a sign on the “parcel proposed for development.” Preston does not dispute that the sign was posted. Preston objected that the mailed and posted notices did not reference the proposal to vacate 2,195.09 square feet of right-of-way. He argued that if he had known more than “a few days ago” when he received the Staff Report ahead of the October 17, 2017, Board meeting that the right-of-way was proposed to be vacated, he would have had expert witnesses at the hearing to give “an equal presentation” in response to Gulfview’s presentation. Preston requested a continuance citing lack of proper notice and insufficient time to prepare for the public hearing. Preston did not introduce any testimony or other evidence regarding the application. Preston’s primary objection to the project was vacation of the right-of-way and he wanted the opportunity to present witnesses regarding that issue. Vacating the right-of-way is a separate process and the hearing before the Board is not the proceeding in which the right-of-way vacation is decided. However, the substantial competent record evidence shows that Preston had actual notice as early as July 20, 2017, that the proposed project contemplated vacating 2,195.09 square feet of right-of-way. Preston’s other objection was that Gulfview’s design plans did not meet the requirements of Beach by Design’s Beach Walk District overlay. Preston argued to the Board that the hotel’s proposed design did not meet the redevelopment goals for addition of facilities and amenities generally described as areas for outdoor dining, outside cafes, and other seaside amenities.3/ However, although Preston had actual notice of the hotel design plans as early as July 20, 2017, he did not introduce any expert testimony or other evidence to support those objections. The Staff Report states that Beach by Design proposed to create a great beach front, known as “Beach Walk,” by relocating South Gulfview Boulevard from the existing right of way. Beach by Design recognized that the redevelopment and revitalization of the properties that front on South Gulfview were and, to a certain extent, still are generally constrained by several factors including small parcel sizes and the Coastal Construction Control Line. As a result, most of the motels and hotels which existed along the east side of South Gulfview would have limited opportunities for redevelopment even if Clearwater Beach were repositioned in the tourism market place. Beach by Design proposed to relocate South Gulfview to the west of its current alignment in order to achieve multiple purposes. First, it would create a drive with a real view of the Beach and the Gulf of Mexico. Second, it would allow the City to vacate the east 35 feet of the existing right of way in favor of the properties along the eastern frontage of existing South Gulfview as an incentive for appropriate redevelopment. Many of those existing properties would substantially benefit from an additional 35 feet of depth which could be used for the addition of facilities and amenities such as safe and comfortable areas for outdoor dining. The creation of Beach Walk and the realignment of South Gulfview Boulevard have all been realized. Several segments of the South Gulfview Boulevard have already been vacated and many of the properties along South Gulfview Boulevard have, in the years since the initial adoption of Beach by Design, been redeveloped with hotels. As noted, this proposal also includes a vacation of a portion of the South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way which will facilitate the redevelopment of the subject site with a new hotel playing an important role in the ongoing renewal and revitalization of the Beach. Specifically, the vacation will allow for the location of an outdoor seating area providing a strong link between Beach Walk and the proposed hotel as supported by Beach by Design. Therefore, the proposal is consistent with this provision. (Emphasis added). The Staff Report concluded that the proposed project is consistent with applicable provisions of the Community Development Code, applicable components of the City’s Comprehensive Plan, the Beach Walk District of Beach by Design, and the Design Guidelines of Beach by Design. Mark Parry, Senior Planner with the City, testified that “the proposed number of units, 88, is contingent on vacation of that right-of- way,” and if the right-of-way is not later vacated, it “would knock out about eight units.” Mr. Parry also testified that the proposed project provides amenities and an outdoor seating area as specified by Beach by Design. Preston only conducted a very short cross-examination of Mr. Parry, despite having party status to do so. Sue Ann Murphy, an experienced land use planner, also testified that the proposed development complied with all applicable Community Development Code, Comprehensive Plan and Beach by Design requirements. The project architect, Istvan Peteranecz, AIA, was accepted by the Board as an expert. Mr. Peteranecz answered questions from Board members regarding the design of the proposed hotel’s main entrance, including the porte cochere and public seating area adjacent to the Beach Walk and immediately south of Frenchy’s. Preston did not cross- examine Ms. Murphy or Mr. Peteranecz, despite having party status to do so. Substantial competent evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the proposed project is consistent with applicable provisions of the Community Development Code, applicable components of the City’s Comprehensive Plan, the Beach Walk District of Beach by Design, and the Design Guidelines of Beach by Design. At the conclusion of the public hearing, the Board acknowledged Preston’s pending request for continuance and proceeded with discussion. After extensive discussion among the Board members, a motion was made and seconded for the Board “to approve case number FLD2017-07012 based on the evidence, the testimony presented, and the application, the staff report, and at today’s hearing, and to adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated in the staff report with all of the conditions of approval, as listed.” The motion carried. On October 19, 2017, the City entered a Development Order memorializing the Board’s decision. The Development Order includes a Finding of Fact that “[t]he total lot area includes 2,195 square feet of the South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way which would need to be vacated by the City,” and includes a Condition of Approval that “application for a building permit be submitted no later than October 17, 2019, unless time extensions are granted.” The City represented at oral argument that if the proposed development is not consistent with the Development Order (e.g., if the approximately 2,195 square feet of the South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way is not vacated), Gulfview will not be able to get a building permit without going through a minor amendment process for a less intense project.
The Issue The issue presented for consideration herein concerns the standing of Petitioners to challenge the development order entered by the City of Alachua, Florida, granting DPI approval to Turkey Creek, Inc. That order dates from June 15, 1982. In particular, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Respondent Turkey Creek asserts that Petitioners are not members of the class of individuals delineated in Subsection 380.07(2), Florida Statutes, who would have standing to appeal the development order; in that Petitioners are neither "owners" or within other classifications of individuals who might file an action before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, which action is in opposition to the grant of the development order. RECORD Although a transcription was not made of the motion hearing, the following items which are attached to this Recommended Order constitute the factual basis for this decision. Attachment "A" is the Notice of Appeal of development order; Attachment "B" is the petition for review of development order with its attendant exhibits; Attachment "C" is the letter of referral from the Secretary to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission to the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings; Attachment "D" is the answer and affirmative defenses to the petition filed by Turkey Creek; Attachment "E" is the motion to dismiss filed by Turkey Creek; Attachment "F" is the notice of hearing related to the motion to dismiss; and Attachment "G" is the supplemental authority offered by Turkey Creek. For purposes of this Recommended Order, notwithstanding the answer of Turkey Creek wherein facts of the Petition are denied, the factual allegations related to the standing issue as made through the petition are deemed to be factually accurate, with the exception of those contentions pertaining to conclusions of law.
Findings Of Fact On January 4, 1982, the Turkey Creek Development of Regional Impact Application for Development Approval was filed with the City of Alachua, Florida, City Commission and North Central Florida Regional Planning Council in accordance with Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. It was filed by Turkey Creek, Inc., as applicant. Turkey Creek, Inc. is wholly-owned by Norwood W. Hope, N. Forest Hope and A. Brice Hope. Turkey Creek proposes to develop 5,300 residential dwelling units on 976+- acres, which constitutes a residential development of regional impact according to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 22F-2.10, Florida Administrative Code, involving real property located in the City of Alachua, Alachua County, Florida, as included in the property description found as an exhibit to the petition document which is Attachment "B" to this Recommended Order. Prior to June 15, 1982, the City of Alachua had previously duly zoned or did simultaneously zone the said 976+-acres PUD and commercial to permit the development as specified in the said application. June 15, 1982, is the date when the City of Alachua adopted the development order for the Turkey Creek Development of Regional Impact. Following the action by the City of Alachua, the Petitioners in this cause, in the person of counsel, filed a notice of appeal of the development order. This appeal was made on June 28, 1982, and on that same date, the petition for review of that development order was filed with the State of Florida, Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. On August 4, 1982, the matter was transmitted to the division of administrative Hearings for formal hearing by action of the Office of the Office of the Secretary of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. The case was subsequently assigned to this Hearing Officer and a motion hearing was conducted to consider a dismissal of this action based upon Respondent Turkey Creek's allegation that the Petitioners lack standing. The motion hearing was conducted on September 2, 1982. Petitioners are owners of real property included within the Turkey Creek development of regional impact and their property is adjacent or in close proximity to properties which were the subject of the City's zoning decision made in conjunction with approval of the development order.
The Issue The preliminary issue in this case is whether the South Florida Water Management District (District) has jurisdiction over the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing (Petition) filed by the Save the Manatee Club (Club)--i.e., whether the Petition was timely or, if not, if the District has jurisdiction under principles of equitable tolling or excusable neglect.
Findings Of Fact On October 11, 1999, Hidden Harbor filed with the District an application for an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) to construct and operate a surface water management system serving a proposed residential development in Lee County, Florida. In January 2001, the Club sent an email to the Florida Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) stating that it was concerned about Hidden Harbor's Application No. 991011- 13, as it might impact an area the Club would like to see as a manatee sanctuary, and was requesting copies of all FWCC documents relating to the permit. FWCC forwarded a copy of this email to the District on January 19, 2001. At the time, the Club's internet website gave the address of its main office in Maitland, Florida, as the Club's official mailing address. On April 9, 2001, the Club opened a Southwest Florida regional satellite office in Estero, Florida, and installed Laura Combs as Regional Coordinator in charge of that office. Responsibility for monitoring the Hidden Harbor application was delegated to Combs and the satellite office. Nonetheless, the Club's website continued to give the address of its main office in Maitland, Florida, as the Club's official mailing address. Combs's prior work experience with the Club was as assistant director of governmental relations in Tallahassee, Florida. In that position, she tracked legislation and actions of the Governor and Cabinet that were of interest to the Club. She had no role in the filing of petitions for administrative hearings on actions of governmental agencies. Combs's education included a bachelor's degree in English and a master's degree in urban and regional planning. She did not have specific legal education in the filing of petitions for administrative hearings on actions of state governmental agencies. On May 30, 2001, the District mailed to the Club at its Maitland office address a letter enclosing the "District's staff report covering the [Hidden Harbor] permit application [No. 991011-13]" and notifying the Club that the "recommendations as stated in the staff report [to grant the attached draft permit] will be presented to our Governing Board for consideration on June 14, 2001." The Club also was advised: Should you wish to object to the staff recommendation or file a petition, please provide written objections, petitions and/or waivers (refer to the attached "Notice of Rights") to [the District's deputy clerk]. The "Notice of Rights" addresses the procedures to be followed if you desire a public hearing or other review of the proposed agency action. You are advised, however, to be prepared to defend your position regarding the permit application when it is considered by the Governing Board for final agency action, even if you agree with the staff recommendation, as the Governing Board may take final agency action which differs materially from the proposed agency action. The Notice of Rights stated that it was intended to conform to the requirement of Section 120.569(1), Florida Statutes, to "inform the recipient of any administrative hearing or judicial review that is available under this section [120.569(1)], s. 120.57 or s. 120.68." It cautioned: Please note that this Notice of Rights is not intended to provide legal advice. Not all the legal proceedings detailed below may be an applicable or appropriate remedy. You may wish to consult an attorney regarding your legal rights. The Notice of Rights included a section entitled "Petition for Administrative Proceedings," which stated in pertinent part: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the South Florida Water Management District's (SFWMD) action has the right to request an administrative hearing on that action. The affected person may request either a formal or an informal hearing, as set forth below. A point of entry into administrative proceedings is governed by Rules 28-106.111 and 40E-1.511, Fla. Admin. Code, (also published as an exception to the Uniform Rules of Procedure as Rule 40E-0.109), as set forth below . . .. Formal Administrative Hearing: If a genuine issue(s) of material fact is in dispute, the affected person seeking a formal hearing on a SFWMD decision which does or may determine their substantial interests shall file a petition for hearing pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. or for mediation pursuant to Section 120.573, Fla. Stat. within 21 days . . . of either written notice through mail or posting or publication of notice that the SFWMD has or intends to take final agency action. Pertinent to this case, the Notice of Rights included a verbatim reproduction of Florida Administrative Code Rule 28- 106.201, addressing required contents of a petition to initiate proceedings involving disputed issues of material fact. Rules 28-106.111, 40E-1.5111, and 40E-0.109 were not reproduced in the Notice of Rights. It is not clear from the evidence when the letter dated May 30, 2001, with attachments (the Notice Correspondence), was received in the Club's Maitland office. It was not date-stamped, as time-sensitive correspondence normally would be. Apparently, it was decided to forward the Notice Correspondence to the new satellite office in Estero for handling. Combs received the forwarded Notice Correspondence in early June 2001. This was the "first time [Combs] had been through this type of process." Combs reviewed the Notice Correspondence, eventually focusing on paragraph 1.a. of the "Petition for Administrative Proceedings" section of the Notice of Rights. She did not read any of the cited statutes and rules except for the rules reproduced verbatim as part of the Notice of Rights. Combs made conflicting statements regarding her understanding of the District's administrative process. However, it appears that she understood that the Club could file a petition within 21 days of receipt of the Notice Correspondence, or within 21 days of the "final" action of the District's Governing Board. She testified that, because the Notice Correspondence did not bear a date-stamp, it was unclear when the first 21-day time period began or ended; as a result, she decided to wait until the District's Governing Board took "final" action and file a petition within the second 21-day time period. Combs appeared at the meeting of the District's Governing Board on June 14, 2001, and spoke in opposition to issuance of the draft permit. Notwithstanding the Club's opposition, the Governing Board decided to issue the draft permit. Combs does not have authority to file petitions for administrative hearings on District actions. She consulted with her supervisor, Patricia Thompson, and they made a recommendation to the Club's governing board, which has ultimate authority to file petitions. Prior to Combs's involvement in the Hidden Harbor application, the Club had staff legal counsel, who could be consulted with respect to the filing of petitions and would advise the Club's governing board. However, the Club did not have staff legal counsel at the time of Combs's involvement and through the time of filing of this petition. (The Club now again has staff legal counsel.) Neither Combs nor Thompson saw any need to consult an attorney. It is not clear when the recommendation of Combs and Thompson was presented to the Club's governing board or when the Club's governing board made its decision to file the Petition. Neither Thompson nor any member of the Club's governing board (nor anyone else who may have participated in the decision to file the Petition) testified. Several (according to Combs, approximately 12) times after the District's Governing Board's meeting on June 14, 2001, Combs telephoned the District's offices to obtain a copy of the District's Governing Board's "final" action when it was reduced to writing. It is not clear from the evidence why several telephone calls were required. Eventually, on June 26, 2001, Combs received a copy of the permit issued to Hidden Harbor; there was no Notice of Rights attached. On July 17, 2001, the Club filed its Petition challenging the permit issued to Hidden Harbor. In the meantime, Hidden Harbor had obtained a final development order from Lee County in reliance on the Club's failure to petition for an administrative hearing. The Club is not a newcomer to Florida's administrative process. It can be officially recognized that the Club has participated in numerous proceedings before DOAH. At least one of those cases involved issues similar to those presented for determination in this case. See Conclusion of Law 32, infra.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order dismissing the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _________________________________ J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Cindy L. Bartin, Esquire Post Office Box 861118 St. Augustine, Florida 32086 Martha M. Collins, Esquire 233 3rd Street North, Suite 100 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Keith W. Rizzardi, Esquire South Florida Water Management District 3301 Gun Club Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-3089 Frank R. Finch, Executive Director South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4680
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-10.041(3)(d) of the South Florida Water Management District (“the District”) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Conservancy is a non-profit Florida corporation with its offices in Naples, Florida. It has 6,200 members residing in Southwest Florida. The mission of the Conservancy is to protect the environment and natural resources of Southwest Florida. The Caloosahatchee River is an important focus of the Conservancy’s organizational activities and objectives. A substantial number of the members of the Conservancy use the Caloosahatchee River for drinking water, boating, fishing, wildlife observation, and scientific research. The proposed rules create a prospective reservation of water in the not-yet-operational Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Reservoir “for fish and wildlife.” The Conservancy’s interests would be substantially affected by the proposed reservation. The District is a regional water management agency created, granted powers, and assigned duties under chapter 373, Florida Statutes (2013). It is headquartered in West Palm Beach, Florida. Proposed rule 40E-10.041(3) states: (3) Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Storage Reservoir: All surface water contained within and released, via operation, from the Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Storage Reservoir is reserved from allocation. The water reserved under this paragraph will be available for fish and wildlife upon a formal determination of the Governing Board, pursuant to state and federal law, that the Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Storage Reservoir is operational. The reservation contained within this subsection and the criteria contained in section 3.11.4 of the Applicant’s Handbook for Water Use Permit Applications within the South Florida Water Management District, incorporated by reference in Rule 40E-2.091, F.A.C., shall be revised in light of changed conditions or new information prior to the approval described in paragraph (3)(b) above. Pursuant to subsection 373.223(4), F.S., presently existing legal uses for the duration of a permit existing on [RULE ADOPTION DATE] are not contrary to the public interest. The Conservancy challenges only paragraph (3)(d), contending that it modifies or contravenes the implementing statute, section 373.223(4).
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's certification as a minority business enterprise should be revoked, as proposed by Petitioner in its letter dated December 20, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Respondent, Civil Construction Technologies, Inc. (CCT), is a corporation engaged in the business of providing earthwork, clearing, canal excavation, and erosion control services for prime contractors. The firm was incorporated on April 6, 2000, and until November 2001, it was located at 1132 Northeast 48th Street, Pompano Beach, Florida. The business was then relocated to 3100 Northwest Boca Raton Boulevard, Boca Raton, Florida. The sole owner and shareholder is Bonnie S. Cramer, a female who qualifies as a minority under the Supplier Diversity & Outreach Program (Program) codified in Part VI, Chapter 40E-7, Florida Administrative Code. That Program is administered by Petitioner, South Florida Water Management District (District). CCT's application for certification as a minority business enterprise (MBE) was filed with the District on December 12, 2000, and was approved on December 15, 2000, in the areas of earthwork, clearing, canal excavation, and erosion control. The certification expires on December 15, 2003. Although the District had "some concerns" regarding Ms. Cramer's knowledge of the business during its review of the application, it gave her "the benefit of the doubt on the application because she had worked in the industry." On August 22, 2001, the District held a "partnering" meeting for all contractors, including CCT, on a pump station project awarded to Beers Stanska, Inc. (the Beers project). CCT was represented at the meeting by Ronald J. Coddington (Ron Coddington), a non-minority professional engineer who had worked on other District projects in the past and owns an earthwork company. Coddington's attendance on behalf of a minority contractor raised suspicions on the part of a District contract administrator, Jessica Flathmann, who also attended the meeting. Ms. Flathmann, who is now on active duty with the military, prepared a short note the same date requesting that the District's compliance section "[p]lease check out [CCT's] information (minority status) with state on-line info." The "state on-line info" refers to the Department of State's web site for Florida corporations. A subsequent name search under the Department of State's corporation records revealed that since at least 1987 Ms. Cramer had been an officer and/or director in a number of other corporations, including Team Land Holdings, Inc. (vice- president, secretary, treasurer, and 50 percent owner), Team Environmental Resources, Inc. (owner, president, vice- president, and secretary-treasurer), Team Land Development, Inc. (treasurer), Team Offshore Services, Inc. (secretary- treasurer), Team Marine Services, Inc. (director and secretary-treasurer), and R.J. Coddington and Associates, P.A. (vice-president). Except for Team Environmental Resources, Inc., Ron Coddington was a principal in, and owner of, all of the other corporations. Because Ms. Cramer had failed to acknowledge a relationship with any other firms on her application, the District decided to conduct an investigation concerning CCT's eligibility for MBE status. Based on a site visit to Ms. Cramer's office, and an interview with her, the District determined that decertification proceedings were appropriate. By letter dated December 20, 2001, as later clarified during discovery, the District alleged that CCT made a material misrepresentation on its original application for certification in violation of Rule 40E-7.653(2), Florida Administrative Code; that CCT "shared resources with a non-minority person or business in the same or an associated field" in violation of Rule 40E- 7.653(6)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code; and that CCT's owner, Ms. Cramer, "does not possess the knowledge and technical expertise to manage the day-to-day activities of her firm." Respondent denies all allegations. It also suggests that the District's real purpose in revoking the certification is because of animosity between certain District personnel and Ron Coddington, with whom Ms. Cramer has had a personal relationship and is now engaged to marry. Material Mispresentation The District first alleges that Petitioner made a material mispresentation on its application for certification by answering Question 20 in the negative. That question reads as follows: ARE ANY OWNERS, PARTNERS OR PRINCIPALS OF YOUR COMPANY AFFILIATED WITH ANY OTHER FIRM(S) AS EMPLOYEES, SHAREHOLDERS, OR DIRECTORS? If Yes, please list below, attach a written explanation of the business relationship and provide a financial statement for the affiliate firm(s). Ms. Cramer answered Question 20 "No." At the end of the application, she executed a lengthy affidavit acknowledging that all of the statements contained in the application were "true, accurate and complete." When the question was answered, Ms. Cramer was a vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and part-owner of Team Land Holdings, Inc., a corporation which owned the building listed as the business address for CCT and two corporations in which Ron Coddington was a principal. As to Team Environmental Services, Inc. and Team Land Development, Inc., however, the parties disagree on Ms. Cramer's status in those corporations at the time the application was filed. The other corporations are not in issue since they are no longer active or Ms. Cramer has resigned as an officer, director, or employee. Ms. Cramer was president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer of Team Environmental Services, Inc. and filed the paperwork to incorporate the business. She indicated that the corporation "never did any business," had no income, closed its books in either April or August 2000, and filed its final tax return for calendar year 2000. Even so, Ms. Cramer continued to file annual reports with the Secretary of State for two more years after the corporation allegedly closed its books, and she did not file Articles of Dissolution for the corporation until April 2002, or just before her deposition in this case was taken. Given these circumstances, it is found that Ms. Cramer was still affiliated with an active corporation at the time she filed her application, and this information should have been disclosed. Beginning in 1987 and continuing until May 2000, Ms. Cramer was a director, officer, and employee of Team Land Development, Inc., a firm engaged in the earthwork business and owned by Ron Coddington. However, Ms. Cramer submitted into evidence a letter to Ron Coddington dated May 10, 2000, tendering her resignation as an officer and director. The authenticity of that letter was not challenged. She also testified that she resigned as an employee around March 2000. While the record shows that Ms. Cramer prepared and filed the annual report for the company in 2001, or after she had resigned as an employee, she explained that she was simply helping out by doing some "extra accounting" for the firm even though she was no longer on the payroll. In light of these circumstances, there is less than clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Cramer was affiliated with Team Land Development, Inc. at the time she submitted her application for certification, and thus she was not required to disclose her relationship with that entity. One of the purposes of Question 20 is to determine if an applicant has a parent company, affiliates, or subsidiaries. This information is then used by the District to determine whether the applicant has true management and control over the business or whether another entity has actual control over the applicant. The information is also used to determine whether the applicant meets the size standards for MBEs when combined with the affiliates. This is important because District regulations establish certain size thresholds (in terms of net assets and number of employees) which an applicant cannot exceed. It can be inferred from the evidence that for these reasons, the District considers the information in Question 20 to be material since the information is essential in order to properly review a MBE application. Ms. Cramer, who signed the application, suggested that Question 20 was ambiguous and unclear. However, Ms. Cramer never sought guidance from District personnel to clear up any confusion she might have, nor did she read the MBE rule itself. Rather, she interpreted the question as requiring an affirmative response only if she was affiliated with another firm involved "in [a] similar or same field" as CCT. Because the two corporations in which she was then affiliated did not provide the same or similar services as CCT, she responded in the negative. Question 20 is clear and unambiguous. It simply requires an applicant to identify any other corporation or entity in which the applicant is affiliated. The question does not mention, or even suggest, that an affirmative answer is required only if the other entity is in the same or similar field as the applicant's business. Respondent's contention that the question was ambiguous and susceptible to more than one interpretation has been rejected. The only remaining issue is whether the omitted information was "material" so as to constitute a ground for revocation of the certification. As noted above, the District considers the information derived from Question 20 to be material since that information is necessary to carry out its responsibility of determining an applicant's eligibility. Therefore, the failure by Ms. Cramer to disclose her relationship with two corporations was a material omission, as alleged in the letter of December 20, 2001. Did CCT share resources with a non-MBE? Petitioner next alleges that CCT shared resources with a non-minority person or business which is in the same field of operations in violation of Rule 40E-7.653(6)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code. Those provisions require that the minority owner demonstrate its independence and that the business does not share common ownership, directors, or facilities with a non-minority person or business in the same or related field of operations. Ron Coddington is the owner of Team Land Development, Inc. (TDI), an earthmoving company which performed contract work for the District until January 2002, and for whom CCT was a subcontractor on two District projects. TDI's business address was 1132 Northeast 48th Street, Pompano Beach, which is the same address used by CCT until November 2001. In addition, R.J. Coddington & Associates, Inc., an engineering firm owned by Ron Coddington, also listed that street address as its business address for the years 2000 and 2001. That firm provides engineering services through Mr. Coddington's professional engineering license. Thus, the three corporations shared the same address from April 2000 (when CCT was incorporated) until November 2001. A small office building is located at 1132 Northeast 48th Street and is owned by Team Land Holdings, Inc., a company in which Ron Coddington and Ms. Cramer each owns 50 percent of the stock. The exact configuration of the offices within the building is not clear although Ms. Cramer testified that the building once had three separate "suites," each with a separate entrance, and that CCT occupied an office in the back of the building with a conference table that was used for all CCT meetings. However, when District investigators visited the building for an interview with Ms. Cramer in October 2001, they entered a common entrance, met her in a "front" office area, and were not invited into a separate office in the back of the building. Likewise, when they interviewed Ron Coddington during the course of this proceeding, he also met them in the same front area and did not invite them into a separate office. Respondent contended that the three firms only shared a fax machine and a kitchen area used primarily for storage purposes. Even so, the more clear and convincing evidence supports a finding that three corporations, including at least one engaged in the same business as CCT, were sharing facilities, as prohibited by the rule. Therefore, it is found that from December 2000 when it was first certified, and until November 2001, CCT shared facilities (offices) with a non-MBE business (Team Land Development, Inc.) which was engaged in the same business (earthmoving) as CCT. Did Ms. Cramer possess the knowledge and experience to operate her business? Finally, the District alleges that Ms. Cramer "does not possess the knowledge and technical expertise to manage the day-to-day activities of her firm," as required by Rule 40E-7.653(5)(c)4., Florida Administrative Code. That rule requires that Ms. Cramer have "managerial and technical capability, knowledge, training, education and experience required to make decisions regarding that particular type of work." To support this allegation, the District relies upon a report prepared by the District's Inspector-General on December 6, 2001; the results of an interview with Ms. Cramer conducted in January 2002 by a professional engineer; and the deposition of Ms. Cramer taken during the spring of 2002 in preparation for the final hearing. Ms. Cramer's background is in accounting and bookkeeping. She is not an engineer. Indeed, on her personal income tax return for the year 2000, she listed her occupation as an accountant. She also admits that she is not an expert in earthmoving, nor does she have experience working at job sites overseeing that type of work. According to the resume attached to her application, and before CCT was incorporated, Ms. Cramer was employed in the following positions, some of which were apparently part- time: (1) bank teller and branch manager of a bank (1972- 1981); (2) bookkeeper for an upholstery firm (1981-1998); owner of a music store (1982-1985); accounting assistant for a general contractor (1985-1987); accounting assistant to a certified public accountant (1987-1998); and treasurer of Team Land Development, Inc. (1987-1999). The same resume represents that CCT's "typical work" includes canal excavation, erosion control and dewatering, and wetland construction. It also indicates that the firm provides "earthwork and construction solutions for prime contractors," as well as "skilled, knowledgeable personnel providing a variety of earthwork, erosion control and site environmental mitigation services." In issuing its proposed agency action, the District relied in part upon an investigation conducted by Mr. Sooker, a certified public accountant in its Inspector-General's Office. Mr. Sooker performed an on-site "audit" of CCT on October 30 and 31, 2001. The audit included an interview with Ms. Cramer and the examination of various documentation related to the business. In his report, Mr. Sooker concluded that CCT did not meet eligibility standards for a MBE for several reasons, including an opinion that Ms. Cramer "d[id] not possess the background, experience, and technical expertise to manage and control job site work activities." After the letter of December 20, 2001, was issued, Ms. Cramer requested a meeting with the District to demonstrate that she had the necessary experience to manage the day-to-day operations of an earthmoving company. The meeting was held in January 2002. At that time, a District professional engineer, Mr. Weldon, who has extensive experience in earthmoving, posed a series of questions to Ms. Cramer regarding her knowledge of that business. While Respondent contends that Mr. Weldon's interview was flawed in many respects, it is found that the interview was a reasonable and appropriate way in which to test Ms. Cramer's qualifications to operate an earthmoving business. In response to many of the questions, Ms. Cramer simply stated that she would rely on her foreman and project manager to resolve the issues raised by the engineer. As to the remaining inquiries, she failed to demonstrate any technical expertise in the area. Thus, the meeting reconfirmed the District's preliminary conclusion (found in Mr. Sooker's report) regarding Ms. Cramer's lack of technical expertise in the area for which CCT was certified. During a deposition taken prior to hearing, Ms. Cramer was also asked a series of questions pertaining to earthmoving to ascertain the degree of experience and competence that she possessed. Again, Ms. Cramer failed to demonstrate that she had the requisite experience necessary to manage her business. For example, Ms. Cramer was unfamiliar with the term "shrinkage," a term commonly used in the business; she could not describe a method for estimating canal excavation or factors necessary to make that estimate; she could not state what type of equipment would be used if the material being excavated had dense sand, weak limestone, or cemented shells; she was unaware that soil borings would indicate the presence of rock in the material being excavated; and she could not describe the process for excavating and constructing a berm "with haul that would affect equipment collection." An experienced person in the field of earthmoving would be expected to correctly answer most, if not all, of these inquiries. Thus, Ms. Cramer did not demonstrate any level of experience or firsthand knowledge in operating an earthwork company. While she was able to respond more accurately to some of these same questions at the final hearing, the undersigned assumed that she could do so only because the intervening time between the deposition and final hearing allowed her to consult with experts and prepare her answers. In addition, Ms. Cramer acknowledged that she has never been a project manager for any construction job, including those that CCT has contracted to perform; she has never operated any heavy equipment; she has never personally prepared job estimates involving plans and specifications by herself; she cannot read construction plans and specifications; she has not negotiated any contracts for CCT; and she has never attended any meetings that the District has held for the Beers project. On the Beers project, in which CCT is a subcontractor for the prime contractor, notices of safety violations by CCT employees are sent to Ron Coddington's attention, and the first subcontract agreement between Beers and CCT was also sent to his attention. In fact, in correspondence to CCT, the Beers office manager for the project assumed that Ron Coddington was president of the firm. At the same time, Ms. Cramer relies heavily on her foremen and Ron Coddington (who serves as a $1,600.00 per week consultant) to deal with all technical aspects of her business and to answer questions regarding the Beers project. She further acknowledged that she has delegated a number of tasks on the Beers project to Ron Coddington, such as providing estimates and bid takeoffs; providing on-site project management; preparing project schedules and monthly estimates; making on-site inspections; coordinating on-site surveys and quality control with CCT employees; assuming responsibility for owner and prime contractor conduct on the District pump station projects; and representing CCT at all job coordination meetings. Notwithstanding the above, Respondent contends that the Inspector-General's report dated December 6, 2001, is the primary underpinning for the District's case and that the report is flawed in numerous respects. For example, the Inspector-General's Office has an operations manual which spells out the manner in which investigations shall be conducted. Contrary to specific requirements in the operations manual, Mr. Sooker did not prepare, sign, and file a statement of independence, and he did not maintain and preserve working papers, outlines of questions, and interview notes in the investigative file. These deficiencies were confirmed through the testimony of Respondent's expert, Mr. Kirchenbaum, a certified public accountant, as well as the Inspector-General himself. While Mr. Sooker's investigation admittedly did not fully conform with the operations manual, his conclusions regarding Ms. Cramer's experience were independently verified and reconfirmed through the interview with Ms. Cramer in January 2002 and the answers given by her in the deposition taken in April 2002. Therefore, even if Mr. Sooker's report is ignored, there is other clear and convincing evidence to support the allegations in the letter of December 20, 2001. For the foregoing reasons, it is found that Ms. Cramer does not have managerial and technical capability, knowledge, training, education, and experience required to make decisions regarding the type of business in which she is certified, as alleged in the letter of December 20, 2001.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order revoking the MBE certification of Civil Construction Technologies, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry Dean, Executive Director South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4680 Catherine A. Linton, Esquire South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4680 Bradford J. Beilly, Esquire Bradford J. Beilly, P.A. 400 Southeast 18th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316-2820
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-7.523(2)(c) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.*
Findings Of Fact The Parties 1. The District is a public corporation existing by virtue of Chapter 25270, Laws of Florida (1949), and operating pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Title 40E-7, Florida Administrative Code, asa multipurpose water management district, with its principal office in West Palm Beach, Florida. 2. KRVSA is a Florida corporation whose members are substantially affected by the rule in question. 3. Phillip B. Griner is an individual who holds a Special Use License to use the Lower Reedy Creek Management Area/Rough Island Management Unit Protected Zone. He has been a member of KVSA since its inception in 1998 and was serving on its board of directors at the time of the final hearing.
Conclusions Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Petition for Administrative Hearing is denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 19th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Pan ate J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2003.
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original notice of appeal with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. 31
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if a Petition for Relief is referred to the DOAH for formal hearing based on a Notice of Determination: No Jurisdiction issued by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR resume jurisdiction of the matter and complete the investigation of the Charge of Discrimination, pursuant to Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes, or permit Petitioner to make her election of remedies pursuant to Section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: William R. Amlong, Esquire Amlong & Amlong, P.A. 500 Northeast Fourth Street Second Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-1154 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, et. al. 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
