The Issue The ultimate issue is whether the application of Petitioner, University Medical Park, for a certificate of need to construct a 130-bed acute care hospital in northern Hillsborough County, Florida should be approved. The factual issues are whether a need exists for the proposed facility under the Department's need rule and, if not, are there any special circumstances which would demonstrate the reasonableness and appropriateness of the application notwithstanding lack of need. The petitioner, while not agreeing with the methodology, conceded that under the DHRS rule as applied there is no need because there is an excess of acute care beds projected for 1989, the applicable planning horizon. The only real factual issue is whether there are any special circumstances which warrant issuance of a CON. The parties filed post-hearing findings of fact and conclusions of law by March 18, 1985, which were read and considered. Many of those proposals are incorporated in the following findings. As indicated some were irrelevant, however, those not included on pertinent issues were rejected because the more credible evidence precluded the proposed finding. Having heard the testimony and carefully considered the Proposed Findings of Fact, there is no evidence which would demonstrate the reasonableness and appropriateness of the application. It is recommended that the application be denied.
Findings Of Fact General Petitioner is a limited partnership composed almost entirely of physicians, including obstetricians/gynecologists (OB/GYN) and specialists providing ancillary care, who practice in the metropolitan Tampa area. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 103-104). Petitioner's managing general partner is Dr. Robert Withers, a doctor specializing in OB/GYN who has practiced in Hillsborough County for over thirty years. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 24- 26, 28-29.) Dr. Withers was a prime moving force in the founding, planning and development of University Community Hospital and Women's Hospital. (Tr. Vo1. 1, pp. 26-28, 73; Vol. 4, pp. 547-548.) Petitioner seeks to construct in DHRS District VI a specialty "women's" hospital providing obstetrical and gynecological services at the corner of 30th Street and Fletcher Avenue in northern Hillsborough County and having 130 acute care beds. 1/ (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 34, 74-75, Vol. 5, pp. 678-679, Northside Ex.-1, pp. 1-2, Ex.-4A.) The proposed hospital is to have 60 obstetrical, 66 gynecological and 4 intensive care beds. (Tr. Vol. 8, P. 1297, Northside Ex.-1 Table 17, Ex.-B.) DHRS District VI is composed of Hardy, Highlands, Hillsborough, Manatee and Polk counties. Each county is designated a subdistrict by the Local Health Council of District VI. Pasco County, immediately north of Hillsborough, is located in DHRS District V and is divided into two subdistricts, east Pasco and west Pasco. If built, Northside would be located in the immediate vicinity of University Community Hospital (UCH) in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. Less than 5 percent of the total surgical procedures at UCH are gynecologically related, and little or no nonsurgical gynecological procedures arc performed there. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 550.) There is no obstetrical practice at UCH, although it has the capacity to handle obstetric emergencies. The primary existing providers of obstetrical services to the metropolitan Tampa area are Tampa General Hospital (TGH) and Women's Hospital (Women's). (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 79, Northside Ex.-4, Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 1074-1075.) TGH is a large public hospital located on Davis Islands near downtown Tampa. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 47-48, Vol. 8, pp. 1356, 1358.) TGH currently has a 35 bed obstetrical unit, but is currently expanding to 70 beds as part of a major renovation and expansion program scheduled for completion in late 1985. (Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 1049, 1095, Vol. 8, pp. 1367-1368, Vol. 10, P. 1674, Northside Ex.- 2, P. 3.) In recent years, the overwhelming majority of Tampa General's admissions in obstetrics at TGH have been indigent patients. (Tr. Vol. 1, P. 61, Vol. 8, pp. 1375- 1379; Vol. 9, P. 1451; TGH Ex.-3.) Tampa General's internal records reflect that it had approximately 2,100 patient days of gynecological care compared with over 38,000 patient days in combined obstetrical care during a recent eleven month period. (TGH Ex.-3..) Women's is a 192 bed "specialty" hospital located in the west central portion of the City of Tampa near Tampa Stadium. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 63-64, 66-67; Vol. 10 P. 1564; Northside Ex.-4.) Women's Hospital serves primarily private-pay female patients. (Vol. 1, pp. 79, 88-89; Vol. 6, pp. 892-893.) Humana Brandon Hospital, which has a 16 bed obstetrics unit, and South Florida Baptist Hospital in Plant City, which has 12 obstetric beds, served eastern Hillsborough County. (Tr. Vol. 7, P. 1075; Northside Ex.-2, P. 3; Northside Ex.-4 and Tr. Vol. 1, P. 79; Northside Ex.-4.) There are two hospitals in eastern Pasco County, which is in DHRS District V. Humana Hospital, Pasco and East Pasco Medical Center, each of which has a six bed obstetric unit. Both hospitals are currently located in Dade City, but the East Pasco Medical Center will soon move to Zephyrhills and expand its obstetrics unit to nine beds. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 108- 109; Tr. Vol. 7, P. 1075; Vol. 8, pp. 1278-1281; Northside Ex.-4.) There are no hospitals in central Pasco County, DHRS District V. Residents of that area currently travel south to greater Tampa, or, to a lesser extent, go to Dade City for their medical services. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 266-267, 271-272; Vol. 7, p. 1038.) Bed Need There are currently 6,564 existing and CON approved acute care beds in DHRS District VI, compared with an overall bed need of 5,718 acute care beds. An excess of 846 beds exist in District VI in 1989, the year which is the planning horizon use by DHRS in determining bed need applicable to this application. (Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 1046-1047, 1163, 1165-66; DHRS Ex.-1.) There is a net need for five acute care beds in DHRS District V according to the Department's methodology. (Tr. Yolk. 7, pp. 1066, 1165; DHRS Ex.-1.) The figures for District VI include Carrollwood Community Hospital which is an osteopathic facility which does not provide obstetrical services. (Tr. Vol. 1, P. 158; Vol. 7, p. 1138; Vol. 8, P. 1291.) However, these osteopathic beds are considered as meeting the total bed need when computing a11 opathic bed need. DHRS has not formally adopted the subdistrict designations of allocations as part of its rules. (Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 1017-1017, 1019; Vol. 8, pp. 1176, 1187.) Consideration of the adoption of subdistricts by the Local Health Council is irrelevant to this application. 2/ Areas of Consideration in Addition to Bed Need Availability Availability is deemed the number of beds available. As set forth above, there is an excess of beds. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1192.) Tampa General Hospital and Humana Women's Hospital offer all of the OB related services which UMP proposes to offer in its application. These and a number of other hospitals to include UCH, offer all of the GYN related services proposed by Northside. University Community Hospital is located 300 yards away from the proposed site of Northside. UCH is fully equipped to perform virtually any kind of GYN/OB procedure. Humana and UCH take indigent patients only on an emergency basis, as would the proposed facility. GYN/OB services are accessible to all residents of Hillsborough County regardless of their ability to pay for such services at TGH. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1469; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1596; Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 582; Hyatt, TGH Exhibit 19, P. 21.) Utilization Utilization is impacted by the number of available beds and the number of days patients stay in the hospital. According to the most recent Local Health Council hospital utilization statistics, the acute care occupancy rate for 14 acute care hospitals in Hillsborough County for the most recent six months was 65 percent. This occupancy rate is based on licensed beds and does not include CON approved beds which are not yet on line. This occupancy rate is substantially below the optimal occupancies determined by DHRS in the Rule. (DHRS Exhibit 4; Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1069.) Utilization of obstetric beds is higher than general acute care beds; however, the rules do not differentiate between general and obstetric beds. 3/ Five Hillsborough County hospitals, Humana Women's, St. Joseph's, Tampa General, Humana Brandon, and South Florida Baptist, offer obstetric services. The most recent Local Health Council utilization reports indicate that overall OB occupancy for these facilities was 82 percent for the past 6 months. However, these computations do not include the 35 C0N-approved beds which will soon be available at Tampa General Hospital. (DHRS Exhibit 4). There will be a substantial excess of acute care beds to include OB beds in Hillsborough County for the foreseeable future. (Baehr, Tr.w Vol. X, pp. 1568, 1594, 1597.) The substantial excess of beds projected will result in lower utilization. In addition to excess beds, utilization is lowered by shorter hospital stays by patients. The nationwide average length of stay has been reduced by almost two days for Medicare patients and one day for all other patients due to a variety of contributing circumstances. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1192; Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1102; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, pp. 1583-84; etc.) This dramatic decline in length of hospital stay is the result of many influences, the most prominent among which are: (1) a change in Medicare reimbursement to a system which rewards prompt discharges of patients and penalizes overutilization ("DGRs"), (2) the adaptation by private payers (insurance companies, etc.) of Medicare type reimbursement, (3) the growing availability and acceptance of alternatives to hospitalization such as ambulatory surgical centers, labor/delivery/recovery suites, etc. and (4) the growing popularity of health care insurance/delivery mechanisms such as health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), preferred provider organizations ("PPOs"), and similar entities which offer direct or indirect financial incentives for avoiding or reducing hospital utilization. The trend toward declining hospital utilization will continue. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1192-98; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, pp. 1584-86; etc.) There has been a significant and progressive decrease in hospital stays for obstetrics over the last five years. During this time, a typical average length of stay has been reduced from three days to two and, in some instances, one day. In addition, there is a growing trend towards facilities (such as LDRs) which provide obstetrics on virtually an outpatient basis. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1456; Hyatt, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 644.) The average length of stay for GYN procedures is also decreasing. In addition, high percentage of GYN procedures are now being performed on an outpatient, as opposed to inpatient, basis. (Hyatt, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 644, etc.) The reduction in hospital stays and excess of acute care beds will lower utilization of acute care hospitals, including their OB components, enough to offset the projected population growth in Hillsborough County. The hospitals in District VI will not achieve the optimal occupancy rates for acute care beds or OB beds in particular by 1989. The 130 additional beds proposed by UMP would lower utilization further. (Paragraphs 7, 14, and 18 above; DHRS Exhibit 1, Humana Exhibit 1.) Geographic Accessibility Ninety percent of the population of Hillsborough County is within 30 minutes of an acute care hospital offering, at least, OB emergency services. TGH 20, overlay 6, shows that essentially all persons living in Hillsborough County are within 30 minutes normal driving time not only to an existing, acute care hospital, but a hospital offering OB services. Petitioner's service area is alleged to include central Pasco County. Although Pasco County is in District V, to the extent the proposed facility might serve central Pasco County, from a planning standpoint it is preferable to have that population in central Paso served by expansion of facilities closer to them. Hospitals in Tampa will become increasingly less accessible with increases in traffic volume over the years. The proposed location of the UMP hospital is across the street from an existing acute care hospital, University Community Hospital ("UCH"). (Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 542.) Geographic accessibility is the same to the proposed UMP hospital and UCH. (Smith, Tr. Vol. III, P. 350; Wentzel, Tr. Vol. IV, p. 486; Peters, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1532.) UCH provides gynecological services but does not provide obstetrical services. However, UCH is capable of delivering babies in emergencies. (Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, p. 563.) The gynecological services and OB capabilities at UCH are located at essentially the same location as Northside's proposed site. Geographic accessibility of OB/GYN services is not enhanced by UMP's proposed 66 medical-surgical beds. The accessibility of acute care beds, which under the rule are all that is considered, is essentially the same for UCH as for the proposed facility. As to geographic accessibility, the residents of Hillsborough and Pasco Counties now have reasonable access to acute care services, including OB services. The UMP project would not increase accessibility to these services by any significant decrease. C. Economic Accessibility Petitioner offered no competent, credible evidence that it would expand services to underserved portions of the community. Demographer Smith did not study income levels or socioeconomic data for the UMP service area. (Smith, TR. Vol. III, pp. 388, 389.) However, Mr. Margolis testified that 24 percent of Tampa General's OB patients, at least 90 percent of who are indigents, came from the UMP service area. (Margolis, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1695.) The patients proposed to be served at the Northside Hospital are not different than those already served in the community. (Withers, Tr. Vol. II, P. 344.) As a result, Northside Hospital would not increase the number of underserved patients. Availability of Health Care Alternative An increasing number of GYN procedures are being performed by hospitals on an outpatient basis and in freestanding ambulatory-surgical centers. An ambulatory-surgical center is already in operation at a location which is near the proposed UMP site. In fact, Dr. Hyatt, a UMP general partner, currently performs GYN procedures at that surgical center. (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 150; Hyatt, Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 644, 646. Ambulatory surgical centers, birthing centers and similar alternative delivery systems offer alternatives to the proposed facility. Existing hospitals are moving to supply such alternatives which, with the excess beds and lower utilization, arc more than adequate to preclude the need for the UMP proposal. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1204, 1205, 1206; Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1453, 1469; Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1154; Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1151, 1154.) Need for Special Equipment & Services DHRS does not consider obstetrics or gynecology to be "special services" for purposes of Section 381.494(6)(c)6, Florida Statutes. In addition, the services proposed by UMP are already available in Hillsborough and Pasco Counties. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1162, 1210.) Need for Research & Educational Facilities USF currently uses Tampa General as a training facility for its OB residents. TCH offered evidence that the new OB facilities being constructed at Tampa General were designed with assistance from USF and were funded by the Florida Legislature, in part, as an educational facility. (Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1391; Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1453-1455.) The educational objectives of USF for OB residents at Tampa General are undermined by a disproportionately high indigent load. Residents need a cross section of patients. The UMP project will further detract from a well rounded OB residency program at Tampa General by causing Tampa General's OB Patient mix to remain unbalanced. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1458; Margolis, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1695.) UMP offered no evidence of arrangements to further medical research or educational needs in the community. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1213. UMP's proposed facility will not contribute to research and education in District VI. Availability of Resources Management UMP will not manage its hospital. It has not secured a management contract nor entered into any type of arrangement to insure that its proposed facility will be managed by knowledgeable and competent personnel. (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, p. 142.) However, there is no alleged or demonstrated shortage of management personnel available. Availability of Funds For Capital and Operating Expenditures The matter of capital funding was a "de novo issue," i.e., evidence was presented which was in addition to different from its application. In its application, Northside stated that its project will be funded through 100 percent debt. Its principal general partner, Dr. Withers, states that this "figure is not correct." However, neither Dr. Withers nor any other Northside witness ever identified the percentage of the project, if any, which is to be funded through equity contributions except the property upon which it would be located. (UMP Exhibit 1, p. 26; Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 134.) The UMP application contained a letter from Landmark Bank of Tampa which indicates an interest on the part of that institution in providing funding to Northside in the event that its application is approved. This one and one half year year old letter falls short of a binding commitment on the part of Landmark Bank to lend UMP the necessary funds to complete and operate its project and is stale. Dr. Withers admitted that Northside had no firm commitment as of the date of the hearing to finance its facility, or any commitment to provide 1196 financing as stated in its application. (UMP Exhibit I/Exhibit Dr. Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 138.) Contribution to Education No evidence was introduced to support the assertion in the application of teaching research interaction between UMP and USF. USF presented evidence that no such interaction would occur. (Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1329.) The duplication of services and competition for patients and staff created by UMP's facility would adversely impact the health professional training programs of USF, the state's primary representative of health professional training programs in District VI. (Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1314-19; 1322-24; 1331-1336.) Financial Feasibility The pro forma statement of income and expenses for the first two years of operation (1987 and 1988) contained in the UMP application projects a small operating loss during the first year and a substantial profit by the end of the second year. These pro formas are predicated on the assumption that the facility will achieve a utilization rate of 61 percent in Year 1 and 78 percent in its second year. To achieve these projected utilization levels, Northside would have to capture a market share of 75-80 percent of all OB patient days and over 75% of all GYN patient days generated by females in its service area. (UMP, Exhibit 1; Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 145, Dacus; Tr. Vol. V, P. 750-755.) These projected market shares and resulting utilization levels are very optimistic. It is unlikely that Northside could achieve these market shares simply by making its services available to the public. More reasonable utilization assumptions for purposes of projecting financial feasibility would be 40-50 percent during the first year and 65 percent in the second year. (Margolis, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1700; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, pp. 1578, 1579, 1601.) UMP omitted the cost of the land on which its facility is to be constructed from its total project cost and thus understates the income necessary to sustain its project. Dr. Withers stated the purchase price of this land was approximately $1.5 million and it has a current market value in excess of $5 million. (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, pp. 139, 140.) Dr. Withers admitted that the purchase price of the land would be included in formulating patient charges. As a matter of DHRS interpretation, the cost of land should be included as part of the capital cost of the project even if donated or leased and, as such, should be added into the pro formas. UMP's financial expert, Barbara Turner, testified that she would normally include land costs in determining financial feasibility of a project, otherwise total project costs would be understated (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 141; Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1215, 1216; Turner, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1714.) In addition, the pro formas failed to include any amount for management expenses associated with the new facility. Dr. Withers admitted UMP does not intend to manage Northside and he anticipates that the management fee would be considerably higher than the $75,000 in administrator salaries included in the application. (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, pp. 143, 144.) Barbara Turner, UMP's financial expert, conceded that the reasonableness of the percent UMP pro formas is predicated on the reasonableness of its projected market share and concomitant utilization assumptions. These projections are rejected as being inconsistent with evidence presented by more credible witnesses. The UMP project, as stated in its application or as presented at hearing, is not financially feasible on the assumption Petitioner projected. VIII. Impact on Existing Facilities Approval of the UMP application would result in a harmful impact on the costs of providing OB/GYN services at existing facilities. The new facility would be utilized by patients who would otherwise utilize existing facilities, hospitals would be serving fewer patients than they are now. This would necessarily increase capital and operating costs on a per patient basis which, in turn, would necessitate increases in patient charges. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1217-1219; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1587.) Existing facilities are operating below optimal occupancy levels. See DHRS Exhibit 4. The Northside project would have an adverse financial impact on Humana, Tampa General Hospital, and other facilities regardless of whether Northside actually makes a profit. See next subheading below. The Northside project would draw away a substantial number of potential private-pay patients from TGH. Residents of the proposed Northside service area constitute approximately 24 percent of the total number of OB patients served by TGH. The Northside project poses a threat to TGH's plans to increase its non- indigent OB patient mix which is the key to its plans to provide a quality, competitive OB service to the residents of Hillsborough County. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VIII, P. 1225; Margolis, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1695.) Impact Upon Costs and Competition Competition via a new entrant in a health care market can be good or bad in terms of both the costs and the quality of care rendered, depending on the existing availability of competition in that market at the time. Competition has a positive effect when the market is not being adequately or efficiently served. In a situation where adequate and efficient service exists, competition can have an adverse impact on costs and on quality because a new facility is simply adding expense to the system without a concomitant benefit. (Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, p. 1650.) Competition among hospitals in Hillsborough County is now "intense and accelerating." (Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, p. 558.) Tampa General is at a competitive disadvantage because of its indigent case load and its inability to offer equity interests to physicians in its hospital. (Blair, Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 945, 947-948); Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1405.) Tampa General Hospital is intensifying its marketing effort, a physician office building under construction now at Tampa General is an illustration of Tampa General's effort to compete for private physicians and patients. (Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1405-1406.) The whole thrust of Tampa General's construction program is to increase its ability to compete for physicians. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1224; Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, p. 1442.) The Tampa General construction will create new competition for physicians and patients. (Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, p. 1099.) Patients go to hospitals where their doctors practice, therefore, hospitals generally compete for physicians. (Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 563; Blair, Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 898, 928.) Because many of the UMP partners are obstetricians who plan to use Northside exclusively, approval of the Northside project would lessen competition. (Popp, TGH Exhibit 18, P. 11.) It is feasible for Tampa General to attract more private pay OB patients. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1460- 1461.) At its recently opened rehabilitation center, Tampa General has attracted more private pay patients. (Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1393-1396.) USF OB residents at Tampa General are planning to practice at Tampa General. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1460-1461.) The state-of-the-art labor, delivery, recovery room to be used at Tampa General will be an attractive alternative to OB patients. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1460- 1461); Popp, TGH Exhibit 18, p.26) IX. Capital Expenditure Proposals The proposed Northside hospital will not offer any service not now available in Tampa. (Hyatt, TGH Exhibit 19, p. 21).
Recommendation Petitioner having failed to prove the need for additional acute care beds to include OB beds or some special circumstance which would warrant approval of the proposed project, it is recommended that its application for a CON be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 1985.
The Issue Which, if any, of the four certificate of need applications for short-term psychiatric beds in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 9 should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Description of the Parties The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") is the agency charged under Chapter 381, Florida Statutes (1991), to make decisions regarding certificate of need ("CON") applications. HRS issued its intent to approve the CON applications of Glenbeigh Hospital of Palm Beach, Inc. ("Glenbeigh"), for 45 beds, and Boca Raton Community Hospital, Inc. ("Boca"), for 15 beds, pursuant to a published fixed need for 67 beds for HRS District IX. HRS also issued its intent to deny the CON applications of Wellington Regional Medical Center, Incorporation ("Wellington") to convert 15 acute care beds to 15 short term adult psychiatric beds, and Savannas Hospital Limited Partnership ("Savannas") to convert 20 substance abuse beds to 20 short term adult psychiatric beds and to add 10 new short term adult beds. District IX includes Palm Beach, Martin, St. Lucie, Okeechobee and Indian River Counties. As a result of Glenbeigh's Notice of Withdrawal filed on April 6, 1993, CON No. 6438 is no longer under consideration in this case. Boca is an existing 394-bed acute care hospital, located one mile north of the Broward County line, and is the applicant for CON No. 6442, to convert 15 medical/surgical beds to 15 adult psychiatric beds, and to delicense an additional 6 medical/surgical beds. Wellington is an existing acute care hospital in Palm Beach County, with 104 acute care medical/surgical beds and 16 substance abuse beds, and is the applicant for CON No. 6441 to convert 15 acute care beds to 15 short term adult psychiatric beds. Savannas is an existing 70 bed child/adolescent and adult psychiatric and substance abuse hospital in St. Lucie County, about 40 miles north of Palm Beach, and is the applicant for CON No. 6444, to convert its 20 substance abuse beds to 20 adult short-term psychiatric beds, and to add 10 new adult short-term psychiatric beds. Lake Hospital and Clinic, Inc., d/b/a Lake Hospital of the Palm Beaches ("Lake"), at the time of hearing, was a 98-bed psychiatric and substance abuse hospital, with 46 adult psychiatric beds, 36 child/adolescent psychiatric beds and 16 substance abuse beds, located in Lake Worth, Palm Beach County, between Boca Raton and West Palm Beach. The parties stipulated that Lake had standing to challenge the Boca application. Community Hospital of the Palm Beaches, Inc., d/b/a Humana Hospital Palm Beaches ("Humana") is an existing 250-bed acute care hospital, with 61 adult and 27 child/adolescent psychiatric beds, and is a Baker Act receiving facility, located directly across the street from Glenbeigh in Palm Beach. Florida Residential Treatment Centers, Inc., d/b/a Charter Hospital of West Palm Beach ("Charter") is an existing 60-bed psychiatric hospital with 20 beds for children and 40 beds for adolescents, located approximately 15 minutes travel time from Glenbeigh. Martin H.M.A., Inc., d/b/a SandyPines Hospital ("SandyPines") is an existing 60 bed child and adolescent psychiatric hospital, and a Baker Act receiving facility, located in Martin County, less than one mile north of the Palm Beach County line. By prehearing stipulation, the parties agreed that the statutory review criteria applicable to the CON application of Boca are those listed in Subsections 381.705(1)(a), (b), (d), (f), (i) - (l) and (n). If Rule 10- 5.011(1)(o) is applicable, the parties stipulated that the disputed criteria are those in Subsections 4.g. and 5.g. Background and Applicability of HRS Rules and Florida Statutes Rule 10-5.011(o) and (p), Florida Administrative Code, was in effect at the time HRS published the fixed need pool and received the applications at issue in this proceeding, the September 1990 batching cycle. The rule distinguished between inpatient psychiatric services based on whether the services were provided on a short-term or long-term basis. Similarly, Rule 10- 5.011(q), Florida Administrative Code, distinguished between short-term and long-term hospital inpatient substance abuse services. On August 10, 1990, HRS published a fixed need pool for 19 short-term psychiatric beds in HRS District IX, with notice of the right to seek an administrative hearing to challenge the correctness of the fixed need pool number. See, Vol. 16, No. 32, Florida Administrative Weekly. On August 17, 1990, HRS published a revised fixed need pool for a net need of 67 additional short-term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds in HRS District IX, based on the denial of a certificate of need application, subsequent to the deadline for submission of the August 10th publication. The local health plan formula, which has not been adopted by rule, allocates 62 of the additional 67 beds needed to the Palm Beach County subdistrict. The revised pool publication did not include notice of the right to an administrative hearing to challenge the revised pool number. See, Vol. 16, No. 33, Florida Administrative Weekly. There were no challenges filed to either the original or revised fixed need pool numbers. On December 23, 1990, HRS published new psychiatric and substance abuse rules, subsequently renumbered as Rule 10-5.040 and 10-5.041, Florida Administrative Code. These new rules abolished the distinction between short- term and long-term services, and instead distinguished psychiatric and substance abuse services by the age of the patient. Pursuant to Section 14 of the new psychiatric rule, that rule does not apply to applications pending final agency action on the effective date of the new rule. HRS will, however, license any applicant approved from the September 1990 batching cycle to provide services to adults or children and adolescents, using the categories in the new rule, not based on the distinction between short and long term services which existed at the time the application was filed. Approved providers will receive separate CONs for adult and child/adolescent services. Rule 10-5.008(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that the fixed need pool shall be published in the Florida Administrative Weekly at least 15 days prior to the letter of intent deadline and . . . shall not be changed or adjusted in the future regardless of any future changes in need methodologies, population estimates, bed inventories, or other factors which would lead to different projections of need, if retroactively applied. Humana, Lake, Charter and SandyPines allege that HRS incorrectly determined need under the old rule, by failing to examine occupancy rates pursuant to that rule. The rule provided, in relevant part, No additional short term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in a service district is at or exceeds 75 percent for the preceding 12 month period. No additional beds for adolescents and children under 18 years of age shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adolescent and children short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds in the Department district is at or exceeds 70 percent for the preceding 12 month period. Hospitals seeking additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds must show evidence that the occupancy standard defined in paragraph six is met and that the number of designated short term psychiatric beds have had an occupancy rate of 75 percent or greater for the preceding year. (Emphasis added.) Rule 10-5.011(o)4(e), Florida Administrative Code. HRS' expert witness, Elizabeth Dudek, testified that the fixed need pool for 67 additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds was calculated pursuant to the formula in Rule 10-5.011(l)(o), Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Dudek also testified that since calculation resulted in a positive number, according to HRS policy, the publication of the fixed need pool indicates that the occupancy prerequisites must have also been met. To the contrary, the State Agency Action Report and the deposition of Lloyd Tribley, the HRS Health Facilities consultant who collected the data to support the publication of the fixed need pool, indicate that he did not determine existing occupancy separately for adults and for children/adolescents, as required by subsection (e) of the old rule. Rather, he determined, pursuant to subsection (f), that overall occupancy rates for licensed short-term psychiatric beds exceeded 75 percent. With the August 10, 1990 publication of the need for 19 additional short-term inpatient psychiatric beds, HRS provided a point of entry to challenge the published need, including the agency's apparent failure to make a determination of existing occupancy rates for separate age categories. No challenge was filed. In the August 17, 1990 publication, HRS failed to provide a point of entry, when it added 48 more beds to the pool as a result of the issuance of a final order denying a prior CON application. The August 10th publication of numeric need, according to HRS' representative should have been based on an analysis of separate and combined occupancy rates. There was no challenge to that publication, therefore the number of beds in the fixed need pool is not at issue in this proceeding. Like and Existing Facilities Humana, Lake and Charter assert that, as a result of the new rule abolishing separate licensure categories for short-term and long-term beds, all psychiatric providers within an applicant's service district are like and existing facilities. These parties also assert that there was not, even under the old rule, any practical difference between these categories of providers, particularly for children/adolescents. In support of this position, the evidence demonstrated that the average lengths of stay in short-term and long- term adolescent psychiatric beds in 1989 were 48.1 days and 53.02 days, respectively. In 1990, the average lengths of stay in short and long-term beds were 41.8 days and 41.9 days, respectively. The parties asserting that the effect of the new rule is to create an additional group of like and existing providers point to HRS' response to the application of Indian River Memorial Hospital in Vero Beach, Florida ("Indian River"). According to the testimony of HRS expert witness Elizabeth Dudek, Indian River was another District 9 applicant in this same batching cycle. Indian River applied for a CON to convert long-term psychiatric beds to short- term psychiatric beds. HRS denied the CON application of Indian River because, under the new rule, which had taken effect before the decisions on the batch were made, Indian River would receive a new license permitting it to treat psychiatric patients regardless of their projected lengths of stay. Glenbeigh asserted that the numeric need for 67 additional short term psychiatric beds cannot be challenged in this proceeding based on the failure of any party timely to challenge the August 10, 1990, publication of need. Similarly, Glenbeigh asserted that the comparison of "like and existing" facilities must be limited to those used in the inventory to compute need. Glenbeigh relied generally on Florida Administrative Code Rule 10-5.011(o), the old rule governing short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services, for the proposition that "like and existing" in Subsection 381.705(1)(b), Florida Statutes, is equivalent to the inventory of licensed and approved beds for short term psychiatric services, which was used in the computation of need. However, the rule also provides, in a list of "other standards and criteria to be considered in determining approval of a certificate of need application for short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds," the following, Applicants shall indicate the availability of other inpatient psychiatric services in the proposed service area, including the number of beds available in crisis stabilization units, short term residential treatment programs, and other inpatient beds whether licensed as a hospital facility or not. In light of the rule directive that the consideration of like and existing services is not limited to licensed provider hospitals, Glenbeigh's assertion that the statutory review criteria is more restrictive and limited to the licensed and approved beds that were used to compute numeric need is rejected. The like and existing facilities are the hospitals or freestanding facilities which are authorized to provide the same psychiatric services, as the applicants seek to provide as a result of this proceeding. It was established at hearing that the following list of District 9 facilities provide psychiatric services comparable to those which the three remaining applicants seek to provide in these consolidated cases: DISTRICT 9 Hospital PSYCHIATRIC BEDS SUBSTANCE ABUSE BEDS Adult Child and Adult Child and Adolescent Adolescent Lic. App. Lic. App. Lic. App. Lic. App. Bethesda Hospital 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Charter Palm (IRTF) 0 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 Fair Oaks 36 0 49 0 14 0 3 0 Forty Fifth Street 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Glenbeigh Palm Beach 0 0 0 0 30 0 30 0 Humana Palm Beach 61 0 27 15 0 0 0 0 Humana Sebastian 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 Indian River Mem. 16 0 38 0 0 0 0 0 J.F. Kennedy Mem. 14 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 Lake Hospital 46 0 36 0 16 0 0 0 Lawnwood Regional 36 Res. Treat. Palm 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 (IRTF) 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 Sandy Pines 0 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 Savannas 35 0 15 0 20 0 0 0 St. Mary Hospital 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wellington Regional 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 Vol. 16, No. 52, Florida Administrative Weekly, (December 28, 1990) (Humana Exhibit 26). Need For Additional Beds An analysis of need beyond that of the numeric need, requires an analysis of the availability and accessibility of the like and existing facilties. One reliable indicator of need is the occupancy levels in the like and existing facilities. In addition to providing guidelines for the publication of need, Rule 10-5.011(o)(4)(e) also mandates a consideration of occupancy levels to determine if applicants are or are not required to demonstrate "not normal circumstances" necessitating the issuance of a CON. For all child/adolescent psychiatric programs in District 9, the expert for Lake and Humana calculated total average occupancy rates at 57.6 percent in 1988, 64.2 percent in 1989, and 53.2 percent in 1990. In support of the accuracy of the expert's calculations, the District 9 Annual Report for 1990 (Lake Exhibit 4) shows occupancy at 46.80 percent in general hospitals, 88.22 percent in specialty hospitals then categorized as short term and 38.22 percent in specialty hospitals then categorized as long term. In addition, during this same period of time, average lengths of stay in District 9 child/adolescent beds also declined by approximately 10 percent. Using the guidelines of the old rule, new short term psychiatric beds should not normally be approved when the child/adolescent rate is below 70 percent. In the new rule, child/adolescent beds should not normally be approved if occupancy is below 75 percent. Therefore, under either rule, applicants who will be licensed for child/adolescent beds, must demonstrate not normal circumstances for their CON applications to be approved. The expert for Lake and Humana, also computed the adult occupancy rates for 1988-1990 in District 9 as follows: 1988- 66.5 percent; 1989 - 73.1 percent; 1990 - 68.5 percent. The occupancy rates for adult beds for the 12- month period ending March, 1990 was 70.6 percent and 69.2 percent for the twelve months ending June, 1990. In evaluating the accuracy of the expert's calculations of occupancy rates for adult beds, a comparison can be made to the District 9 Annual Report for 1990 (Lake Exhibit 4). Occupancy rates were 57.75 percent in general hospitals and 79.45 percent in specialty hospitals. This data does not include Indian River Memorial or Lawnwood Regional which were also listed on the December 1990 inventory of licensed adult beds, nor St. Mary's Hospital which was listed as having 40 approved adult beds. The comparison indicates the accuracy of concluding that the highest occupancy level for District 9 adult psychiatric beds during the period 1988 to 1990 was approximately 70 percent. Using the guidelines of the old rule, 75 percent occupancy is required before new adult beds can be approved unless there is a not normal circumstance. Boca's Proposal Boca Raton Community Hospital ("Boca") is a 394-bed not-for-profit acute care hospital, accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospitals and Health Organizations, which proposes to convert 21 of its medical/surgical to 15 adult psychiatric beds and to delicense an additional 6 acute care beds. Boca's CON would be conditioned on the provision of 10.8 percent total annual patient days to Medicaid patients and a minimum of 5 percent gross revenues generated, or 2 percent total annual patient days to medically indigent patients. Boca has proposed this alternative so that, if it fails to provide direct care to indigents, it may donate the revenues to further the objectives of the state and district mental health councils. Boca Raton Community Hospital Corporation has control and manages the Boca's property, policies and funds. The Boca Raton Community Hospital Foundation raises funds for Boca and has the funds necessary to accomplish the proposed project at a cost of $932,531. Boca's application asserts that a not normal circumstance exists in the need to serve Medicaid patients in the district, and that a need exists to serve geriatric psychiatric patients in an acute care hospital, due to their general medical condition. Medicaid reimbursement for psychiatric care is only available in acute care hospitals. Boca Historically serves in excess of 70 percent Medicare (geriatric) patients. In 1990, 72 percent of Medicaid psychiatric patients residing in Boca's service area sought psychiatric services outside District 9, as compared to the outmigration of 14.7 percent Medicare patients, and 11 percent commercial insurance patients. Boca supported its proposed 10.8 percent Medicaid CON condition, with evidence that 10.8 percent of all psychiatric discharges in its market area were for Medicaid patients. Boca's opponents dispute the claim that a disproportionate outmigration of District 9 Medicaid patients is, in and of itself, a not normal circumstance. Using the travel time standard for inpatient psychiatric services of 45 minutes under average driving conditions, the opponents argue that District 10 facilities should be considered as available alternatives to additional psychiatric beds in District 9. In fact, the parties stipulated that there are no geographic access problems in District 9. In contrast to the opponents position, Subsections 381.705(a), (b)(, (d), (f) and (h), Florida Statutes (1991), indicate that need, available alternatives and accessibility are evaluated within a district, as defined by Subsection 381.702(5). Therefore, using the statutory criteria as indicative of the situation which is normal, the disproportionate outmigration of medicaid patients can be considered a not normal circumstance with a showing of access hardships for this payor group. Boca's opponents also assert general acute care adult beds are adequate. In August 1991, the occupancy rate was 56.9 percent in the 171 licensed adult psychiatric beds in District 9 general acute care hospitals which are eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. Finally, Boca's opponents argue that Boca historically has not, and will not serve Medicaid patients in sufficient number to alter the outmigration. In 1990, Boca reported 671 Medicaid inpatient days from a total of 99,955. That is equivalent to 92 of the 16,170 admissions. Because Boca has a closed medical staff, only the psychiatrists on staff would be able to admit patients to a psychiatric unit. From the testimony and depositions received in evidence, Boca's psychiatrists who discussed their service to Medicaid patients treated less than 12 Medicaid patients a year. One psychiatrist, who had previously treated Medicaid patients at a mental health center, has been in private practice since 1983-84, but was not sure he had treated a Medicaid patient in his private practice and has received a new Medicaid provider number a few weeks prior to hearing. One Boca psychiatrist does not treat Medicaid patients on an inpatient basis. Two other Boca psychiatrists reported seeing 10 and "a couple" of Medicaid patients a year, respectively. The latter of these described the Medicaid billing procedure as cumbersome. Given the unavailability of Medicaid eligible beds in the District and the nature of the practices of its closed staff of psychiatrists, Boca has failed to establish that its CON application will alleviate the outmigration for psychiatric services of District 9 Medicaid patients. This conclusion is not altered by the subsequent closure of Lake's 46 adult psychiatric beds, because Medicaid reimbursement would not have been available at Lake which was not an acute care hospital. In fact, HRS takes the position that there are no not normal circumstances in this case. Wellington's Proposal Wellington, a 120 bed hospital in West Palm Beach, Florida, proposed to convert 15 acute care beds to 15 short term adult psychiatric beds which, if approved, will be licensed as adult psychiatric beds. Wellington's acute care beds are only 28 percent occupied. Wellington is located in the western portion of Palm Beach County, where no other inpatient psychiatric facilities are located. Wellington is a wholly owned subsidiary of Universal Health Services, Inc. ("UHS"), accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospitals and Health Organizations (JCAHO) and the American Osteopathic Association (AOA), and offers clinical experience for students of the Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine (SECOM). Internships and externships for osteopathic students are also provided at Humana's psychiatric pavilion. Wellington proposes to fund the total project cost of $920,000 from funds available to UHS and intends to become a Baker Act receiving facility. Wellington is not a disproportionate share hospital, and projects 1 percent Medicaid service in its payor mix. Wellington proposes to serve adult psychiatric patients in 15 beds, and projects 53.3 percent and 70 percent occupancy in those beds in years one and two, but does not make a third year projection of at least 80 percent occupancy as required by Paragraph 4(d) of Rule 10-5.011(o). Because the average annual adult occupancy rate in the district is less than 75 percent, any applicant proposing to serve adults must demonstrate that a not normal circumstance exists for approval of its CON application. In addition, there appears to be no shortage of psychiatric beds in acute care hospitals in District 9. See Finding of Fact 39, supra. Not Normal Circumstance Wellington has not alleged nor demonstrated that any of the factors related to its current operations, location or proposed services are not normal circumstances in support of its CON application. Absent the showing of a not normal circumstance, Wellington's proposal cannot be approved, pursuant to Paragraph 4(e) and Rule 10-5.011(o), Florida Administrative Code. Savannas Proposal Savannas Hospital Limited partnership d/b/a Savannas Hospital ("Savannas") is a JCAHO accredited 70 bed psychiatric and substance abuse hospital located in Port St. Lucie, St. Lucie County, Florida, approximately 40 miles north of Palm Beach. Savannas, a Baker Act facility, proposes to convert all 20 of its licensed substance abuse beds to psychiatric beds and to add 10 new psychiatric beds, at a total project cost of $1,444,818. Savannas also proposes to commit to providing 7 percent indigent care. While not specifically describing its circumstances as not normal, Savannas does indicate that it is (1) the only applicant in the northern sub- district of District 9, and (2) could readmit to a segregated unit low functioning neurogeriatric patients of the type it previously served. Savannas also indicated that Medicare reimbursement is not available for patients who have substance abuse, rather than psychiatric primary diagnoses. As a freestanding provider, Savannas is not eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. Savannas demonstrates what services it would provide, if its CON is approved, but fails to identify a need for the services by District 9 psychiatric patients. Within the northern sub-district, the only other facility in St. Lucie County, Lawnwood, reported an occupancy rate of 65 percent in 1989. AHCA also argued that the substance abuse beds at Savannas are needed and should not be converted to psychiatric beds. That position is supported by the fact that Savannas substance abuse beds had a higher occupancy level than its psychiatric beds in 1989. Savannas' application and the evidence presented do not support the need for the services proposed by Savannas, nor does Savannas assert that any not normal circumstances exist.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Certificate of Need Number 6438 to Glenbeigh Hospital of Palm Beach, Inc.; Certificate of Need Number 6442 to Boca Raton Community Hospital, Inc.; Certificate of Need Number 6441 to Wellington Regional Medical Center, Inc.; and Certificate of Need Number 6444 to Savannas Hospital Limited Partnership. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of June 1993. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June 1993. APPENDIX The following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Humana Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 2. 3-6. Issues not addressed. 7-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3 and 4. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 44 and 46. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 10. 11-12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. 13-15. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 & 29. Issue not addressed. 20-21. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 22. Issue not addressed. 23-24. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8 and 9. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 11. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 10. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12 and Conclusions of Law 4. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Rejected in Finding of Fact 20. Rejected in Findings of Fact 12 and 18. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 17. Rejected in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 16 and 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. 38-47. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 44 and 47. Issue not addressed. Rejected in Finding of Fact 46. Issue not addressed. 52-54. Adopted in Findings of Fact 46 and 47. 55-57. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 21. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 22. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 21. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 54 Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 26, 38, 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 54, 55 and 57. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. 74-75. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 27. 76-77. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 28. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 31. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 82. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 82. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 37. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 39. Issue not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27 and 30. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27, 29 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 31. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 42. Issue not addressed. Addressed in Preliminary Statement. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 1. 95-99. Issues not addressed Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 10. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 102-114. Issues not addressed Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Issue not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 37. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 10. 121-122. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 4 and 47. Issue not addressed. Irrlevant. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 10 Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 10, 25, 47 and 48. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 11. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 47, 48 and 49. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 45. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 46. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 47 and 48. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 47 and 48. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 15. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 47, 48 and 49. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 11. Lake Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. 3-4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 43. 11-12. Issues not addressed. 13-19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27-43. 20-21. Issues not addressed. 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 25-26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 27-28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 29-31. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. 32. Rejected in relevant part in Finding of Fact 13. 33. Issue not addressed. 34. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 35. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 36-37. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 38-39. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. 40. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 41. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 30. 42-43. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 30. 44. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 45. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 46-47. Issues not addressed. 48. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 49-52. Issues not addressed. 53. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 42. 54-56. Issues not addressed. 57. Accepted in relevant part in Conclusions of Law 4. 58-59. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26 and in Conclusions of Law 4. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 17. 65-66. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 18, 27 and 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. Adopted in Findings of Fact 28 and 31. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27, 39 and 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Findings of Fact 37, 39 and 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Findings of Fact 47, 48, 49, 53 and 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 84-89. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 92-97. Issues not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 41. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 37. 100-102. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 47 and 48. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. 111-113. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Adopted. Adopted. Accepted in relevant part. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 3 and 32. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 3. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 41. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 41. Issue not addressed. 128-132. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 133-135. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 32 and 41. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 45. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. 150-151. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. 152-156. Issues not addressed. 157-158. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 159. Adopted in Findings of Fact 48 and 49. 160. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 161. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 162. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. 163. Adopted in Finding of Fact 57. 164. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 165. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 166. Charter Adopted in Finding of Fact 57. 1. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 1. 2-3. Adopted. 4-10. Accepted in Preliminary Statement. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 12-15. Issues not addressed. 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 18-19. Issues not addressed. 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 21-25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 8. 26-38. Issues not addressed 39-40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 43-44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adoped in Conclusion of Law 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Issue not addressed. 52-53. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. 54-55. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. 58-73. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 78-79. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. 86-94. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in Findings of Fact 37, 39 and 42. 99-101. Issues not addressed. 102. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 103-134. Issues not addressed. 135. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 136-140. Issues not addressed. Boca Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Preliminary Statement. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3 and 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 10. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. 12. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 14. Adopted. 15-16. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. 18. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 19. Issue not addressed. 20-21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 22. Rejected in Finding of Fact 39. 23. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 26-27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. 28-30. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 41. 31. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 33. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 34. 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. 36. Rejected in Finding of Fact 39. 37-42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. 43-47. Issues not addressed. 48. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 30. 49-50. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Issue not addressed. 53-54. Rejected in Finding of Fact 30. 55-56. Issues not addressed. 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 58-59. Issues not addressed. Rejected in Findings of Fact 39 and 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 64-65. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 32, 35 and 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 34. Issue not addressed. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Issue not addressed. Adopted. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 81-82. Rejected in Finding of Fact 42. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Rejected in Findings of Fact 25 and 42. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 89-97. Issues not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Rejected in Finding of Fact 42. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Sandy Pines 1. Issue not addressed. 2-3. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. 4. Issue not addressed. 5. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 9. 6-8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 9-13. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 15. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. 20-24. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. 25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 9. 26-29. Issues not addressed. 30. Adopted. 31-33. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 42, 43, 48, 49 and 54. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 28 and 31. Issue not addressed. 39-40. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 41-42. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 12. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 12 and 17. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 17. 46-47. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. 48. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25 and 26. 49-50. Issues not addressed. Adopted. Adopted. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 7. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 42. 55-56. Issues not addressed. 57. Adopted. 58-59. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Conclusion of Law 3. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. 62-64. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 67. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 22. 68-69. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 21. 70. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. 71. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26 and in 72. Conclusion of Law 3. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 26 and 73. 38. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 25, 27 and 30. 74-75. Not legible. 76. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 77-80. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. 81. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 82-83. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. 84-95. Issues not addressed. Wellington 1-2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4 and 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. 8-10. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 45. 11-12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. 13-19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4 and 44. 20. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 46. 21-22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 44 and 46. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4 and 44. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 46. 27-28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. 31-32. Issues not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Adopted. Issue not addressed. 36-37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. 38-42. Issues not addressed. 43. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 42 and 47. 44-63. Issues not addressed. 64-65. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 46. 66-67. Issues not addressed. 68. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 69-91. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 47. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 12. 94-103. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 1 and 44. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 45. 106-111. Issues not addressed 112. Rejected in Findings of Fact 25, 27 and 30. 113-115. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 45. Savannas Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 50. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 53. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 56. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 5 and 50. Adopted. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Rejected in Finding of Fact 56. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 51. Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 51. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 51. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. 30-33. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12. 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 35-37. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Issue not addressed. 40-42. Rejected in Finding of Fact 54. 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. 44-48. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 50. 49-51. Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. Adopted. Adopted. 56-57. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 50 Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. Issue not addressed. 60-61. Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. 62-63. Issues not addressed. 64. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. 65-66. Issues not addressed. 67. Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. 68-70. Issues not addressed. 71. Adopted in Finding of Fact 52. 72-77. Issues not addressed 78. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 79-100. Issues not addressed. HRS Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 16 and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 10-11. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 12. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 12. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12. 16-17. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 32, 46 and 52. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. 21. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. 22. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 2. 23-33. Issues not addressed. 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 35-36. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 3. 37. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 32. 38. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 39. Rejected in Findings of Fact 40, 41 and 42. 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 41. Issue not addressed. 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 44. Issue not addressed. 45-46. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. 48. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 44. 49. Issue not addressed. 50. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 46. 51. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 47. 52. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 46. 53-54. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 45. 55. Issue not addressed. 56-57. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 46. 58. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 47. 59-61. Issues not addressed. 62-64. Adopted in Findings of Fact 50 and 51. 65. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 65. 66-68. Issues not addressed. 69. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 52. 70-71. Issues not addressed. 72. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 53. 73. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 53. 74. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. 75-77. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 56. 78-80. Issues not addressed. 81-82. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 56. 83-89. Issues not addressed. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Cooper, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William B. Wiley, Esquire McFARLAIN, STERNSTEIN, WILEY & CASSEDY, P.A. Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32316-2174 James C. Hauser, Esquire Foley & Lardner Post Office Box 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael J. Cherniga, Esquire David C. Ashburn, Esquire Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert D. Newell, Jr., Esquire Newell & Stahl, P.A. 817 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6313 Michael J. Glazer, Esquire C. Gary Williams, Esquire Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert S. Cohen, Esquire John F. Gilroy, III, Esquire Haben, Culpepper, Dunbar & French, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Charles H. Hood, Jr., Esquire MONACO, SMITH, HOOD, PERKINS, ORFINGER & STOUT 444 Seabreeze Boulevard, #900 Post Office Box 15200 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Harold D. Lewis, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact I The Parties Charter Medical of Orange County, Inc., (Charter) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation, founded in Macon, Georgia in 1969. The parent corporation operates approximately 92 hospitals throughout the country, including Florida. Most of its hospitals are psychiatric or substance abuse facilities. Orlando Regional Medical Center (ORMC) is a 1,119- bed, nonprofit medical system comprised of four divisions. In downtown Orlando it operates a 630-bed tertiary care hospital and a 255-bed Arnold Palmer Hospital for women and children. A Sand Lake campus is located 10 miles southwest of Orlando, off I-4, and includes medical/surgical beds and 32 licensed short-term psychiatric beds. ORMC's St. Cloud Campus in Osceola County, south of Orlando, includes 84 medical/surgical beds. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) is the state agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the certificate of need program pursuant to Sections 381.701-.715, F.S. Psychiatric Institute of Orlando, Inc., d/b/a Laurel Oaks Hospital, (Laurel Oaks) is a subsidiary of P1A Psychiatric Hospitals, Inc., which is a subsidiary of National Medical Enterprises (NME). P1A owns approximately 50 psychiatric hospitals throughout the county, including (30-bed Laurel Oaks, in southwest Orange County, a short-term psychiatric and substance abuse facility for children and adolescents Health Management Associates, Inc., (HMA) is a health management company which owns or operates 16 hospitals in the southeastern United States, including four psychiatric hospitals in Florida. HMA's Crossroads University Behavioral Center is a 100-bed free-standing psychiatric hospital in northeast Orange County. Its 60 adult beds and 40 adolescent beds opened in January 1989 as a licensed long-term facility, but it has been operating continually as a short-term facility. The Applications Charter proposes to develop a new free-standing 60- bed psychiatric hospital (40 beds for adults, 10 beds for adolescents and 10 beds for children). It plans a wide range of treatment modalities utilizing a multi-disciplinary team approach, tailored to the age and needs of the patient. Although no specific site has been selected, several have been identified in southwest Orange County. Charter anticipates the total cost for the project will be $7,783,000. Charter's patients will be primarily commercially insured (71%), with 15% Medicare and 4% indigent. Charter has committed to serve this share of indigent for the first two years of operation. As a specialty hospital, Charter is not eligible to accept Medicaid patients. ORMC proposes to build a 60-bed free-standing facility on a 7.2 acre site within 40 acres it already owns at Sand Lake and adjacent to its existing Sand Lake Hospital, for a total project cost of $6,678,935. No new licensed beds are required as ORNC will transfer its 32 short term beds from the sixth floor of the Sand Lake Hospital and will convert 28 of its licensed medical/surgical beds from its downtown hospital. The 60 beds will consist of 30 adult and 30 adolescent short term beds. Since the existing 32 beds are primarily adult beds, ORMC's project will be adding adolescent beds to the inventory in District 7. Proximity to Sand Lake Hospital will facilitate shared services, including engineering, dietary and laundry. ORMC also expects the joint use of therapists at its psychiatric facility and its existing brain injury rehabilitation unit at Sand Lake. Because the facility will be added to ORMC's general hospital license, it can and will accept Medicaid patients. ORMC has committed to serve 20% Medicare, 8% Medicaid and 8% indigent patients. ORMC will likely seek an outside management firm to operate its psychiatric facility. The Review On August 23, 1988, HRS published a need for 140 short-term psychiatric beds in District 7. Its SAAR issued in January 1989, recommended approval of a total of 137 beds. When the SAAR was amended in March 1989, to include the Charter approval, the total surged to 197 approved beds. Even after First Hospital withdrew its application for 55 beds, the total approved exceeded the published need for the 1993 horizon year by two beds. Numeric Need The short-term psychiatric bed need rule is found at Rule 10- 5.011(1)(o) , F.A.C. "Short-term" is defined as an average length of stay of 30 days or less for adults, and 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years. A favorable need determination will not normally be given to an applicant unless a bed need exists according to sub-paragraph (1)(o)4 of "the rule". Rule 10-5.011(1)(0)4, F.A.C. provides as follows: Bed allocations for acute care short term general psychiatric services shall be based on the following standards: A minimum of .15 beds per 1,000 population should be located in hospitals holding a general license to ensure access to needed services for persons with multiple health These beds shall be designated as short term inpatient hospital psychiatric beds. 20 short term inpatient hospital beds per 1,000 population may be located in specialty hospitals, or hospitals holding a general license. The distribution of these beds shall be based on local need, cost effectiveness, and quality of care considerations. The short term inpatient psychiatric bed need for a Department service district shall be projected 5 years into the future based on the most recent available January or July population estimate prior to the beginning to the respective batching cycle. The projected number of beds shall be based on a bed need ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population. These beds are allocated in addition to the total number of general acute care hospital beds allocated to each Department District under Paragraph 10-5.011(1)(m). The net need for short term psychiatric beds shall be calculated by subtracting the number of licensed and approved beds from the number of projected beds. The population estimates are based on population projections by the Executive Office of the Governor. Occupancy Standards. New Facilities must be able to project an average 70% occupancy rate for adult psychiatric beds and 60% for children and adolescent beds in the second year of operation, and must be able to project an average 80% occupancy rate for adult beds and 70% for children and adolescent short term psychiatric inpatient hospital beds for the third year of operation. No additional short term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in a service district is at or exceeds 75% for the preceding 12 month period. No additional beds for adolescents and children under 18 years of age shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adolescent and children short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds in the Department district is at or exceeds 70% for the preceding 12 month period. Hospitals seeking additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds must show evidence that the occupancy standard defined in paragraph six is met and that the number of designated short term psychiatric beds have had an occupancy rate of 75% or greater for the preceding year. Unit size. In order to assure specialized staff and services at a reasonable cost, short term inpatient psychiatric hospital based services should have at least 15 designated beds. Applicants proposing to build a new but separate psychiatric acute care facility and intending to apply for a specialty hospital license should have a minimum of 50 beds. The parties do not dispute that application of the formula yields a need for 140 beds, the total published in the applicable fixed need pool. Nor do the parties dispute that the occupancy standard was met, since HRS uses the lower standard of 70% as a threshold for determining whether need should be published. The parties agree that approval of both Charter's and ORMC's applications results in an excess of two beds over the published need. There is substantial dispute as to whether that excess is justified, and as to the composition of the beds as "speciality hospital" or "general hospital" beds. The only provision in agency rules or policy for exceeding bed need calculations is when "not normal" or "special" circumstances exist in the District. HRS' Policy Manual for the Certificate of Need program, dated October 1, 1988, provides in Section 9-6 B. (3): If a qualified applicant exist but the proposed project exceeds the beds or services identified in the fixed need pool, the department may award beds or services in excess of the pool when warranted by special circumstances as defined in rule 10- 5.011(1)(b), 1-4, F.A.C. and, specifically for nursing homes Rule 10-5.011(1)(K)2.j. F.A.C. (Laurel Oaks Exhibit #10, P. 9-2) The referenced sections of Rule 10-5.011(1)(b), F.A.C., relate to the enhancement of access--primarily economic access and access by underserved groups. Access is addressed in Part VII, below. No evidence was presented regarding special problems of access in District 7. Rather, HRS asserts that its excess approval was based on "rounding up" the numbers of beds, and on the favorable occupancy rates in the district. In its SAAR, HRS calculated the following occupancy rates by age cohort in the district: Adult 75.8% Child/Adolescent 74.8%; and in Orange County: Adult 57.4% Child/Adolescent 100. The adult rate is therefore slightly above the 75% minimum in the district, and substantially below the minimum in Orange County. The child/adolescent rate is above the 70% minimum in both the district and county. HRS appropriately does not utilize occupancy in beds other than licensed short term psychiatric bed in calculating its rates as it would be difficult to compute the number of available beds (medical/surgical, long term psychiatric, etc.). The rule specifies that a minimum of .15 beds per 1000 population "should" be allocated to hospital1s holding a general license and that .20 beds per 1000 population may be located in either speciality hospitals or hospitals holding a general license. Of the 140 beds needed in District 7, 75 may be located in a speciality hospital under this formula. 30 speciality beds were awarded to West Lake and are unchallenged. The Charter application for 60 speciality beds exceeds by 15, the 45 speciality beds left to be allocated. The State and Local Health Plans The State Health Plan is dated 1985-1987. Goal 1 is the only portion of the plan that is relevant in this review. It essentially reiterates the need methodology described above, regarding the .35 beds per 1000 population and the 70% and 75% annual occupancy thresholds. The applicable local health plan is the 1988 local health plan for District 7. This plan divides the district into "planning areas": Brevard, Osceola, Seminole and Orange -- the four counties within the district. Planning areas, unlike subdistricts, are more in the nature of guidelines and do not carry the same legal weight as subdistricts. Both applicants are committed to submit data to the local health councils, as provided in recommendation #2. Both applicants have committed to provide a fair share of care to the underserved, although ORMC's commitment is substantially greater and has a proven record to support it. Recommendation #5 provides that no new short-term psychiatric or substance abuse beds shall be approved until all existing beds in the planning area are operating at or above 75% occupancy for the most recent twelve months for which data is available from the local health council. This criteria is barely met when adult and children/adolescent occupancy is combined, and is not met by the occupancy rate for adult beds in Orange County. Financial Feasibility The pro formas of both applicants, which are no more than best guess estimates, are generally reasonable, based upon the experience of the applicants' existing programs. Charter's proposal makes no provision for management fees, although such fees are remitted to the parent company by its subsidiaries and are reported to the Health Care Cost Containment Board. Charter anticipates that it would not incur additional corporate overhead to support this facility if it is built. In recent years ORMC's psychiatric unit has lost money in its operation when overhead is factored into the cost. Its Program Director, Jeffrey Oppenheim, reasonably anticipates the new facility will make a profit, as it will serve a better mix of age cohorts and will offer a more desirable setting than its limited facility now located on the sixth floor of a medical/surgical hospital. The financial feasibility of both applications depends on the programs' ability to attract patients. That ability is not seriously questioned. Both applications have substantial experience in operating financially efficient health care programs. Quality of Care and Accessibility No evidence was presented to challenge either applicant's ability to provide quality care. Nor, however, was the quality of care of existing alternative programs at issue. Geographic access in District 7 is not a problem, and none suggests that the access standard in Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.g., F.A.C., is not met (travel time of 45 minutes or less for 90% of the service area population). Charter's inability to provide Medicaid services and its time-limited commitment to serve even 4% indigents amount to only minimal contribution to the economically underserved population. In the past, ORMC has been a receiving facility for Baker Act patients and it anticipates it will again when the psychiatric program has its new quarters. It is only one of two hospitals in Orange County eligible to provide Medicaid services and is the fifth highest provider of charity and Medicaid in the State of Florida, according to Medical Health Care Cost Containment Board data. Impact on Existing Facilities and Competition Positive competition among providers already exists in District 7. There are eleven existing short term psychiatric programs in the four-county area, including both speciality and general hospitals, and adult, children and adolescent programs. Only three obtained an occupancy rate of more than 75% for the fiscal period ending June 1988. The Availability of Health Manpower There is a shortage of nurses, qualified social workers and counsellors in District 7. HMA has experienced problems in recruiting staff at its Orlando facility. Competition for these staff has caused salaries to rise, and consequently the cost of providing services has risen. Turnover results when staff are attracted to new facilities, causing training problems and affecting quality of care. Charter has the corporate resources to conduct effective recruiting, but has no experience recruiting in the Orlando area. ORMC, a large diverse facility, with good opportunity for lateral and upward mobility, has experienced few problems staffing its programs. The Availability of Alternatives Eight of eleven District 7 short term psychiatric facilities have operated below 75% occupancy in the last two years. These under-utilized facilities are plainly alternatives for new projects proposing the same services. Neither applicant is proposing novel or innovative services in psychiatric care. That licensed long term psychiatric facilities such as HMA, are operating short term programs does not justify the approval of new short term beds, but rather suggests these programs could be converted, with little or no capital outlay, into short term programs. Conversion of under-utilized acute are beds to short term psychiatric beds is also an alternative in District 7. Acute care bed occupancy rates in each county of District 7 failed to reach 60% in the most recent 12-month period of available data. The criterion of Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.f., F.A.C. favors the conversion of under-utilized beds in other hospital services unless conversion costs are prohibitive. There has been a trend in the last several years away from inpatient care and toward less restrictive treatment modalities. Both applicants acknowledge this trend with their inclusion of partial hospitalization programs in their plans. ORMC has no reasonable alternative to building a new facility if it is to maintain its inpatient psychiatric program. There is an increasing demand for the medical surgical beds it currently occupies on the sixth floor of Sand Lake Hospital. There is no appropriate space in its downtown facilities. Balancing the Criteria Comparative Review and Summary As reflected above, not all of the relevant statutory and rule criteria have been met by these applicants. There remains, however, the planning horizon numerical need for additional short term psychiatric beds. While that need could likely be met with the utilization of beds that are not licensed for the provision of short term care, such a solution frustrates state licensing requirements. Three alternative dispositions exist: to deny both ORMC and Charter applications, leaving an unmet need in this cycle for 86 beds; to grant one application only; or to approve both and exceed the need by two beds. HRS argues that the two-bed difference is of little consequence and that the excessive number of specialty beds if Charter is approved is irrelevant, as no general hospital is currently competing for the beds. It is not possible to conjecture that appropriate general hospital applicants will participate in a near future cycle, but it is certain that if those beds are awarded in this cycle to a specialty hospital, they will not be available in a future cycle. Nothing requires that all beds identified in a fixed pool must be awarded in that cycle. The converse follows when, as here, other considerations weigh against approval of additional beds. Between the two applicants, ORMC more consistently meets the rule and statutory criteria. Although it still proposes a substantial capital outlay, (ORMC) relies on conversion of existing licensed beds and results in less impact on other existing programs. Its contribution to the underserved population is more substantial; it proposes more needed adolescent, rather than adult beds; and it does not violate the .15/.20 general hospital, specialty hospital bed balance. That balance needs to be maintained in this case to insure competition among Medicaid providers. In summary, the evidence supports approval of ORMC's application and denial of Charter's.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED That a Final Order be entered denying CON number 5691 to Charter Medical of Orange County, Inc.; and granting CON #5697 to Orlando Regional Medical Center. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 15th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASES NO. 89-1358,89-1366.89-1368,89-2039 & 89-2041 The following constitute rulings on the findings of fact proposed by each party: Charter Medical of Orange County, Inc. Adopted in substance in paragraph 1. Adopted in substance in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. 6.-17. Adopted in statement of the issues. 18. Adopted in paragraphs 6 and 7. 19.-36. Rejected as unnecessary, except as summarized in paragraph 6. 37. Addressed in paragraph 30. 38.-5O. Rejected as unnecessary, except as summarized in paragraph 36. 51.-57. Rejected as unnecessary, except at summarized in paragraph 7. 58.-6I. Adopted in paragraph 16. 62.-69. Rejected as unnecessary and contrary to the methodology in the rule. 70. Adopted in substance in paragraph 16. 71.-77. Rejected as unnecessary. 78. Rejected as contrary to the evidence and law. "Not normal" does not include high occupancy rates in several facilities. 79.-8I. Adopted in summary in paragraph 21. 82.-83. Rejected as immaterial. The evidence in this case supports maintenance of the balance, notwithstanding past practice. 84. Adopted in paragraph 15. 85.-103. Rejected as unnecessary. 104. Rejected as contrary to the law and evidence. 105. & 106. Adopted in paragraph 22. 107.-109. Adopted in paragraph 23. 110. & 111. Rejected as unnecessary. 112. & 113. Adopted in paragraph 24. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 25. 116.-149. Rejected as unnecessary. 150. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 26 and 29. 151.-161. Rejected as unnecessary. 162.-164. Adopted in substance in paragraph 27. 165.-171. Rejected as unnecessary. 172. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 173.-180. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 181. Adopted in paragraph 5. 182.-190. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 43. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 193.-198. Rejected as unnecessary. 199. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 200.-206. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 8. 210.-213. Rejected as unnecessary. 214. Adopted by implication in paragraph 33. 215.-218. Rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. & 221. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 222. Adopted in summary in paragraph :28. 223.-238. Rejected as unnecessary. Orlando Regional Medical Center Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 9. 3.-7. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 42. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 42. Adopted in summary in paragraph 12. Adopted in paragraph 1. Rejected as ummaterial. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 15. Addressed in the preliminary statement. Adopted in paragraph 14. Rejected as unnecessary. 22.-24. Adopted in summary in paragraph 16. Adopted in paragraph 15 and conclusion of law #7. Adopted in substance in paragraph 21. Adopted in paragraph 15. Rejected as unnecessary. 29 & 30. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in paragraph 22. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 23. Adopted in paragraph 23. 36 & 37. Adopted in paragraph 24. Adopted in paragraph 11 and 33. Adopted in paragraph 8. Adopted in paragraph 11. 41 & 42. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 25. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 26. 48.-52. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 10. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence (the finding as to no alternatives). The finding regarding Park Place is unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 42. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 36. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 30. 63.-66. Rejected as unnecessary. 67. Adopted in paragraph 47. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1. & 2. Addressed in Preliminary Statement. Adopted in paragraphs 6. and 9. Adopted in paragraph 24. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in paragraph 36. 7.-9. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in paragraph 30. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 26. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Adopted in paragraph 33. Adopted in substance in paragraph 32. Adopted by implication in paragraphs 30 and 34. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Adopted in summary in paragraph 13. Adopted in paragraph 15. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. The policy is found in HRS' Policy Manual. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in paragraph 21. Rejected as unnecessary. 26 & 27. Adopted by implication in 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 33 & 34. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 46. Rejected as contrary to the evidence, and immaterial (as to the ratio). Rejected as contrary to the definition "not normal" and immaterial. 38 & 39. Rejected as argument. Adopted in paragraph 16. Adopted in paragraph 20. Rejected as unnecessary. 43 & 49. Rejected as argument. Laurel Oaks Hospital Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 13. & 9. Addressed in Preliminary Statement. 10. Adopted in paragraph 18. 11.-21. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 8. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 14. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. The term is "should", not "shall". Adopted in paragraph 15. 36 Adopted in paragraph 13. 37.-40. Adopted in paragraph 16. 41 & 42. Adopted in paragraph 18. 43 & 44. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 45.-47. Rejected as argument and unnecessary. 48 & 49. Adopted in paragraph 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 16. 52 - 54. Rejected as unnecessary. 55 & 56. Adopted in summary in paragraph 20. 57.-61. Rejected as unnecessary or argument. 62.-65. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 20 and 23. 66 & 67. Adopted in paragraph 22. 68. Adopted in paragraph 23. 69.-72. Rejected as unnecessary or cumulative. 73 & 74. Adopted in substance in paragraph 24. 75. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 76.-78. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Adopted in paragraphs 30 and 31. Adopted in paragraph 37. 82.-85. Rejected as unnecessary. 86. Adopted in paragraph 30. 87 & 88. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 34. Adopted in paragraph 41. Adopted in paragraphs 38 and 39. 92.-95 Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 39. Adopted in paragraph 35. Adopted in paragraph 30. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 101-112. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 27. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 35. 116-121. Rejected as cumulative or unnecessary. Health Management Associates1 Inc:. (HMA) 1. & 2. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 6. 5.-6. Rejected as unnecessary. 7.-11. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 16. Adopted in paragraphs 15 and 23. Adopted in paragraph 25. Adopted in paragraph 16. Adopted in paragraphs 16 and 18. 20 Adopted in paragraph 19. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 21. 23 & 24. Rejected as unnecessary. 25 & 26. Adopted in paragraph 5. 27.-51. Rejected as unnecessary. 52. Adopted in paragraph 35. 53.-55. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Michael J. Cherniga, Esquire Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301 James M. Barclay, Esquire Cobb, Cole & Bell 315 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Steven R. Bechtel, Esquire Mateer, Harbert & Bates 225 East Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32802 Edgar Lee Elzie, Esquire MacFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly First Florida Bank Building, Suite 804 Tallahassee, FL 32401 C. Gary Williams, Esquire R. Stan Peeler, Esquire Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor 227 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 John Brennan, Jr., Esquire Bonner & O'Connell 900 17th street, Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20006 Robert S. Cohen, Esquire Haben & Culpepper 306 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 John Miller, General Counsel HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. R. S. Power, Agency Clerk HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Introduction Orlando General Hospital applied in April, 1987, for a certificate of need to allow it to convert 24 existing medical-surgical beds to short term psychiatric beds. O.G. Ex. 2, p. 1. It did not explicitly apply for beds limited to serve adults. It did, however, state that adolescent care would not be provided "at this time," leaving open the use of the 24 beds in the future for possible adolescent use. Id. at p. 5. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., applied for a certificate of need for a 50 bed short term psychiatric specialty hospital. It explicitly applied for a specialty hospital having 50 beds of "short term adult psychiatric care." C.M. Ex. 1, application, section I. In the executive summary, it characterized its proposal as a specialty hospital "for adults." Id. at p. 1. Charter does not intend to treat child or adolescent short term psychiatric patients. T. 23. The applications were filed in early 1987 to meet need in the January, 1992, planning horizon. The rule that applies in this case is the one contained in the prehearing stipulation. T. 392. It is rule 10-5.011(1)(o), Fla. Admin. Code. A copy of the rule is contained in O.G. Ex. 7, p. 33. The provisions of the local health plan at issue in this case are accurately reproduced in the State Agency Action Report (SAAR) which is C.M. Ex. 5. Net Short Term Psychiatric Bed Need (Numeric Need) Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4a-c, Fla. Admin. Code, provides that the projected number of beds shall be based on a bed need ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population projected five years into the future and based, in this case, on the January, 1987, projections for January, 1992. That 1992 population for District VII is projected to be 1,505,564, and thus the gross short term psychiatric bed need is 527 beds. For this batching cycle, the inventory of licensed and approved short term psychiatric beds was 410. These were: General Hospitals Florida Hospital-Altamonte 20 Florida Hospital-Orlando 85 Orlando Regional Med. Center 32 Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital 25 Subtotal 162 Specialty Hospitals Brevard Mental Health Center 52 CPC Palm Bay (began 10/86) 40 Laurel Oaks (began 10/86) 60 Lynnhaven (approved only) 39 Park Place (approved only) 17 West Lake 40 Subtotal 248 TOTAL (Licensed and approved) 410 TOTAL (Licensed only) 354 Thus, there is a net need for 117 short term psychiatric beds In District VII by 1992. The rule further specifies that a minimum of .15 per 1,000 population should be allocated to hospitals holding a general license, and that .20 per 1,000 of the beds may be located in either speciality hospitals or hospitals holding a general license. HRS interprets the word "should" in the rule with respect to .15 per 1,000 allocated to hospitals with a general license as being mandatory. C.M. Ex. 5, pp. 13-14. This is a reasonable construction of the rule. By 1992 there must be 226 short term psychiatric beds located in hospitals holding a general license. Since currently there are 162 beds in such hospitals, there is a net need by January, 1992, for 64 short term psychiatric beds to be opened in hospitals holding a general license. The remainder of the net bed need, 53 beds, may be located in either a specialty hospital or a hospital holding a general license. T. 500-02. The Occupancy Rate for "All Existing Adult Short Term Inpatient Psychiatric Beds" Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4e, Fla. Admin. Code, provides in part that "no additional short term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in a service district is at or exceeds 75 percent for the preceding 12 month period." (E.S.). Calendar year 1986 is the period of time accepted by all parties as the "preceding 12 month period" as specified by the rule, that is, the period of time to calculate the occupancy rate for this batching cycle. See, e.g., T. 285; C.M. Ex. 5. The State Agency Action Report Occupancy Rate The State Agency Action Report computed the occupancy rate for all licensed short term psychiatric beds in District VII in calendar year 1986 at 70.13 percent. C.M. Ex. 5, p. 10. This figure was based upon data as to patient days as reported by District hospitals to the District VII local health council and was based upon 354 licensed beds in the District during the full calendar year, but excluded 56 beds the re approved but not opened. O.G. Ex. 7, p. 6. Exclusion of CPC Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks CPC Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks have been designated by certificate of need issued by HRS to serve only children and adolescents. T. 507. Since those facilities by law cannot serve adults, their beds are not "adult beds," their patient days are not adult patient days, and their occupancy rate is not an adult occupancy rate. T. 1128. If CPC Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks were excluded from the calculation of the occupancy rate in the SAAR, the occupancy rate would be 73.7 percent. This rate is a weighted average based upon a 86,779 patient days that were possible at 100 percent occupancy of all licensed short term psychiatric beds in District VII in 1986, excluding Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks. C.M. Ex. 17, p. 11, fn. 9. How Many Adult Patient Days and Beds? HRS often issues certificates of need without age restrictions, allowing the facility to provide short term psychiatric treatment to everyone, regardless of age. Such hospitals can and do serve all ages, and their licensed short term psychiatric beds are not designated as, or restricted to, adults. T. 1128-29. With the exception of Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks, none of the other licensed short term psychiatric hospitals in the District are restricted by HRS by patient age. HRS does not have data to enable it to determine which short term psychiatric beds were used by adult patients in the District in 1986. T. 1169. Use of beds for age cohorts can dramatically and continuously change during a calendar year, and 41 has no reliable means to know about such changes. T. 1229-30. Hospitals issued certificates of need without limitation as to the age of the patient are not required by HRS to report the number of patient days served by the hospital by age or age group of the patient. See T. 1218-19; HRS Ex. 2. HRS Ex. 2. Consequently, the reported short term psychiatric patient days for District VII for calendar year 1986 mix adult patient days with patient days for children and adolescents. Thus, with the exception of Laurel Oaks and Palm Bay, it is impossible in this case for the applicants and other parties in this batching cycle to untangle pure adult psychiatric patient days from the available data. T. 392, 353, 287, 291, 371, 1169-71. It is impossible on this record to make a finding of fact as to what would happen to the mixed occupancy rate all patient days attributable to adolescents and children could be excluded from the adult patient days. The only bit of evidence is found in C.M. Ex. 17, the data from Florida Hospital, which shows for that hospital that the 16 adolescent unit in 1986 had an occupancy rate of 60.92 percent, and the open adult unit had an occupancy rate of 82.42 percent. C.M. Ex. 17, p. 3. But that percentage is more a reflection of Florida Hospital's choice in how it set up the beds in the two programs than it is a reflection of need. For example, had Florida Hospital chosen to allocate only 12 beds to its adolescent program, instead of 16, the 1986 occupancy rate for that unit, based on 3,558 patients a day, would have been 81.23 percent. One wonders why Florida Hospital did not simply allocate a lower number of beds to the adolescent unit, since it had only 13 admissions to that unit in 1986. In any event, since a hospital like Florida Hospital has discretion as to how it sets up its beds with respect to the ages of patients. In those beds, the fact that it had an occupancy rate of 60.92 percent in the subunit it called the adolescent unit in 1986 is relatively meaningless when trying to predict which way a pure adult occupancy rate might change if adolescent and child patient days could be excluded. In summary, there is no accurate count of beds licensed only as adult beds, there is no accurate count of beds used only as adult beds, and there is no accurate count of adult patient days. The Problem of West Lake Hospital The record has an additional data problem with respect to calculation of the occupancy rate of adult short term psychiatric beds. West Lake Hospital is licensed for 40 short term beds (not restricted by age), and 30 long term psychiatric beds. Data for calendar year 1986, the only year relevant in this case, is a mixture of short term and long term patient days. C.M. Ex. 17. As will be discussed ahead, additional evidence as to the patient days at West Lake Hospital was excluded from evidence for failure to comply with the prehearing order. The Problem of Short Term Psychiatric Patient Days Occurring in General Hospitals Without Licensed Short Term Psychiatric Beds A general hospital with no licensed short term psychiatric care can lawfully provide temporary and sporadic short term psychiatric care in its medical-surgical beds. T. 1191. In calendar year 1986, Orlando General Hospital reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board that it provided 4,969 psychiatric (MDC 19) patient days of care. O.G. Ex. 7, p. 11. By 1988, it had over 30 psychiatric patients in the hospital at any given time. T. 753. Orlando General Hospital does not have any beds licensed for short term psychiatric care, or for long term psychiatric care, for that matter. Orlando General Hospital's psychiatric patients are currently receiving inpatient psychiatric care that is substantially the same as would be provided in a licensed short term psychiatric bed, with the exception that the care is osteopathic in nature. See T. 797, 1355-58, 1360-62, 788-90, 792-93. HRS Policy as to the Data Problems HRS stated that it "... would not attempt to fix a specific occupancy for a specific age cohort" in this case, T. 1220. A good faith attempt was made, however. Following a new policy, HRS argued that the adult bed occupancy rate should exclude the beds and patient days of hospitals having certificates of need explicitly limited to service of the needs of children and adolescents (Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks), but should include all of the licensed short term psychiatric beds at any other facility that is not restricted by patient age. T. 1127-29. It was acknowledged that the information is faulty, but the Department urges that it is the best that it can do under the circumstances. T. 1174. With respect to patient days, HRS also urges that only the patient days reported to the local health council by hospitals having licensed adult short term psychiatric beds should be counted in the mixed rate. In particular, HRS argues that it should not use patient day data reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board because such data is not limited to hospitals having "designated" psychiatric units. T. 1126-27. This argument is not reasonable. Hospitals that are legally authorized to provide short term psychiatric care to adults (i.e., having a certificate of need and a license) can provide such care in any licensed bed in the hospital, even though the bed is not licensed as a psychiatric bed. Moreover, a general hospital with no licensed short term psychiatric care, according to HRS witnesses, can lawfully provide temporary and sporadic short term psychiatric care in its medical-surgical beds. It may even provide such care on a continuous, ongoing basis, as in the case of Orlando General Hospital, although the legality of doing so is questioned by HRS. The critical question is not whether these licensed hospitals have legal authority to provide short term psychiatric care, but whether the care in fact given results in a short term psychiatric patient day in the District. If the care given is essentially the same as if the patient had been in a licensed short term psychiatric bed, it would be unreasonable not to treat the resulting statistic as a short term psychiatric patient day. What is at stake is a true measurement of District capacity. If tomorrow all of the District short term psychiatric patients and the patient days generated by such patients transferred to the District licensed short term psychiatric beds, these short term psychiatric patient days would certainly be counted in the occupancy rate. When trying to assess the real extent of availability of District capacity, a false picture of excess and unused capacity would be shown if real short term psychiatric patient days are occurring somewhere in the District, but are not counted in determining the occupancy rate. On the other hand, if the facility is not even a licensed hospital, it is presumptively providing an alternative kind of inpatient psychiatric care that is different from a licensed psychiatric hospital. Thus, its patient days are irrelevant absent some specific proof that the care given in such a bed is essentially the same as a short term psychiatric patient day in a licensed general or specialty hospital. What is an "Existing" Adult Short Term Bed? Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4e, Fla. Admin. Code, calls for the occupancy rate for "all existing" adult short term psychiatric beds in the service district, and does not define the word "existing." Petitioners assert that "existing" adult beds of the facility for purposes of determining occupancy rate is the number of beds characterized by the facility as having been in fact used for psychiatric care during the year, but only if that number is less than the number of licensed short term psychiatric beds. T. 391, 354-55. The Respondent and the Intervenor argue that "existing" adult beds is fixed by the number of licensed short term psychiatric beds granted to the facility by the state if available to serve adult patients. Normally, to be licensed a bed must be available within 24 hours. T. 1121. Orlando Regional Medical Center In calendar year 1986, Orlando Regional Medical Center had 32 licensed short term psychiatric beds. T. 348. These 32 beds were not restricted by patient age. In calendar year 1986, Orlando Regional Medical Center characterized as "in service" 32 beds for the first 7 months of 1986, 22 beds for the month of August, 18 beds for the month of September, and 12 beds for the remaining 3 months of the year. The figure of 25 beds used by the Petitioners is the weighted average. T. 348. These licensed short term psychiatric beds at Orlando Regional Medical Center were temporarily not in service because of the construction of new facilities at the hospital. Orlando Regional Medical Facility intended to reopen those beds in the future because the hospital reminded the party seeking discovery that it had 32 licensed beds, and characterized the missing beds as having been "warehoused," that is, saved for future use. T. 509-10; O.G. Ex. 7, appendix 3. Thus, all 32 of Orlando Regional Medical Center's licensed beds would be available and would be used for adult short term psychiatric care if demand existed. Florida Hospital Florida Hospital has two facilities relevant to this case, one in Orlando, in Orange County, and one in Altamonte Springs, in Seminole County. In calendar year 1986, Florida Hospital had 105 beds licensed as short term psychiatric beds. Florida Hospital would serve patients of any age in these 105 beds. C.M. Ex. 18 is a document which was obtained from Florida Hospital through discovery. T. 286. The document is entitled "Florida Hospital Center for Psychiatry Monthly Operating Statistics," and thus was assumed by Charter's expert to be Florida Hospital's characterization of its data as psychiatric data. T. 289. C.M. Ex. 18 could not have been obtained by Charter at the time it made application. It was obtainable only through the discovery process after commencement of section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., proceedings. T. 314-16, 386-87. Florida Hospital reported in discovery that in calendar year 1986, it had 113 beds operating in its "Center for Psychiatry." Of these, 16 were substance abuse beds, 13 were beds in an eating disorders unit, and 16 were adolescent beds. That left 24 beds in the intensive care unit, 24 beds in an open unit, and 20 beds at a unit at Altamonte Springs. C.M. Ex. 18. The 16 substance abuse beds clearly were not psychiatric beds. If the 13 eating disorders beds were short term psychiatric beds, Florida Hospital had 97 of its 105 licensed short term psychiatric beds in actual operation in 1986. If they were not, Florida Hospital had 84 of its 105 licensed short term psychiatric beds in actual operation in 1986. There is no evidence in this record that Florida Hospital could not and would not have readily opened 8 more short term psychiatric beds during 1986 if demand for those beds had existed, thus having "open" all 105 of its licensed beds. There is no evidence in this record that in 1986, Florida Hospital could not have closed its 16 bed adolescent unit and devoted all of those beds to adult short term psychiatric care, had there been a need. Indeed, it appears that generally speaking, that is how Florida Hospital operates: by shifting beds to other uses within its licensed authority according to demand. See T. 1322-26. Thus, all 105 of Florida Hospital's licensed beds would have been available and would have been used for adult short term psychiatric patients if the demand existed. Counting Patient Days - Are Eating Disorder Patient Days Psychiatric Patient Days? Florida Hospital reported in discovery that it had 2,982 patient days in its eating disorder unit, and that the unit operated with 13 beds. C.M. Ex. 18, P. 3, lines 8 and 26. The eating disorder unit reports to the administrative director of the Florida Hospital Center for Psychiatry. T. 977. The administrative director could not explain why the unit reported to the Center for Psychiatry. T. 977. The unit has co-directors, one a psychiatrist, and the other a specialist in internal medicine. Id. The administrative director of the Center for Psychiatry characterizes the 13 eating disorders beds as medical-surgical beds, and classifies patients in those beds as primarily having a medical problem, T. 976, but the psychiatrist co-director of the program hedged, and would not say whether the primary diagnosis is medical or psychiatric. T. 1315. The patients typically are, however, very ill from a medical point of view. T. 1314. Florida Hospital's characterization of the nature of the care given in its eating disorders unit, as summarized in the preceding paragraph, in view of the manner in which the witnesses were unclear as to how to characterize the eating disorder unit, is not evidence that the care given in that unit is not psychiatric care in view of Florida Hospital's interest in these cases in opposition to the applications. Charter's expert concluded from C.M. Ex. 18 that Florida Hospital was serving short term psychiatric patients in its eating disorders unit at Altamonte Springs. T. 287. He characterized this as a short term psychiatric service in medical-surgical beds. T. 289. But he also characterized the 13 beds as psychiatric beds. T. 287-88. HRS has issued a certificate of need to a short term psychiatric hospital limiting that certificate of need to treatment of eating disorders, thereby recognizing treatment of eating disorders in that case as a form of psychiatric treatment. T. 1191. From testimony at the hearing, it would appear that HRS's expert would view the eating disorder unit at Altamonte Springs as a short term psychiatric program. T. 1191-1192, 1194. It is concluded that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the care rendered to patients in the eating disorders unit was psychiatric care. The unit is administratively a part of the hospital's Center for Psychiatry. While the patients are very ill, medically speaking, they also have substantial mental health problems. Finally, and most persuasive, HRS has previously characterized such care as short term psychiatric care. If these 2,982 eating disorder patient days are counted as psychiatric patient days in 1986 for District VII, and if the number of beds at Florida Hospital remains as it was in the SAAR calculation (105 licensed beds), then the total patient days for the District changes from 63,976 to 66,958. The result is that the occupancy rate for District VII for 1986 for adult and mixed short term psychiatric beds changes from 73.72 percent to 77.16 percent. C.M. Ex. 17, p. 13. This calculation is the result of a weighted average discussed above. Psychiatric Patient Days Reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board Orlando Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital report patient days by Medicare major diagnostic categories (MDC). MDC 19 is the category for psychiatric care. T. 512; O.G. Ex. 7. The data collected in this record was for calendar year 1986. T. 603-604. Relying upon MDC 19 statistics for calendar year 1986, Florida Hospital (Orlando and Altamonte Springs combined) had 28,372 MDC 19 patient days, and Orlando Regional Medical Center had 7,328 MDC 19 patient days. The Florida Hospital MDC 19 patient days shown in table 6, O.G. Ex. 7, are very close to the number of patient days shown on C.M. Ex. 18, the operating statistics from the "Center for Psychiatry" obtained from Florida Hospital in discovery. The MDC 19 patient days, 28,372, exceed the "Center for Psychiatry" reported data by only 452. The Orlando Regional Medical Center's MDO 19 patient days, 7,328, is 618 patient days greater than the patient days reported by Orlando Regional Medical Center to the local health council. If these MDC 19 patient days are assumed to be short term adult psychiatric patient days, following the same mathematical calculation used by HRS both in the SAAR and in testimony during the hearing (with the same weighted averages), the occupancy rate for adult and mixed short term psychiatric care in District VII, using licensed beds, was 78.39 percent in calendar year 1986. O.G. Ex. 7, table 6. This calculation uses the same weighted average (86,779 patient days at 100 percent occupancy) as used by all the other parties. C.M. Ex. 17, p. 11, fn. 9. There is no evidence in the record that the foregoing MDC 19 patient days are limited to short term psychiatric days, or the extent to which the data considers long term patient days as well. Of course, there is also no evidence available to separate the MDC 19 patient days into adult patient days and patient days attributable to children and adolescents. Westlake Hospital Data as to Short Term Psychiatric Patient Days in 1986 The Intervenor, Florida Hospital, has renewed its effort to have F.H. Ex. 3, and testimony based upon that exhibit admitted, into evidence. The exhibit and testimony involves data as to short term psychiatric patient days for 1986 at Westlake Hospital, located in Seminole County. Florida Hospital argues that the ruling excluding F.H. Ex. 3 from evidence, as well as testimony related to that exhibit, is inconsistent with the ruling that allowed Charter Medical to introduce C.M. Ex. 19. It is argued that the only difference is that in the case of Charter Medical, the witness first testified as to the contents of the exhibit, whereas in Florida Hospital's case, the exhibit was admitted, the witness testified, and then the exhibit was excluded. Florida Hospital argues that as a result of this sequence of events, its witness was not afforded an opportunity to present the same evidence from memory without the exhibit. From a review of the sequence of events, it is apparent that there is a substantial difference between the two exhibits, as well as a substantial difference in the procedures used by counsel, and that difference necessitates the two rulings. C.M. Ex. 19 is nearly identical to C.M. Ex. 17, with three exceptions. In C.M. Ex. 19 the patient days at the Florida Hospital eating disorder unit were moved from the Orlando facility to the Altamonte Springs facility. C.M. Ex. 19 also excluded adolescent patient days from the Florida Hospital count changed the number of "existing" beds at Orlando Regional Medical Center to 25 instead of 32. T. 295. C.M. Ex. 19 made no other changes to C.M. Ex. 17 with respect to patient days or number of beds. Two objections were made by Florida Hospital to the admission of C.M. Ex. 19, that C.M. Ex. 19 had not been provided to opposing counsel at the exchange of exhibits, in violation of the prehearing order, and that C.M. Ex. 19 was an impermissible amendment to Charter Medical's application for certificate of need. T. 295-296. Only the first objection is the subject of Florida Hospital's renewed argument. The Hearing Officer at the time overruled the first objection because it was determined that C.M. Ex. 19 merely summarized the testimony of Dr. Luke as to changes he would make to C.M. Ex. 17. That ruling was correct, and should not be changed at this time. All of the underlying data for the expert analysis in C.M. Ex. 19 came into evidence without objection that it had not been exchanged among the parties. C.M. Ex. 18 contained the data as to adolescent patient days and eating disorder patient days at Florida Hospital in 196. That data came into evidence without objection that it had not been exchanged. T. 316. Dr. Luke's testimony that Orlando Regional Medical Center had only 25 beds operational in 1986 came into evidence without objection. T. 292. Dr. Luke's testimony concerning the location of the eating disorders unit at Altamonte Springs came into evidence without objection. T. 287, 291. Both of these latter evidentiary matters were of a type that easily could have been known to Dr. Luke without reference to a document to refresh his memory. Additionally, the parties were well aware of the argument that Orlando Regional Medical Center had only 25 operational beds in 1986, and that Florida Hospital had only 48 adult beds in operation in 1986, since that evidence and argument was a fundamental part of Orlando General Hospital's basic bed need exhibit, O.G. Ex. 7, and the testimony of Ms. Horowitz. Moreover, the type of analysis of the data contained in C.M. Ex. 19 is the same as that of Ms. Horowitz in O.G. Ex. 7. Thus, Florida Hospital was not caught by surprise by C.M. Ex. 19. The exhibit did not contain new data or new modes of analysis. Florida Hospital's attempt to introduce data as to the actual number of short term psychiatric patient days at Westlake Hospital in 1986 was quite different. The data as to patient days at Westlake had not been produced during the deposition of Florida Hospital's witness, although similar data for 1987 and 1988 was produced. T. 867. Had it been made available in discovery, the failure to exchange the data as an exhibit as required by the prehearing order would have been less serious. But the exhibit had not been given by Florida Hospital to opposing parties, in violation of the prehearing order. T. 869. F.H. Ex. 3 did not reorganize data that otherwise was exchanged between the parties. It attempted to introduce new raw statistical data that had not been furnished opposing counsel as required by the prehearing order. The Hearing Officer initially ruled that F.H. Ex. 3 should be admitted into evidence and allowed the witness to testify concerning the data contained in the document. T. 870-871. That initial ruling was in error. The data contained in F.H. Ex. 3 is not at all simple. The document consists of four pages of numbers representing monthly statistics in 1986 at Westlake Hospital for each of its units. It is highly unlikely that a witness could have remembered all of that data presented the data in testimony without reliance upon the exhibit. Indeed, the witness testified that all of his testimony was based upon F.H. Ex. 3. T. 907. The witness had apparently given a different impression as to Westlake's occupancy rate in 1986 during his deposition, and did so without the benefit of F.H. Ex. 3. T. 910. Florida Hospital could have asked the witness if he could have presented his testimony without reference to F.H. Ex. 3, but it did not ask the witness that critical question. In sum, the witness could not have presented his analysis from memory. He had to have F.H. Ex. 3 in front of him as he testified. On December 2, 1987, an order was entered setting this case for formal administrative hearing beginning on July 11, 1988. That order established prehearing procedures. Paragraph 3 of that order requires counsel to meet no later than 10 days before the hearing to, among other things, "examine and number all exhibits and documents proposed to be introduced into evidence at the hearing." Later in the same paragraph is the requirement that the parties file a prehearing stipulation containing a list of all exhibits to be offered at the hearing. Paragraph 3D of the prehearing order states in part that failure to comply with the requirements of the order "may result in the exclusion of testimony or exhibits." The first time that opposing counsel were given the opportunity to see the data in F.H. Ex. 3 was in the middle of the formal administrative hearing. The exhibit contained detailed raw statistical data. C.M. Ex. 19 did not try to present new raw statistical data. For these reasons, F.H. Ex. 3 and all testimony related to that exhibit by Mr. Menard was excluded from evidence. Later in the hearing, Florida Hospital sought to introduce the same data through the testimony of Wendy Thomas, the planning director and data manager for the local health council. T. 1050. Counsel for Florida Hospital first attempted to show the witness the document that had been excluded from evidence, and counsel for the other parties objected. T. 1047-1049. The Hearing Officer suggested to counsel that counsel should first ask the witness whether she had made a computation and then ask what was the basis of the computation, rather than show the witness the document. T. 1049. Counsel then attempted to do that. But when counsel asked the witness for her computation, it was still unclear whether the witness based her calculation upon data in the excluded document. T. 1053. After a number of other questions, it still was unclear whether the data in the excluded document was the basis for the calculation. T. 1053-1055. The Hearing Officer then asked the witness if she could identify F.H. Ex. 3. The witness said that F.H. Ex. 3 contained the exact type of information that she had in her own files, and that her document looked like F.H. Ex. 3, except it was photocopied smaller. T. 1056. During all of this exchange, the witness was never asked by counsel for Florida Hospital if she ever had an independent memory of the details of the underlying data, or whether, if that memory now had faded, looking at F.H. Ex. 3 would refresh her memory. Since it was apparent that the basis for the witness's calculation was the same raw statistical data as contained in F.H. Ex. 3, the Hearing Officer granted the motion to exclude the testimony. Later, in cross examination of the proffered testimony, the witness testified that the basis for her calculation was the use of a document containing the same data as F.H. Ex. 3. T. 1087-1088, 1091. Thus, counsel for Florida Hospital did not lay a proper predicate for attempting to use F.H. Ex. 3 to refresh the memory of either witness. As discussed above, had it done so, it is unlikely that either witness could have testified from memory as to the statistics because the data contained in F.H. Ex. 3 was too detailed to have ever been in the memory of either witness. Florida Hospital argued that Ms. Thomas's calculation should be admitted because the raw data had been in her possession for over a year. That argument is unpersuasive. The raw data was in the possession of Westlake Hospital as well. The issue is not whether opposing parties might have discovered the data on their own, but compliance with the prehearing order requiring exchange of important exhibits. For these reasons, the Hearing Officer's rulings as to exclusion of the foregoing evidence will remain unchanged. The Local Health Plan Applicability No part of the District VII local health plan was adopted by HRS as a rule when these applications were and reviewed. T. 1214. Several years ago, with respect to applications for certificates of need for short term psychiatric beds, HRS considered need and occupancy rates only on a district-wide basis. T. 1184. See e.g. C.M. Ex. 20, where HRS did not refer to the local health plan as to these issues in District VII. HRS has now changed that policy, however, and considers need and occupancy at the district level and by portions of the District if those issues are effectively required by the local health plan. T. 1184. For purposes of planning for short term psychiatric services, the local health plan divides District VII into county "planning areas." Orange County is thus a local health plan planning area. The local health plan does not use planning areas for substance abuse planning, and it does not explain why there is a difference in planning. Orlando General and Charter both propose to locate their proposed short term adult psychiatric beds in Orange County if granted certificates of need. Counties are convenient units for health planning purposes because population data exists by county. T. 1180. Census tracts and zip code areas are also convenient geographical units for health planning. T. 1180-81. If a proposed facility is to be located very close to the county line, it would make no difference which side of the line it was on with respect to the ability of the facility to serve patients originating in either county. T. 1181. Allocation of Net Need to Orange County The local health plan, policy 3, provides that if the application of rule 10-5.011(1)(o) indicates a need (at the District level), the need is to be allocated among the counties in the district using the state numeric need method by county. T. 1027-29; C.M. Ex. 5. Applying all of the age calculations for the projected populations and bed inventory of Orange County only, the local health plan allocates 55 new short term psychiatric beds to Orange County by 1992. However, applying the allocation ratios of the rule, there is an excess of 18 short term psychiatric beds in general hospitals, and thus none of the 55 beds would be mainly allocable to a general hospital. There is, nonetheless, a potential allocation of need of 73 beds in either a specialty or a general hospital, and the net need of 55 beds could be allocated to either a specialty hospital or a general hospital. The Orange County Mixed Occupancy Rate The local health plan, policy 4, applies the 75 percent occupancy standard to the county level. The policy explicitly calls for an average annual occupancy rate for all existing facilities in the planning area with respect to adult short term psychiatric beds. C.M. Ex. 5. Relying upon the calculation in the SAAR, but deleting Laurel Oaks, the mixed occupancy rate for Grange County in 1986 was less than 58.4 percent. This calculation only includes the beds at Florida Hospital (Orlando) and Orlando Regional Medical Center. The calculation is based upon 18,696 patient days at Florida Hospital (Orlando) in 85 beds, and 6,242 patient days in Orlando Regional Medical Center in 32 beds. There were 4,969 MDC 19 patient days occurring at Orlando General Hospital in 1986. There were 7,328 MDC 19 patient days occurring at Orlando Regional Medical Center in 1986. The eating disorder patient days occurred in Seminole County (Altamonte springs) and should not be counted in an Orlando occupancy rate. The only data as to patient days at Florida Hospital, Orlando only, is that found in C.M. Ex. 18, which is the same as the SAAR, which reports 18,696 patient days. (The MDC 19 data mixes the two units.) The number of licensed short term psychiatric beds in Orange County in 1986 was 117. All of these beds were licensed the entire year, and thus there was no need to do a weighted average of potential patient days for these beds. See C.M. Ex. 17, p. 11; O.G. Ex. 7, table 6. Using all of the foregoing patient days, the number of patient days was 30,993, the number of licensed short term psychiatric beds was 117, and the mixed occupancy rate for Orange County for 1986 was 72.6 percent. If it is not appropriate to count the 4,969 patient days at Orlando General Hospital in the Orange County occupancy rate, the 1986 Orange County occupancy rate was only 60.09 percent. Conversion of Existing Beds and Service to Indigent Patients Policy 5 of the local health plan states that excess bed capacity in, among other types of beds, medical/surgical beds, should be eliminated by reallocation of beds among the services, including psychiatric services. Policy 6 of the local health plan states that primary consideration should be given for project approval to applicants who satisfy to the greatest extent the following priorities: The first priority is to applicants who commit to serving "underserved client groups," including Medicaid, Baker Act, and medically indigent patients. The second priority is to applicants who convert underutilized existing beds. As will be discussed in the conclusions of law, Orlando General's application satisfies these priorities, and Charter Medical's application does not. Other Evidence as to Future Need Historically, health care providers have been reimbursed on a fee- for-service basis. The more services provided, the greater the payment. These insurance arrangements had little incentive to decrease the level of services. T. 720. In the last three or four years, the health insurance industry has changed its methods of providing insurance. A very large percentage of insured patient care is now managed by use of flat rates based upon a per person count (capitation). The rates do not increase related to utilization. Managed health care reimbursement uses a system whereby the health care provider is paid a flat rate annually for each insured person, and agrees to provide for the health care needs of all such persons generally without considering the degree of utilization during the year. T. 722-723. Under the capitation system, the provider has the incentive to provide only such care that, in intensity or duration, is the minimum that is clinically acceptable. T. 724. Psychiatric services have been included in the movement of the industry toward managed health care reimbursement rather than fee-for-service reimbursement. T. 722. The health care industry now offers competitive managed health care plans in central Florida, and the trend is for an increase in the availability of such methods of reimbursement in central Florida. T. 726-727. It is now 40 percent of the insurance market, and in the early 1990's, the percentage of managed health care may be twice that percentage. T. 727. The effect of the new reimbursement system is to substantially lower the length of stay, and to lower the rate of admission as well, at short term psychiatric hospitals. T. 724-725, 881-882, 1319-1320. Orlando General Hospital projected that its average length of stay would be 30 days in 1992. It has discovered from current experience that its average length of stay is about 15 days. T. 433, 464. District VII has recently experienced an increase in the availability of community based mental health facilities. These facilities provide a variety of mental health services, including brief inpatient care. The facilities do not require a certificate of need. T. 1046-1047, 1319. The Nature of the Proposed Programs Orlando General Hospital General Orlando General is a 197 bed acute care general osteopathic hospital located in Orlando, Florida, in Orange County. Orlando General proposes to convert a 35 bed medical-surgical unit to 24 short term psychiatric beds at a capital cost of $689,272. It would relocate 11 of its medical-surgical beds, and convert the remainder to short term psychiatric beds. Orlando General Hospital is located in the southeast portion of Orange County. T. 1107. It is the most eastward facility in Orange County with the exception of a long term psychiatric hospital now under construction. T. 1107. The primary service area of Orlando General by location of physicians offices is the southern half of Seminole County and the northern portion of Orange County. In particular, the hospital serves northeastern Orange County through the location of its physicians' offices. T. 412; O.G. Ex. 2, p. 27. The program of treatment described in Orlando General's application is no longer an accurate description of Orlando General's current program or of the intended program. T. 453. The treatment programs planned for the new short term psychiatric unit are comparable to the programs planned by Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., and are adequate and appropriate programs for short term psychiatric care. Psychiatric Care for the Elderly Orlando General Hospital would provide adequate and appropriate specialized short term psychiatric care for elderly patients, but would not provide such care in a unit physically separated from other patients. There currently is a split of professional opinion as to whether or not geriatric patients should be treated in a psychiatric unit separated (physically as well as programmatically) from other patients. There are benefits from both approaches. T. 1315-1317, 68, 74-76, 43-45, 770. Various Charter Medical hospitals do it both ways. T. 70. Osteopathic Medicine at Orlando General Hospital Osteopathic medicine differs from allopathic medicine in its emphasis upon viewing the interaction of all parts of the body, rather than a single part, and the use of muscular and skeletal manipulation. T. 1349, 753-754. Orlando General Hospital is an osteopathic hospital and has been osteopathic in nature since the 1960's. It was founded by osteopathic physicians, and the hospital abides by osteopathic philosophies. The Board of Trustees at the hospital are all osteopathic physicians. Although it has medical doctors on staff, the majority are osteopathic physicians Orlando General Hospital is accredited by the American Osteopathic Association to train osteopathic physicians, and has such training programs, primarily in family medicine. T. 412-414, 755. There are about 80 osteopathic physicians in Orange County, and the vast majority are on the staff at Orlando General Hospital. T. 760. Patients who prefer osteopathy, and osteopathic physicians, prefer an osteopathic hospital. Osteopathic physicians believe that they deliver better care to their patients in an osteopathic facility rather than an allopathic facility. About 30 percent of the psychiatric patients treated by Dr. Greene at Orlando General Hospital receive manipulation as a therapy. T. 1351. There is a shortage of osteopathic psychiatrists. T. 756. Other than Randall Greene, D.O., there are no osteopathic psychiatrists in the Orange County area. Id. There is a shortage of places for psychiatric resident training. There is no osteopathic psychiatric residency in Florida, and only a few in the country. T. 764, 1349. Consequently, osteopaths seeking to become psychiatrists often have to go to allopathic hospitals for residencies. T. 1349 Residency in an allopathic hospital is often not approved by the American College of osteopathic psychiatrists. Thus the osteopath who has had his or her residency in an allopathic hospital and lacks such approval will not be readily accepted as an osteopathic psychiatrist on the staff of an osteopathic hospital. T. 1350. Orlando General Intends to have a residency program in osteopathic psychiatric for at least two positions if it is granted a certificate of need. T. 762, 415. The Evolution of Osteo-Psychiatric Care at Orlando General Hospital Dr. Randall Greene came to Orlando in 1982. He is an osteopathic physician and psychiatrist. He initially was on the staff at four hospitals but soon discovered that other osteopathic physicians were referring patients needing psychiatric care to Orlando General Hospital because it was an osteopathic hospital. These physicians frequently asked Dr. Greene to provide psychiatric care at Orlando General. T. 754. Osteopathic physicians who referred their patients to Dr. Greene and to Orlando General Hospital continued to treat the physical ailments of those patients at Orlando General Hospital. T. 760. Dr. Greene now limits his psychiatric practice to Orlando General Hospital because of the large number of psychiatric patients being treated at the hospital. T. 756. Thirty to forty percent of the psychiatric patients come to Orlando General via the emergency room. T. 421, 445. Additionally, patients admitted to the new substance abuse program often need psychiatric care. T. 407. Orlando General has difficulty transferring its psychiatric patients to other hospitals. A number of the patients have no insurance or have only Medicaid coverage. T. 420. Orlando General Hospital is located in a lower economic area, and thus attracts patients of this type. Id. Patients who prefer osteopathic treatment also prefer not to be transferred to an allopathic hospital. T. 759. The increase in numbers of psychiatric patients served at Orlando General Hospital in medical-surgical beds helped to offset the hospital's loss of medical-surgical patient days during the same period. T. 452 Due to the large number of psychiatric patients, and the decline in need for medical-surgical beds, Orlando General hospital decided to apply for the instant certificate of need. Due to the osteopathic nature of the hospital, physicians, patients and the hospital prefer to keep these patients at Orlando General Hospital rather than refer them to an allopathic hospital. It is HRS's position that if a hospital does not advertise itself as having a distinct psychiatric unit and does not organize within itself a distinct psychiatric unit, the admission and treatment of psychiatric patients to medical-surgical beds on an "random" and unplanned basis is proper even the hospital does not have licensed psychiatric beds. T. 1191. Orlando General hospital does not hold itself out to the public through advertising as having a separate psychiatric unit. T. 468. Patient Mix & Commitment to Charity Care Orlando General Hospital currently provides a large portion of charity care for Orange County. T. 1100. In its 26 bed chemical dependency unit, Orlando General reserves 2 beds for indigents. T. 785. The unit also sets aside, as needed, one bed for any Florida nurse whose license is in jeopardy due to chemical dependence and who has no financial means to pay for treatment. Id. Orlando General Hospital typically has a larger amount of bad debt and charity care (for people who do not pay) than other hospitals in the area. T. 423. In 1987, Orlando General Hospital reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board that it had $141,404 in charity care, and that it had $3,244,530 in bad debt. T. 657, 660. Bad debt constituted 9.7 percent of gross revenue. T. 660. Since it is very difficult to determine at admission whether the patient realistically can pay for services, a lot of this bad debt is, in a functional sense, charity care. T. 659-660. It is concluded from the foregoing that Orlando General Hospital has a genuine commitment to providing health care to persons who cannot pay. T. 422, 662. Orlando General Hospital projects that it will in its proposed 24 bed short term psychiatric unit 5 percent indigent patients, 8 percent Medicaid patients, 20 percent Medicare patients, 50 percent insured patients, and 17 percent private pay patients. These projections are reasonable and are consistent with Orlando General Hospital's current experience. T. 662-664; O.G. Ex. 2, p. 16. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc. General Charter Medical proposes to construct a 50 bed free standing short term psychiatric hospital in Orange County, Florida. The capital cost of the proposed project would $5,85,000. C.M. Ex. 1. Charter Medical would offer adult and geriatric short term psychiatric services in the proposed short term beds. As a free standing specialty hospital devoted entirely to short term psychiatric care, Charter Medical's proposal should be able to provide more space and additional therapies than would typically be found at a general hospital with a short term psychiatric unit. T. 47-50, 890-91. Charter Medical would provide adequate geriatric short term psychiatric care in a separate unit with separate programs consisting of the latest techniques for caring for the mentally ill elderly patient. Charter Medical's proposed facility would not be able to treat short term psychiatric patients who also have serious medical problems, which undoubtedly will include elderly patients. Charter Medical would have adequate transfer arrangements with a general hospital to serve the medical needs of its patients, and would have adequate staffing and equipment within the free standing specialty hospital to meet the routine and emergency medical needs of its patients. Staffing Orlando General and Charter Medical would be able to recruit, train, and retain adequate staff to operate its proposed short term psychiatric unit. T. 635-648, 849-852, T. 137-143. Lone Term Financial Feasibility Orlando General Hospital Charges When these applications were filed, HRS did not have standards for the contents of a pro forma of income and expenses. Orlando General Hospital initially projected a charge rate of $350 in 1987 and $375 in 1988. This charge rate was based upon the charge rate for Orlando General's substance abuse unit at that time, compared with a survey of five other hospitals having short term psychiatric beds. T. 425; O.G. Ex. 2, p. 24, 49. As of the summer of 1988, the Medicaid program reimbursed Orlando General Hospital for its MDC 19 (psychiatric) patients at the rate of $418 per day. T. 585. Charter Medical proposes to charge $475 per day during 1988. Florida Hospital currently charges between $425 and $445 per short term psychiatric patient day, and these charges do not include ancillary charges. T. 992. Westlake Hospital currently charges about $550 per short term psychiatric patient day. T. 888. Winter Park Pavilion is a freestanding psychiatric hospital with 39 adult psychiatric beds. The record does not indicate whether it is licensed for short or long term care. The facility charges about $500 per patient day, which does not include ancillary costs. T. 913, 918. Crossroads University Behavioral Center is a freestanding 100 bed long term psychiatric hospital that is under construction. T. 808. Crossroads has considered charges in the range of $500 to $600 per day, but has not definitely settled on the rate. T. 832-833. The charges proposed by Orlando General Hospital in its application are very reasonable, if not very conservative. Projected Utilization Orlando General Hospital's MDC 19 patient days (psychiatric patient days) have increased steadily from 1986. In 1986, the hospital had 4,969 MDC 19 patient days; in 1987, it had 7,779 MDC 19 patient days; and extrapolating (multiplying by 4) from the data for the first three months of 196, Orlando General could reasonably expect 11,804 MDC 19 patient days in 1988. O.G. Ex. 2, p. 11; T. 516. Since a 24 bed unit at 100 percent occupancy would only generate 8,760 patient days, it is unreasonable to use 11,804 as the estimate of patient days in 1988. However, it is concluded that Orlando General Hospital would have no difficulty at all in very quickly filling its proposed 24 bed unit to capacity. Expenses Orlando General Hospital's application estimated that direct expenses of the proposed 24 bed short term psychiatric unit would be $801,505 in 1987, $839,080. In 1988, and $887,030 in 1989. O.G. Ex. 2. These are reasonable projections of direct expenses. The pro forma filed by Orlando General Hospital in its application did not include an estimate of allocated expenses. The allocated expenses would typically have been 60 percent of total expenses, and the direct expenses only 40 percent of total expenses. T. 698. The projected direct expenses for 1988 in Orlando General Hospital's application were $839,080. Since that is only 40 percent of the total expense, the total projected expense (including 60 percent for indirect allocated expense) would be $2,097,700. Long Term Financial Feasibility If Orlando General Hospital charged $375 per patient day in 1988, and had 8,760 patient days, as is reasonable to expect, given its actual experience, Orlando General would have $3,285,000 in gross revenue for 1988. Assuming that net revenue, after additions and after accounting for contractuals and bad debt, will be the same percentage of gross revenue as shown in Orlando General's application, which was 76.74 percent, this would generate a net revenue of $2,520,909. This net revenue would entirely cover not only the direct expenses but also the allocated expenses, and would leave profit of $423,209. All of the remaining issues raised by the parties as to the accuracy of Orlando General's estimates of nursing expense or bad debt are irrelevant given the large amount of leeway Orlando General would have, if necessary, to raise its charges from $375 to something closer to the charges of other area hospitals. In summary, Orlando General Hospital's proposal is financially feasible in the long term. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc. Charter Medical's proposed charges include charges for physicians who admit patients, perform histories and physicals, and make daily medical rounds. The proposed charges are reasonable. If there were need, Charter Medical's proposal would be financially feasible in the long term. The need for Charter Medical's proposed facility has not been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, however. See the Conclusions of Law herein. While the numerical need rule as applied to Orange County shows a need for 55 beds, in actual practice that need is a need for osteopathic psychiatric care. The thirty or so patients currently treated on a daily basis at Orlando General Hospital ended up at that hospital, rather than Orlando Regional Medical Center or Florida Hospital, primarily because the patients preferred osteopathic care and were admitted to Orlando General Hospital by osteopathic physicians. Absent action by HRS to stop Orlando General Hospital from treating these patients, the patients would not be available to Charter Medical in its proposed facility. This would leave Charter Medical in a situation of opening a new 50 bed facility when the county occupancy rate in 1986 was 60 percent in the only two licensed facilities in the area. It would also leave Charter Medical in a situation of opening a new facility in the face of the trend to managed health care and the certainty that the average length of stay for short term psychiatric care by 1992 will decrease from current levels. For these reasons, Charter Medical has not proven financially feasibility in the long term by a preponderance of the evidence. Quality of Care Orlando General Hospital Orlando General Hospital would provide care of good quality comparable to care that would be provided by Charter Medical. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc. Charter Medical Corporation is a large corporation that has experience in the operation of a large number of psychiatric hospitals. That expertise would be available to insure that the care provided in Orange County would be of good quality. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., would provide care of good quality comparable to care that would be provided by Orlando General. Comparative Review as to Important Differences The Orlando General Hospital Application Orlando General Hospital intends to convert 24 underutilized medical and surgical beds to 24 short term psychiatric beds. T. 517. Since the project calls for conversion of existing facilities, the capital cost is $700,000, and does not include the construction of new buildings. T. 517. Since the capital cost is relatively low, the project will not drain away a large amount of reimbursement from reimbursement funding sources, thus making those funds available to other health care facilities. T. 1223. As a licensed general hospital, Orlando General Hospital's patients including the patients that would be served by the proposed short term psychiatric unit, would be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement T. 1224. Orlando General Hospital has a good record in Orange County of serving indigent patients, and currently is providing care to a large portion of the indigents cared for by Orange County. T. 1099-1100. As discussed in the section concerning osteopathic care, Orlando General Hospital's proposal for a short term psychiatric unit would have a number of benefits to the practice of osteopathic medicine in the region, and the availability of osteopathic care to patients desiring that form of care. Patients in the short term psychiatric unit at Orlando General Hospital could be transferred to a medical bed when a medical need arises without having to be transported by an ambulance. The Charter Medical Application Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation. Charter Medical Corporation has been in existence for 20 years and has 81 hospitals. Of these, 68 are psychiatric or substance abuse facilities. Charter Medical thus has extensive resources and experience to provide very good psychiatric care at the proposed facility. As a free standing hospital dedicated solely to short term psychiatric care, it is reasonable to expect that Charter Medical's facility will tend to provide more space, more varied programs, and more intensive patient care than a general hospital. This would occur because in a general hospital, the psychiatric unit must compete with medical units for allocation of resources, and in some hospitals, the psychiatric unit is given a lower priority due to the tendency of such hospitals to emphasize the medical aspect of their services. T. 47-49. Charter Medical's facility would not treat Medicaid patients, and it proposes to serve a very small percentage of indigent patients. Charter proposes in future years after the second year to provide 1.5 percent of gross revenue as charity care, and 5 percent as bad debt. T. 377-79, 197. Charter Medical's facility would serve primarily private pay and insured patients, thus draining away these paying patients from other hospitals, to the detriment of other hospitals. T. 971. The Substantial Interest of Florida Hospital If a certificate of need were granted to Charter Medical, Florida Hospital would suffer an adverse impact by loss of patients and additional competition for staff. T. 971-972, 1318-1321, 1327.
Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended in case number 87-4748 that a final order be entered denying the application of Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., to construct and operate a new 50 bed short term psychiatric hospital, and in case number 87-4753 that a final order be entered granting the application of Orlando General Hospital to convert 24 medical-surgical beds to short term psychiatric beds. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX 1 TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-4748 and 87-4753 The following are rulings upon proposed findings of fact which have either been rejected or which have been adopted by reference. The numbers used are the numbers used by the parties. Statements of fact in this appendix or proposed findings of fact adopted by reference in this appendix are additional findings of fact. Findings of fact proposed by Charter Medical: 3-5. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The need is for beds in either a specialty or a general hospital. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The operational use of the beds is not relevant to the occupancy rate. Had the beds been restricted as a matter of licensure to children, like Palm Bay or Laurel Oaks, the beds would not have been potentially available for adults. Only in that case would exclusion of these beds have been proper. The operational use of the beds is not relevant to the occupancy rate. The testimony regarding the use of the word "existing" in the health planning field has been rejected as not persuasive. The context of such use was not explained, and thus a finding cannot be made that the use of the word is properly applicable to the way HRS intends the word to be used in its occupancy rule. The equation of "existing" with "operational" confuses capacity and need as discussed elsewhere in this recommended order. The HRS interpretation is the most reasonable construction of the word, and leads to a meaning far more consistent with the purposes of the certificate of need regulatory law than does the equation of "existing" with merely being operational. The certificate of need law is aimed at determining need five years into the future. How a hospital may temporarily operate its licensed beds during that period to respond to fluctuations in demand and operational idiosyncrasies at the particular hospital is irrelevant to the question of whether HRS should grant certificates of need and additional licensed capacity within the District. Dr. Luke's calculation was conservative and correct, but a better calculation is the one by Orlando General's expert (78 percent) that uses MDC 19 patient days. The only relevant count is 105 licensed beds at the two facilities. The last sentence is rejected for lack of credible evidence from which to draw that inference, as explained elsewhere in this recommended order. 20-21. The only relevant count is licensed beds. 22. Orlando General's average daily census was 13.6 based upon 4,969 MDC 19 patient days in 1986. 23-24. The only relevant count is licensed beds. 28. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 30. It is true that the health care needs of the metropolitan Orlando impact counties adjacent to Orange County due to the sprawl of that urban area across several county lines. But there is sufficient expert evidence in this record to conclude that generally speaking, the local health council has not acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its choices of counties as health planning areas for purposes of allocation of bed need and for purposes of applying occupancy rates. Nonetheless, the that the urban extent of the metropolitan Orlando area is important has been accepted in this recommended order with respect to the conclusion that the factor that the Orange County occupancy rate is only slightly below 75 percent is entitled to less weight in this case. 32, 33, 35, 37-63. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 64 (first sentence). It is realistically expected that Charter Medical will devote 1.5 percent of its gross patient revenue to barity care. T. 377- 379. 65-70. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 71-72. Financial feasibility has not been shown due to lack of need. Lack of need will result in insufficient occupancy and revenue. 73-74. The extrapolation from the actual trend of increase in patient days in District VII for the years 1983-1987 to create a projection of patient days in 1988 through 1992 would have been a valid and important way to show need, and would have been accepted had the projection accounted for the trend in the industry toward shorter lengths of stay due to changes in methods of payments for mental health care. The extrapolation simply assumes that the past will continue. In this case, there is substantial reason to believe that the past will not continue, that the base data, 1983-1987, is not valid for predicting patient days in 1992 because the patient days in 1992 will largely be paid for under a new system, a system that discourages inpatient stays beyond that which is absolutely necessary from a clinical point of view. Charter Medical projects that it will rely upon insurance for payment 67 percent of the time, so the changes in insurance payments will substantially affect patient days in 1992 at its proposed facility. 75-85. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 89. While osteopathic psychiatric care is essentially the same as allopathic psychiatric care, there are two critical differences. Osteopathic medicine in general emphasizes consideration of the functioning of the body as a whole; allopathic medicine does not. Secondly, osteopathic medicine utilizes muscular and skeletal manipulation in treatment, including psychiatric treatment, and allopathic medicine does not. These two differences are sufficiently marked for patients to have a preference for one or the other approach. 91-92. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 93-94. These proposed findings are true and are adopted by reference, but the findings do not prove that the quality of care at Orlando General Hospital would not be adequate in 1992. It was apparent that Dr. Greene's heavy caseload was not an optimum circumstance. However, at the time of the , Orlando General had four staff psychiatrists. T. 1355. Dr. Greene testified that the care was "basically" the same, but his testimony clearly reflected his opinion that the "deeper" differences were significant. T. 756, 1350-1354. The record cited does not support a finding that the majority of the patients transferred were indigent. That question was not asked. This proposed finding places the cart before the horse. Osteopathic physicians gravitate to Orlando General Hospital to practice osteopathy. In the practice of osteopathy, they achieve many job satisfactions, including care of patients and making money. 98-99. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant because based upon the past, not upon a future having more staff psychiatrists. Moreover, it is clinically acceptable for other professionals to provide therapy and counseling. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant. The program description in the application was superseded by evidence during the formal administrative hearing. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. Orlando General Hospital is an existing hospital that already has these functions. It may need some augmentation of staff in these areas, but if it does, it would be an unreasonable conclusion to make that it would fail to add such 103-106. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The only exception is the last sentence in proposed finding 106. The number 18 is not supported by the record cited. This method has not been shown to be unreasonable. It is true that it was the method used. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. There was an accounting for bad debt. O.G. Ex. 2, p. 48. The point is essentially irrelevant. A 10 percent increase based upon 1987 salaries would be only about 20,000. Moreover, Charter Medical stipulated in the prehearing stipulation that the salaries of all personnel are reasonable. The proposed finding of fact is true but irrelevant. A pro forma does not have to comport with generally accepted accounting principles. Even with the addition of these charges, the resultant charge is comparable to charges of other area hospitals, including. Charter Medical's proposed charge of $475, which with inflation would increase rapidly to $500. 113-122, 124. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 125-127. Proof that an existing health care program is in sound financial condition is essentially irrelevant to the question of whether that program has a substantial interest sufficient to permit intervention into a section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., formal proceeding. Proof of competition for the same patients in the same service area is sufficient to show that the existing program will be "substantially affected" to entitle it to intervene. Section 381.709(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). Florida Hospital has proven its substantial interest by showing that the addition of new short term psychiatric beds, particularily a new facility like proposed by Charter Medical, will increase competition in Orange County for patients and staff. T. 881, 883, 649, 855-856. 128-129. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference 130. Mr. Holton's testimony was not only based upon consideration of the data mentioned in this proposed finding of fact, but also his experience in general with managed health care plans and the effect such plans have had upon the market place. The proposed finding that his testimony was not credible is rejected. 131 (first two sentences), 132-133. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. Findings of Fact proposed by Orlando General Hospital: 7-12, 17, 19, 29. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The statement is true only from the perspective of the osteopathic psychiatrist and with respect to osteopathic care. Allopathic physicians disagree. The second sentence is subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. It is true, however, and is adopted by reference. 34. The second sentence is subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. It is true, however, and is adopted by reference. 38-49, 51-60. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The proposition that separate geriatric units offer no benefits to geriatric patients is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The proposition that there is no problem in mixing the elderly with younger patients, or that an elderly patient does much better in a mixed population, is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The second and third sentences are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. 67-71, 73-80. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 86-87. While these proposed findings of fact are true, they are only marginally relevant since the ratio is measured as of 1992, not 1988. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. It is unclear when Dr. Greene meant when he testified that his census was 35 to 40 patients. For the first 90 days of 1988, the hospital had 2,951 MDC 19 patient days, or 32.8 patients per day. The analysis with respect to "existing" beds and the county analysis have been rejected as explained in this recommended order. The last sentence is subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. It is true, however, and is adopted by reference. 97-102. The legal argument that beds temporarily not in operation are not "existing" has been rejected as explained in this recommended order. Thus, these findings are not relevant. 105, 107 (last sentence). These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 109. The second sentence is rejected as a finding of fact because the health planning context was not adequately explained. 110-111. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 114-115. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 117. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 118-120. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant. 122. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 123, 124, 126, 127, 129-131, 133. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The proposed finding of fact is true, but has not been shown to impact the financial feasibility of the Charter Medical proposal. The indirect costs within a single hospital are more relevant to long term financial feasibility of the proposed project than the indirect costs to a single hospital from a parent corporation that has over 60 such hospitals. 136, 147, 151, 152. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The patient body count for the first three months of 1988 was 32.8. O.G. Ex. 2, p. 11. The "consciousness" of a corporation is difficult . Orlando General Hospital was well aware that its medical-surgical census was decreasing and its psychiatric population was increasing. It is true that the increase of its psychiatric population was largely due to causes outside the control of the hospital, however, and not due to marketing efforts by the hospital. 161 (last sentence), 162. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. This proposed finding of fact is only marginally relevant because the result could be an average caused a minority of states who do things differently. Moreover, there Is no evidence that Florida is like this. The third sentence is subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. It is true, however, and is adopted by reference. 167. The statement is true only if HRS allows Orlando General Hospital to continue to serve this large number of psychiatric patients without having a certificate of need. If the practice were discontinued, some of the patients would be served by other hospitals in the District, including Florida Hospital. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 174, 176. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 177. The current state of access to short term psychiatric services in eastern Orange County was not credibly proven. 179. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. Findings of fact proposed by HRS: 1, 2, 3, 4. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 5, 6. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 13. The number should be 64, not 63. 22. The occupancy rate is a mathematical attempt to measure the degree to which the District VII capacity to serve adult short term psychiatric patients has been used up. The theory implicit in the rule is that, with respect to adult capacity, the decision to add new capacity should be delayed until the old capacity is at least 75 percent or more used up. The rate has a numerator (patient days) and a denominator (the real capacity). Any argument that tries to ignore real patient days occurring in the District, or real capacity to serve those patients, is unreasonable. Findings of fact proposed by Florida Hospital: The second sentence is true, but the issue is not she license of the beds is, but what type of patient day is generated by that service. The preponderance of the evidence is that those were short term psychiatric patient days. The first sentence is rejected for the reasons stated above. 19-21. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 20-27. F.H. Ex. 3 was excluded from evidence, and the testimony related to that exhibit was also excluded from evidence for the reasons stated elsewhere in this recommended order. 28. This proposed finding fails to consider the MDC 19 evidence of patient days at Florida Hospital and Orlando Regional Medical Center. 29-30. These proposed findings of fact are true, and the reasoning therein is part of the reason why the denominator of the fraction that is the occupancy rate must be licensed beds. 31. A correction to the number of patient days at Westlake Hospital is legally appropriate, but the evidence for such a correction has been excluded from the record for reasons having nothing to do with the legal propriety of such a correction. 33. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 34-39. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The fact that existing facilities may have beds available to treat future patients is not inconsistent with a decision to grant a certificate of need for additional licensed beds. The occupancy rate threshold in the rule is 75 percent occupancy, not 100 percent occupancy. It is to be expected that the District will have 25 percent or less of its beds unoccupied when new beds are approved. 41, 43-44, 46-47. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. This proposed finding of fact is contrary to the credible evidence. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant. See section 381.705(1)(g) and (h), Fla. Stat. (1987). This proposed finding of fact is contrary to the credible evidence. This proposed finding of fact is contrary to the credible evidence. To the contrary, where need exists, these are grounds for determining which of the competing applicants should be approved. 60. A conclusion that the occupancy rates are "stable" cannot be made from data based only upon calendar year 1986, which was two years ago, and six years from 1992, the time when need is projected. 61-69. These findings of fact are true. Even where there is need, the opening of the new facility normally lures some patients away from existing facilities. But if need exists sufficient to grant a certificate of need, this short term harm to existing providers is irrelevant. Finally, health care costs would not increase if there is need. While it is true that the Charter Medical utilization projections were initially prepared without a close analysis of District VII, the projections are nonetheless reasonable as discussed elsewhere in this recommenced order. Inflation of expenses without projection of inflation in revenues is an incomplete and unreasonable mode of projection. T. 229-230. Given the size of the Charter Medical Corporation and the number of hospitals it owns and operates, the condition of one more hospital will not Increase home office expenses. Those expenses will exist whether this project exists or not. The financial feasibility of the project in Orlando, therefor, need not consider home office expenses. T. 242-244. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The quantitative relevancy of this proposed finding of fact has not been shown. The proposed finding of fact is otherwise true. Orlando General Hospital's current patient census is a sufficient basis for a finding that its projected occupancy rate is reasonable. Charges proposed in an application for a certificate of need are not promises binding upon the applicant. In future years, the applicant is reasonably expected to make substantial changes in its charge structure based upon market conditions. Proposed charges, as well as proposed changes to charges to meet altered contingencies beyond the control of the applicant, is entirely appropriate for analysis in a certificate of need case. The only relevant question is whether the altered charge compares favorably with competing applicants. 81-83. Florida Hospital proved that the market for staff is competitive and that hiring staff is difficult at the moment. But it did not prove that the applicants would fail to hire adequate staff to operate their proposed facilities. T. 1327. 92-102. These proposed findings of fact summarize proposed findings of fact which have previously been addressed. APPENDIX 2 TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-4748 and 87-4753 Rule 10-5.008(3), Fla. Admin. Code, provides that "[s]ubsequent to an application being deemed complete by the Office of Health Planning and Development, no further information or amendment will be accepted by the Department." (E.S.) The rule states that the Department will accept no information after the application is deemed complete. The words used are not ambiguous or unclear. Thus, if normal rules of construction were to be followed, the conclusion would be drawn $ha the Department is bound by its own clear rule, and cannot, by interpretation, add exceptions. But an equally valid rule of construction is that absurd results must be avoided. Certificate of need cases, particular ones like the case at bar, are highly competitive and complicated. It would be unreasonable to require the applicants to prove applications that have become erroneous due to the passage of time. While the question is a close one, the Hearing Officer has concluded that it would be better to ignore the clear words of the rule, and attempt to apply the evolving interpretative policy of the Department to avoid an absurd result. The following appear to be the existing final orders of the Department interpreting rule 10-5.008(3), and its predecessor, published in the Florida Administrative Law Reports. Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Heartland of Palm Beach, 8 F.A.L.R. 4650 (September 24, 1986); Arbor Health Care Company, Inc., d/b/a Martin Health Center, Inc., v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 709 (October 13, 1986); Mease Hospital and Clinic v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 159 (October 13, 1986); Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Heartland of Collier County v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 8 F.A.L.R. 5883 (December 8, 1986); Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Nursing Center of Highlands County, v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 F.A.L.R. 1081 (December, 1986); Manatee Mental Health Center, Inc. d/b/a Manatee Crisis Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 1430 (February 2, 1987); Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Heartland of Hillsborouh, v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 F.A.L.R. 1630 (February 5, 1987); Manor Care, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 F.A.L.R. 1628 (March 2, 1987); Psychiatric Institutes of America, Inc., d/b/a Psychiatric Institute of Orlando v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 1626a (March 5, 1987) ; Manor Care, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 2139 (March 24, 1987); Wuesthoff Health Services, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 2110 (April 17, 1987); Hialeah Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 2363 (May 1, 1987); Palms Residential Treatment Center, Inc., d/b/a Manatee Palms Residential Treatment Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 10 F.A.L.R. 1425 (February 15, 1988). These final orders contain the following statements concerning the Department's interpretation of rule 10-5.008(3) and its evolving policy with respect to changes to applications for certificates of need during section proceedings and admissibility of new information not contained in the original applications: Health Care and Retirement, supra, 8 F.A.L.R. 1081: During 120.57 proceedings, an application may be updated to address facts extrinsic to the application such as interest rates, inflation of construction costs, current occupancies, compliance with new state or local health plans, and changes in bed or service inventories. An applicant is not allowed to update by adding additional services, beds, construction, or other concepts not initially reviewed by HRS. Manatee Mental Health Center, supra, 9 F.A.L.R. at 1431: ... HRS has authority by statute to issue a CON for an identifiable portion of . Section 381.4C4(8), Florida Statutes. MMHC's "amended" proposal reduced the number of beds sought, and was properly considered during the 120.57 proceedings. Manor Care. Inc., supra, 9 F.A.L.R. at 1628: The amended applications [amended to address needs of Alzheimer's disease patients] changed the scope and character of the proposed facilities and services and thus, must be reviewed initially at HRS... [ limited the denovo concept by requiring that evidence of changed circumstances be considered only if relevant to the application. Hialeah Hospital, Inc., 9 F.A.L.R. at 2366: It is recognized that more than a year may pass between the free form decision by HRS and the final 120.57 hearing and this passage of time may require updating an application by evidence of changed circumstances such as the' effect of inflation on interest and construction costs. For the sake of clarity HRS would avoid the use of the word "amendment" to describe such updating. Such evidence of changed circumstances beyond the control of the applicant is relevant to the original application and is admissible at the 120.57 hearing. Taking the easiest first, those items explicitly listed by the Department in the first Health Care and Retirement case, "interest rates, inflation of construction costs, current occupancies, compliance with new state or local health plans, and changes in bed or service inventories," which change after the application is initially filed, are permitted. Not permitted are "additional services, beds, construction, or other concepts not initially reviewed by HRS." The remainder of the Department's incipient policy, as presently articulated, is obscure. The word "extrinsic" without the list of examples is of little guidance. The application is only an idea on paper. Anything new, other than the bare words on the paper as originally filed, is literally "extrinsic" thereto. The concept of whether the new information changes the "scope and character of the facilities and services" originally reviewed in free form action by the Department is similarly of little guidance because the phrase "scope and character" can mean practically anything. Of fundamental difficulty is whether this phrase is intended to select substantial changes to the original application, or all changes. For example, if the original application proposes separate shower stalls and tubs for double rooms, but the amended application proposes a combination shower and tub, has the "scope and character" of the "facilities and services" changed? The phrase "additional services, beds, construction, or other concepts not initially reviewed by HRS" is similarly vague. What is a service or construction or a concept not originally reviewed? Would this include the change in bathing equipment discussed above? The concept of "control" of the applicant over the information that goes into the original application is the only phrase that gives applicants any guidance. The word "control" probably is intended as a "knew or reasonably should have "known" standard. If the applicant reasonably should have known about the information and should have provided the Department with the information as a part of its original application, then the new information cannot be considered during the formal administrative hearing. The Hearing Officer will be guided, thus, by the explicit list of items provided by the Department in the Health Care and Retirement case, and by the concept of "control" provided by the Hialeah case. COPIES FURNISHED: For Agency HRS Theodore D. Mack. Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Executive Building Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (904) 488-8673 Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc. Fred W. Baggett, Esquire Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard 101 East College Avenue Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 222-6891 William D. Hoffman, Jr., Esquire Deborah J. Winegard, Esquire King & Spalding 2500 Trust Company Tower Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 572-4600 Orlando Regional Medical Center, Inc. Steven R. Bechtel, Esquire Mateer, Harbert & Bates, P. A. 100 East Robinson Street Post Office Box 2854 Orlando, Florida 32802 (305) 425-9044 Orlando General Hospital, Inc. Eric J. Haugdahl, Esquire 1363 East Lafayette Street Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 878-0215 Florida Hospital Stephen K. Boone, Esquire Robert P. Mudge, Esquire Boone, Boone, Klingbeil & Boone, P. A. 1001 Avenida del Circo Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284 (813) 488-6716 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent’s denial of Petitioner’s Level II appeal should be upheld or whether the inpatient residential mental health services provided to R.H. by McLean Hospital’s 3 East Dialectical Behavior Therapy (“DBT”) program from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015, and again from October 15, 2015, through December 11, 2015, were “medically necessary” and therefore covered under the terms of the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan.
Findings Of Fact DSGI is the state agency responsible for administration of the state group insurance program, pursuant to section 110.123, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, A.H., is a State of Florida employee and was insured through the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan (the “Plan”). R.H., the child of A.H., was eligible for coverage under A.H.’s health insurance policy as of September 1, 2015. Pursuant to contract, Florida Blue acts as DSGI’s third-party medical claims administrator for employee health insurance benefits. New Directions is Florida Blue’s subcontractor and third-party administrator for mental health and substance abuse reviews and authorizations. “Utilization management” is the process of reviewing a service claim to determine whether the service is a covered benefit under the Plan and whether the service is “medically necessary” as that term is defined in the Plan. In cases involving mental health or substance abuse services, the service must also satisfy the more detailed and specific coverage guidelines, titled “Medical Necessity Criteria,” established by New Directions.1/ Consistent with general practice in the field, the “medical necessity” criteria of the New Directions document observe the following levels of care, in increasing order of intensity: psychiatric outpatient; psychiatric intensive outpatient; psychiatric partial hospitalization; psychiatric residential; and psychiatric acute residential. In the interests of conserving medical resources and preserving patient liberty, safety, and dignity, every effort is made to place patients in the least intensive level of care consistent with effective treatment of their presenting condition. R.H., a female who was 15 years old during the period relevant to this proceeding, has been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and has a history of eating disorders. Her treating psychologist in Florida, Nicolle Arbelaez Lopez, noted that R.H. was also being treated for generalized anxiety disorder. R.H. had an inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in Florida for eating disorder treatment in May 2015. R.H. transitioned to partial hospitalization over the summer, followed by a step down to the Renfrew Center's intensive outpatient program, then by a step up back to partial hospitalization when her eating disorder behaviors worsened. Though less intensive than a full residential admission, intensive outpatient treatment and partial hospitalization allow patients to receive comparatively intensive treatment while remaining in their home environment.2/ R.H.’s final discharge from the Renfrew Center was on August 21, 2015. At the time she was admitted to McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program, R.H. had a recent history of engaging in superficial cutting of her arm. On August 30, 2015, R.H. intentionally hit herself in the hand with a hammer. R.H.’s mother took her to the emergency room for treatment and told the treating personnel that R.H. had fallen down some stairs. The hammer blow caused swelling and bruising but no broken bones. R.H. was also continuing to purge and restrict her food intake. R.H.’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Thania V. Quesdada, and her psychologist, Ms. Lopez, both urged that she be admitted to one of three nationally-recognized immersion DBT programs. Her family chose the program at McLean Hospital. DBT is a cognitive behavioral treatment that was originally developed to treat chronically suicidal individuals diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, though it is now employed for treatment of other conditions, including eating disorders. DBT teaches behavioral coping skills such as mindfulness, distress tolerance, interpersonal effectiveness, and emotional regulation. At the hearing, DSGI did not dispute the general efficacy of DBT treatment. However, DSGI did dispute whether R.H.’s presentation merited “immersion” DBT, i.e., a residential inpatient admission. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program is self-pay and requires a minimum stay of 28 days. The program does not accept insurance and does not assist patients with insurance reimbursement efforts. Because of its stance on insurance, the 3 East DBT program is obviously not an in-network provider under the Plan. Prior to admission, Petitioner was aware that the 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. R.H. was in residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015. While at McLean Hospital, R.H. engaged in restricting and purging behaviors that led to medical instability. She was discharged to Cambridge Eating Disorder Center on September 23, 2015. She remained at the Cambridge Center until October 15, 2015. R.H.’s stay at the Cambridge Center was pre-certified by New Directions and is not at issue in this proceeding. On October 15, 2015, R.H. returned to McLean Hospital, again as a residential inpatient admission. She remained at McLean Hospital until her discharge on December 11, 2015. The total billed amount for R.H.’s two stays at McLean Hospital was $96,950, which was paid by the family out-of- pocket. Section 3-5 of the Plan sets forth the following under the heading “Mental Health and Substance Dependency Services”: “Physician office visits, Intensive Outpatient Treatment, Inpatient and Partial Hospitalization and Residential Treatment Services are covered based on medical necessity.” The general definition of “Medically Necessary” is set forth at section 15-4 of the Plan: [s]ervices required to identify or treat the Illness, injury, Condition, or Mental and Nervous Disorder a Doctor has diagnosed or reasonably suspects. The service must be: consistent with the symptom, diagnosis and treatment of the patient’s Condition; in accordance with standards of good medical practice; required for reasons other than convenience of the patient or the Doctor; approved by the appropriate medical body or board for the illness or injury in question; and at the most appropriate level of medical supply, service, or care that can be safely provided. The fact that a service, prescription drug, or supply is prescribed by a Doctor does not necessarily mean that the service is Medically Necessary. Florida Blue, CVS/Caremark, and DSGI determine whether a service, prescription drug, or supply is Medically Necessary. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for psychiatric residential admissions: Must meet all of the following: A DSM diagnosis is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for eating disorder residential admissions: Must meet 1-4 and either 5, 6, or 7 A DSM diagnosis found in the Feeding and Eating Disorder section is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. There are active biomedical complications that require 24-hour care, including, but not limited to: Adults Children/Adolescents Pulse <40 <50 Blood Pressure <90/60 <80/50 Orthostatic changes in BP Systolic: >20 point drop Systolic: > 20 point drop (Supine to standing) Diastolic: > 10 point drop Diastolic: > 10 point drop Potassium < 3 meq/l Hypokalemia Body temperature < 97 F Abnormal core temperature Electrolytes/ serum chemistry Significant deviation from normal Significant deviation from normal Must have either a. or b.: A low body weight that can reasonably lead to instability in the absence of intervention as evidenced by one of the following: Less than 85% of IBW or a BMI less than 16.5. Greater than 10% decrease in body weight within the last 30 days. In children and adolescents, greater than 10% decrease in body weight during a rapid growth cycle. Persistence or worsening of eating disorder behavior despite recent (with [sic] the last three months), appropriate therapeutic intervention in a structured eating disorder treatment setting. If PHP or IOP is contraindicated, documentation of the rationale supporting the contraindication is required. One of the following must be present: Compensatory behaviors (binging, purging, laxative abuse, excessive exercise, etc.) have caused significant physiological complications. Compensatory behaviors occur multiple times daily and have failed to respond to treatment at a lower level of care and acute physiologic imbalance can reasonably be expected. New Directions’ contact notes for this case indicate that it was called by someone named “Rachelle” on behalf of A.H.’s family on September 3, 2015. This person asked about the authorization process for McLean Hospital. No witness was presented who had direct knowledge of the contents of this conversation. The note indicates that “Rachelle” was advised that any authorization process must be initiated with New Directions by McLean Hospital. On September 9, 2015, the day R.H. was admitted to McLean Hospital, Florida Blue received what its notes reference as a “critical inquiry” message regarding this admission. A Florida Blue employee phoned the number attached to the message but discovered it was not for A.H. but for “someone at AllState Insurance who is out of the office.” (This person turned out to be Pearl Harrison, R.H.’s grandmother and qualified representative in this proceeding, who had not yet obtained a release to receive confidential medical information concerning R.H.). No number for A.H. could be found. Florida Blue contacted New Directions, which confirmed that no request for pre-authorization3/ had been received from McLean Hospital or the member. R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital were not emergency admissions. The term “medical emergency” was not specifically defined in the 2015 Plan, but expert testimony at the hearing established that it is a term of common meaning and usage in the medical community. An emergency situation is one in which there is an immediate risk of death, serious bodily harm, or creation of an irreversible condition. If care is not administered immediately, the person will harm herself or someone else. Michael Shaw, the utilization management team leader for New Directions, explained that emergency care is not provided at the residential level of care, but in an inpatient setting under lock and key. The medical records indicated that R.H.’s last incident of self-harming behavior occurred about a week prior to her admission to McLean Hospital. Her injuries were superficial and she was in no immediate danger or risk of irreversible damage. Section 7-1 of the Plan provides for hospital admissions, including the following pertinent language as to non-emergency admissions to non-network hospitals and pre- certification for stays at non-network hospitals: Non-Network Hospital: Non-emergency Admission Every non-emergency admission to a non- network Hospital must be pre-certified. This means that before services are provided Florida Blue must certify the Hospital admission and provide the number of days for which certification is given. Precertification of non-network Hospital stays is your responsibility, even if the Doctor admitting you or your dependent to the Hospital is a Network Provider. Failure to obtain pre-certification will result in penalties (higher out-of-pocket costs). For more information on penalties, see “If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay” within this section below. To pre-certify your stay in a non-network Hospital, ask your Doctor to call Florida Blue at (800) 955-5692 before your Hospital admission and provide the reason for hospitalization, the proposed treatment or surgery, testing, and the number of Hospital days anticipated. Florida Blue will review your Doctor’s request for admission certification and immediately notify your Doctor or the Hospital if your admission has been certified and the number of days for which certification has been given. If the admission is not certified, your Doctor may submit additional information for a second review. If your Hospital stay is certified and you need to stay longer than the number of days for which certification was given, your Doctor must call Florida Blue to request certification for the additional days. Your Doctor should make this call as soon as possible. * * * If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay: Non- Network Hospital Benefits for covered services will be reduced by 25 percent of the covered charges, not to exceed a maximum benefit reduction of $500 IF you are admitted to a participating Hospital (Payment for Hospital Services or PHS Provider)[4/] that is not part of the Preferred Patient Care (PPC) Network and admission certification has not been requested on your behalf or the request is denied. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your first two days of hospitalization IF your non-network Hospital admission is denied, but you are admitted to a non-network Hospital anyway. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your entire Hospital stay IF you are admitted to a non-network Hospital without having your Doctor call prior to the admission. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for the additional days that were not certified IF your non-network Hospital admission is certified but your stay is longer than the number of days for which the admission was certified. The Plan’s pre-certification requirement was not met. Neither A.H. nor McLean Hospital requested pre-certification. Mr. Shaw testified that he spoke to three different people at McLean Hospital, all of whom stated that the 3 East DBT program does not accept or work with insurance. Mr. Shaw was unable to generate the paperwork needed to begin the pre-certification process because McLean Hospital declined to share with him the necessary clinical information about R.H.5/ Although pre-certification was not obtained for R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital, Florida Blue conducted a post-service review to determine whether the claim was eligible for reimbursement. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level I appeal pursuant to Section 12 of the Plan, under which a person denied benefits or payment of a claim for medical services may obtain a review by Florida Blue. Petitioner submitted a package of R.H.’s medical records for review. Prest & Associates, Inc., a URAC-approved independent review organization,6/ was retained to conduct an independent review of Petitioner’s claim. Dr. Barbara Center, a staff psychiatrist with Prest & Associates, performed a review designed to determine the medical necessity of R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital. Dr. Center is board-certified in General Psychiatry, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and Addiction Medicine. Dr. Center reviewed the claim in terms of the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions and for eating disorder residential admissions. She performed two reviews, one for the admission starting on September 9, 2015, and another for the admission starting on October 15, 2015. Dr. Center stated that the McLean Hospital medical records provided by Petitioner gave a detailed description of R.H.’s history of present illness, past psychiatric history, and other elements of her history that were adequate for making a medical necessity determination. As to the September 9 admission, Dr. Center concluded that medical necessity criteria were not met for either a psychiatric residential or an eating disorder residential admission. As to the psychiatric residential criteria, Dr. Center concluded that R.H.’s admission failed to satisfy criteria 3, 4, and 5. Dr. Center testified that criterion 4 looks at symptoms and behaviors that represent a significant deterioration from the patient’s baseline functioning in several areas. R.H.’s primary support structures were stable. Her mother was clearly involved in her care and had the support of other family members. Dr. Center stated that the medical records showed no sign of substantial social or interpersonal deterioration, aside from some typical difficulty in starting high school. R.H. was having no medical instability at the time of admission. She was not at a dangerously low body weight. She had a recent onset of self-harming behaviors, but there was no documentation of acute risk issues that warranted placement in 24-hour care. As to criterion 5, Dr. Center testified that the records showed no indication that R.H.’s family and support system was unsupportive or unable to take her to treatment and participate in her care. There was no documentation that R.H. could not progress in a less intensive level of care. Dr. Center noted that R.H.’s prior treatment for eating disorders had been at varying levels of care and that R.H. had not had multiple brief acute inpatient stays. Criterion 3 is a diagnosis of exclusion, meaning that if there is no apparent medical necessity for the residential placement, then the reason must be “primarily social, custodial, interpersonal or respite care.” Dr. Center found in the records no support for a 24-hour residential placement. She noted that R.H.’s self-injury was of a recent onset and that McLean Hospital had ruled out any immediate prospect of self-injury or serious threat to other people. Cutting is not uncommon among adolescents and does not rise to the level of requiring residential care. Mental health providers distinguish between self-injurious behaviors and suicidal ideation, and McLean Hospital did not describe R.H. as suicidal. Dr. Center testified that, at the request of Mr. Shaw, she also reviewed R.H.’s admission in terms of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. Dr. Center noted that R.H. was not at a dangerous body weight (122 pounds, with a BMI of 22.2) at the time of her admission on September 9. There was no indication of medical instability or of out-of- control eating disorders requiring 24-hour care. Dr. Center testified that DBT is routinely taught on an outpatient basis and that she recommended outpatient treatment for the stay beginning on September 9. She opined that R.H. did not meet numbers 3 through 7 of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. As to the McLean Hospital admission beginning on October 15, 2015, Dr. Center recommended intensive outpatient treatment. Dr. Center knew that R.H. had been transitioned from McLean Hospital to the Cambridge Center to address the eating disorder as her primary symptom. Dr. Center felt that continuing R.H. in an intensive outpatient setting would help her stabilize and maintain the progress she had made at the Cambridge Center. Dr. Center stated that a basic tenet of medical care, and especially psychiatric care, is that the patient be treated in the least restrictive setting possible under the circumstances. She stated that it is always best to treat people in the environment they live in. Treatment in the 24- hour residential setting removes the patient from the stressors she will have to deal with when she goes home. Upon her readmission to the McLean Hospital from Cambridge Center, R.H. denied suicidal ideation and homicidal ideation, and the record disclosed nothing to indicate suicidal thoughts. R.H. denied auditory or visual hallucinations and her mood was described as “euthymic,” i.e., essentially normal. Dr. Center acknowledged that the medical record showed that R.H. had been in intensive outpatient treatment for her eating disorder at the Renfrew Center in Florida from July 23 through August 21, 2015, with limited success. Dr. Center stated that the issue for R.H. had recently changed from her eating disorder to her self-harming behavior and believed that an intensive outpatient program focusing on skills to deal with self-injurious behaviors would be the appropriate placement under the circumstances. Dr. Center also acknowledged that her review did not include the records of R.H.’s treating psychiatrist and therapist during her stay at Renfrew, and that their notes indicated that R.H.’s condition had regressed while in intensive outpatient care. Dr. Center testified that these records might have persuaded her to recommend a higher level of care, such as a partial hospital program, but that she still would not have recommended residential placement. After Dr. Center rendered her opinion that R.H.’s residential stays at McLean Hospital were not medically necessary, the claim was reviewed by Dr. Frank Santamaria, Florida Blue’s care management medical director. In rendering his opinion, Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records sent by Petitioner and McLean Hospital, the log of contact notes kept by New Directions, and Dr. Center’s report.7/ He testified that the available records were adequate to allow him to render an opinion as to medical necessity. Dr. Santamaria concluded that, as to the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions, R.H. failed to meet criteria 3, 4, and 5. He opined generally that when assessing the need for a residential stay, he is looking for someone who is at risk of self-harm or harming others or who has an acute severe psychiatric condition such as a psychotic disorder that requires confinement. Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H.’s eating disorder was not the primary concern at the time of her admissions to McLean Hospital; however, because the eating disorder was occurring at the same time as the psychiatric problem, he was also looking for medical manifestations of the eating disorder, such as severe weight loss affecting blood chemistry. Criterion 4 requires documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three of five listed areas. Under area 4a, “primary support,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had good support from her mother and grandmother. He did not believe that primary support was a problem.8/ As to area 4b, “social/interpersonal,” the notes indicated that R.H. recently had an altercation with a friend. Dr. Santamaria did not find such an altercation out of the ordinary for a 15-year-old and thus found no functional impairment under 4b. Area 4c, “occupational/educational,” appeared to pose no problem because the records indicated that R.H. was an A-B student, despite her rocky first week of high school. As to area 4d, “health/medical compliance,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had been compliant with medical instructions and her family had been good about seeking care for her. As to area 4e, “ability to maintain safety for either self or others,” Dr. Santamaria acknowledged that R.H. had hit her hand with a hammer and acted in other self-injurious ways, chiefly superficial cutting. He testified that such behaviors are not uncommon in younger populations and do not necessarily make the person a candidate for residential care. Self-injury alone does not satisfy the criterion, unless there is a concern for suicide or homicide. The hammer incident occurred in August, at least one week before R.H.’s admission to McLean Hospital. The McLean Hospital admission note of September 9, 2015, indicates no reported history of suicidal thinking. Dr. Santamaria found no documentation to indicate R.H. was aggressive against herself or others. She had no acute conditions such as psychotic disorders. Dr. Santamaria noted that even if area 4e were deemed to have been met, criterion 4 requires significant functional impairment and degradation from baseline functioning in at least three of the listed areas, and that R.H. at most satisfied one area of the criterion. Criterion 5 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria requires that one of three conditions relating to the patient’s support system or treatment history be met. Dr. Santamaria concluded that none of the three conditions were met. Condition 5c requires a recent history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care. Dr. Santamaria conceded that the record he examined disclosed little information about prior therapies that had been tried with R.H., but he concluded that the record was sufficient to confirm that R.H. did not have multiple brief inpatient stays. He was reasonably confident that McLean Hospital would have documented such stays had they occurred because they would be a very significant part of her history. Dr. Santamaria also noted that R.H. had been able to transition to an intensive outpatient program from her inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in May 2015. Condition 5a requires that family members or the patient’s support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine the goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. The record disclosed that R.H.’s mother, who was her custodial guardian, had a history of substance abuse but had gone through a rehabilitation program, attended Narcotics Anonymous regularly, and had been sober for one year at the time of R.H.’s October 15, 2015, admission to McLean Hospital. Dr. Santamaria testified that if R.H.’s mother were currently using drugs and R.H. had nowhere else to go, then condition 5a might be met. However, the actual situation presented by the medical record did not establish that R.H. was living in an unsafe environment that could undermine her treatment. As to condition 5b, a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care, Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. had responded to various therapies in the past. As noted above, criterion 3 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria is exclusionary, i.e., if the placement appears not to be medically necessary, then one begins to seek another motivation, such as the desire for a change of pace or a respite for the family. Dr. Santamaria noted that DBT does not require placement at the residential level. It can be done at an intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization level, both of which are lower levels of care than residential.9/ This fact made Dr. Santamaria suspect that the prime motive for R.H.’s placement may have been custodial. Dr. Santamaria testified that he also analyzed R.H.’s admission under the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. He stated that he could not be certain from the record whether McLean Hospital was treating R.H.’s eating disorder, as well as providing DBT, but he knew that McLean Hospital was mindful of the eating disorder. He also knew that R.H.’s transfer to the Cambridge Center was partly because her eating disorder was becoming worse. Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. did not satisfy criteria 3 through 7 for an eating disorder residential admission. Dr. Santamaria testified that R.H. did not meet eating disorder residential criteria 3 through 5 for the same reasons she did not meet the identical criteria 3 through 5 of the psychiatric residential criteria. Criterion 6 concerns biomedical complications of an eating disorder. Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records and concluded that R.H. presented none of the complications that would require 24-hour care at the time of her admission on September 9, 2015. Dr. Santamaria likewise found that R.H. satisfied neither factor 7a nor 7b of Criterion 7. As to 7a, R.H. did not present with a low body weight and there was no documentation that she had lost 10 percent of her body weight in the last 30 days. As to 7b, there was no evidence that R.H.’s “compensatory behaviors,” i.e., binging and purging, had caused “significant physiological complications” or that such behaviors occurred multiple times daily and did not respond to treatment “at an intensive lower level of care.” Dr. Santamaria testified that his analysis as to the October 15, 2015, admission was identical to that for the September 9, 2015, admission. As to both admissions, he believed that intensive outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Santamaria defined “intensive outpatient” as three hours of intensive therapy for at least three days per week. He believed that this level of care could address all of R.H.’s issues, including her self-injurious behavior. Dr. Santamaria concluded that if R.H. tried the intensive outpatient level of care and failed, then a higher level could be considered. Like Dr. Center, he stated that he might have recommended a partial hospitalization setting had he known that intensive outpatient had been tried and failed, but he still would not have recommended a 24-hour residential admission. Petitioner’s presentation implied that Florida Blue and/or Prest & Associates base their coverage decisions on financial considerations rather than strictly on the merits of the claims. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria both testified that they had no incentive, financial or otherwise, to deny a claim for reimbursement. Their testimony on this point is credible. Petitioner offered no direct evidence that Florida Blue or Prest & Associates directly pressure their physician employees to reject meritorious claims, and there is no evidence that Dr. Santamaria or Dr. Center based their recommendations on anything other than their assessment of R.H.’s medical records in light of the relevant medical necessity criteria. Petitioner raised questions about the completeness of the records examined by Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center and sounded a skeptical note as to the diligence of the physicians’ efforts to obtain additional documentation. As found above, both Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center testified that they had adequate documentation to render an opinion as to medical necessity in this case. Both physicians stated that in other cases they have taken additional steps to obtain missing information, including making peer-to-peer calls to the treating physicians or reaching out to the case managers, but that no such steps were necessary in this case. Both physicians conceded that not all of the medical records were available to them at the time of their reviews. They did not have records from R.H.’s stays at the Renfrew Center and the Cambridge Center or the notes of R.H.’s treating physicians in Florida. Both Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria credibly testified that nothing in these additional records would have changed their opinion as to the medical necessity of residential treatment for R.H. Section 12 of the Plan, which sets forth the appeal process for a denied claim, expressly states: “Your appeal may include any additional documentation, information, evidence or testimony that you would like reviewed and considered during the appeal process.” This language is included in the explanations for both the Level I and Level II appeals. Nothing prevents the member from providing any documentation whatsoever during the appeal process. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria are physician reviewers, not medical investigators. If something Petitioner asserted to be relevant to the decision was missing from the files, it was not the fault of the reviewing physicians. It is ultimately the member’s responsibility to provide appropriate documentation for review. By letter dated April 5, 2016, Florida Blue notified Petitioner that it “remains unable to approve additional coverage and/or payment for the Residential Treatment.” The letter set forth the following rationale for the denial: Per the State Employees’ PPO Plan Booklet and Benefits Document page 5-5: “Services or supplies that are not Medically Necessary, as determined by Florida Blue and/or CVS Caremark clinical staff and Division of State Group Insurance, are non- covered.” Specifically, coverage for the Mental Health (Eating Disorder) Residential stays is denied as it does not meet the definition of medical necessity. This is for hospital stay on and after 09/09/2015 and 10/15/2015. The final decision to proceed with the requested services is between the provider and the member. Records show that the member was not deemed to be a present risk to self or to others. Though the member had a preoccupation with weight sand [sic] eating, there was no evidence of inability to adequately care for self with functioning in multiple sphere areas, including stabilization of the eating disorder issues. There was no report of medical instability or psychosis. The member was in a body weight range. The member was described as having her eating disorder symptoms under control. From the clinical evidence, this member could have been safely treated at each occasion at a lesser level of care such as in an eating disorder intensive outpatient setting. This review was done using New Directions Clinical Care criteria and is based on the opinion of a board certified psychiatrist. Services that are not medically necessary are not covered under your health benefit plan. The denial letter provided Petitioner with information regarding the Level II appeal process to DSGI, including a reference to the pertinent section of the Plan. The denial letter reiterated that Petitioner could submit any information or documentation that Petitioner believed could assist in DSGI’s review of the appeal. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level II appeal to DSGI on May 23, 2016. The Level II appeal was reviewed by DSGI’s legal nurse coordinator, Kathy Flippo. Ms. Flippo reviewed all of the documents reviewed by Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria, plus additional records submitted by Petitioner with the Level II appeal request. Ms. Flippo determined that the stays at issue were non-emergency admissions that required pre-certification and that the pre-certification requirements of the Plan were not met. Ms. Flippo reached the same conclusions as Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria regarding the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria. Ms. Flippo concluded that R.H. did not meet criteria 3, 4, or 5. Ms. Flippo testified that she did not review the case pursuant to the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria because Petitioner’s Level II appeal addressed only the psychiatric issues and because R.H.’s eating disorder stay at the Cambridge Center was covered by Florida Blue. By letter dated July 29, 2016, signed by Tami Fillyaw, director of DSGI, Petitioner was informed that the Level II appeal had been denied. The letter informed Petitioner of his rights under the Plan to file a petition for a formal or an informal hearing contesting the denial of the appeal and/or to request a binding external review from an Independent Review Organization (“IRO”).10/ Petitioner requested both an administrative hearing and an external review.11/ The external review was conducted under the auspices of the Medical Review Institute of America, Inc. (“MRIoA”), a URAC-accredited external review network. The MRIoA assigned a physician whom it stated is board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the specialties of General Psychiatry and Child & Adolescent Psychiatry.12/ The external review upheld the adverse determinations regarding coverage for the McLean Hospital stays. In its decision letter dated November 11, 2016, the MRIoA provided the following relevant clinical summary and findings: At the time in question, the patient was a 15 year old female with a variety of difficulties related to depression, anxiety, eating disorder symptoms, and symptoms of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) with self-harming behaviors. This review has to do with a question of whether residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC) for two episodes of service 9/9/15-9/22/15 and 10/15/15-12/11/15 met the plan criteria for medical necessity. It is noted that the patient was treated in a special eating disorders program on the dates between these two episodes. * * * The patient’s presentation did not meet the plan criteria for medical necessity for the dates in question. Specifically, the patient did not meet criteria #5 of the Admission Criteria. The patient is noted to have a caring and effective support system that would have supported a less intensive level of care. There was no recent history of inability to be effectively treated at an intensive level of service below residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC), and there was no recent history of inability to transition from inpatient treatment into a less intensive level of care. At the time of admission to residential treatment, it is clear that the patient struggled with mood dysregulation along with episodes of food restriction and self- harming behaviors. She was not responding to attempts at outpatient treatment. The residential program in question was sought out specifically due to its approach to the utilization of DBT (dialectical behavior therapy). However, there is no indication that the patient could not have responded to attempts to escalate her treatment in the outpatient setting through the use of either intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization services. In particular, the patient could have been involved in a formal DBT program without utilization of residential treatment. Her symptom severity for the dates in question was not of a severity to require the use of round the clock observation and treatment. As a result, there was no medical necessity for residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC). * * * The appeal letters from the patient’s family, outpatient providers, and residential facility discuss the need for residential treatment due to the patient’s symptoms severity, particularly the patient’s episodes of self-harming behavior and the need for her to participate in the immersive DBT program utilized at the residential program in question. The patient’s need for more intensive treatment is acknowledged. However, the patient’s recent treatment history was one of outpatient treatment with a previous history of residential treatment for eating disorder symptoms. For the DOS in question, the patient could have obtained appropriate and effective DBT in a less restrictive setting, such as either a partial hospitalization program (PHP) or an intensive outpatient program (IOP). Based on the above, the previous determination has been upheld. At the hearing, Petitioner complained that, prior to receiving the letter denying the Level II appeal, he had no inkling that medical necessity determinations were based on criteria produced by New Directions. The Plan’s definition of “medically necessary” does not reference the fact that Florida Blue relies on the New Directions criteria for medical necessity determinations in psychiatric and eating disorder admissions. Petitioner basically argues that not having the precise language of the New Directions medical necessity criteria deprived him and the medical providers of the ability to frame the coverage requests in such a way as to satisfy the criteria. The record evidence shows Florida Blue does not make the New Directions medical necessity criteria directly available to its members. In fact, New Directions is nowhere mentioned in the Plan. Witnesses for DSGI correctly stated that anyone can download the criteria from the New Directions website, but Petitioner pointed out that one must be aware the criteria exist before one can download them. If this case is typical, it appears that a Florida Blue member must be denied coverage and go through the appeal process before Florida Blue makes him aware of precisely how the determination of medical necessity is made. Dr. Santamaria testified that Florida Blue does not expect its members to have any knowledge of the New Directions criteria or to “understand all the medical jargon.” The member is expected to present Florida Blue with the best and most accurate medical information available (preferably before the services are rendered) and rely on Florida Blue to make the decision. Dr. Santamaria stated, “Your role is not to do the utilization management. That’s my role. Your role is, if you disagree with a coverage determination, to appeal it and to even have your doctor speak on your behalf or write a letter or do whatever. It’s not your role to access the documents and to use them on your own. That--that’s not what they were created for.” Dr. Santamaria emphasized that the member’s “role” is not to “meet criteria” but to provide Florida Blue with information sufficient to allow its experts to apply the criteria. While his phrasing may be condescending, Dr. Santamaria’s statement is basically accurate: the medical records determine whether the criteria have been met. Petitioner’s awareness of the particulars of the criteria would not change the substance of the medical record. The undersigned tends to agree with Petitioner that Florida Blue’s process could be more transparent. However, Petitioner failed to show how the outcome would have been different if the New Directions medical necessity criteria had been available to him or McLean Hospital. Every expert who examined the medical records agreed that R.H. did not meet the criteria for medical necessity. Their opinions are credited. Ms. Flippo emphasized that Florida Blue did not deny coverage merely because McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program was self-pay. If the member had been able to obtain pre- certification for hospitalization and a proper bill had been presented to Florida Blue, it would have been covered at the allowable non-network coverage amount. Ms. Flippo also stated that even if pre-certification had been obtained, Florida Blue would certainly not have covered the 70 days that R.H. spent in McLean Hospital. Ms. Flippo had never seen more than 15 days at a time approved, even for members who were floridly psychotic and admitted under the Baker Act. With modern treatments and medications, it is seldom necessary to keep patients at a residential level of care for months at a time. All of the experts agreed that DBT is more commonly provided on an outpatient basis. Additionally, Mr. Shaw pointed out that the ability of the insurer to pay the non-contracted, non-network rate to the hospital is contingent on the hospital’s willingness to accept insurance payments. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. Mr. Shaw succinctly stated, “We’re not obligated to pay you back because you made the choice to go to a facility that takes your money but not ours.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance, issue a final order denying Petitioner’s claim for coverage under the State Employees’ PPO Plan for R.H.’s residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, to September 30, 2015, and October 15, 2015, to December 11, 2015. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2017.
The Issue Kindred Hospitals East, LLC ("Kindred") and Select Specialty Hospital-Palm Beach, Inc. ("Select-Palm Beach"), filed applications for Certificates of Need ("CONs") with the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA" or the "Agency") seeking approval for the establishment of long-term care hospitals ("LTCHs") in Palm Beach County, AHCA District 9. Select-Palm Beach's application, CON No. 9661, seeks approval for the establishment of a 60-bed freestanding LTCH in "east central" Palm Beach County about 20 miles south of Kindred's planned location. Kindred's application, CON No. 9662, seeks approval for the establishment of a 70-bed LTCH in the "north central" portion of the county. The ultimate issue in this case is whether either or both applications should be approved by the Agency.
Findings Of Fact Long Term Care Hospitals Of the four classes of facilities licensed as hospitals by the Agency, "Class I or general hospitals," includes: General acute care hospitals with an average length of stay of 25 days or less for all beds; Long term care hospitals, which meet the provisions of subsection 59A-3.065(27), F.A.C.; and, Rural hospitals designated under Section 395, Part III, F.S. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.252(1)(a). This proceeding concerns CON applications for the second of Florida's Class I or general hospitals: LTCHs. A critically ill patient may be admitted and treated in a general acute care hospital, but, if the patient cannot be stabilized or discharged to a lower level of care on the continuum of care within a relatively short time, the patient may be discharged to an LTCH. An LTCH patient is almost always "critically catastrophically ill or ha[s] been." (Tr. 23). Typically, an LTCH patient is medically unstable, requires extensive nursing care with physician oversight, and often requires extensive technological support. The LTCH patient usually fits into one or more of four categories. One category is patients in need of pulmonary/respiratory services. Usually ventilator dependent, these types of LTCH patients have other needs as well that requires "complex comprehensive ventilator weaning in addition to meeting ... other needs." (Tr. 26). A second category is patients in need of wound care whose wound is life-threatening. Frequently compromised by inadequate nutrition, these types of LTCH patients are often diabetic. There are a number of typical factors that may account for the seriousness of the wound patient's condition. The job of the staff at the LTCH in such a case is to attend to the wound and all the other medical problems of the patient that have extended the time required for care of the wound. A third category is patients with some sort of neuro-trauma. These patients may have had a stroke and are often elderly; if younger, they may be victims of a car accident or some other serious trauma. They typically have multiple body systems that require medical treatment, broken bones and a closed head injury for example, that have made them "very sick and complex." (Tr. 27). The fourth category is referred to by the broad nomenclature of "medically complex" although it is a subset of the population of LTCH patients all of whom are medically complex. The condition of the patients in this fourth category involves two or more body systems. The patients usually present at the LTCH with "renal failure ... [and] with another medical condition ... that requires a ventilator ..." Id. In short, LTCHs provide extended medical and rehabilitative care to patients with multiple, chronic, and/or clinically complex acute medical conditions that usually require care for a relatively extended period of time. To meet the definition of an LTCH a facility must have an average length of inpatient stay ("ALOS") greater than 25 days for all hospital beds. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.065(34). The staffs at general acute care hospitals and LTCHs have different orientations. With a staff oriented toward a patient population with a much shorter ALOS, the general acute care hospital setting may not be appropriate for a patient who qualifies for LTCH services. The staff at a general acute care hospital frequently judges success by a patient getting well in a relatively short time. It is often difficult for general acute care hospital staff to sustain the interest and effort necessary to serve the LTCH patient well precisely because of the staff's expectation that the patient will improve is not met in a timely fashion. As time goes by, that expectation continues to be frustrated, a discouragement to staff. The LTCH is unlike other specialized health care settings. The complex, medical, nursing, and therapeutic requirements necessary to serve the LTCH patient may be beyond the capability of the traditional comprehensive medical rehabilitation ("CMR") hospital, nursing home, skilled nursing facility ("SNF"), or, the skilled nursing unit ("SNU"). CMR units and hospitals are rarely, if ever, appropriate for the LTCH patient. Almost invariably, LTCH patients are not able to tolerate the minimum three (3) hours of therapy per day associated with CMR. The primary focus of LTCHs, moreover, is to provide continued acute medical treatment to the patient that may not yet be stable, with the ultimate goal of getting the patient on the road to recovery. In comparison, the CMR hospital treats medically stable patients consistent with its primary focus of restoring functional capabilities, a more advanced step in the continuum of care. Services provided in LTCHs are distinct from those provided in SNFs or SNUs. The latter are not oriented generally to patients who need daily physician visits or the intense nursing services or observations needed by an LTCH patient. Most nursing and clinical personnel in SNFs and SNUs are not experienced with the unique psychosocial needs of long-term acute care patients and their families. An LTCH is distinguished within the healthcare continuum by the high level of care the patient requires, the interdisciplinary treatment model it follows, and the duration of the patient's hospitalization. Within the continuum of care, LTCHs occupy a niche between traditional acute care hospitals that provide initial hospitalization care on a short-term basis and post-acute care facilities such as nursing homes, SNFs, SNUs, and comprehensive medical rehabilitation facilities. Medicare has long recognized LTCHs as a distinct level of care within the health care continuum. The federal government's prospective payment system ("PPS") now treats the LTCH level of service as distinct with its "own DRG system and ... [its] own case rate reimbursement." (Tr. 108). Under the LTCH PPS, each patient is assigned an LTC- DRG (different than the DRG under the general hospital DRG system) with a corresponding payment rate that is weighted based on the patient diagnosis and acuity. The Parties The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the CON Program and licensing LTCHs and other hospital facilities pursuant to the authority of Health Facility and Services Development Act, Sections 408.031-408.045, Florida Statutes. Select-Palm Beach is the applicant for a free-standing 60-bed LTCH in "east Central Palm Beach County," Select Ex. 1, stamped page 12, near JFK Medical Center in AHCA District 9. Its application, CON No. 9661, was denied by the Agency. Select-Palm Beach is a wholly owned subsidiary of Select Medical Corporation, which provides long term acute care services at 83 LTCHs in 24 states, four of which are freestanding hospitals. The other 79 are each "hospitals-in-a- hospital" ("HIH" or "LTCH HIH"). Kindred is the applicant for a 70-bed LTCH to be located in the north central portion of Palm Beach County in AHCA District 9. Its application, CON No. 9662, was denied by the Agency. Kindred is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kindred Healthcare, Inc. ("Kindred Healthcare"). Kindred Healthcare operates 73 LTCHs, 59 of which are freestanding, according to the testimony of Mr. Novak. See Tr. 56-57. Kindred Healthcare has been operating LTCHs since 1985 and has operated them in Florida for more than 15 years. At the time of the submission of Kindred's application, Kindred Healthcare's six LTCHs in Florida were Kindred-North Florida, a 60-bed LTCH in Pinellas County, AHCA District 5; Kindred-Central Tampa, with 102 beds, and Kindred-Bay Area- Tampa, with 73 beds, both in Hillsborough County, in AHCA District 6; Kindred-Ft. Lauderdale with 64 beds and Kindred- Hollywood with 124 beds, both in Broward County, ACHA District 10; and Kindred-Coral Gables, with 53 beds, in Dade County, AHCA District 11. The Applications and AHCA's Review The applications were submitted in the first application cycle of 2003. Select-Palm Beach's application is CON No. 9661; Kindred's is CON No. 9662. Select-Palm Beach estimates its total project costs to be $12,856,139. Select-Palm Beach has not yet acquired the site for its proposed LTCH, but did include in its application a map showing three priority site locations, with its preferred site, designated "Site 1," located near JFK Medical Center. At $12,937,419, Kindred's estimate of its project cost is slightly more than Select-Palm Beach's. The exact site of Kindred's proposed LTCH had not been determined at the time of hearing. Kindred's preference, however, is to locate in the West Palm Beach area in the general vicinity of St. Mary's Hospital, in the northern portion of Palm Beach County along the I-95 corridor. This is approximately 15 to 20 miles north of Select's preferred location for its LTCH. There is no LTCH in the five-county service area that comprises District 9: Indian River, Okeechobee, St. Lucie, Martin, and Palm Beach Counties. There are two LTCHs in adjacent District 10 (to the south). They have a total of 188 beds and an average occupancy of 80 percent. The Agency views LTCH care as a district-wide service primarily for Medicare patients. At the time of the filing of the applications, the population in District 9 was over 1.6 million, including about 400,000 in the age cohort 65 and over. About 70 percent of the District 9 population lives in Palm Beach County. More than 70 percent of the District's general acute care hospitals are located in that county. Kindred's preferred location for its LTCH is approximately 40 to 50 miles from the closest District 10 LTCH; Select-Palm Beach is approximately 25 to 35 miles from the closest District 10 LTCH. The locations of Select Palm-Beach's and Kindred's proposed LTCHs are complementary. The SAAR Following its review of the two applications, AHCA issued its State Agency Action Report ("SAAR"). Section G., of the report, entitled "RECOMMENDATION," states: "Deny Con #9661 and CON #9662." Agency Ex. 2, p. 43. On June 11, 2003, the report was signed by Karen Rivera, Health Services and Facilities Consultant Supervisor Certificate of Need, and Mr. Gregg as the Chief of the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation. It contained a section entitled "Authorization for Agency Action" that states, "[a]uthorized representatives of the Agency for Health Care Administration adopted the recommendations contained herein and released the State Agency Action Report." Agency Ex. 2, p. 44. The adoption of the recommendations is the functional equivalent of preliminary denial of the applications. In Section F. of the SAAR under the heading of "Need," (Agency Ex. 2, p. 40), the Agency explained its primary bases for denial; it concluded that the applicants had not shown need for an LTCH in AHCA District 9. The discussions for the two, although not precisely identical, are quite similar: Select Specialty Hospital-Palm Beach, Inc.(CON #9661): The applicant's two methodological approaches to demonstrate need are not supported by any specific discharge studies or other data, including DRG admission criteria from area hospitals regarding potential need. The applicant also failed to provide any supporting documentation from area physicians or other providers regarding potential referrals. It was further not demonstrated that patients that qualify for LTCH services are not currently being served or that an access problem exists for residents in District 9. Kindred Hospitals East, L.L.C. (CON #9662): The various methodological approaches presented are not supported by any specific DRG admission criteria from area hospitals suggesting potential need. The applicant provided numerous letters of support for the project from area hospitals, physicians and case managers. However, the number of potential referrals of patients needing LTCH services was not quantified. It was further not demonstrated that patients that qualify for LTCH services are not currently being served or that an access problem exists for residents in District 9. Id. At hearing, the Agency's witness professed no disagreement with the SAAR and continued to maintain the same bases contained in the SAAR for the denials of the two applications The SAAR took no issue with either applicant's ability to provide quality care. It concluded that funding for each applicant was likely to be available and that each project appeared to be financially feasible once operating. The SAAR further stated that there were no major architectural concerns regarding Kindred's proposed facility design, but noted reservations regarding the need for further study and revision of Select Palm-Beach's proposed surgery/procedure wing, as well as cost uncertainties for Select Palm Beach because of such potential revisions. By the time of final hearing, however, the parties had stipulated to the reasonableness of each applicant's proposed costs and methods of construction. The parties stipulated to the satisfaction of a number of the statutory CON criteria by the two applicants. The parties agreed that the applications complied with the content and review process requirements of sections 408.037 and 409.039, Florida Statutes, with one exception. Select reserved the issue of the lack of a Year 2 of Schedule 6, (Staffing) in Kindred's application. The form of Schedule 6 provided by AHCA to Kindred (unlike other schedules of the application) does not clearly indicate that a second year of staffing data must be provided. The remainder of the criteria stipulated and the positions of the parties as articulated in testimony at hearing and in the proposed orders that were submitted leave need as the sole issue of consequence with one exception: whether Kindred has demonstrated that its project is financially feasible in the long term. Kindred's Long Term Financial Feasibility Select-Palm Beach contends that Kindred's project is not financially feasible in the long term for two reasons. They relate to Kindred's application and are stated in Select Palm Beach's proposed order: Kindred understated property taxes[;] Kindred completely fails to include in its expenses on Schedule 8, patient medical assistance trust fund (PMATF) taxes [citation omitted]. Proposed Recommended Order of Select-Palm Beach, Inc., p. 32, Finding of Fact 97. Raised after the proceeding began at DOAH by Select- Palm Beach, these two issues were not considered by AHCA when it conducted its review of Kindred's application because the issues were not apparent from the face of the application. AHCA's Review of Kindred's Application Kindred emerged from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings on April 20, 2001, under a plan of reorganization. With respect to the events that led to the bankruptcy proceeding and the need to review prior financial statements, AHCA made the following finding in the SAAR: Under the plan [of reorganization], the applicant [Kindred] adopted the fresh start accounting provision of SOP 90-7. Under fresh start accounting, a new reporting entity is created and the recorded amounts of assets and liabilities are adjusted to reflect their estimated fair values. Accordingly, the prior period financial statements are not comparable to the current period statements and will not be considered in this analysis. Agency Ex. 2, p. 30. The financial statements provided by Kindred as part of its application show that Kindred Healthcare, Kindred's parent, is a financially strong company. The information contained in Kindred's CON application filed in 2003 included Kindred Healthcare's financial statements from the preceding calendar year. Kindred Healthcare's Consolidated Statement of Operations for the year ended December 31, 2002, showed "Income from Operations" to be more than $33 million, and net cash provided by operating activities (cash flow) of over $248 million for the period. Its Consolidated Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2002, showed cash and cash equivalents of over $244 million and total assets of over $1.6 billion. In light of the information contained in Kindred's CON application, the SAAR concluded with regard to short term financial feasibility: Based on the audited financial statements of the applicant, cash on hand and cash flows, if they continue at the current level, would be sufficient to fund this project as proposed. Funding for all capital projects, with the support of its parent, is likely to be available as needed. Agency Ex. 2, p. 30 (emphasis supplied). The SAAR recognized that Kindred projected a "year two operating loss for the hospital of $287,215." Agency Ex. 2, p. Nonetheless, the SAAR concludes on the issue of financial feasibility, "[w]ith continued operational support from the parent company, this project [Kindred's] is considered financially feasible." Id. The Agency did not have the information, however, at the time it reviewed Kindred's application that Kindred understated property taxes and omitted the Public Medicaid Trust Fund and Medical Assistance Trust Fund ("PMATF") "provider tax" of 1.5 percent that would be imposed on Kindred's anticipated revenues of $11,635,919 as contended by Select-Palm Beach. Consistent with Select Palm-Beach's general contentions about property taxes and PMATF taxes, "Kindred acknowledges that it likely understated taxes to be incurred in the operation of its facility." Kindred's Proposed Recommended Order, paragraph 50, p. 19. The parties agree, moreover, that the omitted PMATF tax is reasonably projected to be $175,000. They do not agree, however, as to the impact of the PMATF tax on year two operating loss. The difference between the two (approximately $43,000) is attributable to a corporate income tax benefit deduction claimed by Kindred so that the combination of the application's projected loss, the omitted PMATF tax, and the deduction yields a year two operating loss of approximately $419,000. Without taking into consideration the income tax benefit, Select-Palm Beach contends that adding in the PMATF tax produces a loss of $462,000. Kindred and Select-Palm Beach also disagree over the projection of property taxes by approximately $50,000. Kindred projects that the property taxes in year two of operation will be approximately $225,000 instead of the $49,400 listed in the application. Select-Palm Beach projects that they will be $50,000 higher at approximately $275,000. Whether Kindred's or Select-Palm Beach's figures are right, Kindred makes two points. First, if year two revenues and expenses, adjusted for underestimated and omitted taxes, are examined on a quarterly basis, the fourth quarter of year two has a better bottom line than the earlier quarters. Not only will the fourth quarter bottom line be better, but, using Kindred's figures, the fourth quarter of year two of operations is profitable. Second, and most importantly given the Agency's willingness to credit Kindred with financial support from its parent, Kindred's application included in its application an interest figure of $1.2 million for year one of operation and $1.03 million for year two. Kindred claims in its proposed recommended order that "[i]n reality ... this project will incur no interest expense as Kindred intends to fund the project out of cash on hand, or operating capital, and would not have to borrow money to construct the project." Id., at paragraph 54, p. 20. Through the testimony of John Grant, Director of Planning and Development for Kindred's parent, Kindred Healthcare, Kindred indicated at hearing that its parent might, indeed, fund the project: A ... Kindred [Healthcare] would likely fund this project out of operating capital. Like I said, in the first nine months of this year Kindred had operating cash flow of approximately $180 million. So it's not as if we would have to actually borrow money to complete a project like this. Q And what was the interest expense that you had budgeted in Year Two for this facility? A $1,032,000. Q ... so is it your statement then that this facility would not owe any interest back to the parent company? A That's correct. Tr. 221-222 (emphasis supplied). If the "financing interest" expense is excluded from Kindred's statement of projected expenses in Schedule 8 of the CON application, using Kindred's revised projections, the project shows a profit of approximately $612,0002 for the second year of operation. If Select-Palm Beach's figures and bottom line loss excludes the "finances interest" expense, the elimination of the expense yields of profit for year two of operations in excess of $500,000. If the support of Kindred's parent is considered as the Agency has signaled its willingness to do and provided that the project is, in fact, funded by Kindred Healthcare rather than financed through some other means that would cause Kindred to incur interest expense, Kindred's project is financially feasible in the long term. With the exception of the issue regarding Kindred's long term financial feasibility, as stated above, taken together, the stipulation and agreements of the parties, the Agency's preliminary review contained in the SAAR, and the evidence at hearing, all distill the issues in this case to one overarching issue left to be resolved by this Recommended Order: need for long term care hospital beds in District 9. Need for the Proposals From AHCA's perspective prior to the hearing, the only issue in dispute with respect to the two applications is need. This point was made clear by Mr. Gregg's testimony at hearing in answer to a question posed by counsel for Select-Palm Beach: Q. ... Assuming there was sufficient need for 130 beds in the district is there any reason why both applicants shouldn't be approved in this case, assuming that need? A. No. (Tr. 398). Both applicants contend that the application each submitted is superior to the other. Neither, however, at this point in the proceeding, has any objection to approval of the other application provided its own application is approved. Consistent with its position that both applications may be approved, Select-Palm Beach presented testimony through its health care planner Patricia Greenberg3 that there was need in District 9 for both applicants' projects. Her testimony, moreover, rehabilitated the single Kindred methodology of three that yielded numeric need less than the 130 beds proposed by both applications: Q ... you do believe that there is a need for both in the district. A I believe there's a need for two facilities in the district. Q It could support two facilities? A Oh, absolutely. Q And the disagreement primarily relates to the conservative approach of Kindred in terms of not factoring in out-migration and the narrowing the DRG categories? A Correct. ... Kindred actually had three models. Two of them support both facilities, but it's the GMLOS model that I typically rely on, and it didn't on the surface support both facilities. That's why I reconciled the two, and I believe that's the difference, is just the 50 DRGs and not including the out-migration. That would boost their need above the 130, and two facilities would give people alternatives, it would foster competition, and it would really improve access in that market. Tr. 150-51. Need for the applications, therefore, is the paramount issue in this case. Since both applicants are qualified to operate an LTCH in Florida, if need is proven for the 130 beds, then with the exception of Kindred's long term financial feasibility, all parties agree that there is no further issue: both applications should be granted. No Agency Numeric Need Methodology The Agency has not established a numeric need methodology for LTCH services. Consequently, it does not publish a fixed-need pool for LTCHs. Nor does the Agency have "any policy upon which to determine need for the proposed beds or service." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)1. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2), which governs "Fixed Need Pools" (the "Fixed Need Pools Rule") states that if "no agency policy exist" with regard to a needs assessment methodology: [T]he applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)2. The Fixed Need Pools Rule goes on to elaborate in subparagraph (e)3 that "[t]he existence of unmet need will not be based solely on the absence of a health service, health care facility, or beds in the district, subdistrict, region or proposed service area." Population, Demographics and Dynamics The first of the four topics to be addressed when an applicant is responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology is "population, demographics and dynamics." The Agency has not defined service areas for LTCHs. Nonetheless, from a health planning perspective, it views LTCH services as being provided district-wide primarily for Medicare patients. Consistent with the Agency's view, Select-Palm Beach identified the entire district, that is, all of AHCA District 9, as its service area. It identified Palm Beach County, one of the five counties in AHCA District 9, as its primary service area. In identifying the service area for Select-Palm Beach, Ms. Greenberg drew data from various sources: population estimates for Palm Beach County and surrounding areas; the number of acute care hospital beds in the area; the number of LTCH beds in the area; the types of patients treated at acute care hospitals; and the lengths of stay of the patients treated at those hospitals. AHCA District 9 has more elderly than any other district in the State, and Palm Beach County has more than any other county except for Dade. Palm Beach County residents comprise 71% of the District 9 population. It is reasonably projected that the elderly population (the "65 and over" age cohort) in Palm Beach County is projected to grow at the rate of 8 percent by 2008. The "65 and over" age cohort is significant because the members of that cohort are most likely to utilize hospital services, including LTCH services. Its members are most likely to suffer complications from illness and surgical procedures and more likely to have co-morbidity conditions that require long- term acute care. Persons over 65 years of age comprise approximately 80 percent of the patient population of LTCH facilities. Both Select-Palm Beach and Kindred project that approximately 80 percent of their admissions will come from Medicare patients. Since 90 percent of admissions to an LTCH come from acute care facilities, most of the patient days expected at Select-Palm Beach's proposed LTCH will originate from residents in its primary service area, Palm Beach County. When looking at the migration pattern for patients at acute care facilities within Palm Beach County, the majority (90 percent) come from Palm Beach County residents. Thus, Select- Palm Beach's projected primary service area is reasonable. Just as Select-Palm Beach, Kindred proposes to serve the entire District. Kindred proposes that its facility be based in Palm Beach County because of the percentage of the district's population in the county as well as because more than 70% of the district's general acute care hospitals are in the county. Its selection of the District as its service area, consistent with the Agency's view, is reasonable. Currently there are no LTCHs in District 9. Availability, Utilization and Quality of Like Services The second topic is "availability, utilization and quality of like services." There are no "like" services available to District residents in the District. Select-Palm Beach and Kindred, therefore, contend that they meet the criteria of the second topic. There are like services in other AHCA Districts. For example, AHCA District 10 has at total of 188 beds at two Kindred facilities in Fort Lauderdale and Hollywood. The Agency, however, did not present evidence of their quality, that they were available or to what extent they are utilized by the residents of AHCA District 9. Medical Treatment Trends The third topic is medical treatment trends. Caring for patients with chronic and long term care needs is becoming increasingly more important as the population ages and as medical technology continues to emerge that prolongs life expectancies. Through treatment provided the medically complex and critically ill with state of the art mechanical ventilators, metabolic analyzers, and breathing monitors, LTCHs meet needs beyond the capability of the typical general acute care hospitals. In this way, LTCHs fill a niche in the continuum of care that addresses the needs of a small but growing patient population. Treatment for these patients in an LTCH, who otherwise would be cared for without adequate reimbursement to the general acute care hospital or moved to an alternative setting with staff and services inadequate to meet their needs, is a medical trend. Market Conditions The fourth topic to be addressed by the applicant is market conditions. The federal government's development of a distinctive prospective payment system for LTCHs (LTC-DRG), has created a market condition favorable to LTCHs. General acute care hospitals face substantial losses for the medically complex patient who uses far greater resources than expected on the basis of individual diagnoses. Medicare covers between 80 and 85 percent of LTCH patients. The remaining patients are covered by private insurance, managed care and Medicaid. LTCH programs allow for shorter lengths of stay in a general acute care facility, reduces re-admissions and provide more discharges to home. These benefits are increasingly recognized. Numeric Need Analysis Kindred presented a set of needs assessment methodologies that yielded numeric need for the beds applied for by Kindred. Select-Palm Beach did the same. Unlike Kindred, however, all of the needs assessment methodologies presented by Select-Palm Beach demonstrated numeric need in excess of the 130 beds proposed by both applications. Select-Palm Beach's methodologies, overall, are superior to Kindred's. Select-Palm Beach used two sets of needs assessment methodologies and sensitivity testing of one of the sets that confirmed the methodology's reasonableness. The two sets or needs assessment methodologies are: (1) a use rate methodology and (2) length of stay methodologies. The use rate methodology yielded projected bed need for Palm Beach County alone in excess of the 130 beds proposed by the two applicants. For the year "7/05 - 6/06" the bed need is projected to be 256; for the year "7/06 - 6/07" the bed need is projected to be 261; and, for the year "7/07 - 6/08" the bed need is projected to be 266. See Select Ex. 1, Bates Stamp p. 000036 and the testimony of Ms. Greenberg at tr. 114. If the use rate analysis had been re-computed to include two districts whose data was excluded from the analysis, the bed need yielded for Palm Beach County alone was 175 beds, a numeric need still in excess of the 130 beds proposed by both applicants. The use rate methodology is reasonable.4 The length of stay methodologies are also reasonable. These two methodologies also yielded numeric need for beds in excess of the 130 beds proposed. The two methodologies yielded need for 167 beds and 250 beds. Agency Denial The Agency's general concerns about LTCHs are not without basis. For many years, there were almost no LTCH CON applications filed with the Agency. A change occurred in 2002. The change in the LTCH environment in the last few years put AHCA in the position of having "to adapt to a rapidly changing situation in terms of [Agency] understanding of what has been going on in recent years with long-term care hospitals." (Tr. 358.) "... [I]n the last couple of years long-term care hospital applications have become [AHCA's] most common type of application." (Tr. 359.) At the time of the upsurge in applications, there was "virtually nothing ... in the academic literature about long- term care hospitals ... that could [provide] ... an understanding of what was going on ... [nor was there anything] in the peer reviewed literature that addressed long-term care hospitals" id., and the health care planning issues that affected them. Two MedPAC reports came out, one in 2003 and another in 2004. The 2003 report conveyed the information that the federal government was unable to identify patients appropriate for LTCH services, services that are overwhelmingly Medicare funded, because of overlap of LTCH services with other types of services. The 2004 report gave an account of the federal government decision to change its payment policy for a type of long-term care hospitals that are known as "hospitals-within- hospitals" (tr. 368) so that "hospitals within hospitals as of this past summer [2004] can now only treat 25 percent of their patients from the host hospital." Id. Both reports roused concerns for AHCA. First, if appropriate LTCH patients cannot be identified and other types of services overlap appropriately with LTCH services, AHCA cannot produce a valid needs assessment methodology. The second produces another concern. In the words of Mr. Gregg, The problem ... with oversupply of long-term care hospital beds is that it creates an incentive for providers to seek patient who are less appropriate for the service. What we know now is that only the sickest patient ... with the most severe conditions are truly appropriate for long-term care hospital placement. * * * ... [T]he MedPAC report most recently shows us that the greatest indicator of utilization of long-term care hospital services is the mere availability of those services. Tr. 368-369. The MedPAC reports, themselves, although marked for identification, were not admitted into evidence. Objections to their admission (in particular, Kindred's) were sustained because they had not been listed by AHCA on the stipulation required by the Pre-hearing Order of Instructions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Agency for Health Care Administration that: approves Select-Palm Beach's application, CON 9661; and approves Kindred's application CON 9662 with the condition that financing of the project be provided by Kindred Healthcare. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 2005.
Findings Of Fact The Parties FRTC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation which proposes to construct and operate a 60 bed intensive residential treatment program (IRTP) in Bradenton, Florida, which is located in the Department's District VI. The Department is the state agency with the authority and responsibility to consider CON applications. Manatee Palms is an existing residential treatment center in Manatee County, Florida which opened in January, 1987 and is currently operating without a CON. It provides services similar or identical to those proposed by FRTC. Manatee Palms was developed by, and is a subsidiary of, Psychiatric Institutes of America. Its primary service area extends beyond District VI from Orlando to Naples. Manatee Palms is a sixty bed facility providing psychiatric, substance abuse and educational services for juveniles up to 18 years of age, and is licensed by the Department as a child caring facility, as a provider of services to the Department, and for subspecialties involving drug and alcohol programs. It is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals as a residential treatment center. The average length of stay for patients is six months. Occupancy rates have been consistently above projections and have been as high as 97 percent in May, 1987. Manatee Memorial is a full-service acute care hospital and an existing provider of short-term psychiatric services in Bradenton, Florida, with 25 licensed short-term psychiatric beds, nine of which comprise a children's and adolescent unit. It is the Manatee County contract provider of in-patient psychiatric services to the medically indigent, and provides approximately 91 percent of the indigent care in Manatee County. Manatee Memorial does not have, and has never sought, a CON as an IRTP, but does have earlier-batched applications pending for additional short and long term psychiatric beds. Its average length of stay is 35-40 days, and its utilization rate is approaching 100 percent. Manatee Memorial provides services similar or identical to those proposed by FRTC, and its program also utilizes a "levels system" similar to that used by FRTC. The Application and Project On September 15, 1986 FRTC filed a Letter of Intent notifying the Department of its intent to file a CON application for an IRTP for children and adolescents in Bradenton, Florida. On October 14, 1986 FRTC filed CON application number 4825 to obtain specialty hospital licensure as an IRTP. This application was initially approved by the Department on March 10, 1987, after the filing of a completeness response on or about December 23, 1986 at the request of the Department. Manatee Palms and Manatee Memorial timely filed petitions for formal administrative hearings challenging the Department's intent to issue the CON. The project at issue in this case is a 60 bed IRTP situated on a 9.35 acre site. The proposed building will have total gross square footage of approximately 32,000 and has been adapted from a prototype short-term psychiatric hospital design which has been used in approximately 50 locations. The floor plan submitted by FRTC provides for 28 semi-private rooms, three of which are designed to accommodate the handicapped, and one 4- bed assessment unit. Additionally, reasonable and sufficient space is provided for five classrooms, occupational therapy, a gymnasium, three group rooms, three day rooms, a seclusion area, three consult rooms, laundry and storage rooms, a nurses' station, dining room, and an administrative wing. A parking area, multi-purpose court, pool, activities field and drainage retention area are also provided. The parties have stipulated that the building will be energy efficient. Total project cost is reasonably estimated at $4,303,020. As a result of design modifications, the square footage of the project has increased by approximately 1,000 gross square feet and project costs have increased by approximately $69,000 from FRTC's completed application. The Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regulation and Health Facilities, John Griffin, testified that for a project of this size these changes are not considered to be "amendments" to the application. The changes in facility design identified at hearing represent refinements and permissible modifications, rather than application amendments. There is no architectural significance to the changes. Rather, they make the design more appropriate for an IRTP. Specifically, a multi-purpose area was converted to a half-court gymnasium, the occupational therapy and interior mechanical spaces were slightly increased for more storage area, a seclusion room was deleted, the nurses' station was reduced, a 4-bed assessment unit was added, and other minor changes were made. FRTC proposes to offer 24-hour psychiatric services to children and adolescents under the age of 18, who are severely emotionally disturbed, and who are admitted voluntarily, after screening, with a history of prior treatment. Its program elements will include occupational therapy, recreational therapy, group and individual therapy, nursing care, an educational component, psychological testing, counseling and family therapy. The FRTC program will be initiated as a locked intensive program whose goal is to return the patient to his family and to life in a natural setting. Patients who are severely retarded, autistic, or with an active diagnosis of substance abuse will not be admitted. The average length of stay for patients is reasonably projected to be one year, with a range of from 6 months to two years. There are no licensed intensive residential treatment programs (IRTP) for children and adolescents in Manatee County, Florida or in the Department's District VI, which includes Manatee County as well as Hardee, Highland, Hillsborough and Polk Counties. There are also no licensed IRTPs in adjoining Districts V and VIII. Stipulations The parties have stipulated that FRTC has the ability to recruit physicians for this project, and also has funds available for FRTC's capital and operating expenditures. In addition, the parties have stipulated that review criteria concerning the need for research and educational facilities, the extent to which the services will be accessible to schools for health professional, and the special needs and circumstances of health maintenance organizations are not applicable to this CON application. Non-Rule Policy For IRTP The Department currently has no rule governing the approval of IRTP applications for a CON. However, since February 1987 the Department has followed a non-rule policy which presumes there is a need for at least one licensed IRTP of reasonable size in each Departmental service district, and which does not consider the existence of unlicensed residential treatment beds in a district in determining if the presumed need has been met. No changes or revisions in this non-rule policy of the Department are under review. The Department applied this non-rule policy in initially approving the CON application. Based upon the testimony of John Griffin, the Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary who administers the CON program and is responsible for health planning, an IRTP applicant does not have to establish "need" in a particular service district where it wants to locate a facility because the non- rule policy presumes there is a need for one IRTP of reasonable size per district. The applicant must, however, establish that there is not presently a licensed IRTP in the district and that it proposed to establish an IRTP of reasonable size. Griffin was not able to explicate this non-rule policy based upon health planning concerns, considerations or factors. Sharon Gordon-Girvin, Administrator of the Department's Office of Community Medical Services and Facilities, was also unable to articulate or explicate a health planning basis for this policy. Rather, the only basis enunciated at hearing by the Department for this non-rule policy was its statutory interpretation of Sections 395.002(8) and 395.003(2)(f), Florida Statutes, as renumbered by Section 34, Chapter 87-92, Laws of Florida. Need And Consistency With State And Local Health Plans There are no licensed IRTPs in District VI. Manatee Palms is a residential treatment center for children and adolescents located in Manatee County, but it is not licensed by the Department as an IRTP. Relevant issues identified in the District VI Local Health Plan are stated as follows: As a general policy, the least restrictive, most cost effective setting and programs should be used. The State of Florida, as a major purchaser of mental health and substance abuse services, can continue to lead the way by encouraging the development of non-hospital alternatives and by purchasing services from them preferentially. Another important issue in psychiatric care is the trend toward hospitalization of children who have behavior and conduct disorders, and who should more appropriately be served through non-hospital alternatives. . . At the present time, the severe emotionally disturbed or emotionally handicapped (SED/EH) child or adolescent is served in a broad range of programs. There are crisis stabilization units (CSUs) for stabilizing the adult client in acute crisis. Currently CSU services for children and adolescents are not adequate throughout the District. Intensive residential, day/night program, group and foster homes are for the client requiring close supervision. Relevant policies set forth in the District Local Health Plan are as follows: The multi-modality approach as expressed in the community mental health (and substance abuse) system should be considered a model of programming, staffing, facility requirements, costs, etc., against which applications for inpatient services should be reviewed. Review of applications for inpatient psychiatric and substance abuse services should include comment from the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Program Offices of DHRS. No additional psychiatric and/or substance abuse beds should be granted approval unless the capacity of current hospital providers is being fully utilized (75 percent occupancy rate annual). Additional psychiatric and/or substance abuse beds should be through conversion of existing beds. The State Health Plan sets forth the following relevant policies and statements: The goal of (mental health) services is (to) . . . provide educational; mental health treatment; and when needed, residential services for severely emotionally disturbed students. It is the intent of the Legislature that the least restrictive means of intervention be employed based on the individual needs of each patient within the scope of available services . . . The program goals for each component of the network are . . . to provide programs and services as close as possible to the child's home in the least restrictive manner consistent with the child's needs. Sufficient funding for the development of residential treatment and community support services is necessary if the state is to fulfill its commitment to providing services for long term mentally ill persons. These services provide, in the long run, a more humane and cost effective means of meeting the mental health needs of Florida residents. Continued development of long and short term inpatient hospital programs for the treatment of adolescents and children is contrary to current treatment practices for these groups and is, therefore, inappropriate without local data to support the need for these services. Such development can contribute to inappropriate placement, unnecessary costs of treatment, and divert scarce resources away from alternative uses. In addition, the following relevant goals are contained in the State Health Plan: Promote the development of a continuum of high quality, cost effective private sector mental health and substance abuse treatment and preventive services. Bring about changes in third party reimbursement policy for psychiatric and substance abuse care which would promote the development of the most appropriate, cost-effective treatment settings . . . Develop a network of residential treatment settings for Florida's severely emotionally disturbed children by 1989 . . . Develop residential placements within Florida for all SED children currently receiving treatment in out of state facilities by 1990. The FRTC application is consistent with the above cited relevant portions of the state and local health plans. It is consistent with the State Health Plan which reflects and emphasizes the trend toward deinstitutionalization and the current emphasis on education, treatment and residential services for severely emotionally disturbed students rather than what has been the traditional approach to treatment in an institutional setting, a generally more costly approach from a capital cost and staffing perspective. The FRTC application promotes treatment within the State and will assist in reducing out of state placements. Through the report and testimony of Ronald T. Luke, Ph.D., J.D., and despite the testimony of Jay Cushman, both of whom were accepted as experts in health planning, FRTC established the need for, and reasonableness of, its 60 licensed IRTP beds in District VI, with 50 percent occupancy in the first year and 60 percent in the second year, using two bed need assessment methodologies. First, using the ratio of licensed IRTP beds in other service districts to population ages 0-17 years old, a range of .07 to 1.33 beds per 1,000 population is identified. Using 1991 population projections for District VI, the 60 bed FRTC facility would result in a bed to population ratio of .17 per 1,000 population aged 0-17 years. Since there are no licensed beds in the current inventory, no adjustment of this ratio must be made to account for existing beds. Thus, the FRTC application is within the range of ratios of currently licensed IRTPs in other districts, and is therefore reasonable. Second, a utilization methodology identifies an intensive residential treatment bed need of 90 in 1987 to 95 in 1991, with target occupancy rates of 90 percent. This methodology is based upon 1987 and 1991 population projections. Using a census rate per 100,000 population of 21.58 which is appropriately and reasonably derived from national data for residential treatment patients aged 0-17, an average daily census of 74 in 1987 and 78 in 1991 is derived. Thus, FRTC has established a need for its facility in District VI, given its projected occupancy levels, and given that there are no licensed beds currently in the District. It is important to recognize that the bed ratio analysis is based upon licensed intensive residential treatment beds in Florida, and is therefore clearly relevant and credible to the issues in this case. The utilization methodology supports and confirms the need found thorough the bed ratio analysis, although it is noted that this methodology, by using national data, is not based upon licensed beds in Florida, and would therefore not be sufficient, in itself, to establish need. It is, however, persuasive and credible in confirming the bed ratio analysis. Accessibility To All Residents FRTC projects only 1.5 percent indigent care and 8 percent bad debt. Its projection for private pay patients is 25 percent and for insurance covered care is 65.5 percent. This is a marginal and insignificant indigent load. There is no provision for services to state-funded patients. FRTC's projected utilization by class of pay is reasonable. The clear purpose of this application is to enable FRTC to become licensed as a hospital under Section 395.002, Florida Statutes, and thereby enable it to be called a "hospital". It was established through the testimony of Dwight Hood, who was accepted as an expert in health care finance and health care third party payments, that if a facility is licensed as a hospital it has a significant advantage for reimbursement from third parties who more readily reimburse for care in a licensed facility than in an unlicensed residential treatment center. Therefore, accessibility will be increased for those children and adolescents in need of this care whose families have insurance coverage, since it is more likely that payments under such third party coverage will be made at an IRTP licensed as a "hospital" than otherwise. Quality of Care The applicant has clearly demonstrated its ability to provide quality care to its patients, based upon the testimony of C. Hal Brunt, M.D., Robert Friedel, M.D. and G. L. Tischler, M.D., who were accepted as experts in psychiatry, and notwithstanding the testimony of Howard Goldman, M.D., and Glen Lewis, M.D., who were also accepted as experts in psychiatry. FRTC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation which has experience in the operation and management of a residential treatment center, Charter Colonial Institute in Virginia, and also has extensive experience in providing quality health care at five hospitals in Florida, including Charter Hospital of Tampa Bay. The treatment program at FRTC will be adapted to local community needs. In providing quality care, FRTC will assign patients to the correct level of care within the facility by insuring that they are seen by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission, and by having each case reviewed by an independent utilization review committee, completing appropriate patient assessments and developing integrated treatment programs which are regularly updated, making appropriate treatment outcome assessments, and providing for continuity of care for patients leaving the IRTP through the development of a community-wide continuum of care. Charter has six out-patient counselling centers located within two hours of the FRTC proposed facility. It is both reasonable and appropriate to structure psychiatric treatment and care in a hospital setting within a "levels system" that rewards and reinforces desired behavior, and FRTC will utilize a "levels system" in its highly goal oriented patient treatment programs. Quality of care is not dependent upon a hospital's environment and physical facilities, according to Dr. Goldman. The floor plan proposed by FRTC is functional and is a proto- typical design used by Charter in approximately fifty locations, although not as an IRTP. The criticisms of the floor plan and facility design to which Maxine Wolfe, Ph.D., and Glen Lewis, M.D., testified do not establish that the applicant will be unable to provide quality care in this facility. While the Petitioners might design a facility differently, and specifically provide for a different orientation of the nurses' station relative to the patient wings, a different location for the dining room, more rooms where a patient can have privacy, and more opportunity for individualized treatment, these preferences do not establish that FRTC's floor plan and design will impair the quality of care rendered at this proposed facility. It is also noted that Dr. Wolfe testified critically about residential treatment in general, and expressed the opinion that residential treatment in a hospital is not beneficial and that children should never be treated in a large facility of any kind under any circumstance. Her testimony clearly establishes her bias and impairs her own credibility and the weight to be given to her testimony in this case. Availability and Adequacy of Alternatives Although there are no licensed IRTPs in District VI residential treatment and/or psychiatric services are currently available to children and adolescents through Manatee Memorial (9 beds), Manatee Palms (60 beds), Glenbeigh (14-16 beds), Sarasota Palms (60-70 beds), Sarasota Memorial Care Center (30 beds), Children's Home in Tampa (68 beds) and Northside Center in Tampa (12 beds). The average of length of stay at the significant majority of these facilities is up to 90 days, and they also attract patients from outside District VI. FRTC proposes to serve patients who require an average length of stay of a year. Some of these facilities serve patients with a dual diagnosis that includes substance abuse whereas FRTC will not. Therefore, these facilities do not offer adequate alternatives for the patients which FRTC is seeking to serve. Further, it was not established that outpatient or ambulatory services represent an adequate and appropriate alternative to an IRTP. Availability of Resources The total project cost of $4,303,020 will be funded through an equity contribution from Charter Medical Corporation and through a conventional loan. Assuming a 50 percent occupancy rate (30 beds) in its first year of operation, the proposed facility will have a staff of 43 positions, 27 of which will represent personnel who will be direct nursing or staff support for the patients, including social workers, psychologists, staff registered nurses, mental health workers, patient care coordinator, nursing supervisors, occupational and recreational therapists and special education teachers. A part-time medical director will also be available. This results in a ratio of 1.4 positions per patient. In comparison, Manatee Palms has a 1.8 staffing ratio based on a census of 55 patients. FRTC has proposed a reasonable and adequate staffing pattern and ratio to treat 30 patients. FRTC will recruit personnel through direct advertising, community contacts, posted notices, job fairs, and school visits. It will compete with unlicensed residential treatment centers, as well as short and long term psychiatric hospitals, in attracting staff for its facility. Although only six mental health workers are identified in FRTC's list of manpower requirements, and it would be beneficial to the level of treatment and care to increase this number, nevertheless, the staffing patterns proposed by FRTC will allow it to render quality care to patients at its facility, based upon 50 percent occupancy in its first year of operation. Staff salaries proposed by FRTC are reasonable and realistic, although its proposed salaries for nurses and mental health workers are higher than that available at Manatee Memorial. Existing facilities may have to increase their salaries to the levels proposed by FRTC to continue to retain and attract qualified staff, particularly nurses and mental health workers. Recruitment difficulties have been experienced in the District VI area for nurses, social workers, mental health workers and occupational therapists. However, it appears that FRTC will be able to attract qualified applicants for all positions due to the level of salaries offered and quality of care provided. Financial Feasibility Net revenues from the first year of operation are projected to be $100,000, which represents 2.3 percent of the capital expenditure as a return on investment. In the second year of operation, net revenues are projected to be $302,000, a 7 percent return on investment. Both years show a fair return on investment, and the pro forma establishes the financial feasibility of this project. In preparing the pro forma for this project, William S. Love, who was accepted as an expert in health care finance, used the reasonable assumption of 50 percent occupancy in the first year of operation and 60 percent in the second year. Despite the testimony of Jay Cushman, who was accepted as an expert health planner, it was not established that FRTC's location will preclude these occupancy rates. Love also assumed patient revenues of $300 per day and an average length of stay of one year. Utilization by class of payor was estimated to be 65 1/2 percent insurance, 25 percent private pay, 8 percent bad debt and 1 1/2 percent indigent care. It was assumed there would be no Medicare or Medicaid. Assumptions regarding patient revenues and utilization by class of payor are reasonable based on the testimony of Love, Luke and Dwight Hood, as well as a survey of insurance benefits available through employers, and despite the testimony of Christopher Knepper, who was accepted as an expert in health care finance. Knepper's testimony is applicable to unlicensed residential treatment centers rather than an IRTP. Therefore, his criticism of the pro forma as underestimating bad debt and overestimating the private pay portion is not persuasive since it disregards the fact that a licensed IRTP, due to its status as a specialty hospital, will have an increased ability to attract patients with insurance and with an ability to pay deductibles and other unreimbursed costs for care. It was established that a residential treatment center licensed as a specialty hospital has a significant advantage in terms of an improved payor mix over unlicensed facilities because of its recognized status with insurance companies. In addition, Knepper's testimony at hearing concerning the financial feasibility of this project conflicted with estimates made during discovery, and his explanation of such discrepancy was not credible. This conflict in Knepper's position at hearing and during discovery reduces the weight to be given to his testimony. FRTC assumed it would not be subject to the indigent care tax, but even if it were subject to the tax this would only add $29,000 in expenses, and therefore not affect the financial feasibility of the project. A management fee will be charged by Charter Medical Corporation, although this is not separately shown on the pro forma. It is the position of FRTC that this fee is associated with home office costs which will exist without regard to this facility. However, this fee, as well as additional construction costs of approximately $70,000, will not affect the financial feasibility of this project since salary costs associated with administration, as well as data processing costs have been separately shown and included on the pro forma as expenses, even though they are sometimes included in a management fee. FRTC's estimate of gross patient revenue of $300 per day for the first year of operation is substantially higher than other facilities offering like services. Net revenues per day during the first year of operation are estimated to be $265.30. Total direct expenses are estimated to be $198.70 for the first year, with total expenses per patient day estimated at $250.50 in the first year. A 7 percent inflation factor was used for the second year of operation, and this is a reasonable inflation factor. Impact On Costs and Competition As previously noted, salary estimates for nurses and mental health workers for this project are above those provided at Manatee Memorial, and therefore could reasonably be expected to increase salaries in these categories for some facilities in the area. The all inclusive charge of $300 per day proposed by FRTC is greater than Manatee Palm's average gross charge of between $270 - $280 per day. It is likely that paying patients, including patients with insurance coverage, who would otherwise be treated at Petitioners' facilities, will be treated at FRTC if this application is approved. However, the extent of such a loss in paying patients due to FRTC is unclear since Manatee Palms is recently receiving greater acceptance by insurers for reimbursement purposes, and Manatee Memorial's estimates of patient losses were based upon impact from both Manatee Palms and FRTC. Reasonableness of Costs The equipment cost estimate of $360,015 is reasonable. This finding is based on the testimony of Susan Hickman, who was accepted as an expert in health care facility equipment. The equipment and beds are appropriate for an IRTP of this size. The total cost of $707,897 for telephones, signage, graphics, interior design and equipment is also reasonable. The construction cost estimate of $2,010,823 is reasonable. This finding is based on the testimony of Patrick A. Regan, who was accepted as an expert in health care facility construction budgeting. Due to the conservative nature of the cost figures, a 2 1/2 percent contingency is adequate, rather than the normal 5-6 percent contingency. The contingency could be used for unbudgeted items such as stucco siding and hard ceilings. FRTC owns the facility site, which was purchased for $664,000.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order approving FRTC's application for CON 4825. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-2036, 87-2049 Rulings on the Joint Proposed Findings of Fact filed by FRTC and the Department: 1 Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 27. 2-4 Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 5 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 6-9 Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 29, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 10-11 Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 15-16 Adopted in Finding of Fact 46, Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 10 but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 21-22 Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 10, 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 27-30 Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 27, 28, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 31 Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 32-34 Adopted in Findings of Fact 27, 28, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 33, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 33, 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 39, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 50-57 Adopted in Findings of Fact 26, 39, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 58 Rejected as unnecessary. 59-61 Adopted in Finding of Fact 15, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary or as a conclusion of law. 62 Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 61 Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 15, 16. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected in Finding of Fact 17. Rejected in Finding of Fact 17, but adopted in part in Finding of Fact 26. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 69-72 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 24, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant since the Department's non-rule policy was not explicated and therefore cannot be relied upon. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant since the "reasonableness" of the facility's size is not at issue, the Department having failed to explicate its non-rule policy. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 31, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected in Findings of Fact 24, 33, 35, 39. The proposed average length of stay of one year is found to be reasonable in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 21, 22. 79-81 Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 23, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 18, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 11, 26 but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 87-88 Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 44, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and therefore unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as unnecessary and simply a summation of testimony. 95-96 Rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary and in part simply a summation of testimony. 97-98 Rejected as a summation of testimony and otherwise as speculative and irrelevant. 99 Rejected as simply a summation of testimony. 100-103 Rejected as irrelevant. 104 Rejected as a summation of, and argument on, the evidence rather than a Finding of Fact. Rulings on the Proposed Findings of Fact filed by Manatee Palms: Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as unnecessary, and as simply a statement of position. 9-11 Rejected as unnecessary and as otherwise covered in preliminary procedural matters. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 31, but otherwise rejected as simply a summation of testimony and position of the parties. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10, 25, 39, 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14, but rejected in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17, but rejected in Finding of Fact 24. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21, 22, 23. Rejected as simply argument and a statement of position rather than a Finding of Fact. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 25, 39. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21, 22, 23. 24-26 Rejected in Findings of Fact 19, 20, 23. Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 44, but rejected in Finding of Fact 23. Rejected in Findings of Fact 23, 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 16, 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. 34-42 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. This is a de novo proceeding through which final agency action will be taken, and therefore preliminary agency findings are irrelevant to a determination of the issues in this case which must be decided based upon evidence presented at hearing. Rejected as simply a statement of position without any citation to the record. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. 45-46 Rejected in Finding of Fact 24. 47-48 Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 24. 49-60 Rejected in Finding of Fact 24. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. Rejected as without citation to the record and as simply a statement of position rather than a Finding of Fact. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 66-70 Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative, since it is established that services are similar or identical to those proposed by FRTC. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 44. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected in Findings of Fact. 26, 39 and otherwise as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant and otherwise not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Rejected as simply a statement of position, without citation to the record. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. 80-81 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8, but otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 82 Rejected as unnecessary. 83-84 Rejected in Findings of Fact 33 and 35, and otherwise as irrelevant. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. Rejected in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 36. 89-90 Rejected in Findings of Fact 35, 37. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38, 39, 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 39, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 98-100 Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 101-102 Adopted in Findings of Fact 38, 39. 103-109 Rejected in Finding of Fact 39, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 26, 29. Rejected in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected in Finding of Fact 35, and otherwise as irrelevant. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38, 39, 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 115-117 Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 40, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted and rejected in part in Findings of Fact 8, 40, but otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38-42. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 45. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence and without citation to the record. Rejected as a conclusion of law. 128-129 Rejected as simply a comment on the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected in Finding of Fact 47. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as simply a statement of position and argument. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact filed by Manatee Memorial: 1-2 Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3-4 Rejected as irrelevant. 5 Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 29. 6-7 Rejected as irrelevant to a determination of the issues in this case. 8-10 Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 34, 36, 45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 13-22 Adopted in Finding of Fact 4, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant or unnecessary. Rejected in Finding of Fact 24 and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 36. Rejected as speculative and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 5, 10, but rejected in in Finding of Fact 44. 30-32 Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 33 Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 34-39 Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. 43-45 Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Since Mr. Griffin is the highest level departmental representative who testified at hearing, his statement of the non-rule policy is presumed to be correct. Rejected in Finding of Fact 16. Rejected in Finding of Fact 16 and otherwise as unnecessary and irrelevant. 49-51 Rejected as irrelevant since this is a de novo hearing by which final agency action will be taken. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21-23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 58-60 Rejected in Findings of Fact 21-23 and otherwise as irrelevant. 61-63 Rejected in Findings of Fact 19, 20, 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30, but rejected in Finding of Fact 31. Rejected in Finding of Fact 39 and otherwise as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25 and rejected in Finding of Fact 26. Rejected in Findings of Fact 26, 39, 42. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 38, 39, 44. Rejected in Findings of Fact 24 and 39. Rejected as speculative, and not based on competent substantial evidence. 71-79 Rejected in Findings of Fact 26, 38, 39 and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 80-83 Rejected in Findings of Fact 33, 35. Rejected in Findings of Fact 33, 35, 38, 39, 42. Rejected in Findings of Fact 39, 40. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38-42. Rejected in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. Rejected in Finding of Fact 33. Rejected in Finding of Fact 35. Rejected in Findings of Fact 27, 33, 35. Rejected in Finding of Fact 37. Rejected as unnecessary. 94-95 Rejected in Finding of Fact 37. 96 Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. 97-100 Rejected in Findings of Fact 28, 29. 101-102 Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 103-105 Rejected in Finding of Fact 29. 106 Rejected in Finding of Fact 8. 107-109 Rejected in Findings of Fact 27, 28, 29 and otherwise not based on competent substantial evidence. 110 Rejected as irrelevant. 111-112 Rejected in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected in Findings of Fact 9, 27, 28, 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 115-116 Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted and rejected in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8 and rejected in Finding of Fact 47. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted and rejected in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 3, 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25, 39, 45. 125-127 Rejected as speculative and not based on competent substantial evidence. 128-130 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: John Rodriguez, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jean Laramore, Esquire Anthony Cleveland, Esquire Bruce A. Leinback, Esquire Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William Hoffman, Esquire Deborah Winegard, Esquire 2500 Trust Co. Tower 25 Park Place Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Fred W. Baggett, Esquire Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John T. Brennan, Jr., Esquire 900 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 600 Washington, DC 20006 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Fl 32399-0700 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations 3/ and admissions of the parties, the exhibits received in evidence, and the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact: FIRST HOSPITAL's address is the World Trade Center, Suite 870, Norfolk, Virginia 23510. CHARTER GLADE HOSPITAL is a freestanding psychiatric hospital located in Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. CHARTER GLADE has (80) licensed psychiatric beds, and twenty-four (24) licensed substance-abuse beds. The service area served by CHARTER GLADE includes Collier, Lee, and Charlotte Counties. The address of HRS is 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. HRS is responsible for the administration of the "Health Facilities and Health Services Planning Act," Section 381.493, et seq., Florida Statutes (the Act), and has implemented its provisions through the adoption of rules set forth in Chapter 10, Florida Administrative Code. FIRST HOSPITAL applied to HRS for a certificate of need (CON) for the establishment of a freestanding specialty hospital in Naples, Florida. Pursuant to the Act, a CON is required before FIRST HOSPITAL can establish its specialty hospital. FIRST HOSPITAL's application was denied by HRS. FIRST HOSPITAL appealed the denial of its application to the Division of Administrative Hearings, DOAH Case No. 84-1835. CHARTER GLADE has intervened in DOAH Case No. 84-1835. In this proceeding, Petitioner has challenged the validity of Rule 10- 5.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code, asserting that the rule is arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, invalid. By virtue of the fact that CHARTER GLADE is an existing facility located in the same service area in which Petitioner proposes to construct and operate its facility, and further by virtue of its participation in DOAH Case No. 84-1835, at least in part, on the basis of the provisions of Rule 10 15.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code, CHARTER GLADE is substantially affected by the issues presented for determination in this cause and should be allowed to participate as a party. The Act contemplates rule adoption by HRS of specialty bed-need methodologies for psychiatric services. See, e.g., Subsection 381.494(8)(g), Florida Statutes (1983). Toward this end, HRS has adopted Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 10-5.11(25), cited as the basis for denying FIRST HOSPITAL's CON application, addresses need for short-term psychiatric beds; Rule 10-5.11(26) purports to address need for long-term psychiatric beds. FIRST HOSPITAL's substantial interest in establishing its proposed specialty hospital has been determined by both of these rules. In particular, Rule 10-5.11(25), Florida Administrative Code, was applied by HRS in the denial of FIRST HOSPITAL's CON application. In addition, FIRST HOSPITAL alleges that Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26) combined fail to assess the need for intermediate inpatient specialty psychiatric services, one of the types of psychiatric services proposed by FIRST HOSPITAL. FIRST HOSPITAL's CON application proposes intermediate inpatient specialty psychiatric services. Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code, were adopted in early 1983. The adoption process began in the summer of 1982 when HRS assigned to one of its employees, Elfie Stamm, the task of developing a bed-need rule for psychiatric services. Ms. Stamm, at that time, was a planner in the Office of Comprehensive Health Planning of HRS. Ms. Stamm has been a planner with HRS for several years and had been responsible for the development of the State Health Plan and for the development of various rules used in the CON process. She had also been employed in the Mental Health Program Office of HRS, where her responsibilities included the development of a state plan with regard to alcoholism and mental health. She was also responsible for monitoring statewide mental health programs. Upon being assigned the task of developing the subject rules, Ms. Stamm made a thorough review of all information available to HRS with regard to the number of existing psychiatric beds and programs throughout Florida. She also evaluated all available local health plans and spoke with various individuals who had been involved in health planning, particularly those with interest in mental health planning. Ms. Stamm surveyed the available literature on health planning emphasizing mental health planning and bed-need methodologies for psychiatric beds. Ms. Stamm wrote the initial draft of Rule 10-5.11(25) based upon her collection and evaluation of data regarding existing and approved psychiatric beds in Florida and her review of literature, both Florida specific and national. A primary feature of the drafts, as well as of the adopted version, of Rule 10-5.11(25) is a fixed bed-to-population ratio of .35/1000, meaning that normally there should be no more than .35 short-term psychiatric beds for each 1,000 persons. Ms. Stamm was instructed to develop rules to assess the need for inpatient psychiatric services. As finally adopted, short-term care is defined in Rule 10-5.11(25) as care not exceeding three months and averaging a length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and 60 days or less for children and adolescents, and long-term care is defined in Rule 10-5.11(26) as care averaging a length of stay of 90 days. Neither rule defines the term "intermediate care." The documents contained in HRS Composite Exhibit IX and reviewed by Ms. Stamm are a representative sample of the literature available in the field and the level of knowledge among health planners as of the date of the promulgation of the subject rules. The documents are a reasonable cross-section of the literature available in the area of psychiatric bed-need assessment. In terms of the literature that was available at the time of the rule adoption in the area of psychiatric bed-need assessment, there is nothing missing from these documents which would have been important to a health planner in developing a psychiatric bed-need methodology. There is discussion in those documents of all the basic methodologies for determining psychiatric bed need. After reviewing all of the available materials, the HRS established a range of from .35 to .37 beds per 1,000 population and from that point made a policy decision to establish a figure of .35 to use in the bed-need formula. In promulgating the subject rules HRS invited and received comment from a broad cross-section of the public, with particular emphasis on those persons and organizations with special knowledge and interest in the provision of mental health services and the determination of psychiatric bed need. HRS conducted a workshop to which it invited a broad cross-section of individuals and organizations with particular knowledge about psychiatric bed need, including representatives of the Florida Hospital Association, Florida Psychiatric Association, Florida Council for Community Mental Health, Florida State Association of District Mental Health Boards, Florida League of Hospitals, Florida Association of Voluntary Hospitals, and the Florida Alcohol and Drug Abuse Association. The comments and results of the workshop were considered by Ms. Stamm and HRS in the promulgation of the subject rules. In response to several requests, HRS conducted a public hearing in accordance with Section 120.54(3), Florida Statutes, to receive comments from interested persons on the subject rules. More than fifteen (15) people representing various hospitals and organizations concerned with psychiatric services entered appearances and made comments at the public hearing. In addition to the oral comment presented at the public hearing, various persons and organizations submitted numerous written comments expressing their opinion with regard to the proposed rules. The comments, both oral and written, were all considered by Ms. Stamm and HRS prior to the promulgation of the subject rules. The process engaged in by HRS, primarily through Ms. Stamm, in the development of the subject rules was extensive and reasonably calculated to invite substantive public comment and to procure the knowledge on the part of HRS necessary to write workable and rational rules concerning psychiatric bed need. The knowledge acquired by HRS through this process with regard to the assessment of psychiatric bed-need methodologies was reasonably sufficient to allow it to knowledgeably draft and promulgate the subject rules. Consideration of this substantive public comment led to several changes in the subject rules as originally drafted. As originally promulgated, Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26) were challenged pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, in various petitions filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings. In settling these proposed rule challenges, HRS modified the rules to provide for even greater flexibility in their application. HRS Composite Exhibits I through XII constitute all written matters considered or produced by HRS in the rule adoption process with regard to the subject rules. All of those documents and papers have been maintained in the records of HRS since the promulgation of the subject rules. The statutory criteria for reviewing CON applications are set out in Sections 381.494(6)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes. Rule 10-5.11, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the rule criteria against which CON applications are evaluated. Subsections (1) through (12) and (25) of Rule 10-5.11 are the rule criteria against which applications for CONs for short-term hospital inpatient psychiatric services are to be evaluated. Subsections (1) through and (26) of Rule 10-5.11 are rule criteria against which applications for CONs for long-term psychiatric services are to be evaluated. Rule 10-5.11(25) sets forth certain criteria specifically for the evaluation of CON applications for short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services. Short-term services are in part defined as services averaging a length of stay of thirty (30) days or less for adults and a stay of sixty (60) days or less for children and adolescents under eighteen (18) years. Rule 10- 5.11(25) in its adopted form provides in relevant part as follows: Short Term Hospital Inpatient Psychiatric Services. Short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services means a category of services which provides a 24-hour a day therapeutic milieu for persons suffering from mental health problems which are so severe and acute that they need intensive, full-time care. Acute psychiatric inpatient care is defined as a service not exceeding three months and averaging a length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and a stay of 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years. Short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services may be provided in specifically designated beds in a hospital holding a general license, or in a facility holding a specialty hospital license. Applications for proposed short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services will be reviewed according to relevant statutory and rule criteria. A favorable need determination for proposed general acute care psychiatric inpatient services will not normally be given to an applicant unless a bed need exists according to paragraph (25)(d) of this rule. A favorable Certificate of Need determination may be made when the criteria, other than as specified in (25)(d), as provided for in Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes, and paragraph (25)(e) of this rule, demonstrate need. Bed allocations for acute care short term general psychiatric services shall be based on the following standards: A minimum of .15 beds per 1,000 population should be located in hospitals holding a general license to ensure access to needed services for persons with multiple health problems. These beds shall be designated as short term inpatient hospital psychiatric beds. .20 short term inpatient hospital beds per 1,000 population may be located in specialty hospitals, or hospitals holding a general license. The distribution of these beds shall be based on local need, cost effectiveness, and quality of care considerations. The short term inpatient psychiatric bed need for a Department service district five years into the future shall be calculated by subtracting the number of existing and approved beds from the number of beds calculated for year x based on a bed need ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population projected for year and based on latest mid-range projections published by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Florida. These beds are allocated in addition to the total number of general and acute care hospital beds allocated to each Department District established in Rule 10-5.11(23). Occupancy Standards. New facilities must be able to project an average 70 percent occupancy rate for adult psychiatric beds and 60 percent for children and adolescent beds in the second year of operation, and must be able to project an average 80 percent occupancy rate for adult beds and 70 percent for children and adolescent short term psychiatric inpatient hospital beds for the third year of operation. No additional short term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in a service district is at or exceeds 75 percent for the preceding 12 month period. No additional beds for adolescents and children under 18 years of age shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adolescent and children short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds in the Department district is at or exceeds 70 percent for the preceding 12 2 month period. Hospitals seeking additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds must show evidence that the occupancy standard defined in paragraph six is met and that the number of designated short term psychiatric beds have had an occupancy rate of 75 percent or greater for the preceding year. Unit size. In order to assure specialized staff and services at a reasonable cost, short term inpatient psychiatric hospital based services should have at least 15 designated beds. Applicants proposing to build a new but separate psychiatric acute care facility and intending to apply for a specialty hospital license should have a minimum of 50 beds. Other standards and criteria to be considered in determining approval of a Certificate of Need application for short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds are as follows: . . . . 7. Access standard. Short term inpatient hospital psychiatric services should be available within a maximum travel time of 45 minutes under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of the service area's population. There are three basic types of methodologies generally accepted in the field of health planning as valid for determining the need for psychiatric hospital beds. The first type is a need-based methodology which evaluates the need for services. The second is a demand or utilization-based method, which utilizes current or projected utilization statistics for a particular service. The third is a fixed-ratio method which involves the use of a ratio, or rate, of service to population to determine projected need for that service in the future. All three of these methodologies are generally accepted and utilized by health planners throughout the United States. Each has its advantages and disadvantages, but all are valid. The fixed ratio methodology is that which HRS has employed in Rule 10 5.11(25). The ratio of .35 beds per thousand population is a reasonable ratio with a rational basis in fact. It is not arbitrary and capricious as a measure of short-term psychiatric bed need. The National Institute of Mental Health developed draft guidelines in the late 197Os suggesting a range of .15 beds to .40 beds per thousand population as an appropriate fixed-bed ratio program for psychiatric short-term acute-care programs. At least four other states presently or in the past have utilized a fixed bed-need ratio in planning for health care needs. They are Massachusetts, Indiana, Michigan and Georgia. Some of those states used fixed-bed ratios less than .35 per thousand. Ms. Stamm, in developing this rule methodology for HRS, considered and balanced the different approaches relating to the establishment of need. One of her concerns on behalf of HRS, in developing the methodology was to strike a proper balance between need and demand since not everyone who needs psychiatric care will choose to seek that care or can afford to seek that care. In 1982, during the time of the rule adoption process, the ratio of existing short-term psychiatric beds per thousand population in Florida was .29 per thousand. Ms. Stamm selected .35 per thousand, in part, to allow for growth in the number of psychiatric beds for reasons other than just population growth. The current rate of existing licensed short-term psychiatric beds in Florida in 1985 is .28 beds per thousand. However, the ratio for currently existing short-term psychiatric beds, plus CON approved beds not yet licensed in 1985, is .39 beds per thousand. The fact that the existing and approved inventory of psychiatric beds is greater than the .35 ratio specified in the rule demonstrates that HRS has applied Rule 10-5.11(25) in a flexible manner as envisioned by the "not normally" language in the rule. A theoretically ideal way to determine psychiatric bed need would be for HRS to go into each community and conduct epidemiological surveys to identify the people who actually need mental health care. While such a survey, properly conducted, might produce momentarily reliable date, it is not a realistic method for statewide planning purposes because of several problems attendant to such a methodology. Such a survey would be very expensive and very time-consuming and is not practical for use on a statewide basis in a state the size of Florida. Because of the time-consuming nature of such a methodology, if applied on a statewide basis, some of the data would be stale before all of the data was gathered. Further, the rapidly changing population in Florida would require that such a survey be continually updated. The allocation of short-term beds between general and specialty hospitals set forth in subsections (d)1 and 2 of Rule 10-5.11(25) has a rational basis in fact and is not arbitrary. There are many patients who simultaneously need medical as well as psychiatric care. To have those patients located in a specialty hospital, away from a general hospital, would be inappropriate. There are also patients who have acute episodes of psychiatric illness and who need to be treated very rapidly. Because there are many more general hospitals than there are freestanding psychiatric specialty hospitals, it is appropriate to ensure that psychiatric beds are available to general hospitals to fill the particular episodic acute needs. Further, there are many patients in Florida who can afford health care only through Medicaid. Because Medicaid does not provide funding of mental health inpatient services in psychiatric specialty hospitals, it is appropriate to include in the methodology an incentive for the location of some psychiatric beds in general hospitals where psychiatric services can be funded by Medicaid. The specific allocation of the .35 per thousand bed need ratio set forth in Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)(1) and (2) is that .15 beds per thousand "should" be associated with general hospitals and .20 beds per thousand "may" be associated with specialty hospitals. This allocation was designed to be flexible so that, in any given circumstance, an allocation other than the .15 and .20 guideline could be applied. The occupancy rate standards set forth in Rule 10 5.11(25) specify that normally, additional beds should not be approved unless the average occupancy of all existing beds in a service district exceeds 75 percent for adults and 70 percent for children and adolescents. The occupancy rate standards set forth in Rule 10- 5.11(25) were not arrived at in an arbitrary fashion and are reasonable in themselves. The occupancy rates are designed to ensure that a reasonable number of beds in each facility are filled. Hospitals with a substantial number of empty beds are not cost effective. Therefore, it is reasonable to project occupancy rates in the range of those projected in the subject rule. Indeed, the occupancy rates in the rule are liberal in terms of minimum occupancy levels, compared with those in the past and those recommended by others in the industry. With regard to the travel access standard in the rule, the Task Force for Institutional Care recommended a 60 minute travel standard for 90 percent of the population in the district. The 45 minute standard is reasonable. The rule does not exclude from within the travel standard area other facilities providing the same service. At the time of the final hearing, there were sixty five (65) existing hospital facilities in Florida which had psychiatric bed services. Of those sixty-five (65) facilities, sixty-one (61), or 93 percent, had more than fifteen (15) psychiatric beds, and fifty-five (55), or 84 percent, had more than twenty (20) psychiatric beds. In the exceptional event that the average occupancy rate for a particular district did not accurately reflect the availability of beds, the language of Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)5, which says that no additional beds shall "normally" be approved unless the occupancy rates are met is sufficiently flexible to account for the exceptionality. The methodology set forth in Rule 10-5.11(25) is designed to identify and express a need for short-term psychiatric inpatient beds for the overall population of Florida. The rule was intended to be sufficiently flexible that, when balanced with the other criteria set forth in Rule 10-5.11(1) through (12), it would allow substantive input from the district and community levels with regard to the need for beds by subpopulation groups such as child, adolescent, adult, and geriatric. The "national guidelines" referred to by Ms. Stamm were proposed hut never adopted. They recommended fixed bed ratios between .15/1000 and .40/1000. The guidelines were based on a 1978 survey by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), which indicated that .15/1000 was the 25th percentile and .40/1000 was the 75th percentile of 1978 existing short-term psychiatric beds nationwide. The NIMH report stated that selection of an appropriate ratio for a particular state depended on the development of the state's mental health system and recognized that special consideration was necessary for traditionally underserved groups such as children, adolescents, and geriatrics. In the context of inpatient psychiatric care, there has been a trend over the last twenty years, and more particularly over the last five years, toward the development of specialty treatment programs, separately planned for children, adolescents, adults, and geriatrics. In recent years in Florida there has also been a trend toward the provision of alternatives to inpatient psychiatric services in facilities such as residential care. In 1982, Ms. Stamm considered evidence that children, adolescents, and geriatrics were not being adequately served by Florida's mental health facilities. Nevertheless, she did not plan for these subgroups in the rule because in her judgment decisions about allocation of services to subpopulation groups were best made at the district level by the local health councils.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Applicant, LMHS The applicant, LMHS, is a public, not-for-profit health care system, created in 1968 by special act of the Legislature. A ten-member publicly elected board of directors is responsible for overseeing LMHS on behalf of the citizens of Lee County. LMHS does not have taxing power. LMHS is the dominant provider of hospital services in Lee County. LMHS operates four hospital facilities under three separate hospital licenses. The four hospital campuses are dispersed throughout Lee County: borrowing the sub-county area descriptors adopted by LMHS’s health planning expert, LMHS operates one hospital in northwest Lee County, one hospital in central Lee County, and two hospitals in south Lee County.1/ At present, the four hospital campuses are licensed to operate a total of 1,423 hospital beds. The only non-LMHS hospital in Lee County is 88-bed Lehigh Regional Medical Center (Lehigh Regional) in northeast Lee County, owned and operated by a for-profit hospital corporation, Health Management Associates, Inc. (HMA). LMHS has a best-practice strategy of increasing and concentrating clinical specialties at each of its existing hospitals. The LMHS board has already approved which specialty service lines will be the focus at each of its four hospitals. Although there is still some duplication of specialty areas, LMHS has tried to move more to clinical specialization concentrated at a specific hospital to lower costs, better utilize resources, and also to concentrate talent and repetitions, leading to improved clinical outcomes. Currently licensed to operate 415 hospital beds, Lee Memorial Hospital (Lee Memorial) is located in downtown Fort Myers in central Lee County. The hospital was initially founded in 1916 and established at its current location in the 1930s. In the 1960s, a five-story clinical tower was constructed on the campus, to which three more stories were added in the 1970s. The original 1930s building was demolished and its site became surface parking. Today, Lee Memorial provides a full array of acute care services, plus clinical specialties in such areas as orthopedics, neurology, oncology, and infectious diseases. Lee Memorial’s licensed bed complement includes 15 adult inpatient psychiatric beds (not in operation), and 60 beds for comprehensive medical rehabilitation (CMR), a tertiary health service.2/ Lee Memorial is a designated stroke center, meaning it is a destination to which EMS providers generally seek to transport stroke patients, bypassing any closer hospital that lacks stroke center designation. Lee Memorial operates the only verified level II adult trauma center in the seven-county region designated AHCA district 8. Lee Memorial also is home to a new residency program for medical school graduates. At its peak, Lee Memorial operated as many as 600 licensed beds at the single downtown Fort Myers location. In 1990, when hospital beds were still regulated under the CON program, Lee Memorial transferred its right to operate 220 beds to establish a new hospital facility to the south, HealthPark Medical Center (HealthPark). One reason to shift some of its regulated hospital beds to the south was because of the growing population in the southern half of Lee County. Another reason was to ensure a paying patient population by moving beds away from Lee Memorial to a more affluent area. That way, LMHS would have better system balance, and be better able to bear the financial burden of caring for disproportionately high numbers of Medicaid and charity care patients at the downtown safety-net hospital. That was a reasonable and appropriate objective. HealthPark, located in south Lee County ZIP code 33908, to the south and a little to the west of Lee Memorial, now operates 368 licensed beds--320 general acute care and 48 neonatal intensive care beds. HealthPark’s specialty programs and services include cardiac care, open heart surgery, and urology. HealthPark is a designated STEMI3/ (heart attack) center, a destination to which EMS providers generally seek to transport heart attack patients, bypassing any closer hospital lacking STEMI center designation. HealthPark also concentrates in specialty women’s and children’s services, offering obstetrics, neonatal intensive care, perinatal intensive care, and pediatrics. HealthPark is a state-designated children’s cancer center. HealthPark’s open heart surgery, neonatal and perinatal intensive care, and pediatric oncology services are all tertiary health services. In 1996, LMHS acquired its third hospital, Cape Coral Medical Center (Cape Coral), from another entity.4/ The acquisition of Cape Coral was another step in furtherance of the strategy to improve LMHS’s overall payer mix by establishing hospitals in affluent areas. Cape Coral is located in northwest Lee County, and is licensed to operate 291 general acute care beds. Cape Coral’s specialty concentrations include obstetrics, orthopedics, gastroenterology, urology, and stroke treatment. Cape Coral recently achieved primary stroke center designation, making it an appropriate destination for EMS transport of stroke patients, according to Lee County EMS transport guidelines. The newest LMHS hospital, built in 2007-2008 and opened in 2009, is Gulf Coast Medical Center (Gulf Coast) in south Lee County ZIP code 33912.5/ With 349 licensed beds, Gulf Coast offers tertiary services including kidney transplantation and open heart surgery, and specialty services including obstetrics, stroke treatment, surgical oncology, and neurology. Gulf Coast is both a designated primary stroke center and a STEMI center. NCH NCH is a not-for-profit system operating two hospital facilities with a combined 715 licensed beds in Collier County, directly to the south of Lee County. Naples Community Hospital (Naples Community) is in downtown Naples. NCH North Naples Hospital Campus (North Naples) is located in the northernmost part of Collier County, near the Collier-Lee County line.6/ The Petitioner in this case is NCH doing business as North Naples. North Naples is licensed to operate 262 acute care beds. It provides an array of acute care hospital services, specialty services including obstetrics and pediatrics, and tertiary health services including neonatal intensive care and CMR. AHCA AHCA is the state health planning agency charged with administering the CON program pursuant to the Health Facility and Services Development Act, sections 408.031-408.0455, Florida Statutes (2013).7/ AHCA is responsible for the coordinated planning of health care services in the state. To carry out its responsibilities for health planning and CON determinations, AHCA maintains a comprehensive health care database, with information that health care facilities are required to submit, such as utilization data. See § 408.033(3), Fla. Stat. AHCA conducts its health planning and CON review based on “health planning service district[s]” defined by statute. See § 408.032(5), Fla. Stat. Relevant in this case is district 8, which includes Sarasota, DeSoto, Charlotte, Lee, Glades, Hendry, and Collier Counties. Additionally, by rule, AHCA has adopted acute care sub-districts, originally utilized in conjunction with an acute care bed need methodology codified as Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.038. The acute care bed need rule was repealed in 2005, following the deregulation of acute care beds from CON review. However, AHCA has maintained its acute care sub-district rule, in which Lee County is designated sub-district 8-5. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-2.100(3)(h)5. The Proposed Project LMHS proposes to establish a new 80-bed general hospital on the southeast corner of U.S. Highway 41 and Coconut Road in Bonita Springs (ZIP code 34135),8/ in south Lee County. The CON application described the hospital services to be offered at the proposed new hospital in only the most general fashion--medical- surgical services, emergency services, intensive care, and telemetry services. Also planned for the proposed hospital are outpatient care, community education, and chronic care management --all non-hospital, non-CON-regulated services. At hearing, LMHS did not elaborate on the planned hospital services for the proposed new facility. Instead, no firm decisions have been made by the health system regarding what types of services will be offered at the new hospital. The proposed site consists of three contiguous parcels, totaling approximately 31 acres. LMHS purchased a 21-acre parcel in 2004, with a view to building a hospital there someday. LMHS later added to its holdings when additional parcels became available. At present, the site’s development of regional impact (DRI) development order does not permit a hospital, but would allow the establishment of a freestanding emergency department. The proposed hospital site is adjacent to the Bonita Community Health Center (BCHC). Jointly owned by LMHS and NCH, BCHC is a substantial health care complex described by LMHS President James Nathan as a “hospital without walls.” This 100,000 square-foot complex includes an urgent care center, ambulatory surgery center, and physicians’ offices. A wide variety of outpatient health care services are provided within the BCHC complex, including radiology/diagnostic imaging, endoscopy, rehabilitation, pain management, and lab services. Although LMHS purchased the adjacent parcels with the intent of establishing a hospital there someday, representatives of LMHS expressed their doubt that “someday” has arrived; they have candidly admitted that this application may be premature. CON Application Filing LMHS did not intend to file a CON application when it did, in the first hospital-project review cycle of 2013. LMHS did not file a letter of intent (LOI) by the initial LOI deadline to signify its intent to file a CON application. However, LMHS’s only Lee County hospital competitor, HMA, filed an LOI on the deadline day. LMHS learned that the project planned by HMA was to replace Lehigh Regional with a new hospital, which would be relocated to south Lee County, a little to the north of the Estero/Bonita Springs area. LMHS was concerned that if the HMA application went forward and was approved, that project would block LMHS’s ability to pursue a hospital in Bonita Springs for many years to come. Therefore, in reaction to HMA’s LOI, LMHS filed a “grace period” LOI, authorized under AHCA’s rules, to submit a competing proposal for a new hospital in south Lee County. But for the HMA LOI, there would have been no grace period for a competing proposal, and LMHS would not have been able to apply when it did. Two weeks later, on the initial application filing deadline, LMHS submitted a “shell” application. LMHS proceeded to quickly prepare the bulk of its application to file five weeks later by the omissions response deadline of April 10, 2013. Shortly before the omissions response deadline, Mr. Nathan met with Jeffrey Gregg, who is in charge of the CON program as director of AHCA’s Florida Center for Health Information and Policy Analysis, and Elizabeth Dudek, AHCA Secretary, to discuss the LMHS application. Mr. Nathan told the AHCA representatives that LMHS was not really ready to file a CON application, but felt cornered and forced into it to respond to the HMA proposal. Mr. Nathan also discussed with AHCA representatives the plan to transfer 80 beds from Lee Memorial, but AHCA told Mr. Nathan not to make such a proposal. Since beds are no longer subject to CON regulation, hospitals are free to add or delicense beds as they deem appropriate, and therefore, an offer to delicense beds adds nothing to a CON proposal. LMHS’s CON application was timely filed on the omissions deadline. A major focus of the application was on why LMHS’s proposal was better than the expected competing HMA proposal. However, HMA did not follow through on its LOI by filing a competing CON application. The LMHS CON application met the technical content requirements for a general hospital CON application, including an assessment of need for the proposed project. LMHS highlighted the following themes to show need for its proposed new hospital: South Lee County “should have its own acute care hospital” because it is a fast-growing area with an older population; by 2018, the southern ZIP codes of Lee County will contain nearly a third of the county’s total population. The Estero/Bonita Springs community strongly supports the proposed new hospital. Approval of the proposed new hospital “will significantly reduce travel times for the service area’s residents and will thereby significantly improve access to acute care services,” as shown by estimated travel times to local hospitals for residents in the proposed primary service area and by Lee County EMS transport logs. LMHS will agree to a CON condition to delicense 80 beds at Lee Memorial, which are underutilized, so that there will be no net addition of acute care beds to the sub-district’s licensed bed complement. AHCA’s Preliminary Review and Denial AHCA conducted its preliminary review of the CON application in accordance with its standard procedures. As part of the preliminary review process for general hospital applications, the CON law now permits existing health care facilities whose established programs may be substantially affected by a proposed project to submit a detailed statement in opposition. Indeed, such a detailed statement is a condition precedent to the existing provider being allowed to participate as a party in any subsequent administrative proceedings conducted with respect to the CON application. See § 408.037(2), Fla. Stat. North Naples timely filed a detailed statement in opposition to LMHS’s proposed new hospital. LMHS timely filed a response to North Naples’ opposition submittal, pursuant to the same law. After considering the CON application, the North Naples opposition submittal, and the LMHS response, AHCA prepared its SAAR in accordance with its standard procedures. A first draft of the SAAR was prepared by the CON reviewer; the primary editor of the SAAR was AHCA CON unit manager James McLemore; and then a second edit was done by Mr. Gregg. Before the SAAR was finalized, Mr. Gregg met with the AHCA Secretary to discuss the proposed decision. The SAAR sets forth AHCA’s preliminary findings and preliminary decision to deny the LMHS application. Mr. Gregg testified at hearing as AHCA’s representative, as well as in his capacity as an expert in health planning and CON review. Through Mr. Gregg’s testimony, AHCA reaffirmed its position in opposition to the LMHS application, and Mr. Gregg offered his opinions to support that position. Statutory and Rule Review Criteria The framework for consideration of LMHS’s proposed project is dictated by the statutory and rule criteria that apply to general hospital CON applications. The applicable statutory review criteria, as amended in 2008 for general hospital CON applications, are as follows: The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed. The availability, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant. * * * (e) The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district. * * * (g) The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness. * * * (i) The applicant’s past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. § 408.035(1), Fla. Stat.; § 408.035(2), Fla. Stat. (identifying review criteria that apply to general hospital applications). AHCA has not promulgated a numeric need methodology to calculate need for new hospital facilities. In the absence of a numeric need methodology promulgated by AHCA for the project at issue, Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2)(e) applies. This rule provides that the applicant is responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory and rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.030 also applies. This rule elaborates on “health care access criteria” to be considered in reviewing CON applications, with a focus on the needs of medically underserved groups such as low income persons. LMHS’s Needs Assessment LMHS set forth its assessment of need for the proposed new hospital, highlighting the population demographics of the area proposed to be served. Theme: South Lee County’s substantial population The main theme of LMHS’s need argument is that south Lee County “should have its own acute care hospital” because it is a fast-growing area with a substantial and older population. (LMHS Exh. 3, p. 37). LMHS asserts that south Lee County’s population is sufficient to demonstrate the need for a new hospital because “by 2018, the southern ZIP codes of Lee County will contain nearly a third of the county’s total population.” Id. LMHS identified eight ZIP codes--33908, 33912, 33913, 33928, 33931, 33967, 34134, and 34135--that constitute “south Lee County.” (LMHS Exh. 3, Table 4). Claritas population projections, reasonably relied on by the applicant, project that by 2018 these eight ZIP codes will have a total population of 200,492 persons, approximately 29 percent of the projected population of 687,795 for all of Lee County. The age 65-and-older population in south Lee County is projected to be 75,150, approximately 40 percent of the projected 65+ population of 185,655 for all of Lee County. A glaring flaw in LMHS’s primary need theme is that the eight-ZIP-code “south Lee County” identified by LMHS is not without its own hospital. That area already has two of the county’s five existing hospitals: Gulf Coast and HealthPark. In advancing its need argument, LMHS selectively uses different meanings of “south Lee County.” When describing the “south Lee County” that deserves a hospital of its own, LMHS means the local Estero/Bonita Springs community in and immediately surrounding the proposed hospital site in the southernmost part of south Lee County. However, when offering up a sufficient population to demonstrate need for a new hospital, “south Lee County” expands to encompass an area that appears to be half, if not more, of the entire county. The total population of the Estero/Bonita Springs community is 76,753, projected to grow to 83,517 by 2018--much more modest population numbers compared to those highlighted by the applicant for the expanded version of south Lee County. While the rate of growth for Estero/Bonita Springs is indeed fast compared to the state and county growth rates, this observation is misleading because the actual numbers are not large. LMHS also emphasizes the larger proportion of elderly in the Estero/Bonita Springs community, which is also expected to continue to grow at a fast clip. Although no specifics were offered, it is accepted as a generic proposition that elderly persons are more frequent consumers of acute care hospital services. By the same token, elderly persons who require hospitalization tend to be sicker, and to present greater risks of potential complications from comorbidities, than non-elderly patients. As a result, for example, as discussed below, Lee County EMS’s emergency transport guidelines steer certain elderly patients to hospitals with greater breadth of services than the very basic hospital planned by LMHS, “as a reasonable precaution.” Projections of a Well-Utilized Proposed Hospital Mr. Davidson, LMHS’s health planning consultant, was provided with the proposed hospital’s location and number of beds, and was asked to develop the need assessment and projections. No evidence was offered regarding who determined that the proposed hospital should have 80 beds, or how that determination was made. Mr. Davidson set about to define the proposed primary and secondary service areas, keeping in mind that section 408.037(2) now requires a general hospital CON application to specifically identify, by ZIP codes, the primary service area from which the proposed hospital is expected to receive 75 percent of its patients, and the secondary service area from which 25 percent of the hospital’s patients are expected. Mr. Davidson selected six ZIP codes for the primary service area. He included the three ZIP codes comprising the Estero/Bonita Springs community. He also included two ZIP codes that are closer to existing hospitals than to the proposed site, according to the drive-time information he compiled. In addition, he included one ZIP code in which there is already a hospital (Gulf Coast, in 33912). Mr. Davidson’s opinion that this was a reasonable, and not overly aggressive, primary service area was not persuasive;9/ the criticisms by the other expert health planning witnesses were more persuasive and are credited. Mr. Davidson selected six more ZIP codes for the secondary service area. These include: two south Lee County ZIP codes that are HealthPark’s home ZIP code (33908) and a ZIP code to the west of HealthPark (33931); three central Lee County ZIP codes to the north of HealthPark and Gulf Coast; and one Collier County ZIP code that is North Naples’ home ZIP code. Mr. Davidson’s opinion that this was a reasonable, and not overly aggressive, secondary service area was not persuasive; the criticisms by the other expert health planning witnesses were more persuasive and are credited. As noted above, the existing LMHS hospitals provide tertiary-level care and a number of specialty service lines and designations that have not been planned for the proposed new hospital. Conversely, there are no services proposed for the new hospital that are not already provided by the existing LMHS hospitals. In the absence of evidence that the proposed new hospital will offer services not available at closer hospitals, it is not reasonable to project that any appreciable numbers of patients will travel farther, and in some instances, bypass one or more larger existing hospitals with greater breadth of services, to obtain the same services at the substantially smaller proposed new hospital. As aptly observed by AHCA’s representative, Mr. Gregg, the evidence to justify such an ambitious service area for a small hospital providing basic services was lacking: So if we were to have been given more detail[:] here’s the way we’re going to fit this into our system, here’s -- you know, here’s why we can design this service area as big as we did, even though it would require a lot of people to drive right by HealthPark or right by Gulf Coast to go to this tiny basic hospital for some reason. I mean, there are fundamental basics about this that just make us scratch our head. (Tr. 1457). The next step after defining the service area was to develop utilization projections, based on historic utilization data for service area residents who obtained the types of services to be offered by the proposed hospital. In this case, the utilization projections suffer from a planning void. Mr. Nathan testified that no decisions have been made regarding what types of services, other than general medical- surgical services, will be provided at the proposed new hospital. In lieu of information regarding the service lines actually planned for the proposed hospital, Mr. Davidson used a subtractive process, eliminating “15 or so” service lines that the proposed hospital either “absolutely wasn’t going to provide,” or that, in his judgment, a small hospital of this type would not provide. The service lines he excluded were: open heart surgery; trauma; neonatal intensive care; inpatient psychiatric, rehabilitation, and substance abuse; and unnamed “others.” His objective was to “narrow the scope of available admissions down to those that a smaller hospital could reasonably aspire to care for.” (Tr. 671-672). That objective is different from identifying the types of services expected because they have been planned for this particular proposed hospital. The testimony of NCH’s health planner, as well as Mr. Gregg, was persuasive on the point that Mr. Davidson’s approach was over-inclusive. The historic data he used included a number of service lines that are not planned for the proposed hospital and, thus, should have been subtracted from the historic utilization base. These include clinical specialties that are the focus of other LMHS hospitals, such as infectious diseases, neurology, neurosurgery, orthopedics, and urology; cardiac care, such as cardiac catheterization and angioplasty that are not planned for the proposed hospital; emergency stroke cases that will be directed to designated stroke centers; pediatric cases that will be referred to HealthPark; and obstetrics, which is not contemplated for the proposed hospital according to the more credible evidence.10/ Mr. Davidson’s market share projections suffer from some of the same flaws as the service area projections: there is no credible evidence to support the assumption that the small proposed new hospital, which has planned to offer only the most basic hospital services, will garner substantial market shares in ZIP codes that are closer to larger existing hospitals providing a greater breadth of services. In addition, variations in market share projections by ZIP code raise questions that were not adequately explained.11/ Overall, the “high-level” theme offered by LMHS’s health planner--that it is unnecessary to know what types of services will be provided at the new hospital in order to reasonably project utilization and market share--was not persuasive. While it is possible that utilization of the proposed new hospital would be sufficient to suggest it is filling a need, LMHS did not offer credible evidence that that is so. Bed Need Methodology for Proposed Service Area Mr. Davidson projected bed need for the proposed service area based on the historic utilization by residents of the 12 ZIP codes in the service lines remaining after his subtractive process, described above. Other than using an over-inclusive base (as described above), Mr. Davidson followed a reasonable approach to determine the average daily census generated by the proposed service area residents, and then applying a 75 percent occupancy standard to convert the average daily census into the number of beds supported by that population. The results of this methodology show that utilization generated by residents of the six-ZIP code primary service area would support 163 hospital beds; and utilization generated by residents of the six-ZIP code secondary service area would support 225 beds in the secondary service area. The total gross bed need for the proposed service area adds up to 388 beds. However, the critical next step was missing: subtract from the gross number of needed beds the number of existing beds, to arrive at the net bed need (or surplus). In the primary service area, 163 beds are needed, but there are already 349 beds at Gulf Coast. Thus, in the primary service area, there is a surplus of 186 beds, according to the applicant’s methodology. In the secondary service area, 225 beds are needed, but there are already 320 acute care beds at HealthPark and 262 acute care beds at North Naples. Thus, in the secondary service area, there is a surplus of 357 beds, according to the applicant’s methodology. While it is true that Gulf Coast and HealthPark use some of their beds to provide some tertiary and specialty services that were subtracted out of this methodology, and all three hospitals presumably provide services to residents outside the proposed service area, Mr. Davidson made no attempt to measure these components. Instead, the LMHS bed need methodology ignores completely the fact that there is substantial existing bed capacity--931 acute care beds--within the proposed service area. Availability and Utilization of Existing Hospitals LMHS offered utilization data for the 12-month period ending June 30, 2012, for Lee County hospitals. Cape Coral’s average annual occupancy rate was 57.6 percent; HealthPark’s was 77.5 percent; Lee Memorial’s was 55.9 percent; Lehigh Regional’s was 44 percent; and Gulf Coast’s was 79.8 percent. Mr. Davidson acknowledged that a reasonable occupancy standard to plan for a small hospital the size of the proposed hospital is 75 percent. For a larger operational hospital, 80 percent is a good standard to use, indicating it is well-utilized. Judged by these standards, only HealthPark and Gulf Coast come near the standard for a well-utilized hospital. As noted in the CON application, these annual averages do not reflect the higher utilization during peak season. According to the application, HealthPark’s occupancy was 88.2 percent and Gulf Coast’s was 86.8 percent for the peak quarter of January-March 2012. LMHS did not present utilization information for North Naples, even though that hospital is closest to the proposed hospital site and is within the proposed service area targeted by the applicant. For the same 12-month period used for the LMHS hospitals, North Naples’ average annual occupancy rate was 50.97 percent and for the January-March 2012 “peak season” quarter, North Naples’ occupancy was 60.68 percent. At the final hearing, LMHS did not present more recent utilization data, choosing instead to rely on the older information in the application. Based on the record evidence, need is not demonstrated by reference to the availability and utilization of existing hospitals in the proposed service area or in the sub-district. Community Support LMHS argued that the strong support by the Estero/Bonita Springs community should be viewed as evidence of need for the proposed new hospital. As summarized in the SAAR, approximately 2,200 letters of support were submitted by local government entities and elected officials, community groups, and area residents, voicing their support for the proposed hospital. LMHS chose not to submit these voluminous support letters in the record. The AHCA reviewer noted in the SAAR that none of the support letters documented instances in which residents of the proposed service area needed acute care hospital services but were unable to obtain them, or suffered poor or undesirable health outcomes due to the current availability of hospital services. Two community members testified at the final hearing to repeat the theme of support by Estero/Bonita Springs community residents and groups. These witnesses offered anecdotal testimony about traffic congestion during season, population growth, and development activity they have seen or heard about. They acknowledged the role their community organization has played in advocating for a neighborhood hospital, including developing and disseminating form letters for persons to express their support. Consistent with the AHCA reviewer’s characterization of the support letters, neither witness attested to any experiences needing acute care hospital services that they were unable to obtain, or any experiences in which they had poor or undesirable outcomes due to the currently available hospital services. There was no such evidence offered by any witness at the final hearing. Mr. Gregg characterized the expression of community support by the Estero/Bonita Springs community as typical “for an upper income, kind of retiree-oriented community where, number one, people anticipate needing to use hospitals, and number two, people have more time on their hands to get involved with things like this.” (Tr. 1433). Mr. Gregg described an extreme example of community support for a prior new hospital CON application, in which AHCA received 21,000 letters of support delivered in two chartered buses that were filled with community residents who wanted to meet with AHCA representatives. Mr. Gregg identified the project as the proposed hospital for North Port, which was ultimately denied following an administrative hearing. In the North Port case, the Administrative Law Judge made this apt observation with regard to the probative value of the overwhelming community support offered there: “A community’s desire for a new hospital does not mean there is a ‘need’ for a new hospital. Under the CON program, the determination of need for a new hospital must be based upon sound health planning principles, not the desires of a particular local government or its citizens.” Manatee Memorial Hospital, L.P. v. Ag. for Health Care Admin., et al., Case Nos. 04-2723CON, 04-3027CON, and 04- 3147CON (Fla. DOAH Dec. 15, 2005; Fla. AHCA April 11, 2006), RO at 26, ¶ 104, adopted in FO. That finding, which was adopted by AHCA in its final order, remains true today, and is adopted herein. Access The statutory review criteria consider access issues from two opposing perspectives: from the perspective of the proposed project, consideration is given to the extent to which the proposal will enhance access to health care services for the applicant’s service district; without the proposed project, consideration is given to the accessibility of existing providers of the health care services proposed by the applicant. Addressing this two-part access inquiry, LMHS contends that the proposed hospital would significantly reduce travel times and significantly enhance access to acute care services. Three kinds of access are routinely considered in CON cases: geographic access, in this case the drive times by individuals to hospitals; emergency access, i.e., the time it takes for emergency ground transport (ambulances) to deliver patients to hospitals; and economic access, i.e., the extent to which hospital services are provided to Medicaid and charity care patients. Geographic Access (drive times to hospitals) For nearly all residents of the applicable service district, district 8, the proposed new hospital was not shown to enhance access to health care at all. The same is true for nearly all residents of sub-district 8-5, Lee County. LMHS was substantially less ambitious in its effort to show access enhancement, limiting its focus on attempting to prove that access to acute care services would be enhanced for residents of the primary service area. LMHS did not attempt to prove that there would be any access enhancement to acute care services for residents of the six-ZIP code secondary service area. As set forth in the CON application, Mr. Davidson used online mapping software to estimate the drive time from each ZIP code in the primary service area to the four existing LMHS hospitals, the two NCH hospitals, and another hospital in north Collier County, Physicians Regional-Pine Ridge. The drive-time information offered by the applicant showed the following: the drive time from ZIP code 33912 was less to three different existing LMHS hospitals than to the proposed new hospital; the drive time from ZIP code 33913 was less to two different existing LMHS hospitals than to the proposed new hospital; and the drive time from ZIP code 33967 was less to one existing LMHS hospital than to the proposed hospital site. Thus, according to LMHS’s own information, drive times would not be reduced at all for three of the six ZIP codes in the primary service area. Not surprisingly, according to LMHS’s information, the three Estero/Bonita Springs ZIP codes are shown to have slightly shorter drive times to the proposed neighborhood hospital than to any existing hospital. However, the same information also suggests that those residents already enjoy very reasonable access of 20-minutes’ drive time or less to one or more existing hospitals: the drive time from ZIP code 33928 is between 14 and 20 minutes to three different existing hospitals; the drive time from ZIP code 34134 is between 18 and 20 minutes to two different existing hospitals; and the drive time from ZIP code 34135 is 19 minutes to one existing hospital. In terms of the extent of drive time enhancement, the LMHS information shows that drive time would be shortened from 14 minutes to seven minutes for ZIP code 33928; from 18 minutes to 12 minutes for ZIP code 34134; and from 19 minutes to 17 minutes for ZIP code 34135. There used to be an access standard codified in the (now-repealed) acute care bed need rule, providing that acute care services should be accessible within a 30-minute drive time under normal conditions to 90 percent of the service area’s population. Mr. Davidson’s opinion is that the former rule’s 30-minute drive time standard remains a reasonable access standard for acute care services. Here, LMHS’s drive time information shows very reasonable access now, meeting an even more rigorous drive-time standard of 20 minutes. The establishment of a new hospital facility will always enhance geographic access by shortening drive times for some residents. For example, if LMHS’s proposed hospital were established, another proposed hospital could demonstrate enhanced access by reducing drive times from seven minutes to four minutes for residents of Estero’s ZIP code 33928. But the question is not whether there is any enhanced access, no matter how insignificant. Instead, the appropriate consideration is the “extent” of enhanced access for residents of the service district or sub-district. Here, the only travel time information offered by LMHS shows nothing more than insignificant reductions of already reasonable travel times for residents of only three of six ZIP codes in the primary service area. The drive-time information offered in the application and at hearing was far from precise, but it was the only evidence offered by the applicant in an attempt to prove its claim that there would be a significant reduction in drive times for residents of the primary service area ZIP codes. No travel time expert or traffic engineer offered his or her expertise to the subject of geographic accessibility in this case. No evidence was presented regarding measured traffic conditions or planned roadway improvements. Anecdotal testimony regarding “congested” roads during “season” was general in nature and insufficient to prove that there is not reasonable access now to basic acute care hospital services for all residents of the proposed service area. The proposed new hospital is not needed to address a geographic access problem. Consideration of the extent of access enhancement does not weigh in favor of the proposed new hospital. Emergency Access LMHS also sought to establish that emergency access via EMS ambulance transport was becoming problematic during the season because of traffic congestion. In its CON application, LMHS offered Lee County EMS transport logs as evidence that ambulance transport times from the Estero/Bonita Springs community to an existing hospital were higher during season than in the off-season months. LMHS represented in its CON application that the voluminous Lee County EMS transport logs show average transport times of over 22 minutes from Bonita Springs to a hospital in March 2012 compared to 15 minutes for June 2012, and average transport times of just under 22 minutes from Estero to a hospital in March 2012 compared to over 17 minutes for June 2012. LMHS suggested that these times were not reasonable because these were all emergency transports at high speeds with flashing lights and sirens. LMHS did not prove the accuracy of this statement. The Lee County EMS ordinance limits the use of sirens and flashing lights to emergency transports, defined to mean transports of patients with life- or limb-threatening conditions. According to Lee County EMS Deputy Chief Panem, 90 to 95 percent of ambulance transports do not involve such conditions. Contrary to the conclusion that LMHS urges should be drawn from the EMS transport logs, the ambulance transport times summarized by LMHS in its application do not demonstrate unreasonable emergency access for residents of Estero/Bonita Springs. The logs do not demonstrate an emergency access problem for the local residents during the season, as contended by LMHS; nor did LMHS offer sufficient evidence to prove that the proposed new hospital would materially improve ambulance transport times. LMHS’s opinion that the ambulance logs show a seasonal emergency access problem for Estero/Bonita Springs residents cannot be credited unless the travel times on the logs reflect patient transports to the nearest hospital, such that establishing a new hospital in Bonita Springs would result in faster ambulance transports for Estero/Bonita Springs residents. Deputy Chief Panem testified that ambulance transport destination is dictated in the first instance by patient choice. In addition, for the “most serious calls,” the destination is dictated by emergency transport guidelines with a matrix identifying the most “appropriate” hospitals to direct patients. For example, as Deputy Chief Panem explained: In the case of a stroke or heart attack, we want them to go to a stroke facility or a heart attack facility[;] or trauma, we have a trauma center in Lee County as well . . . Lee Memorial Hospital downtown is a level II trauma center. (Tr. 378). The emergency transport matrix identifies the hospitals qualified to handle emergency heart attack, stroke, or trauma patients. In addition, the matrix identifies the “most appropriate facility” for emergency pediatrics, obstetrics, pediatric orthopedic emergencies, and other categories involving the “most serious calls.” Of comparable size to the proposed new hospital, 88-bed Lehigh Regional is not identified as an “appropriate facility” to transport patients with any of the serious conditions shown in the matrix. Similar to Lehigh Regional, the slightly smaller proposed new hospital is not expected to be identified as an appropriate facility destination for patients with any of the conditions designated in the Lee County EMS emergency transport matrix. The Lee County EMS transport guidelines clarify that all trauma alert patients “will be” transported to Lee Memorial as the Level II Trauma Center. In addition, the guidelines provide as follows: “Non-trauma alert patients with a high index of suspicion (elderly, etc.) should preferentially be transported to the Trauma Center as a reasonable precaution.” (emphasis added). For the elderly, then, a condition that would not normally be considered one of the most serious cases to be steered to the most appropriate hospital may be reclassified as such, as a reasonable precaution because the patient is elderly. The Lee County EMS transport logs do not reflect the reason for the chosen destination. The patients may have requested transport to distant facilities instead of to the nearest facilities. Patients with the most serious conditions may have accepted the advice of ambulance crews that they should be transported to the “most appropriate facility” with special resources to treat their serious conditions; or those patients may have been unable to express their choice due to the seriousness of their condition, in which case the patients would be taken to the most appropriate facility, bypassing closer facilities. Elderly patients may have been convinced to take the reasonable precaution to go to an appropriate facility even if their condition did not fall into the most serious categories. Since the transport times on the EMS logs do not necessarily reflect transport times to the closest hospital, it is not reasonable to conclude that the transport times would be shorter if there were an even closer hospital, particularly where the closer hospital is not likely to be designated as an appropriate destination in the transport guidelines matrix. The most serious cases, categorized in the EMS transport matrix, are the ones for which minutes matter. For those cases, a new hospital in Estero/Bonita Springs, which has not planned to be a STEMI receiving center, a stroke center, or a trauma center, is not going to enhance access to emergency care, even for the neighborhood residents. The evidence at hearing did not establish that ambulance transport times are excessive or cause an emergency access problem now.12/ In fact, Deputy Chief Panem did not offer the opinion, or offer any evidence to prove, that the drive time for ambulances transporting patients to area hospitals is unreasonable or contrary to any standard for reasonable emergency access. Instead, Lee County EMS recently opposed an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Bonita Springs Fire District to provide emergency ground transportation to hospitals, because Lee County EMS believed then, and believes now, that it is providing efficient and effective emergency transport services to the Bonita Springs area residents. At hearing, LMHS tried a different approach by attempting to prove an emergency access problem during season, not because of the ambulance drive times, but because of delays at the emergency departments themselves after patients are transported there. The new focus at hearing was on EMS “offload” times, described as the time between ambulance arrival at the hospital and the time the ambulance crews hand over responsibility for a patient to the emergency department staff. According to Deputy Chief Panem, Lee County hospitals rarely go on “bypass,” a status that informs EMS providers not to transport patients to a hospital because additional emergency patients cannot be accommodated. No “bypass” evidence was offered, suggesting that “bypass” status is not a problem in Lee County and that Lee County emergency departments are available to EMS providers. Deputy Chief Panem also confirmed that North Naples does not go on bypass. The North Naples emergency department consistently has been available to receive patients transported by Lee County EMS ambulances, during seasonal and off- season months. Offload times are a function of a variety of factors. Reasons for delays in offloading patients can include inadequate capacity or functionality of the emergency department, or inadequate staffing in the emergency department such that there may be empty treatment bays, but the bays cannot be filled with patients because there is no staff to tend to the patients. Individual instances of offload delays can occur when emergency department personnel prioritize incoming cases, and less-emergent cases might have to wait while more-emergent cases are taken first, even if they arrived later. Offload times are also a function of “throughput” issues. Approximately 20 to 25 percent of emergency department patients require admission to the hospital, but there can be delays in the admission process, causing the patient to be held in a treatment bay that could otherwise be filled by the next emergency patient. There can be many reasons for throughput delays, including the lack of an available acute care bed, or inadequate staffing that prevents available acute care beds from being filled. No evidence was offered to prove the actual causes of any offload delays. Moreover, the evidence failed to establish that offload times were unreasonable or excessive. Deputy Chief Panem offered offload time data summaries that reflect very good performance by LMHS hospitals and by North Naples. Deputy Chief Panem understandably advocates the shortest possible offload time, so that Lee County EMS ambulances are back in service more quickly. Lee County EMS persuaded the LMHS emergency departments to agree to a goal for offload times of 30 minutes or less 90 percent of the time, and that is the goal he tracks. Both Lee Memorial and North Naples have consistently met or exceeded that goal in almost every month over the last five years, including during peak seasonal months. Cape Coral and Gulf Coast sometimes fall below the goal in peak seasonal months, but the evidence did not establish offload times that are excessive or unreasonable during peak months. HealthPark is the one LMHS hospital that appears to consistently fall below Lee County EMS’s offload time goal; in peak seasonal months, HealthPark’s offload times were less than 30 minutes in approximately 70 percent of the cases. No evidence was offered to prove the extent of offload delays at HealthPark for the other 30 percent of emergency cases, nor was evidence offered to prove the extent of offload delays at any other hospital. Deputy Chief Panem referred anecdotally to offload times that can sometimes reach as high as two to three hours during season, but he did not provide specifics. Without documentation of the extent and magnitude of offload delays, it is impossible to conclude that they are unreasonable or excessive. There is no persuasive evidence suggesting that this facet of emergency care would be helped by approval of the proposed new hospital, especially given the complicated array of possible reasons for each case in which there was a delayed offload.13/ Staffing/professional coverage issues likely would be exacerbated by approving another hospital venue for LMHS. Pure physical plant issues, such as emergency department capacity and acute care bed availability, might be helped to some degree, at least in theory, by a new hospital, but to a lesser degree than directly addressing any capacity issues at the existing hospitals. For example, HealthPark’s emergency department has served as a combined destination for a wide array of adult and pediatric emergencies. However, HealthPark is about to break ground on a new on-campus children’s hospital with its own dedicated emergency department. There will be substantially expanded capacity both within the new dedicated pediatric emergency department, and in the existing emergency department, where vacated space used for pediatric patients will be freed up for adults. Beyond the emergency departments themselves, there will be substantial additional acute care bed capacity, with space built to accommodate 160 dedicated pediatric beds in the new children’s hospital. The existing hospital will have the ability to add more than the 80 acute care beds proposed for the new hospital. This additional bed capacity could be in place within roughly the same timeframe projected for opening the proposed new hospital. To the extent additional capacity would improve emergency department performance, Cape Coral is completing an expansion project that increases its treatment bays from 24 to 42, and Lee Memorial is adding nine observation beds to its emergency department. No current expansion projects were identified for Gulf Coast, which just began operations in 2009, but LMHS has already invested in design and construction features to enable that facility to expand by an additional 252 beds. In Mr. Kistel’s words, Gulf Coast has a “tremendous platform for growth[.]” (Tr. 259). Mr. Gregg summarized AHCA’s perspective in considering the applicant’s arguments of geographic and emergency access enhancement, as follows: [I]n our view, this community is already well served by existing hospitals, either within the applicant’s system or from the competing Naples system, and we don’t think that the situation would be improved by adding another very small, extremely basic hospital. And to the extent that that would mislead people into thinking that it’s a full-service hospital that handles time-sensitive emergencies in the way that the larger hospitals do, that’s another concern. (Tr. 1425). * * * The fact that this hospital does not plan to offer those most time-sensitive services means that any – on the surface, as I said earlier, the possible improvement in emergency access offered by any new hospital is at least partially negated in this case because it has been proposed as such a basic hospital, when the more sophisticated services are located not far away. (Tr. 1431). Mr. Gregg’s opinion is reasonable and is credited. Economic Access The Estero/Bonita Springs community is a very affluent area, known for its golf courses and gated communities. As a result of the demographics of the proposed hospital’s projected service area, LMHS’s application offers to accept as a CON condition a commitment to provide 10 percent of the total annual patient days to a combination of Medicaid, charity, and self-pay patients. This commitment is less than the 2011-2012 experience for the primary service area, where patient days attributable to residents in these three payer classes was a combined 16.3 percent; and the commitment is less than the 2011- 2012 experience for the total proposed service area, where patient days in these three categories was a combined 14.4 percent. Nonetheless, LMHS’s experts reasonably explained that the commitment was established on the low side, taking into account the uncertainties of changes in the health care environment, to ensure that the commitment could be achieved. In contrast with the 10 percent commitment and the historic level of Medicaid/charity/self-pay patient days in the proposed service area, Lee Memorial historically has provided the highest combined level of Medicaid and charity patient days in district 8. According to LMHS’s financial expert, in 2012, Lee Memorial downtown and HealthPark, combined for reporting purposes under the same license, provided 31.5 percent of their patient days to Medicaid and charity patients--a percentage that would be even higher, it is safe to assume, if patient days in the “self- pay/other” payer category were added. At hearing, Mr. Gregg reasonably expressed concern with LMHS shifting its resources from the low-income downtown area where there is great need for economic access to a very affluent area where comparable levels of service to the medically needy would be impossible to achieve. Mr. Gregg acknowledged that AHCA has approved proposals in the past that help systems with safety-net hospitals achieve balance by moving some of the safety net’s resources to an affluent area. As previously noted, that sort of rationale was at play in the LMHS project to establish HealthPark, and again in the acquisitions of Cape Coral and Gulf Coast. However, LMHS now has three of its four hospitals thriving in relatively affluent areas. To move more LMHS resources from the downtown safety-net hospital to another affluent area would not be a move towards system balance, but rather, system imbalance, and would be contrary to the economic access CON review criteria in statute and rule. Missing Needs Assessment Factor: Medical Treatment Trends The consistent testimony of all witnesses with expertise to address this subject was that the trend in medical treatment continues to be in the direction of outpatient care in lieu of inpatient hospital care. The expected result will be that inpatient hospital usage will narrow to the most highly specialized services provided to patients with more serious conditions requiring more complex, specialized treatments. Mr. Gregg described this trend as follows: “[O]nly those services that are very expensive, operated by very extensive personnel” will be offered to inpatients in the future. (Tr. 1412). A basic acute care hospital without planned specialty or tertiary services is inconsistent with the type of hospital dictated by this medical treatment trend. Mr. Gregg reasonably opined that “the ability of a hospital system to sprinkle about small little satellite facilities is drawing to a close.” (Tr. 1413). Small hospitals will no longer be able to add specialized and tertiary services, because these will be concentrated in fewer hospitals. LMHS’s move to clinical specialization at its hospitals bears this out. Another trend expected to impact services within the timeframe at issue is the development of telemedicine as an alternative to inpatient hospital care. For patients who cannot be treated in an outpatient setting and released, an option will be for patients to recover at home in their own beds, with close monitoring options such as visual monitoring by video linking the patient with medical professionals, and use of devices to constantly measure and report vital signs monitored by a practitioner at a remote location. Telemedicine offers advantages over inpatient hospitalization with regard to infection control and patient comfort, as well as overall health care cost control by reducing the need for capital-intensive traditional bricks-and- mortar hospitals. A medical treatment trend being actively pursued by both LMHS and NCH is for better, more efficient management of inpatient care so as to reduce the average length of patient stays. A ten-year master planning process recently undertaken by LMHS included a goal to further reduce average lengths of stay by 0.65 days by 2021, and thereby reduce the number of hospital beds needed system-wide by 128 beds. LMHS did not address the subject of medical treatment trends as part of its needs assessment. The persuasive evidence demonstrated that medical treatment trends do not support the need for the proposed new facility; consideration of these trends weighs against approval. Competition; Market Conditions The proposed new hospital will not foster competition; it will diminish competition by expanding LMHS’s market dominance of acute care services in Lee County. AHCA voiced its reasonable concerns about Lee Memorial’s “unprecedented” market dominance of acute care services in a county as large as Lee, which recently ranked as the eighth most populous county in Florida. LMHS already provides a majority of hospital care being obtained by residents of the primary service area. LMHS will increase its market share if the proposed new hospital is approved. This increase will come both directly, via basic medical-surgical services provided to patients at the new hospital, and indirectly, via LMHS’s plan for the proposed new hospital to serve as a feeder system to direct patients to other LMHS hospitals for more specialized care.14/ The evidence did not establish that LMHS historically has used its market power as leverage to demand higher charges from private insurers. However, as LMHS’s financial expert acknowledged, the health care environment is undergoing changes, making the past less predictive of the future. The changing environment was cited as the reason for LMHS’s low commitment to Medicaid and charity care for the proposed project. There is evidence of LMHS’s market power in its high operating margin, more than six percent higher than NCH’s operating margin between 2009 and 2012. LMHS’s financial expert’s opinion that total margin should be considered instead of operating margin when looking at market power was not persuasive. Of concern is the market power in the field of hospital operations, making operating margin the appropriate measure. Overall, Mr. Gregg reasonably explained the lack of competitive benefit from the proposed project: I think that this proposal does less for competition than virtually any acute care hospital proposal that we’ve seen. As I said, it led the Agency to somewhat scratch [its] head in disbelief. There is no other situation like it. . . . This is the most basic of satellites. This hospital will be referring patients to the rest of the Lee Memorial system in diverse abundance because they are not going to be able to offer specialized services. And economies of scale are not going to allow it in the future. People will not be able to duplicate the expensive services that hospitals offer. So we do not see this as enhancing competition in any way at all. (Tr. 1416-1417). The proposed hospital’s inclusion of outpatient services, community education, and chronic care management presents an awkward dimension of direct competition with adjacent BCHC, the joint venture between LMHS and NCH. BCHC has been a money-losing proposition in a direct sense, but both systems remain committed to the venture, in part because of the indirect benefit they now share in the form of referrals of patients to both systems’ hospitals. Duplication of BCHC’s services, which are already struggling financially, would not appear to be beneficial competition. While this is not a significant factor, to the extent LMHS makes a point of the non-hospital outpatient services that will be available at the proposed new hospital, it must be noted that that dimension of the project does nothing to enhance beneficial competition. Adverse Impact NCH would suffer a substantial adverse financial impact caused by the establishment of the proposed hospital, if approved. A large part of the adverse financial impact would be attributable to lost patient volume at North Naples, an established hospital which is not well-utilized now, without a new hospital targeting residents of North Naples’ home zip code. The expected adverse financial impact of the proposed new hospital was reasonably estimated to be $6.4 million annually. Just as LMHS cited concerns about the unpredictability of the health care environment as a reason to lower its Medicaid/charity commitment for the proposed project, NCH has concerns with whether the substantial adverse impact from the proposed hospital will do serious harm to NCH’s viability, when added to the uncertain impacts of the Affordable Care Act, sequestration, Medicaid reimbursement, and other changes. LMHS counters with the view that if the proposed hospital is approved, in time population growth will offset the proposed hospital’s adverse impact. While consideration of medical treatment trends may dictate that an increasing amount of future population growth will be treated in settings other than a traditional hospital, Mr. Gregg opined that over time, the area’s population growth will still tend to drive hospital usage up. However, future hospital usage will be by a narrower class of more complex patients. Considering all of the competing factors established in this record, the likely adverse impact that NCH would experience if the proposed hospital is established, though substantial enough to support the standing of Petitioner North Naples, is not viewed as extreme enough to pose a threat to NCH’s viability. Institution/System-Specific Interests LMHS’s proposed condition to transfer 80 beds from Lee Memorial downtown is not a factor weighing in favor of approval of its proposed hospital. At hearing, LMHS defended the proposed CON condition as a helpful way to allow LMHS to address facility challenges at Lee Memorial. The evidence showed that to some extent, this issue is overstated in that, by all accounts, Lee Memorial provides excellent, award-winning care that meets all credentialing requirements for full accreditation. The evidence also suggested that to some extent, there are serious system issues facing LMHS that will need to be confronted at some point to answer the unanswered question posed by Mr. Gregg: What will become of Lee Memorial? Recognizing this, LMHS began a ten-year master planning process in 2011, to take a look at LMHS’s four hospitals in the context of the needs of Lee County over a ten-year horizon, and determine how LMHS could meet those needs. A team of outside and in-house experts were involved in the ten-year master planning process. LMHS’s strategic planning team looked at projected volumes and population information for all of Lee County over the next ten years and determined the number of beds needed to address projected needs. Recommendations were then developed regarding how LMHS would meet the needs identified for Lee County through 2021 by rearranging, adding, and subtracting beds among the four existing hospital campuses. A cornerstone of the master plan assessment by numerous outside experts and LMHS experts was that Lee Memorial’s existing physical plant was approaching the end of its useful life. Options considered were: replace the hospital building on the existing campus; downsize the hospital and relocate some of the beds and services to Gulf Coast; and the favored option, discontinue operations of Lee Memorial as an acute care hospital, removing all acute care beds and reestablishing those beds and services primarily at the Gulf Coast campus, with some beds possibly placed at Cape Coral. All of these options addressed the projected needs for Lee County through 2021 within the existing expansion capabilities of Gulf Coast and Cape Coral, and the expansion capabilities that HealthPark will have with the addition of its new on-campus children’s hospital. Somewhat confusingly, the CON application referred several times to LMHS’s “ten-year master plan for our long-term facility needs, which considers the changing geographic population trends of our region, the need for additional capacity during the seasonal months, and facility challenges at Lee Memorial[.]” (LMHS Exh. 3, pp. 12, 57). The implication given by these references was that the new hospital project was being proposed in furtherance of the ten-year master plan, as the product of careful, studied consideration in a long-range planning process to address the future needs of Lee County. To the contrary, although the referenced ten-year master plan process was, indeed, a long- range deliberative planning process to assess and plan for the future needs of Lee County, the ten-year master plan did not contemplate the proposed new hospital as a way to meet the needs in Lee County identified through 2021.15/ The ten-year master planning process was halted because of concerns about the options identified for Lee Memorial. Further investigation was to be undertaken for Lee Memorial and what services needed to be maintained there. No evidence was presented to suggest that this investigation had taken place as of the final hearing. The proposed CON condition to transfer 80 beds from Lee Memorial does nothing to address the big picture issues that LMHS faces regarding the Lee Memorial campus. According to different LMHS witnesses, either some or nearly all of those licensed beds are not operational or available to be put in service, so the license is meaningless and delicensing them would accomplish nothing. To the extent any of those beds are operational, delicensing them might cause Lee Memorial to suddenly have throughput problems and drop below the EMS offload time goal, when it has been one of the system’s best performers. The proposed piecemeal dismantling of Lee Memorial, without a plan to address the bigger picture, reasonably causes AHCA great concern. As Mr. Gregg explained, “[I]t raises a fundamental concern for us, in that the area around Lee Memorial, the area of downtown Fort Myers is the lower income area of Lee County. The area around the proposed facility, Estero, Bonita, is one of the upper income areas of Lee County.” (Tr. 1410). The plan to shift resources away from downtown caused Mr. Gregg to pose the unanswered question: “[W]hat is to become of Lee Memorial?” Id. Recognizing the physical plant challenges faced there, nonetheless AHCA was left to ask, “[W]hat about that population and how does [the proposed new hospital] relate? How does this proposed facility fit into the multihospital system that might exist in the future?” (Tr. 1410-1411). These are not only reasonable, unanswered questions, they are the same questions left hanging when LMHS interrupted the ten-year master planning process to react to HMA’s LOI with the CON application at issue here. Balanced Review of Pertinent Criteria In AHCA’s initial review, when it came time to weigh and balance the pertinent criteria, “It was difficult for us to come up with the positive about this proposal.” (Tr. 1432). In this case, AHCA’s initial review assessment was borne out by the evidence at hearing. The undersigned must agree with AHCA that the balance of factors weighs heavily, if not entirely, against approval of the application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue a Final Order denying CON application no. 10185. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2014.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA or the Agency) should approve the application for certificate of need (CON) 7700 filed by Miami Beach Healthcare Group, LTD. d/b/a Miami Heart Institute (Miami Heart or MH).
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing and taking action on CON applications pursuant to Chapter 408, Florida Statutes. The applicant, Miami Heart, operates a hospital facility known as Miami Heart Institute which, at the time of hearing, was comprised of a north campus (consisting of 273 licensed beds) and a south campus (consisting of 258 beds) in Miami, Florida. The two campuses operate under a single license which consolidated the operation of the two facilities. The consolidation of the license was approved by CON 7399 which was issued by the Agency prior to the hearing of this case. The Petitioner, Mount Sinai, is an existing health care facility doing business in the same service district. On February 4, 1994, AHCA published a fixed need pool of zero adult inpatient psychiatric beds for the planning horizon applicable to this batching cycle. The fixed need pool was not challenged. On February 18, 1994, Miami Heart submitted its letter of intent for the first hospital batching cycle of 1994, and sought to add twenty adult general inpatient psychiatric beds at the Miami Heart Institute south campus. Such facility is located in the Agency's district 11 and is approximately two (2) miles from the north campus. Notice of that letter was published in the March 11, 1994, Florida Administrative Weekly. Miami Heart's letter of intent provided, in pertinent part: By this letter, Miami Beach Healthcare Group, Ltd., d/b/a Miami Heart Institute announces its intent to file a Certificate of Need Application on or before March 23, 1994 for approval to establish 20 hospital inpatient general psychiatric beds for adults at Miami Heart Institute. Thus, the applicant seeks approval for this project pursuant to Sections 408.036(1)(h), Florida Statutes. The proposed capital expenditure for this project shall not exceed $1,000,000 and will include new construction and the renovation of existing space. Miami Heart Institute is located in Local Health Council District 11. There are no subsdistricts for Hospital Inpatient General Psychiatric Beds for Adults in District 11. The applicable need formula for Hospital General Psychiatric Beds for Adults is contained within Rule 59C-1.040(4)(c), F.A.C. The Agency published a fixed need of "0" for Hospital General Psychiatric Beds for Adults in District 11 for this batching cycle. However, "not normal" circumstances exist within District which justify approval of this project. These circumstances are that Miami Beach Community Hospital, which is also owned by Miami Beach Healthcare Group, Ltd., and which has an approved Certificate of Need Application to consol- idate its license with that of the Miami Heart Institute, has pending a Certificate of Need Application to delicense up to 20 hospital inpatient general psychiatric beds for adults. The effect of the application, which is the subject of this Letter of Intent, will be to relocate 20 of the delicensed adult psychiatric beds to the Miami Heart Institute. Because of the "not normal" circumstances alleged in the Miami Heart letter of intent, the Agency extended a grace period to allow competing letters of intent to be filed. No additional letters of intent were submitted during the grace period. On March 23, 1994, Miami Heart timely submitted its CON application for the project at issue, CON no. 7700. Notice of the application was published in the April 8, 1994, Florida Administrative Weekly. Such application was deemed complete by the Agency and was considered to be a companion to the delicensure of the north campus beds. On July 22, 1994, the Agency published in the Florida Administrative Weekly its preliminary decision to approve CON no. 7700. In the same batch as the instant case, Cedars Healthcare Group (Cedars), also in district 11, applied to add adult psychiatric beds to Cedars Medical Center through the delicensure of an equal number of adult psychiatric beds at Victoria Pavilion. Cedars holds a single license for the operation of both Cedars Medical Center and Victoria Pavilion. As in this case, the Agency gave notice of its intent to grant the CON application. Although this "transfer" was initially challenged, it was subsequently dismissed. Although filed at the same time (and, therefore, theoretically within the same batch), the Cedars CON application and the Miami Heart CON application were not comparatively reviewed by the Agency. The Agency determined the applicants were merely seeking to relocate their own licensed beds. Based upon that determination, MH's application was evaluated in the context of the statutory criteria, the adult psychiatric beds and services rule (Rule 59C-1.040, Florida Administrative Code), the district 11 local health plan, and the 1993 state health plan. Ms. Dudek also considered the utilization data for district 11 facilities. Mount Sinai timely filed a petition challenging the proposed approval of CON 7700 and, for purposes of this proceeding only, the parties stipulated that MS has standing to raise the issues remaining in this cause. Mount Sinai's existing psychiatric unit utilization is presently at or near full capacity, and MS' existing unit would not provide an adequate, available, or accessible alternative to Miami Heart's proposal, unless additional bed capacity were available to MS in the future through approval of additional beds or changes in existing utilization. Miami Heart's proposal to establish twenty adult general inpatient psychiatric beds at its Miami Heart Institute south campus was made in connection with its application to delicense twenty adult general inpatient psychiatric beds at its north campus. The Agency advised MH to submit two CON applications: one for the delicensure (CON no. 7474) and one for the establishment of the twenty beds at the south campus (CON no. 7700). The application to delicense the north campus beds was expeditiously approved and has not been challenged. As to the application to establish the twenty beds at the south campus, the following statutory criteria are not at issue: Section 408.035(1)(c), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (m), (n), (o) and (2)(b) and (e), Florida Statutes. The parties have stipulated that Miami Heart meets, at least minimally, those criteria. During 1993, Miami Heart made the business decision to cease operations at its north campus and to seek the Agency's approval to relocate beds and services from that facility to other facilities owned by MH, including the south campus. Miami Heart does not intend to delicense the twenty beds at the north campus until the twenty beds are licensed at the south campus. The goal is merely to transfer the existing program with its services to the south campus. Miami Heart did not seek beds from a fixed need pool. Since approximately April, 1993, the Miami Heart north campus has operated with the twenty bed adult psychiatric unit and with a limited number of obstetrical beds. The approval of CON no. 7700 will not change the overall total number of adult general inpatient psychiatric beds within the district. The adult psychiatric program at MH experiences the highest utilization of any program in district 11, with an average length of stay that is consistent with other adult programs around the state. Miami Heart's existing psychiatric program was instituted in 1978. Since 1984, there has been little change in nursing and other staff. The program provides a full continuum of care, with outpatient programs, aftercare, and support programs. Nearly ninety-nine percent of the program's inpatient patient days are attributable to patients diagnosed with serious mental disorders. The Miami Heart program specializes in a biological approach to psychiatric cases in the diagnosis and treatment of affective disorders, including a variety of mood disorders and related conditions. The Miami Heart program is distinctive from other psychiatric programs in the district. If the MH program were discontinued, the patients would have limited alternatives for access to the same diagnostic and treatment services in the district. There are no statutes or rules promulgated which specifically address the transfer of psychiatric beds or services from one facility owned by a health care entity to another facility also owned by the same entity. In reviewing the instant CON application, the Agency determined it has the discretion to evaluate each transfer case based upon the review criteria and to consider the appropriate weight factors should be given. Factors which may affect the review include the change of location, the utilization of the existing services, the quality of the existing programs and services, the financial feasibility, architectural issues, and any other factor critical to the review process. In this case, the weight given to the numeric need criteria was not significant. The Agency determined that because the transfer would not result in a change to the overall bed inventory, the calculated fixed need pool did not apply to the instant application. In effect, because the calculation of numeric need was inapplicable, this case must be considered "not normal" pursuant to Rule 59C-1.040(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The Agency determined that other criteria were to be given greater consideration. Such factors were the reasonableness of the proposal, the ability to afford access, the applicant's ability to provide a quality program, and the project's financial feasibility. The Agency determined that, on balance, this application should be approved as the statutory and other review criteria were met. Although put on notice of the other CON applications, Mount Sinai did not file an application for psychiatric beds at the same time as Miami Heart or Cedars. Mount Sinai did not claim that the proposed delicensures and transfers made beds available for competitive review. The Agency has interpreted Rule 59C-1.040, Florida Administrative Code, to mean that it will not normally approve an application for beds or services unless the statutory and rule criteria are met, including the need determination criteria. There is no list of circumstances which are routinely considered "not normal" by the Agency. In this case, the proposed transfer of beds was, in itself, considered "not normal." The approval of Miami Heart's application would allow an existing program to continue. As a result, the overhead to maintain two campuses would be reduced. Further, the relocation would allow the program to continue to provide access, both geographically and financially, to the same patient service area. And, since the program has the highest utilization rate of any adult program in the district, its continuation would be beneficial to the area. The program has an established referral base for admissions to the facility. The transfer is reasonable for providing access to the medically under-served. The quality of care, while not in issue, would be expected to continue at its existing level or improve. The transfer would allow better access to ancillary hospital departments and consulting specialists who may be needed even though the primary diagnosis is psychiatric. The cost of the transfer when compared to the costs to be incurred if the transfer is not approved make the approval a benefit to the service area. If the program is not relocated, Medicaid access could change if the hospital is reclassified from a general facility to a specialty facility. The proposed cost for the project does not exceed one million dollars. If the north campus must be renovated, a greater capital expenditure would be expected. The expected impact on competition for other providers is limited due to the high utilization for all programs in the vicinity. The subject proposal is consistent with the district and state health care plans and the need for health care facilities and services. The services being transferred is an existing program which is highly utilized and which is not creating "new beds." As such, the proposal complies with Section 408.035(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization, and adequacy of like and existing services in the district will not be adversely affected by the approval of the subject application. The proposed transfer is consistent with, and appropriate, in light of these criteria. Therefore, the proposal complies with Section 408.035(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The subject application demonstrates a full continuum of care with safeguards to assure that alternatives to inpatient care are fully utilized when appropriate. Therefore, the availability and adequacy of other services, such as outpatient care, has been demonstrated and would deter unnecessary utilization. Thus, Miami Heart has shown its application complies with Section 408.035(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Miami Heart has also demonstrated that the probable impact of its proposal is in compliance with Section 408.035(1)(l), Florida Statutes. The proposed transfer will not adversely impact the costs of providing services, the competition on the supply of services, or the improvements or innovations in the financing and delivery of services which foster competition, promote quality assurance, and cost-effectiveness. Miami Heart has taken an innovative approach to promote quality assurance and cost effectiveness. Its purpose, to close a facility and relocate beds (removing unnecessary acute care beds in the process), represents a departure from the traditional approach to providing health care services. By approving Miami Heart's application, overhead costs associated with the unnecessary facility will be eliminated. There is no less costly, more efficient alternative which would allow the continuation of the services and program Miami Heart has established at the north campus than the approval of transfer to the south campus. The MH proposal is most practical and readily available solution which will allow the north campus to close and the beds and services to remain available and accessible. The renovation of the medical surgical space at the south campus to afford a location for the psychiatric unit is the most practical and readily available solution which will allow the north campus to close and the beds and services to remain available and accessible. In totality, the circumstances of this case make the approval of Miami Heart's application for CON no. 7700 the most reasonable and practical solution given the "not normal" conditions of this application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order approving CON 7700 as recommended in the SAAR. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 5th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4755 Note: Proposed findings of fact are to contain one essential fact per numbered paragraph. Proposed findings of fact paragraphs containing multiple sentences with more than one statement of fact are difficult to review. In reviewing for this case, where all sentences were accurate and supported by the recorded cited, the paragraph has been accepted. If the paragraph contained mixed statements where one sentence was an accurate statement of fact but the others were not, the paragraph has been rejected. Similarly, if one sentence was editorial comment, argument, or an unsupported statement to a statement of fact, the paragraph has been rejected. Proposed findings of fact should not include argument, editorial comments, or statements of fact mixed with such comments. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner, Mount Sinai: Paragraphs 1 through 13 were cited as stipulated facts. Paragraph 14 is rejected as irrelevant. With regard to paragraph 15 it is accepted that Miami Heart made the business decision to move the psychiatric beds beds from the north campus to the south campus. Any inference created by the remainder of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 16 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 17 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraph 19 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 20 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 21 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 22 is accepted. Paragraph 23 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 24 is accepted. Paragraph 25 is rejected as repetitive, or immaterial, unnecessary to the resolution of the issues. Paragraph 26 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 27 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 28 is accepted but not relevant. Paragraphs 29 and 30 are accepted. Paragraphs 31 through 33 are rejected as argument, comment or irrelevant. Paragraph 34 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 35 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact, or irrelevant as the FNP was not in dispute. Paragraph 36 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 37 is rejected as repetitive, or comment. Paragraph 38 is rejected as repetitive, comment or conclusion of law, not fact, or irrelevant. Paragraph 39 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 40 is accepted. Paragraph 41, 42, and 43 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence and/or argument. Paragraph 44 is rejected as argument and comment on the testimony. Paragraph 45 is rejected as argument, irrelevant, and/or not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 46 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 47 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 48 is rejected as comment, argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 49 is rejected as comment on testimony. It is accepted that the proposed relocation or transfer of beds is a "not normal" circumstance. Paragraph 50 is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 51 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 52 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 53 is rejected as argument, comment or recitation of testimony, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 54 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 55 is rejected as irrelevant, comment, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 56 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 57 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 58 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 59 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 60 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 61 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 62 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 63 is accepted. Paragraph 64 is rejected as irrelevant. Mount Sinai could have filed in this batch given the not normal circumstances disclosed in the Miami Heart notice. Paragraph 65 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 66 is rejected as comment or irrelevant. Paragraph 67 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 68 is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 69 is rejected as argument, comment or irrelevant. Paragraph 70 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, Agency: Paragraphs 1 through 6 are accepted. With the deletion of the words "cardiac catheterization" and the inclusion of the word "psychiatric beds" in place, paragraph 7 is accepted. Cardiac catheterization is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 8 is accepted. The second sentence of paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence or an error of law, otherwise, the paragraph is accepted. Paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraphs 11 through 17 are accepted. Paragraph 18 is rejected as conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraphs 19 and 20 are accepted. The first two sentences of paragraph 21 are accepted; the remainder rejected as conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 22 is rejected as comment or argument. Paragraph 23 is accepted. Paragraph 24 is rejected as argument, speculation, or irrelevant. Paragraph 25 is accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, Miami Heart: Paragraphs 1 through 13 are accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 14 is accepted; the remainder is rejected as contrary to law or irrelevant since MS did not file in the batch when it could have. Paragraph 15 is accepted. Paragraph 16 is accepted as the Agency's statement of its authority or policy in this case, not fact. Paragraphs 17 through 20 are accepted. Paragraph 21 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 22 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 23 through 35 are accepted. Paragraph 36 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraphs 37 through 40 are accepted. Paragraph 41 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence to the extent that it concludes the distance to be one mile; evidence deemed credible placed the distance at two miles. Paragraphs 42 through 47 are accepted. Paragraph 48 is rejected as comment. Paragraphs 49 through 57 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 R. Terry Rigsby Geoffrey D. Smith Wendy Delvecchio Blank, Rigsby & Meenan, P.A. 204 S. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lesley Mendelson Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration 325 John Knox Road, Suite 301 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4131 Stephen Ecenia Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Suite 420 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551