Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Findings Based on Stipulations The Petitioner is MCI Telecommunications Corporation (MCI), whose business address is Suite 400, 400 Perimeter Center Terrace NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30346. The Respondent is State of Florida, Department of General Services (Department), whose address is 614 Larson Building, 200 East Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida. Rule 13A-1.001(1)(c) and (d), Florida Administrative Code (the "challenged rule"), provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 13A-I. 001 Definitions. A Purchase -- A purchase is defined as an acquisition by contracting in any manner, whether by rent, lease, lease/purchase or installment sales contract which may provide for the payment of interest on unpaid portions of the purchase price, or outright purchase, from a source of supply for either commodities or contractual services. Within the meaning of this definition of a purchase, the following are not a purchase: Regulated utilities. Regulated Public Communications, i.e., telephone, telegraph. (emphasis added) MCI is certified by the Florida Public Service Commission to provide intrastate long distance telecommunications services within the State of Florida and is authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to provide interstate telecommunications services throughout the United States. On November 10, 1987, the Division of Communications of the Department of General Services awarded contracts to provide intermachine trunks, intrastate WATS, and interstate WATS for the State of Florida following a "negotiation" process. According to the Department of General Services, such "negotiations" were conducted as a joint venture between the Division of Communications and the Division of Purchasing. MCI was one of the suppliers involved in the "negotiations," but it was not issued a CSA for intermachine trunks, intrastate WATS, or interstate WATS. On November 23, 1987, MCI filed with the Division of Communications a formal written protest of that award and of the process leading up to the award. The Florida Public Service Commission has granted long distance certificates to a number of competitive long distance companies, including MCI, AT&T, Microtel, U.S. Sprint, and others. MCI and other competitive carriers today provide both intrastate and interstate long distance service in the State of Florida. MCI, Microtel, AT&T, Southland, and USTS are all interexchange carriers authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to provide, among other things, interstate WATS. MCI, AT&T, Southland, and Microtel are all interexchange carriers certified by the Florida Public Service Commission to provide, among other things, intermachine trunks and intrastate WATS. Prior to 1982, intermachine trunks, intrastate WATS and interstate WATS were available from only a single source within the State of Florida (the Bell System). Currently, intermachine trunks, intrastate WATS, and interstate WATS are all available from more than one source within the State of Florida. Findings Based on Evidence Adduced at Hearing The Intervenors are Microtel, Inc., whose address is 7100 West Camino Real, Suite 311, Boca Raton, Florida 33433, and United States Transmission Systems, whose business address is 320 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022. The Department from time to time procures long distance telephone service of the types provided by MCI for the State of Florida. The Department regards long distance telecommunications services or facilities as "regulated public communications" that are covered by subsection (d) of the challenged rule. The Department does not regard long distance telecommunications services or facilities as "regulated utilities" that are covered by subsection (c) of the challenged rule. Under subsection (d) of the challenged rule, the Department can procure long distance telephone services or facilities without competitive bidding or competitive negotiations simply by picking up the telephone and negotiating a contract with a single vendor, or by issuing a communications service authorization (CSA) to a particular vendor. The Department uses subsection (d) of the challenged rule as a basis for procuring telephone services or facilities approximately four to five times a year. The Department used subsection (d) of the challenged rule as authority for a negotiated procurement of interstate long distance telephone services or facilities for the State in 1985. The Division of Communications would have to approve the purchase of any transmission service or facility for any agency of the State of Florida. The Department did not rely on subsection (d) of the challenged rule as a basis for authority to negotiate the purchase of interstate and intrastate long distance telephone services or facilities for the State in 1987. However, the Department could have relied on subsection (d) of the challenged rule for authority to negotiate that 1987 purchase. There have been a number of amendments to Rule 13A-1.001. From September 7, 1978, to until August 25, 1982, the rule exempted the procurement of "utilities" and "public communications" from the definition of purchase. Since August 26, 1982, the rule has exempted the procurement of "regulated utilities" and "regulated public communications" from that definition. No section or subsection of Chapter 282 is referred to in the note to Rule 13A-1.001, either as authority for the rule or as the law implemented by the rule.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Michael L. Illes, holds law enforcement certificate number 02-24636. On or about December 1981, while on duty, the Respondent responded to a call from Deborah Raybin regarding a malfunctioning alarm system at her home in Broward County, Florida. At said time, the Respondent was employed by the Broward County Sheriff's Department in the capacity of a deputy sheriff. The Respondent went to the Raybin home in the routine course of his duties. The Respondent admitted having been to the Raybin home after December 1981 in response to further false alarms and on other occasions not related to his duties. However, no competent evidence was introduced that the Respondent harassed Ms. Raybin by going to her home while either on duty or off duty. No evidence was received in support of the allegations that the Respondent, while on duty, went to the Raybin home and offered pornographic movies to Ms. Raybin. The only competent evidence presented was the credible testimony of the Respondent that while at the Raybin house on official business on or about June 19, 1982, he was asked by Ms. Raybin for a video tape. Respondent admitted that on the night of June 23, 1982, he arrived at the Raybin house with said video tape. At that time, prior to his ringing Ms. Raybin's doorbell, Respondent was stopped by his shift supervisor and another officer of the Broward County Sheriff's Department. They were there in response to a telephone call from a person whose identity was not established by competent evidence. The Respondent was out of his assigned patrol zone and had not checked out of his patrol car (unit). While proceeding to the Sheriff's Department prior to the beginning of his shift, Respondent made a traffic arrest of a driver for driving while under the influence. Respondent was involved in booking the arrested driver until after 12:00 midnight on the evening of June 23, 1982. Thereafter, he went to the Raybin house. On the night shift, the policy regarding leaving an assigned patrol area was flexible, particularly during those periods in which on-duty personnel were on break or eating. While on break, officers were not required to be in their patrol zones. Respondent would have been entitled to a break at the time he was at the Raybin house. Conflicting testimony was received concerning whether officers were required to check out of their units while on break. The shift supervisor stated that officers were required to check out when on break or at meals. Respondent stated that the night shift officers did not customarily check out on breaks because criminals monitored their radio reports and committed crimes when they knew that the officers were on break or at meals. Neither side could substantiate their testimony with any written policy. No evidence was received regarding when officers would report that they were on break, i.e., when they left their assigned zone, when they arrived at a break location, or when they left their units. Based upon the testimony received and the fact that officers wore portable radio units, it is found that officers were required to check out if they intended to be away from their units for more than a few minutes. When stopped by his shift supervisor, the Respondent was wearing his police radio. Respondent's uncontroverted and credible testimony was that he had stopped at the Raybin house on his way to his break location to drop off the tape Ms. Raybin had requested and had not intended to remain at the Raybin house longer than was necessary to drop off said tape.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent, Michael L. Illes, be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William H. Ravenell, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1601 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles T. Whitelock, Esquire 1244 SE Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 G. Patrick Gallagher, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission 408 North Adams Street Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the application form for authority to register as a money transmitter used by the Respondent and other alleged statements asserted by the Petitioner violates Section 120.535(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an attorney, who represents clients who seek to engage in the business of funds transmitter, payment instrument issuer, foreign currency exchanger or check casher. The Petitioner is the attorney who represents such clients, rather than being one who seeks to become registered as a funds transmitter, etc. The clients of the Petitioner, who seek registration, are not parties to the Amended Petition. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the regulation of the money-transmitting industry, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 560.102 and 560.105, Florida Statutes. The provisions of Chapter 560, Florida Statutes, known as the "Money Transmitters Code", took effect on July 1, 1994. Section 560.204, Florida Statutes, provides, in part: No person shall engage for consideration, nor in any manner advertise that they engage, in the selling or issuing of payment instru- ments or in the activity of a funds trans- mitter, without first obtaining registration under the provisions of this part. * * * Section 560.303, Florida Statutes, provides, in part: No person shall engage in, or in any manner advertise engagement in, the business of cashing payment instruments or the exchanging of foreign currency without first registering under the provisions of this part. * * * On or about May 28, 1996, the Petitioner filed his Petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings alleging that certain "statements" of the Department violated Section 120.535, Florida Statutes. On June 12, 1996, the Department submitted for publication, in the June 28, 1996 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the following rule: 3C-560.122 Application Procedure for Registration as a Funds Transmitter, Payment Instrument Issuer, Foreign Currency Exchanger, or Check Casher. Each person who seeks to obtain registration as a money transmitter, payment instrument issuer, foreign currency exchanger, or check casher, shall apply to the Depart- ment by submitting the following: a completed Application for Authority to Register as a Money Transmitter, Form DBF-C-94, effective , which is hereby incorporated by reference and avail- able by mail from the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Banking, Room LL-22, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350; and a non-refundable application fee of $500 in the case of a funds transmitter or payment instrument issuer registration, or a non-refundable application fee of $250 in the case of a foreign currency exchanger or check casher. Request for Additional Information. Any request for additional information will be made by the Department within thirty (30) days after receipt of the application by the Department. The additional information must be received by the Department within forty- five (45) days from the date of the request. Failure to respond to the request within forty-five (45) days from the date of request shall be construed by the Department as grounds for denial for failure to complete the application, and the application shall be denied pursuant to s. 120.60(2), F.S. Amendment of Application. (a) An applicant may amend the application as to those factors generally within the control or selection of the applicant once, as a matter of course, at any time within thirty (30) days from the Department's receipt for filing. Otherwise, the appli- cation may be amended only with prior written permission from the Department. Requests to make changes which are material to the appli- cation or to the Department's evaluation of the application filed at any time after the application has been received may be deemed by the Department to be grounds for denial, and a new application, accompanied by the appropriate filing fee, may be required. Withdrawal of Application. An appli- cant may request withdrawal of an application prior to a determination of the application being made by the Department by submitting a written request that the application be withdrawn. Refunds. If the application is with- drawn or denied, the application fee is non- refundable. Upon approval of an application, a registration will be sent by the Department to the applicant's mailing address as indicated on the application. Specific Authority 560.105(3), 120.53(1)(b) FS. Law Implemented 560.204, 560.205, 560.206, 560.303, 560.306 FS. History - New . On July 29, 1996, the Department filed the above rule and Application form for adoption with the Department for State and it took effect on August 18, 1996. The Department, accordingly, has used the rule-making procedure expeditiously and in good faith to adopt a rule which addresses the statements with which the Petitioner is concerned. The Petitioner has asserted in his Amended Petition that he is "substantially affected by the statement as [he has] clients who are threatened with criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1960 for not having a license required by Chapter 560." The Petitioner additionally claims that "as legal counsel to these clients, [he is] unable to provide competent legal advice regarding the application of Chapter 560." The Petitioner, however, has provided no evidence that he, as opposed to his unidentified clients, will suffer any injury as a result of the alleged statement or rule. The "immediate" injury allegedly amounts to the threat of criminal prosecution of the Petitioner's unidentified clients under 18 U.S.C. Section 1960 for not having a license required by the above-referenced Florida Statutes and not by the alleged generally-applicable statement or "rule". The Petitioner has not presented any evidence that any alleged injury on the part of either his unidentified clients or himself is within the zone of interest protected by Chapter 560, Florida Statutes. The zone of interest, which could be discerned from that statute's provisions, does not provide for protection of a lawyer's ability to provide competent legal advice to clients concerning such a statute's applicability to their interests. If a statute is unclear or policies or rules practiced or promulgated in furtherance of that statutory charge by an agency are unclear, a lawyer, in advising and litigating on behalf of his clients, has recourse to the courts or to the administrative adjudicatory process. However, it is their interests he would seek to protect in such situations and not his own as a lawyer. The Petitioner, the attorney for unidentified clients allegedly affected, has not, in his Amended Petition, identified those clients, as parties or otherwise, nor the immediate injury they will allegedly suffer nor asserted or established with proof how they are "substantially affected". It is necessary that that be done to enable such clients to bring this challenge as petitioners in their own right. In any event, the Petitioner, as counsel for those clients, has no standing since he is not a substantially-affected person who is in danger of suffering an "immediate injury" in his own right, which would arise within the ambit of the "zone of interest" protected by Chapter 560, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is simply not the proper "substantially-affected person" to bring this challenge.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioners should be placed on the State of Florida’s Convicted Vendor List.
Findings Of Fact On January 5, 2005, in the United States District Court for the Northern District Court of California, Technologies entered a plea of guilty to the commission of two crimes: an antitrust violation, involving the submission of fraudulent and non-competitive bids, and a mail fraud violation. Technologies’ conviction arose out of its participation in the E-Rate Program — a federal program designed to provide funding to public schools and public libraries for telecommunication services, including local and long-distance telephone service, internet access, and internal connections. The E-Rate Program is operated under the offices of the Federal Communications Commission, hereinafter FCC, and is administered by the Universal Services Administrative Company, hereinafter USAC. On January 28, 2005, by Notice of Public Entity Crime, Inter-Tel provided notice of this conviction to DMS. On March 9, 2005, Inter-Tel provided DMS a supplement to its (Inter-Tel’s) notice of January 28, 2005. On August 29, 2006, by Notice of Intent to Place Person or Affiliate on Convicted Vendor List, DMS issued a notice of intent to place Technologies on the convicted vendor list. Technologies received DMS’ notice of August 29, 2006, on August 31, 2006. On September 18, 2006, Inter-Tel timely filed a petition for formal administrative hearing to determine whether it is in the public interest for Technologies to be placed on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List. The nature and details of the public entity crime for which Technologies was convicted are fully set forth in the criminal information filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District Court of California. As specified in the criminal information, Technologies’ public entity crime implicated specific employees working on specific transactions in Michigan and California only. In addition, the conduct was isolated to one of fifty-nine branch offices of Technologies and one related operating unit. As part of its plea agreement, Technologies agreed to pay $1,721,000.00 in criminal fines. In addition to these fines, Technologies agreed to pay to the United States $7,000,000.00 as part of a civil settlement between it an the United States. The $7,000,000.00 was comprised of a cash payment in the amount of $6,740,458.12 and the release of the United States from invoices in the amount of $259,541.88 for work Technologies and other affiliated subsidiaries had performed under the E-Rate Program but had not yet been compensated for. On January 6, 2005, one day after the plea agreement and civil settlement agreement were accepted by the Court, Technologies made cash payments to the United States in the amounts of $1,721,000.00 and $6,740,458.12. In doing so, Technologies paid all fines, penalties, and damages owed in connection with its conviction. Confirmation of the wire transfers to the United States was provided. As confirmed by the Department of Justice, hereinafter DOJ, Inter-Tel cooperated with the federal investigation by voluntarily supplying a wide array of information and documents to DOJ and by encouraging current and former employees to cooperate with DOJ’s investigators. DOJ characterized this cooperation by Inter-Tel as enabling it “to expand [its] knowledge base to criminal behavior at school districts not previously covered in other pleas” and noted that “the nature, speed, and extent of Inter-Tel’s cooperation has been very helpful in developing [its] investigation to date.” Inter-Tel has fully cooperated with DMS in connection with its investigation under Section 287.133, Florida Statutes. Inter-Tel promptly provided information as requested by DMS and made its attorneys available to DMS to facilitate collection of records and information vital to DMS’ investigation. The employees who were identified as being responsible for the conduct leading to the public entity crime to which Technologies pled guilty were Jason King, Bill Boehm, Jim O’Hare, Earl Nelson, and Tim Scarafiotti. Jason King resigned from Technologies on August 14, 2003. Bill Boehm resigned from Technologies on September 24, 2004. Jim O’Hare was terminated from Technologies on August 14, 2002. Earl Nelson retired from Technologies on April 30, 2002. Tim Scarafiotti resigned from Technologies on October 30, 2002. No business or employment relationships currently exist between Technologies and Jason King, Bill Boehm, Jim O’Hare, Earl Nelson, or Tim Scarafiotti. Inter-Tel has implemented an intensive, multi-year program of monitoring, training, and auditing with respect to government procurement contracts, including a comprehensive anti-fraud and antitrust compliance plan. On February 15, 2005, Inter-Tel formally adopted a compliance program that includes: (1) an Antitrust and Anti- Fraud policy; (2) a government sales policy; (3) and E-Rate code of conduct; and (4) detailed description of the procedures for administering these policies, including employee training, reporting of suspected violations, disciplinary action, internal monitoring, external reporting, and the responsibilities of Inter-Tel’s compliance officer. In January 2005, Inter-Tel hired a full-time compliance officer, whose job it is to ensure that Inter-Tel conducts its activities involving public entities in accordance with applicable laws and the compliance program. The compliance officer’s responsibilities include at least monthly meetings with key executives in Inter-Tel’s accounting, finance, installations, legal, marketing, and sales departments to ensure compliance. The current compliance officer has over ten years of legal experience specializing in public procurement. While the settlement agreement with the United States only requires training for employees who deal in public procurement, Inter-Tel’s management has mandated that all employees of Inter-Tel, and its subsidiaries, including Technologies, receive extensive training on the E-Rate program, antitrust, fraud, government procurement ,and ethics. To accomplish this, Inter-Tel developed internal training programs and, in addition, retained a private company that specializes in developing compliance training. To date, all employees of Inter-Tel and its subsidiaries, including Technologies, have received the above-mentioned trainings, and new hires receive the training shortly after beginning employment with Inter-Tel, or any of the affiliated subsidiaries, including Technologies. In 2004, Inter-Tel established an ethics hotline to permit employees and other third parties to report suspected violations of Inter-Tel’s Code of Business Conduct anonymously by telephone and the internet. In response to the fraudulent conduct, on June 30, 2006, the FCC issued its Notice of Debarment debarring Technologies from the E-Rate Program for one year, effective June 30, 2006 to June 30, 2007. The standard FCC debarment period is three years. The FCC debarment is limited in scope and does not affect Inter-Tel’s ability to continue contracting with other federal agencies. During the period of 2002 to 2004, Technologies transacted business with over twenty public entities within the State of Florida. Technologies is one of three companies that have been approved by DMS’ Division of State Purchasing to provide Key System telecommunication equipment to public entities in Florida. Since 2000, Inter-Tel has organized yearly company- wide United Way fundraisers, through which Inter-Tel has raised in excess of $100,000.00. After Hurricane Katrina, Inter-Tel conducted a one-month internal company-wide fundraising campaign and raised over $43,000.00 in donations from employees. Inter-Tel matched funds donated by employees for a total of over $85,000.00 raised for Hurricane Katrina victims. Following the terrorism events of September 11, 2001, employees raised over $117,000.00 for the American Red Cross. Inter-Tel matched the employee-donated funds for a total of over $241,000.00 donated by Inter-Tel to the 9/11 relief effort. A table reflecting all the charitable and civic campaigns participate in, or organized by, Inter-Tel since 2000 was provided.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent, Sport Clips, Inc., is Petitioner’s “employer” under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, chapter 760, Florida Statutes (“FCRA”).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: SCI is a Texas corporation, whose sole office is located at 110 Sport Clips Way, Georgetown, Texas, 78628. SCI’s Chief Executive Officer at the time of the alleged discriminatory events was Gordon B. Logan. SCI is the owner of the “Sport Clips” trademarks and business system. It licenses the Sport Clips trademarks and business system to independent business people. Each Sport Clips franchisee signs a franchise agreement under which SCI licenses its trademarks and the franchisee agrees to abide by certain operating rules that protect the Sport Clips trademarks and brand. In addition, each franchisee pays to SCI a royalty and advertising fee, as well as other fees. Sport Clips is a sports-themed hair-cutting salon which provides customers with haircuts, shampoo, and beard trims. There are approximately 1,800 Sport Clips franchise stores and an additional 75 Sport Clips stores owned and operated by SCI. SCI provides operating rules to its franchisees in a confidential operating manual.2 The operating manual does not cover employment policies, employee compensation, or employee benefits. These employment matters are determined by the individual franchisee. Instead, the operating manual focuses on business operations. According to Gordon Logan, CEO of SCI, the company trademark “[is] the essence of the business. You have to have a trademark and protect that trademark in order to have a viable system, one that franchisees can present in a consistent manner and the public knows what to expect when they come into a franchise business using that trademark.” The purpose of the procedures and specifications in the operating manual is to protect the Sport Clips trademark and brand. If SCI failed to enforce its trademark and brand standards, it could lose the right to use the trademark. Further, it ensures that the public’s expectations are met 2 Neither party introduced a copy of the confidential operating manual into evidence at the hearing and therefore it is not part of the record of this case. no matter which store they visit in the country, and protects the franchisees’ investments in the franchise. The procedures and specifications set forth in SCI’s franchise agreement and operating manual, including requiring franchisees to participate in specific training, use Sport Clips uniforms, and use a particular point of sales system, are typical of the franchise industry. JV-SC is a Florida Limited Liability Company managed by Drew C. Hopper. JV-SC’s sole corporate office is located at 708 Main Street, Houston, Texas. No SCI officer, employee, or representative holds any position with JV-SC, nor does any JV-SC officer, employee, or representative hold any position with SCI. Likewise, SCI has no ownership interest in any of Mr. Hopper’s Sport Clips stores or business entities, and Mr. Hopper and his business entities have no ownership interest in SCI. Over the last 21 years, Mr. Hopper has been involved in approximately 30 Sport Clips stores as a franchisee. Through JV-SC, Mr. Hopper operates eight Sport Clips franchise stores for profit in North Central Florida, including two locations in Gainesville. Mr. Hopper hired Ms. Kelley to manage the day-to-day operations of the Gainesville stores, and Ms. Kelley hired Ms. Turner, with Mr. Hopper’s approval, to manage and cut hair at one of JV-SC’s Gainesville stores. JV-SC has a franchise agreement with SCI with regard to the Gainesville location managed by Ms. Turner (“Franchise Agreement”). Under the Franchise Agreement, SCI granted JV-SC “a non-exclusive and personal license to operate one unit of the Franchised Business in strict conformity with the Franchisor’s standards and specifications” at 2231 Northwest 13th Street, Suite 20, Gainesville, Florida 32608 (“13th Street Location”). Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner were responsible for recruiting and hiring hair stylists at the 13th Street Location. Ms. Turner was responsible for supervising the stylists at the 13th Street Location. Employees in JV-SC’s corporate office in Houston also handled human resources functions for JV-SC. Mr. Hopper ultimately decided what to pay stylists on behalf of JV-SC. JV-SC set employee expectations and Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner were responsible for handling employee misconduct and firing decisions at the 13th Street Location. Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner were also responsible for ensuring that the 13th Street Location was properly equipped with necessary tools and inventory. Mr. Boyd was a hair stylist at the 13th Street Location. He was hired by Ms. Turner on August 30, 2017, and his rate of pay was set by JV-SC at $10 per hour. When he was hired, he completed a new hire form which states in bold print at the top: “JV-SC Investments LLC DBA Sport Clips FL901.” Mr. Boyd’s employment was terminated less than three months after he was hired by Ms. Turner for a violation of JV-SC policy related to a customer complaint. SCI had no involvement in Mr. Boyd’s hiring or termination of employment. During his employment, Mr. Boyd’s work schedule was established by Ms. Turner and his benefits, including holidays, vacation pay, and health insurance, were determined by JV-SC. If Mr. Boyd was going to be late or absent from work, he needed to contact Ms. Turner. Ms. Turner supervised Mr. Boyd’s appearance and conduct while on duty at the 13th Street Location and she conducted his performance reviews. SCI has never exercised control over Mr. Boyd, including his working hours, pay, and vacation benefits. Mr. Boyd’s personnel records were created and maintained by JV-SC and the records repeatedly identify JV-SC as Mr. Boyd’s employer. Mr. Boyd’s paychecks and W-2 were issued by JV-SC and make no reference to SCI. Likewise, Ms. Turner and Ms. Kelley were hired and paid by JV-SC and JV-SC created and maintained their personnel records. SCI has no employment records indicating that Mr. Boyd, Ms. Turner, or Ms. Kelley were ever employed by SCI. JV-SC had an employee handbook based on a template it received from SCI. The handbook was modified by JV-SC and could be modified by JV-SC at any time. Indeed, SCI expressly advised JV-SC to modify the form handbook to ensure it complied with local laws and to reflect the business practices of JV-SC. The employee handbook identifies JV-SC in bold red print on the front cover and provides “Sport Clips stores are independently owned and operated franchises. Team Members working in franchised stores are employed by the franchisee (Team Leader) and are not employed by Sport Clips, Inc.” JV-SC’s employee handbook was provided to its employees, including Mr. Boyd. JV-SC’s employee handbook required Mr. Boyd to report complaints of discrimination to his manager, Ms. Turner, or if he had a complaint concerning her, to Mr. Hopper at JV-SC. Under section XVI of the Franchise Agreement, JV-SC “acknowledges and agrees that [JV-SC] is an independent business person and independent contractor.” Further, this section provides in relevant part: Nothing in the Agreement is intended to make either party an agent, legal representative, subsidiary, joint venturer, partner, employee or servant of the other for any purpose whatsoever. During the term of this Agreement, [JV-SC] shall hold itself out to the public as an independent contractor operating the Franchised Business pursuant to a license from [SCI] and as an authorized user of the System and the Proprietary marks which are owned by [SCI]. [JV-SC] agrees to take such affirmative action as may be necessary to do so, including exhibiting to customers a sign provided by [SCI] in a conspicuous place on the premises of the Franchised Business. In compliance with this section of the Franchise Agreement, JV-SC posted at its 13th Street Location a sign in the front of the store which states: “This Sport Clips store is owned and operated by JV-SC Investments, LLC an independent Sport Clips franchisee.” With regard to JV-SC’s employees, the Franchise Agreement provides that “[SCI] shall not have the power to hire, manage, compensate or fire [JV-SC’s] employees and it is expressly agreed that [SCI] has no employment relationship with [JV-SC’s] employees.” The Franchise Agreement further provides: Franchisees are responsible for hiring, managing and compensating their employees within the laws of any jurisdiction in which they operate and are encouraged to consult their own legal counsel to ensure their compliance with all applicable laws. Franchisee and Franchisor recognize that Franchisor neither dictates nor controls labor and employment matters for the Franchisee or the Franchisee’s employees. Over the last 21 years, SCI has never told Mr. Hopper “who to hire, how to hire, how much [he] should hire them for, how much [he] should pay [employees]. It’s always been up to [him].” With regard to JV-SC’s funds and store premises, the Franchise Agreement provides “[e]xcept as herein expressly provided, [SCI] may not control or have access to [JV-SC’s] funds or the premises of the Franchised Business, or in any other way exercise dominion or control over the Franchised Business.” SCI has no control or ownership interest over JV-SC’s bank accounts, set up by Mr. Hopper; SCI is only authorized to withdraw from the accounts the specific royalties and fees set forth in the Franchise Agreement. Proceeds from the sales at the 13th Street Location are deposited into JV-SC’s bank account. SCI does not lease or own the property at the 13th Street Location or any of the 23 locations Mr. Hopper franchises from SCI. JV-SC leases the property from a third party. SCI does not own any real estate in common with or lease any property to Mr. Hopper or his related business entities.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner failed to prove that Sport Clips, Inc. is an “employer” pursuant to section 760.02(7), Florida Statute, and dismissing the Petitions for Relief filed in these consolidated cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of August, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Robert W. Bauer, Esquire Bauer Law Group, P.A. Suite B 3721 Northwest 40th Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32606 (eServed) Deborah L. Taylor, Esquire SportsClips, Inc. Suite 1200 3730 Kirby Drive Houston, Texas 77098 Stephanie M. Marchman, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. Suite 106 720 Southwest 2nd Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601-6250 (eServed) Maria Perez Youngblood, Esquire Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A. Suite B 3721 Northwest 40th Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32606 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Did the Respondents offer to sell a business opportunity without filing a disclosure statement with the Department and without providing prospective purchasers a disclosure statement at least three working days prior to the receipt of any consideration for the signing of a business opportunity contract contrary to Section 559.80, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact On March 5, 1994, Star Vision was in attendance at a trade show in Jacksonville, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibits 3,5) Upon investigating Star Vision's activities at the show, the Department's representatives, Bob James and Bill Bassett, found Star Vision to be offering for sale a business opportunity as defined by Chapter 559, Part VIII, Florida Statutes. (Petitioner's Exhibits 3,5) Star Vision offered to sell a business opportunity representing that one could become a "licensee" upon paying $600. (Petitioner's Exhibits 5) Star Vision had not file a copy of the required disclosure statement with the Department prior to making the offering above. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2,3) Granhan and Bray were given a letter notifying them of the filing requirements together with a business opportunity registration package. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2,3) On March 12,1994, Star Vision attended another trade show in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4) Upon investigating Star Vision's activities at the show, the Department's representative, James R. Kelly, found Star Vision to be offering for sale a business opportunity. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4) Star Vision represented the following while offering to sell a business opportunity: The regular price of the opportunity was $1,495 but they were running a special of $495 for anyone signing up at the show; and Purchasers would receive training tapes and other training that teaches how to market and sell the product. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4) The Department received a consumer complaint against STAR VISION from Mr. Alan Drake. Upon purchasing a business opportunity from Star Vision, Mr. Drake was provided with audio and video tapes which instruct purchasers how to sell and market the product. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1) Upon selling him a business opportunity, Star Vision did not provide Mr. Drake with a disclosure statement, and has never registered with the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ordering that: Respondents to cease and desist selling business opportunities in the State of Florida, Imposing an administrative fine of $5,000 for each violation, in accordance with Section 559.813(2), Florida Statutes, against Terry Granhan and Mike Bray d/b/a Star Vision Direct Cable in the amount of $15,000. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Jay S. Levenstein, Senior Attorney Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Terry Granhan and Mike Bray Star Vision Direct Cable, Inc. 9050 Highway 64, Suite 115 Memphis, TN 38002 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a licensed physician, holding Florida license number ME 59702. The Respondent is board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology. The Respondent has been licensed in Florida since 1991 and has never been the subject of a previous disciplinary action. In the mid-1990s the Respondent owned and operated several women's health clinics in Florida, where he practiced maternal/fetal medicine and performed terminations of pregnancies. In August 1997, the Respondent purchased a building in Ocala, Florida, for the purpose of opening a women's health clinic. His intention to open a clinic in Ocala was apparently controversial, and he was asked by Larry Cretul, the Chairman of the Marion County Commission, to reconsider the decision. The Respondent became associated with Michael Spielvogel, a real estate broker, through Mr. Spielvogel's wife, who worked for the Respondent. The Respondent discussed with Mr. Spielvogel the possibility that the Ocala property could be sold to the Marion County government. Mr. Spielvogel engaged in telephone conversations with Mr. Cretul about the sale of the property to the county. Mr. Cretul allegedly became concerned about the nature of the conversations and contacted law enforcement authorities. An investigation by the Ocala office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) commenced, which included the recording of the conversations between Mr. Spielvogel and Mr. Cretul, apparently without Mr. Spielvogel's knowledge. On one specific occasion, a conversation occurred between Mr. Spielvogel and Mr. Cretul, after which Mr. Spielvogel contacted the Tampa office of the FBI and reported that Mr. Cretul had threatened him. Mr. Spielvogel told the FBI that Mr. Cretul had referenced an Alabama women's clinic that had been bombed on the date of the alleged conversation, and suggested that the Ocala clinic would come to an even more spectacular demise. By subsequently prepared affidavit, Mr. Spielvogel reported the substance of the conversation including the allegation that Mr. Cretul had threatened the facility. Also by affidavit, the Respondent reported that he had been present with Mr. Spielvogel during the conversation and although not able to hear Mr. Cretul speak, had observed Mr. Spielvogel react as if Mr. Cretul had threatened the Ocala clinic. The Ocala clinic eventually opened. The Respondent sought to employ off-duty law enforcement officers to provide security for the facility, but the Marion County Sheriff's Department denied the request. The Respondent sought relief by filing a federal lawsuit against Marion County and other parties. During a conversation with the county's attorney as to why the county had been named in the suit, the Respondent's counsel reported to the county's attorney the threat allegedly made by Mr. Cretul. In addition, the Respondent's counsel produced the affidavits of the Respondent and Spielvogel regarding the alleged conversation. The county attorney allegedly learned from Mr. Cretul that the conversations had been recorded, contacted the FBI, and eventually convened an unsuccessful settlement conference in March 1999 that was videotaped by the FBI. In April 1999, the FBI allegedly advised Mr. Spielvogel that the law enforcement authorities were aware that the allegations against Mr. Cretul were false. Mr. Spielvogel advised the Respondent that the FBI had been investigating the allegation. In June 2000, both the Respondent and Mr. Spielvogel were indicted by a grand jury and charged with conspiracy to commit extortion, mail fraud, and perjury. Mr. Spielvogel was additionally charged with filing a false affidavit and making false statements to the FBI. The trial commenced in January 2001. The men were tried as co-defendants although represented by separate counsel. A break in the trial occurred from January 12 through January 19, due to a scheduling conflict. When the break commenced, the Respondent's defense lawyers received detailed transcriptions of recorded telephone conversations between Mr. Spielvogel and Mr. Cretul, at which time it became obvious to the defense team that Mr. Spielvogel had been untruthful about his conversations with Mr. Cretul, and that the alleged threat by Mr. Cretul had not occurred. When confronted with the information by counsel, Mr. Spielvogel admitted the dishonesty and apologized. The Respondent was not present at the time the lawyers confronted Mr. Spielvogel, but entered the room shortly thereafter and observed Mr. Spielvogel's apology. The defense lawyers decided that when the trial resumed, Mr. Spielvogel would make the disclosure of his dishonesty during his testimony, which was scheduled to begin when the trial resumed. The Respondent was scheduled to testify after Mr. Spielvogel. When the trial resumed, Mr. Spielvogel and the Respondent testified as planned. On February 1, 2001, the jury convicted both Mr. Spielvogel and the Respondent on all counts charged. In May, the Respondent was sentenced to serve 46 months in prison, placed on two years of supervised release, and fined $25,000. Mr. Spielvogel was sentenced to 41 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The Respondent entered prison and began serving his sentence in July 2001. The convictions were appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Oral arguments occurred on February 27, 2001. The Respondent was ordered released from prison on February 28, 2001. By written decision issued on July 16, 2001, the Respondent's conviction was vacated, and the case was remanded for retrial on the sole issue of whether the Respondent's affidavit regarding his observations during the Spielvogel/Cretul threat conversation was false and constituted conspiracy to commit perjury. The court found that the Respondent's threat to file litigation against Marion County, "even if made in bad faith and supported by false affidavits" failed to violate the statute (the "Hobbs Act") under which the Respondent had been charged as to the indictment for conspiracy to commit extortion or attempted extortion. The court further found that the "mailing of litigation documents, even perjurious ones, did not violate the mail fraud statute" under which the Respondent and Mr. Spielvogel had been charged. As to the actual affidavits, the government had charged that the Respondent and Spielvogel had agreed to supply perjured affidavits as evidence in the legal action against Marion County. The court, reviewing the evidence as required in the light most favorable to the government's position, stated that the government offered circumstantial evidence upon which a jury could infer such an agreement. The court specifically stated as follows: During the Government's case, it introduced the affidavits of Spielvogel and Pendergraft. These statements indicated that Cretul threatened Spielvogel on January 29 and that Pendergraft observed Spielvogel receiving these threats. The Government offered evidence that Cretul did not, in fact, make the threats on January 29. Cretul testified that he never made the threat asserted by Spielvogel, and, on the FBI tapes of Cretul's conversations with Spielvogel, Cretul never made the threats that Spielvogel asserted in his affidavit. This demonstrated that Spielvogel's statements were false. Furthermore, Spielvogel was at home when he spoke with Cretul on January 29. The Government and Pendergraft stipulated that Pendergraft was not at Spielvogel's home during Spielvogel's conversation with Cretul on January 29. This was evidence that Pendergraft did not observe what he said he observed. From this circumstantial evidence, the jury could infer that Pendergraft and Spielvogel agreed to fabricate the threats and Pendergraft's observation of the threats. Because the original perjury conviction was included within the convictions for extortion and mail fraud (both of which were vacated), the court remanded the case and directed that the perjury charge should be retried against the Respondent. In October 2002, the U.S. Attorney initiated re-prosecution of the perjury case. In March 2004, after additional litigation including another appeal to the United States Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit, the trial judge directed the parties to resolve the case. Discussions between all parties eventually resulted in the Respondent's entry on June 28, 2004, of a guilty plea to one count of "Accessory After the Fact," and he was adjudicated guilty by the trial court. The facts upon which the Respondent entered the plea and was convicted were set forth in a document titled "Factual Basis" which provides as follows: James Scott Pendergraft is a medical doctor who owns and operates several women's reproductive health facilities in the State of Florida, including one in Ocala. In February 1998, Michael Spielvogel, a business associate of Pendergraft, intentionally made false reports to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), regarding alleged threats of death and destruction by then Commissioner Larry Cretul. Specifically, Spielvogel falsely reported to the FBI that Commissioner Cretul had threatened that if Dr. Pendergraft opened a medical facility in Ocala, Florida, a bombing that had recently occurred at a medical facility in Birmingham, Alabama, "would be nothing compared to what would happen in Ocala." At the time Spielvogel made the false reports to the FBI, he (Spielvogel) knew that Cretul had never made this statement. Spielvogel was subsequently indicted and charged with making a false report to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and his trial commenced on January 2, 2001, in Ocala, Florida. While the trial was in progress, Spielvogel informed Pendergraft that Cretul had never made the alleged threatening statement, and that Spielvogel had thus made a false report to the FBI. Spielvogel, however, continued to relay to Dr. Pendergraft that he felt threatened by the communications with Cretul, and that Spielvogel staged a telephone call in front of Pendergraft where he repeated the threat into the telephone to convince Pendergraft that Cretul had just made the threat. Before the commencement of the trial, Pendergraft had procured the professional services of William Caddy, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, to assist in Spielvogel's defense. Dr. Caddy was prepared to testify, and Pendergraft was aware of the substance of the prospective testimony of Dr. Caddy, by having reviewed Dr. Caddy's report. Pendergraft knew that Dr. Caddy's report did not contain the truthful disclosure referenced above, and, in fact, reported that Spielvogel believed the false statements to be true. Pendergraft took the affirmative step of concealing the crime committed by Spielvogel by continuing to procure and pay for the services of Dr. Caddy, which included providing contemplated testimony at the trial on behalf of Mr. Spielvogel in order to have him exonerated and avoid punishment. Based upon the conviction of Accessory After the Fact, the Respondent was sentenced to time served, and to pay a total of $300 in assessments and fines.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order DISMISSING the Administrative Complaint filed against James S. Pendergraft, M.D. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Blake Hunter, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Kenneth J. Metzger, Esquire Fowler White Boggs Banker P.A. Post Office Box 11240 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Kathryn L. Kasprzak, Esquire Fowler White Boggs Banker, P.A. 37 North Orange Avenue, Suite 500 Orlando, Florida 32801 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issues to be resolved are whether Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and if so, what penalties should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact From 1999 until his termination in December 2007, Respondent was registered with the Office of Financial Regulation as an associated person of ProEquities, Inc. (ProEquities). At all times material hereto, Respondent engaged in both the sale of insurance and the sale of securities products from his Daytona Beach office. His activities with respect to the sale of securities were supervised from ProEquities' Orlando branch office. In the fall of 2006, Respondent appeared as a guest in a short segment of a radio program. He did not obtain prior approval from ProEquities for this appearance. ProEquities received an inquiry from the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) regarding the radio appearance, and asked Respondent to explain his participation. He responded by letter stating, I was a guest on the radio show to provide educational information. The show is about a wide range of educational information for seniors, and since it wasn't my own show I didn't feel I needed to get approval. I was only on for about 6 minutes, and of course as we discussed this should have been approved. In the future I will submit approval for any advertising or other appearances that I participate in. As a result of the November 2006 radio appearance, ProEquities issued a Letter of Caution to Respondent for providing his contact information and offering his services to listeners without prior firm approval. Respondent signed the Letter of Caution on December 7, 2006, and agreed to comply with ProEquities' advertising policies. Sometime after the Letter of Caution was issued, Respondent discussed with ProEquities' Compliance Officer, Michael Moore, the possibility of having his own radio show. Moore told him the firm would have to review and approve the scripts. Although initially Respondent forwarded the scripts to Moore, at some point he stopped doing so and Moore assumed that Respondent had stopped doing the show.1/ ProEquities received a second inquiry from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), formerly NASD, regarding Respondent's radio show and both print and radio ads that Respondent was using. On November 2, 2007, Respondent submitted an e-mailed statement to the firm stating, "I thought the radio ads had been approved last November. As far as the print ad goes, it was so generic and didn't state any specific product information that I assumed it did not need to be approved." In addition, Respondent submitted a copy of a print advertisement and the transcripts of two 30-second radio commercials. The scripts for the radio commercials stated as follows: Great news for those who are planning for retirement or already retired. David Tucker has been showing the people of Daytona Beach how to retire in comfort for 32 years. David will show you the tools needed to help meet your retirement goals. Call David Tucker of David Tucker & Associates at (386) 761-9401. Be sure to listen to Investment Strategies with David Tucker every Sunday from 12:00 to 12:30 PM on WNDB 1150 AM. If you are unhappy with your investments call David Tucker at (386) 761-9401. He can show you how to benefit from any market gains, and safeguard 100% of your principal, and interest earned, regardless of market fluctuations. Be sure to listen to Investment Strategies with David Tucker every Sunday from 12:00 to 12:30 PM on WNDB 1150 AM. The print advertisement submitted to ProEquities stated in part, We offer stocks, bonds, annuities, mutual funds, life & health insurance, and long-term care. Ask Us How To Guarantee Income for Life. The print advertisement submitted by Respondent also contained the required disclosure that Respondent sold securities through ProEquities, which stated: Securities offered through ProEquities, Inc., A Registered Broker-Dealer. Member, NASD and SIPC. David A. Tucker & Associates is independent of ProEquities, Inc. Securities offered through ProEquities, Inc., like all investments, are subject to risks. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns. In reliance upon Tucker's submission of the print advertisement described above, and believing that was the advertisement used, ProEquities submitted the print advertisement to FINRA in response to the November 2, 2007, inquiry. On November 26, 2007, ProEquities issued a "Letter of Warning" to Respondent, based on the fact that prior approval had not been obtained for the print advertisement or the radio spots. The Letter of Warning reminded Respondent of the previously issued Letter of Caution, and stated in part: By signing that Letter of Caution, you agreed that you would comply with all firm policies regarding advertising and sales literature, including but not limited to, print material, personal and business websites, radio broadcasts, television broadcasts, seminars and other advertising or promotional events. The firm's policies, as well as FINRA Rule 2200, regarding communications with the public, are clear - any and all sales and promotional materials must be pre-approved by the firm's compliance department. The firm intends to maintain strict compliance with securities industry rules and regulations; and we expect our representatives to uphold the same standard. This particular area of communications with the public is the focus of heightened regulatory scrutiny; therefore violations of this rule hold the increased possibility of regulatory action against the firm, your OSJ and you. The Letter of Warning imposed a $500 fine; an immediate three-month suspension of all forms of advertising and/or promotional events, with the exception of certain identified, previously scheduled events; and the option at the end of the three-month period to either pay another fine of $1,500 or continue the suspension of advertising privileges for another three months. Respondent acknowledged the Letter of Warning in writing and paid the $500 fine on November 26, 2007. Following the issuance and acknowledgment of the Letter of Warning, ProEquities conducted an unannounced audit of Respondent's Daytona Beach office. During the audit, Mr. Moore discovered that there was print advertisement that was used by Tucker that did not match the print advertisement submitted to ProEquities and in turn supplied to FINRA in response to its inquiry. This additional print advertisement did not include the securities disclosure quoted in Finding of Fact 11. It simply states, "We Offer Stocks, Bonds, Annuities, Mutual Funds, Life and Health Ins. and Long-Term Care. Ask Us How to Guarantee Income for Life." It is not clear whether both print ads were being used simultaneously, whether the disclosure language was added deliberately before submitting the advertisement to ProEquities, or whether failing to send it was, as Respondent contends, an oversight. What is clear is that Respondent used the advertisement without the disclosure language on numerous occasions and saw no problem with its use. The advertisement which contains no disclosure statement was published 110 times. The radio commercials, which also failed to include any type of disclosure regarding the name of the member, ProEquities, aired 120 times. The statement "ask us how to guarantee income for life" in the print advertisement required disclosures so that it was fair and balanced and not misleading to the public. It also needed to clarify what product it was advertising, and that any guarantee was subject to the claims paying ability of the issuing insurance company if the advertised product is an annuity. Respondent asserted that the claim is meant only for annuities products, such as equity indexed annuities. However, nothing in the advertisement indicates that the guarantee is limited to this type of product, as opposed to the array of products mentioned in the advertisement, and Respondent indicated that the consumer would not receive that information until they came in for an appointment to discuss what type of investment the consumer might with to purchase. Forcing a consumer to come in for an appointment in order to receive information that should have been disclosed in the advertisement is misleading and a waste of the consumer's time.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding that Respondent violated the provisions of Conduct Rule 2210(b)(1), (c)(7), (d)(1)(A), and (d)(2)(C)(i), and thereby violated Section 517.161(1)(a) and (h), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69W-600.013(2)(h); That Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes; and That Respondent be ordered to pay an administrative fine of $15,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent willfully violated Section 106.07(5), Florida Statutes (2004), by certifying to the correctness of five campaign treasurer's reports (CTRs), which did not disclose payments that Respondent's media consultant made to two television stations on Respondent's behalf.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has jurisdiction to investigate and enforce Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. Respondent was an unsuccessful candidate for the Walton County Commission in 2004. Respondent was defeated in the August 31, 2004, primary election. Respondent is not an experienced politician. The 2004 campaign was his first and only attempt to run for public office. Respondent's campaign was entirely self-funded. Guy Davidson was the political consultant for Respondent's opponent. On or about August 22, 2004, Mr. Davidson filed a sworn complaint with Petitioner against Respondent. The complaint alleged that Respondent was running television ads (requiring cash in advance) although no expenditures to stations for airtime appeared on Respondent's CTRs. On March 10, 2004, Respondent signed a Statement of Candidate form as required by Section 106.023, Florida Statutes (2003). The statement indicates that Respondent had received, read, and understood the requirements of Chapter 106, Florida Statute (2003). On March 10, 2004, Respondent filed his Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Candidates. Respondent appointed his personal and business bookkeeper, Iris Schipper, to serve as his campaign treasurer. Respondent had confidence in Ms. Schipper, who had accounting experience, but no experience with political campaigns. On July 15, 2004, Respondent appointed himself as his deputy campaign treasurer. In the spring of 2004, Respondent hired Steven Petermann, the owner of Petermann Corporation, as his campaign media consultant for the purpose of creating, producing, distributing and disseminating political advertisements for Respondent's campaign. Mr. Petermann was in charge of all media aspects concerning Respondent's campaign. Respondent had known Mr. Petermann for years. Prior to the 2004 campaign, Respondent employed Mr. Petermann for advertising services concerning business ventures unrelated to Respondent's campaign. Mr. Petermann was experienced in providing campaign advertising for local political races. He had done so for approximately 30 campaigns. Mr. Petermann provided Respondent with advertising services which were similar to the services that Mr. Petermann provided to other political candidates. Respondent never specified to Mr. Petermann what advertising to buy or how much to spend. Respondent and Mr. Petermann had no specific payment or billing terms in mind when Mr. Petermann agreed to act as Respondent's media consultant or at anytime during the campaign. Generally, Mr. Petermann did not expect his political clients to pay him until the end of their campaigns. However, Respondent attempted to pay Mr. Petermann in full in accordance with the balance due on Petermann Corporation statements or in advance on those occasions when Respondent knew about projected campaign costs. In other words, Respondent tried to make sure that Mr. Petermann was paid in advance or promptly reimbursed for campaign expenses. In this regard, Respondent acted consistently with his prior private business relationship with Mr. Petermann. With regard to Respondent's campaign advertising budget, Respondent told Mr. Petermann to do "whatever it took to run a successful campaign." Respondent trusted Mr. Petermann's professional judgment as to how much advertising was needed and in which mediums the advertising was to run. Respondent knew Mr. Petermann was making expenditures on behalf of the campaign. Respondent was aware of each and every expenditure his campaign made to Mr. Petermann because he was very involved in his campaign finances. Mr. Petermann wrote the following checks on his business account directly to WJHG-TV and WBBM-TV for advertising time on behalf of Respondent's campaign: Date of Check Check Number Payee Television Station Amount of Petermann Expenditure for Perry 06-11-04 025246 WMBB-TV $442.00 06-14-04 025247 WJHG-TV $450.50 06-29-04 025294 WJHG-TV $450.50 06-29-04 025297 WMBB-TV $446.25 07-26-04 025405 WJHG-TV $743.75 07-26-04 025406 WMBB-TV $956.25 08-12-04 025491 WJHG-TV $743.75 08-12-04 025492 WMBB-TV $956.25 08-30-04 025548 WJHG-TV $331.50 Respondent made no expenditures from his campaign account directly to a television station. Additionally, no expenditures to television stations were listed on Respondent's CTRs. Mr. Petermann purchased all of the television airtime on behalf of Respondent's campaign. Mr. Petermann periodically sent Respondent statements for campaign services and expenses. The statements did not itemize each expenditure for television airtime. The statements did list television advertising and various other advertising purchases in general. Respondent did not list the checks that Mr. Petermann paid directly to WJHG-TV and WMBB-TY for Respondent's television airtime on any CTR during his 2004 campaign. A member of the public could not look at Respondent's CTRs and determine the following: (a) which television stations Respondent paid for campaign advertising; (b) how much Respondent paid for television advertising; and (c) how much Respondent paid for Mr. Petermann's professional services. During the course of the campaign, Respondent reported making several payments to Petermann Advertising or Petermann Corporation. Respondent listed each payment made to Mr. Petermann on his CTRs. Respondent did not break down the expenditures and itemize the components of the expenditures on his CRTs, including how much was paid to Mr. Petermann for his professional services. In a letter dated June 24, 2004, Mr. Beasley, Walton County Supervisor of Elections, advised all candidates, including Respondent, to read an enclosed memorandum from Phyllis Hampton, Chief of the Bureau of Election Records for the Department of State, Division of Elections. Mr. Beasley requested all candidates to sign an enclosed statement and return the statement to his office in the enclosed stamped and addressed envelope. Ms. Hampton's memorandum was dated June 17, 2004. It specifically referred to "2004 Campaign Finance Legislative Changes." The memorandum discussed the disclaimer that candidates were required to use on campaign advertising effective July 1, 2004. The last two paragraphs of Ms. Hampton's memorandum stated as follows: Enclosed is a copy of Chapter Law 2004- 252 (CS/SB 2346 &516). Section 5 of this law amends Section 106.143, Florida Statutes. We are also enclosing a handout that contains Section 106.143, Florida Statutes, as amended, as well as examples of political disclaimers under the new law. There are other changes in this law that affect campaign financing for candidates and a summary of those changes is enclosed. The Division of Elections of the Department of State has posted all enacted legislation that affect The Florida Election Code, Chapters 97-106, Florida Statutes, on its web site. That web site is http://election.dos.state. fl.us. If you have any questions, please feel free to call us at 850-245-6240. When Mr. Beasley received Ms. Hampton's memorandum, it included a copy of Public Law 2004-252. Mr. Beasley did not duplicate the law when he sent Ms. Hampton's memorandum to candidates in Walton County. If any candidate had requested a copy of the new law, Mr. Beasley would have obtained a copy for the candidate or referred the candidate to the Internet. Respondent received Ms. Hampton's memorandum regarding the changes in the law, but he did not read it over in detail. Instead, Respondent continued to direct his attention to campaign issues. There is no evidence that Respondent took any affirmative steps to inquire which sections of the law were amended in addition to the requirements for political disclaimers. Respondent did not go to the Department of State, Division of Elections' website to review the law or a copy of the updated candidate's handbook. All Respondent did was to send a copy of the letter to Mr. Petermann. Respondent did not give Ms. Schipper a copy of Ms. Hampton's June 17, 2004, memorandum during the campaign. Ms. Schipper received the memorandum and filed it in one of Respondent's campaign files after the campaign ended. Respondent wrote a personal check dated June 30, 2004, made payable to Peterman Corp. in the amount of $7,500. The check does not state its purpose. Mr. Petermann deposited this check in his business account on July 1, 2004. Respondent wrote the June 30, 2004, personal check to Petermann Corp. because he was in Mr. Petermann's office and wanted to make sure Mr. Petermann was paid promptly for his services and expenses on Respondent's behalf. On June 30, 2004, Respondent had not yet appointed himself as his deputy campaign treasurer and did not have a campaign check signed by Ms. Schipper. Respondent's Q2 CTR, which covered the period from April 1, 2004, to June 30, 2004, was due to be filed on July 12, 2004. The report listed no expenditure to Mr. Petermann. The report did not disclose that Mr. Petermann had spent $1,789.25 on behalf of Respondent's campaign to pay for advertisements on two television stations during the reporting period. On July 24, 2004, Respondent, as deputy campaign treasurer, wrote a check on his campaign account. The check was payable to Petermann Advertising in the amount of $10,000. The check did not state its purpose. On August 5, 2004, Ms. Schipper wrote a check on Respondent's campaign account. The check was payable to Respondent in the amount of $7,500. The purpose of the check was to reimburse Respondent for the amount Respondent paid to Mr. Petermann out of Respondent's personal account on June 30, 2004. On August 6, 2004, Ms. Schipper wrote a check on Respondent's campaign account. The check was payable to Petermann Advertising in the amount of $10,000. The check states that its purpose was advertising. Respondent's F2 CRT, which covered the period from July 24, 2004, through August 6, 2004, was due to be filed on August 13, 2004. The F2 CRT listed the following payments as expenditures: (a) a check dated July 24, 2004, to Petermann Advertising for campaign advertising in the amount of $10,000; (b) a check dated August 5, 2004, to Petermann Advertising/mlp (Respondent's initials) for campaign advertising in the amount of $7,500; and (c) a check dated August 6, 2004, to Petermann Advertising for campaign advertising in the amount of $10,000. The August 5, 2004, check, listed as payable to Petermann Advertising/mlp, was a reimbursement to Respondent for the personal check he wrote on June 30, 2004. Respondent's F2 CTR did not disclose that Mr. Petermann spent $1,700 on behalf of Respondent's campaign to pay for advertisements on two television stations during the reporting period. Ms. Schipper contacted someone in Mr. Beasley's office in Santa Rosa Beach, Florida, by telephone on August 13, 2004, before she filed Respondent's F2 CRT. Ms. Schipper inquired about the proper method of reporting the August 5, 2004, payment of campaign funds to reimburse Respondent for his personal check dated June 30, 2004, to Mr. Petermann. During the hearing, Ms. Schipper testified as follows: Okay. I called the -- there was a question about this particular expense because the nature of the check that I just explained because I wasn't sure. I knew I had to report it, but I wasn't sure how I should report it. So I called the supervisor of elections office and I told them what had happened, including the fact that Lee Perry was totally self-funding his campaign and that he had a paid check personally that we need to record as an expenditure on the campaign account and I told her that I had to -- to fund the campaign account and then pay it back to Lee and it was just like an in and out transaction, but I had to report it, but it was to Petermann Advertising. We had other checks to Petermann Advertising. It was all the campaign advertising. How did I need to do that. After speaking with an unidentified female in Mr. Beasley's office, Ms. Schipper was not comfortable with the answer to her inquiry. Ms. Schipper decided to list the check as payable to Petermann Advertising/mlp. Ms. Schipper did not call anyone else regarding the proper method of reporting the June 30, 2004, check, which reimbursed Respondent for reimbursing Mr. Petermann for advertising services and advertising expenses paid to television stations. On August 20, 2004, Ms. Schipper wrote a campaign check payable to Petermann Advertising for campaign advertising in the amount of $15,000. Respondent's F3 CTR, covering the period from August 7, 2004, through August 26, 2004, was due to be filed on August 27, 2004. Respondent's F3 CTR listed one expenditure to Petermann Advertising for campaign advertising in the amount of $15,000. Respondent's F3 CTR did not disclose that Mr. Petermann had spent $1,700 on behalf of Respondent's campaign to pay for advertisements on two television stations during the reporting period. On September 10, 2004, Ms. Schipper wrote a campaign check payable to Petermann Advertising for campaign advertising in the amount of $11,422.23. Respondent's G1 CTR, covering the period from August 27, 2004, through September 10, 2004, was due to be filed on September 17, 2004. Respondent's G1 CTR listed a check payable to Petermann Advertising as an expenditure. The check, dated September 10, 2004, was for campaign advertising in the amount of $11,422.23. Respondent's G1 CTR did not disclose that Mr. Petermann spent $331.50 on behalf of Respondent's campaign to pay for advertisements on one television station during the reporting period. On October 19, 2004, Ms. Schipper wrote a campaign check payable to Petermann Advertising for the "Perry Campaign" in the amount of $9,100. After filing Respondent's F3 CTR, Ms. Schipper realized that Mr. Petermann never received the August 20, 2004, campaign check in the amount of $15,000. Therefore, Ms. Schipper cancelled the check and filed an Amended F3 CTR on October 22, 2004. Respondent's Amended F3 CTR indicated that $15,000 was subtracted from Respondent's expenditures. The Amended F3 CTR listed the October 19, 2004, check as an expenditure. The check was payable to Petermann Advertising for campaign advertising in the amount of $9,100. Mr. Beasley has two offices. The main office is located in Defuniak Springs, Florida. The satellite office is located in Santa Rosa Beach, Florida. Neither office has a written record of inquiries concerning the reporting of expenditures for Respondent's campaign. As a general office practice, Mr. Beasley's staff does not make notes or records of telephone conversation with candidates or other individuals who call regarding campaign issues. Ms. Schipper called Mr. Beasley's office in Santa Rose Beach, Florida, when she had a question about her duties as campaign treasurer. If she could not get an answer to her question, Ms. Schipper called Mr. Beasley's office in Defuniak Springs, Florida. Ms. Schipper's office during the 2004 campaign was in Respondent's residence, which had two telephone lines. During the hearing, Respondent presented telephone records showing seven telephone calls from the residence to Mr. Beasley's main office in Defuniak Springs, Florida, on the following dates: July 1, 2004; July 7, 2004; July 16, 2004; July 17, 2004; August 27, 2004; August 30, 2004; and September 9, 2004. The telephone records do not show any calls made to Mr. Beasley's office in Santa Rosa Beach, Florida. Ms. Schipper called Mr. Beasley's Santa Rosa Beach office to inquire about reimbursing Respondent for the June 30, 2004, personal payment to Mr. Petermann. However, there is no evidence that Ms. Schipper called either of Mr. Beasley's offices to inquire specifically about the proper method of reporting campaign expenditures, paid directly to Mr. Petermann, part of which included indirect payments or reimbursements for advertising on television stations. Mr. Beasley has no independent recollection of speaking with Ms. Schipper during the campaign. There is no evidence that anyone on Mr. Beasley's staff remembers speaking with Respondent or Ms. Schipper about campaign finance reports during the 2004 campaign. Mr. Beasley's office provided Respondent with a copy of the 2004 Candidate and Campaign Treasurer Handbook (published November 2003)(handbook) and Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent and Ms. Schipper referred to these resources from time to time during the campaign on an as needed basis. The handbook did not specifically require a candidate to "itemize" expenditures to media consultants. The handbook contains the following statement on the first page: Important Notice The information contained in this publication is intended as a quick reference guide only and is current upon publication. Chapter 97-106, Florida Statutes, the Constitution of the State of Florida, Division of Elections' opinions and rules, Attorney General opinions, county charters, city charters and ordinances, and other sources should be reviewed in their entirety for complete information regarding campaign financing and qualifying. In addition, the following publication produced by the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections should be reviewed for further information regarding candidates and committees: 2004 Federal Qualifying Handbook 2004 Committee and Campaign Treasurer Handbook 2004 Handbook on Filing Campaign Reports 2004 Election Cycle Calendar of Reporting Dates for Candidates, Political Committees and Committees of Continuous Existence 2004 Election Cycle Calendar of Reporting Dates for Political Party Executive Committees. All forms and publications provided by the Division of Elections are available on our web site at http://election.dos.state.fl.us. Please direct any questions to either your county supervisor or elections or the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections at (850) 245-6240. (Emphasis included) Chapter 7 of the handbook states as follows regarding the duties and responsibilities of campaign treasurers: IMPORTANT: No contribution or expenditure, including contributions or expenditures of a candidate or of the candidate's family, shall be directly or indirectly made or received in furtherance of the candidacy of any person for nomination or election to political office in the state except through the duly appointed campaign treasurer of the candidate. (Emphasis included) Chapter 10 of the handbook states as follows regarding campaign expenditures: An expenditure is a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, transfer of funds by a campaign treasurer or deputy campaign treasurer between a primary depository and a separate interest-bearing account or certificate of deposit, or gift of money or anything of value made for the purpose of influencing the results of an election. * * * A candidate shall: 1. Pay all campaign expenditures by a check drawn on the campaign account (except petty cash); (emphasis included) Chapter 14 of the handbook states as follows regarding the filling of campaign reports: Reporting Expenditures Form DS-DE 14, Itemized Expenditures is used to report all expenditures made, regardless of the amount and must contain: Full name an address of each person to whom expenditures have been made along with the amount, date and clear purpose of the expenditure. Name, address and office sought by each candidate on whose behalf such expenditure was made. Full name and address of each person to whom an expenditure for personal services, salary or reimbursed expenses was made along with the amount, date and clear purpose of the expenditure. A candidate or any other individual may be reimbursed for expenses incurred for travel, food and beverage, office supplies, and mementoes expressing gratitude to campaign supporters as provided for in section 106.021(3), F.S. * * * 5. Amount and nature of debts and obligations owed by or to the candidate, which relate to the conduct of any political campaign. (Emphasis included) On July 1, 2004, amendments to Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2004), became effective, including the addition of Section 106.07(4)(a)13., Florida Statutes (2004), which states as follows: (4)(a) Each report required by this section shall contain: * * * 13. The primary purpose of an expenditure made indirectly through a campaign treasurer for goods and services such as communications media placement or procurement services, campaign signs, insurance, and other expenditures that include multiple components as part of the expenditure. The primary purpose of an expenditure shall be that purpose, including integral and directly related components that comprises 80 percent of such expenditure. After July 1, 2004, the Department of State, Division of Elections, revised and published the 2004 Candidate and Campaign Treasurer Handbook (effective July 2004)(amended handbook). The preface to the amended handbook states as follows: "This publication has been amended in July of 2004 to reflect changes as provided by Chapter Law 2004-252. New language is displayed in red." The notice on the first page of the amended handbook was not revised. Chapter 7 of the amended handbook states as follows regarding the duties and responsibilities of campaign treasurers: IMPORTANT: No contribution or expenditure, including contributions or expenditures of a candidate or of the candidate's family, shall be directly or indirectly made or received in furtherance of the candidacy of any person for nomination or election to political office in the state except through the duly appointed campaign treasurer of the candidate, subject to the following exceptions: * * * Reimbursements to a candidate or any other individual for expenses incurred in connection with the campaign by a check drawn upon the campaign account and reported pursuant to Section 106.07(4), F.S. After July 1, 2004, the full name and address of each person to whom the candidate or other individual made payment for which reimbursement was made by check drawn upon the campaign account shall be reported pursuant to Section 106.07(4), F.S., together with the purpose of such payment; Expenditures made indirectly through a treasurer for goods or services, such as communications media placement or procurement services, campaign signs, insurance or other expenditures that include multiple integral components as part of the expenditure and reported pursuant to Section 106.07(4)(a)13 . . . . (Emphasis included) Chapter 10 of the amended handbook states as follows regarding campaign expenditures: An expenditure is a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, transfer of funds by a campaign treasurer or deputy campaign treasurer between a primary depository and a separate interest-bearing account or certificate of deposit, or gift of money or anything of value made for the purpose of influencing the results of an election or making an electioneering communication. An expenditure for an electioneering communication is made when the earliest of the following occurs:A person executes a contract for applicable goods or services;A person makes payment, in whole or in part, for applicable goods or services ; orThe electioneering communication is publicly disseminated. * * * A candidate or other individual may be reimbursed for expenses incurred in connection with the campaign by a check drawn on the campaign account and reported pursuant to section 106.07(4), F.S. After July 1, 2004, the full name and address of each person to whom the candidate or other individual made payment for which reimbursement was made by check drawn upon the campaign account shall be reported pursuant to Section 106.07(4), F.S., together with the purpose of such payment. * * * A candidate shall: 1. Pay all campaign expenditures by a check drawn on the campaign account (except petty cash); (Emphasis included) Chapter 14 of the amended handbook states as follows regarding the filling of campaign reports: Reporting Expenditures Form DS-DE 14, Itemized Expenditures is used to report all expenditures made, regardless of the amount and must contain: Full name an address of each person to whom expenditures have been made along with the amount, date and clear purpose of the expenditure. Name, address and office sought by each candidate on whose behalf such expenditure was made. Full name and address of each person to whom an expenditure for personal services, salary or reimbursed expenses was made along with the amount, date and clear purpose of the expenditure. A candidate or any other individual may be reimbursed for expenses incurred for travel, food and beverage, office supplies, and mementoes expressing gratitude to campaign supporters as provided for in section 106.021(3), F.S. (Emphasis included) * * * 5. Amount and nature of debts and obligations owed by or to the candidate, which relate to the conduct of any political campaign. * * * 7. The primary purposes of an expenditure made indirectly through a campaign treasurer for goods and services such as communications media placement or procurement services, campaign signs, insurance, and other expenditures that include multiple components as part of the expenditure. The primary purpose of an expenditure shall be that purpose, including integral and directly related components, that comprises 80 percent of such expenditure. (Emphasis included) For the 2004 campaign, reporting forms applicable to candidates did not provide for "itemization" of payments made by media consultants to various component providers of goods and services. In contrast, forms applicable to political parties and committees required and provided a reporting mechanism for itemizing payments made by third party consultants to the providers of the component services. Those forms did not specifically apply to individual candidates. At the time of the hearing, the Department of State, Division of Elections, was in the rulemaking process to develop standards and reporting forms for candidates to use when itemizing component parts of an expenditure made to a campaign consultant or vendor. Respondent and Ms. Schipper never called the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections, to make campaign finance report inquiries. After reviewing the handbook as published in November 2003, Ms. Schipper believed she had a fair understanding of campaign reporting requirements. Ms. Schipper did not review Chapter 106.07(4), Florida Statutes (2004), or the amended handbook. Respondent also reviewed Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2003), and the handbook as published in November 2003. He did not review Section 106.07(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), but primarily relied on Ms. Schipper to properly report campaign expenditures. All checks written on Respondent's campaign account were reported on Respondent's CTRs. Respondent's CTRs reflect that Respondent's total campaign account receipts equaled his total expenditures. During the hearing, the parties stipulated that Respondent had the ability to pay the maximum fine possible if it was determined that he committed the violations charged.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Section 106.07(5), Florida Statutes (2004), as charged in Counts 1-5 of the Order of Probable Cause, dismiss Count 6 of the Order of Probable Cause, and impose a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2006.
