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DONALD F. WOODARD vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 90-003386 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Jun. 01, 1990 Number: 90-003386 Latest Update: Aug. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed by the Department of Corrections as a full-time career service employee. On July 13, 1984, he was ranked as a Correctional Officer I at Florida State Prison (FSP). On March 2, 1990, Petitioner had been placed on workers' compensation due to a back injury. On Thursday, April 5, 1990, Dr. W. David Sikes of the Bradford Chiropractic Center signed a medical release permitting Petitioner to return to light duty on Monday, April 9, 1990. Dr. Sikes was apparently the authorized treating physician to whom the agency had currently obligated itself pursuant to Chapter 440 F.S. [The Florida Workers' Compensation Act]. A previous physician had released Petitioner for full-duty work on April 3, 1990. Petitioner was present in the office of Personnel Manager Marion Bronson on Friday, April 6, 1990. At that time, Mr. Bronson told Petitioner to report for work on the first shift (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.) on Monday, April 9, 1990. This meant Petitioner would be doing mail room duty during the day instead of his regular duties on his regular shift of midnight to 8:00 a.m. Petitioner told Mr. Bronson he could not work the first shift due to his needing to be home to take of his invalid wife. To this, Mr. Bronson replied that the first shift was the only light duty available. On Friday, April 6, 1990 Petitioner did not refuse to come in to work the first shift on Monday, April 9, and he did not tell Mr. Bronson that he was already signed out on annual leave for that date. Nonetheless, Mr. Bronson was left with the impression at the end of their meeting that Petitioner would not come back to light-duty work on Monday. Petitioner did not report for work on the first shift on April 9, 10, or 11, 1990 (Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday). On Wednesday, April 11, 1990, Mr. Bronson mailed Petitioner a letter that read, in pertinent part: You have been carried in unauthorized leave without pay status since April 9, 1990. You were also carried on unauthorized leave without pay on April 3, 1990. You are hereby instructed to return to duty at 8:00 a.m. the day after you receive this letter. If you do not return to duty on that date it will be deemed that you have abandoned your position at Florida State Prison and you will be dismissed. In the past, the FSP personnel office usually made further efforts to contact missing employees after such a letter had been sent, but no such attempts were made in this instance. Normally, FSP gives employees an opportunity to call in and rectify absentee problems but deems it abandonment if the employee does not respond. At no time subsequent to April 6, 1990 did Petitioner contact anyone at FSP regarding his absence. Petitioner did not actually receive the April 11 letter until Friday, April 13. Petitioner did not report for work on Saturday, April 14, Sunday, April 15, or Monday, April 16. Saturday would have been a regular workday for Petitioner. However, Petitioner's usual days off were Sunday and Monday, and nothing had been said by Mr. Bronson about altering Petitioner's workdays. On Monday, April 16, Mr. Bronson mailed Petitioner a letter that read, in pertinent part: This is to inform you that in accordance with Section 22A-7.010(2), F.A.C., you have been deemed to have abandoned your position as Correctional Officer I and resigned from the Career Service System effective April 14, 1990. A copy of Section 22A-7.010(2) is enclosed for your information. You have been absent from duty for at least three consecutive workdays without authorized leave as follows: April 10, 11, and 12, 1990. Please be advised that you have been dropped from the payroll effective the close of business April 14, 1990. Unbeknownst to Mr. Bronson, Petitioner had exercised preapproved annual leave for the period of April 10-14, 1990. None of Petitioner's superiors advised Mr. Bronson of this fact. There was no notation to this effect in Petitioner's personnel file in Mr. Bronson's office. It was Mr. Bronson's testimony that it was better personnel management and he would have preferred to have Petitioner drawing annual leave during this period than to be paying him full pay for makeshift light duty. If Petitioner had requested annual leave on April 6, 1990, Mr. Bronson would have granted it. As of April 14, 1990, Petitioner had "banked" 119.75 hours of annual leave time which would have been sufficient to cover his April 10-14, 1990 vacation or "no show" days. Additionally, he also had available 26.5 hours of sick leave but this sick leave was subject to certain deductions and adjustments which had allowed the agency to keep Petitioner on at full pay the previous week while technically he was only eligible for a reduced amount based on workers' compensation. In accord with standard FSP policy, Petitioner had previously submitted an annual leave request form on October 16, 1989 to request leave for the week of April 10 through April 14, 1990. This form had been approved by his immediate superior, who at that time was his shift supervisor, Officer Gaskin. Officer Gaskin was the correct superior to make such approval. Mr. Bronson has nothing to do with the approval of leave under such circumstances. Harry Tison, who became Petitioner's shift supervisor in April 1990 while Petitioner was still out on workers' compensation leave, was not aware of Petitioner's preapproved annual leave until Mr. Bronson's office began making inquiries after the April 16 letter, but at that time, Tison was able to refer to a leave calendar posted in his area which showed that Petitioner was expected to be out on annual leave on those days. From that information, Officer Tison, by reason of his familiarity with the FSP system and hierarchy, could infer that Petitioner's leave had been approved by FSP's highest command figure, "the Colonel." Some witnesses alluded to FSP policy that even preapproved annual leave requests constituted only tentative approval unless the employee checked with his supervisor a week before actually exercising his leave so as to be sure that the preapproved leave had not been revoked due to an employee crunch, but there is no such rule or printed policy of the Department of Corrections or FSP, and the evidence is insufficient to establish such a vague policy as uniform or binding on Petitioner. Also, in this instance, the week before, Petitioner was away from work most of that week on workers' compensation disability, and there is no evidence of any employee crunch which would have altered the prior annual leave approval.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner has not abandoned his position and returning him to the appropriate position with back pay and emoluments, subject to any appropriate setoffs under the Workers' Compensation Act and any mitigation from other employment. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Petitioner has filed only a "Final Argument" and that is essentially legal argument and proposed conclusions of law as opposed to proposed findings of fact which are entitled to a ruling pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. Moreover, the format does not lend itself to intelligible rulings since no sentence is numbered. Respondent's PFOF: 1-6 Accepted. Accepted except for the last sentence, which does not comport with the testimony heard. Accepted. Rejected in FOF 13, which reflects the greater weight of the credible evidence. Accepted but subordinate. - 15 Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Perri M. King Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Gloria W. Fletcher, Esquire 515 North Main Street, Suite 300 Post Office Box 1208 Gainesville, Florida 32602 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs JERRY O. BRYAN, 90-002048 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Crestview, Florida Apr. 02, 1990 Number: 90-002048 Latest Update: Nov. 27, 1990

Findings Of Fact Respondent Jerry O. Bryan began working for the State Road Department in 1968. In 1983, he started his most recent assignment with the agency, now called the Florida Department of Transportation, as an engineering technician III, in a career service position. An employee handbook respondent was furnished in 1983 had this to say about "JOB ABANDONMENT": After an unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. It is very important that you coordinate any personal absences with your immediate supervisor, in accordance with our current leave policy. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, at page 43. Perhaps with this in mind, respondent requested leave without pay when he learned he faced six months' incarceration, as a result of his criminal conviction for cultivating marijuana on federal property. Respondent's supervisor, Robert Edward Minchin, Jr. denied his request for leave without pay, in accordance with a DOT policy against granting leave to DOT employees who are incarcerated. Mr. Bryan did not request annual leave, although some 220 hours' entitlement had accumulated. Asked whether he would have granted Mr. Bryan's leave request absent "a policy of not authorizing leave while someone was incarcerated," Mr. Minchin answered in the negative, saying Mr. Bryan "was going to be needed during ... [the time] he would be out. T.22. At no time did petitioner ever take disciplinary action against respondent, who received satisfactory or higher job performance ratings, the whole time he worked for petitioner. Aware that Mr. Bryan did not desire or intend to resign, relinquish or abandon his career service position, Mr. Minchin took steps to remove him from the payroll solely on grounds that he was absent without authorized leave for three consecutive workdays.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reinstate respondent and award back pay, but without prejudice to instituting any appropriate proceedings before the Public Employees Relations Commission. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry O. Bryan Federal Prison Camp Post Office Box 600 Eglin AFB, Florida 32542-7606 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Robert Scanlon, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (2) 110.227447.207
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PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs WALTER AUERBACH, 96-003683 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Aug. 06, 1996 Number: 96-003683 Latest Update: Oct. 17, 1997

The Issue A notice dated July 2, 1996 and an administrative complaint dated September 30, 1996, charge Respondent with willful neglect of duty. The issue for disposition is whether he committed this violation and if so, whether he should be terminated as a member of the instructional staff of the Palm Beach County School Board.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Walter Auerbach, has been employed as a classroom teacher with the Palm Beach County school district since the 1976-77 school year and is employed pursuant to a continuing contract from which he may be discharged only in accordance with the terms of section 231.36, Florida Statutes. (Stipulation of the parties) Respondent was administratively placed in the district’s Department of Information Management in the 1994-95 school year pending resolution of allegations of misconduct brought by a female student. He was transferred to the district’s textbook/library media service office for the 1995-96 school year. (Stipulation of the parties) The reassignment was by agreement between Respondent’s representative, Clarence Gunn, Associate Executive Director of the Palm Beach County Classroom Teachers’ Association (CTA) and district staff. In December 1994, Respondent entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in the criminal case related to the student’s allegations. An investigation and proceedings by Professional Practices Services continued, however, and any disposition of that proceeding is not a matter of record here. Respondent satisfied the terms of his deferred prosecution agreement in December 1995. Jane Terwillegar was Respondent’s supervisor in the district’s library media services department. His duties were primarily computer searches for bibliographic records. When he came to work Respondent did his assignments, worked quietly and left; there were no concerns about his performance. However, he attended only sporadically in the fall of 1995, and starting in January 1996 he attended very rarely. At one point Ms. Terwillegar said something to him about showing up to earn his money, but he responded that he had a great deal of sick leave. By early 1996, Respondent had depleted all of his sick leave, but continued to be absent far more than he attended. Vernon Crawford is the district’s director of multimedia services and is Jane Terwillegar’s immediate supervisor. Because of budget cuts in his department, Mr. Crawford has a standing request for assistance from employees with available time. He is happy to take on individuals placed on special or temporary assignment by Dr. Walter Pierce, assistant superintendent for personnel relations. The understanding that he has with the personnel department is that the individuals are assigned on a temporary or day-to-day basis. Mr. Crawford does not question why the individual is assigned and he usually asks his staff not to question the circumstances. From time to time, Ms. Terwillegar advised Mr. Crawford that Respondent was absent; and after the first part of 1996, when the absences were increasing, Mr. Crawford sought the guidance of Dr. Pierce’s office in addressing the problem with Respondent. On the advice of Paul LaChance, an administrative assistant for employee relations, Mr. Crawford sent this letter to Respondent on April 17, 1996: Dear Mr. Auerbach: Since your interim assignment to the Department of Multimedia Services on August 15, 1995, you have taken one hundred twenty five (125) days of sick leave without medical documentation. You have not requested nor received approval for short term or long term leave of absence. Consequently, I am directing you to provide Jane Terwillegar, Specialist for Library/Media Support and your assigned supervisor, with a written, signed statement from your doctor documenting the necessity of your sick leave as well as a date when s/he projects you able to return to work. Your failure to provide this information within ten (10) days of receipt of this letter may result in my recommending disciplinary action for violation of proper reporting procedures and use of sick leave as outlined in School Board Policy 3.80, Leaves of Absence, and leave provisions contained in Article V, Section A.2 and Section B.1(f), and any other pertinent provision of the Agreement between the School Board of Palm Beach County and the Classroom Teachers Association. (Respondent’s exhibit 1) Respondent took the letter to his representative, Mr. Gunn, who told him to take a doctor’s statement to his supervisor, so that he could work out the appropriate leave based on the doctor’s determination. In response, Respondent turned in to Jane Terwillegar a statement from his chiropractor, Dr. Brian Soroka, dated April 26, 1996 stating: This is to certify that Walter Auerbach has recovered sufficiently to be able to return to regular work. Restrictions: none. (Petitioner’s exhibit 1) Instead of returning to work, Respondent continued his practice of calling in every morning early and leaving a message on the office answering machine. Jonathan Leahy, an employee in the Library/Media Services Department at the McKesson Building answered the phone when Respondent called in after 8:00 a.m., but most frequently he took Respondent’s messages from the answering machine. Starting in mid-April, at Mr. Crawford’s instruction, he wrote the messages down, verbatim. The messages were typically brief: “I’m not going to make it today”; or “I’m under the weather”; or, on a couple of occasions, Respondent said that he needed to meet with his lawyer. Between April 16 and June 14, 1996, Respondent was absent forty-two work days. Meanwhile, on May 7, 1996, Mr. Crawford sent another letter to Respondent: Dear Mr. Auerbach: Yesterday, May 6, 1996, Jane Terwillegar, your assigned supervisor, brought me a work release form from the Family Chiropractic Center, dated April 26, 1996, that you were able to return to regular work duty with no restrictions. Be advised that your actions to date remain in noncompliance with my April 17, 1996 letter to you. Further, even though the Family Chiropractic Center cleared you on April 26, 1996, to return to work, you have not done so and have remained continuously absent. At this point, I am directing you to provide me with the information I directed you in my April 17, 1996 letter to provide me: medical verification from your attending physician as to the specific reason(s) and need for your continual absenteeism. Such documentation is to be provided to Jane Terwillegar or to my office within five (5) working days from your receipt of this letter. Failure to provide this information may result in my recommending disciplinary action outlined in my April 17, 1996, letter which you received and signed for on April 18, 1996. (Petitioner’s exhibit 3) There was no response by Respondent to the May 7th letter and a meeting was convened on June 14, 1996 with Respondent, Mr. Gunn, Mr. LaChance and Mr. Crawford. Respondent was given another opportunity to present a physician’s statement justifying his absences. Respondent returned to Dr. Soroka and obtained this statement dated June 18, 1996: Mr. Auerbach has been treating in this office for low back pain and stress related complaints. He treats on a supportive care basis as his symptoms necessitate. On occasion, he is unable to work due to the severity of his symptoms. (Respondent’s exhibit 3) On July 2, 1996, the superintendent, Dr. Kowal, notified Respondent of her recommendation that he be terminated for willful neglect of duties based on his excessive use of sick leave without approved leave and his failure to return to duty after being released by his doctor. There are leave forms indicating that Respondent’s sick leave was “approved”. These forms are ordinarily turned in when an employee returns from an illness. Many of the forms were not completed or signed by Respondent, but rather were signed by someone else, when he never returned during a pay period and the forms needed to go to the payroll office. The leave forms are marked “approved”. Mr. Crawford approved the leave because Respondent called in and because Respondent was only a temporarily-assigned employee. Nevertheless, after the early part of 1996 when the absences increased in frequency, Mr. Crawford appropriately sought advice of the personnel office and he followed that advice regarding a physician’s statement to justify Respondent’s absences. Dr. Soroka was the only medical professional treating Respondent during the relevant period. Based on Respondent’s complaints to him, Dr. Soroka performed chiropractic adjustments to relieve muscle strains and irritations to his nervous system. Nothing in Dr. Soroka’s records indicated that Respondent was incapable of working and he never told Respondent to not return to work. Respondent contends that his absences were justified by the stress that he was suffering from his legal problems. He was the caregiver for aged and ailing parents; and he also suffered from anxiety attacks, headaches and lower back pain. Respondent’s contract with the district was for 196 days in the 1995/96 school year. Of those 196 days, he was absent approximately 167 days. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between Palm Beach County Classroom Teachers Association and the School District of Palm Beach County, Florida, July 1, 1995 - June 30, 1997, governs Respondent’s employment during the relevant period. Paid leave is available for illness of an employee and the employee’s family. All absences from duty must be covered by leave applications which are duly authorized. Leave for sickness or other emergencies will be deemed granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. When misuse of sick leave is suspected, the superintendent may investigate and require verification of illness. (Respondent’s exhibit 2, Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article V, Section A). When employees have used all accumulated leave, but are still qualified for sick leave, they are entitled to sick leave without pay. Except in emergency situations, short or long-term leaves of absences without pay must be approved in advance. As with paid leave, leave for sickness or other emergencies may be deemed granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. An eligible employee may be granted family medical leave under procedures described in the collective bargaining agreement. (Respondent’s exhibit 2, Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article V, Sections C and D) Respondent did not request leave in advance for his own illness or for that of his parents or for his meetings or depositions related to his pending professional practices case. Instead, he apparently relied on the automatic approval process described above when he called in day after day, for weeks at a time. By April it was entirely appropriate for his supervisor and her superiors to require that he provide some evidence of his need for leave. He failed to comply with two requests for that evidence. The collective bargaining agreement describes procedures for discipline of employees, including this: Without the consent of the employee and the Association, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. The collective bargaining agreement also requires progressive discipline (reprimand through dismissal) ...[e]xcept in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the district or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable school rules and regulations. (Respondent’s exhibit 2, Collective Bargaining Agreement, Section M)

Florida Laws (1) 120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 6B-4.009
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VIOLA D. COOPER vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 89-003538 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-003538 Latest Update: Dec. 19, 1989

The Issue Whether the Petitioner was absent from work without authorization for three consecutive workdays so that she is deemed to have abandoned her position and to have resigned as a Career Service employee.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Viola D. Cooper began her employment with Respondent Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on October 19, 1987. She held the position of Support Service Aide at the Landmark Learning Center in Opa Locka, Florida. When she was hired, she was given a copy of the Department's Employee Handbook which contains attendance and leave policies. She signed a receipt for the handbook which acknowledged that she understood it was her responsibility to review the handbook in detail. On several occasions, Petitioner was counseled by her immediate supervisor regarding the proper procedures to follow when Petitioner would be late reporting to work and when Petitioner wanted to use some of the leave time available to her. Additionally, on August 8, 1988, Petitioner received a written reprimand from her supervisor for being absent from work without authorized leave. That written reprimand recited that Petitioner was scheduled to work on July 5, 1988, and that she failed to come to work and failed to call. She was, accordingly, assessed eight hours of leave without pay for that particular day and was advised that a future violation of absence without authorized leave would result in disciplinary action ranging from a 10-day suspension to dismissal. She was further reminded in that written reprimand that she was required to request leave when she was going to take time off from work. On May 3, 1989, Petitioner advised her then supervisor Barbara Butler that she intended to take off some time to visit her sick mother, that she did not know exactly when she would be doing that, and that she did not know how long she would be gone. She told Butler she did not want to use any of her annual leave (vacation) time available to her; instead, she wished to take leave without pay so as to not use her annual leave time for that purpose. Her supervisor again advised her as to the proper procedures and further advised her that if she wished to take leave without pay such a request must be presented in writing in advance to Edward Dixon, the Food Service Director at Landmark. Petitioner understood the instructions given to her by Butler. She advised Butler that she would attempt to finish working the rest of that week but that if she found out that she needed to go even in the middle of the night, she would do so. Petitioner worked May 4 and May 5, 1989. During the time period of May 3 when Butler advised her to follow the proper procedures and informed her, once again, as to what the proper procedures were, through May 5, her last day of work, Petitioner submitted no request for leave to her supervisor and made no request of Dixon for authorized leave without pay. Petitioner was not scheduled to work on May 6 and 7, a Saturday and a Sunday. From Monday, May 8, 1989, through Thursday, May 11, 1989, Petitioner failed to report to work. Petitioner had not requested that she be permitted to take leave from her work assignment, and no authorization had been given to her by anyone to not report for work on those days. Butler advised Dixon that Petitioner had stated that she might be taking time off to visit her mother, and Dixon's subsequent attempt to contact Petitioner to ascertain why she had failed to report to work for four consecutive days was unsuccessful. By certified letter dated May 11, 1989, Dixon and Ulysses Davis, Superintendent at Landmark Learning Center, advised Petitioner that she had not called in or reported to work on May 8 through May 11 and, therefore, she had abandoned her position and was deemed to have resigned from the Career Service. They further advised Petitioner that her resignation would be effective on the date she received the letter or on the date that they received the undelivered letter directed to her. Petitioner received that letter on May 19, 1989. Between May 8, 1989, and May 19, 1989, Petitioner had made no contact with anyone at Landmark Learning Center. By May 19, 1989, Petitioner had been absent without leave for 10 consecutive workdays. On May 19, Petitioner appeared at Landmark Learning Center to pick up her pay check. Although she went to the food service area while she was at Landmark, she did not speak to Butler, Dixon, or anyone else regarding her lengthy unauthorized absence or her failure to request leave in advance of failing to appear for work. Similarly, she failed to speak to anyone in Landmark's personnel office regarding her failure to request leave time.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner was absent without authorized leave for three consecutive workdays and is therefore deemed to have abandoned her position and to have resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of December, 1989. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-3538 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact contained in her paragraphs numbered 1-3 have been rejected as being contrary to the evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4, and 7 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 has been rejected as being contrary to the evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 8 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Judd-Edwards Assistant Regional Director 2171 Northwest 22nd Court Miami, Florida 33142 Julie Waldman and Caridad Planas, Esquire 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue 5-424 Miami, Florida 33128 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Aletta L. Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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MARSHALL T. HAZLEWOOD vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 83-003053 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003053 Latest Update: Apr. 13, 1984

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Marshall T. Hazlewood, was an employee of respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT), from April 12, 1972 until July 14, 1983 at the Pinetta Toll Plaza in Satellite Beach, Florida. He served in the positions of toll collector, shift supervisor and manager I at that facility. In April, 1983 Hazlewood advised his supervisor that he would retire in July, 1983. By this time, Hazlewood had accumulated annual leave in excess of 240 hours, as well as an undisclosed amount of compensatory time and sick leave. His supervisor asked him not to use his annual leave in excess of 240 hours until July, or just prior to his retirement, because of a shortage of other personnel services (OPS) money for that fiscal year. In other words, if Hazlewood used his leave in April, May or June, the supervisor would necessarily have to use current fiscal year OPS funds to hire a temporary replacement. Hazlewood acquiesced and continued to work until June without taking annual leave. On June 16, 1983 Hazlewood put in an annual leave slip requesting annual leave (except for July 4, a holiday, and his personal holiday) from June 27 through July 14, 1983, his retirement date. This brought his total annual leave down to 238.50 hours as of the close of July 14, his date of retirement. The leave slip was approved by his supervisor and forwarded to the bureau chief in Tallahassee. He also spoke by telephone with the coordinator for the Tampa section and the assistant bureau chief in Tallahassee concerning his retirement. Whether he told them of his plans to use annual leave the last few weeks of employment was not disclosed. In any event, no one questioned his leave slip. When he retired on July 14, 1983 Hazlewood received his normal pay plus compensation for unused sick leave. He also received a warrant in the amount of $1,005.68 which represented compensation for 238.50 hours of unused annual leave. Because the pay system at DOT is computerized, and not manually checked until several weeks later, Hazlewood received his final pay without a hitch. Later on, after a manual review of his file was made, it was learned that Hazlewood's final pay had been improperly computed. DOT requested a return of the warrant, and apparently reissued a second warrant which was $324 less than the first. That prompted the instant proceeding. According to Rule 22A-8.10(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code, promulgated by the Department of Administration (DOA), and which must be adhered to by DOT, an employee cannot be paid for leave after his "last official day of employment." An employee's last official day of employment is interpreted to mean when he is physically present on the job. The parties have stipulated that Hazlewood's last official day of employment was June 26, 1983, when he actually reported to work. The DOA also interprets the rule to prohibit the taking of annual leave in conjunction with an employee's separation from service. This includes the taking of such leave merely to use up sick leave or to bring one's total annual leave down to the maximum reimbursable amount of 240 hours. These interpretations were disseminated by DOT to all of its field offices, including the chief of toll facilities, as early as October, 1981, and are generally described on page 21 of the DOT Employee Handbook which Hazlewood had. They are also expressed in "Interpretation of Attendance and Leave Rules" issued by the DOA. After determining Hazlewood's last date of employment to be June 26, his balance of annual leave was properly reduced to 176 hours rather than 238.50 hours. This balance was arrived at by deducting those hours of leave improperly used during the pay period ending July 14, 1983, and for which he had already been paid, from the 240 maximum hours one can accumulate at date of retirement. The DOT accordingly reissued Hazlewood a check for 176 hours of unused leave, which was $324 less than the amount previously given to him. This was actually less than the amount DOT should have deducted, for it did not seek to recover excess payments during the two-week pay period ending June 30, 1983. Petitioner contends that because no one advised him that taking leave in the manner he did was improper, it is unfair to now penalize him for doing so. He also points out that his supervisor approved the leave slip and was the one who suggested he delay taking leave until July because of budgetary problems. He considers it morally wrong for DOT to treat him in the manner that it has. The DOT acknowledged that the leave slip was approved, but stated the supervisor was apparently unaware of existing Department policy. It contends that all non Tallahassee offices are periodically advised of personnel rules, and that the Hazlewood case was one of a few that sometimes occurs. After the Hazlewood error came to light, DOT issued another memorandum on September 1, 1983 to all personnel explaining the policy for leave time upon separation from service.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Marshall T. Hazlewood to have reinstated $324 in payments for unused annual leave be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Marshall T. Hazlewood 333 McLeod Drive Cocoa, Florida 32922 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul N. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ALVA J. BARFIELD vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 89-005714 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Oct. 20, 1989 Number: 89-005714 Latest Update: Feb. 27, 1990

Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent was a career-service employee of Respondent. She served as a health service representative assigned to the Seminole County Public Health Unit. Her specific task was to investigate and follow up on contacts for sexually transmitted diseases. Petitioner's Employee Handbook, which Respondent received when she was hired, states: You may request annual leave for any purpose desired, but you must obtain Your supervisor's approval before taking annual leave. If an emergency develops, tell your supervisor of the emergency and ask for verbal approval to use annual leave. When you return to work, complete the leave request form for your supervisor's signature. The Handbook also Provides that certain employees are entitled to one eight-hour personal holiday "at a time which is mutually agreeable to the individual and the immediate supervisor." The local policy of the Seminole County Public Health Unit required each employee to request leave by filling out the back of a timesheet. In this manner, the employee would show the type of leave requested, the date and time of the leave, the employee's initials. The form provided spaces for the signature of the supervisor and the date described in detail in the Paragraph 5 below. The back of the timesheet states: "All Leave and Overtime must be requested and approved in advance." The Handbook requires advance approval of annual leave. Although the blanket statement on the back of the timesheet requires advance approval of all leave and overtime, the Seminole County Public Health Unit routinely did not require advance approval for all types of leave. For instance, sick leave, overtime, and annual leave for less than a few hours were normally approved after the fact. On at least two occasions, including one involving Respondent, annual leave for an entire day was also approved after it had beef taken. However, the Seminole County Public Health Unit normally requires advance approval of annual leave for a Period of one day or more. The instructions on the timesheet direct that the date next to the supervisor's signature indicate the date of the request for leave. Consistent with the varying policies governing leave, the date beside the supervisor's signature on the timesheet was used to show the date of approval of a request for annual leave and the date of the request for sick leave and certain other types of leave. By negative implication, the Handbook also requires written approval of annual leave for nonemergencies because it expressly permits "verbal approval" for annual leave for emergencies. There are no requirements in the Handbook or the timesheets for written approval of requests for other forms of leave, and the Seminole County Public Health Unit did not maintain enforceable policies to that effect. Two persons were authorized to approve requests of Respondent for annual leave. The first person was Charlotte Blades, who was the coordinator of the sexually transmitted disease program of the Seminole County Public Health Unit. Ms. Blades was Respondent's immediate supervisor The other person authorized to approve requests for annual leave was Bernice Duncan, who was the senior community health nurse of the Seminole County Public Health Unit and Ms. Blades' supervisor. In practice, the written approval of Ms. Blades could be revoked by Ms. Duncan. On one occasion, Respondent requested eight hours' annual leave to attend her son's high school graduation on June 9, 1989. Ms. Blades signed the timesheet on May 23, 1989. Between that date and the date of the leave, Ms. Duncan told Respondent that, although Ms. Blades had signed the timesheet, the leave was not approved. Ultimately, Respondent received approval for leave through 2:30 p.m., rather than 5:00 p.m., on the day of the graduation. In late July or early August, 1989, Respondent submitted a timesheet requesting 32 hours' annual leave from August 28-31, 1989. About one week later, before Ms. Blades or Ms. Duncan had acted on the request, Respondent changed the request to September 1, which was the Friday before Labor Day weekend, and September 13-14, 1989. In addition, she requested leave with pay for September 15, 1989, as her personal holiday. According to the timesheets, Ms. Blades approved the September 1 leave request on August 25, 1989, which was a Saturday. She assured Respondent that she would discuss with Ms. Duncan the remaining requests for leave. Respondent followed up with Ms. Blades several times, explaining that she wanted the leave to attend her son's graduation ceremonies from military basic training in South Carolina. Despite her assurances, Ms. Blades had not mentioned Respondent's request to Ms. Duncan before Ms. Blades became sick and missed work from September 6-9. On the second day of Ms. Blades' absence, Respondent took her request to Ms. Duncan, who said that she had not been aware of Respondent's request. Ms. Duncan told Respondent that Ms. Blades was on sick leave and did not respond further. The following day, Respondent spoke again with Ms. Duncan, who this time assured her that if Ms. Blades were not at work on Monday, September 11, Ms. Duncan would sign the timesheet approving the leave requested for September 13-15. Ms. Blades returned to work on Monday, September 11. When Respondent asked her in the morning to sign the timesheet, Ms. Blades refused to do so and told her that it had not yet been approved. Consistent with her prior conversations with Respondent, though, Ms. Blades did not say that the request had been disapproved. Respondent then left the office for much of the day. When she returned, Ms. Blades and Ms. Duncan were both out. The next day, Tuesday, September 12, Ms. Blades spoke with Respondent, but still declined to say whether the request was approved or rejected. She continued to say merely that the request had not yet been approved. Tuesday afternoon, Respondent told a coworker to tell Ms. Blades that Respondent was going to South Carolina and would be back the following Monday morning. While still in town, Respondent telephoned both supervisors shortly after 8:00 a.m. on Wednesday, but they had not arrived at work yet. Respondent asked the receptionist to remind Ms. Blades that Respondent had gone to South Carolina and would return the following Monday morning. Both messages were delivered to Ms. Blades, who relayed them to Ms. Duncan. Respondent then departed for South Carolina, where she remained through at least September 15. At the time of her departure, Respondent knew that her request for annual leave had not been approved and that she was taking unauthorized annual leave. When she arrived back in the office on September 18, Respondent received a copy of a letter dated September 15 that had been mailed to her the prior Friday. The letter states that Respondent had been separated from State service for abandonment of position, effective at the close of business on September 15, 1989. The second paragraph of the letter contains material misstatements of fact. It states that Respondent had been advised that, due to the present work situation, her leave could not be approved. The letter also states that she did not contact her supervisor that she would be absent. No one ever advised Respondent that her leave could not be approved or in fact was rejected until after her return from South Carolina. Also, Respondent informed both supervisors, directly and through third parties, that she would be absent, where she was going, why, and when she would return. However, she did not contact them during the three-day absence. Concerning the request for leave for a personal holiday, neither Ms. Blades nor Ms. Duncan ever informed Respondent that the date was inconvenient. Under the circumstances, Respondent could reasonably infer that the date was agreeable with Ms. Blades. At no time did Respondent intend to abandon her career-service position. The facts do not support a reasonable inference that Respondent abandoned her job during the three days in question.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order finding that Respondent has not abandoned her position in Career Service employment with the State of Florida. ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda L. Parkinson Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 701 Orlando, FL 32801 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Alva J. Barfield 1010 Locust Avenue Sanford, FL 32771

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
# 7
RICHARD HERRING vs. DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, 87-002172RX (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002172RX Latest Update: Sep. 18, 1987

The Issue The issues raised in this case are those set forth in a petition of May 18, 1987, in which the Petitioner, Richard Herring, challenged former Rule 22SM- 3.007, Florida Administrative Code, which became effective on May 29, 1986, and the amendment to that rule which had an effective date of February 1, 1987. In particular, Petitioner believes that the rule in its prior and existing forms exceeded the authority of the enabling legislation which is stated to underlie the promulgation. Petitioner contends that the rule in the prior and present form is arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner claims that the rule in its terms establishes penalties not authorized by the legislature. Petitioner believes that material changes were made to the rule following public hearing which were not supported or noticed or required by statute. Finally, Petitioner argues that the economic impact statements associated with the prior version of the rule and the February 1, 1987, version are not adequate, in that they do not apprise the Petitioner or others similarly situated of the negative implications of the rule. Exhibits and witnesses Richard Herring testified in his own behalf and called as witnesses Pam Hill and Vivian Pyle. In furtherance of his claims he submitted Petitioner's Exhibits 1-29, 32-39 and 42-45 which were received into evidence. Respondent offered Don Bradley as a witness in defense of this action.

Findings Of Fact On July 30, 1984, Richard Herring became a member of the Senior Management Service Personnel System within the State of Florida. He was recognized as a member of Senior Management from that day until March 2, 1987, the date he voluntarily left that system. During that time he served as Deputy Director of Developmental Services within the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). In confirmation of his elevation to the status of Senior Management employee, correspondence of August 3, 1984, was sent to the Petitioner over signature of Vivian Pyle, Central Personnel Officer for HRS. A copy of that letter may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 2 admitted into evidence. As had been explained in his recruitment, the letter reminded the Petitioner that any future annual leave which he accumulated in excess of 480 hours effective as of the anniversary date of his employment would be converted to sick leave on an hour for hour basis. It further stated that at the point of separation from Senior Management Service, Herring, as an appointee to that system, would be paid for unused annual leave, not to exceed 480 hours. The rule provision pertaining to annual leave in effect at the time of Petitioner's acceptance into Senior Management Service was Rule 22SM-1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code. That rule became effective on March 16, 1981. A copy of the rule may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. The rule in the aforementioned subpart stated: (3) A Senior Management appointee shall be paid for unused annual leave upon separation, not to exceed 480 hours; all other Senior Management benefits shall cease. Payment for sick leave may be made when permitted by Section 110.122, Florida Statutes. The Department of Administration determined to revise the existing rules pertaining to Senior Management Service. To this end, on February 21, 1986, Respondent gave notice of its proposed rule changes. This notification was given in the Florida Administrative Weekly. A copy of the notice, together with the full text of the proposed rule as contemplated in the notice, may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits 4 and 5 submitted into evidence. The notification states that the change calls for the repeal of existing Rules 22SM- 1.01 through 22SM-1.14, Florida Administrative Code, and the contemporaneous adoption of Rules 22SM-3.001 through 3.011, Florida Administrative Code. This meant that the Respondent had in mind the repeal of the aforementioned Rule 22SM-1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code. The stated purpose of these changes was ". . . to provide a more clearly defined rule structure for the Senior Management Service and to allow for 1985 statutory revisions." The statement of economic impact of the rule was that it would be limited only to the administrative cost of promulgation of the new rules. As noticed, the proposed Rule 22SM-3.007 at Section (6) stated: Upon appointment to a Senior Management position of a person moving from a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, any leave accrued and unused by the person in the prior position shall be subject to the following: Special compensatory leave credits shall be paid for in cash prior to appointment to the Senior Management Service. Regular compensatory leave shall not be transferred into the Senior Management Service. Annual leave shall be retained and be credited to the employee's account for use by the employee with approval of the agency head pursuant to Section 22SM-3.007(3) or paid for on termination from state government. Termination from state government shall mean that the person is not on any state payroll for at least thirty-one (31) calendar days following separation from the Senior Management Service. Sick leave not paid for shall be retained and be used or be subject to terminal payment in accordance with Subsection (4) above. Subsection (6)(c) to proposed Rule 22SM-3.007 as it speaks to the payment previously earned for annual leave upon termination from state government pertains to new employees who would be appointed to Senior Management positions following the effective date of the rule. It does not contemplate the question of payment of annual leave for those persons who had been appointed to Senior Management Service prior to the effective date of the proposed rule. In fact, the overall Chapter 22SM-3 as proposed did not speak to the question of payment of unused annual leave accrued by those existing employees when they left Senior Management. Conversely, Subsection (4) to this proposed rule spoke to the matter of payment for sick leave for employees who were in Senior Management before the effective date of the proposal, a counterpart to Subsection (6)(d) dealing with employees who would come after the effective date of the proposed rule. The statement of the summary of the rule changes contemplated by the notice of February 21, 1986, may be found in a copy of the summary, Petitioner's Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence. In that summary it indicated: . . . The rule sets certain requirements agencies must conform to in the areas of appointments, performance evaluations, attendance and leave for employees appointed to positions in the Service. Agencies are required to maintain personnel files and records which shall be subject to post audit review by the Department of Administration. Under the statement of economic impact in the summary dealing with cost or benefits to persons directly affected, it was stated: It is estimated that the leave benefits will benefit Senior Management Service employees, but calculation of the amount is not feasible, since such depends upon salary and individual leave utilization patterns. . . . A public hearing was held on the proposed Chapter 22SM-3. The hearing date was March 7, 1986. In the summary of the hearing and changes, a copy of which may be found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence, it is noted that the State of Florida, Department of Insurance, recommended that the payment be made for excess annual leave when an employee leaves Senior Management Service and moves to another service. That change was not adopted. The executive summary of the proposed Rules 22SM-3, found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence identified the fact of the replacement of Chapter 22SM-1 with proposed Chapter 22SM-3 and the fact that any changes to the noticed version of the rule of February 21, 1986, were said to represent only minor technical changes recommended by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. It was stated that no changes were made as a result of the public hearing held on March 7, 1986. This is taken to mean that there were no substantive changes made in that the summary of the public hearing and changes did identify certain modifications to the proposal that were recommended and adopted following the public hearing session. None of those changes that resulted from the public hearing spoke to proposed Rule 22SM-3.007. On May 6, 1986, Glenn W. Robertson, Jr., Secretary to the Administration Commission, wrote to Gilda H. Lambert, Secretary, Department of Administration, to advise her that on that date the Administration Commission had approved with amendment the request to repeal existing Rules 22SM-1.01 through 1.14, Florida Administrative Code, and to adopt proposed Rules 22SM- 3.001 through 3.011. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 8, together with the statement of the executive summary identifying the proposed permanent rule amendments which were contemplated by the Administration Commission. Within the statement of amendments promoted by the Administration Commission was an amendment to proposed Rule 22SM- 3.007(6)(c), which stated: (6)(c) Annual leave shall be retained and credited to the employee's account for use by the employee with approval of the agency head pursuant to Section 22SM-3.007 or if the employee is transferring to Career Service, up to 240 hours of Annual leave will be transferred. Any Annual leave balance after the 240 transfer will be paid for except that the amount accrued (sic) since the employee's last anniversary will be paid for on a prorated basis in accordance with the appropriate accrual rate for Career Service. Annual leave will be paid for on termination from state government. Termination from state government --. This change to proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c) was at the instigation of the Commissioner of Agriculture in the language. . . . or if the employee is transferring to Career Service, up to 240 hours of Annual leave will be transferred. Any Annual leave balance after the 240 transfer will be paid for except that the amount accrued (sic) since the employee's last anniversary will be paid for on a prorated basis in accordance Service. Annual leave will be paid for on termination from state government. This was not the choice of the Department of Administration in terms of the substance or placement of this language. Ultimately, the language set forth in the amendments to the proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c) as found in Petitioner's Exhibit 8 made their way into the final version of the rule. The language prompted by the Agriculture Commissioner had not been contemplated by the language noticed when the rule was proposed on February 21, 1986, nor was it the product of public comment in the public hearing of March 6, 1986, or based upon remarks received from the APA committee or material received by the proposing agency within 21 days of notice of the proposed rule. The language was never noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly. In May 1986, upon an unspecified date, certification was given from the Department of Administration to the Secretary of State confirming the adoption of Rules 22SM-3.001 through 22SM-3.011, Florida Administrative Code. The effective date of this adoption was May 29, 1986. A copy of that certification to the Department of State may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 9. A copy of the summary of changes by the Administration Commission in its May 6, 1986 meeting setting out the suggested language of the Agriculture Commissioner on the topic of Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c), Florida Administrative Code, may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit 10. This item, as well as the language from Subsection (6)(c) and which was sent to the Secretary of State's office and became the final version of that rule subsection, included an additional sentence which stated, "Termination from state government shall mean that the person is not on any state payroll for at least thirty-one (31) calendar days following separation from Senior Management Service," and which had not been set out completely in the executive summary sent to Secretary Lambert on May 6, 1986, found as Petitioner's Exhibit 8 admitted into evidence. This most recently quoted language is, however, the same language as found in the last sentence of Subsection (6)(c) to the notice of that matter given on February 21, 1986. In the final analysis, the changes suggested by the Commissioner of Agriculture were a part of the Administration Commission's deliberations. The final summary of the rules amendments which was filed with the Secretary of State on May 9, 1986, did not depart from the initial summary of the rules amendments pertaining to the replacement of Rules 22SM-1.01 through 22SM-1.14 with Rules 22SM-3.001 through 22SM-3.011. The statement of economic impact remained the same as well. A copy of the summary of the rules amendments and the final statement of economic impact may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 11 admitted into evidence. The final version of proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c), which was enacted, was no more specific on the subject of payment of annual leave credits upon termination of an employee who had been appointed to Senior Management Service prior to the effective date of the rule than was the version of that provision noticed on February 21, 1986. When Subsection (6)(c) is read in the context of the overall Section (6), the language describes that experience pertaining to persons appointed to Senior Management following the effective date of the rule and their leave credits brought with them. It does not describe those who were already employees in the Senior Management system before the effective date of the rule and their annual leave credits or annual leave credits earned by new employees upon admission to the Senior Management Service. This circumstance, taken together with the repeal of the previous Rule 22SM- 1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code, means that the question of the payment for annual leave hours upon the termination from Senior Management Service after May 29, 1986, for those who had been appointed to Senior Management Service before that date was unresolved by rules of the Department of Administration beyond May 29, 1986, as was the matter of how to deal with hours earned by the new members who came into the Senior Management Service. This circumstance would remain until the passage of an amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective February 1, 1987. Petitioner challenged Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, by petition of May 18, 1987. In that same petition, he challenged Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective February 1, 1987. All accumulated annual leave for which Petitioner claims entitlement to payment had been accumulated prior to February 1, 1987. As forecast, Respondent determined to amend certain rules within Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, to include Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code. To this end, on October 17, 1986, Respondent gave notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intention. The summary given by the notice of October 17, 1986, stated: The rule amendments provide for clarification of the designation of positions to be included in the Senior Management Service, provide for the transfer of leave between services, provide for the accrual of 240 hours of annual leave and 120 hours of sick leave each year, and provide for membership in the Senior Management Service class of the Florida Retirement System. The comments on economic impact found in the notice were to the effect: The executive agencies will be required to expend approximately $11,628 in the aggregate to implement the provisions of this rule. The overall purpose and effect of the rules changes was explained as being implementation of provisions made by the 1986 Legislature, as to Part IV, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes. See Petitioner's Exhibit 13/14 admitted into evidence. In this amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007, Section (6) in existing language becomes Section (10) in the new language. Subsection (6)(c) in the existing language is modified at Subsection (10)(c) by referring to employees as members and deleting the language beginning with " . . or if the employee is transferring . . ." to the end of that Subsection (6)(c). There are added Sections (5) and (6) in the proposed rule which address the circumstance of annual leave credit for persons who were in Senior Management Service at the point the prospective effective date of the rule noticed on October 17, 1986, as well as annual leave credits earned by employees who became members after the effective date of the amendment to the rule. This is a new addition not found in Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, which was silent on the treatment of annual leave credits for persons who had been in Senior Management Service before May 29, 1986, and the leave credits yet to be earned by those who became members after that date. For Petitioner's purposes, in this challenge, the proposal to add Sections (5) and (6) was tacit recognition of the fact that in the provisions set forth in Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, the question of payment for annual leave upon termination of employees who had been hired before the effective date of that rule was not addressed. The language of the proposed amendment to Rule 22SM- 3.007 at Section as noticed on October 17, 1986, indicated: Upon transfer of a Senior Management Service member to a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, annual leave credits shall be retained and shall be calculated and credit as follows: All annual leave credits accrued on the member's last anniversary date shall be prorated at the rate of 20 hours monthly or 9.230 hours biweekly for each period worked thereafter. If the member is transferring to the Career Service, up to 240 hours of annual leave will be transferred and any annual leave balance in excess of 240 hours shall be paid for in cash. Subsection (5)(b) in the proposed amendment spoke to the transfer of 240 if the employee transferred to Career Service, and payment for excess balance over 240 hours earned while Senior Management employees for all that class of employees regardless of their point of employment in the same way Subsection (6)(c) of the May 29, 1986, rule spoke to those matters of payment for annual leave brought with them related to employees who would become members of the Senior Management Service on May 29, 1986, and subsequently. A second category of payment for annual leave was described in the proposed rule noticed on October 17, 1986, Rule 22SM-3.007(6), which stated: Annual leave will be paid for upon termination from state government. Termination from state government shall mean that the person is not on any state payroll for at least thirty-one (31) calendar days following separation from the Senior Management Service. This statement pertained to those employees who were members of the Senior Management Service prior to the enactment of the proposed rule and those who would become members and earn credits after the enactment. None of the provisions in the proposed amendments advertised on October 17, 1986, dealt specifically with transfer of or payment for annual leave credits for persons who were not leaving state government, not going to Career Service, but leaving the Senior Management Service to go into other positions within state government over which the Department of Administration had no control as to personnel matters. Effective March 3, 1987, Petitioner transferred to such an organization, namely, the State Legislature. The proposed amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007 noticed October 17, 1986, at Section (3) increased the credit for annual leave and sick leave from 176 hours to 240 hours and 104 hours to 120 hours, respectively. It is couched in terms of giving these benefits upon the appointment and on the anniversary date of appointment to the Senior Management Service. At the commencement of the steps taken to amend Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, the overall summary of the amendments spoke in terms of the provision for transfer of leave between the personnel services, and the increase in accrued leave to 240 hours of annual leave and 120 hours of sick leave and the provision of membership in the Senior Management Service class of the Florida Retirement System. The statement of the economic impact indicated that the executive agencies would be required to expend approximately $11,628 in the aggregate to implement this rule. The statement of costs or benefits to persons directly affected was said to be: It is estimated that the leave benefits will benefit Senior Management Service members, but calculation of the amount is not feasible, since such depends upon salary and individual leave utilization patterns. This comprehensive statement of the summary of rules and the economic impact statement may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 15 admitted into evidence. A public hearing was scheduled for November 7, 1986, and was held in the Larson Building auditorium, Tallahassee, Florida. This was the sole public hearing held to consider the amendments contemplated by the October 17, 1986, notice. By letter of November 5, 1986, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 16 admitted into evidence, James J. Parry, Director of the Office of Human Resources, State University System of Florida, made mention of his concerns about the proposed amendments. In particular, he was concerned that the higher annual leave and sick leave credits provided in the Senior Management Service and the ability to convert those to sick leave presented potential liability to the State University System when hiring individuals who had been members of the Senior Management Service. He urged change in the language of proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(5) which would make it clear that the annual leave credits had to be transferred from Senior Management Service to the receiving employer according to that governmental body's personnel plan, if unaffiliated with the Department of Administration. Furthermore, he suggested that if the annual leave had been converted to sick leave while the employee was with Senior Management Service, upon the affiliation of the employee with the State University System there was a potential of passing along the cost of payment of that unused sick leave upon the termination of that employee's affiliation with the State University System or other governmental employer. He pointed out his belief that the economic impact statement in the proposed rule amendment only spoke to the increase in annual leave credit when in fact there would be an increase in sick leave credit as well. This references the economic impact statement at paragraph 1 to Petitioner's Exhibit 15 where mention is made of the cost incurred to an agency for annual leave accrual rates without mention of concomitant increases in cost for sick leave credits. Parry, by his November 5, 1986, remarks set out in the Petitioner's Exhibit 16, did not reference any specific concern about whether the agency for whom a Senior Manager had worked prior to transfer to the State University System would be liable for payment of annual leave hours accrued prior to transfer. Don Bradley, Chief of the Bureau of Classification and Pay, Department of Administration, received the November 5, 1986, Parry letter on November 6, 1986, a day before the public hearing. (Bradley is the principal author of the version of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, under consideration.) That letter was introduced into the record of the public hearing. Bradley recalls that Parry's concern as expressed in the letter and at the point of the public hearing revolved around the fact that the State University System would not allow accumulation of annual leave credit as high in total hours as was allowed by the Senior Management Service. Parry, according to Bradley, wanted to see a revision to the rule amendment which specifically stated that any transferred hours from Senior Management Service to the State University System be in accordance with the personnel rules on annual leave credits utilized by the State University System. Parry is not reported to have expressed an interest at the public hearing on the question of the employing agency of an employee within the Senior Management Service needing to pay for unused annual leave credits prior to transfer of the employee into the State University System, per se. Bradley recalls that there was a related discussion on who would pay for annual leave the State University System did not accept in an effort by Parry to clarify that his organization would not be responsible for payment. The proposed amendments to existing Rule 22SM-3.007 were presented to the Administration Commission. This was done by transmittal to the Office of Planning and Budget of the Governor's Office and from there to the Cabinet Aides to members of the Administration Commission. This submission occurred a week prior to the Cabinet meeting at which the Administration Commission considered the question of the amendments. As set out in Petitioner's Exhibit 17 containing a memorandum from the Department of Administration Secretary, Gilda H. Lambert, dated November 25, 1986, reference is made to the Cabinet Aides' consideration of proposed amendments to 22SM-3.007, described in that document as 22SM-1.007 and changes brought about in this session. That meeting of Cabinet Aides took place on the morning of November 25, 1986, causing certain revisions to be made to the proposed rules on Senior Management Service. It is unclear how the notice was given of the Cabinet Aides' meeting at which point Mr. Bradley and Mr. Parry discussed changes to the proposed amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code. In any event, it does not appear that Petitioner would have been apprised of this session. Among those items addressed by Secretary Lambert was a description of what was referred to there as 22SM-1.007 on attendance and leave at Section (5) on page 8 wherein she says that the revision was made to: Clarify that upon transfer to a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, unused annual leave credits shall not be paid for and may be transferred subject to the rules governing the system into which the member is transferring. Within Petitioner's Exhibit 17 is the exact nature of Section (5) with the revision being employed. The new language is underlined in this rendition of the version of Section (5) after the Cabinet Aides' meeting. Upon transfer of a Senior Management Service member to a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, annual leave credits shall not be paid for and may be transferred subject to the rules governing the system into which the member is transferring. All annual leave credits accrued on the member's last anniversary date shall be prorated at the rate of 20 hours monthly or 9.230 hours biweekly for each pay period or portion thereof, worked subsequent to the member's last anniversary date. As can be seen by this action, Subsection (5)(b) was deleted. These changes were not noticed by publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Mr. Bradley describes the underlined changes alluded to in the preceding paragraph as a product of ongoing negotiations between him and Mr. Parry which took place at the point of the Cabinet Aides' meeting dealing with the proposed amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code. In the response to the Parry concerns, Mr. Bradley did not feel that it was necessary to change the proposed language put out in the notice of October 17, 1986, pertaining to Rule 22SM-3.007(5) dealing with transfer of hours to a personnel system not administered by the Department of Administration, in that the receiving employers outside DOA controls were not obligated to receive annual credits above what was called for in their personnel systems. Nonetheless, he acquiesced in the inclusion of language in Section (5) arrived at in the Cabinet Aides meeting which made this point abundantly clear. It is that aspect of the change dealing with the transfer of annual leave credit subject to the rules of the governing system into which the member would be transferring that is seen to address Parry's concerns. The portion of the changes that deal with the unwillingness to pay for annual leave credits unless the employee is leaving Senior Management Service to go out of state government as contemplated by Section (6) may be seen as a related matter, in that the nonpayment of annual leave could cause the entire amount of those credits to be transferred over to the State University System or the Legislature to which Petitioner made his transfer. Nevertheless, Parry's emphasis was to make certain that the State University System not have to accept more annual leave credit than it would allow its employees to carry at any given point in time. The fact of nonpayment increases the potential liability for payment of unused annual leave on the part of a receiving agency. This reality does not comport with Parry's contribution before and at the point of public hearing in protecting his organization. His secondary concern expressed at the public hearing about not paying for excess annual leave his agency would not accept coincides with the idea that he wished to minimize the financial exposure of the State University System. This auxiliary position is not tantamount to advocacy which called for the abolishment of all payment for annual leave upon transfer. Finally, this last expression on the topic of payment for unused annual leave left at point of transfer does not give rise to the notion that it was sufficiently debated to notice interested parties that a rule would be enacted that disallowed payment for annual leave upon transfer to any state agency from Senior Management Service. The changes that came about in Section (5) by the Bradley/Parry discussion at the Cabinet Aides' meeting brought forth the additional penalty to the employee in Senior Management Service that annual leave credit would not be paid for in the future. This expression was contrary to the repealed Rule 22SM- 1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code, in effect prior to May 29, 1986, which allowed payment for annual leave upon any transfer, overturned the silence on this point in Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, and set aside the less restrictive statement on payment for annual leave in Section (5) as advertised on October 17, 1986. On balance, the addition of the language following the Cabinet Aides' meeting in which it is stated that annual leave credits shall not be paid for in transfer to other state government employment is seen to be a product of the thinking of the Department of Administration, not sufficiently foreseen by actions in the public hearing on November 7, 1986, not duly noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly and not based upon remarks received from the APA committee or material received by the proposing agency within 21 days of the October 17, 1986 notice. The summary of the hearing on November 7, 1986, pertaining to the proposed amendment to the rule describes the participation on the question of proposed Rule 22SM-3.007 of other agencies in state government, as well as Mr. Parry from the State University System. A copy of that summary of hearing and changes may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 20 admitted into evidence. The statement of changes found within that exhibit included the elimination of the payment of annual leave in excess of 240 hours if an employee transfers to another position in state government outside of the Selected Exempt Service. This is taken to mean transfer of a Senior Management Service employee to Career Service as described in Subsection (5)(c) noticed on October 17, 1986. It does not speak to the absolute prohibition of payment for annual leave hours accrued prior to transfer from Senior Management Service to any receiving governmental agency. On December 30, 1986, the amendments to Rule 22SM- 3.007 were filed with the Secretary of State. A copy of that filing may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 19 admitted into evidence. Those amendments to Rule 22SM-3.007, to include the changes at Section (5) disallowing payment for annual leave credits upon transfer to another state government agency from Senior Management Service are included. In accordance with the final language of the rule, there is set forth a summary of the rule amendments which may be found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 21. It states: The rule amendments provide for clarification of the designation of positions to be included in the Senior Management Service, provide for the transfer of leave between services, provide for the accrual of 240 hours of annual leave and 120 hours of sick leave each year, and provide for membership in the Senior Management Service class of the Florida Retirement System. The statement of justification for the amendments was that the changes were made to implement 1986 legislation of Part IV, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes. The economic impact statement found within Petitioner's Exhibit 21 said that the aggregate cost to the executive agencies was $11,628. It stated that the number of position descriptions that were involved would be approximately four hundred. On January 31, 1987, there were 1370+ positions in Senior Management Service before the new rule provisions were placed in effect. On February 1, 1987, as a result of the implementation of the 1986 amendment to Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, there were left approximately three hundred fifty Senior Managers. Within the economic impact statement as finally established for the amendments effective February 1, 1987, it is said: It is estimated that the leave benefits will benefit Senior Management Service members, but calculation of the amount is not feasible, since such depends upon salary and individual leave utilization patterns. Mr. Bradley, author of Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, and the amendment to those provisions as printed out on February 1, 1987, said that the Department of Administration had in mind the creation of a Senior Management Service system to try to retain Senior Managers. This included the idea of the discontinuation of payment to Senior Managers except under circumstances where they left state government. He had in mind limiting the idea of automatic payment when a Senior Management Service employee went to the Legislature or the State University System or the court system. To his way of thinking, this would encourage the senior management to remain with the employing agency. As described before, his desired outcome is not achieved until such point as the last version of Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 1, 1987, came into effect. This was an arrangement without due notice and without regard for the hardship created by the imposition of the nonpayment for transfer rule, unless it can be said that the increase in annual leave credit and sick leave credit contemplated by the February 1, 1987, version of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, is seen as an offset. It cannot be so regarded for persons such as the Petitioner who gained very little profit from the increase in annual leave and sick leave hours while losing a substantial number of annual leave credits when he left HRS to go to the Legislature. Petitioner had been made aware sometime in December 1986, of the language of the proposed amendment noticed on October 17, 1986, pertaining to Rule 22SM-3.007. The language discussing the purpose and impact of the proposed amendments would not have given rise to any concerns on his part about the changes that were eventually brought forth in the final version of the rule effective February 1, 1987. On December 10, 1986, Petitioner had an annual leave balance of approximately 536 hours. He used some leave around the Christmas holidays and reduced that, having in mind his belief that only 480 hours could be carried forward into the new year. He felt that he was being threatened in his position as a Senior Manager at HRS, given the fact that a number of Senior Managers were being replaced in that organization in late 1986. By cashing in an amount approaching 500 hours of annual leave, he expected to be paid an amount approximating $10,000, which might assist him in his change in job positions. On April 23, 1987, having not received word on his request for payment of annual leave for Senior Management Service, Petitioner wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Administration to ascertain the outcome of his request for payment. The Secretary was and is Adis Vila. At the same time he wrote to Vivian Pyle, HRS personnel official, making the same request. He expressed concern in his correspondence on the subject of an excessive amount of leave balance being shown by his present employer, the Florida Legislature. Copies of the correspondence to those two individuals may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits 26 and 27 admitted into evidence. By way of response, as noted in Petitioner's Exhibit 28 admitted into evidence, Ms. Pyle answers his inquiry and cites to the fact that Rule 22SM- 3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 5, 1987, does not allow for the payment of annual leave upon transfer into the State Legislature system. In correspondence of that same date from Secretary Vila, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 29 admitted into evidence, the Department of Administration makes reference to the fact that the May 29, 1986, Sections 22SM- 3.007(5) and (6), Florida Administrative Code, indicated that the annual leave should be transferred subject to the rules governing the system where the employee was transferred and that accrued annual leave would be paid only upon termination from state government. The rule referred to in the correspondence does not contemplate persons who had been employed before the rule became effective transferring annual leave to the State Legislature from Senior Management or being paid for that annual leave. Moreover, at the time of his transfer, the applicable version of the rule was the February 1, 1987, statement which specifically disallowed payment for annual leave in any circumstance other than leaving state government. Although an interpretation may be given that the Department of Administration believes that the version of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, controls the question of the entitlement of Petitioner to payment for annual leave upon his termination from Senior Management Service on March 2, 1987, that interpretation is not an appropriate one. That version of the rule was amended on February 1, 1987, and by such amendment the language of the May 29, 1986, rule was superseded, regardless of the construction given the May 29, 1986, version of the rule. Consequently, the resolution of the Petitioner's claim to entitlement for payment for annual leave credits accrued must necessarily be resolved under the terms of the rule effective February 1, 1987, if controlled by rule. Based upon computer printout information about Senior Management Service employees who were in the program as of February 1, 1987, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 32 admitted into evidence, Petitioner made calculations as to the value of accumulated annual leave for those employees if they were paid by the Department of Administration at that juncture. That value was in excess of $1.9 million. The calculation made by the Petitioner concerning the amount of potential money Senior Managers would have been entitled to upon transfer does not take into account the possibility of reduced payments in transfer to Career Service under the terms of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986. Obviously, under that version of the rule and the version of February 1, 1987, termination from state government would allow for the payment of all outstanding annual leave. Petitioner's Exhibit 34 admitted into evidence is a copy of the employee handbook in effect at the time that Petitioner took his position with the Florida Legislature. It establishes that the employee may only carry 360 hours of annual leave forward into January 1 of an ensuing year. Hours above that are converted into sick leave. The sick leave credits are not paid in full if the Petitioner leaves state government after working in the Florida House of Representatives. The value of those sick leave hours would be 1/4 of all hours not to exceed 480 hours. When Petitioner left HRS, he asked to be paid for all but approximately 24 hours accumulated annual leave. It was determined subsequently that this meant that 432 hours were being requested for payment. Instead, HRS transferred 432 hours of annual leave to the Florida House of Representatives. The beginning balance of annual leave hours with the Florida House of Representatives was limited to 360 hours with the balance of 72 hours being subject to conversion to sick leave. The conversion of 72 hours of annual leave to sick leave upon the date of employment with the Florida House of Representatives was further exacerbated by the fact that 476.15 hours of sick leave was also sent over. The significance of this was that with the addition of 3.85 sick leave hours, he would reach the maximum number of allowable sick leave hours to be maintained at any given point by an employee of the Legislature. That amount of hours would have been added in the first month in that 8 hours and 40 minutes of sick are obtained for each month of employment by an employee of the Florida House of Representatives. Consequently, not only had 72 of his hours been disallowed as annual leave credit hours but also 68.15 hours within that 72 hours would have no value, in that 476.15 hours had been transferred as sick leave hours, leaving only 3.85 hours to be converted to sick leave from the 72 annual leave hours. Finally, throughout the 1987 year, Petitioner would earn annual leave credits and compensatory leave credits with the Florida House of Representatives, creating a potential loss in annual leave hours at the conclusion of the calendar year 1987 based upon the maximum number of hours having been transferred into the Florida House of Representatives personnel system upon his hiring and the influence of additional hours added to that total. In the payment for sick leave and annual leave as a member of the Legislature, Petitioner would receive a reduced hourly rate compared to the Senior Management position which Petitioner held with HRS, evidencing further economic disadvantage imposed by disallowing the Petitioner's request for payment for the annual leave upon transfer from HRS to the Florida House of Representatives. To further explain, when Petitioner transferred to the Florida House of Representatives, he took an $8,640 pay cut. Again, payment for the claimed hours of annual leave would have been somewhere approximating $10,000, which would have offset the dire consequences of the salary reduction when changing from HRS to the Florida House of Representatives. Petitioner never sought to present evidence or argument concerning Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, and the amendment to that rule effective February 1, 1987. Prior to this case, he did not participate in the public hearing which was conducted concerning those matters.

Florida Laws (6) 1.01110.122120.54120.56120.57120.68
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PALM BEACH SCHOOL BOARD vs FREDERICK ELLIS, 04-002990 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Aug. 23, 2004 Number: 04-002990 Latest Update: Feb. 14, 2005

The Issue Whether Respondent's employment should be terminated "for being absent without approved leave," as recommended in the Superintendent of Schools of the School District of Palm Beach County's Petition for Involuntary Resignation.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The School Board is responsible for the operation, control and supervision of all public schools (grades K through 12) and support facilities within the jurisdictional boundaries of the School District. Systemwide testing programs in the School District are coordinated by the School District's Department of Research, Evaluation, and Accountability (DREA). At all times material to the instant case, Marc Baron headed DREA. DREA operates a test distribution center. Cherie Boone is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, in charge of the DREA test distribution center. Ms. Boone supervises four employees. As their supervisor, she is "responsible for [among other things, their] time and attendance." Respondent is employed as a materials handling technician with the School District. At all times material to the instant case, he was assigned to work in the DREA test distribution center under the direct supervision of Ms. Boone. As a materials handling technician employed by the School District, Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 1227 (NCF&O) and, at all times material to the instant case, has been covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the School District and NCF&O (NCF&O Contract). Article 7 of the NCF&O Contract discusses "employees['] contractual rights." It provides as follows: SECTION 1. Probationary Employees All newly hired or rehired employees may be subject to a probationary period of ninety (90) workdays. Employees who have not completed such period of employment may be discharged without recourse. Probationary employees shall not be eligible for any type of leave except accrued sick leave, annual leave, or short term unpaid leave (due to illness) not to exceed five (5) days. SECTION 2. Permanent Employees Upon successful completion of the probationary period by the employee, the employee status shall be continuous unless the Superintendent terminates the employee for reasons stated in Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). In the event the Superintendent seeks termination of a continuous employee, the School Board may suspend the employee with or without pay. The employee shall receive written notice and shall have the opportunity to formally appeal the termination. The appeals process shall be determined in accordance with Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). Article 8 of the NFC&O Contract addresses the subject of "[m]anagement [r]ights." It provides as follows: NCF&O and its members recognize the responsibility of the District to operate and manage its affairs in all respects in accordance with its responsibilities as established by law and as delegated by the State Board of Education; and the powers of authority which the District has not officially agreed to share by this agreement, are retained by the District. It is the right of the District to determine unilaterally the purpose of each of its constituent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion over its organization and operations. It is also the right of the District to manage and direct its employees, establish reasonable rules and procedures, take disciplinary action for proper cause, and relieve its employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, provided, however, that the exercise of such rights shall not preclude employees or their representatives from raising grievances, should decisions on the above matters have the practical consequences of violating the terms and conditions of this agreement in force. The District has the sole authority to determine the purpose and mission and the amount of the budget to be adopted by the School Board. The District and NCF&O agree that the District has and retains unaltered, its legal right to select, assign, reassign, or relocate any of its employees, and to carry out its mission under the law and State Board of Education Regulations, unless otherwise specifically enumerated herein. Except to the extent it has been done prior to May 26, 1998, no bargaining unit work which would result in the loss of jobs by members of the bargaining unit, shall be contracted out without prior consultation with the Union. It is understood that changes under this Article may not be arbitrary and capricious, and it is agreed that the District has those rights which are enumerated within Florida Statute 447; however, nothing herein shall relieve the parties of their ability to request impact bargaining. Among the "rules and procedures" that the School District, through the School Board, has established in exercising its "[m]anagement [r]ights" are School Board Directive 3.27 and School Board Policy 6Gx50-3.80, which provide, in pertinent part, as follows: School Board Directive 3.27 * * * Resignations. If employees desire to be released from their employment contract the following procedures are to be followed: * * * c. When employees do not report for duty for three (3) consecutive days without notifying their supervisor, the principal/department head will initiate a certified letter to the employee stating that their resignations will be recommended to the School Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting. * * * Suspension/Termination. The Principal/Department Head may recommend to the Assistant Superintendent for Personnel Relations disciplinary action against an employee if the employee commits one or more of the following offenses, including but not limited to: * * * b. Willful absence from duty without leave in violation of Section 231.44, Florida Statutes.[2] * * * Employees included in a bargaining unit are subject to suspension/dismissal provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. * * * 6. When a recommendation for suspension and termination is made, the procedures listed in School Board Policy 3.27 shall be followed. * * * School Board Policy 6Gx50-3.80 A leave of absence is permission granted by the Board, or allowed under its adopted policies, for an employee to be absent from duty for specified periods of time with the right of returning to employment on the expiration of the leave. All absences of School Board employees from duty shall be covered by leave duly authorized and granted. Leave shall be officially granted in advance by the School Board and shall be used for the purposes set forth in the leave application. Leave for sickness or other emergencies may be deemed to be granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. No leave except military leave shall be granted for a period greater than one (1) year. A new leave application may be filed and granted at the expiration of leave, but automatic renewals of leave shall not be allowed. Leave may be with or without pay and provided by law, rules of the State Board of Education, School Board policy, and negotiated contracts. If the terms of the collective bargaining agreement differ from this Policy, the language of the employee's agreement will take precedence. The following types of leave are available for School District employees: Leave for personal reasons Annual leave for 12-month personnel Sick leave Catastrophic leave Injury or illness in-line-of-duty leave Sabbatical leave Temporary military leave Regular military service leave Professional leave and extended professional leave Charter school leave Voluntary/extended military leave Leave of absence for the purpose of campaigning for political office Personal leave including maternity/ recovery and child care Paid Leaves * * * c. Sick Leave * * * iv. An employee requiring more than thirty (30) working days of paid leave for recovery may be required to submit medical evidence at reasonable intervals supporting the need for additional leave. * * * Sick leave claims shall be honored as submitted by the employee for personal illness, as well as illness or death of father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, child or other close relative or member of the employee's own household. Sick leave without pay may be granted for employees who have used all accumulated sick leave, but who would otherwise qualify for sick leave. The Superintendent may require a doctor's statement of verification of illness. A request to the Superintendent for a verification of claim may be initiated by the principal or supervisor. * * * Unpaid Leaves * * * e. Personal Leave -- An employee requesting short-term or long-term personal leave shall make written application to the supervisor, stating reasons for such leave. The Board shall satisfy itself in terms of the need of the requested leave. Personal leave may be used to extend a leave of absence due to sickness when that sickness has extended beyond all compensable leave for the duration of up to one (1) calendar year when supported by doctor's statements verifying the necessity of the extended leave. An employee requesting return to duty who has served efficiently and exhibited those qualities called for in the position held prior to such leave will be given every consideration for reemployment provided the conditions of employment have been met and the request is supported by a doctor's statement certifying that his physical condition is satisfactory to return to normal duties. * * * Article 17 of the NCF&O Contract, as noted in Article 7 of the contract, deals with the "[d]iscipline of [e]mployees." It provides as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Union, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. All disciplinary action shall be governed by applicable statutes and provisions of the Agreement. Further, an employee shall be provided with a written charge of wrongdoing, setting forth the specific charges against that employee as soon as possible after the investigation has begun. Any information which may be relied upon to take action against an employee will be shared promptly with said employee and his/her Union representative as soon as possible. Copies of any written information/correspondence that is related to the action of the employee or the investigating administrator(s) will be provided promptly to the employee and his/her Union representative. An employee against whom action is to be taken under this Article and his/her Union representative shall have the right to review and refute any and all of the information relied upon to support any proposed disciplinary action prior to taking such action. To this end, the employee and the Union representative shall be afforded a reasonable amount of time to prepare and present responses/refutations concerning the pending disciplinary action and concerning the appropriateness of the proposed disciplinary action. This amount of time is to be mutually agreed upon by the parties. Only previous disciplinary actions which are a part of the employee’s personnel file or which are a matter of record as provided in paragraph #7 below may be cited if these previous actions are reasonably related to the existing charge. Where just cause warrants such disciplinary action(s) and in keeping with provisions of this Article, an employee may be reprimanded verbally, reprimanded in writing, suspended without pay, or dismissed upon the recommendation of the immediate supervisor to the Superintendent and final action taken by the District. Other disciplinary action(s) may be taken with the mutual agreement of the parties. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable School Board rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With A Written Notation. Such written notation shall be placed in the employee’s personnel file and shall not be used to the further detriment of the employee, unless there is another reasonably related act by that same employee within a twenty-four (24) month period. Written Reprimand. A written reprimand may be issued to an employee when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article. Such written reprimand shall be dated and signed by the giver of the reprimand and shall be filed in the affected employee’s personnel file upon a receipt of a copy to the employee by certified mail. Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay by the School Board may be issued to an employee, when appropriate, in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. The length of the suspension also shall be determined by just cause as set forth in this Article. The notice and specifics of the suspension without pay shall be placed in writing, dated, and signed by the giver of the suspension and a copy provided to the employee by certified mail. The specific days of suspension will be clearly set forth in the written suspension notice which shall be filed in the affected employee’s personnel file in keeping with provisions of Chapter 119 and 231.291 of the Florida Statutes. An employee may be dismissed when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. An employee against whom disciplinary action(s) has/have been taken may appeal through the grievance procedure. However, if the disciplinary action(s) is/are to be taken by the District, then the employee shall have a choice of appeal between either the Department [sic] of Administrative Hearings in accordance with Florida Statutes or the grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. Such choice must be exercised within fifteen (15) days of receipt of written notification of disciplinary action being taken, and the District notified accordingly. If the grievance procedure is selected, the grievance shall be initiated at Step Three. Article 18 of the NCF&O Contract describes the grievance procedure available to bargaining unit members who allege a "misapplication or misinterpretation of the agreement." The described procedure consists of an "informal level" and four formal "levels," the final one being "arbitration before an impartial arbitrator, using the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services." Pursuant to Section 4B. of Article 18, "if NCF&O decides to withdraw its support of an alleged grievance, the individual may continue to process the claim on his/her own, so long as all costs are borne by that individual"; however, according to Section 4E. of Article 18, "[a]grievance, once [actually] withdrawn, may not be reopened without the mutual written agreement between the [School District] and [the] NCF&O." "[L]eave [w]ithout [p]ay" is the subject of Article 25 of the NCF&O Contract, which provides as follows: SECTION 1. Personal Leave of Absence Personal leave of absence as described herein is leave without pay and may be requested by a member of the bargaining unit for purely personal reasons. A member of the bargaining unit may request short-term personal leave of absence within the school or department to which the employee is assigned. Personal leave as described herein shall be requested through the principal or department head for his/her approval and subsequently approved by the Superintendent. An employee granted an unpaid leave of absence shall be returned to his/her former classification if the leave is less than ninety (90) days, notwithstanding the layoff provisions contained in this agreement. An employee granted a leave of absence and who wishes to return before the leave period has expired, may submit a request to return to the principal/department head. An employee granted a leave of absence in excess of ninety (90) days will be permitted to return to work provided there is an opening in the same job classification in the work unit. If the former position is not available, the employee, upon written request, shall be listed as an eligible applicant for a period of six (6) months. Group Life and Hospitalization Insurance coverage may be continued for a period equal to the authorized leave of absence, provided full premium payments, including the Board's payment, are kept current by the employee. SECTION 2. Return from Leave Failure to return to work at the expiration of approved leave shall be considered as absence without leave and grounds for dismissal.[3] This section should be subject to extenuating circumstances preventing timely return, as determined by the Superintendent.4 Section 2 of Article 35 of NCF&O Contract protects employees from "[h]arassment." It provides as follows: No employee shall be subjected to or be part of: Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, offensive, lewd or suggestive comments. Also includes the creation of a hostile, intimidating, or offensive work environment. Verbal or physical abuse is submitted to by an employee. An adverse decision is made against an employee after such abuse is rejected. Racial/ethnic slurs, jokes, or other inappropriate conduct. Verbal or physical abuse. An adverse decision shall not be made against an employee after such abuse is rejected. Racial/ethnic slurs, jokes, or other inappropriate conduct. There came a time when Respondent claimed, in a Level One grievance filed under the NCF&O Contract, that he was a victim, at the hands of Ms. Boone, of the "[h]arassment" proscribed by Section 2 of Article 35 of the contract. The grievance was filed (with the support of NCF&O) on or about April 8, 2004, several weeks following an incident in which Ms. Boone "yell[ed]" at Respondent for returning "a little bit late[]" from a delivery run. It contained the following "[g]rievance [s]tatement" and description of the "[r]elief [s]ought": Grievance Statement: (Include Date of Occurrence) Mr. Ellis fe[e]ls that he is working in a hostile work environment. He had meeting with the Dept. Head to express his feelings. On March 31, the employee was issued a written reprimand when there has never been any discipline for the employee. Relief Sought: The reprimand is withdrawn from all personnel files. All intimidation of the employee to cease immediately. Ms. Boone, on behalf of the School District, responded to the grievance by providing Respondent with the following written "disposition": After careful consideration of all available information, it has been determined that there has not been a violation, misapplication, or misinterpretation of the collective bargaining procedures. The grievance was not pursued beyond Level One. Since March 16, 2004, Respondent had not been reporting to work, notwithstanding that he had not received authorization to be absent. On or about April 5, 2004, Respondent submitted a request for leave of absence without pay for the period from April 5, 2004, to July 5, 2004. The type of leave without pay he requested was personal leave. By letter dated April 8, 2004, Mr. Baron advised Respondent that Respondent's request was being denied. In his letter, Mr. Baron wrote: You were absent without approved leave on April 5, 2004, April 6, 2004, and April 8, 2004. On Monday, April 5, 2004, you reported your intended absences and requested personal leave of absence starting April 5, 2004 through July 5, 2004. Pursuant to Article 25, Section 1, of the Agreement between The School District of Palm Beach County and National Conference of Firem[e]n & Oilers, "Personal leave of absence as described herein is leave without pay and may be requested by a member of the bargaining unit for purely personal reasons. A member of the bargaining unit may request short-term personal leave of absence within the school or department to which the employee is assigned. Personal leave as described herein shall be requested through the principal or department head for his/her approval and subsequently approved by the Superintendent." Your request for personal unpaid leave is denied. You are directed to return to work on Monday, April 12, 2004. Continued unapproved absences will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination. Respondent did not return to work on April 12, 2004, as directed. The matter of Respondent's unauthorized absences was then "turn[ed] . . . over to [the School District's] personnel [office]" to "deal with." The personnel office decided to ask the School Board to terminate Respondent's employment for his having been absent without authorization. Before the School Board took any action, Respondent submitted another request for leave of absence without pay. The type of leave without pay he requested this time was sick leave. On the request form, Respondent indicated that he wanted the leave period to begin on April 16, 2004, "but there was no end date" written in anywhere on the form. Without an "end date," the form could not be processed. Sherry Kleinman, a School District analyst assigned to the personnel office (whose job duties include processing "all the leaves of absence for School [District] employees"), telephoned Respondent and "asked him what end date he wanted" her to place on the form for him. During their telephone conversation, Ms. Kleinman and Respondent "agreed upon" a May 17, 2004, "end date." Ms. Kleinman inserted this "end date" in the appropriate space on the form and then completed processing Respondent's leave request. Respondent was granted leave without pay for the period starting April 16, 2004, and ending May 17, 2004. Moreover, the personnel office "pulled" its recommendation that the School Board terminate Respondent for his having been absent without authorization. Respondent did not report to work at any time following the expiration of his authorized leave on May 17, 2004, nor did he seek an extension of this leave. There has been no showing made that there were extenuating circumstances present preventing Respondent's timely return to work; nor has it been shown that the issue of whether such extenuating circumstances existed has ever been presented to the Superintendent for determination. Personnel office staff attempted to reach Respondent by telephone to encourage him to seek an extension of the authorized leave that had expired. These efforts were unsuccessful. Upon being advised of the situation by Ms. Kleinman, NCF&O business agent Carolyn Killings, who had helped Respondent in filing his "[h]arassment" grievance, offered to try to contact Respondent, but she too was unable to "reach him." By letter dated June 14, 2004, Ernie Camerino, the assistant director of the personnel office, advised Respondent of the following: You were recently notified by your supervisor of your failure to return to work. As a result of such action, Personnel is currently processing your involuntary resignation from employment with the School District. Please be advised that I will recommend at the July 21, 2004 meeting of the School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida, your involuntary resignation. Subsequent to the July 21, 2004 Board meeting you will have fifteen (15) days to file an appeal under Section 120.[6]8, Florida Statutes. Unless a timely request for an administrative hearing (DOAH) is made within fifteen (15) days stated herein pursuant to Section 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes the District will consider this matter closed. This action is taken in accordance with Section 1001.42 and 1001.51, Florida Statutes. Failure to timely request an administrative hearing shall waive all rights to request a DOAH hearing on such matters and shall be subject only to appeal rights under Section 120.[6]8, Florida Statutes. You have a choice of filing a grievance or requesting a hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). Questions regarding the appeals process should be referred to the District's Legal Department. If you find this letter inconsistent with the action taken above, you may contact Mr. Camerino immediately at . . . to resolve this matter prior to School Board Action. By letter dated July 8, 2004, Respondent informed the School District's legal department that he was "requesting an appeal" of Mr. Camerino's "involuntary resignation" recommendation. On August 23, 2004, the same day the Superintendent filed his Petition for Involuntary Resignation recommending that the School Board terminate Respondent's employment, the School District referred Respondent's appeal to DOAH.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order terminating Respondent's employment based on his failure to return to work following the expiration of his leave without pay on May 17, 2004. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2005.

Florida Laws (12) 1001.321001.421001.511012.221012.231012.391012.401012.67120.569120.57447.203447.209
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JAMES H. FOSTER vs. UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, 86-002604 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-002604 Latest Update: Nov. 25, 1986

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner was employed by Respondent beginning in 1985 and, at all times material hereto, was supervised by Dr. Frank A. Coliazzi. Petitioner had been made aware of the rules and policy of the Respondent in regard to unauthorized leave of absence. Specifically, Petitioner was counselled in this regard on March 26, 1986, by Dr. Frank A. Colliazzi for his unauthorized leave of absence on March 25, 1986. Petitioner knew, or should have known, that un-authorized leave of absences could result in disciplinary action or the loss of employment through abandonment. Prior to April 14, 1986, Petitioner had a history of unauthorized leave of absences. In fact, Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on April 9 & 11, 1986, after being counselled as late as March 26, 1986 in this regard. Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on April 14, 15 & 16, 1986. Petitioner appeared briefly at the work place on April 15, 1986 but did not go to work and left immediately when requested to work by Dr. Colliazzi, with a promise to return to work the next morning, April 16; 1986, at 8:00 a.m. The Petitioner did not request a leave of absence at this time and did not return to work on April 16, 1986 as promised. Respondent's certified letter of April 16, 1986, informing Petitioner that Respondent considered him to have abandoned his position because of his three (3) consecutive days of unauthorized leave was not received by Petitioner until April 24, 1986 due to Petitioner's failure to notify Respondent of his change of address. However, Petitioner was made aware of the letter and its contents by Maxine Fields on April 21, 1986. Petitioner's failure to return to work on April 17 & 18, 1986, lends support to Respondent's contention that Petitioner had abandoned his job since Petitioner was not aware of Respondent's position on his abandonment until April 21, 1986. At no time relevant to this proceeding was leave requested by Petitioner or granted by Respondent. Although Petitioner received notice of the hearings, he failed to appear at either one and present evidence in rebuttal to Respondent's position.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the action of the Respondent in deeming the Petitioner to have abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service was correct and affirming such action. RESPECTFULLY ENTERED and SUBMITTED this 25th day of November, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2604 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(1), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner: Petitioner did not submit any Proposed Findings of Fact. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 & 8. 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6 & 7. 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Judy Waldman, Esquire General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 Barbara Wingo, Esquire Associate General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 James H. Foster 3216 Lancastor Lane Tampa, Florida 33619 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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