Findings Of Fact Petitioner was arrested in 1979 and convicted in 1980 of the third- degree felony of attempted trafficking in cannabis. He served 25 months of a five-year sentence. For about five months during 1978, Petitioner cultivated a marijuana crop consisting of about 120 plants. Although Petitioner's participation did not extend to the sale of the cannabis, he was aware of the commercial purpose for which it was being cultivated. Petitioner earned about $13,000 for his efforts. Shortly following his release from prison, Petitioner moved to the St. Petersburg area where he began to work in the roofing industry as a roofing laborer and, later, supervisor. He has continuously worked in the St. Petersburg area since, except for a period of about nine months during which he resided out of state. For the past two years, following an on-the-job injury, Petitioner has worked as a roofing sales representative. For the past nine months, he has worked as a sales representative for Ron Webb Roofing, where he worked as a roofing laborer and supervisor from 1983 through 1985 prior to his injury. Petitioner has never had a customer complaint while working in the roofing industry. As a sales representative, he is required to handle cash entrusted to him for his employer, and he has never mishandled any of these funds. Petitioner was married last July to a cardiac care nurse. He has since adopted her 16 year-old son, and the couple is expecting a baby in June. Petitioner is an active member of the PTA at his son's school. He also attends Northside Methodist Church nearly every week. Petitioner pursues as a hobby the practice of magic. He is a member of the Society for American Magicians, and this year is the president of the St. Petersburg assembly, which has 196 members and is currently the fifth largest in the United States. Petitioner has freely donated his magician services for the entertainment of the less fortunate. Recently, he performed for free for the Special Olympics in Clearwater, nursing homes, church groups, and birthday parties. Petitioner has rehabilitated himself and is of good moral character.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order issuing Petitioner a license as a home improvement seller. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 6th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan D. Watson, Esquire Yeakle and Watson, P.A. 890 Florida Federal Building One Fourth Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Stephen M. Christian, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of Comptroller 1313 Tampa Street Suite 615 Tampa, Florida 33602-3394 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Plaza Level The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, respondent Bobbie G. Scheffer, who holds license No. 0073955, was a real estate broker for Rivard Realty, Inc. in Fort Walton Beach, Florida; and Ralph S. Ecoff was a licensed real estate salesman, employed by Rivard Realty, Inc. He holds license No. 0454969. In the spring of 1988, another salesman in the employ of Rivard Realty, Inc., Wayne Thompson, obtained the listing for the three-bedroom, one-story house at 28 East Casa Loma Drive in Mary Esther, Florida, from its then corporate owner, Roman Acts, Inc. He received information about the property from a representative of the corporation. Without verifying the information, Mr. Thompson entered it into a computer. Misled by the owner's representative, he reported the house's age as eight years. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. In fact, the house had been built in 1974. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. A public water supply serves the house, but a septic tank, not a public sewer, receives wastewater from the house. Aware of these matters, Mr. Thompson, when confronted with a blank on a form labelled "WATR/SEW", filled in "Pub. Wat." Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. No more than another letter or two could have been squeezed into the blank on the form displayed on a computer video terminal. Respondent Ralph S. Ecoff saw the house in the course of showing it to prospective buyers, and decided to buy it himself. After a representative of Roman Acts, Inc. accepted his offer (but before the closing), Mr. Ecoff and a partner set about refurbishing the house. Mr. Ecoff, a septuagenarian who bought the house with the intention of reselling it, finds computers intimidating. Still another real estate salesman in the employ of Rivard Realty, Inc., Steve Kehran, volunteered to enter a revised listing in the multiple listing service computer, to let it be known that the property was again for sale. As instructed by Mr. Ecoff, Mr. Kehran raised the price and "changed the blurbage" (to read "EVERYTHING NEW AGAIN. COMPARES WITH NEW HOME. LOW INTEREST RATE," etc.) Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11. In keeping with Mr. Ecoff's instructions, Kehran relied on the superseded listing for other information about the house. That is why the age of the house was again inaccurately reported as eight years. Extrapolating innocently but inaccurately from the earlier listing's "Pub. Wat.," Mr. Kehran assumed public sewers accompanied the public water supply and filled in the "WATER/SEW" blank with the abbreviation "Comm Sew." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11. Mr. Ecoff had read the listing from which Mr. Kehran took the information but, he testified, he did not read it carefully. Whether he read over what Mr. Kehran wrote at any time before the Stacys complained of the inaccuracies is not clear. Mr. Ecoff has said all along that he was aware the property had a septic tank. He testified to this effect at hearing and also testified that he was aware the house was more than eight years old when the Stacys agreed to buy it. If he had read the listing Mr. Kehran entered in the computer for him with proper care and due regard for the importance of its accuracy, he would have discovered the misinformation it contained. Although Mr. Stacy had physical possession of a multiple listing sheet bearing the information Mr. Kehran introduced into the computer data bank at Mr. Ecoff's behest, while he and his wife drove around with Ms. Scheffer, looking at houses, and may well have read it at that time, the evidence did not show that either Ms. Scheffer or Mr. Ecoff reiterated the information verbally. (It was not clear whether Mr. Stacy retained the sheet Ms. Scheffer furnished him after seeing the house.) Engaged by a mortgage company, an appraiser who was familiar with the neighborhood reported the true age of the house, but put its "effective age" at ten years, after two visits to the property. The appraiser's report, which recited inaccurately, as the listing had, that a public sewer served the property, was furnished to the mortgage company that financed the Stacys' purchase. Once the report reached the mortgage company, it was available to the Stacys, although they did not in fact see it, as far as the evidence showed, before the closing, which took place on August 24, 1988. On or before January 1, 1991, Mr. and Mrs. Stacy will be required to cause pipe to be installed to connect the house to a public sewer main, itself yet to be laid. Mr. Stacy has been told the hook-up will cost $1,600.00 over and above the $600.00 it will cost to install the connector. Even so, the evidence did not establish that the house's dependence on a septic tank affected its market value in 1988. The evidence also failed to show that the house's age materially affected its value. Ms. Scheffer encourages salespersons in her employ to take advantage of courses the local Board of Realtors offers, and scheduled Mr. Ecoff for every such course available. She has not personally instructed salespeople to verify information sellers give them by independent inspection. Perhaps because the practice of relying on sellers' representations is widespread, the multiple listing sheets all bear the disclaimer, "INFORMATION DEEMED RELIABLE, BUT NOT GUARANTEED." The evidence did not show how carefully Ms. Scheffer read the inaccurate listing that salesmen in her employ generated, or that she would have been or should have been aware of the inaccuracies, however carefully she had examined the listing. Although Mr. Ecoff said he knew there was a septic tank on the property because the grass was so green in part of the backyard, Mr. Stacy testified that the septic tank is buried in front of the house. It was not proven that even an experienced real estate broker like Ms. Scheffer should necessarily infer an actual age of more than eight from an effective age of ten years. In short, the evidence did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that respondent Scheffer actually knew or had reason to know the listing was inaccurate.
Recommendation It is, in accordance with Rule 21V-18.008, Florida Administrative Code, recommended: That petitioner suspend respondent Ecoff's license for thirty (30) days. That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint, insofar as it alleges that respondent Scheffer violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1989). RECOMMENDED this 20th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1990.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was properly denied mortgage assistance through Florida Housing Finance Corporation's ("Florida Housing") Hardest-Hit Fund Elderly Mortgage Assistance ("ELMORE") program based on a conviction for fraud allegedly in connection with a real estate transaction.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes, to promote the public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing or refinancing housing. For purposes of this proceeding, Florida Housing is an agency of the State of Florida. Florida Housing is also considered the state's housing finance agency which means Florida Housing, at times, conducts business as if it were a financial institution. Florida Housing administers the Hardest-Hit Fund, using funds appropriated by the United States Congress through the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act to help stabilize housing markets and prevent foreclosures. The Hardest-Hit Fund comes directly to Florida Housing from the United States Treasury through a Housing Finance Agency ("HFA") Participation Agreement. The ELMORE program is one of the programs created under the umbrella of the Hardest-Hit Fund. The ELMORE program is designed to assist senior homeowners in Florida who are facing foreclosure due to the inability to pay property charges such as property taxes, homeowners insurance, and homeowners or condo association dues after the homeowner was paid all of the equity under a reverse mortgage. The HFA agreement is a summary guideline for the ELMORE program and its general requirements. The stated goal of the program is to help senior homeowners remain in their homes. The Summary Guidelines include certain borrower eligibility criteria, property/loan eligibility criteria, and program exclusions, among other guidelines. The program exclusions reference the "Dodd-Frank exclusion for having been convicted of a mortgage-related felony in the past ten years." The Dodd-Frank Act exclusion for criminal applicants is codified 12 U.S.C. § 5220b, and states in part: (d) Prevention of qualification for criminal applicants (1) In general No person shall be eligible to begin receiving assistance from the Making Home Affordable Program authorized under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (12 U.S.C. 5201 et seq.), or any other mortgage assistance program authorized or funded by that Act, on or after 60 days after July 21, 2010, if such person, in connection with a mortgage or real estate transaction, has been convicted, within the last 10 years, of any one of the following: Felony larceny, theft, fraud, or forgery. Money laundering. Tax evasion. On or about February 27, 2017, Betty Baldwin, Power of Attorney for Tolz, submitted an application for mortgage assistance through Florida Housing's Hardest-Hit Fund for ELMORE benefits. On or about May 11, 2017, the application was denied. On or about November 8, 2018, Tolz submitted another application for mortgage assistance from the ELMORE program. On December 5, 2018, Florida Housing's Director of Homeownership Programs, David Westcott, issued a letter with an ineligibility determination to Tolz, which included a Notice of Rights.1/ Mr. Westcott is ultimately responsible for the final eligibility determinations on Hardest-Hit Fund mortgage assistance applications. The Denial of ELMORE Program Benefits Mr. Westcott denied Tolz's application for ELMORE program funds because she had, what Mr. Westcott determined to be, a disqualifying felony conviction in connection with a real estate transaction in violation of the Dodd-Frank Act provision. Mr. Westcott testified that pursuant to the HFA agreement with the United States Treasury, Florida Housing is prohibited from using ELMORE funds to assist applicants that have a disqualifying Dodd-Frank Act conviction. During the period of 2003 through 2010, Tolz used her position as a fiduciary in the role of bankruptcy trustee, receiver, and personal representative to misappropriate millions of dollars from bankruptcy estates, receiverships, and other matters, by writing or causing the writing of unauthorized checks from a variety of fiduciary accounts which contained funds she was appointed to safeguard. Tolz then used the misappropriated money for her own benefit and to conceal her previous misappropriations by restoring the balances of other fiduciary accounts from which she had previously taken funds in a Ponzi scheme framework. To conceal this theft, Tolz falsified documents and used a fictitious bank account. On or about December 12, 2011, Tolz was convicted in Broward County Circuit Court of grand theft in the first degree. Tolz was convicted on or about July 27, 2011, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. To secure a plea deal and in order to bolster her claim that her sentence should be reduced from the federal guidelines, prior to sentencing, Tolz surrendered five real estate properties, which she owned, to the United States government. The value of these properties was then used to offset and lessen Tolz's restitution obligation to her victims. Tolz understood that these properties would not be accepted to satisfy her restitution obligation unless they were purchased, mortgaged, or improved with the assets of her victims. In the federal criminal case, Tolz executed a Factual Basis Supporting Change of Plea ("Factual Basis") on or about April 15, 2011. Tolz agreed not to contest the information in the Factual Basis. Further, Tolz agreed that it provided a sufficient factual basis for her plea of guilty in the case, and had the case proceeded to trial, that the United States would have proven the facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Paragraph 11 of the Factual basis states: MARIKA TOLZ, directly or indirectly, utilized funds obtained through the fraudulent scheme to purchase, maintain and improve real properties, including, but not limited to the following real properties: 2344 North Federal Highway, Hollywood, Florida; 1804 Sherman Street, Hollywood, Florida; 704 SE 3rd Avenue, Hallandale, Florida; 815 SW 30th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida; and 3031 North Ocean Blvd, Apartment 403, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308. In making the ineligibility determination on Tolz's application for ELMORE program funds, Mr. Westcott determined that Tolz's conviction was in connection with a real estate transaction because Tolz agreed in the Factual Basis that she used funds obtained through the fraud to "purchase, maintain and improve real properties." Florida Housing determined that Tolz's conviction disqualified her from receiving mortgage assistance from the ELMORE program because: As part of the Hardest-Hit Fund, the ELMORE program funds are authorized by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008; Tolz was convicted of the enumerated offense of a "fraud;" The conviction occurred on or about July 21, 2011, which is within the last ten years; and The conviction was in connection with a real estate transaction because Tolz used funds obtained through the fraud to "purchase, maintain and improve real properties." "In Connection With" A Mortgage or Real Estate Transaction Tolz contends that her crimes were not "in connection with a mortgage or real estate transaction." At both her sentencing hearing in federal court and at the final hearing in this proceeding, Tolz stated that she owned these surrendered properties for 30 or 40 years. Tolz now argues that because she owned these properties well before the fraud of which she was convicted occurred, no mortgage or real estate transaction was involved in the crime and, therefore, she should not be disqualified from ELMORE benefits. Tolz now claims she surrendered these properties to facilitate the forfeiture on the advice of counsel, that she was heavily medicated at the time of sentencing, and that the prosecutor and the court knew that these properties were not associated with her underlying crimes. Tolz admitted at final hearing that she surrendered these properties to do an end-run around the system to reduce the more than two million dollars she owed in restitution. However, in that same sentencing hearing, the prosecutor representing the United States stated "I'll also indicate, although it's clear from the record, that notwithstanding the picture that she's somehow a pauper, or was a pauper, the fact of the matter is the forfeiture properties indicated in the forfeiture which she agreed to were her properties, at least partially paid for by the offense."2/ An impartial reading of the sentencing transcript demonstrates that during sentencing the United States believed that the properties involved in the criminal forfeiture were, in part, paid for by the crime for which Petitioner was convicted. The undersigned finds the facts, as offered by Tolz in her 2011 "Factual Basis" offered in support of a sentence reduction and reduction of her restitution obligation, to be more credible than her denial at final hearing that these properties were not purchased, improved, or maintained with the funds from her crimes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Amended Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2019.
The Issue Whether Petitioners' proposed rates are justified pursuant to the requirements of Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, or whether the Department of Financial Services, Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR) was correct in denying the requested rate increases.
Findings Of Fact The Hartford companies are property and casualty insurers transacting insurance in the State of Florida pursuant to valid certificates of authority and the Florida Insurance Code. Two types of personal lines insurance filings submitted by Hartford to the OIR are at issue in this proceeding: two filings for homeowners insurance (Case Nos. 07-5185 and 07-5186) and two filings for dwelling fire insurance (Case Nos. 07-5187 and 07- 5188). Hartford's substantial interests are affected by the notices disapproving the filings in this case. Homeowners insurance includes coverage for a variety of perils in and around a home, is usually purchased by a homeowner, and covers both the structure and the contents of a home. Dwelling/fire insurance is usually purchased by the owners of properties that are leased or rented to others, and provides coverage for the structure only. Both types of insurance cover damage caused by hurricanes. The New Legislation and its Requirements In a special session held in January 2007, the Florida Legislature enacted changes to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (CAT Fund), as reflected in Chapter 2007-1, Laws of Florida. The special session was precipitated by a perceived crisis regarding the cost and availability of homeowners insurance after the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons. As a result of the substantial number of claims incurred after multiple severe hurricanes each of these years, changes in the insurance marketplace resulted in some insurance companies withdrawing from the Florida market, others non-renewing policies, one company becoming insolvent, and the cost for reinsurance available to all insurers rising dramatically. One of the primary features of the legislation was an expansion of the CAT Fund. The CAT Fund was established in 1993 after Hurricane Andrew to provide reinsurance to insurers for property insurance written in Florida at a price significantly less than the private market. The CAT Fund is a non-profit entity and is tax exempt. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 2007-1, the CAT Fund had an industry-wide capacity of approximately $16 million. The purpose of the changes enacted by the Legislature was to reduce the cost of reinsurance and thereby reduce the cost of property insurance in the state. As a result of Chapter 2007-1, the industry-wide capacity of the CAT Fund was increased to $28 billion, and insurers were given an opportunity to purchase an additional layer of reinsurance, referred to as the TICL layer (temporary increase in coverage limit), from the CAT Fund. Section 3 of Chapter 2007-1 required insurers to submit a filing to the OIR for policies written after June 1, 2007, that took into account a "presumed factor" calculated by OIR and that purported to reflect savings created by the law. The new law delegated to the OIR the duty to specify by Order the date such filings, referred to as "presumed factor filings" had to be made. On February 19, 2007, the OIR issued Order No. 89321-07. The Order required insurers to make a filing by March 15, 2007, which either adopted presumed factors published by the OIR or used the presumed factors and reflected a rate decrease taking the presumed factors into account. The presumed factors were the amounts the OIR calculated as the average savings created by Chapter 2007-1, and insurers were required to reduce their rates by an amount equal to the impact of the presumed factors. The OIR published the presumed factors on March 1, 2007. In its March 15, 2007, filings, Hartford adopted the presumed factors published by OIR. As a result, Hartford reduced its rates, effective June 1, 2007, on the products at issue in these filings by the following percentages: Case No. 07-5185 homeowners product: 17.7% Case No. 07-5186 homeowners product: 21.9% Case No. 07-5187 dwelling/fire product: 8.7% Case No. 07-5188 dwelling/fire product: 6.2% The Order also required that insurers submit a "True-Up Filing" pursuant to Section 627.026(2)(a)1., Florida Statutes. The filing was to be a complete rate filing that included the company's actual reinsurance costs and programs. Hartford's filings at issue in these proceedings are its True-Up Filings. The True-Up Filings Hartford submitted its True-Up filings June 15, 2007. The rate filings were certified as required by Section 627.062(9), Florida Statutes. The filings were amended August 8, 2007. Hartford's True Up Filings, as amended, request the following increases in rates over those reflected in the March 15, 2007, presumed factor filings: Case No. 07-5185 homeowners product: 22.0% Case No. 07-5186 homeowners product: 31.6% Case No. 07-5187 dwelling and fire product: 69.0% Case No. 07-5188 dwelling and fire product: 35.9% The net effects of Hartford's proposed rate filings result in the following increases over the rates in place before the Presumed Factor Filings: Case No. 07-5185 homeowners product: .4% Case No. 07-5186 homeowners product: 2.8% Case No. 07-5187 dwelling/fire product: 54.3% Case No. 07-5188 dwelling/fire product: 27.5% Case Nos. 07-5185 and 07-5186 (homeowners) affect approximately 92,000 insurance policies. Case Nos. 07-5187 and 07-5188 (dwelling/fire) affect approximately 2,550 policies. A public hearing was conducted on the filings August 16, 2007. Representatives from Hartford were not notified prior to the public hearing what concerns the OIR might have with the filings. Following the hearing, on August 20, 2007, Petitioners provided by letter and supporting documentation additional information related to the filings in an effort to address questions raised at the public hearing. The OIR did not issue clarification letters to Hartford concerning any of the information provided or any deficiencies in the filings before issuing its Notices of Intent to Disapprove the True-Up Filings. All four filings were reviewed on behalf of the OIR by Allan Schwartz. Mr. Schwartz reviewed only the True-Up Filings and did not review any previous filings submitted by Hartford with respect to the four product lines. On September 10, 2007, the OIR issued Notices of Intent to Disapprove each of the filings at issue in this case. The reasons give for disapproving the two homeowners filings are identical and are as follows: Having reviewed the information submitted, the Office finds that this filing does not provide sufficient documentation or justification to demonstrate that the proposed rate(s) comply with the standards of the appropriate statute(s) and rules(s) including demonstrating that the proposed rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. The deficiencies include but are not limited to: The premium trends are too low and are not reflective of the historical pattern of premium trends. The loss trends are too high and are not reflective of the historical pattern of loss trends. The loss trends are based on an unexplained and undocumented method using "modeled" frequency and severity as opposed to actual frequency and severity. The loss trends are excessive and inconsistent compared to other sources of loss trends such as Fast Track data. The catastrophe hurricane losses, ALAE and ULAE amounts are excessive and not supported. The catastrophe non-hurricane losses, ALAE and ULAE amounts are excessive and not supported. The particular time period from 1992 to 2006 used to calculate these values has not been justified. There has been no explanation of why the extraordinarily high reported losses for 1992 and 1993 should be expected to occur in the future. The underwriting profit and contingency factors are excessive and not supported. Various components underlying the calculation of the underwriting profit and contingency factors, including but not limited to the return on surplus, premium to surplus ratio, investment income and tax rate are not supported or justified. The underwriting expenses and other expenses are excessive and not supported. The non-FHCF reinsurance costs are excessive and not supported. The FHCF reinsurance costs are excessive and not supported. The fact that no new business is being written has not been taken into account. No explanation has been provided as too [sic] Hartford believes it is reasonable to return such a low percentage of premium in the form of loss payments to policyholders. For example, for the building policy forms, only about 40% of the premium requested by Hartford is expected to be returned to policyholders in the form of loss payments. As a result of the deficiencies set forth above, the Office finds that the proposed rate(s) are not justified, and must be deemed excessive and therefore, the Office intends to disapprove the above-referenced filing. The Notices of Intent to Disapprove the two dwelling/fire filings each list nine deficiencies. Seven of the nine (numbers 1-6 and 8) are the same as deficiencies listed for the homeowners filings. The remaining deficiencies named for Case No. 07-5187 are as follows: 7. The credibility standard and credibility value are not supported. 9. No explanation has been provided as too (sic) why Hartford believes it needs such a large rate increase currently, when the cumulative rate change implemented by Hartford for this program from 2001 to 2006 was an increase of only about 10%. The deficiencies listed for Case No. 07-5188 are the same as those listed for Case No. 07-5187, with the exception that with respect to deficiency number 9, the rate change implemented for the program in Case No. 07-5188 from 2001 to 2006 was a decrease of about -3%. Documentation Required for the Filings Florida's regulatory framework, consistent with most states, requires that insurance rates not be inadequate, excessive, or unfairly discriminatory. In making a determination concerning whether a proposed rate complies with this standard, the OIR is charged with considering certain enumerated factors in accordance with generally accepted and reasonable actuarial techniques. Chapter 2007-1 also amended Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, to add a certification requirement. The amendment requires the chief executive officer or chief financial officer and chief actuary of a property insurer to certify under oath that they have reviewed the rate filing; that to their knowledge, the rate filing does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which the statements were made, not misleading; that based on their knowledge, the information in the filing fairly presents the basis of the rate filing for the period presented; and that the rate filing reflects all premium savings reasonably expected to result from legislative enactments and are in accordance with generally accepted and reasonable actuarial techniques. § 627.062(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). Actuarial Standards of Practice 9 and 41 govern documentation by an actuary. Relevant sections of Standard of Practice 9 provide: Extent of documentation - . . . Appropriate records, worksheets, and other documentation of the actuary's work should be maintained by the actuary and retained for a reasonable length of time. Documentation should be sufficient for another actuary practicing in the same field to evaluate the work. The documentation should describe clearly the sources of data, material assumptions, and methods. Any material changes in sources of data, assumptions, or methods from the last analysis should be documented. The actuary should explain the reason(s) for and describe the impact of the changes. Prevention of misuse - . . . The actuary should take reasonable steps to ensure that an actuarial work product is presented fairly, that the presentation as a whole is clear in its actuarial aspects, and that the actuary is identified as the source of the actuarial aspects, and that the actuary is available to answer questions.. . . . * * * 5.5 Availability of documentation- Documentation should be available to the actuary's client or employer, and it should be made available to other persons when the client or employer so requests, assuming appropriate compensation, and provided such availability is not otherwise improper. . . . In determining the appropriate level of documentation for the proposed rate filings, Petitioner relied on its communications with OIR, as well as its understanding of what has been required in the past. This reliance is reasonable and is consistent with both the statutory and rule provisions governing the filings. Use of the RMS Catastrophic Loss Projection Model In order to estimate future losses in a rate filing, an insurer must estimate catastrophic and non-catastrophic losses. Hartford's projected catastrophic losses in the filings are based upon information provided from the Risk Management Solutions (RMS) catastrophic loss projection model, version 5.1a. Hartford's actuaries rely on this model, consistent with the standards governing actuarial practice, and their reliance is reasonable. Catastrophe loss projection models may be used in the preparation of insurance filings, if they have been considered by and accepted by the Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology (the Hurricane Commission). The Hurricane Commission determined that the RMS model, version 5.1a was acceptable for projecting hurricane loss costs for personal residential rate filings on May 17, 2006. In addition to approval by the Hurricane Commission, use of the model is appropriate "only if the office and the consumer advocate appointed pursuant to s. 627.0613 have access to all of the assumptions and factors that were used in developing the actuarial methods, principles, standards, models, or output ranges, and are not precluded from disclosing such information in a rate proceeding." §627.0628(3)(c), Fla. Stat. Both the Consumer Advocate and a staff person from the OIR are members of the Hurricane Commission. In that context, both have the ability to make on-site visits to the modeling companies, and to ask any questions they choose regarding the models. Both OIR's representative and the Consumer Advocate participated in the meetings and had the same opportunity as other commissioners to ask any question they wished about RMS 5.1a. The Hurricane Commission members, including the Consumer Advocate, clearly have access to the information identified in Section 627.0628(3)(c). However, there are restrictions on the Hurricane Commission members' ability to share the information received regarding trade secrets disclosed by the modeling companies. For that reason, the Commission's deliberations are not, standing alone, sufficient to determine that the Office of Insurance Regulation has access. In this case, credible evidence was submitted to show that RMS officials met with staff from the Office in July and October 2006 to discuss the model. RMS offered to provide any of its trade secret information to the OIR, subject to a non- disclosure agreement to protect its dissemination to competitors. RMS also opened an office in Tallahassee and invited OIR staff to examine any parts of the model they wished. In addition, both RMS and Hartford have answered extensive questionnaires prepared by OIR regarding the RMS model, and Hartford has offered to assist OIR in gathering any additional information it requires. Most of the questions posed by OIR involve the same areas reviewed by the Commission. RMS' representative also testified at hearing that RMS would not object to disclosure of the assumptions during the hearing itself if necessary. Finally, OIR Exhibit 1 is the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund 2007 Ratemaking Formula Report. The Executive Summary from the report explains how rates were recommended for the Florida Hurricane Catastrophic Fund (CAT Fund) for the 2007- 2008 contract year. The report stated that the RMS model, as well as three other models accepted by the Hurricane Commission, were used for determining expected aggregate losses to the CAT Fund reinsurance layer. Three models, including the RMS model, were also used for analysis of detailed allocation to type of business, territory, construction and deductible, as well as special coverage questions. The models were compared in detail and given equal weight. The report notes that these three models were also used in 1999-2006 ratemaking. The report is prepared by Paragon Strategic Solutions, Inc., an independent consultant selected by the State Board of Administration, in accordance with Section 215.555(5), Florida Statutes. While OIR did not prepare the report, they show no hesitation in accepting and relying on the report and the modeled information it contains in these proceedings. Indeed, one of OIR's criticisms is Hartford's failure to use the report with respect to CAT Fund loss recovery estimates. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, it is found that the OIR and Consumer Advocate were provided access to the factors and assumptions used in the RMS model, as contemplated by Section 627.0628. The Alleged Deficiencies in the Homeowners Filings1/ A rate is an estimate of the expected value of future costs. It provides for all costs associated with the transfer of risk. A rate is reasonable and not excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory if it is an actuarially sound estimate of the expected value of all future costs associated with an individual risk transfer. In preparing a filing, an actuary identifies the time period that its proposed rates are expected to be in effect. Because ratemaking is prospective, it involves determining the financial value of future contingent events. For the rate filings in question, actuaries for Hartford developed their rate indications by first considering trended premium, which reflects changes in premium revenue based on a variety of factors, including construction costs and the value of the buildings insured. Trended premium is the best estimate of the premium revenue that will be collected if the current rates remain in effect for the time period the filing is expected to be in place. Expenses associated with writing and servicing the business, the reinsurance costs to support the business and an allowance for profit are subtracted from the trended premium. The remainder is what would be available to pay losses. This approach to ratemaking, which is used by Hartford, is a standard actuarial approach to present the information for a rate indication. As part of the process, expected claims and the cost to service and settle those claims is also projected. These calculations show the amount of money that would be available to pay claims if no changes are made in the rates and how much increased premium is necessary to cover claims. The additional amount of premium reflects not only claims payments but also taxes, licenses and fees that are tied to the amount of premium. The first deficiency identified by OIR is that "the premium trends are too low and are not reflective of the historical pattern of premium trends." In determining the premium trend in each filing, Hartford used data from the previous five years and fit an exponential trend to the historical pattern, which is a standard actuarial technique. Hartford also looked at the factors affecting the more recent years, which were higher. For example, the peak in premium trend in 2006 was a result of the cost increases driven by the 2004 and 2005 hurricanes, and the peak in demand for labor and construction supplies not matched by supply. Costs were coming down going into 2007, and Hartford believed that 2006 was out of pattern from what they could anticipate seeing in the future. The premium trends reflected in Hartford's filings are reasonable, reflective of historical patterns, and based on standard actuarial techniques. The second identified deficiency with respect to the homeowner filings was that the loss trends are too high and are not reflective of the historical pattern of loss trends. A loss trend reflects the amount an insurance company expects the cost of claims to change. It consists of a frequency trend, which is the number of claims the insurance company expects to receive, and a severity trend, which is the average cost per claim. The loss trend compares historical data used in the filing with the future time period when the new rates are expected to be in effect. Hartford's loss trends were estimated using a generalized linear model, projecting frequency and severity separately. The model was based on 20 quarters of historical information. The more credible testimony presented indicates that the loss trends were actuarially appropriate. The third identified deficiency is that the loss trends are based on an unexplained and undocumented method using "modeled" frequency and severity as opposed to actual frequency and severity. As noted above, the generalized linear model uses actual, historical data. Sufficient documentation was provided in the filing, coupled with Hartford's August 20, 2007, letter. The method used to determine loss trends is reasonable and is consistent with standard actuarial practice. The fourth identified deficiency is that loss trends are excessive and inconsistent compared to other sources of loss trends, such as Fast Track data. Saying that the loss trends are excessive is a reiteration of the claim that they are too high, already addressed with respect to deficiency number two. Fast Track data is data provided by the Insurance Services Office. It uses unaudited information and is prepared on a "quick turnaround" basis. Fast Track data is based on paid claims rather than incurred claims data, and upon a broad number of companies with different claims settlement practices. Because it relies on paid claims, there is a time lag in the information provided. Hartford did not rely on Fast Track data, but instead relied upon its own data for calculating loss trends. Given the volume of business involved, Hartford had enough data to rely on for projecting future losses. Moreover, Respondents point to no statutory or rule requirement to use Fast Track data. The filings are not deficient on this basis. The fifth identified deficiency in the Notice of Intent to Disapprove is that catastrophe hurricane losses, ALAE and ULAE amounts are excessive and not supported. ALAE stands for "allocated loss adjustment expenses," and represents the costs the company incurs to settle a claim and that can be attributed to that particular claim, such as legal bills, court costs, experts and engineering reports. By contrast, ULAE stands for "unallocated loss adjustment expense" and represents the remainder of claims settlement costs that cannot be linked to a specific claim, such as office space, salaries and general overhead. Part of the OIR's objection with respect to this deficiency relates to the use of the RMS model. As stated above at paragraphs 25-33, the use of the RMS model is reasonable. With respect to ALAE, Hartford analyzed both nationwide data (4.4%) and Florida data (4.8%) and selected an ALAE load between the two (4.6%). This choice benefits Florida policyholders. It is reasonable to select between the national and Florida historical figures, given the amount of actual hurricane data available during the period used. With respect to ULAE, the factors used were based upon directions received from Ken Ritzenthaler, an actuary with OIR, in a previous filing. The prior discussions with Mr. Ritzenthaler are referenced in the exhibits to the filing. The more credible evidence demonstrates that the ALAE and ULAE expenses with respect to catastrophic hurricane losses are sufficiently documented in Hartford's filings and are based on reasonable actuarial judgment. The sixth identified deficiency is that the catastrophe non-hurricane losses, ALAE and ULAE amounts are excessive and not supported. According to OIR, the particular time period from 1992 to 2006 used to calculate these values has not been justified, and there has been no explanation of why the extraordinarily high reported losses for 1992 and 1993 should be expected to occur in the future. OIR's complaint with respect to non-hurricane losses is based upon the number of years of data included. While the RMS model was used for hurricane losses, there is no model for non- hurricane losses, so Hartford used its historical data. This becomes important because in both 1992 and 1993, there were unusual storms that caused significant losses. Hartford's data begins with 1992 and goes through 2006, which means approximately fifteen years worth of data is used. Hartford's explanation for choosing that time period is that hurricane models were first used in 1992, and it was at that time that non-hurricane losses had to be separated from hurricane losses. Thus, it was the first year that Hartford had the data in the right form and sufficient detail to use in a rate filing. Petitioners have submitted rate filings in the past that begin non-hurricane, ALAE and ULAE losses with 1992, increasing the number of years included in the data with each filing. Prior filings using this data have been approved by OIR. It is preferable to use thirty years of experience for this calculation. However, there was no testimony that such a time-frame is actuarially or statutorily required, and OIR's suggestion that these two high-loss years should be ignored is not based upon any identified actuarial standard. Hartford attempted to mitigate the effect of the severe losses in 1992 and 1993 by capping the losses for those years, as opposed to relying on the actual losses.2/ The methodology used by Hartford was reasonable and appropriate. No other basis was identified by the OIR to support this stated deficiency. The seventh identified deficiency is that the underwriting profit and contingency factors are excessive and not supported. The underwriting profit factor is the amount of income, expressed as a percentage of premium, that an insurance company needs from premium in excess of losses, settlement costs and other expenses in order to generate a fair rate of return on its capital necessary to support its Florida exposures for the applicable line of business. Hartford's proposed underwriting profit factor for its largest homeowners filing is 15.3%. Section 627.062(2)(b), Florida Statutes, contemplates the allowance of a reasonable rate of return, commensurate with the risk to which the insurance company exposes its capital and surplus. Section 627.062(2)(b)4., Florida Statutes, authorizes the adoption of rules to specify the manner in which insurers shall calculate investment income attributable to classes of insurance written in Florida, and the manner in which investment income shall be used in the calculation of insurance rates. The subsection specifically indicates that the manner in which investment income shall be used in the calculation of insurance rates shall contemplate allowances for an underwriting profit factor. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-170.003 is entitled "Calculation of Investment Income," and the stated purpose of this rule is as follows: (1) The purpose of this rule is to specify the manner in which insurers shall calculate investment income attributable to insurance policies in Florida and the manner in which such investment income is used in the calculation of insurance rates by the development of an underwriting profit and contingency factor compatible with a reasonable rate of return. (Emphasis supplied). Mr. Schwartz relied on the contents of this rule in determining that the underwriting profit factor in Hartford's filings was too high, in that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-170.003(6)(a) and (7) specifies that: (6)(a) . . . An underwriting profit and contingency factor greater than the quantity 5% is prima facie evidence of an excessive expected rate of return and unacceptable, unless supporting evidence is presented demonstrating that an underwriting profit and contingency factor included in the filing that is greater than this quantity is necessary for the insurer to earn a reasonable rate of return. In such case, the criteria presented as determined by criteria in subsection (7) shall be used by the Office of Insurance Regulation in evaluating this supporting evidence. * * * An underwriting profit and contingency factor calculated in accordance with this rule is considered to be compatible with a reasonable expected rate of return on net worth. If a determination must be made as to whether an expected rate of return is reasonable, the following criteria shall be used in that determination. An expected rate of return for Florida business is to be considered reasonable if, when sustained by the insurer for its business during the period for which the rates under scrutiny are in effect, it neither threatens the insurer's solvency nor makes the insurer more attractive to policyholders or investors from a corporate financial perspective than the same insurer would be had this rule not been implemented, all other variables being equal; or Alternatively, the expected rate of return for Florida business is to be considered reasonable if it is commensurate with the rate of return anticipated for other industries having corresponding risk and it is sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the insurer so as to maintain its credit and, if a stock insurer, to attract capital, or if a mutual or reciprocal insurer, to accumulate surplus reasonably necessary to support growth in Florida premium volume reasonably expected during the time the rates under scrutiny are in effect. Mr. Schwartz also testified that the last published underwriting profit and contingency factor published by OIR was 3.7%, well below what is identified in Hartford's filings. Hartford counters that reliance on the rule is a misapplication of the rule (with no explanation why), is inconsistent with OIR's treatment of the profit factors in their previous filings, and ignores the language of Section 627.062(2)(b)11., Florida Statutes. No evidence was presented to show whether the expected rate of return threatens Hartford's solvency or makes them more attractive to policyholders or investors from a corporate financial perspective than they would have been if Rule 69O- 170.003 was not implemented. Likewise, it was not demonstrated that the expected rate of return for Florida business is commensurate with the rate of return for other industries having corresponding risk and is necessary to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the insurer in order to maintain its credit and to attract capital. While the position taken by OIR with respect to Hartford's filings may be inconsistent with the position taken in past filings, that cannot be determined on this record. The prior filings, and the communications Hartford had with OIR with regard to those filings, are not included in the exhibits in this case. There is no way to determine whether Petitioners chose to present evidence in the context of prior filings consistent with the criteria in Rule 69O-170.003, or whether OIR approved the underwriting profit and contingency factor despite Rule 69O- 170.003. Having an underwriting profit factor that is considered excessive will result in a higher rate indication. Therefore, it is found that the seventh identified deficiency in the Notices of Intent to Disapprove for the homeowners filings and the second identified deficiency in the Notices of Intent to Disapprove for the dwelling/fire filings is sustained. The eighth identified deficiency is that various components underlying the calculation of the underwriting profit and contingency factors, including but not limited to the return on surplus, premium to surplus ratio, investment income and tax rate are not supported or justified. Return on surplus is the total net income that would result from the underwriting income and the investment income contributions relative to the amount of capital that is exposed. Surplus is necessary in addition to income expected from premium, to insure that claims will be paid should losses in a particular year exceed premium and income earned on premium. Hartford's expected return on surplus in these filings is 15%. The return on surplus is clearly tied to the underwriting profit factor, although the percentages are not necessarily the same. It follows, however, that if the underwriting income and contingency factor is excessive, then the return on surplus may also be too high. Hartford has not demonstrated that the return on surplus can stand, independent of a finding that the underwriting profit and contingency factor is excessive. Premium-to-surplus ratio is a measure of the number of dollars of premium Hartford writes relative to the amount of surplus that is supporting that exposure. Hartford's premium-to- surplus ratio in the AARP homeowners filing is 1.08, which means that if Hartford wrote $108 of premium, it would allocate $100 of surplus to support that premium.3/ The premium-to-surplus ratio is reasonable, given the amount of risk associated with homeowners insurance in Florida. The OIR's position regarding investment income and tax rates are related. The criticism is that the filing used a low- risk investment rate based on a LIBOR (London Interbank Offering Rate), which is a standard in the investment community for risk- free or low-risk yield calculations. The filing also used a full 35% income tax rate applied to the yield. Evidence was presented to show that, if the actual portfolio numbers and corresponding lower tax rate were used in the filings, the rate after taxes would be the same. The problem, however, is that Section 627.062(2)(b)4., Florida Statutes, requires the OIR to consider investment income reasonably expected by the insurer, "consistent with the insurer's investment practices," which assumes actual practices. While the evidence at hearing regarding Hartford's investments using its actual portfolio yield may result in a similar bottom line, the assumptions used in the filing are not based on Petitioner's actual investment practices. As a result, the tax rate identified in the filing is also not the actual tax rate that has been paid by Hartford. The greater weight of the evidence indicates the data used is not consistent with the requirements of Section 627.062(2)(b)4., Florida Statutes. Therefore, the eighth deficiency is sustained to the extent that the filing does not adequately support the return on surplus, investment income and tax rate. The ninth identified deficiency is that the underwriting expenses and other expenses are excessive and not supported. Hartford used the most recent three years of actual expense data, analyzed them and made expense selections based on actuarial judgment. The use of the three-year time frame was both reasonable and consistent with common ratemaking practices. Likewise, the commission rates reflected in the agency filings are also reasonable. The tenth identified deficiency is that the non-FHCF (or private) reinsurance costs are excessive and not supported. The criticism regarding private reinsurance purchases is three- fold: 1) that Hartford paid too much for their reinsurance coverage; 2) that Hartford purchases their reinsurance coverage on a nationwide basis as opposed to purchasing coverage for Florida only; and 3) that the percentage of the reinsurance coverage allocated to Florida is too high. Hartford buys private reinsurance in order to write business in areas that are exposed to catastrophes. It buys reinsurance from approximately 40 different reinsurers in a competitive, arm's-length process and does not buy reinsurance from corporate affiliates. Hartford used the "net cost" of insurance in its filings, an approach that is appropriate and consistent with standard actuarial practices. Hartford also used the RMS model to estimate the expected reinsurance recoveries, which are subtracted from the premium costs. Hartford buys private catastrophic reinsurance on a nationwide basis to protect against losses from hurricanes, earthquakes and terrorism, and allocates a portion of those costs to Florida. Testimony was presented, and is accepted as credible, that attempting to purchase reinsurance from private vendors for Florida alone would not be cost-effective. The cost of reinsurance, excluding a layer of reinsurance that covers only the Northeast region of the country and is not reflected in calculating costs for Florida, is approximately $113 million. Hartford retains the first $250 million in catastrophe risk for any single event, which means losses from an event must exceed that amount before the company recovers from any reinsurer. In 2006, Hartford raised its retention of losses from $175 million to $250 million in an effort to reduce the cost of reinsurance. Hartford purchases reinsurance in "layers," which cover losses based on the amount of total losses Hartford incurs in various events. Hartford allocates approximately 65% of the private reinsurance costs (excluding the Northeast layer) to Florida in the AARP homeowners filing. Only 6-7% of Hartford's homeowners policies are written in Florida. The amount Hartford paid for reinsurance from private vendors is reasonable, given the market climate in which the insurance was purchased. Hartford has demonstrated that the process by which the reinsurance was purchased resulted in a price that was clearly the result of an arms-length transaction with the aim of securing the best price possible. Likewise, the determination to purchase reinsurance on a nationwide basis as opposed to a state-by-state program allows Hartford to purchase reinsurance at a better rate, and is more cost-effective. Purchasing reinsurance in this manner, and then allocating an appropriate percentage to Florida, is a reasonable approach. With respect to the allocation of a percentage of reinsurance cost to Florida, OIR argues that, given that Florida represents only 6-7% of Hartford's homeowner insurance business, allocation of 65% of the reinsurance costs to Florida is per se unreasonable. However, the more logical approach is to examine what percentage of the overall catastrophic loss is attributable to Florida, and allocate reinsurance costs accordingly. After carefully examining both the testimony of all of the witnesses and the exhibits presented in this case, the undersigned cannot conclude that the allocation of 65% of the private reinsurance costs is reasonable, and will not result in an excessive rate.4/ The eleventh identified deficiency is that the FHCF (or CAT Fund) reinsurance costs are excessive and not supported. Hartford purchases both the traditional layer of CAT Fund coverage, which is addressed in a separate filing and not reflected in these filings, and the TICL layer made available pursuant to Chapter 2007-1, Laws of Florida. Hartford removed the costs of its previously purchased private reinsurance that overlapped with the TICL layer and those costs are not reflected in these filings and have not been passed on to Florida policyholders. In estimating the amount of premium Hartford would pay for the TICL coverage, it relied on information provided by Paragon, a consulting firm that calculates the rates for the CAT Fund. As noted in finding of fact number 31, the RMS model, along with three other models accepted by the Hurricane Commission, were used by Paragon for determining expected aggregate losses to the CAT Fund reinsurance layer, clearly a crucial factor in determining the rate for the CAT fund. Hartford did not use the loss recoveries calculated by Paragon, but instead estimated the total amount of premium it would pay for the TICL coverage and subtracted the expected loss recoveries based on the RMS model alone. The expected loss recoveries under the RMS model standing alone were 60% of the loss recovery estimate calculated by Paragon when using all four models. Hartford claimed that its use of the RMS model was necessary for consistency. However, it pointed to no actuarial standard that would support its position with respect to this particular issue. Moreover, given that the premium used as calculated by Paragon used all four models, it is actually inconsistent to use one number which was determined based on all four models (the Paragon-based premium estimate) for one half of this particular calculation and then subtract another number using only one model for the other half (the loss recoveries rate) in order to determine the net premium. To do so fails to take into account the unique nature of the CAT fund, in terms of its low expenses and tax-exempt status. Accordingly, it is found that the CAT-Fund reinsurance costs for the TICL layer are excessive. The twelfth identified deficiency is that Hartford did not consider in the filing that no new business is being written. OIR's explanation of this asserted deficiency is that the costs associated with writing new business are generally higher than that associated with writing renewals. Therefore, according to OIR, failure to make adjustments to their historical experience to reflect the current mix of business, means that the costs included in the filing would be excessive. Hartford began restricting the writing of new business for these filings in 2002. Ultimately, no new business for the AARP program was written after November 2006 and no new business was written for the agency program after June 2006. Credible evidence was presented to demonstrate that a very low percentage of new business has been written over the period of time used for demonstrating Hartford's historical losses. As a result, the effect of no longer writing new business is already reflected in the data used to determine expenses. No additional adjustment in the filing was necessary in this regard. The thirteenth identified deficiency is that no explanation has been provided as to why Hartford believes it is reasonable to return such a low percentage of premium in the form of loss payments to policyholders. For example, for the building policy forms, OIR states that only about 40% of the premium requested by Hartford is expected to be returned to policyholders in the form of loss payments. OIR pointed to no actuarial standard that would require a specific explanation regarding how much of the premium should be returned to policyholders. Nor was any statutory or rule reference supplied to support the contention that such an explanation was required. Finally, the more credible evidence presented indicates that the correct percentage is 44%. In any event, this criticism is not a basis for finding a deficiency in the filing. Alleged Deficiencies in the Dwelling/Fire Filings The seventh deficiency identified in the dwelling/fire filings, not reflected in the homeowner filings, is that the credibility standard and credibility values are not supported. Credibility is the concept of identifying how much weight to put on a particular set of information relative to other potential information. Credibility value is determined by applying the "square root rule" to the credibility value, a commonly used actuarial approach to credibility. Hartford used the credibility standard of 40,000 earned house years in these filings. This credibility standard has been the standard within the industry for personal property filings for over forty years and has been used in prior filings submitted to OIR. Mr. Schwartz testified that his criticism with respect to the credibility standard and credibility values is that Hartford did not explain why they used that particular standard. However, Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-170.0135 discusses those items that must be included in the Actuarial Memorandum for a filing. With respect to credibility standards and values, Rule 69O-170.0135(2)(e)5., provides that the basis need only be explained when the standard has changed from the previous filing. Given that no change has been made in these filings with respect to the credibility standard, this criticism is not a valid basis for issuing a Notice of Intent to Disapprove. The ninth deficiency in the Notice relating to the dwelling/fire filing in Case No. 07-5187 provides: "No explanation has been provided as too (sic) why Hartford believes it needs such a large rate increase currently, when the cumulative rate change implemented by Hartford for this program from 2001 to 2006 was an increase of only about 10%." With respect to Case No. 07-5188, the deficiency is essentially the same, except the cumulative rate change identified for the same period of time is a decrease of about -3%. Testimony established that the dwelling/fire rate increases were larger than those identified for the homeowners filings because Hartford did not seek rate increases for these lines for several years. The decision not to seek increases was not based on the adequacy of current rates. Rather, the decision was based on an internal determination that, based on the relatively small number of policies involved in these two filings, the amount of increased premium reflected in a rate increase was not sufficient to incur the costs associated with preparing the filings. Mr. Schwartz pointed to no authority, either in statute, rule, or Actuarial Standard, that requires the explanation he desired. He acknowledged that he understood the basis of how Hartford reached the rate increase they are requesting. The failure to provide the explanation Mr. Schwartz was seeking is not a valid basis for a Notice of Intent to Disapprove.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered that disapproves the rate filings in Case Nos. 07-5185 and 07-5186 based upon the deficiencies numbered 7,8,10 and 11 in the Notices of Intent to Disapprove, and that disapproves the rate filings in Case Nos. 07-5187 and 07-5188 based on the deficiencies numbered 2,3,5 and in the Notices of Intent to Disapprove. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2008.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent violated Subsections 475.42(1)(a) and 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2009),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Division of Real Estate is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the real estate sales profession in Florida, including licensure of real estate sales associates and enforcement of the statutory provisions within its charge. Ms. Friels is a real estate sales associate who first obtained her license in 2005. Ms. Friels has never had any prior disciplinary action taken against her. Ms. Friels received a renewal notice from the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (the Department), notifying her that her sales associate license was due to expire on March 31, 2009. The notice touted in bold print that the "Department Provides Instant Online Renewal," while also offering a Renewal Notice card to detach and mail in to the Department. The Renewal card option required nothing to be filled in by the licensee unless an address update were necessary (in which case a box could be checked and the address updated on the back of the card), or unless the licensee wanted to opt for inactive status, which could be done by checking a different box. Otherwise, the card could simply be sent in with payment of the $85.00 renewal fee. The card included the following statement in small print: IMPORTANT: SUBMITTING YOUR RENEWAL REQUEST TO THE DEPARTMENT AFFIRMS COMPLIANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR RENEWAL. Ms. Friels had been undergoing a period of great personal challenges and stress in the two-year period leading up to the licensure expiration date and nearly missed the renewal deadline. On the day before her license was to expire, she utilized the "Instant Online Renewal" option after contacting a Department customer representative to make sure that her online renewal payment would be credited immediately so that it would be timely before the March 31, 2009, expiration date. As alleged in the Administrative Complaint, "[o]n . . . March 30, 2009 Respondent paid the renewal fee of $85.00 to renew her real estate license." The Department receipt showed the online payment of the $85.00 fee on March 30, 2009, for the renewal of real estate sales associate License No. SL3141119 held by Marsha Evans Friels. At the time Ms. Friels processed her online license renewal, she had not completed the 14 hours of continuing education she was required to complete during the two-year licensure period ending on March 30, 2009, but Ms. Friels did not realize at that time that she had not complied with the continuing education requirements. Ms. Friels explained that although she was generally aware of the continuing education requirement for licensure renewal, the reason she did not realize that she had not taken the required coursework during this particular two-year period was because she was coping with a series of tragic, personal challenges. The circumstances were compelling, as she explained: In May 2007, Ms. Friels' older sister died of breast cancer; then, in October 2007, Ms. Friels' father died, and Ms. Friels assumed the responsibilities for arranging for his funeral and then probating his estate; and finally, Ms. Friels' youngest sister, who was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and had lived with her father, was left without care, and the responsibilities for caring for her sister and making decisions about her placement fell on Ms. Friels' shoulders. While these circumstances do not excuse a failure to comply with the continuing education requirements during the two-year period, the totality of the circumstances make the oversight understandable and mitigate against Ms. Friels' culpability. Ms. Friels was under the impression that having accessed the Department's "Instant Online Renewal" and successfully remitted payment of the renewal fee in time, she had done all that was needed to renew her license. She received no notice to the contrary. Apparently, however, at some point after Ms. Friels thought she had successfully renewed her license via the Department's Instant Online Renewal service, the Department's records re-characterized the status of Ms. Friels' license as involuntarily inactive, effective on March 31, 2009, "due to non[-]renewal of her real estate sales associate license." Neither Ms. Friels, nor the licensed broker with whom Ms. Friels was associated, received notice that her real estate sales associate license had been changed to inactive status, that Ms. Friels had not satisfied the continuing education requirements at license renewal, or that her "Instant Online Renewal" and payment were ineffective to renew her license. Ms. Friels presented evidence of the Department's practice to issue a Notice of Deficiency or a Continuing Education Deficiency letter, when a real estate sales associate renews a license without having completed the required continuing education hours. No evidence was offered to explain why this practice would not have applied in this case or why no such notice was given to Ms. Friels. Operating under the impression that she had successfully renewed her license and receiving no notice to the contrary, on one occasion, on approximately June 1, 2009, Ms. Friels participated as a real estate sales associate working on a real estate sales contract under the supervision of Ms. Williams, the licensed broker with whom Ms. Friels was associated, who remained actively involved in the transaction. Mr. Brissenden is a real estate appraiser who was asked to perform an appraisal on the property that was the subject of the same contract, which is how he came to learn that Ms. Friels was operating as a sales associate. Mr. Brissenden testified that he happened to be online on the Department's licensing portal checking on some other things when he looked up Ms. Friels' license out of curiosity. He saw that her license was shown to be inactive, and, so, he filed a complaint. Ms. Friels first learned that she had not completed the required continuing education hours in the two-year period before renewal when she received a letter advising her that she was being investigated for operating as a sales associate without an active license. Immediately upon learning that she had a continuing education deficiency, Ms. Friels took the 14-hour continuing education course and successfully completed the required hours. This course included the "Real Estate Core Law" component required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-3.009(2)(a). The course material, which according to rule, must be submitted to the Florida Real Estate Commission for review and approval, included the following: In the event a license is renewed without the required continuing education course having been completed, the licensee will be sent a deficiency letter. This letter will inform the licensee that the required continuing education was not completed prior to renewal. Ms. Friels' license was reinstated to "active" status on October 16, 2009, following her completion of the 14-hour course credited to her prior renewal cycle. Ms. Friels cooperated with the investigation and submitted a letter with supporting documentation explaining that she did not realize she had not completed the continuing education course during the prior two years and detailing her personal circumstances that led to her oversight. At the completion of the investigation, the investigator contacted Ms. Friels to deliver a Uniform Disciplinary Citation, on December 11, 2009. By this document, the investigator sets forth her determination that there was probable cause to believe Ms. Friels had violated Subsection 475.42(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and that the Department had set the penalty at a $500.00 fine (plus no additional amount for costs). Ms. Friels had the choice of accepting the citation, in which case it would become a final order, or disputing the citation, in which case the charges would be prosecuted as a disciplinary action pursuant to Section 455.225, Florida Statutes. Ms. Friels testified that while she accepted responsibility for not completing the required continuing education and was willing to resolve this matter by paying the $500 fine in December 2009, she was unwilling to accept the citation's charge of violating Subsection 475.42(1)(b), Florida Statutes. That subsection establishes the following as a violation: A person licensed as a sales associate may not operate as a broker or operate as a sales associate for any person not registered as her or his employer. Ms. Friels perceived this charge as more serious, in effect, charging her with operating outside the scope of her sales associate license by operating in a broker capacity. Throughout this proceeding, Ms. Friels remained sensitive to the suggestion that she had operated as more than a real estate sales associate and went to great pains to establish that she did not exceed the bounds of a licensed real estate sales associate and that she was acting under the supervision of the licensed broker with whom she was associated. The subsequently-issued Administrative Complaint charged Ms. Friels with a violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes, not Subsection 475.42(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Uniform Disciplinary Citation. By this time, however, when Ms. Friels attempted to resolve the dispute, the Division of Real Estate would not agree to the penalty originally proposed in the Citation (with the incorrect statutory charge), but instead proposed additional terms, including payment of $521.40 in investigation costs on top of the $500 fine, plus attendance at two meetings of the Florida Real Estate Commission. Ms. Friels objected to the increased financial consequences since in her view, the reason why the dispute was not resolved by the citation was because the wrong statutory violation was charged. Before the evidentiary hearing, counsel for the Division of Real Estate acknowledged that this case involves, at most, a "minor violation of licensing law." After the evidentiary portion of the hearing, counsel reiterated the Division's position that "this is a minor licensing violation and we're looking for a very minor penalty." Inexplicably, the Proposed Recommended Order submitted by the Petitioner proposed a significantly elevated recommended penalty. The Petitioner proposed an increased fine of $1,000, plus a 30-day suspension, plus costs of investigation, plus "fees pursuant to Section 455.227(3), Florida Statutes,"3 despite assurances at the close of the hearing that the Petitioner was only looking for a "very minor penalty" consistent with what had been previously offered. The appropriate penalty for a violation of licensing law cannot be determined without first reviewing the record evidence on mitigating and aggravating circumstances in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-24.001(4). Here, no aggravating circumstances were established or even argued while there are multiple mitigating circumstances. There was no evidence of any harm to the consumers or public as a result of Ms. Friels' oversight in not completing her continuing education by her license renewal date or as a result of her participating as a real estate sales associate in a transaction in June 2009. The fact that there was only one count in the Administrative Complaint is a mitigating circumstance to be considered. Likewise, the fact that Ms. Friels has no disciplinary history is another mitigating circumstance weighing in favor of leniency below the normal penalty ranges established in rule. Consideration of the financial hardship to the Respondent as a result of imposition of a fine or suspension of a license, adds to the weight of mitigating circumstances. Ms. Friels testified to the hardship she has endured as a result of personal circumstances beyond her control. Ms. Friels was forthright and sincere in accepting responsibility for her oversight and acted immediately to rectify the continuing education deficiency as soon as she received notice of it. Under the circumstances, imposition of a fine or suspension of her license would result in unnecessary financial hardship. Finally, under the catch-all language in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-24.001(4)(b) ("mitigating circumstances may include, but are not limited to . . ."), consideration must be given to the Respondent's compelling personal circumstances that make her oversight understandable and mitigate further against imposing a penalty in the normal range. The circumstances here were far from normal, and imposing a penalty as if they were normal would be unduly harsh.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, finding that the Respondent, Marsha Evans Friels, violated Subsection 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes (and, thereby, Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes); issuing a reprimand as the sole penalty; and waiving the permissive assessment of costs allowed by Subsection 455.227(3)(a), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 2010.
The Issue The issues in the case are whether Respondents committed fraud and/or misrepresentation in entering into various retail installment contracts in violation of Section 520.995(1)(b), Florida Statutes; and whether the Department of Banking and Finance is entitled to an Order against Respondents, including fines and a Cease and Desist Order.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Lynn Haven Home Center, Inc. (Lynn Haven), was a licensed motor vehicle retail installment seller with locations at 3250 Highway 77, Panama City, Florida 32405; and 161 Racetrack Boulevard, Fort Walton, Florida 32547. Christopher Wilson was an employee of Lynn Haven Home Center, Inc. Doyce Lindley was allegedly a director of Lynn Haven at its Fort Walton office. However, no competent evidence was submitted at the hearing supporting these allegations and no witness was familiar with Mr. Lindley, his role in Lynn Haven, or his association with any sales of Lynn Haven. Since no relationship with the company was established and no relationship with any of the sales of the company was established, no findings can be made regarding Mr. Lindley. Therefore, the Administrative Complaint should be dismissed in regards to him. Lynn Haven had a dealer agreement with Bombadier Capital Company (Bombadier) under which Bombadier would finance the purchase of a mobile home by a qualified buyer based, in part, on the buyer's credit application, credit history and manner of financing the mobile home, including the amount of the down payment. The dealer agreement between Lynn Haven and Bombadier stated, in part, as follows: Each consumer will have paid any specified down payment in cash or by trade-in prior to delivery of Home, and no part of such down payment will have been loaned or otherwise provided directly or indirectly by Dealer or, to Dealer's knowledge, any other person; any property received by Dealer in trade on a Home which secures a Security Instrument shall be free from any liens, security interests, encumbrances or any other claims, and each Consumer at the time of execution of the Security Instrument shall be the legal owner of such Collateral. The agreement also required Lynn Haven to give truthful information on retail installment contracts. If the dealer did not supply truthful information, the deal would be cancelled prior to funding. If the false information was discovered after the loan was funded, the dealer would be pursued for repayment of the loan. Around May 1998, Bombadier financed one loan for Royal Gaddy which had been originated by Lynn Haven. Mr. Gaddy did not testify at the hearing. Therefore, no competent evidence regarding the negotiations between or the exact home purchased or seen by Mr. Gaddy was introduced at the hearing. The purchase documents reflect that the serial number of the home was the same on all the purchase documents, indicating that one particular home was being purchased by Mr. Gaddy. However, the invoice for the home and the purchase agreement for the home disagree as to the width of the home. The invoice reflects a width of 24 feet and the purchase agreement reflects a width of 27 feet. It is unclear what documents Bombadier reviewed in agreeing to make the loan to Mr. Gaddy. There was no competent evidence presented at the hearing on how the documents for this purchase and loan were prepared or why there was a discrepancy in the home width among the documents. Collin McGowan, the alleged owner of Lynn Haven, submitted the loan to Bombadier. For unknown reasons, Mr. Gaddy defaulted on his loan and the mobile home was repossessed by Bombadier. The lender discovered by visual inspection that the trailer was not the size represented on the retail installment contract. The trailer was, in fact, 24 feet in width instead of the 27 feet indicated on the sales agreement. No competent evidence was introduced which indicated that Respondent Wilson filled out any document possessed by Bombadier as it relates to Royal Gaddy. Likewise, there was no competent evidence that Respondent Wilson had anything to do with the Gaddy purchase or loan. The documents themselves do not constitute evidence of fraud or misrepresentation since the width discrepancy could just as reasonably be due to a typographical error. Therefore, this allegation of the Administrative Complaint against the Respondents should be dismissed. Around January 1998, Donna Huff bought a home from Lynn Haven. Mrs. Huff talked to Respondent Wilson about the purchase of a mobile home. At some point, she spoke with a salesperson that she could not afford a five percent down payment on a home. She did not know if the salesperson she told this to was Respondent Wilson or another salesperson. The salesperson told her not to worry about it and that she could get into a new mobile home. Ms. Huff put down $100.00 cash on the mobile home. She purchased the mobile home under an installment contract. The installment contract was later assigned to Green Tree Financial Center, Inc. No one from Green Tree testified at the hearing regarding this loan, any dealer agreement it had with Lynn Haven, or the representations, if any, Green Tree relied on to take assignment of this installment contract. Nor did anyone from Green Tree or elsewhere testify as to the standards in the industry regarding borrowing a cash down payment. Ms. Huff’s retail installment contract states that she paid $3,602.92 as a cash down payment. Ms. Huff did not notice the amount of the down payment until this investigation, several years after her purchase. She does not know where the amount of the down payment in the installment contract came from. From a review of the documents, it appears that the remainder of the down payment came from money remaining after the seller closed the sale with Ms. Huff. The down payment was generated by adding $2,003.00 to the setup and delivery costs for the mobile home under the heading "TI over allowance." The setup and delivery costs were included in the total sales price of the home. The cash sale price was $33,665.00 plus $2,069.90 in taxes for a total of $35,734.90. The difference between the cash sale price of $33,665.00 and the unpaid balance of the loan of $32,131.98 is $1,534.92. The difference of $1,534.92 plus $2,003.00 equals $3,602.92 or the down payment amount listed in the retail installment contract for Ms. Huff's home. In effect the money for the down payment came from the amount financed under the installment contract. No evidence was introduced by Petitioner demonstrating that any document Mrs. Huff signed was submitted to any lending institution. No evidence was introduced by Petitioner demonstrating that any document Mrs. Huff signed was utilized by any lending institution for any purpose. No evidence was introduced by Petitioner demonstrating that Respondent Wilson wrote anything on any document submitted to a lending institution regarding the source of any down payment funds provided by Mrs. Huff for the purchase of her home or that the source for such down payment was from borrowed funds. Without such evidence, none of the Respondents are guilty of fraud or misrepresentation and the parts of the Administrative Complaint regarding Ms. Huff's transaction should be dismissed. Around March 1998, Rick Laux bought a mobile home from Lynn Haven. Mr. Laux dealt with Respondent Wilson, but did not recognize him at the hearing. Mr. Laux traded in a mobile home to Lynn Haven towards the purchase of a new mobile home. Mr. Laux's equity of $9,472.68 in the mobile home he traded in was used as a down payment on the new mobile home. No cash down payment was made by Mr. Laux. Lynn Haven set up the new mobile home on ten acres that Mr. Laux owned. Lynn Haven also installed a well, septic system, and power pole on Mr. Laux's ten acres. The land had already been cleared by Mr. Laux. No clearing was done by Lynn Haven. The ten acres also served as collateral on the mortgage used in part to buy the mobile home from Lynn Haven. Mr. Laux had no knowledge of who arranged for financing of his mobile home. However, the home was financed by Unicor Mortgage. The loan was closed by Stewart Title of Northwest Florida, a third-party loan closing agent. A review of the HUD statement, a federally required loan closing document, shows that Lynn Haven was paid $9,996.00 for costs associated with land improvements. The purchase agreement, signed by Mr. Laux, shows that Mr. Laux was charged $3,500.00 for land preparation that was not done by Lynn Haven. The $3,500.00 charge was part of the $9,996.00 in land improvement costs paid to Lynn Haven at closing. The remainder of the land improvement costs were a well ($3,850.00), septic system ($1,350.00), and power pole ($1,296.00). The $3,500.00 charge appears along with other figures which eventually yield an estimated total cost and an estimated loan amount, which estimated amount became the final amount financed by Mr. Laux and funded by Unicor. The purpose for the $3,500.00 charge could only have been to increase the estimated loan amount for the transaction in order to pull money out of the transaction to balance against the equity down payment allowed on the trade in. However, it is unclear that Unicor relied on or even saw the purchase agreement between Lynn Haven and Mr. Laux. Further, it is unclear whether the amount allowed for the trade in was accurate or inaccurate. What is clear is that the $3,500.00 figure was a made-up figure. Mr. Laux had no knowledge of who filled out any form relating to his purchase. No one from Unicor or Stewart Title testified as to who filled out the loan closing documents or who supplied the numbers and information used therein. Likewise, there was no evidence introduced by Petitioner demonstrating that Respondent Wilson wrote anything on any document submitted to a lending institution regarding the source of any down payment funds provided by Mr. Laux for the purchase of his home or that Respondent Wilson filled out the purchase agreement associated with this transaction. However, it is clear an agent of Lynn Haven prepared the sales agreement in which the land improvement costs were included and that underlies the eventual loan amount for the Laux transaction. The $3,500.00 amount is a fictitious amount and a misrepresentation on the part of Lynn Haven. Therefore, Lynn Haven is guilty of misrepresentation in an installment loan transaction. In 1998, Brian Withey purchased a mobile home in a home package from Lynn Haven. The package included a lot, well, septic tank, and power pole, as well as permits and other necessities for setting up the home. The salesperson for Mr. Withey was Respondent Wilson. Mr. Withey paid $900.00 as a cash down payment for the mobile home. The purchase agreement reflects a proposed cash down payment of $13,075.00. The amount is very hard to read and may actually be a different amount, but the down payment does appear to be over $10,000.00. It is unclear from the documents exactly where the amount of the proposed cash down payment came from or if it was the amount of payment actually used to close the loan. The HUD Settlement Statement was unreadable. Therefore, it is impossible to determine the closing costs involved in the loan or to trace through other documents the amounts used in the HUD statement. A new home closeout sheet reflects an over-allowance of $12,225.00 and an item labeled "extra gross" of $7,075.00. The extra gross item was made up of amounts for a well ($900.00), power ($710.00), septic system ($700.00), and driveway ($4,765.00). Lynn Haven did not install a driveway for Mr. Withey. The extra gross amounts were the differences between dollar figures listed in a column labeled "charged" and dollar figures listed in a column labeled "actual." The figures appear to be related to costs. However, there was no evidence to support that conclusion. The figure in the charged column for the driveway was $4,765.00, but the figure in the actual column was $0. There was no evidence regarding this extra gross sheet and the document was not recognized by Mr. Withey at the hearing. Likewise, there was no evidence regarding how these two documents were used in closing the loan, what the loan amount was, or even who the lender was. No evidence was introduced by Petitioner demonstrating that any document introduced into evidence was submitted to any lending institution or utilized by any lending institution for any purpose. Likewise, none of these documents can be linked to Respondent Wilson as providing any of the information on any documents submitted to a lending institution regarding the source of any down payment funds provided by Mr. Withey for the purchase of his home. Therefore, Respondent Wilson is not guilty of fraud or misrepresentation and the portions of the Administrative Complaint relating thereto should be dismissed. The evidence regarding whether Lynn Haven charged Mr. Withey for a driveway which he did not receive is not clear since how the extra gross sheet was used in the eventual loan or purchase is not clear. The suspicion is that the driveway value was used to inflate the requested loan amount in order to yield enough cash for a down payment. However, there was insufficient evidence to support such a conclusion since the HUD statement was unreadable. Therefore, the portions of the Administrative Complaint related to the Withey transaction against Lynn Haven should be dismissed. Betty Brown bought a home from Lynn Haven in March of 1998. The salesperson she dealt with was Randy, last name unknown. Respondent Christopher Wilson had no involvement with her purchase. Ms. Brown traded in her mobile home for a new mobile home, and she was allowed $7,000.00 for her trade in. No other cash was deposited by Ms. Brown. The new mobile home was placed on the lot owned by her where the old mobile home had been. No land improvements were required and no septic system, power pole, or well was required since those items were already present on the property. However, the salesperson for Lynn Haven told her they would add charges for a septic tank and well to account for a $10,000.00 down payment. In essence, false charges or allowances for improvements would be added to the loan amount to increase the loan amount to balance against a $10,000.00 cash down payment. Ms. Brown was uncomfortable with this process and questioned the salesperson about it. She was told that it was standard practice in purchasing a mobile home. The lender for Ms. Brown’s transaction was Unicor Mortgage, Inc., and the closing agent was Stewart Title of Northwest Florida, Inc. No one from either of these corporations testified as to this loan or who supplied the figures used in the HUD closing statement. No evidence was introduced by Petitioner demonstrating that any document signed by Ms. Brown was submitted to any lending institution. Likewise, no evidence was introduced by Petitioner demonstrating that any document Ms. Brown signed was utilized by a lending institution for any purpose. No evidence was introduced by Petitioner which demonstrated that Respondent Wilson wrote anything on any document submitted to a lending institution regarding the source of any down payment funds provided by Ms. Brown for the purchase of her home. Therefore, Respondent Wilson is not guilty of fraud or misrepresentation and the portions of the Administrative Complaint relating thereto should be dismissed. The evidence did show Lynn Haven charged or included in the purchase agreement amounts for a well, power pole, and septic system which were already present on her property in order to inflate the value of the loan so that a $10,000.00 down payment could be reflected for the loan. This practice is at worst fraud, at best an intentional misrepresentation of the actual down payment for the mobile home. Therefore, Lynn Haven is guilty of fraud and misrepresentation in an installment contract. Around June 1998, Maureen Pooler purchased a mobile home from Lynn Haven. The salesperson she dealt with was Randy, last name unknown. Ms. Pooler never dealt with Respondent Wilson. Ms. Pooler did not discuss any down payment requirements with the salesperson, but did tell him that she only had $2,000.00 to put down on a mobile home. While looking at the homes on Lynn Haven’s sales lot, the salesperson told Ms. Pooler that Lynn Haven would reduce the price of any mobile home on the lot because the business was moving down the road. Ms. Pooler picked out two mobile homes and gave the salesperson a check for $2,000.00. Lynn Haven ran a credit history on Ms. Pooler. Later, the salesperson called to inform Ms. Pooler that she had been approved for a loan on the lesser of the two mobile homes. The evidence did not demonstrate if any sales contract or other paperwork was submitted to gain such approval. The retail installment contract shows a down payment of $13,000.00. A separate document titled “Purchase agreement” lists no amounts for a down payment. The purchase agreement does contain a net trade amount of $13,000.00. The New Home Washout Sheet reflects a $10,000.00 over allowance. However, none of these figures can be traced through to the installment contract and the evidence did not demonstrate the relationship, if any, among these various documents. The installment contract was assigned to Green Tree Financial Center, Inc. No one from Green Tree testified at the hearing regarding this loan, any dealer agreement it had with Lynn Haven, or the representations, if any, Green Tree relied on to take assignment of this installment contract. Nor did anyone from Green Tree or elsewhere testify as to the standards in the industry regarding borrowing a cash down payment. No evidence was introduced by Petitioner demonstrating that any document signed by Ms. Pooler was submitted to any lending institution. Likewise, no evidence was introduced by Petitioner demonstrating that any document Ms. Pooler signed was utilized by any lending institution for any purpose. No evidence was introduced by Petitioner which demonstrated that Respondent Wilson wrote anything on any document submitted to a lending institution regarding the source of any down payment funds provided by Ms. Pooler for the purchase of her home. Therefore, the portions of the Administrative Complaint relating to the Pooler transaction against the Respondents should be dismissed. Around April 1998, Larry Laux purchased a mobile home from Lynn Haven. The salesperson he dealt with was Randy Wilson. Mr. Laux never dealt with Respondent Wilson in any material manner. Mr. Laux did not make a cash down payment on the mobile home. He did use some land he owned and had been living on as collateral. Mr. Laux told the salesperson that he could not make a cash down payment. The salesperson replied that, given Mr. Laux’s credit rating, the lack of a down payment should not be a problem. The alleged purchase agreement for the mobile home contained two signatures for Mr. Laux and his wife. However, the signatures were not those of the Laux’s, and Mr. Laux did not recognize the purchase agreement. In any event, the home was purchased and a loan was closed by Mr. Laux. The lender was Green Tree Financial Services and the closing agent was Stewart Title of Northwest Florida, Inc. No one from either corporation testified as to the Laux loan or the paperwork relied on for that loan. The HUD statement for the loan does not reflect a down payment. However, the HUD statement does reflect a disbursement of funds to Lynn Haven for land improvements in the amount of $4,450.00. The land improvement figure consisted of charges for a power pole ($1,000.00), water, and sewer hookups ($3,000.00) and land clearing ($450.00). Except for the power pole, Lynn Haven did not provide these items to Mr. Laux, and Mr. Laux was never given the money for the hookups or land clearing. Lynn Haven kept the money for services it did not provide. Therefore, Lynn Haven is guilty of fraud in a financial transaction for home improvements. No evidence was introduced by Petitioner demonstrating that any document signed by Mr. and Mrs. Laux was submitted to any lending institution. Likewise, no evidence was introduced by Petitioner demonstrating that ay document Mr. and Mrs. Laux signed was utilized by any lending institution for any purpose. No evidence was introduced by Petitioner which demonstrated that Respondent Wilson wrote anything on any document submitted to a lending institution regarding the source of any down payment funds provided by Mr. and Mrs. Laux for the purchase of their home. Therefore, the portions of the Administrative Complaint related to the Laux transaction against the Respondent Wilson should be dismissed. In December 1997, Terries Mesiner bought a home from Lynn Haven. Respondent Wilson was the salesperson who dealt with Mr. Mesiner. The facts surrounding the Mesiner negotiations and eventual sale are unclear. There appears to have been some sort of prequalification or approval for a purchase of a mobile home. However, there were two different mobile homes involved. The first was the one the Mesiner’s wanted but did not purchase. At some point there were discussions for additions to a mobile home they wanted to purchase which included a whirlpool tub, large deck, and extra insulation. However, the evidence did not show to which mobile home the discussion of these additions pertained. Likewise the evidence did not demonstrate that these discussions resulted in a contractual agreement that Lynn Haven would provide these additions. What is clear is that Respondent Wilson told Mr. Mesiner he needed 15 percent of the purchase price as a down payment on the purchase of mobile home. Mr. Mesiner indicated he could only pay $3,000.00 as a down payment. Respondent Wilson told him they would "work around it." Mr. Mesiner paid $3,000.00 as a down payment on the mobile home. The down payment shown on the HUD settlement statement was $13,001.83. There was no evidence which demonstrated where the figure used for the down payment in the HUD statement came from. Neither the lender nor the closing agent testified at the hearing and none of the documents introduced into evidence pertaining to this transaction seem to relate to this figure. Moreover, the HUD statement does not list Lynn Haven as the seller, but some other individuals whose roles were not identified at the hearing. Mr. Mesiner performed a walk-through of his newly-purchased home and approved of everything as being appropriate that was included in his home. Mr. Mesiner further signed all closing documents, none of which mentioned a deck, a whirlpool, or extra insulation or charges for such items. No evidence was introduced by Petitioner demonstrating that any document signed by Mr. Mesiner was submitted to any lending institution or utilized by any lending institution for any purpose. No evidence was introduced by Petitioner which demonstrated that Respondent Wilson wrote anything on any document submitted to a lending institution regarding the source of any down payment funds provided by Mr. Mesiner for the purchase of his home. Therefore, the portions of the Administrative Complaint regarding the Mesiner transaction should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enters a final order as: That Lynn Haven Home Center, Inc., cease and desist any and all further violations of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes, and the rules duly promulgated thereunder, including, but not limited to Section 520.995(1)(b), Florida Statutes; and That Lynn Haven Home Center, Inc., pay a fine in the amount of $1,000.00 (one thousand dollars) per violation; and That the Administrative Complaint filed against Christopher Wilson and Doyce Lindley be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Clyde C. Caillouet, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance 4900 Bayou Boulevard, Suite 103 Pensacola, Florida 32503 Brant Hargrove, Esquire Law Office of Brant Hargrove 2984 Wellington Circle, West Tallahassee, Florida 32309 Doyce Lindley 13 Warwick Drive Shalimar, Florida 32579 Michael A. Reichman, Esquire Post Office Box 41 Monticello, Florida 32345 Honorable Robert F. Milligan Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level 09 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Robert Beitler, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Fletcher Building, Suite 526 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these Findings of Fact, the Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0317497. In 1985, the Respondent operated his own real estate brokerage firm, Kline Real Estate, Inc., which acted as a marketing agent for Majestic Builders, a construction company. Both Kline Real Estate, Inc., and Majestic Builders did business in and around the Spring Hill, Hernando County, Florida, area. Majestic Builders was owned by George Orlando. In early 1985, Majestic Builders' qualifying general contractor was Stephen Cannon. In early 1985, the Respondent was contacted by the Whitmarshes of Lynchburg, Virginia, who expressed interest in having a modified version of a Majestic Builders model home built on a piece of property in Spring Hill, Florida. Eventually, the Whitmarshes selected a lot on which to have the residence built, and the Respondent brokered the purchase of the lot (from a third party) and the construction contract. Both contracts were entered into on or about April 27, 1985. Both contracts required that the Whitmarshes make a deposit, $1,000 on the lot purchase and $5,000 on the construction contract. Both deposits were made into the escrow account maintained by Kline Real Estate, Inc. The $1,000 deposit was disbursed without incident at the closing of the lot purchase on or about May 7, 1985. The construction contract between the Whitmarshes and Majestic Builders provided in connection with the deposit: DEPOSIT TO FIX HOME PRICE FOR PERIOD OF 6 MOS. [MONTHS), DURING WHICH COMMENCEMENT MAY BEGIN WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTIFICATION AND INITIAL PAYMENT OF 30% OF BALANCE. SHOULD COMMENCEMENT BE AFTER 6 MOS., DEPOSIT WILL STILL APPLY BUT TO NEW PURCHASE PRICE OF MODEL AT TIME OF CONSTRUCTION. For the balance of the spring and summer of 1985, the Whitmarshes continued to consult with the Respondent and, primarily through the Respondent, with George Orlando regarding the modifications the Whitmarshes desired to make to the Majestic Builders model, but they were not particularly anxious to commence construction for personal, family health reasons. In addition, they understood and knew from the contract provision and from conversation with the Respondent that their $5,000 deposit was supposed to be credited to the price of the home they eventually built even if commencement was more than six months from the contract date. On or about November 11, 1985, the Respondent advised the Whitmarshes by telephone, confirmed in writing: This [is] notification, that in accordance with your contract, you are legally in default. This letter is written out of legal necessity and has no bearing on your deposit which will bw [sic] applied to the agreed upon purchase price of a Majestic Home. The default merely is to state the builder is no longer held to the prices quoted. And any changes either up or down will be reflected in the new contract price. (Emphasis added.) Notwithstanding his November 11 letter, the Respondent withdrew the Whitmarshes' $5,000 deposit from the Kline Real Estate, Inc., escrow account and deposited it in the Kline Real Estate, Inc. operating account. Of the $5,000, $1,000 was used the purchase of a building lot for Majestic Builders, and $1,500 was paid directly to George Orlando, to whom the Respondent believed the $5,000 belonged. 1/ The Respondent is unable to account for the balance of the $5,000. 2/ On or about March 21, 1986, the Respondent received a letter from Mr. Whitmarsh stating: "With this letter I authorize you to use $500 from my escrow account to obtain a new floor plan and prepare a cost estimate for my revised version of your Wind and Wildfire Model Home." The Respondent, who had had a heart attack in September, 1985, and was in the process of closing out Kline Real Estate, Inc., and getting out of the real estate business, passed the letter on to George Orlando. Orlando balked at the request, taking the position that the purpose of the $5,000 was not for use to draw up revised plans. But it is the Respondent's understanding that Orlando eventually relented and agreed not to require the Whitmarshes to pay for the revised plans with new money. It is unclear from the evidence whether revised plans ever were drawn. 3/ In approximately June or July, 1986, the Respondent closed Kline Real Estate, Inc., and got out of the real estate business. He never heard anything else from the Whitmarshes about the transaction and assumed that Orlando and the Whitmarshes had satisfactorily concluded their business dealings. But in fact in approximately early 1987, the Whitmarshes received information that Majestic Builders was not a licensed contractor. Although, on checking, they learned that Majestic Builders then had a licensed qualifying contractor, the Whitmarshes still did not feel comfortable with Orlando and Majestic Builders. In about April, 1987, the Whitmarshes decided to hire another builder and asked Orlando for the return of their deposit. Orlando refused, saying that the Respondent had the money. 4/ Nonetheless, the Whitmarshes never contacted the Respondent for the return of the deposit. Later, the Whitmarshes and Orlando became involved in another dispute arising out of the alleged improper use of Orlando's Wind and Wildfire drawings by the Whitmarshes and the builder they eventually hired, Stephen Cannon, who had been Majestic Builders' qualifying general contractor but had left to start his own construction company with the understanding that Cannon would not use any of Majestic Builders' drawings. The Respondent had no knowledge of any of these disputes between Orlando and the Whitmarshes until he was interviewed by a Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) investigator in August, 1988. The DPR had begun an investigation of Orlando on the Whitmarshes' complaint of alleged violations of the laws regulating construction contractors and learned that the dispute involved a deposit that had been held in trust by a licensed real estate broker. DPR then began an investigation of the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding the Respondent, Ronold E. Kline, guilty of violating portions of paragraph (b) and paragraphs (d) and (k) of Sections 475.25(1), Florida Statutes (1987), and suspending his license for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1989.
The Issue The four count Administrative Complaint presents the following issues: Whether Mr. Burgess is guilty of concealment, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2007).2 Whether Mr. Burgess operated as a broker without being the holder of a valid and current license as a broker in violation of Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes and, therefore, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Whether Mr. Burgess failed to ensure his brokerage corporation had a current registration with the Department in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-5.019, and, therefore, in violation of Section 475.25(1), Florida Statutes. Whether Mr. Burgess is failed to account or deliver to the Bells any property or assets which has come into his hands and is not his property and which he is not entitled to retain, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Clear and convincing evidence establishes the following findings of fact: The parties agree that Mr. Burgess is now, and has been at all times material to this case, a Florida licensed real estate broker, holding license number 701456. Mr. Burgess's business relationship with Willis C. and Nell F. Bell (the Bells) began in 2002 and 2003. In those years he served as realtor in selling a duplex and buying a house located at 42 East Drive, North Miami Beach, Florida. Later the Bells paid Mr. Burgess $1,000 to assist with re-financing the house. In the following years, Mr. Burgess borrowed money from the Bells. The Bells knew little about real estate and the real estate business. They trusted and relied upon Mr. Burgess, and he knew that. Mr. Burgess entered into a contract with the Bells to sell a townhouse located at 648 Northeast Second Street, Homestead, Florida. The contract is titled “Exclusive Right of Sale Listing Agreement” and dated October 3, 2006. The contract identifies Mr. Burgess as an “Authorized Listing Associate or Broker.” It gives Mr. Burgess the exclusive right to sell the Bells’ property and obligated him to market and sell the property. The contract identifies the sale price as $310,000.00. The contract term is October 3, 2006 to April 3, 2007. The first sentence of the contract identifies the parties as the Bells (Sellers) and Mr. Burgess and World Realty (Brokers). Mr. Burgess signed it as “Authorized Listing Associate or Broker.” The signature area identifies the Brokerage Firm Name as Beachfront Realty, Inc. The Bells purchased the Homestead townhouse at Mr. Burgess’s urging. He convinced the Bells that buying the Homestead townhouse was a good real estate investment. Mr. Burgess also loaned the Bells $3,000 or $3,500 to help them purchase the property. Mr. Burgess did not succeed in finding buyers for the property. Mr. Burgess proposed to the Bells that they rent the property. He repeatedly offered to locate a tenant for them. For some time the Bells resisted the idea because of concerns about wear and tear and possible damage to a new townhouse. Finally they agreed. Mr. Burgess identified a tenant, Ms. Kenya Horne. He repeatedly told the Bells that Ms. Horne’s occupation and lease of the townhouse were dependent on approval to participate in a government rent support program. Mr. Burgess prepared and the Bells executed a lease with Ms. Horne for the period beginning October 8, 2007 and ending September 30, 2008. It provided for lease payments of $1,300.00 per month and a security deposit of $1,300.00. Mr. Burgess signed the lease as a witness. But the Bells told Mr. Burgess that they did not want Ms. Horne to take possession of the townhouse until they met and approved her. Mr. Burgess agreed. He repeatedly assured the Bells that he would not give Ms. Horne possession of the property until they had met and approved of her. Also Mr. Burgess repeatedly advised the Bells that Ms. Horne had not moved into the property because she could not obtain needed approval for rent assistance. These assurances were false. Despite his repeated assurances and statements, Mr. Burgess gave the tenant possession of the property. She lived there four or five months. During the same time period, while the tenant occupied the property, Mr. Burgess was telling the Bells that Ms. Horne had not obtained rent assistance and that renting the property to her was not going to work. He never told the Bells that the tenant moved in. And he never gave the Bells any rental payments or a deposit or made any arrangements for them to receive rental payments or a deposit. Uneasy about matters, the Bells traveled with Laurence Linder, a friend who was a real estate broker and insurance salesman, to Homestead to inspect the townhouse. They found that the property had been occupied and damaged. The damage included holes in several walls and fire damage in the kitchen. The stove and microwave were destroyed. The carpet was damaged. The Bells called Mr. Burgess from the townhouse and asked him how the property was. Mr. Burgess did not know that the Bells were at the townhouse. He told them it was in fine shape. When the Bells told Mr. Burgess that they were in the townhouse, he broke down and cried and admitted he had let somebody live there without telling them. When the Bells confronted Mr. Burgess with his actions and the damage, Mr. Burgess admitted deceiving the Bells about the tenant and her occupation of the townhouse. He promised to make restitution for the damage. Mr. Burgess signed a document titled Remedy of Rental. In it he agreed to do the following: Pay the City of Homestead’s final outstanding utility bill of $1,700 on or before March 14, 2008. Pay the Bells $4,600 to repair damage and an additional $2,000. Pay the Bells $5,200.00, the rental amount from October 2007 to January 2008, on or before April 11, 2008. Pay all amounts by certified or cashiers check. Mr. Burgess did not make any of the payments agreed to in the Remedy of Rental.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating insurance and insurance related activities in Florida. Petitioner is the agency responsible for regulating any licensed or unlicensed person engaged in activities prohibited under Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. 1/ Respondent is licensed as an independent adjuster. Respondent's license number is 289505173. Gilmore Wimberly & Associates, Inc. (GWA) is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of insurance adjusting. GWA's principal place of business is 1033 Oak Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32204. All billing for independent adjusting services is processed in the Jacksonville office. However, GWA maintains branch offices to adjust claims throughout the state. One of the branch offices is located at 251 Maitland Avenue, Suite 110, Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701 (the "Altamonte office"). In March and April, 1994, Respondent was employed by GWA as an independent adjuster in charge of operating the Altamonte office. Respondent supervised one secretary and an appraiser. Respondent issued five unauthorized invoices to GWA clients in the aggregate amount of $2,329.92. Respondent altered the address on the face of the invoices so that payment would be made to the Altamonte office rather than the home office in Jacksonville (the "altered invoices"). 2/ Respondent received payment for the altered invoices on drafts or checks ("checks") from insurance companies that employed GWA to provide adjusting services. Each check was made payable to GWA. Respondent endorsed the checks on behalf of GWA. Respondent had no authority to endorse the checks. Respondent endorsed the checks to himself. Respondent then deposited the checks to his personal bank account. 3/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of the charges in the Administrative Complaint and revoking Respondent's license. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1995.
