The Issue The issue in this case is whether an Application to the South Florida Water Management District for Authority to Utilize Works or Land of the District filed by Respondents, Joint Facilities Board of River Oaks H.O.A. and Little Oaks H.O.A., should be approved by the South Florida Water Management District.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Arthur Pivirotto and Ann H. Pivirotto presented no evidence in this matter. Petitioners have, therefore, failed to meet their burden of proof that Right of Way Occupancy Permit Application Number 94-1005-2 should not be granted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a Final Order in case number 96-0870 dismissing the Petition for Formal Proceedings Per 40E-1.521 Fl. Admin. Code and 120.57 F.S. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee Florida. LARRY SART1N, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Fleck, Esquire 6650 West Indiantown Road Suite 200 Jupiter, Florida 33458 Charles H. Burns, Esquire 1080 East Indiantown Road Jupiter, Florida 33477 Scott Allen Glazier, Esquire South Florida Water Management District 3301 Gun Club Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Donald S. Fradley, Esquire 27 Pennock Lane Jupiter, Florida 33458 Alan J. Cooper, Esquire Tequesta Corporate Center 250 Tequesta Drive, Suite 200 Tequesta, Florida 33469 Samuel E. Poole, III, Executive Director Department of Environmental Protection South Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33146
Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Settlement Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the 2{, U, day of - J lJ_h (2 ---' 2014, m Tallahassee, Florida. ELIZ RETARY Agency for Health Care Administration A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BYLAW. WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Shena Grantham, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS#3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Peter A. Lewis, Esquire Law Offices of Peter A. Lewis, P.L. 3023 North Shannon Lakes Drive, #101 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (U.S. Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE == ' I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to ------==-- the above named addressees by U.S. Mail on this th f 2014. Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue Whether Rule 27G-1.06(2) and Rule 27G-1.08(4), Florida Administrative Code, or either of them, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact The parties have stipulated that Fairfield Communities, Inc. (Fairfield) has the requisite standing to challenge the rule provisions at issue and that Friends of Fort George, Inc., (Friends), Florida Wildlife Federation (FWF) and Florida Audubon Society (Audubon) have standing to participate as intervenors in support of these rule provisions. The Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) is the state agency that promulgated the challenged rules. The Fort George DRI case, No. 86-4127, began on August 1, 1986, when the Department of Community Affairs took an appeal of the development order entered by the City of Jacksonville on June 12, 1986 on grounds The MLUP does not accurately show or locate the DER jurisdictional line on the western side of the island from which buffer areas required by the ADO are to be measured . . . The MLUP does not properly or accurately depict or locate buffer areas surrounding the sloughs on the western side of Fort George Island. Exhibit B to the Prehearing Stipulation. Together with others, the Intervenors in the present case filed, in the Fort George DRI case, No. 86-4127, a motion to intervene as of right and request for consideration of additional issues on August 7, 1986. The intervenors in No. 86-4127 sought consideration of a wide range of issues in the Fort George DRI case, including questions concerning Blue Pond, the perimeter buffer zone, the interior habitat, weirs, berms, dikes and hydraulic connections, the adequacy of the water supply, the effect of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission's disapproval, the placement of various boundaries, and whether "Fairfield has failed to provide adequate protection of the microclimate and ecology of the Rollins Bird and Plant Sanctuary as mandated by the ADO . . ." Exhibit C to the Prehearing Stipulation. In filing their motion to intervene as of right and request for consideration of additional issues in No. 86-4127, Friends, Audubon and FWF expressly relied on Rule 27G-1.06, Florida Administrative Code. The portion under challenge here provides: (2) Motions to intervene filed with the Commission within 30 days of the filing of a notice of appeal may request the Commission to consider issues raised in the record below but not raised by the parties to the appeal. Rule 27G-1.06, Florida Administrative Code. In the order of transmittal, entered in No. 86-4127 on October 15, 1986, FLWAC denied consideration of every issue raised by the intervenors, except for the issue concerning the Rollins Bird and Plant Sanctuary, and added a related issue, also concerning the Rollins Bird and Plant Sanctuary, citing Rule 27G- 1.08, Florida Administrative Code. The portion of that rule under challenge here provides: Within 60 days of receipt of a notice of appeal, the Commission shall meet to review the issues raised by the parties. If the Commission determines that an issue of statewide or regional importance was not raised by the parties but is necessary to its disposition of the appeal, the Commission shall specify said issue and shall specify whether the issue shall be the subject of review based on the record made below, additional evidence or a combination thereof. New issues shall not be raised by the parties or other persons after this Commission meeting. At this meeting, the Commission may also dispose of procedural motions, including motions to intervene, which have been filed within 30 days of the filing of the notice of appeal. Rule 27G-1.08, Florida Administrative Code. Fairfield, as the applicant for the development order in No. 86- 4127, questions FLWAC's authority to promulgate rules that allow FLWAC to consider issues not raised by the party who took the DRI appeal, whether sua sponte or on motion of an intervenor.
The Issue The issue in these cases is whether proposed amendments to Rules 40C-4.041, 40C-4.051, 40C-4.091, 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023, 40C-41.033, 40C-41.043, 40C-41.051, and 40C-41.063, and the related revisions to the Applicant’s Handbook: Management and Storage of Surface Waters are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as alleged by petitioners.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioners in Case No. 97-0870RP, Consolidated-Tomoka Land Company; Indigo Development Group, Inc.; Indigo Group, Inc.; Indigo Group, Ltd.; Patricia Lagoni, as Trustee of Trust Nos. IDI-1, IDI-2 IDI-3 and IDI-4; Seaview Development Corporation; LeRoy E. Folsom; James S. Whiteside, Jr. and Joan W. Whiteside; Susan Spear Root; Susan R. Graham and Chapman J. Root, II, Trustees of the Chapman S. Root 1982 Living Trust; Daniel P. S. Paul, individually and as trustee of the Daniel P. S. Paul Charitable Remainder Trust; and Ava and Rufus, Inc. (petitioners), own real property within an area which will be affected by certain rules proposed by respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District (District). The District is authorized to adopt rules pursuant to Chapters 120 and 373, Florida Statutes. Petitioners in Case No. 97-0871RP, Samuel P. Bell, III and Anne Moorman-Reeves (petitioners), also own real property within an area affected by the proposed rules. Both groups of petitioners are substantially affected persons and thus have standing to inititate these rule challenges. Intervenor, Association of Florida Community Developers, Inc. (AFCD), is a not-for-profit corporation comprised of forty members, primarily developers. Its mission is to promote programs that encourage economic growth in Florida "through the responsible development of large-scale residential communities." Of its forty members, seven own property within the boundaries of the District and regularly apply for permits from the District for the development of large-scale residential or mixed-use developments and five regularly apply for permits on behalf of land owners. Only one member, however, Consolidated-Tomoka Land Company (Consolidated-Tomoka), which is already a party in Case No. 97-0870RP, owns property within the area affected by the proposed hydrologic basins. For the reasons cited in the Conclusions of Law, AFCD lacks standing to participate in this proceeding. The development of the proposed rules was formally initiated by the District in May 1994. At that time, the District began investigating the need for criteria including delineation of new hydrolgic basins, a recharge standard, water quality criteria, erosion and sediment control, a standard to limit drawdowns in wetlands, a special zone for the protection of habitat, and local government notification. After notice of rule development was published in October 1995, and several workshops were held, on January 17, 1997, the District published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intention to make certain revisions to Rules 40C- 4.041, 40C-4.051, 40C-4.091, 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023, 40C-41.033, 40C-41.043, 40C-41.051, and 41C-41.063, and related revisions to portions of a document known as the Applicant’s Handbook: Management and Storage of Surface Waters (Handbook). On February 12, 1997, by a 5 to 3 vote, the District’s Governing Board formally proposed to adopt those rules, with two amendments. In broad terms, the new rules create two geographic areas of special concern and impose more stringent permitting standards and criteria for systems within those areas. Claiming that the proposed rules were invalid on a number of grounds, petitioners in Case Nos. 97-0870RP and 97- 0871RP initiated these proceedings by filing petitions on February 21 and 24, 1997, respectively. In petitions which include almost every statutory ground for invalidating a rule under Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (1996), petitioners have first contended that Rules 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C- 41.023, 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5(1), 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 18.1 and Appendix K, are invalid because they exceed the District’s grant of rulemaking authority. They also contend that Rules 40C-41.063(6)(a) and (d), and Handbook Sections 11.5.1, 11.5.4, and 18.1, are invalid because they enlarge the specific provisions of law implemented. They next contend that Rules 40C-4.051(7), 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C- 41.011, 40C-41.023, 40C-4.041(2)(b), 40C-41.051(2), 40C- 41.063(6)(a), (b) and (d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.5.2 and 11.5.4, are not supported by competent substantial evidence. They allege further that Rules 40C- 4.041(2)(b), 40C-4.051(7), 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C- 41.023, 40C-41.051(2), and 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4, 18.1 and Appendix K are arbitrary and capricious. Petitioners next contend that Rules 40C-4.041(2)(b) and 40C- 41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4 and 18.1, are invalid because their alternative lower cost proposal substantially accomplishes the statutory objectives purportedly being implemented through the proposed rules and revisions. Finally, petitioners assert that Rule 40C-41.063(6)(d) and Handbook Section 11.5.4(d) are invalid because they fail to establish adequate standards to guide, and vest unbridled discretion in, the District. As a corollary to these claims and in the event they prevail on any issue, petitioners have requested attorney’s fees and costs under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes, on the theory the District’s actions were not substantially justified and there are no special circumstances which would make an award to petitioners unjust. The Proposed Rules Generally The proposed rules affect two geographic areas within the District designated as the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek Hydrologic Basins. The former basin is located almost entirely in the northeastern portion of Volusia County and covers some 150 square miles. The latter basin is located in the southeastern portion of Volusia County and covers 94 square miles. Together, the two basins make up more than twenty percent of Volusia County, and they include parts of the Cities of Daytona Beach, Ormond Beach, and Port Orange. Although the Tomoka and Spruce Creek Rivers, which flow through the basins, were designated Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW) on July 11, 1991, on balance, the water quality of both basins can only be characterized as fair. The Halifax River is a large estuarine system that lies north of the Indian River Lagoon and south of the Matanzas and Tolomato systems and parallel to the Atlantic Ocean. The Tomoka River Basin is at the northern end of the Halifax River, while the Spruce Creek Basin is at the southern end. The Halifax River connects with the Atlantic Ocean in only one place, Ponce Inlet, which is between the proposed basins. Because of this single connection, the estuary is a very low energy system due to minimal wave action, and the system is dependent on the basins that drain into the Halifax River. Thus, the water resources and the integrated components of habitat of the proposed basins are critical to the overall health and biological diversity for the entire region. The District regulates and controls the management and storage of surface waters through its Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) program, which has district-wide application. There are two types of permits relevant to these proceedings: stormwater and ERPs. The former permit is designed for smaller residential or commercial developments and primarily protects against the adverse impacts of stormwater runoff on water quality. An ERP is required for larger systems and covers a broad range of issues including water quality, water quantity, and biological concerns. Criteria for the issuance of individual and conceptual approval permits for systems which meet certain thresholds are found in Chapter 40C-4, Florida Administrative Code, while additional standards and criteria (over and above those found in Chapter 40C-4) for systems within specified designated areas of special concern are found in Chapter 40C-41, Florida Administrative Code. Such areas of special concern contain more stringent regulatory criteria, and they are designed to address specific problems in given areas where high quality resources need special protection, or rapid development adversely affects the water resources. In addition, by Rule 40C-4.091, the District has adopted and incorporated by reference a document known as the "Applicant’s Handbook: Management and Storage of Surface Waters" (Handbook) which "provides applicants, potential applicants, and others who are interested, with information regarding the permitting program for the regulation of surface water management systems under Chapters 40C-4, 40C-40, 40C-41, and 40C-400, F.A.C." This controversy involves a challenge, on numerous grounds, to proposed revisions to all or parts of three rules in Chapter 40C-4, six rules in Chapter 40C-41, and a number of related revisions in the Handbook. Chapter 40C-4 and the Handbook 10. Proposed Rules 40C-4.041(2) and 40C-4.043(1), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1 and 11.0, establish the new basins and make them subject to the provisions of Chapters 40C-4 and 40C-41 and the Handbook. The proposed basins are made up of smaller drainage basins associated with the tributaries to the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek. Besides the two new basins, the District has already established at least five other areas of special concern (basins) within its boundaries. Under current Chapter 40C-4, an ERP is required for the construction, alteration, operation, maintenance, abandonment, or removal of a surface water management system which serves projects with a total land area of 40 or more acres, provides for the placement of 12 or more acres of impervious surface, or has any wetland impact. Smaller projects need only obtain a stormwater permit from the District. By proposed amendments to Rules 40C-4.041(2)(b)3., 6. and (g), and Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f) and 11.0(e) of the Handbook, these thresholds within the two basins are reduced to 10 acres and 2 acres, respectively. Thus, if the revisions become effective, some projects which now qualify for stormwater permits will require a general ERP. It follows that any projects not exceeding these thresholds are exempt from permitting requirements. New provisions relative to exemptions from the permitting thresholds are found in Rule 40C-4.051(7) while the legal description of the two basins is found in Rule 40C- 4.091(1)(a) and Appendix K of the Handbook. Exempted from the permitting thresholds are those systems which meet the conditions for exemption set forth in subsection (2) of the rule, and systems "which consist of public road shoulder paving, outside the Riparian Habitat Protection Zone, which do not result in the creation of additional traffic lanes, and systems which consist of public turn lane construction outside the Riparian Habitat Protection Zone." In addition, related revisions to Sections 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4 and 18.1 of the Handbook add four special basin "standards and design criteria" to the current District requirements. These are extra permitting standards that must be met in addition to standards contained in the District’s ERP rules. Three of the criteria are engineering related while the fourth creates a Riparian Habitat Protection Zone (RHPZ) along the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek. The same criteria now apply in the Econlockhatchee River and Wekiva River Hydrologic Basins, two other designated areas of special concern. Section 11.5.1 imposes a new "recharge standard" which requires ERP permittees to retain within the Most Effective Recharge Area (MERA) three inches of runoff from the directly connected impervious surface area. MERAs are defined as areas with Type A soils. There is no requirement under existing rules that stormwater and ERP permittees retain runoff for recharge purposes. Current standards require that a system not cause a net reduction in flood storage within a 10-year floodplain. Under proposed Section 11.5.2 of the Handbook, a system within the basins must not cause a net reduction in flood storage within the 100-year floodplain. The proposed stormwater management standard in Section prohibits the use of certain stormwater treatment methodologies, such as the use of detention with filtration systems, based upon the size of the system. Current District rules contain no such size-based restrictions. In Section 11.5.4, the District proposes to establish RHPZs along the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek. These RHPZs extend a minimum of 275, 320 or 550 feet landward from the waterward edge of the wetlands adjacent to the defined portions of each watercourse. For example, if the adjacent wetlands extend 400 feet landward of the water’s edge in an area where the rule defines an RHPZ width as 550 feet, 150 feet of uplands landward of the landward extent of the wetlands would be included in the RHPZ at that site. The RHPZ also includes a minimum 50- foot upland component. The RHPZ standard also provides that development within a designated RHPZ is presumed to adversely affect the abundance, food sources, or habitat of aquatic or wetland dependent species in the RHPZ. An applicant may rebut this presumption, however, by demonstrating that the "overall merits" of the proposed development offset the adverse impacts. Chapter 40C-41 Existing Chapter 40C-41 designates five geographic areas of special concern and establishes additional criteria and standards for systems constructed within those areas. By amendments to Rules 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023(5), 40C-41.033 and 40C-41.043(1), the District proposes to add the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek Hydrologic Basins as new geographic areas of special concern. By changes to Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), the District has also proposed to codify the previously described recharge standard, 100-year floodplain standard, stormwater management standards and RHPZ as special requirements for systems constructed within the basins. As specific authority for adopting the proposed rules, the District has cited, in varying combinations, Sections 120.54(8), 373.044, 373.046(4), 373.113, 373.118, 373.171, 373.406, 373.413, 373.415, 373.416, 373.418, and 373.421(2), Florida Statutes. It also cites, in various combinations, Sections 120.54(8), 373.046, 373.118, 373.409, 373.413, 373.4135, 373.414, 373.415, 373.416, 373.421(2)-(6), 373.426, and 373.429, Florida Statutes, as the laws being implemented. Do the Rules Exceed the Agency’s Grant of Rulemaking Authority? Petitioners first contend that Rules 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023 and 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4, 18.1 and Appendix K exceed the agency’s grant of rulemaking authority. The challenged rules and sections generally fall into two broad categories: (1) the establishment of the new basins and their legal descriptions, and (2) the establishment of new basin criteria. Proposed Rules 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011 and 40C- 41.023(5), and Sections 3.3.1, 11.0(e), 11.5 and Appendix K, fall into the first category while Rule 40C-41.063(6) and Sections 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4 and 18.1 fall into the latter. In adopting the rules and sections pertaining to the new basins and their respective boundaries, the District has relied upon Sections 120.54(8), 373.044, 373.046(4), 373.113, 373.171, 373.415, 373.418, and 373.421(2), Florida Statutes, as the specific authority for adopting the rules. In adopting the new basin criteria, the District relies upon Sections 120.54(8), 373.044, 373.046(4), 373.113, 373.171, 373.415, 373.418 and 373.421(2), Florida Statutes, as the specific authority. For the reasons given in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Order, the challenged rules and sections exceed the District’s rulemaking authority and are thus an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Do the Rules Enlarge the Specific Provisions of Law Implemented? Petitioners next allege that Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a) and (d) and Handbook Sections 11.5.1, 11.5.4 and 18.1 are invalid because they enlarge the specific provisions of law implemented. Paragraph (6)(a) of the rule and Sections 11.5.1 and 18.1 propose to adopt the recharge standard while paragraph (6)(d) and Section establish the new RHPZs. The law being implemented for both standards is Sections 373.413, 373.414, 373.416 and 373.426, Florida Statutes. Section 373.413 provides that the District "may require such permits and impose such reasonable conditions as are necessary to assure that the construction or alteration" of a system "will not be harmful to the water resources of the district." Similarly, Section 373.416 authorizes the District to require permits on reasonable conditions necessary to assure that the operation and maintenance of the system "will not be harmful to the water resources of the district." Section 373.414 authorizes the District to require applicants to provide "reasonable assurance" that state water quality standards will not be violated. Finally, Section 373.426 protects "the water resources of the district" from improper abandonment or removal of surface water management systems. The statutes being implemented do not refer to a recharge standard or RHPZ. Neither do they refer to any "particular" program or duty which would authorize these rules. Therefore, Rule 40C-063(6)(a) and (d) and Sections 11.5.1, 11.5.4 and 18.1 enlarge the law being implemented and thus are invalid. Are the Rules Arbitrary and Capricious? Petitioners next contend that Rules 40C-4.041(2)(b), 40C-4.051(7), 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023, 40C- 41.051(2) and 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4, and Appendix K are arbitrary and capricious. These rules and sections pertain to the proposed basin designation and boundaries, threshold revisions, and exemptions. A determination as to whether the rules and sections are supported by fact and logic is set forth below below. Basins The establishment of two new hydrologic basins is based on the District’s concern to protect the water resources within these areas from the affects of growth, new homes and related infrastructure being built in the area. That is to say, additional resource protections are necessary in the proposed basins due to development pressure. While the parties have sharply disagreed over the extent, if any, of development pressure, it is noted that the coastal areas of Volusia County to the east of the proposed basins are already intensely developed. It can be reasonably expected that the population pressure in those areas will lead to increased development in the proposed basins. In addition, there has already been significant permitting activity in the proposed basins, and the number of binding wetland determinations issued by the District (for future five-year periods of time) indicate future development. It is true, as petitioners assert, that Volusia County’s population grew only 8.7 percent from 1990-1995, or less than the statewide average growth rate of 9.7 percent for the same time period, and that its growth rate is less than many other counties within the District. The evidence shows, however, that by the year 2010, Volusia County’s population is expected to increase by 115,530 people, not an insignificant number. At the same time, there is a concentration of numerous Floridan aquifer wellfields within or adjacent to the new basins. Increased water withdrawals from those wellfields will cause adverse impacts. The coastal communities of Volusia County, who are the primary users of water, project an increase in the need for water by the year 2010 of between 60 percent to 100 percent. Finally, development leads to compacted soils, an increase in impervious surfaces and a loss of habitat for aquatic and wetland dependent species. These result in increased runoff rates, with related higher volumes and rates of stormwater runoff. Also, they cause the introduction of stormwater pollutants such as fuels, oils, heavy metals, fertilizers and pesticide into the water. The establishment of new basins addresses these concerns. Given these considerations, it is found that the designation of the basins as areas of special concern is not without logic or reason. The fact that the basin boundaries had not been separately drawn, or used for planning purposes, by the District prior to May 1994 does not detract from this finding. Therefore, Rules 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011 and 40C-41.023, and Handbook Sections 3.3.1 (c) and (f), 11.0(e), 11.5 and Appendix K are not arbitrary or capricous. Recharge standard Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a) and Section 11.5.1 of the Handbook require in part that "[p]rojects, or portions of projects, in the Most Effective Recharge Areas must retain three inches of runoff from the directly connected impervious area within the Most Effective Recharge Area of the project." In addition, Section 18.1 contains a list of Type A soils for Flagler and Volusia Counties to determine whether a proposed project is in the Most Effective Recharge Area. Petitioners contend there is no rational basis for imposing this more stringent permitting criterion. In response to this objection, the District established that the proposed basins are within an area of recharge for the Floridan aquifer. Rainfall is the sole source of freshwater recharge for the Floridan and surficial aquifer systems. In other words, rainfall percolates into the ground and recharges the surficial aquifer which in turn recharges the Floridan aquifer. As noted earlier, the coastal communities of Volusia County have projected an increase of at least 60 percent in the need for water by the year 2010. While there is no direct evidential correlation between water supply demand and population growth, it can be reasonably inferred that the population increase of more than 115,000 persons by the year 2010 will likewise increase the demand for water. As water withdrawals from existing wellfields increase, saltwater intrusion can reasonably be expected to occur in greater proportions. Saltwater intrusion has the effect of contaminating the Floridan aquifer and lowering the surficial aquifer, both of which impact wetland communities and the base flow of streams. To the extent that recharge is diminished, the problems associated with those water withdrawals will be exacerbated. Type A soil, to which the recharge standard applies, has the highest infiltration rate. When impervious surfaces (over Type A soils) are directly connected to a stormwater pond, the rainfall will have an opportunity to percolate into the soil. Through the use of recognized "curve" numbers and historical rainfall data in the vicinity of the proposed basins, the District established that the retention of three inches of runoff in Type A soils should result in post-development recharge approximating pre-development recharge. In view of the above, and the fact that existing ERP, OFW and management of storage of stormwater requirements are not sufficient to provide for equivalent retention of stormwater for recharge purposes, the recharge standard has a rational basis. Therefore, Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a) and Handbook Sections 11.5.1 and 18.1 are not arbitrary and capricious. Floodplain storage criteria Rule 40C-41.063(6)(b) and Handbook Section 11.5.2 establish new floodplain storage criteria for systems in the two basins or any of their tributaries. More specifically, they provide that a system "may not cause a net reduction in flood storage within the 100-year floodplain" of the two basins. Currently, this "no net reduction" standard applies only to development within the 10-year floodplain. The parties agree that flooding has occurred within the boundaries of the new basins. Two factors which affect flooding are excessive runoff and inadequate floodplain storage. The size of a project and the amount of impervious surface are directly related to the amount of runoff generated. The amount of runoff affects flooding conditions in downstream areas. The District also established that fill results in the loss of floodplain storage. The loss of floodplain storage in one area will increase flood elevations in other areas, both upstream and downstream from where the loss of floodplain storage occurs. Compensating storage provides storage volume to make up for the fill that is placed in the floodplain. The new standard requires that systems within the basins must not cause a net reduction in flood storage within the 100-year floodplain. Thus, if an applicant proposes to construct a system which reduces the floodplain’s storage capacity, the applicant will be required to compensate for the lost storage capacity, thereby preventing an increase in flood elevation. Even petitioners’ expert witness Harper agreed that the rule’s objective is a "worthwhile goal." Given these considerations, it is found that the floodplain storage standard is supported by logic and reason, and Rule 40C-41.063(6)(b) and Handbook Section 11.5.2 are not arbitrary and capricious. Stormwater management standard Proposed Rule 40C-41.063(6)(c) and Handbook Section provide generally that when constructing new stormwater management systems which serve drainage areas in excess of 10 acres, an applicant cannot use detention with filtration as the sole stormwater methodology. They also provide that when retention systems are not feasible due to limited percolation capacity, "wet detention treatment or other treatment demonstrated to be equivalent to retention or wet detention . . . must be used." Under current standards, applicants may choose the type and location of stormwater treatment ponds. Thus, instead of locating a detention pond in an area of high filtration, an applicant can choose to locate the detention in an area of low filtration thereby discharging the stormwater to surface waters. The evidence shows that detention with filtration systems fail after a relatively short period of time because pollutants clog the filters that remove them. Once filters clog, water does not filter and the pond does not function as designed. Malfunctioning detention with filtration systems can cause localized water quality violations. The new standard curtails the use of detention with filtration. The evidence further shows that the Tomoka River has moderately elevated levels of nitrogen and elevated levels of total phosphorus. The water quality in Spruce Creek is similar with even higher levels of total phosphorus. Because detention with filtration systems is an ineffective way to remove nitrogen, dissolved phosphorus, and dissolved metals, the receiving water bodies will be improved if the less effective detention of filtration systems is eliminated. The new standard will achieve this goal. Even petitioners’ expert witness Harper acknowledged that the detention with filtration method is a poor stormwater management technique. Based upon the foregoing considerations, it is found that the stormwater management standard is based on logic and reason, and Rule 40C-41.063(6)(c) and Handbook Section 11.5.3 are not arbitrary and capricious, as alleged by petitioners. Riparian Habitat Protection Zone Proposed Rule 40C-41.063(6)(d) and Handbook Section establish an RHPZ along the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek. These new zones provide additional protection over and above that provided under the existing ERP program. As noted earlier, these zones extend a minimum of 275, 320, or 550 feet landward from the waterward edge of the wetlands adjacent to the defined portions of each water course, and they include a minimum 50-foot upland component. The rule and section presume that certain activities within the zones will "adversely affect the abundance, food sources, or habitat of aquatic or wetland dependent species provided by (the) Zone," and to overcome this presumption, an applicant must demonstrate "that the overall merits of the proposed plan of development, including mitigation as described in section 12.3 . . . provide a degree of resource protection . . which offsets adverse effects of the proposed system on the uplands and wetlands within the Zone." Finally, the rule and section provide that "[s]ome reasonable use of the land within the Protection Zone can be allowed." The record contains sharply conflicting testimony regarding the logic and reason for the zones, and the parties have devoted substantial portions of their proposed findings of fact to address this issue. In resolving these conflicts, the undersigned has accepted the more credible and persuasive evidence, and this evidence is embodied in the findings below. To begin with, similar RHPZs already exist in the Econlockhatchee and Wekiva River Hydrologic Basins, two other geographic areas of special concern. Like the existing RHPZs, the purpose of the new RHPZs is to protect the riparian wetland and upland areas which are necessary to sustain viable populations of aquatic or wetland dependent species. The Tomoka River and Spruce Creek systems are important and critical for the wildlife and overall ecology of eastern Volusia and Flagler Counties. The riparian habitat along the two systems consist of estuarine saltwater marsh, forested wetlands, including cypress and hardwood, freshwater marsh, hammocks, flatwoods, and sandhills. Aquatic and wetland dependent species need a combination of these riparian habitats for feeding, breeding, and nesting. These species are an integral component of the water resources. There is a critical relationship among the biotic components of the water resources such as the living plants and animals. Interdependent relationships exist between all of these components, and if one component is not present, the overall balance and health of the water resource is adversely impacted. Similarly, the entire food chain is impacted by the loss of an aquatic or wetland dependent species from the aquatic or wetland system. The proposed RHPZ widths are based on, and related to, the spatial needs of species rather than a specific width of wetlands and uplands. Spatial requirement is the area an animal needs to perform all of its life functions, such as foraging, breeding, denning, and nesting, without harassment or any kind of detriment in order to maintain a viable population. All experts agree that, in order to sustain a viable population, 50 to 500 individuals must be maintained. Current ERP rules do not provide for this degree of protection for these spatial requirements. Spatial requirement is determined by two methods. One method is to determine the distance for which a species is sensitive to disturbance when it is feeding or nesting. For example, if a species is intolerant to humans and would require a distance of 200 feet away from humans, then that would be the spatial requirement of that species. A second method is to determine a species’ home range requirement. Home range is the area within which a species moves in order to obtain requirements to help sustain life, such as food. For those species for which no data in the literature exists regarding spatial requirements, a technique known as "guilding" is used to group species based upon their nesting and feeding zones. The proposed 550-foot RHPZ width addresses the spatial needs for a majority of aquatic and wetland dependent species in cypress and hardwood swamps. In the salt marshes, the 320-foot width satisfies the spatial needs of a majority of the species. Where the river narrows and the canopy covers the riverbed, there is a uniform habitat not separated by the water body. Therefore, a 275-foot RHPZ straddling the river provides the 550-foot width necessary to maintain viable populations. Under current rules, in order to reduce or eliminate wetland impacts, an applicant may propose a buffer with a minimum width of 15 feet and an average width of 25 feet between the wetland and the system being proposed in order to address the secondary impacts to the habitat of wetlands. This buffer essentially acts as a cushion around the wetlands to protect the wetland habitat from adjacent wetland development. If the wetland is used by a listed species, then additional measures may be required in order to protect the nesting, denning or critical feeding habitat of that species in the wetland. Listed species, however, do not include all aquatic and wetland dependent species, and they include only those that are classified as endangered, threatened, or species of special concern. The new 50-foot upland component will be applied in areas where the wetlands extend beyond the appropriate 550, 320 and 275-foot widths. This extension is necessary and appropriate because the existing rules are designed to protect the intrinsic value of wetland habitat. They do not, however, include protection of the intrinsic value of upland habitat, which is used, for example, by frogs and turtles. In addition, existing rules do not protect upland foraging areas or wildlife corridors except for those limited areas needed for ingress and egress to the nest from the wetland. Finally, most aquatic and wetland dependent species are not a listed species, and thus they receive no upland habitat protection under existing ERP rules. In contrast, the new rule provides protection for spatial needs of all aquatic and wetland dependent species and their use of uplands for foraging, breeding, and nesting. While there are some flaws in the analyses used by the District to justify the zones, collectively there is sufficient credible and persuasive evidence found in the Center for Wetlands Study, the 1990 East Central Florida Regional Planning Council report, detailed ground and air investigations, the District’s regulatory experience, and its permitting experience with basin rules in the Wekiva and Econlockhatchee Basins, which have similar RHPZ dimensions, to support a finding that the rule and section are based on logic and reason. Therefore, Rule 40C- 41.063(6)(d) and Handbook Section 11.5.4 are not arbitrary or capricious. Exemptions Proposed revisions to Rules 40C-4.051(7) and 40C- 41.051(2) exempt from permitting requirements projects which are less than 10 acres in size and of less than 2 acres of impervious surface. Also exempted are single family dwelling units not a part of a larger common plan of development or sale, public road shoulder paving, and systems that qualify for a noticed general permit. In their objection, petitioners have contended that there is no rational basis for exempting these activities, and that in proposing the rules, the District failed to consider the cumulative impacts of these exempt activities. In responding to these objections, the District established that exempt projects are not expected to comprise a large number of permit applications for the basins. Accordingly, such projects will not individually or cumulatively significantly exacerbate flooding problems. From a water quantity standpoint, exempt projects will have a relatively minimal impact, while water quality standards will be preserved through the stormwater permitting program. As to fish and wildlife issues, exempted projects will likewise have a relatively minimal impact. With respect to exemptions for public road shoulder paving, single family dwelling units, and systems that qualify for a noticed general permit, these projects are so small that they are not likely to have a significant adverse impact, either individually or cumulatively. Economic considerations regarding hardships played a role in the District’s decision to exempt projects under the 10- acre threshold. More specifically, criteria designed for larger parcels of land cannot be reasonably applied to small, subthreshold projects without the property owner enduring difficulty and severe hardship. Thus, the 10-acre threshold was chosen as a balance between water resource protection and providing flexibility in project sizes to accomplish project development. Because smaller projects will not need to meet the 25-year, 24-hour water quantity ERP attenuation requirement, land will be saved, and the project designer will have more flexibility when designing a project that is exempted from ERP thresholds. Finally, the District’s stated purpose of not placing an unnecessary burden on citizens attempting to develop small projects is a sound, rational basis for creating the exemptions. Accordingly, Rules 40C-4.051(7) and 40C-41.051(2) are founded on logic and reason, and they are not arbitrary and capricious. Are the Rules Supported by Competent Substantial Evidence? As a corollary to the arbitrary and capricious allegation, petitioners further contend that proposed Rules 40C- 4.041(2)(b), 40C-4.051(7), 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C- 41.023, 40C-41.051(2) and 40C-41.063(6)(a), (b) and (d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.0(e), 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.4, 18.1 and Appendix K are not supported by competent substantial evidence. In other words, they contend that the underlying factual predicate for the foregoing rules is unreliable, undependable, or untrustworthy. For the reasons cited in the findings in paragraphs 28- 63 it is found that the factual underpinning for Rules 40C- 4.041(2)(b), 40C-4.051(7), 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C- 4.023, 40C-41.051(2) and 40C-41.063(a), (b) and (d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.0(e), 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.4, 18.1 and Appendix K is sufficiently reliable, dependable and trustworthy so as to constitute competent substantial evidential support for their proposed adoption. Do Rule 40C-41.063(6)(d) and Handbook Section 11.5.4(d) Vest Unbridled Discretion in, and Contain Inadequate Standards to Guide, the District? Petitioners next argue that Rule 40C-41.063(6)(d) and Section 11.5.4(d) of the Handbook are invalid because they fail to establish adequate standards to guide the agency’s determination, and they vest unbridled discretion in the District to make certain determinations. A contention made in the initial petitions that the same rule and section are vague has presumably been abandoned since this ground is not cited in the prehearing stipulation or petitioners’ proposed orders. Subparagraph (6)(d)1. of the challenged rule and paragraph (a) of the section specify that, for those development activities which involve the "construction, alteration, operation, maintenance, removal, and abandonment of a system" within the RHPZ, an applicant "must provide reasonable assurance" that the system "will not adversely affect the abundance, diversity, food sources or habitat (including its use to satisfy nesting, breeding, and resting needs) of aquatic or wetland dependent species." In subparagraph (6)(d)2. and paragraph (b) of the rule and section, it is "presumed" that the following activities will "adversely affect the abundance, food sources, or habitat of aquatic or wetland dependent species provided by the Zone: construction of buildings, golf courses, impoundments, roads, canals, ditches, swales, and any land clearing which results in the creation of a system." Under subparagraph (d)4. and paragraph (d) of the rule and section, the presumption may be satisfied by an applicant demonstrating that the overall merits of the proposed plan of development, including mitigation as described in section 12.3, Applicant’s Handbook: Management and Storage of Surface Waters, provide a degree of resource protection to these types of fish and wildlife which offsets adverse effects of the proposed system on the uplands and wetlands within the zone. Some reasonable use of the land within the protection zone can be allowed under this section. Therefore, the presumption can be rebutted through considerations of subparagraph 6(d)4. and paragraph (d). As explained by the District, the term "overall merits" means that, in the review of the permit application, all of the impacts of the site plan to the surface water resource by the construction of the system will be reviewed. In other words, the District will review the "overall merits" of a system by balancing any detrimental impacts within the RHPZ with beneficial environmental aspects of the plan. The goal, of course, is to achieve a project design whose merits allow a development to proceed and also protect the beneficial functions of the RHPZ. For example, in areas of the development that are not proposed for development, the applicant can provide an ecological benefit by restoring or enhancing functions to a portion of the RHPZ. Where there are areas outside the RHPZ that would add further beneficial functions to aquatic or wetland dependent species, those areas could be set aside and incorporated into an overall protection plan that would be part of the site plan. The District will apply the new "overall merits" standard in a permitting scenario similar to the manner in which the current Wekiva and Econlockhatchee River Basin standards are now being applied. In those hydrologic basins, similar standards, including the "overall merits" criterion, have been applied by the District for a number of years without difficulty, and numerous activities have been authorized within their respective RHPZs. In fact, District records show that only two permits for activities within those basins have ever been denied, while more than 560 permits have been issued since the establishment of the two basins. Further assistance and clarification are found in the mitigation provisions in section 12.3 of the Handbook, which contains fifteen pages of guidance. Both the rule and section specifically provide that "mitigation as described in section 12.3" may be utilized by an applicant in meeting this standard. This provision enables an applicant to offset adverse impacts to the abundance, food sources, and habitat of aquatic or wetland dependent species within the RHPZ by proposing mitigation alternatives described therein. Petitioners contend that these mitigation alternatives are impractical since they do not allow for mitigating upland impacts and that section 12.3 now applies only to the Econlockhatchee and Wekiva River Basins. However, the District established that the use of the techniques described in Section 12.3 will be extended to the two new basins. As to the mitigation of upland impacts, Section 12.3.2.2(d) specifically refers to upland preservation as a mitigation option. It is also noteworthy that petitioners’ expert witness Exum conceded that he has utilized, without difficulty or misunderstanding, the same provisions when processing applications for permits in the Econlockhatchee and Wekiva Basins. Therefore, there are adequate standards within the rule and section to guide the District’s determination of the "overall merits" of an applicant’s proposed development plan. Likewise, that portion of the rule and section do not vest unbridled discretion in the District to determine whether an applicant has rebutted the presumption created by the standard. Petitioners next contend that the provision in Rule 40C-41.063(6)(d)4. and Section 11.5.4(d) which allows an applicant to make "some reasonable use of the land within the Protection Zone" contains inadequate standards and places unbridled discretion in the District. This provision, however, is found to be reasonably specific, given the fact that the amount of development which can be permitted can only be determined on a case-by-case basis after the District considers the specific nature of the unique characteristics of the site, including the proposed development, and the type of water resources that are adversely affected by the development. To establish a fixed percentage of development that would be permissible would be arbitrary. Moreover, the same provision has been fairly applied for a number of years in two other basins, and petitioners’ experts have successfully dealt with this issue without difficulty. Therefore, this portion of the rule and section contains adequate standards and does not vest unbridled discretion in the District. Finally, petitioners contend that the same rule and section vest unbridled discretion in the District to determine what is an "aquatic or wetland dependent species." The evidence shows, however, that petitioners’ witnesses Exum and Godly were aware of the meaning of this term of art, and they had a common understanding of its meaning. Further detail or definition of the term is unnecessary. Therefore, that portion of the rule and section does not vest unbridled discretion in the District. Whether Petitioners’ Lower Cost Proposal Substantially Meets the Statutory Objectives Being Implemented? The District prepared a Statement of Estimated Regulatory Costs (SERC) for the proposed rules, as required by Sections 120.54(3)(b)1. and 120.541, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). A summary of the SERC was published with the proposed rules on January 17, 1997, in the Florida Administrative Weekly. On February 6, 1997, Consolidated-Tomoka, but no other petitioners, timely submitted to the District a good faith, lower cost, regulatory alternative to the proposed rules. The District rejected this alternative proposal and provided a statement of its reasons for doing so. The parties have stipulated that the alternative would impose less regulatory costs on petitioners than are imposed by the proposed threshold revisions, recharge standard, floodplain storage criteria, stormwater management standard, and Riparian Wildlife Habitat Zone. Consolidated-Tomoka, joined in by all other petitioners, next contend that Rules 40C-4.041(2)(b) and 40C- 41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4, and 18.1, are invalid because the alternative cost proposal substantially accomplishes the statutory objectives purportedly being implemented through the proposed rules. More specifically, they contend that the current District rules, along with the existing OFW designation of Spruce Creek and the Tomoka River, already provide adequate protection to the water quality and quantity within the proposed basins, and thus the existing rules accomplish the same statutory objectives at a lower cost to petitioners. The proposed revisions to Rule 40C-041(2)(b) and Section 3.3.1(c) and (f) provide that non-exempt systems within the two new basins will be subject to the threshold revisions contained in the rule and section. Thus, they will bring into the ERP regulatory framework projects that now otherwise require only a stormwater permit under Chapter 40C-42. These projects now contribute to flooding and will continue to do so in the future absent a rule change. Because petitioners proposed alternative (of adopting no rule) does nothing to address the flooding caused by these projects, it does not substantially accomplish the statutory objective of protecting water resources. The statutory objective of the proposed recharge standard in Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a) and Sections 11.5.1 and 18.1 is to protect the District’s water resources by replacing groundwater withdrawn from the Floridan aquifer for public consumption with potable freshwater from rainfall. The evidence supports a finding that a need for recharge exists, and petitioners’ own expert agreed that recharge is necessary to maintain groundwater supplies. The alternative that no rule be adopted does not advance the statutory goal of protecting water resources. The statutory objective being implemented by the proposed floodplain storage standard in Rule 40C-41.063(6)(b) and Section 11.5.2 is the protection of water resources by reducing flooding. Under current conditions, flooding problems occur, and existing rules only address floodplain storage for the 10-year floodplain. The new criterion will prevent a decrease in floodplain storage in the 100-year floodplain. This in turn removes the loss of floodplain storage as a cause of flooding, thereby accomplishing the statutory goal. The new standard will ensure that future development will maintain more floodplain storage than is maintained under existing rules and thus create less future flooding potential. The proposal that no standard be adopted does not accomplish this objective. The proposed stormwater management standard in Rule 40C-41.063(6)(d)(c) and Section 11.5.3 implements the District’s statutory objective of protecting the water resources by minimizing the impact of malfunctioning detention with filtration systems on the OFWs in the proposed basins that receive discharges from such systems. Existing regulations allow systems within the proposed basins to utilize detention with filtration systems. Petitioners’ proposal does not prevent this from occurring or address the statutory objective of the law being implemented. Therefore, it is not an appropriate alternative. Finally, as to the RHPZ standard in Rule 40C- 41.063(6)(d) and Section 11.5.4, petitioners contend that the District’s current buffer requirements are sufficient to protect upland habitat utilized by wetland dependent species. They also contend that the establishment of the RHPZ exceeds the District’s delegated legislative authority and thus there is no statutory objective to be implemented. Finally, they argue that the establishment of the RHPZ will not lead to any significant enhancement of the water quality in Spruce Creek or the Tomoka River. As to this proposed standard, the District’s statutory objective is to protect water resources from harm. Aquatic or wetland dependent species are, of course, an integral component of the water resources. If urbanization pressures continue, the two basins will lose valuable habitat for aquatic or wetland species. Current ERP rules do not provide for the protection of the spatial requirements of aquatic and wetland dependent species, such as habitat and food sources, in order to maintain viable populations. Indeed, the current buffer merely provides a cushion to the wetland from the upland development, and it is not designed to maintain nesting habitat for those species. Moreover, current rules only protect the uplands for species that are listed and that use uplands for nesting and denning. Unlisted species receive no protection, and even listed species are not provided habitat necessary to maintain other life functions such as foraging. Therefore, a no-rule alternative does not substantially accomplish the statutory objective of preventing harm to water resources, including the aquatic or wetland dependent species. As noted in paragraph 23, the proposed standard exceeds the District's rulemaking authority. For the reasons cited in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Order, however, this does not mean that the rule cannot substantially accomplish the statutory objective. Therefore, the contention that the prior determination of invalidity mandates a similar determination here is without merit. Finally, as to the contention that the new standard will not lead to any significant enhancement of the water quality, the evidence shows that the standard is not intended to enhance water quality in the streams, and thus the argument is irrelevant.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Woodland, is made up of property owners in Woodland Lakes subdivision, an area abutting on Woodland Bayou, situated off Pensacola Bay in Santa Rosa County, Florida. Petitioner, Margaret B. Miller, owns property directly across the channel which forms the entrance to Woodland Bayou and which is the proposed location for the bulkhead and riprap forming the subject matter of this dispute. Mrs. Miller and her late husband purchased their property, which is not located in Woodland Lakes subdivision, in 1957. Their lot is located on Pensacola Bay and at the time she and her husband purchased the property, they were looking for an area that had the special characteristics of this lot she now owns. It included big trees, a gentle slope to the Bay, and a view out over Pensacola Bay across a sandy peninsula which extended out into the bay a considerable distance and which they owned. At the time they made their purchase, Woodland Bayou opened into Pensacola Bay at the East End but the opening near Mrs. Miller's property was obstructed by a sandy beach. The extent of channel blocking and obstruction caused by this sandy beach was the subject of a lawsuit between the Millers, the Woodland Lake Property Owners Association, and the State of Florida 1n June, 1972. The substance of that suit was concerned with ownership of the land which extended out from the Miller property into Pensacola Bay over which certain of the parties desired to cut a channel from Woodland Bayou into Pensacola Bay. There was substantial conflict in the testimony at the time as to whether there was a natural channel existing across the Miller property prior to 1957-1958 or not, or, in the alternative, whether the Millers filled in an existing channel thereby blocking reasonable entrance to Woodland Bayou. The answer to that question is irrelevant to the issue in this hearing. However, a judgment of the Circuit Court entered on June 13, 1972, awarded to the Millers title to property which extended out across the currently existing channel dredged subsequent to that time by the Respondent, Woodland, to a point into Pensacola Bay. The decision of the court also awarded to the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund a section of property directly west of the northern tip of the Miller property consisting of a strip approximately 40 feet wide and a maximum of76 feet long lying approximately perpendicular to the currently-existing channel and through which it was envisioned the channel would be dredged from the entrance of Woodland Bayou out to Pensacola Bay. By so doing, the canal would have made a left turn coming out of the bayou into Pensacola Bay but the Miller's property, which was not then split by the canal, would be left intact. According to Mr. Hunsley, the dredging completed after the entry of the final judgment in the Quiet Title suit was not done consistent with the dictates of that judgment. Instead, the channel was cut straight out from the bayou across the Miller property, and so it remains to this day. He contends, however, that historically, the channel existed in this very spot and that the Millers as well as other property owners in the area at the time, closed the channel off by dredging and filling at their own expense some time in 1957 and 1958. Regardless of the history regarding the genesis of the channel, however, the fact remains that the channel now exists in a straight line from Woodland Bayou to Pensacola Bay across the Miller property and has so since 1972 when it was dredged subsequent to the lawsuit. The channel, being a tidal channel and subject to sand drift caused by wind and wave action, tends to become clogged with sand on a periodic basis. Because of the increased clogging currently experienced, sometime prior to September 9, 1983, the officers of Woodland circulated a petition to secure the permission of all the neighbors in the subdivision to construct a bulkhead on the Woodland side of the channel across from and up channel from the Miller property. This petition, which at the time did not include riprap, was approved by all property owners in the subdivision except for 2 and was then forwarded to the Gulf Breeze City Council to allow the Council to assess costs in the amount of approximately $600.00 per property owner against the property owners in the event DER approved the permit to construct the bulkhead. Mrs. Miller was not solicited to sign the Petition nor will she be assessed any of the costs of construction of the bulkhead if approved since she is not a property owner in the subdivision in question. The petition was circulated, according to Mr. Kettenring, who has lived in the area for several years, because of the increasing sedimentation. To his knowledge, the channel was last dredged in 1982 and 1983. Prior to that time, during the period 1979-1981, he recalls at least three fish kills in the bayou but none since the dredging was accomplished. The residents of Woodland and the surrounding owners are all on septic tanks. There is no city sewage service to this area and every year there is a change in the clarity of the water in Woodland Bayou in the summer. During warmer weather, as the temperature increases, the water becomes cloudy and full of algae. However, after dredging was accomplished and the channel was opened further both in width and in depth, the water quality improved considerably. Mr. Kettenring has seen patterns of sand drifting from the point into the channel. The area has changed considerably in that the point has scalloped out into the channel blocking it. As a result, the bayou, which is at the mainland source of the channel, is currently somewhat brackish. Access of boat owners to the bayou has become impaired. On September 9, 1983, the application submitted by Woodland was received by DER, and a determination was made that the proposed project lay in Class III waters of the State, the standards for which are outlined in Rule 17-3.121, Florida Administrative Code. Shortly thereafter on September 28, 1983, DER notified Woodland that the application was incomplete in that the application fee had not been submitted, aerial photographs of the area were required, and a consent for the use of State-owned land was necessary. In addition, it was determined that Woodland needed to provide detailed plans for compliance with State water quality standards as well as a hydrographic survey. All requirements were subsequently met except for the survey. The application originally called for an additional 300 foot bulkhead to the east of the area in question here and the hydrographic survey referred to that bulkhead. Subsequent to the filing of the application, however, that bulkhead portion of the project was deleted and when that was done, the need for the hydrographic survey was obviated. Since all other shortcomings in the application had been corrected, the project was then reviewed by Mr. Hambrick who recommended the installation of riprap in front of the remaining bulkhead and grass, and on December 20, 1984, DER published an intent to issue for the project. The project in question is a 150 feet long bulkhead fronted with 35 cubic yards of riprap at the toe. The bulkhead will be located at the entrance channel of Woodland bayou across from Petitioner's property. Mr. Hambrick, who initially reviewed the application for DER and who signed off on it in December, 1984, visited the site in question on at least 2 or 3 occasions in relation to the application and because Mrs. York, Miller's neighbor, also had an application for a bulkhead pending. He looked at the property and determined that the amended application did not call for riprap. However, because the new law requires riprap in front of seawalls, he recommended that the riprap be installed here where there is no grass. In other words, according to Mr. Hambrick, riprap will be placed flush against the bulkhead where no sea grasses exist but will curve out in front of the sea grasses where there is grass at the foot of the bulkhead which will proceed behind the grassed area. The purpose of using riprap is to dissipate wave energy. Riprap will diminish the effect of the wave and its adverse effect on Petitioner's property. Mr. Hambrick is of the opinion that installing the bulkhead and riprap would not cause or increase damage to Petitioner's property and based on the criteria he used in analyzing the project, he feels that it is in the public interest. The factors he used in his consideration of this project include: that an erosion problem exists in the area, that bulkheading and riprapping would reduce the need for dredging, that there is a history of fish kills in the area, that maintaining a channel would help flush out the bayou, and homeowners on the bayou would have access to Pensacola Bay and their interests constituted a part of the public interest. Since the revised application was completed in October, 1984, it therefore had to comply with the criteria outlined in the new water quality bill which are two-fold in general application. These are: that the project will have no adverse effects on water quality of Woodland Bayou but would likely improve it through the increased flushing of the bayou as a result of maintaininq the channel, and that a need for dredging would be reduced since the channel will not shoal in as much. According to Mr. Hambrick, at the present time there is a collapsing and sluffing off of soil along the channel, which has increased since his prior visit in November, 1984. In his analysis of the project, he considered the effects that the project would have on the public interest, water quality, wildlife and fish in the area, and the historical and archeological aspects of the area. In his opinion, riprap would provide a habitat for marine wildlife which is a plus factor and would help to maintain a shallow shore environment. It would help to maintain a stand of marsh grass that is presently in the area and which is being covered with sand coming from the eroding point. In his opinion, there would be no adverse effect on the archaeological aspects of the area nor is there any indication of any adverse effect on the public interest, including Mrs. Miller. He also considers there would be no adverse effect on marine productivity which, in his opinion, would very likely improve as a result of the project. In his opinion, overall the project will maintain and even enhance the public interest considerations in the area and there would be no damage to the marine bottom by the installation of the riprap. Since the bulkhead will be fronted by riprap, it is not considered a vertical seawall which would be prohibited by the statute as it is currently constituted. Mr. Hambrick is quite certain in his opinion that since Mrs. Miller's property is already bulkheaded and riprapped, there would be no further erosion of her property. Consequently, there would be no adverse ecological effect notwithstanding the fact that Mrs. Miller contends that keeping the channel open would be a continuing trespass to her property. She also contends that when she put in her bulkhead, now at water's edge, it was designed as a retaining wall and was located in sand some substantial distance from the water. When the channel was cut across her land, the beach from the channel to the "retaining wall" eroded and when it appeared the wall would be undercut as well, she put in the riprap. All of this would be perpetuated by the construction of Woodland's project which would keep the channel open and keep it naturally closing as she believes it would do if left alone. In short, Mr. Hambrick's analysis of the situation including his personal visits to the site lead him to conclude that the project will not: harm water quality in the area, increase the number of boats using the channel, influence the speed of boats that use the channel, or increase erosion of Petitioner's property. This opinion is supported by that of Dr. Echternacht, a hydrographic engineer who is also convinced that construction of the proposed bulkhead and riprap would not cause any erosion to Petitioner's property. In fact, the riprap in front of the bulkhead will act to absorb wave energy and since it cannot be placed in a vertical manner, it reduces that amount of reflected energy. The bulkhead and riprap as proposed here would reduce the amount of soil infusion into the channel and thereby the amount of dredging needed. The technical aspects of the proposal were also considered by Mr. Fancher, the dredge and fill supervisor for DER in the Northwest District. When he reviewed the application, including Mr. Hambrick's proposal for riprap, he concurred with it. In order to appropriately receive a permit, applicants must show that the application conforms to both water quality and public interest standards. After his review of the entire project, Mr. Fancher concluded that this project would not adversely affect water quality standards and would not adversely affect but in fact might promote public interest considerations. When the Florida Legislature passed its new water quality bill in October, 1983, it prohibited the construction of most vertical seawalls. In Mr. Fancher's opinion, what is proposed here is not a vertical seawall and there is no evidence submitted by Petitioner to refute this. In fact, there was no evidence presented by Petitioner, save her own testimony which does not serve to overcome the expert opinions to the contrary, that the proposed project fails to meet the tests set out under the laws of this State.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Woodland Lake Property Owners, Inc.'s permit to construct a bulkhead be issued as modified. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth G. Oertel, Esq. Oertel and Hoffman 2700 Blair Stone Road Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. B. Murphy, Esq. 506 S. Palafox Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Brad Thomas, Esq. Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Victoria Tschinkel Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Rd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Pal-Mar has filed application No. 29454 pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, requesting approval for a surface water management system known as Phase III of Pal-Mar Water Management District, to serve approximately 3,600 acres of residential land in Martin County, Florida. The project discharges to C-44, the St. Lucie canal. SFWMD's staff report recommends approval be granted for the proposed water management system based on considerations of water quality, rates of discharge, environmental impact and flood protection. Approval is subject to certain conditions which are not material to the instant cause. As background material to the staff report, the staff makes reference to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers report entitled "Survey-Review Report of Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project, Martin County," dated September 22, 1967. The Corps of Engineers' report was not used in the decision-making process but rather was included in the staff report to provide a comprehensive overview. Whether the Corps of Engineers' plans were ever implemented would not affect the recommendations of the staff. The land in question is currently zoned "IZ" (interim zoning) according to Martin County's zoning regulations. In this category, if the neighborhood is predominantly one classification of usage, then the zoning director is to be governed by the regulations for that class of usage in determining the standard zoning regulations to be applied to the interim zoning district. If no trend of development has been established in the neighborhood, the minimum standards of the R2 single family zoning district are to be complied with. Rule 16K-4.035, Florida Administrative Code, entitled Basis of Review of Applications for Construction of Works, provides in Section (2) that all applications such as the instant one shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of the district's "Basis Of Review For Construction Of Surface Water Management Systems Serving Projects With Two Or More Acres Of Impervious Area Within The South Florida Water Management District - December, 1977." The Basis of Review provides in Part VI that before an application will be considered for the issuance of a permit, the proposed land use must be "compatible with the applicable zoning for the area." The evidence indicates that the land in question has a history of agricultural use. However, the evidence also discloses that far from being a trend towards agricultural use there is a trend away from it. A major portion of the neighboring lands will be devoted to Phases I, II, IV and V, of the Pal-Mar Water Management District. According to Florida Land Sales Board registrations, the land in question is subdivided into one-half acre, one acre, 1.4 acre and two acre lots. The average project density is one lot per acre. In addition, there is some mobile home usage within neighboring areas. If there is a trend, it is toward R2 zoning type usage. SFWMD's staff concluded that the proposed land use was compatible with the applicable zoning for the area. Martin County has failed to establish that such compatibility does not exist. In the Redraft of Order Permitting Change of Plan of Reclamation and Change of Name dated November 4, 1969, the Honorable C. Pfeiffer Trowbridge, Circuit Court Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Martin County, observes that the Petitioner in that case (herein Pal-Mar) "permanently and irrevocably withdrew its application to drain into the St. Lucie canal thereby removing all reasons for objections" to the proceedings in Circuit Court. However, there is no evidence to indicate that there exists a prohibition against drainage into the St. Lucie canal or that Judge Trowbridge's order is intended to preclude approval of Pal-Mar's present application.
Findings Of Fact Lake Powell Improvement Corporation is a consortium of interested owners of land comprising the majority of the Lake Powell shoreline. Camp Helen Company, one of its members, owns lake property which was formerly operated as a recreational facility for associates of Avondale Mills. Camp Helen Company now holds the property for the possibility of future development. George Jeter is one of approximately 76 persons who sent a form letter to the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) in opposition to the designation of Lake Powell/Phillips Inlet as an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW). The rule-making proceeding to designate Lake Powell/Phillips Inlet an OFW was initiated with a petition filed on June 11, 1987, by the St. Andrews Bay Resource Management Association, a private citizens' organization formed in 1986 to help protect wildlife and resources in the St. Andrews Bay area. A public workshop was conducted by DER on September 6, 1990, in Panama City, Florida. Approximately 70 persons attended the workshop, including Bay County residents, Walton County residents, Lake Powell area property owners and representatives from various organizations. Craig Crockard, Vice President of Lake Powell Improvement Corporation, opposed the designation based on alleged degradation of property values and tax base, negative impact on growth and increase in road maintenance costs. Agency staff encouraged workshop participants and members of the public to submit information, including economic information, that would aid in the decision-making process. Only general and speculative information was received, with the exception of a response from the Department of Transportation that costs of future construction and expansion of the Phillips Inlet bridge, part of four-laning Highway 98, would be increased by $1.5 million as a result of the OFW regulations. DER sent a letter to Craig Crockard, received on April 2, 1991, requesting specifics as to the property owners' development plans and estimated economic impacts by April 5th. Crockard responded that the deadline was too short and that it was obvious that the decision had already been made. At no time, up to and including the hearing before the Environmental Regulation Commission (ERC), did Petitioners or other opponents provide information as to specific economic impacts of the proposed designation. The proposed rule would add the following area to rule 17- 302.700(9)(i), F.A.C. specifying special waters under the OFW designation: Special Waters * * * Lake Powell, Phillips Inlet, and all tributaries to Lake Powell as bounded by the following described line: Begin at the Northwest corner of Section 26, Township 2 South, Range 18 West; thence East to the Northwest corner of Section 29, Township 2 South, Range 17 West; thence South to the Northwest corner of the SW 1/4 of Section 29, Township 2 South, Range 17 West; thence East to the West line of Section 27, Township 2 South, Range 17 West, thence South to the mean high water line of the Gulf of Mexico; thence meander Northwest along the mean high water line to the West line of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 18 West; thence North to the point of beginning ( - - 91). * * * In making its determination to recommend OFW designation for Lake Powell to the ERC, the Department compared Lake Powell to other water bodies. Lake Powell was found to be exceptionally ecologically and recreationally significant in terms of size, water quality and recreational usage. The Department makes its determination as to whether the proposed water body is exceptional by making direct comparisons to features of other water bodies, and by relying on the professional judgements of others familiar with the particular class of water bodies. Lake Powell has been compared by professionals familiar with other water bodies in the area and in their opinion it has exceptional value as an ecosystem. The Department relied on professional judgement of this type as well as its own findings when making the determination that Lake Powell was exceptional. Lake Powell is located in Bay and Walton Counties in Northwest Florida adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico. Its total surface area of 737 acres makes it the largest by far of any of a series of similar lakes in the area. Seven small streams provide fresh water to the lake; periodically Phillips Inlet, connecting the lake to the Gulf of Mexico, opens or closes. When the inlet is open, the lake becomes estuarine in nature. Most of the shoreline of Lake Powell is still undeveloped and the lake is significant in that it has experienced only minimal adverse impact from human activity. There are no permitted point source discharges to Lake Powell. It is basin-shaped, with a shallow shell, steep sandy slopes, and a flat bottom ranging from approximately 10 to 20 feet deep. Silty, high organic sediments in the water are amenable to degradation and are uniquely sensitive to pollution. Restricted flushing and the opportunity for development growth in the area add to that sensitivity. Lake Powell is a Class III waterbody. Water quality in the lake is good, and meets Class III standards; some parameters are as good as Class II standards. The low dissolved oxygen level in the lake is a result of natural conditions, is not a result of pollution, and is therefore not a violation of the Class III standard for dissolved oxygen. Lake Powell is one of the lakes in the state that is part of the water quality sampling effort known as Lake Watch. A benefit of OFW designation to this effort will be that Lake Powell, absent degradation, can serve as a control lake to compare other Lake Watch lakes throughout the State. At least 170 species of birds, (trust resources of the US Fish and Wildlife Service), have been observed and are dependent on Lake Powell. Unusual species include the piping plover (federally and state designated threatened), snowy plover (state designated threatened), least tern (state designated threatened), and bald eagle (federally designated endangered and state designated threatened). These species have a direct dependence on Lake Powell for habitat, feeding, or nesting areas. They are dependent on non-trust species such as small fishes which could be impacted by chemicals introduced to the lake. Edwin James Kepner, a biologist for the National Marine Fisheries Service, has identified three new species of nematodes which so far have been uniquely found in Lake Powell. Although nematode species are among the most abundant on earth (97,000 individuals may be found in a single rotting apple), they are a highly significant part of an ecological system and must be understood and studied for any understanding of marine communities. The lake supports a diversity of animals. At least 87 species of macrobenthic invertebrates and 67 species of fin fish inhabit the lake, a diversity based on the system's intermittent connection to the Gulf and the lake's relatively pristine condition compared to other lakes. One would expect to find even more diversity, 3 to 4 times more species, if better and more accurate sampling methods were employed. Lake Powell presents a unique nursery area, since most large predator fishes do not have access to it. The lake presently supports a variety of recreational activities, including canoeing, sailing, windsurfing, water-skiing, fishing, crabbing and picnicking. This recreational use has increased during the last five years. Lake Powell is ranked 36th out of 361 lakes statewide in a 1982 study of recreational usage. In terms of potential to the public for recreational usage, Lake Powell has three public access points to the lake, and a possible fourth. Public access is gained by a Bay County public park and by way of Gulf View Drive, which is owned by Bay County and used to launch boats. There is a public dock in Walton County which is also used extensively. The fourth access is currently the subject of an inquiry by the Bay County Audubon Society. The unusual quality of recreational experience lies in the pristine nature of the lake and the fact that it is located not far from the Miracle Strip in Panama City Beach. The ERC Commissioners, who were taken on a tour of the lake, were able to contrast the two areas and found that Lake Powell had unusual recreational value. Lake Powell provides an exceptional educational opportunity, and with its many different types of habitat it is a compact, manageable educational laboratory. As compared to the St. Andrews Bay System it would be much easier to collect samples, obtain information on biotic communities and generally conduct research on the effectiveness of regulatory programs, due to the manageable size of the lake. The proposed amendment to Rule 17-302.700(9)(i), F.A.C., to designate Lake Powell as an OFW would potentially affect future Department permit applicants by requiring they provide the Department with reasonable assurances that the proposed project is clearly in the public interest and that the proposed project would not lower existing ambient water quality standards (Rule 17-4.242, F.A.C.); by requiring that direct stormwater discharges into the lake include an additional 50% treatment level (Rule 17-25.025(9), F.A.C.); and by reducing the exemption for private residential docks from 1000 square feet to 500 square feet (Rule 17-4.04(9)(c), F.A.C.). These requirements will result in increased costs to permit applicants, although the costs cannot be calculated at this time since there are no such projects firmly proposed to the Department. The primary beneficial effect of the proposed rule would be the protection of future water quality based on existing ambient water quality standards at time of OFW designation. Pursuant to Section 120.54(2), F.S., an Economic Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared by the Department. Section 120.54(2)(b), F.S., requires the statement to include: * * * An estimate of the cost to the agency of the implementation of the proposed action, including the estimated amount of paperwork; An estimate of the cost or the economic benefit to all persons directly affected by the proposed action; An estimate of the impact of the proposed action on competition and the open market for employment, if applicable; A detailed statement of the data and method used in making each of the above estimates; and An analysis of the impact on small business as defined in the Florida Small and Minority Business Assistance Act of 1985. Additionally, Rule 17-302.700(4)(e) provides: An economic impact analysis consistent with Chapter 120, shall be prepared which provides a general analysis of the impact on growth and development including such factors as impacts on planned or potential industrial, agricultural, or other development or expansion. It is undisputed that the EIS properly addressed the costs of implementation to the Department. The EIS identified the kind of Department permit applicant that would potentially be affected by the rule amendment, and what kinds of developmental impacts could be expected by operation of other Department rules. The EIS did not identify any specific costs that would be attributable to the rule, as the Department was unaware of any specific development plans for the lake that would be subject to the Department rules. Existing development activities are grandfathered and would not be affected by the more stringent requirements. The Department stated in its EIS that the overall costs imposed on future development due to the proposed OFW designation would depend on both the nature of the development and its impact on the ambient water quality of the lake. Since the type and nature of future development in the area is uncertain, an estimate of the potential aggregate costs associated with the proposed OFW designation could not be made at the time the EIS was prepared. The EIS properly addressed the costs of the proposed rule to the parties, based upon the facts as known to the Department. The benefits to the public of the rule were stated to be largely environmental, as a result of protection of future ambient water quality standards in the lake. The EIS cited an economic benefit to land owners around the lake in the form of enhanced property values due to water quality protections of the OFW designation, water quality being an important variable in determining property values of waterfront property. That property values would be enhanced is based on the DER economist's study of another state's experience and experience with OFW designation in other Florida counties. The EIS properly addresses the benefits of the rule. The EIS states that there will be no significant effect on competition as a result of the proposed OFW designation; Petitioners have not presented any evidence to the contrary. The EIS adequately addresses the rule's effect on competition. The EIS states that the proposed OFW designation is not expected to create any significant adverse disproportionate impacts on small businesses, as required by Section 120.54(2)(b)5., F.S. As Petitioners have not introduced any evidence to the contrary, the EIS adequately addresses this issue. The EIS states that appropriate economic analysis techniques were employed preparing the EIS. Petitioners participated in the rulemaking process; they attended the Panama City workshop when economic information was solicited; they submitted written comments, none of which provided specific economic information; and they participated in the ERC hearing but offered no evidence to the Commission regarding economic impacts of the rule. The type of information they suggest that the Department should consider was not submitted by them, or anyone else, during the rulemaking process or this hearing. The evidence shows that the Department considered all comments submitted throughout the rulemaking process in making the recommendation of OFW designation to the ERC. The EIS properly explains the data and methodology used in its preparation, and this data and methodology was adequate to estimate the economic impacts of the rule. In January 1991, the Bay County Board of County Commissioners amended the County's comprehensive plan to provide special protection for Lake Powell. These provisions include more stringent requirements for stormwater retention and detention, an objective to maintain Lake Powell's water quality at its present level, restriction on use of household septic tanks, designation of a low-density residential zone, and prohibition of point source discharges which would lower existing water quality. (Joint Exhibit #1, Appendix D) Both parties have invoked the plan amendments for their own purpose. Petitioners argue that the plan amendments provide the same or greater protection than the proposed OFW designation and that the designation is not needed. This argument ignores the fact that at least 10% of the lake lies within Walton County, outside Bay County's jurisdiction. DER did not require Bay County to amend its plan and could not require it to maintain the new Lake Powell protections indefinitely. The OFW designation does not detract from or conflict with the local government's commendable initiative, but rather augments it. Respondent, DER, addresses the plan in its modified EIS where it discusses the contention by the Department of Transportation (DOT) that OFW designation will add $1.5 million in costs to widen a road at the Phillips Inlet bridge. DER's economist concedes that designation will result in additional costs and has discussed that in the EIS. Because he has not received back-up data from DOT he is unable to confirm that the cost will be as much as DOT asserts. He also attributes the increase to the new stormwater requirements of the Bay County comprehensive plan, and concludes the additional costs due to OFW designation might be zero. (Joint Exhibit #2, p. 7) Even if misplaced, the attribution of costs does not invalidate the EIS or the proposed designation. The EIS generally describes potential costs and provides a basis to weigh the environmental, social and economic costs against the environmental, social and economic benefits. In summary, the facts above support the ERC's finding that the waters selected for designation are of exceptional recreational or ecological significance and the benefits of designation outweigh its costs.
The Issue Whether Rules 40B-1.702(4); 40B-4.1020(12) and (30); 40B-4.1030; 40B-4.1040(1)(b) and (c); 40B-4.2030(4); 40B-4.3000(1)(a); 40B-4.3010; 40B-4.3020; 40B-4.3030; 40B- 4.3040; and 40B-400.103(1)(h), Florida Administrative Code, of the Suwannee River Water Management District, are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority for reasons described in the Second Amended Petition to Determine Validity of Rules.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Angelo's is a Florida Limited Partnership, whose address is 26400 Sherwood, Warren, Michigan 48091. The District is an agency of the State of Florida established under Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, with its address at 9225 County Road 49, Live Oak, Florida 32060. Angelo's owns property in Hamilton County approximately four miles to the east of Interstate 75 and to the north of U.S. Highway 41, immediately to the east of the Alapaha River. Angelo's conducts commercial sand mining operations on a portion of its property pursuant to various agency authorizations, including an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) issued by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (Department), Permit No. 158176-001, and a Special Permit issued by Hamilton County, SP 98-3. The ERP was issued by the Department pursuant to its authority under Chapter 373, Part IV, Florida Statutes. Angelo's mining operations constitute a "mining project" as that term is used in Section II.A.1.e of an Operating Agreement Concerning Regulation under Part IV, Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Aquaculture General Permits under Section 403.814, Florida Statutes, between the District and the Department (Operating Agreement). The Operating Agreement has been adopted as a District rule pursuant to Rule 40B-400.091, Florida Administrative Code. Angelo's has filed with the Department an application to modify its ERP to expand its sand mining operations into an area of its property immediately to the west of its current operations (the "proposed expanded area"). Angelo's application is being processed by the Department at this time. Angelo's ERP modification application is being processed by the Department under the Operating Agreement. The District has asserted permitting jurisdiction over the proposed expanded area because the proposed sand mining activities would occur in what the District asserts to be the floodway of the Alapaha. The District asserts that an ERP would be required from the District so that the District can address the work of the district (WOD) impacts. Petitioner has not filed a permit application with the District regarding the project. It is Petitioner's position that to do so would be futile. The Challenged Rules The rules or portions thereof which are challenged in this proceeding are as follows: Rule 40B-1.702(4), Florida Administrative Code, reads as follows: (4) A works of the district permit under Chapter 40B-4, F.A.C., must be obtained prior to initiating any project as outlined in (3) above within a regulatory floodway as defined by the District. Rule 40B-4.1020(12) and (30), Florida Administrative Code, read as follows: (12) "Floodway" or 'regulatory floodway" means the channel of a river, stream, or other watercourse and adjacent land areas that must be reserved in order to discharge the 100-year flood without cumulatively increasing the 100-year flood elevation more than a designated height. Unless otherwise noted, all regulatory floodways in the Suwannee River Water Management District provide for no more then one-foot rise in surface water. * * * (30) "Work of the district" means those projects and works including, but not limited to, structures, impoundments, wells, streams, and other watercourses, together with the appurtenant facilities and accompanying lands, which have been officially adopted by the governing board as works of the district. Works of the district officially adopted by the board are adopted by rule in Rule 40B-4.3000 of this chapter. Rule 40B-4.1030, Florida Administrative Code, reads as follows: The implementation dates of this chapter are as follows: January 1, 1986 for Rule 40B- 4.1040(1)(a) which requires persons to obtain surfacewater management permits. April 1, 1986 for Rule 40B- 4.1040(1)(b) and Rule 40B-4.3040 which require persons to obtain works of the district development permit if the proposed development is in one of the following areas adopted as a work of the district. The Alapaha River and its floodway in Hamilton County, Florida; The Aucilla River and its floodway in Jefferson, Madison, or Taylor counties, Florida; The Suwannee River or its floodway in Columbia, Hamilton, Lafayette, Madison, or Suwannee counties, Florida; or The Withlacoochee River and its floodway in Hamilton or Madison counties, Florida. (c) July 1, 1986 for Rule 40B-4.1040(1)(b) or 40B-4.3040 which require persons to obtain work of the district development permit if the proposed development is in one of the following areas adopted as a work of the district. The Santa Fe River and its floodway in Alachua, Bradford, Columbia, Gilchrist, Suwannee, or Union counties, Florida; or The Suwannee River and its floodway in Dixie, Gilchrist, or Levy counties, Florida. Rule 40B-4.1040(1)(b) and (c), Florida Administrative Code, reads as follows: (1) Permits are required as follows: * * * Works of the district development permit prior to connecting with, placing structures or works in or across, discharging to, or other development within a work of the district. When the need to obtain a works of the district development permit is in conjunction with the requirements for obtaining a surfacewater management permit, application shall be made and shall be considered by the district as part of the request for a surfacewater management permit application. Otherwise, a separate works of the district development permit must be obtained. Rule 40B-4.2030(4), Florida Administrative Code, reads as follows: (4) The new surfacewater management systems or individual works shall not facilitate development in a work of the district if such developments will have the potential of reducing floodway conveyance. (emphasis supplied) Rule 40B-4.3000(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, reads as follows: The governing board is authorized to adopt and prescribe the manner in which persons may connect with or make use of works of the district pursuant to Section 373.085, Florida Statutes. Further, Section 373.019(15) provides that works of the district may include streams and accompanying lands as adopted by the governing board. In order to implement the non-structural flood control policy of the district, the governing board finds it is necessary to prevent any obstruction of the free flow of water of rivers and streams within the district. Therefore, the governing board does hereby adopt the following rivers and their accompanying floodways as works of the district: The Alapaha River and its floodway in Hamilton County, Florida; . . . . Rule 40B-4.3010, Florida Administrative Code, reads as follows: A general works of the district development permit may be granted pursuant to the procedures in Rule 40B-1.703 to any person for the development described below: Construction of a structure for single-family residential or agricultural use including the leveling of land for the foundation and associated private water supply, wastewater disposal, and driveway access which is in compliance with all applicable ordinances or rules of local government, state, and federal agencies, and which meets the requirements of this chapter. A general permit issued pursuant to this rule shall be subject to the conditions in Rule 40B-4.3030. Rule 40B-4.3020, Florida Administrative Code, reads as follows: Content of Works of the District Development Permit Applications. Applications for a general work of the district development permit shall be filed with the district and shall contain the following: Form 40B-4-5, "Application for General Work of the District Development Permit," Suwannee River Water Management District, 4-1-86, hereby incorporated by reference and which contains the following: The applicant's name and complete address including zip code; The owner's name and complete address if applicant is other than the owner; If applicable, the name, complete address, phone number, and contact person of the applicant or owner; Copies of all permits received from local units of government, state, or federal agencies, specifically a copy of the building or development permit issued by the appropriate unit of local government, including any variances issued thereto, and a copy of the onsite sewage disposal system permit issued by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services under Chapter 10D- 6, Florida Administrative Code; A site plan to scale showing all improvements, work, or works with any conditions or limitations placed thereon; and Any supporting calculations, designs, surveys, or applicable documents, which in the applicant's opinion, may support the application. Applications for individual or conceptual approval works of the district development permits shall be filed with the district and shall contain the following: Form 40B-4-4, "Application for Surfacewater Management System Construction, Alteration, Operation, Maintenance, and/or Works of the District Development", Suwannee River Water Management District, 10-1-85, hereby adopted by reference and which contains the following: The applicant's name and complete address including zip code; The owner's name and complete address if applicant is other than the owner; If applicable, the name, complete address, phone number, and contact person of the owner. General project information including: The applicant's project name or identification number; The project location relative to county, section, township, and range, or a metes and bounds description; The total project area in acres; The total land area owned or controlled by the applicant or owner which is contiguous with the project area; A description of the scope of the proposed project including the land uses to be served; A description of the proposed surfacewater management system or work; A description of the water body or area which will receive any proposed discharges from the system; and Anticipated beginning and ending date of construction or alteration. Copies of all permits received from, or applications made to, local units of government, state, or federal agencies. A site plan to scale showing all improvements, work, or works with any conditions or limitations placed thereon. Any supporting calculations, designs, surveys, or applicable legal documents, which in the applicant's opinion, support the application. Copies of engineer or surveyor certifications required by this chapter. Rule 40B-4.3030, Florida Administrative Code, reads as follows: Conditions for Issuance of Works of the District Development Permits. The district will not approve the issuance of separate permits for development in a work of the district for any proposed project that requires a district surfacewater management permit pursuant to Part II of this chapter. For such projects, development in a work of the district may be authorized as part of any surfacewater management permit issued. The district will not approve the issuance of a works of the district development permit for any work, structures, road, or other facilities which have the potential of individually or cumulatively reducing floodway conveyance or increasing water-surface elevations above the 100-year flood elevation, or increasing soil erosion. The district will presume such a facility will not reduce conveyance or increase water-surface elevations above the 100-year flood elevation or increase soil erosion if: Roads with public access are constructed and laid out in conformance with the minimum standards of local government. Where roads are not required to be paved, the applicant must provide design specifications for erosion and sediment control. Where roads are required to be paved, swales will generally be considered adequate for erosion and sediment control; Buildings in the floodway are elevated on piles without the use of fill such that the lowest structural member of the first floor of the building is at an elevation at least one foot above the 100-year flood elevation; The area below the first floor of elevated buildings is left clear and unobstructed except for the piles or stairways; A permanent elevation monument is established on the property to be developed by a surveyor. The monument shall be adequate to establish land surface and minimum buildup elevations to the nearest 1/100 of a foot; No permanent fill or other obstructions are placed above the natural grade of the ground except for minor obstructions which are less than or equal to 100 square feet of the cross-sectional area of the floodway on any building or other similar structure provided that all such obstruction developed on any single parcel of land after the implementation date of this chapter is considered cumulatively; No activities are proposed which would result in the filling or conversion of wetlands. For any structure placed within a floodway which, because of its proposed design and method of construction, may, in the opinion of the district, result in obstruction of flows or increase in the water surface elevation of the 100-year flood, the district may require as a condition for issuance of a work of the district development permit that an engineer certify that such a structure will not obstruct flows or increase 100-year flood elevations. The following conditions shall apply to all works of the district development permits issued for development on lands subdivided after January 1, 1985: Clearing of land shall be limited [except as provided in (b) and (c) below] to that necessary to remove diseased vegetation, construct structures, associated water supply, wastewater disposal, and private driveway access facilities, and no construction, additions or reconstruction shall occur in the front 75 feet of an area immediately adjacent to a water. Clearing of vegetation within the front 75 feet immediately adjacent to a water shall be limited to that necessary to gain access or remove diseased vegetation. Harvest or regeneration of timber or agricultural crops shall not be limited provided the erosion of disturbed soils can be controlled through the use of appropriate best management practices, the seasonal scheduling of such activities will avoid work during times of high-flood hazard, and the 75 feet immediately adjacent to and including the normally recognized bank of a water is left in its natural state as a buffer strip. As to those lands subdivided prior to January 1, 1985, the governing board shall, in cases of extreme hardship, issue works of the district development permits with exceptions to the conditions listed in Rule 40B-4.3030(4)(a) through (c). The 75-foot setback in paragraphs (a) through (d) above shall be considered a minimum depth for an undisturbed buffer. The limitations on disturbance and clearing within the buffer as set out in paragraphs through (d) above shall apply, and any runoff through the buffer shall be maintained as unchannelized sheet flow. The actual depth of the setback and buffer for any land use other than single-family residential development, agriculture, or forestry shall be calculated in accordance with the methodology in: "Urban Hydrology for Small Watersheds", U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, Engineering Division, Technical Release 55, June 1986; and, "Buffer Zone Study for Suwannee River Water Management District", Dames and Moore, September 8, 1988, such that the post-development composite curve number for any one-acre area within the encroachment line does not exceed; a value of 46 for areas within the encroachment line with predominantly Class A soils; a value of 65 for areas within the encroachment line with predominantly Class B soils; a value of 77 for areas within the encroachment line with predominantly Class C soils; or a value of 82 for areas within the encroachment line with predominantly Class D soils. (emphasis supplied) Rule 40B-4.3040, Florida Administrative Code, reads as follows: Unlawful Use of Works of the District. It shall be unlawful to connect with, place a structure in or across, or otherwise cause development to occur in a work of the district without a works of the district development permit. The district may use any remedy available to it under Chapter 120 or 373, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 40B-1, Florida Administrative Code, to cause an unpermitted development to be removed or permitted. It shall be unlawful for any permitted use to violate the provisions of Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, or this chapter, or the limiting conditions of a works of the district development permit. The district may use any remedy available to it under Chapter 120 or 373, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 40B-1, Florida Administrative Code, to cause the unpermitted use to be removed or brought into compliance with Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and this chapter. Damage to works of the district resulting from violations specified in Rule 40B-4.3040(1) and (2) above shall be repaired by the violator to the satisfaction of the district. In lieu of making repairs, the violator may deposit with the district a sufficient sum to insure such repair. Rule 40B-400.103(1)(h), Florida Administrative Code, reads as follows: (1) In order to obtain a standard general, individual, or conceptual approval permit under this chapter or chapter 40B-4, F.A.C., an applicant must provide reasonable assurance that the construction, alteration, operation, maintenance, removal or abandonment of a surface water management system: * * * (h) Will not cause adverse impacts to a work of the District established pursuant to s. 373.086. . . . Facts Based Upon the Evidence of Record History of the rules Mr. David Fisk is Assistant Director of the District. At the time of the hearing, he had been employed there for 26 and one-half years. He played a significant role in the rule adoption process of the rules that are the subject of this dispute. As part of that process, the District entered into a consulting contract with an engineering, planning, and consulting firm and consulted with the U.S. Corps of Engineers and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to conduct what are described as the FEMA flood studies. Additionally, the district commissioned an aerial photography consultant who provided a series of rectified ortho photographs of the entire floodplain of the rivers within the District, and a surveying subcontractor who provided vertical control and survey cross sections and hydrographic surveys of the rivers. The District also worked in conjunction with the United States Geological Survey to accumulate all of the hydrologic record available on flooding. The information was given to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers who, operating under FEMA guidelines for conducting flood insurance rate studies, performed the analytical and computer modeling work to identify the flood plains and floodway boundaries. The District used the amassed knowledge of maps, cross sections and surveys that were developed as part of the FEMA flood studies as technical evidence or support for the adoption of the works of the district rules. Following a series of public workshops and public hearings in 1985, the rules were adopted and became effective in 1986. None of the rules were challenged in their proposed state. The District adopted the floodways of the Suwannee, Santa Fe, Alapaha, Aucilla, and Withlacoochee Rivers as works of the district. According to Mr. Fisk, the District adopted the rules pursuant to Section 373.086, Florida Statutes, which provided authority to the District to adopt district works and Section 373.085, Florida Statutes, which provided authority to regulate activities within those works. The Floodway Line Petitioner hired Mr. John Barnard, a professional civil engineer, with extensive environmental permitting experience, to look at the floodway and floodplain issues associated with Petitioner's site and project. Mr. Barnard conducted an engineering study entitled, "Floodplain Evaluation." It was Mr. Barnard's opinion that FEMA's determination of the floodway line was less than precise. Mr. Barnard used FEMA's data regarding the base flood elevation but manually changed the encroachment factor resulting in his placement of the floodway line in a different location than determined by FEMA. Mr. Barnard acknowledged that different engineers using different encroachment factors would reach different conclusions.1/ Respondent's expert in hydrology and hydraulic engineering, Brett Cunningham, noted that the definition of floodway in Rule 40B-4.1020(12), Florida Administrative Code, is essentially the same definition that used is in the FEMA regulations and which also is commonly used across the country in environmental rules and regulations. Mr. Barnard also acknowledged that the District's definition of "floodway", as found in Rule 40B-4.1020(12), Florida Administrative Code, is fairly commonly used by environmental regulatory agencies. Moreover, it was Mr. Cunningham's opinion that the Alapaha River is a stream or watercourse within the meaning of the rule and its floodway an accompanying land. In Mr. Cunningham's opinion, the FEMA flood insurance studies are widely used across the country for a variety of reasons and are typically relied upon by hydrologists and engineers to locate floodways. The definition of "works of the district" in Rule 40B-1020(30), Florida Administrative Code, is taken directly from the language found in Section 373.019(23), Florida Statutes. The statutory definition includes express references to streams and other watercourses, together with the appurtenant facilities and accompanying lands. Petitioner alleges that the phrase "will not cause adverse impact to a work of the SRWMD" as found in Rule 40B- 400.103(1)(h) is not clear because it does not identify what specific adverse impacts are being reviewed. While Petitioner's expert, Mr. Price, was not clear as to what the phrase means, Respondent's expert, Mr. Cunningham, understood the meaning of the phrase and noted that "adverse impact" is a phrase which is very commonplace in the rules and regulations of environmental agencies and is attributed a commonsense definition. The expert engineers differed in their opinions as to the meaning of the term "potential for reducing floodway conveyance" as used in Rule 40B-4.2030(4), Florida Administrative Code. According to Petitioner's expert engineer, Mr. Barnard, "potential for reducing floodway conveyance" is not a specific term that is open to interpretation as an engineer, and that he cannot quantify what constitutes "potential." Respondent's expert, Mr. Cunningham, understood the meaning of the phrase to be any increase in floodway conveyance. It was his opinion that there was nothing about that phrase to cause confusion. Rule 40B-4.3030, Florida Administrative Code, addresses conditions for issuance of works of the district development permits. Petitioner's expert Mr. Price testified that there is no quantification to what constitutes an "increase in soil erosion" as referenced in subsection (2) and linked the reference of soil erosion to a 100-year flood event referenced in the same subsection. Mr. Cunningham was of the opinion that there is no need to quantify an increase in soil erosion in the rule. He noted that soil erosion is used in a common sense manner and that attempting to put a numerical limit on it is not practical and "it's not something that's done anywhere throughout the country. It's just not something that lends itself to easy quantification like flood stages do". Mr. Cunningham's opinion that the words and phrases which Petitioner asserts are vague are words of common usage and understanding to persons in the field is the more persuasive testimony. This opinion is also consistent with statutory construction used by courts which will be addressed in the conclusions of law.
The Issue Whether or not the action taken by the Respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District, in the person of its Governing Board at a meeting held on March 15, 1978, and by an amendment to the action which took place on November 15, 1978, constituted the adoption of a rule, which is invalid for failure to meet the requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. (The motion and amendment stated the following: March 15, 1978 "That the St. Johns River Water Management District close District-owned fee simple land in the St. Johns Marsh to half-track or full-track vehicles which have as an integral part tires and/or rubber tracks for propulsion hut excluding four-wheel and conventional to-wheel-drive vehicles, and direct staff to return to the Board within 90 days with an Impact of vehicu- lar use on Marsh ecosystems and the management policy with regard to these track vehicles, and that emergency vehicles be excluded from the prohibition proposed." November 15, 1978 "1. A motion to ban all vehicles excepting boats from the District marsh held in fee simple."
Findings Of Fact THIS CAUSE comes on for consideration based upon the Petition for Administrative Determination filed by the Petitioner, Lacy Everett, and received by the State of Florida, Department of Administration, Division of Administrative Hearings, on November 9, 1978. This Petition was filed pursuant to provisions of Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes. Subsequent to the receipt of the Petition, the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings reviewed the Petition and made an order of assignment of the case to Charles C. Adams, Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings. The date of the Order of Assignment was November 13, 1978. By that Order, the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings required that a final hearing be held within thirty (30) days of the date of the Order. The hearing was conducted on December 4, 1978. The Petitioner, Lacy Everett, is a resident of Delray Beach, Florida. Beginning in 1957 and continuing through 1978, the Petitioner has hunted or desired to hunt in the area known as the St. Johns Marsh. This marshland Is under the ownership and control of the Respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District. During the pendency of the time that the petitioner has hunted in the subject area he has used half-track, four-wheel-drive and conventional two-wheel-drive vehicles. For the last nine years the type vehicle he has used has been a half-track vehicle. The petitioner has elected this method of transportation because in his judgment it is the only vehicle which would allow him access to the St. Johns Marsh. The Petitioner has hunted in the St. Johns Marsh area on every weekend over a two-month period in each year during the time frame which began in 1957 up to 1578, in which year he was prohibited from using the half-track vehicle. He wishes to hunt in the St. Johns Marsh area in succeeding years and to use the half-track vehicle. The Respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District, is an agency created pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, which statute deals with the water resources of the State of Florida. Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, Part I, is entitled "State Water Resources Plan." The overall policy statement of that plan may be found in Section 373.016, Florida Statutes, which reads as follows: "373.016 Declaration of policy.-- The waters in the state are among its basic resources. Such waters have not hereto- fore been conserved or fully controlled so as to realize their full beneficial use. It is further declared to he the policy of the Legislature: To provide for the management of water and related land resources; To promote the conservation, development, and proper utilization of surface and ground water; To develop and regulate dams, impoundments, reservoirs, and other works and to provide water storage for beneficial purposes; To prevent damage from floods, soil erosion, and excessive drainage; To preserve natural resources, fish and wildlife; To promote recreational development, pro- tect public lands, and assist in maintaining the navigability of rivers and harbors; and Otherwise to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the people of this state. The Legislature recognizes that the water resource problems of the state vary from region to region, both in magnitude and complexity. It is therefore the intent of the Legislature to vest in the Department of Environmental Regulation or its successor agency the power and responsibility to accomplish the conservation, protection, management, and control of the waters of the state and with sufficient flexibility and discretion to accomplish these ends through delegation of appropriate powers to the various water management districts. The department may exercise any power heroin authorized to be exercised by a water management district; however, to the greatest extent practicable, such power should be delegated to the governing board of a water management district." To implement those policies, certain water management districts were created pursuant to Section 373.069, Florida Statutes. Respondent, St. Johns River water Management District, was one of the agencies established to create and exercise the overall policies of the State Water Resources Plan. Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, Part I, also allowed for agencies, such as the St. Johns River Water Management District, to purchase land as a means to effectuate management policies. This authority is granted in Section 373.086, Florida Statutes. In keeping with the statutory authority granted through Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, the Respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District, purchased the property known as the St. Johns Marsh and holds fee simple title to that land. On March 15, 1978, at a meeting of the Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District a motion was made and amended to the effect that: "The St. Johns River Water Management District close District-owned fee simple land in the St. Johns Marsh to half-track or full-track vehicles having as an integral part tires and/or rubber tracks for propulsion but excluding four-wheel and conventional two-wheel-drive vehicles, and direct staff to return to the Board within 90 days with an impact of vehicular use on Marsh ecosystems and a management policy with regard to these track vehicles, and that emergency vehicles be excluded from the prohibition proposed." That motion was seconded and carried unanimously by the directors present at the meeting. The terms and conditions of this motion may be found In the copy of the minutes made of the meeting held on March 15, 1978, which is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. At the meeting certain members of the public were allowed to speak on the issue of the motion, among these were persons who desired to use track vehicles in the St. Johns Marsh. The minutes do not indicate that the Petitioner was among those persons speaking. However, it was stipulated between the parties that the Petitioner did attend certain public hearings before the St. Johns River Water Management District Governing Board which dealt with the question of utilization of track vehicles in the St. Johns Marsh. On June 21, 1978, at a meeting of the Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District, the question of the prohibition of certain vehicles in the St. Johns Marsh was raised. In the course of that discussion one of the staff members presented four possible alternatives on the question of the continuation of the prohibition against the utilization of the aforementioned classes of vehicles. Those alternatives were that "(1) no action with no ban; (2) continue ban and extend the study period; (3) discontinue the ban-extend the study period; and (4) continue the ban with no more study." The matter was further considered in the course of the meeting and, under a motion which was carried unanimously, a decision was made to extend the ban for 90 days, meaning that the prohibition against the utilization of the type vehicles mentioned in the March 15, 1978, action would be extended for 90 days. Another element of the motion was that the public be notified that the final decision on the matter would be made by the Governing Board in 90 days and that no public hearing be advertised if it was not necessary. The discussion as reported in the minutes of the Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. The Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District met on October 13, 1978, and discussed the matter of a ban on half-track vehicles in the 8t. Johns Marsh. At that time a motion was made to extend the ban on utilization of half-track vehicles in the St. Johns Marsh until the next Board meeting, at which time a public hearing would be held. The expressed rationalization for extending the ban was due to the fact that there was in the mind of the Respondent an immediate danger to the public welfare in the area where the ban was imposed. The motion as stated was carried unanimously. Again, this discussion may be found in the minutes of the Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District for the date of October 13, 1978. These minutes are found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. Before the next meeting of the Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District was convened, the Petitioner requested a "draw out" hearing before the St. Johns River Water Management District. This request was made pursuant to Subsection 120.54(16), Florida Statutes. That request may be found as the Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. In his prayer for relief the Petitioner states that to proceed under Subsection 120.54(3), Florida Statutes, would not protect his interest and, therefore, it is necessary to proceed under Subsection 120.54(16), Florida Statutes. The request for hearing also alludes to the fact that the proposed rule had been published in the Florida Administrative weekly on October 20, 1978, and the rule published was the one originally adopted 00 March 15, 1978, as extended by the various meetings of the Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District held in the interim period. On November 14, 1978, a public hearing was held on the question of the motion which had been passed on March 15, 1978, and is the subject of this hearing. At the November 14, 1978, meeting the existence of the request for hearing under Subsection 120.54(16), Florida Statutes, was brought to the attention of the Governing Board, as well as the Petition which is the subject of this cause filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings. It was also discussed that an injunction suit was to be instituted against the Petitioner, Lacy Everett, on the basis that Mr. Everett intended to use a half-track vehicle to hunt on Use St. Johns Marsh in spite of the prohibition which had been instituted on March 15, 1978. The attorney for Mr. Everett was allowed to speak to the Board in the course of the meeting and expressed his legal theory of the case, as well as relating certain hearsay information pertaining to experiences which had been reported in the Florida Everglades pertaining to the utilization of half-track vehicles. The minutes of the November 14, 1978, meeting may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. On November 15, 1978, the Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District again met and considered the question of the use of off-road vehicles in the St, Johns Marsh. According to the minutes of the meeting, the attorney for the Respondent characterized the request for a "draw out" hearing made by the Petitioner as being a request for a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, hearing if the Respondent adopted the prohibition against the use of off-road vehicles as a rule. The minutes indicate that the attorney for the Respondent then instructed the Governing Board that in view of the absence of Petitioner's attorney at the November 15, 1978, hearing, the Board need not contact the Petitioner further on the question of the prohibition of off-road vehicles in the St. Johns Marsh. Subsequent to that instruction by the attorney for the Respondent, certain motions were made and passed as follows: "1. A motion to ban all vehicles excepting boats from the District marsh held in fee simple. This motion is to authorize our attorney to publish and advertise for rule adoption a rule prohibiting all vehicles excepting boats from the District marsh field in fee simple. Emergency vehicle use, District vehicle use and vehicle use necessary for ranch and farm operations of adjacent property owners shall be excepted from this rule. This motion will also authorize appropri- ate officers to arrest and prosecute all persons violating the Board's order on vehicle use in the marsh fee simple ownership. This motion is also to authorize nod ratify conjunctive suits against all persons violating the Board's order on vehicle use in the marsh fee simple ownership." In considering the facts and law involved in this dispute, the initial question to be resolved concerns the standing of the Petitioner to challenge the action prohibiting off-road vehicles which was taken on March 15, 1978, and amended on November 15, 1978. Petitioner has demonstrated his standing by establishing the long term pattern of his usage of the St. Johns Marsh for purposes of hunting and proving his reliance on the restricted classes of vehicles to transport him into the hunting area. Therefore, he is a proper party within the meaning of Subsection 120.52(10)(b), Florida Statutes, which reads: "Any other person who, as a matter of con- stitutional right, provision of statute, or provision of agency regulation, is entitled to participate in whole or in part in the proceed- ing, or whose substantial interests will be effected by proposed agency action, and who makes an appearance as a party." (emphasis added) Moreover, under the provisions of Subsection 120.54(4)(a), Florida Statutes, the person substantially effected may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of any proposed rule, using as a grounds the fact that the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Burns, 193 So.2d 691 (1 Fla.App. 1967), Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Kirk, 200 So.2d 178 (Fla. 1967) and City of Key West v. Askew, 324 So.2d 655 (1 Fla.App. 1975) On the merits of the Petition filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Petitioner is correct when he asserts that the procedural provisions of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, have not been complied with and the Respondent has agreed with this contention by written stipulation. This noncompliance with the provisions of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, pertains to the procedural requirements for summarization, a statement of authority, a statement of the estimate of the economic impact, notice and publication. The Petitioner is incorrect when he asserts that the Respondent has no legal authority for the promulgation of a rule pertaining to the regulation of the use of vehicles in the St. Johns Marsh which is held in fee simple by the Respondent. Respondent does have authority to regulate and that authority is found in Subsections 373.016 and 373.086, Florida Statutes. These provisions allow for the purchase of the land and for the protection of the environment and efficient use of water resources in the area of their concern. Therefore, the prohibition of vehicular traffic in the St. Johns Marsh is not per se an invalid exercise of legislative authority. Thus, the inquiry becomes one of whether or not the action taken of March 15, 1978, and the amendment to that action which occurred on November 15, 1978, is a rule and subject to the procedural requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. In Subsection 120.52(14) a rule is defined as: "(14) 'Rule' means each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the organi- zation, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any requirement or solicits any information not specifically required by statute or by an exist- ing rule. The term also includes the amendment or repeal of a rule. The term does not include: Internal management memoranda which do not affect either the private interests of any person or any plan or procedure important to the public and which have no application outside the agency issuing the memorandum. Legal memoranda or opinions issued to an agency by the Attorney General or agency legal opinions prior to their use in connection with an agency action. The preparation or modification of: Agency budgets. Contractual provisions reached as a result of collective bargaining. Agricultural marketing orders under chapter 573 or chapter 601. Curricula by an educational unit." The action taken by motion on March 15, 1978, and the November 15, 1978, amendment found in Motion No. 1 on that day's agenda should be analyzed in view of the definition of a rule stated in Subsection 120.52(14), Florida Statutes. When this is done, the inescapable conclusion that must be reached is that the original action of March 15, 1978, and the amendment of November 15, 1978, in which additional categories of vehicles were banned, were agency statements of general applicability that implemented and interpreted or described law or policy of that agency. Those actions of the two dates mentioned have broad application and have present and prospective effect. They, therefore, are not properly characterized as a rule which the agency Intends to adopt. They constitute a rule which exists and the passage and implementation of this rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, because the rule was not passed in accordance with the procedures required by Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. (Although the Petitioner has not plead his case under the provisions of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, the issues are duly joined and there is no prejudice to the parties in considering the case as a Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, dispute. The standing which the Petitioner had to assert his claim under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, would exist in a Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, hearing because he is substantially affected by the stated rule for the same reasons as set forth in the discussion of his Petition under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes.) The Respondent has tried to argue that the action it has taken on March 15, 1978, and extended up to and including the amendment of November 15, 1978, found in agenda motion No. 1 is an order of the agency not subject to attack under the provisions of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. It urges that the actions taken under various hearings before the Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District were preliminary to the passage of a proposed rule and that the authorization for the publication and advertisement of the rule did not take place until November 15, 1978, as Motion No. 2 on the agenda which has been spoken of. Had the Respondent requested studies by its staff on the feasibility of prohibiting certain classes of vehicles from being allowed to operate in the St. Johns Marsh as opposed to an absolute prohibition of certain classes of vehicles, then the Respondent's argument would be persuasive. In fact, the Respondent has implemented policy which prohibits specific members of the general public from utilizing the disputed area and has done so without affording an opportunity to those individual citizens to be heard on the question of the passage of such a rule and without following the mandated requirements found in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Respondent also argues that a "draw out" hearing was given in accordance with the requirements of Subsection 120.54(16), Florida Statutes, arid Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Therefore, any challenge to the action taken in that proceeding before the Respondent may not be made by a collateral attack under the provisions of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, that alleges that the action is a rule. This Order does not undertake to consider the propriety of the action taken in the Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, hearing held before the Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District. That action is viewed as an effort on the part of the Petitioner to protect himself against the short- term implications of the prohibition against the utilization of his half-track vehicle in the St. Johns Marsh, That in no way prohibits the Petitioner from filing an Independent attack against the rule itself under the provisions of either Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, or Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Once the Respondent has entered its order in the Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, hearing, which was the "draw out" hearing requested under Section 120.54(16), Florida Statutes, the Petitioner may appeal or not at his discretion. The underlying rule of March 15, 1978, as amended November 15, 1978, because of its prospective application is a proper subject of a rule challenge on the ground that its passage did not comply with the procedural requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Division of Administrative Hearings has exclusive jurisdiction over rule challenges filed pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and/or Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, and this remedy does not constitute a collateral scrutiny of agency action by a Hearing Officer within the meaning of the case of State Dept. of Health, Etc. v. Barr, 359 So.2d 503 (1 Fla.App. 1978). In the Barr case the Court indicated that the Respondents in the appeal could not on the one hand request a declaratory statement from an agency which was subject to appeal, and then make a collateral attack on that declaratory statement on the basis that the declaratory statement was an improperly promulgated rule. The Barr case facts may be distinguished from the facts sub judice, in that this Petitioner sought to protect himself via the Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, hearing, against the short-term acts of the Respondent which were prohibiting the utilization of the vehicles at the moment, and concurrently challenged the underlying basis of the actions which the agency was taking by filing his rules case under the provisions of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. By pursuing these remedies, the Petitioner is not subjecting the Respondent to harassment through duplicitous litigation.
