The Issue Whether Respondent should be deemed to have abandoned her employment with Petitioner and resigned from Career Service on March 10, 1989.
Findings Of Fact From March 31, 1987 through March 6, 1989, Nguyet Mackay, Respondent herein, was an employee of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Petitioner herein). Petitioner's workday commences at 7:30 a.m. At approximately 9:30 a.m., on March 6, 1989, Respondent called Larry Blackburn, a supervisory employee and advised that she was in Ohio and requested leave without pay (LWOP). Blackburn was without authority to approve LWOP and so advised Respondent, but agreed to submit Respondent's request to personnel for consideration. Blackburn expressed skepticism about granting LWOP to Respondent since Respondent, at the time, was on special probation for failing to achieve the required standards in her department. During the conversation with Blackburn on March 6, Respondent advised Blackburn that she was enroute to California to pick up her sister and other relatives and that she would again call the following day, i.e., March 7, to find out if her request for LWOP was granted. Blackburn, in an effort to make sure that in the event Respondent called prior to his arrival at work the following morning, left specific instructions with Marilyn Ford, a unit supervisor, on whether to grant or deny Respondent's request for LWOP. At approximately 8:30 a.m., on March 7, 1989, Respondent phoned to inquire whether her request for LWOP was approved. Ford inquired of Respondent the basis for her request for LWOP and determined that since it was not an emergency, Respondent was advised and placed on unauthorized LWOP and that disciplinary action was being contemplated. Ford further advised Respondent that she was to report to work the following day, March 8, 1989, at her regular reporting time. Respondent was cautioned that in the event that she failed to report to work by the close of business on Friday, March 10, 1989, her employment relationship with Petitioner would be severed for abandonment of position. Respondent advised supervisor Ford that she had flown to California from Ohio to meet with seven members of her family who were flying to California from Malaysia, a sister and brother-in-law and their five children, who had a language barrier and were unable to communicate in English. Respondent understood the directives issued by Ford respecting her unauthorized LWOP and her duty to report to work on March 8. Respondent did not report to work by the close of business on March 10, and her only communication with Petitioner following the March 7, 1989 conversation with Marilyn Ford, was a phone call during the week of March 13 to give her new address and directions for mailing her final paycheck. By letter dated March 13, 1989, Respondent was advised that she was deemed to have resigned from Career Service on March 10, 1989, based on her continuous absence from work without authorization during the period 7:30 a.m., Monday, March 6, 1989 through 4:00 p.m., Friday, March 10, 1989, since such absence without authorized leave for three consecutive work days constituted an abandonment of position. At the time of Respondent's employment on March 31, 1987, she received a copy of Petitioner's employee handbook and loyalty oath and acknowledged her responsibility to review the handbook in detail and request any clarification needed from either her supervisor or the personnel office. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Administration enter a Final Order denying Respondent's petition for review of the facts herein based on the determination that Respondent abandoned her position of employment with Petitioner on March 10, 1989. DONE and ENTERED this 25th of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Shari N. Cortese, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 701 94th Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33702 Nguyet Mackay 6202 South Harold Avenue Tampa, Florida 33601 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1500 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 A. J. McMullian, III Interim Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Kennie W. McKay should be deemed to have abandoned his position and to have resigned from the Career Service on account of his absence from work on March 10, 13, 14, and 15, 1987?
Findings Of Fact Some 18 years ago, when petitioner Kennie W. McKay began working at the Dozier School in Marianna, he received a copy of the employee handbook the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) published at the time. A more recent edition, dated June 1, 1986, provides, in part: As soon as possible on the first day of absence, it is your responsibility to notify your supervisor that the absence is due to illness, injury, exposure to a contagious disease, or the illness or injury of a member of your immediate family. Your supervisor should also be given an estimate of the length of the absence. Medical certification may be requested. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, p. 19. It was not clear from the evidence either that this language appeared in the edition Mr. McKay was furnished when he began work, or that he had ever seen the edition which came into evidence without objection. On June 1, 1983, the Dozier School adopted "POLICY AND PROCEDURE #:035" requiring advance approval of leave, except when "illness or a bona fide emergency" occasions the absence. In that event, the policy specifies that the employee must contact his/her supervisor as soon as possible. If he/she is unable to contact his/her immediate supervisor, the employee must contact the next higher level supervisor or someone in his/her normal chain of command. Leaving messages with the switchboard, coworkers, or other uninvolved staff will not be considered adequate notice. The employee is to notify his/her supervisor and only in situations where the employee is unable to contact the supervisor himself/herself will a call/contact from another person be acceptable. * * * (6) Employees displaying a pattern of unplanned absences may be suspected of abusing their leave privileges and may be subject to appropriate corrective action in accordance with HRSP 60-1 State Personnel Rules (Chapter 22A-8 and HRSR 60-51). Respondent's Exhibit No. 5, pp. 1 and 2. HRS has not promulgated this "policy and procedure" as an administrative rule. Direct evidence did not establish to what extent, if at all, petitioner McKay was aware of its existence or its provisions. But his efforts to reach the man he thought to be his immediate supervisor, James R. Kersey, suggest he believed he was required to try to do so. In his letter of February 23, 1987, the Dozier School's superintendent, Roy C. McKay, no relation to petitioner, advised petitioner McKay that Mr. Kersey would become his immediate supervisor upon petitioner's demotion from carpenter to house parent. In part, the letter stated: This is official notification that you are being demoted from Carpenter, position number 01082, to Houseparent, position number 01188. You are to report to Friendship House on the 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift, effective Friday, February 27, 1987, or the first day you return back to work. 1/ Your immediate supervisor will be Mr. James Kersey, Houseparent Supervisor I; and your days off will be Wednesday and Thursday. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Like Mr. Kersey, Mr. James Pyles and Mr. Jethro Pittman were house parent supervisors I assigned to Friendship House. Each supervised a different shift. Houseparent supervisors I reported to Norman Harris, who reported to assistant superintendent Pate, who reported to superintendent McKay. On every shift, an administrative duty officer has campus-wide responsibility. The administrative duty officer is also in the chain of command. Petitioner McKay did not learn until after he was told he no longer had a job that Mr. Harris was to be in the chain of command, because he did not see Mr. Harris' memorandum of March 10, 1987, until after March 16, 1987. In this memorandum, Mr. Harris advised: YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR WILL BE JAMES PYLES, HOUSEPARENT SUPERVISOR I. YOUR NEXT HIGHER SUPERVISOR BILL BE ME, MR. NORMAN HARRIS. Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. Written communications addressed to petitioner McKay dated on and after March 10, 1987, were placed in "his box," but Superintendent McKay was aware that petitioner McKay did not see them on or before March 16, 1987. Before the superintendent's letter of February 23, 1987, gave "official notice" of the demotion, the two Messrs. McKay and others met in the Dozier School's conference room, on February 20, 1987. Petitioner McKay told those present that he had a doctor's appointment in Columbus, Georgia on March 10, 1987. As the superintendent understood it, the doctor had earlier warned against petitioner's overexerting himself, even against his walking too far. Everybody knew he was on leave on account of his medical condition at the time of the conference; he was, in fact, demoted because he was not physically able to discharge the duties of a carpenter. Evidently because he told the superintendent that he had a "sick slip through the ninth," the superintendent directed him to report on the tenth. Whoever drew the work schedule put him down as beginning his new assignment on March 9, 1987. As it happened, somebody in the doctor's office in Columbus called petitioner McKay's wife on March 9, 1987, and rescheduled the appointment for March 11, 1987. Deciding not to report for work before seeing the doctor, Kennie McKay telephoned the Dozier School on the tenth to let them know. Twice he reached Mr. Bridges, who was working the day shift as a house parent at Friendship House. He told Mr. Bridges he was not coming in to work that night. He asked each time to speak to Mr. Kersey. Each time Mr. Bridges told him Mr. Kersey was not there. Although Friendship House is the most secure cottage at the Dozier School and the locus of the school's "intensive supervision program," which is designed to calm boys down who are "in an uproar," the work on the night shift is not physically demanding. The boys are supposed to be asleep, and a house parent can call for reinforcements if problems arise. The houseparent can lock himself in a "crime cage" out of reach of the inmates, and could do his duty, which is mainly to observe, on crutches, if necessary. Nevertheless, when petitioner McKay visited the doctor in Columbus on March 11, 1987, he obtained a form from the doctor's office stating "out of work until next visit in 3 wks." Respondent's Exhibit No. 12. After he reached Marianna, he telephoned the Dozier School at 7:46 p.m. that evening. Charles Gardner, Jr., who was working as a house parent at Opportunity Cottage, took the telephone call. Mr. McKay told him he could not come to work that night, that he had been to see a doctor, that he had a doctor's excuse, and that he needed to talk to a night supervisor. While they were talking, Luther L. Spurlock, a house parent supervisor II in charge of a cluster that did not include Friendship House, entered the room, and took the phone from Mr. Gardner, who handed it to him. Petitioner McKay told Mr. Spurlock, "I'll be in tomorrow with a doctor's slip for Danny." After the phone call was over, Mr. Spurlock said to Mr. Gardner, "I'm not McKay's supervisor," or words to that effect. A form filled out toward the end of the shift stated: Kenny McKay called and said that he would be at the school tomorrow with a doctor slip to give Mr. Pate. Everything went well tonight no major problems. Respondent's Exhibit No. 10. Mr. Spurlock did not tell the petitioner that he ought to notify anybody else about his continuing absence. Kennie McKay had not been scheduled to work on March 11, 1987, in any event. His next scheduled work day was March 13, 1987. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. On March 13, 1987, he telephoned the superintendent's office but, when told he was in a meeting, asked to speak to Bruce Gambill, Dozier School's business manager , instead. Mr. Gambill answers directly to the superintendent. He told Mr. Gambill "that he had been to the doctor and had a sick slip to be out of work." Respondent's Exhibit No. 11. Mr. Gambill asked him to bring a copy of the slip to the business office for Workers Compensation purposes ... [and] instructed Mr. McKay to contact his supervisor concerning the sick slip and being out of work. [Petitioner] said he had tried to call, but there was no answer. [Mr. Gambill] told him he needed to let his supervisor know about the sick slip. Respondent's Exhibit No. 11. Petitioner had telephoned that morning at 10:24 from Marianna, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, but he had not reached Mr. Pittman, the supervisor, who testified he might have been on an errand then. Whether Petitioner tried again to reach a supervisor after speaking to Mr. Gambill is not clear. James Pyles, the man who, although petitioner did not know it at the time, became the latter's supervisor on March 10, 1987, asked superintendent Roy McKay's permission to use a state car about three o'clock that afternoon to find out if Kennie McKay was going to come to work. Mr. Pyles drove to Dothan, Alabama, where he found petitioner walking around without crutches in an establishment known as Shag's. He did not tell petitioner that he had been made his supervisor or suggest that, since he did not seem to need crutches, petitioner come to work. The following night, as well, Mr. Pyles saw Mr. McKay getting around without crutches. On that occasion, too, Mr. Pyles refrained from any discussion relating to work at Dozier School. When Kennie W. McKay brought the doctor's slip, Respondent's Exhibit No. 11, to Dozier School on March 17, 1987, he was informed he no longer had a job.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration rule that Kennie W. McKay has not abandoned his position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and has never lost his membership in the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: The Petitioner, Louis C. Germain, has been employed with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Foster Care Unit-452 since late 1984 or early 1985. On the morning of February 3, 1986, the Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident during the course of his employment while enroute to pick up a client who had a court appointment. As a result of the accident the Petitioner sustained several injuries, including a nose injury, back pains, headaches and blurred vision. The Petitioner was taken to his physician's office. At approximately 4:30 p.m. on February 3, 1986, the Petitioner called his immediate supervisor, Ms. Shelia Weiner, and advised her of the accident and of his injuries. On Friday, February 7, 1986, the Petitioner went to his office to pick up his pay check. The Petitioner spoke with Ms. Weiner and informed her that he did not know when his physician would allow him to return to work. On Monday, February 17, 1986, the Petitioner returned to the office once more to pick up a pay check. Ms. Weiner told the Petitioner that he had to report to work on Thursday, February 20, 1986. The Petitioner told Ms. Weiner that he was still suffering from injuries sustained in the February 3, 1986 accident and that he did not know when he would be able to return to work. On February 20, 1986, Ms. Weiner wrote the Petitioner a letter stating that his absence from work since February 17, 1986 had not been authorized. The letter stated in part that: "You are directed to report to work immediately and provide an explanation for your absences." The Petitioner received Ms. Weiner's letter on Saturday, February 22, 1986. On Tuesday, February 25, 1986, the Petitioner had an appointment with his physician and obtained a medical statement from her. The Petitioner's physician indicated in the medical statement that Petitioner had been under her care since the automobile accident of February 3, 1986, that Petitioner sustained multiple injuries in the accident and that Petitioner was now able to return to work. The Petitioner returned to work on February 25, 1986 and was advised that he needed to speak with Mr. Carlos Baptiste, supervisor of the personnel department. The Petitioner presented the letter from his doctor to Mr. Baptiste, but Baptiste was not satisfied with the doctor's statement and felt that it was "insufficient." Baptiste asked the Petitioner if he had a towing receipt or an accident report to confirm the accident of February 3, 1986. The Petitioner replied that he did not. The Petitioner was not allowed to return to work. At the final hearing, Mr. Baptiste stated that: "If Mr. Germain had produced an accident report, he would still be working with HRS." The Petitioner's leave and attendance record maintained by DHRS reflected that the Petitioner was given sick leave from February 3 to February 6, 1986. From February 7 to February 20, 1986 the Petitioner was placed on leave without pay. On March 3, 1986, Ms. Sylvia Williams notified the Petitioner by certified mail that due to his absence from work since "February 17, 1986", he was deemed to have abandoned his position and to have resigned from the Career Service.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order reinstating Petitioner to his position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Foster Care Unit-452 in Miami, Florida. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1987 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3319 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Matters not contained therein are rejected as argument. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Matters not contained therein rejected as argument. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Matters not contained therein are rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Rejected as a recitation of testimony and/or argument. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Matters not contained therein are rejected as mis- leading. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Louis C. Germain 308 Northeast 117 Street Miami, Florida 33161 Leonard T. Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue - Suite 790 Miami, Florida 33128 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John Miller, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner may lawfully discipline Respondent due to excessive absences from work.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner employed Respondent as a police officer in the Operations Division of the Cape Coral Police Department (Department) from October 5, 1987, through approximately April 27, 1998, when Petitioner terminated her employment. As detailed below, Petitioner monthly provides its employees with a specified amount of leave, based on their years of service. Petitioner credits all leave in a single account. Employees then draw on their leave account by taking scheduled and unscheduled leave. This case involves Respondent's use of allegedly excessive amounts of leave. In 1989, Respondent used 125.76 hours of unscheduled leave. On May 23, 1989, she received an interim performance evaluation noting that she was "below acceptable" in unscheduled leave time and needed to improve her relations with other employees. On October 13, 1989, she received an annual performance evaluation stating that she had had 18 days "sick leave" in the preceding 12 months and was below "operational standard" in attendance and relations with others; all of her other categories were marked as meeting operational standard. The attached narrative notes a "slight improvement" since her May 1989 interim performance evaluation. In 1990, Respondent used 198.5 hours of unscheduled leave. Her October 12, 1990, annual performance evaluation states that Respondent was again below operational standard in attendance with 23.25 days of "sick leave." She had raised her relations with others to operational standard and work habits to above operational standard. The narrative attached to the evaluation states that the evaluator has spent a sizable amount of time conferring with Susan regarding causes to her illnesses and resulting time off due to illness. Officer Von Halla does have problems with migraine's and when she experiences one, she is [less than] an effective part of the shift in fulfilling her normal duties. I have tried to understand why she experiences so many migraines and have suggested different activities (i.e. physical exercise, stress reduction). I am confident that despite the significant amount of time taken due to illness, when this officer calls in sick, she is sick and does not use this time for other unknown reasons. I feel, currently, Officer Von Halla is attempting to minimize the amount of times she calls in sick. Despite some improvement recently, Officer Von Halla still is in need of progress in this area so her time reserved starts reflecting this. The narrative concludes that Respondent can improve her weak point, which is attendance, by "finding new ways to minimize the migraine potential and making a genuine effort towards this." Another evaluative document speaks in a very different tone from the annual performance evaluation, which is signed by a sergeant who was Respondent's immediate supervisor. On October 2, 1990--only 10 days before the 1990 annual evaluation-- a captain reviewed Respondent's use of unscheduled leave and warned: you are hereby notified that this level of unscheduled leave time usage will no longer be tolerated. You will be required to achieve a level of usage that is consistent with the national and department average which equates to approximately sixty hours per year, or five hours per month. If you fail to maintain this rate between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1990 I will request that the Chief of Police consider terminating your employment effective January 1, 1991. If you are successful, you will be expected to maintain this average with the exception of documented major medical complications that require the use of extended leave. By memorandum dated December 14, 1990, from the captain to the police chief, the captain stated: On October 2, 1990, I advised Officer Von Halla that she would be required to maintain an acceptable level of unscheduled leave usage through December 31, 1990. The level of usage was established at five (5) hours per month, or a total of 15 hours for the period of October 2, 1990, through December 31, 1990. . . . Since October 2, 1990, Officer Von Halla has chosen to utilize forty (40) hours of leave. Thirty-two (32) hours were for illness as noted by her chiropractor and eight (8) for unexpected visitors. The captain's memorandum reasons: "In analyzing Officer Von Halla's unscheduled leave, it is clear that her utilization of unscheduled leave far exceeds any norms and Officer Von Halla is clearly abusing this city benefit." The memorandum states that, after consulting with the city attorney and city manager, the captain was recommending that Petitioner initiate termination proceedings against Respondent. By memorandum dated January 17, 1991, the captain asked a lieutenant to convene a Command Review Board to evaluate Respondent's excessive absenteeism and her violation of three groups of general orders prohibiting feigning of illness and failing to perform duties, abusing sick leave, and engaging in any conduct adversely affecting the morale and efficiency of the Department. The memorandum explains the last alleged violation as noting that the department had had to use 66 hours of overtime, at a cost of $1125, to cover shift shortages caused by Respondent's unscheduled absences. The Command Review Board sustained the allegation that Respondent had abused her unscheduled leave, but rejected the allegations of feigning illness and failing to perform duties and engaging in any conduct adversely affecting the morale and efficiency of the department. Accordingly, the Command Review Board recommended that the police chief suspend Respondent without pay for one day. By memorandum dated February 2, 1991, the police chief adopted the findings and determinations of the Command Review Board and suspended Respondent for one day. By memorandum dated February 14, 1991, Respondent protested the proposed discipline and demanded a hearing. The arbitrator entered a decision on June 24, 1991, that the police chief had just cause for suspending Respondent for one day without pay. Respondent served this suspension. The next annual performance evaluation is dated January 25, 1992. Respondent earned marks of above operational standard in job knowledge, quality of work, initiative, work habits, and appearance. Her only mark of below operational standard was in attendance. In the preceding 15.5 months, Respondent had used 18 days of "sick leave" and had one day without pay, due to her exhaustion of leave. From May 1990 through April 1991, Respondent used 148 hours of unscheduled leave. The evaluations and memoranda from 1992 through 1994 are largely the same: average or above-average performance in all areas but attendance. The records note only the excessive use of unscheduled leave, but do not attribute the use to fraud. From January 13, 1994 through December 26, 1997, Respondent used 691.72 hours of unscheduled leave. On February 12, 1995, the former captain, now a major, recommended that the Department suspend Respondent without pay for three days due to excessive use of unscheduled leave. By memorandum dated February 27, 1995, the police chief, "with some reluctance," concurred with the recommendation of three days' suspension. On April 18, 1995, a Departmental disciplinary review board met and failed to agree on corrective action. The board recommended only that the Department remove Respondent from field duty and place her in a noncritical position. Upon further deliberations, the board agreed upon a two-day suspension. Respondent served this suspension in June 1995, and the following month a quarterly evaluation dated July 1, 1995, notes that she was still using unscheduled leave. A memorandum dated September 10, 1995, notes that Respondent used 213 hours of unscheduled leave in the first eight months of 1995. By memorandum dated September 20, 1995, the major and three of his subordinates, including the person with immediate supervisory authority over Respondent, recommended to the police chief that the Department terminate Respondent due to excessive use of unscheduled leave. Rejecting the recommendation for termination, the police chief imposed a 30-day suspension without pay, based partly on the assurance of Respondent's physician that the cause of her constant illness had been corrected. Respondent served her suspension from November 22- December 21, 1995. Quarterly evaluations in June 1996 and March 1997 note some improvement in the use of unscheduled leave. From October 1996 through September 17, 1997, Respondent used 180 hours of unscheduled sick leave. From October 1, 1997, through January 26, 1998, Respondent used 82 hours of unscheduled leave. By memorandum dated January 26, 1998, the major advised the police chief of Respondent's continued use of unscheduled leave and recommended termination. By notice to Respondent from the police chief dated February 13, 1998, the chief advised Respondent that he was considering disciplinary action, including termination. The notice cites the following grounds from Article Seven, Section C, Ordinance 50-94: excessive unauthorized tardiness or absence from work, violation of Department work rules or operating procedures, actions or conduct detrimental to Petitioner's interests, or any other properly substantiated cause that adversely affects Petitioner. The notice alleges that Respondent's conduct also violates department General Order D-1.IV.36, which prohibits excessive use of unscheduled leave. The notice summarizes Respondent's past use of unscheduled leave and the discipline that she had received. The notice asserts that she had used 96 hours of unscheduled leave in the past four months. By letter dated March 12, 1998, Respondent advised the police chief that her ear, nose, and throat physician had placed her on Predisone, which had eliminated her debilitating headaches. By letter dated March 16, 1998, the police chief provided Respondent final notice of proposed disciplinary action for the four grounds mentioned in the prior notice. Respondent has raised an issue of disparate treatment. However, the record fails to reveal other, similarly situated employees with comparable patterns of usage of unscheduled leave. The record contains a detailed record of Respondent's relevant payroll history from January 1, 1994, through May 1, 1998, on which date Petitioner terminated her. By year, these records disclose the following totals of hours for unscheduled leave and leave without pay, the latter of which is due to Respondent's exhaustion of her granted leave: 1994--190 and 48.22; 1995--201 and 148; 1996--94 and 42; 1997--174 and 58; and 1998 (four months)--32.72 and 0. The respective totals are 691.72 and 296.22 hours. Respondent's use of unscheduled leave and leave without pay far exceed the averages for the Department. Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit, which is represented by the Florida State Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). Petitioner and FOP negotiated a collective bargaining agreement in effect from October 1, 1997, through September 30, 2000 (Agreement). Article 3, Section 1, of the Agreement provides: Except as specifically abridged or modified by a provision of this Agreement, City will continue to have, whether exercised or not, all of the rights, powers and authority heretofore existing, including, but not limited to, the following: . . . to hire, transfer, promote and demote employees; to direct employees, to take disciplinary action up to, and including, termination; to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; [and] to issue rules and regulations . . .. Article 10, Section 2, of the Agreement describes the forms of discipline as follows: In accordance with Police Department General Order D-1 (as dated April 1, 1993), forms of corrective action will be utilized by City with the approval of the Police Chief shall include: Counseling or Re-Training--to correct and improve employee performance; Reprimand--a written statement warning the employee of the consequence of future misconduct of a similar nature; Suspension-- suspension from duty without pay; Demotion--a change to a position of lesser responsibility and salary; and Termination--dismissal from the Police Department. Article 10, Section 3, of the Agreement provides that Petitioner shall use "[p]rogressive corrective action," unless the severity of the offense dictates a more severe action. Article 11 of the Agreement provides that Petitioner may take disciplinary action against an employee for "just cause." Article 15, Section 1(a), of the Agreement grants employees with five or less years of continuous service 25 days of annual leave per year. Article 15, Section 1(b), grants employees with 6-10 years of continuous service 30 days of annual leave per year. The remaining subsections grant more leave based on years of service. Article 15, Section 1(g), of the Agreement provides: The use of annual leave for other than illness must be scheduled with the employee's supervisor. In case of illness, an employee must notify his/her supervisor not later than two (2) hours before the beginning of the scheduled work day or in accordance with Police Department Rules and Regulations. The Agreement provides that Petitioner may discipline covered employees for "just cause," but does not identify what constitutes "just cause." Ordinance 50-94 (Ordinance) sets forth the rules and regulations governing all of Petitioner's employees. Article One, Section B.2, states that the Ordinance covers employees who are parties to a collective bargaining agreement, "except that in the event of a conflict between the terms of this Ordinance and the collective bargaining agreement, the collective bargaining agreement shall govern." Article Six, Section E, provides that an employee may be dismissed for "just cause," but that the department head must comply with the procedures in Article Seven prior to termination. Article Seven, Section B, requires progressive discipline for "the same or similar conduct by the employee," although Petitioner reserves the right to impose the most severe discipline as an initial measure "when circumstances warrant." Article Seven, Section C, cites several grounds for discipline, including "[g]ross neglect of duty or specific serious failure to perform assigned duties"; "[m]ental or physical impairment, normally as supported by written documentation from not less than two licensed physicians, that prevents the employee, even with reasonable accommodation, from performing the essential functions of his or her position"; "[a]bsence without leave, or failure to give proper notice of absence"; "[e]xcessive unauthorized tardiness or absence from work"; "[v]iolation of Department work rules or operating procedures"; "[a]ctions or conduct detrimental to the interests of the City"; or "[a]ny other properly substantiated cause which adversely affects the City." Article Seven, Section D, requires that the employee proceed with a grievance for proposed discipline under the ordinance or collective bargaining agreement. Section E.5 describes the hearing conducted under the ordinance, which is the procedure that Respondent elected, and states, at Subsubsection 7, that the Administrative Law Judge is to determine if Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence "just cause" for the discipline. Subsubsection 8 provides that the order is a final order. Subsubsection 9 provides for judicial review. Article Eleven describes attendance and leave. Section A.6.a provides that fulltime employees shall be present at their assigned jobs, "unless absence from duty is authorized by the Department Head as provided herein." Section A.6.c states in part: Excessive unscheduled absences or tardiness shall be grounds for disciplinary action. For purposes of this paragraph, "excessive unscheduled absences or tardiness" shall mean use which is in excess of the average number of hours and/or occurrences of unscheduled leave taken by other City employees in the same or similar positions . . .. Article Seven, Section E.3, defines unscheduled leave as that which the employee requests and the supervisor approves on the day that it is taken. This section states: "An employee's excessive use of unscheduled leave may be grounds for disciplinary action." Section E.1 contains a schedule for the accrual of leave, and the applicable monthly accrual rate, which increases with seniority, applies to the total of each employee's scheduled and unscheduled leave. Department General Order D-1 (General Order), as last revised on December 11, 1995, provides, at Section II, that it applies to [ALL] members of the Department. This section states that the police chief will use progressive discipline, "unless the severity of the offense dictates a more severe action." Section IV prohibits various acts, including feigning illness, avoiding responsibility, or failing to perform one's duties; "excessive use of unscheduled leave"; or engaging in conduct that adversely affects the morale and efficiency of the department. By memorandum dated July 20, 1987, a major in the Department advised all operations division personnel that absences, "regardless of cause," weaken the Department's ability to serve the public though personnel shortages, increase personnel costs due to overtime to cover absences, and increase burdens on other employees. The safety of the public and law enforcement officers requires a minimum staffing of law enforcement officers on each shift. The absence of a scheduled officer requires that the Department pay overtime for an unscheduled officer to report for duty. The record does not demonstrate that unscheduled absences of an officer, up to the total amount of granted leave, compromise the safety of the public or other officers. The contrary inference is precluded in part by the fact that, in the Agreement, Petitioner grants each officer a certain amount of leave and does not further restrict the officer's choice to use his or her granted leave as unscheduled leave. However, the use of unscheduled leave in excess of the granted leave is not anticipated by the Agreement and may compromise the safety of the public and other officers.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was terminated from his position with the Respondent in retaliation for his filing of a national origin discrimination complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on August 17, 1988.
Findings Of Fact The Southland Corporation, d/b/a Southland Distribution Center, is an "employer" within the definition found in Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. Guillermo A. Barbosa was an "employee" of the Respondent as defined in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes, and was employed by Respondent for approximately sixteen (16) years. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these proceedings and the parties involved. All procedural prerequisites and requirements have been duly accomplished or satisfied. The Petitioner, Guillermo A. Barbosa, is fully competent to represent himself on a pro se basis. He exhibited clear understanding of the procedural requirements at the formal hearing and the legal import of his burden of proof on his claim of an unlawful practice against the Respondent. Petitioner exhibited comprehension of the English language, both spoken and written, and exhibited fluency in the speaking of English in the interrogation of witnesses at the formal hearings. Respondent, The Southland Corporation, d/b/a Southland Distribution Center, functions as a warehousing and distribution complex for a number of commercial customers including 7-Eleven convenience stores and restaurant chains such as Steak & Ale, Bennigan's, TGI Friday's, Krystal and others. In order to service its regional territory of four states, it employs approximately 630 employees in a large 440,000 square foot warehousing facility located on Sand Lake Road in Orlando, Florida. Respondent's warehouse operates 24 hours a day five (5) days per week. Respondent's work force stores a variety of goods and products and, upon order or request from a given customer or account, selects the indicated goods, packs them in appropriate containers and loads the order on tractor trailer rigs for transport and delivery to the final destination point. The Respondent places great emphasis upon the importance of time and schedules. Timely reporting for work and attendance as scheduled is emphasized by the Company so that the closely integrated operation of the complex can be maintained with efficiencies of labor and close coordination of schedules between warehouse operation, the transportation link and the store hours of the customer. The policies, procedures and work rules of the Company provide incentive programs to reward employees who report to work as scheduled in a prompt and consistent manner. Conversely, through its work rules, the Company provides that employees who demonstrate a pattern of tardiness or absence may be disciplined or discharged. For these same reasons, the work rules published to the employees and acknowledged by each worker also stress that a failure to report to work when directed or as scheduled for a period of 48 hours (no show/no call) will result in automatic termination of employment. The Respondent views employee reliability for reporting to work as scheduled and on time as a fundamental condition of employment. On August 11, 1988, Petitioner reported an on-the-job injury and was relieved of duty and, under directions from the Respondent's occupational health nurse, treated by an outside physician. On August 17, 1988, while on the medical leave of absence due to the work-related injury, Petitioner filed a discrimination charge alleging denial of transfer or promotion due to his national origin. A notice of the charge of discrimination was directed to the attention of the Personnel Manager of the Respondent and was received on September 7, 1988. On Friday, September 16, 1988, Petitioner was released by the treating physician and given "return to work orders" instructing him to return to work without restrictions. The following work day, Monday, September 19, 1988, the Petitioner resumed his normal duties and work routine. However, after approximately one to one and one half hours of work, Petitioner reported that he had either re- injured himself or had aggravated the prior injury for which he had been treated. The Respondent again placed Petitioner on medical leave of absence due to the work-related injury and directed him for treatment to the outside physician. On Friday, September 30, 1988, Petitioner was again released by the treating physician without limitations or restrictions and given instructions to return to work. On the next workday, Monday, October 3, 1988, Petitioner failed to show up at his scheduled time. After being absent without authority or explanation for five consecutive work days, the Warehouse Manager, Mr. Julius Dix, mailed a letter to Petitioner. The letter explained that pursuant to Rule 12 of the Company's "working conditions", specifically failure to report to work as directed and being absent without explanation or authorization for five consecutive work days, the Company was placing Petitioner on suspension pending further review. Although dated October 5, 1988, the letter drafted by Mr. Julius Dix was actually written and sent on Friday, October 7, 1988. However, the date of the letter was made retroactive to the actual point of job abandonment pursuant to the so-called "48- hour rule". On October 17, 1989 Petitioner mailed a copy of a medical form from an outside physician indicating that Petitioner had been disabled from working from October 13 to October 25, 1988. It was received by an employee of Respondent on October 19, 1988. A similar form was mailed October 26, 1988 and received on October 28, 1988. There was no letter or personal explanation accompanying the medical form. Petitioner stated that upon being released by the treating physician, he contacted the Warehouse Manager, Mr. Julius Dix, and upon explaining that his injury continued to disable him from returning to work, was given permission to continue on medical leave and seek treatment by another physician. However, Mr. Dix testified that he had never given such permission or directions, nor had he received any communications or contact from Petitioner on Friday, September 30, or during the subsequent week. The more credible testimony is that Petitioner made no communication with his employer during the week of October 3, 1988. Following corporate review, required for long-term employees, Petitioner's employment was formally terminated for violation of the "48-hour rule" (no show/no call) under a subsequent letter from Mr. Julius Dix dated October 25, 1988. On November 8, 1988, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination alleging retaliation. The Petitioner's work history demonstrates his knowledge of the 48- hour rule and prior compliance under similar circumstances. The 48-hour rule of Respondent has been applied in a consistent and uniform manner to a substantial number of other employees during a period of time immediately prior to the action taken with regard to the administrative termination of Petitioner's employment. The administration of this rule by the Company has resulted in termination of the non-complying employees.
Recommendation Based upon the testimony and evidence submitted on the record in the formal hearings on this matter and by application of the relevant or governing principles of law to the findings of facts established on such record, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be issued which denies the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner did not file proposed findings of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 (sic) -- accepted in substance. Paragraphs 7 and 8 -- rejected as not relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Guillermo A. Barbosa Dana Baird 854 Long Bay Court General Counsel Kissimmee, Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Thomas C. Garwood, Jr., Esquire Building F, Suite 240 Garwood and McKenna, P.A. Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 322 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida Margaret Jones Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925
Findings Of Fact In September, 1989, Shirley B. Walker (Walker), was a clerk-typist in the Bartow office of the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), District 6, Subdistrict B, Children, Youth and Families, Child Protection Services. Walker was absent on Tuesday, September 5, 1989, and had a friend call her supervisor to say that Walker would not be at work until Friday, September 8, 1989, due to a medical condition. Walker reportedly had been in an altercation with her husband over the Labor Day weekend and had been injured to the extent that her neck was in a brace. The supervisor, Patricia Lawler, asked that the friend give Walker the message that she would need to bring a doctor's excuse with her on her return to work. Walker did not return to work on Friday, September 8, 1989. Walker did not give, or arrange for, any notification to her supervisor or anyone in the office that she would not be at work that day. Since Walker had no home telephone, and the telephone number of a relative that had been given to her supervisor as a means of contacting her at home was obsolete by September 8, Lawler asked office friends of Walker to go to Walker's home during the lunch hour to check on her well-being and find out why she was not at work. When they did, they found no one at home. Walker also did not go to work on Monday through Friday, September 11 through 15, 1989. Again, she did not give, or arrange for, any notification to her supervisor or anyone in the office that she would not be at work. No one at the office knew anything further about Walker or why she was not at work from Friday, September 8 through Friday, September 15, 1989. When Walker began her work at HRS, she was given an employee handbook, part of which clearly states: "If you are absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned." At approximately 4:45 p.m. on Friday, September 15, 1989, Lawler hand- delivered to Walker at Walker's home a letter notifying Walker that she was being terminated from her employment with HRS for the consecutive unexcused and unauthorized absences, which were viewed as an abandonment of her employment and a resignation from the State Career Service. Although Walker asked for a formal administrative hearing on the question whether she had abandoned her position, neither she nor anyone on her behalf appeared at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a final order finding that the Petitioner, Shirley B. Walker, abandoned her position and resigned from the State Career Service. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley B. Walker 1050 Golfview Avenue Apartment 803 Bartow, FL 33830 Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 W. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33614 Aletta Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact Frank Bowder began his employment with Exports, Inc., under the tutelage of Kenneth L. Kellar, President and sole stockholder of Exports, Inc., at the office in Washington state approximately 20 years ago. He became very knowledgeable about the company's business, and approximately 15 years ago he was sent by Kellar to operate the company's Florida office. He was given the title of general manager of the Florida office and remained an excellent employee until his recent death. Kellar considered Frank Bowder to be an excellent manager of the product of Exports, Inc., but recognized that Frank Bowder had a large turnover of employees. His wife Mae Bowder was also an employee of Exports, Inc., and was considered by Kellar to be "the best cleaning woman there is." She was in charge of cleaning and maintenance duties at the Florida office. At some point Mae Bowder began representing to people that she was the office manager of the Florida office. That information was brought to Kellar's's attention on several occasions, and he corrected that information by explaining that she was simply in charge of maintenance. At some point Mae Bowder's son, Wayne Evans, became employed by the Bowders in the Florida office and was given the title of warehouse manager. Within the last several years, Frank Bowder allowed his wife to "become" the office manager. When Kellar found out, he fired her because he believed that she was "not office material." Approximately a year later Kellar found out that Mae Bowder was once again the office manager. He spoke to Frank about it, and Frank explained, essentially, that Mae was giving him so many problems at home about it that he had to hire her back. Kellar fired her once again. Sometime thereafter, Kellar found out that Frank was ill. He came to the Florida office and discovered Mae Bowder once again employed as "office manager." He again discussed the matter with Frank and determined the extent of Frank's illness, which was terminal. He told Frank that Frank was too ill to be running the office full time and told Frank that he should only come to the office a few hours a day. Frank responded that he did not know what to do about his wife. Kellar then went to Mae Bowder and discussed with her the fact that he only wanted Frank to be at the office a few hours a day and that it was too difficult for Frank to continue working full time. He also told Mae Bowder that she should be staying home and taking care of Frank because Frank was so sick. Mae Bowder specifically asked Kellar if he were firing her, and Kellar responded "no" but that she should be staying home to take care of her husband. Mae Bowder "got in a huff," threatened two of the female office personnel, and left. Kellar did not see her again until the final hearing in this cause. Kellar began investigating the operations of the Florida office at that point and began discussing with the other employees there how the office had been managed. He discovered problems. He was told that the Bowders gave highly preferential treatment to Wayne Evans in comparison to the other employees. He discovered that Mrs. Bowder did not like to hire black employees, and the black employees who were hired were not given keys to the office. There was a stated policy by Mrs. Bowder to not hire people with children. Specifically, one black employee did not tell Mrs. Bowder that she had a child when she was hired. When she later became pregnant, Mrs. Bowder was furious. The employee was given one month for unpaid maternity leave and when she called at the end of that month, Mrs. Bowder told her she had been laid off. When she called two months later, the time by which her baby who was sick could be left with someone else, Mrs. Bowder returned her call a week later telling her she could come back to work because another black employee had left. Lastly, the other employees reported that Mrs. Bowder would yell and curse at them, threaten to hit them with an upraised hand, and even pushed and shoved an employee on one occasion because that employee had made a mistake in her work. The employees had previously not made these complaints because they could have only complained to the general manager who was the husband of the person about whom they would be complaining. Kellar brought an employee from the Washington office down to the Florida office to assist Frank Bowder and continued to pay Frank Bower his salary until he died. No evidence was offered that Kellar would not have continued to pay Mae Bowder her salary if she had reduced her hours in order to take care of Frank rather than walking out when Kellar tried to discuss the matter with her. No one else was present when Kellar and Mae Bowder had their discussion at the time when Mae Bowder resigned. Later that day, according to her son, Kellar made a comment that the Bowders had been the last of the married couples working for the company. Such a statement, if it were made, is susceptible of many interpretations, including sadness for the end of an era. Kellar did not fire Mae Bowder.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Exports, Inc., not guilty of committing an unlawful employment practice and dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief filed in this cause. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. McGlynn, Esquire 4633 10th Avenue North Lake Worth, Florida 33463 Kenneth L. Kellar President/Owner Exports, Inc. Post Office Box 449 Blaine, WA 98230 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Whether Respondent should have been suspended from her position with Petitioner as a school bus aide, and whether Respondent should be dismissed from her position.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, The School Board of Dade County (Board), was a duly constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within the school district of Miami-Dade County, Florida,1 pursuant to Article IX, Constitution of the State of Florida, and Section 230.03, Florida Statutes. Jamella R. King (King), was employed by the Board as a school bus aide from November 1989 until her suspension in July 1997. The position of school bus aide is governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the Board. Since 1993, King's employment history has been characterized by excessive unauthorized absences, tardiness, and a continued disregard for administrative directives. In December 1993, King participated in a conference-for- the-record (CFR) because of her excessive unauthorized absences. Respondent was referred to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP), a confidential, collectively bargained for benefit which assists employees who may be having problems that, while not associated with employment, may be interfering with their performance. King refused to attend the scheduled counseling sessions. In February 1994, King participated in another CFR to discuss her attendance problem. The seriousness of the situation was brought to King's attention, and she was directed to improve her attendance. King was again referred to EAP, but failed to avail herself of these services. On or about January 22, 1996, a Transportation Operations Procedures Reminder (Reminder) was given to King. The Reminder set forth the Board's attendance policies and advised King that she currently had four and a half days of unauthorized leave. On April 30, 1996, another Reminder was given to King, addressing her attendance deficiencies. At that time, King had accumulated the equivalent of at least ten days of unauthorized absences in the 1995/1996 school year. From August 28, 1995, to May 28, 1996, King accumulated the equivalent of 21 days of unauthorized absences. On or about June 10, 1996, a CFR was held with King to review her continued disregard of proper attendance practices. King was again referred to EAP and was advised that she must improve her attendance. King was warned that her failure to improve could result in termination of her employment. King refused to follow this directive and continued to accumulate unauthorized absences. In July 1996, King signed in for work, but failed to go to her assigned route. King was issued a letter of warning for failure to complete her assigned route. King's supervisor directed her to improve her attendance. King failed to improve her attendance. As of October 10, 1996, King had accumulated 36 days of unauthorized absences for the preceding 12 month period. On October 29, 1996, a CFR was held with King concerning her attendance problem. At the CFR King received a reasonable directive from her supervisor to improve her attendance. King failed to follow this directive. In January 1997, King was removed from her assigned placement and placed on sub-status by her supervisor because King had become unreliable at her work site due to her continued unauthorized absences. Sub-status refers to a pool of aides who substitute as needed. From January 4, 1996, to February 10, 1997, King accumulated the equivalent of 47.5 days of unauthorized absences. On February 10, 1997, a CFR was held with King regarding her attendance problems. King was again directed to improve her attendance. From March 4, 1996, to April 15, 1997, King had accumulated the equivalent of 44 days of unauthorized absences. On May 27, 1997, a CFR was held with King regarding her continued attendance problem. King's continual unauthorized absences adversely impacted her work site because her coworkers were compelled to perform King's job duties. King's unauthorized absences also adversely affected the quality of transportation being provided to the students who ride the buses to which bus aides are assigned. These students have special needs that require the presence of an aide who can properly attend to those needs. Without a bus aide, there is the potential that the bus driver will be interrupted and distracted by those students. Additionally, when different bus aides appear on the bus, these students may feel uncertain and nervous, which may also unnecessarily distract the bus driver. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between AFSCME and the Board provides: ARTICLE II -- RECOGNITION * * * Section 3. . . .It is understood and agreed that management possesses the sole right, duty, and responsibility for the operation of the schools and that all management rights repose in it, but that such rights must be exercised consistently with the other provisions of the agreement. These rights include, but are not limited to, the following: Discipline or discharge of any employee for just cause; . . . * * * ARTICLE V --DEFINITIONS * * * Section 27. Unauthorized Absence -- Any absence without pay which has not been requested by the employee and approved by the supervisor, in writing, at least five days in advance. Employees are required to notify the work location, prior to the beginning of the workday, when they are unable to report to work or intend to be absent. Absences of the employee, where notice of absence is made prior to the start of the workday, but are not covered by the employee having accumulated sick or personal leave, shall be charged as unauthorized absence and may result in disciplinary action in accordance with Article XI. Upon the employee reporting back to work, the employee shall be apprised of the unauthorized leave status; however, if the employee can demonstrate that there are extenuating circumstances (e.g., hospitalization or other unanticipated emergency), then consideration will be given to changing the status of leave. The work location supervisor has the authority to change an unauthorized leave; however, nothing herein precludes requested leave being determined to be unauthorized where the employee does not have available sick or sufficient personal leave. * * * ARTICLE XI -- DISCIPLINARY ACTION Section 4. Types of Separation Dissolution of the employment relation between a permanent unit member and the Board may occur in any of four distinct types of separation. * * * Excessive Absenteeism/Abandonment of Position -- An unauthorized absence for three consecutive workdays shall be evidence of abandonment of position. Unauthorized absences totaling 10 or more workdays during the previous 12-month period shall be evidence of excessive absenteeism. Either of the foregoing shall constitute grounds for termination. . . . Disciplinary -- The employee is separated by the employer for disciplinary cause arising from the employee's performance or non-performance of job responsibilities. Such action occurs at any necessary point in time. On July 23, 1997, the Board suspended King and initiated action to dismiss her from employment with the Dade County Public Schools.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered sustaining King's suspension without pay and dismissing her from her position with Petitioner as a school bus aide. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at tee hearing, the following findings of fact are made: On or about December 5, 1969, the Petitioner, Hugh G. Purkey became employed by the State of Florida, Department of Transportation. In 1984, Petitioner held the position of Engineer II, Area Engineer and was assigned to the North Dade Maintenance Yard (NDMY). In 1983, Petitioner executed a form which acknowledged he had received a complete copy of the DOT employee handbook. The acknowledgement specified that enployees are responsible to review the handbook in detail and to request any clarification needed from a supervisor. The handbook provided the following regarding job abandonnent: After an unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. It is very important that you coordinate any personal absences with your immediate supervisor, in accordance with our current leave policy. On or about October 23, 1984, Petitioner filed a request for a medical leave of absence. This request was based upon Petitioner's pulmonary disorder which prevented him from performing his duties with the NDMY. Petitioner was to receive pay based upon his accrued annual and/or sick leave through Novenber 6, 1984, thereafter, he was to be on leave without pay for a period of four months. This leave request was approved by the Petitioner's supervisor, Clive Taylor. Mr. Taylor was the only supervisor or employee at the NDMY who was authorized to grant a leave of absence for Petitioner. On January 28, 1985, an extension of Petitioner's leave of absence was granted by Mr. Taylor. This extension authorized two additional months of leave and specified that Petitioner would return to work no later than May 6, 1985. Prior to the leave of absence described above, Petitioner had performed his duties with the NDMY in an above satisfactory manner. Prior to May 6, 1985, Petitioner had complied with the rules and regulations regarding requests for leave. Petitioner did not return to work on May 6, 1985. Petitioner did not file a request for a leave extension. Mr. Taylor did not approve an extension of the leave beyond May 6, 1985. Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on May 6, 7, and 8, 1985. On May 10, 1985, Mr. Taylor executed a form entitled "Resignation and Exit Interview Form." This form provided, in part: "Mr. Purkey is not available for signature" and "Mr. Purkey is pursuing regular disability retirement." Petitioner did not execute the form but was advised of its content by telephone. Sometime prior to April 30, 1985, Petitioner had applied for disability retirement benefits. That request was filed with the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement and was denied based upon a determination that Petitioner was not totally and permanently disabled from rendering useful and efficient service. When that determination was made, Petitioner elected to file for regular retirement since he had accrued over ten years with the State. Thereafter, Petitioner received retirement benefits which were granted and paid retroactively from February 1, 1985. On July 9, 1986, Petitioner received a physician's statement which provided: It is my professional opinion that this patient may return to work requiring no strenuous physical activity providing that the patient continue on his medication and return for regular checkups in any office. Upon receipt of the physician's statement, Petitioner contacted the NDMY to request that he be allowed to return to work. Petitioner was advised that he had been terminated from employment in May, 1985, based upon his failure to return to work following his leave of absence. On July 29, 1986, Petitioner wrote to John C. Gocdnight, Assistant Secretary of Transportation, and requested Mr. Goodnight's assistance to allow Petitioner to return to DOT. That letter admitted that Petitioner knew his position had been filled but claimed he had been on leave. Petitioner maintained that he was "much too young to retire." The letter failed to mention that Petitioner had already been receiving retirement benefits. Petitioner listed his address subsequent to November, 1984, as Dunnellon, Florida. There is no record in Petitioner's personnel file which confirms DOT sent, and Petitioner received, a notice of his termination from employment in May, 1985. Petitioner did not request a hearing to review that termination until January, 1989.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a final order finding that the Petitioner, Hugh G. Purkey, abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: Paragraph 1 is accepted. The first portion of paragraph 2 is accepted; the designation of his last actual day of employment is in error and is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The date indicated, January 20, 1984, was not his last day of actual employment. According to DOT exhibit 8 (the referenced citation) that date was the last date worked. Petitioner's last date of employment would have been calculated from May 5, 1985 (the last date of his authorized leave). With regard to paragraphs 3 and 4, it is accepted that Petitioner used his accrued sick and annual leave until they were exhausted. After the paid leave was used, Petitioner applied for and received, by filing the appropriate form, an authorized leave without pay. Paragraph 5 is accepted. Paragraph 6 is accepted. Paragraph 7 is accepted. Paragraph 8 is accepted. Paragraph 9 is accepted. Paragraph 10 is rejected as comment, argument, or recitation of testimony which does not constitute a finding of specific fact. Paragraph 11 is rejected as incomplete or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 12 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 13 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 14 is rejected as vague and ambiguous. It is accepted that Petitioner filed his original leave request and that Ms. Sellers assisted him. Paragraph 15 is rejected as incomplete and contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 16 is accepted to the extent that it provides that clerks would assist persons who requested such assistance. The first three sentences of paragraph 17 are accepted; the balance of the paragraph is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. The first sentence of paragraph 18 is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant or unknown. DOT did not establish that the form was sent and received by Petitioner. Paragraph 19 is accepted. Paragraph 20 is rejected as a provision of law. The parties have not disputed that the notice is required. Paragraph 21 is accepted to the extent that DOT cannot prove that such notice was provided to Petitioner. Paragraph 22 is rejected as incomplete or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 23 is rejected as irrelevant since Petitioner did not request that his medical leave be continued as required by the rule. Paragraph 24 is rejected as irrelevant. Further, the authorization to return was not without limitation. Paragraph 25 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 26 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 27 is rejected as irrelevant. With regard to the letter to Goodnight, Petitioner admitted in that letter that he knew his position had been filled. Paragraph 28 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 29 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 30 is accepted. Paragraph 31 is rejected as irrelevant or not covered by the record. With regard to paragraph 32, it is accepted that Petitioner's request for disability retirement was denied and that he ultimately elected to seek early retirement; otherwise, it is rejected as hearsay uncorroborated by direct evidence. Paragraph 33 is accepted. Paragraph 34 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the credible evidence. Paragraph 35 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 36 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 37 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 38 is rejected as comment, argument, or recitation of testimony. Paragraph 39 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 40 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Petitioner's section described as "Analysis" has not been considered findings of fact. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY DOT: 1. Paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, and 25 are accepted. Paragraph 2 is rejected as Irrelevant. Paragraph 4 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 19 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 20 is accepted but is unnecessary. Paragraph 23 is rejected as unsupported by the record. DOT's section described as "Analysis" has not been considered findings of fact COPIES FURNISHED: Paul H. Field WICKER, SMITH, BLOMQVIST, TUTAN, O'HARA, McCOY, GRAHAM & LANE Grove Plaza Building, 5th Floor 2900 Middle Street Miami, Florida 33133 Charles Gardner Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Acting Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Edith Rogers, was employed as a data operator with the Indian River County Health Unit, a sub-unit of the Department. She was hired by the Department on January 4, 1988 and began working for Gerry L. Waite as a data operator in October, 1988. When employees are hired by the Health Unit, they are briefed on the unit's leave policies and procedures and are given a copy of the unit's personnel policies for which each employee is obligated to sign a receipt. That portion of the handbook dealing with absences provides that when possible, employees requesting to be absent should request authorization from their supervisor in advance. If prior application is not possible, and absence is necessary, the employee is to call in at the earliest possible moment to let the supervisor know what is going on and approximately how long the employee will be absent. Respondent has complied with these policies on several occasions in the past. On July 26, 1991, a Friday, the Respondent was at her place of employment and there was no indication given that she was experiencing any difficulty. The following Monday, however, July 29, 1991, she did not report for work and Ms. Waite, her supervisor, knew from an article which had appeared in the prior day's newspaper, that Respondent had been arrested. Respondent did not call in on that day, nor did anyone else call in for her. Respondent remained in jail until August 19, 1991. Subsequent to Monday, July 29, 1991, Ms. Waite called the jail twice a week to check on the Respondent's statue. Each time the Respondent was there. At no time during that period did Respondent, or anyone else on her behalf, call her duty section and speak with her supervisor regarding the basis for her absence, nor did Respondent write a letter to explain, though she was able to do so. Mrs. Rogers did not come to work on August 20, 1991, a Tuesday and the day after her release from jail, nor did she come in on August 21 or 22, 1991, the following Wednesday and Thursday. There was no contact from the Respondent, and her absence subsequent to her release had not been authorized. Ms. Waite is satisfied that Respondent knew the abandonment provisions and the potential results of failing to appear for several days without authority since, in 1984, a similar action was taken regarding her employment with the Department in St. Lucie County, and she was deemed to have abandoned her position at that time. Respondent was seen in Walmart by another Department employee on the morning of Tuesday, August 20, 1991. At that time she was buying clothes for her 13 year old son preparatory to getting him enrolled in middle school. She admits she did not call her office on that day, however, on Wednesday, August 21, 1991, after arranging to have the power to her residence turned on and taking care of some other personal affairs, she called a friend of hers, Mrs. Brenda Troutman, who works for the Health Unit in its vital statistics division, and explained where she was. Ms. Troutman, however, was not working in Respondent's division nor was she in any supervisory capacity over her. Though Ms. Rogers claims she asked Ms. Troutman to notify Ms. Waite of her status for her, Ms. Troutman declined to do so, suggesting Ms. Rogers make the contact herself. On Thursday, August 22, 1991, Respondent did call her office and asked to speak with Ms. Waite. Unfortunately, she called at lunchtime, sometime between 1 and 1:15 PM, and neither Ms. Waite, nor anyone else in authority was there to speak with her. Respondent admits she did not leave her name at the time of that call. The evidence is clear that at no time, from the time Ms. Rogers was placed in jail in July until Ms. Waite spoke with her on the evening of Friday, August 23, 1991, did Respondent, or anyone on her behalf, make any sincere effort to contact the Unit to explain, officially, to anyone in authority where she was, the reason for her absence, and when she would be back. At that time, Ms. Rogers advised Ms. Waite that she would be back to work on August 26, 1991, but Ms. Waite told her then it was too late as she had already been processed for abandonment of her position. Ms. Waite is quite certain that Ms. Rogers is and was aware of the procedures to be used when an absence is anticipated or when it was unavoidable, because Respondent has taken advantage of these procedures and utilized them several times in the past during the period she has been working for the Department. According to Ms. Register, the employee specialist with the Department's District office, there is a difference between an abandonment action and a termination for cause. The latter is a disciplinary action and is appealable through the Public Employees Relations Commission or through union grievance procedures. The abandonment is a determination made after an unauthorized absence with a provision for review, and is more a constructive action determined on the basis of the employee's failure to appear. Respondent is quite insistent that she did not intend to abandon her position and intended to come back to work the Monday following her release, (August 26, 1991). She claims one of the reasons for her delay in going back to the office was her embarrassment in going back and facing her coworkers after having been in jail, but she contends that at all times she wanted her job back. She differentiates her situation in this case from that in the 1984 abandonment action. Then, she admits, she walked away from her job because of her addiction to cocaine. Here, she claims, this was not her intent, and she fully intended to go back to work just as soon as she was able to do so.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore recommended that a Final Order be entered finding that Respondent, Edith Rogers, abandoned her position with the Indian River County Health Unit and resigned from the Career Service. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 24th day of January, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen M. Miller, Esquire DHRS, District 9 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Charles A. Sullivan, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 2620 Vero Beach, Florida 32961-2620 John Slye General Counsel DHRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk DHRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
