Findings Of Fact On or about February 9, 1983, the State of Florida, Department of General Services, Division of Construction and Property Management, Bureau of Property Management ("DGS"), received a certification of need from the Department of Corrections ("DOC") requesting authority for DOC to advertise for competitive bids from private persons interested in providing leased office space needed to house DOC's Bureau of Industries. The Bureau of Industries was then located in leased space with leases which were scheduled to expire June 30, 1983. The Bureau of Industries has been located in DOC's central office area since its creation in 1957. The DOC central office includes the Secretary and Deputy Secretary; the Assistant Secretaries for Operations, Programs, Management, and Budget. All these officials, together with subsidiary bureaus, staff, and other subordinates are located in two adjacent buildings of the Winewood Office Complex on Blair Stone Road in Tallahassee. The prison industry program is under the supervision of the industries administrator who reports directly to the Assistant Secretary for Operations. DOC sought approval from DGS to enter into a lease for privately owned office space because of its perceived need to locate within walking distance of its central office. Programs administered by the Bureau of Industries work closely with other DOC personnel and functions located in the central office in the Winewood Office Complex. Moving any distance from the central office would create problems for the DOC mailing system and would require extra time spent traveling to and from the central office. Personnel in the Bureau of Industries utilize central office files, and confer often with staff located in the central office. Locating outside the general area of the central office would require additional expenses with regard to availability of vehicles, pick up of mail and supplies, and duplication of support services. Accordingly, DGS and DOC determined, and the record in this cause establishes, that it would not be in the state's best interest to require DOC to locate its Bureau of Industries program either in state-owned buildings in the Capitol Center, or in any area beyond walking distance of the central office location. On March 21 and 31, 1983, respectively, DOC published an advertisement in the Tallahassee Democrat inviting all interested persons to submit sealed bids at or before 2:00 p.m. on April 19, 1983, in accordance with the Invitation to Bid and Specifications prepared by DOC for the office space needed to house the Bureau of Industries. A portion of the bid specifications required that office space to be leased be located within a circle drawn on a city map of the City of Tallahassee, Florida, which could roughly be described as the southeastern portion of the city, in the vicinity of the Winewood Office Complex. There were four possible bidders in the area within the circle on the map attached to the bid specifications. Of these four possible bidders, two within the area actually submitted bids--Blairstone Center Partners and Washington Square, Ltd. One of the general provisions of the bid specifications provided as follows: The Department of Corrections reserves the right to reject any and all bids, waive any minor informality or technicality in bids received and to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and best. . . At or before 11:00 a.m. on April 19, 1983, DOC received sealed bids from Petitioner and Intervenors in response to the aforesaid advertisement, and at 11:00 a.m. on April 19, 1983, DOC opened, tabulated, and published each of the bids. The bid submitted by Petitioner was not responsive to the requirements of the Invitation to Bid and Specifications because the property offered by Petitioner in its response was outside the area indicated on the map annexed to the Invitation to Bid. The bid submitted by Intervenor, Blairstone Center Partners, failed to offer the full services specified in paragraph six of DOC's Bid Submittal Form; failed to offer the exclusive parking specified in the paragraph seven of the Bid Submittal Form; failed to supply the photographs specified in paragraph ten of Respondent's Bid Submittal Form; and failed to supply the information specified in paragraphs one through eight of the Bid Submittal Form. Accordingly, the record in this cause fully establishes that the bids submitted by Petitioner and by Intervenors Blairstone Center Partners, failed to comply with the requirements of the Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form, and that the deficiencies in the bids of Petitioner and Intervenor, Blairstone Center Partners, were so material as to require their rejection. The Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form required that bidders offer for lease 2,683 square feet, plus or minus three percent. The bid submitted by Intervenor, Washington Square, Ltd., offered 2,797 square feet, which is approximately 34 square feet more than allowed in the Invitation to Bid. After this fact was discovered upon opening the bid, DOC personnel contacted a representative of Washington Square, Ltd., and advised the net square footage offered in the bid submitted by Washington Square, Ltd., exceeded the net square footage of space that DOC was authorized to lease and pay for under the Invitation to Bid. Washington Square, Ltd., subsequently agreed to modify its proposal by relieving DOC from any obligation to pay for the extra 34 square feet, and reducing the annual rental for the first year from $26,012.10 to $25,695.90, and for the second year from $27,576.60 to $27,243.18. The record in this cause does not establish any misconduct or collusion between Washington Square, Ltd., and DOC personnel obtaining this modification, nor does the record in this cause establish that any actual or prospective bidders suffered any competitive disadvantage as a result of this modification. The effect of Washington Square, Ltd.'s modification of its proposal rendered that proposal the only bid which was responsive to the Invitation to Bid. On August 18, 1983, Washington Square, Ltd., executed a deed to the property which was the subject matter of its bid to Ben Grace. Washington Square also executed an assignment of the proposed bid award to Grace.
The Issue Whether Petitioner/Intervenor Hedin's challenge to Respondent's preliminary determination to award Lease No. 590:2241 to 1436 Building, Inc. should be sustained? Whether Petitioner/Intervenor Schlitt's challenge to said preliminary determination should be sustained?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: 1 In March, 1991, after requesting and receiving approval from the Department of General Services, the Respondent issued an Invitation to Bid for Lease No. 590:2241 (hereinafter referred to as the "ITB"). The cover page of the ITB contained the Bid Advertisement, which read as follows: The State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative services is seeking approximately 17,064 net rentable square feet of office space to lease in Indian River County within the following boundaries: North, to Lindsey Road, South to Olso Road, East to A1A and West to Kings Highway. Space must be in an existing building. Occupancy no later than October 1, 1991, or within 120 days after notification of bid award, whichever occurs last. Desire a five (5) year lease with five (5) one year renewal options. Sealed bids will be received until 3:30 p.m.,, April 24, 199[1] at Riviera Beach, FL. Information and specifications will be provided to all interested parties at a mandatory pre-proposal conference to be held at Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 1050 15th Street West, Riviera Beach, FL. 33404, April 5, 1991 at 1:00 p.m. The Department of HRS reserves the right to reject any and all bids received and if necessary to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive bids. The office space sought by Respondent was to house a client service center that is currently operating out of a 12,000 square foot facility owned by Petitioner/Intervenor Hedin. Respondent needs approximately 5,000 more square feet of office space for this center. Page B-1 of the ITB contained the definitions of various terms used in the ITB. Among the terms defined was "lowest and best bid." "Lowest and best bid" was defined as follows: That bid selected by the District Administrator, designee, or Deputy Secretary upon the recommendation of the bid evaluation committee following an objective and detailed process to evaluate and compare bids. "Lowest" refers to the total evaluation score. Weights for evaluation criteria are prescribed on pages B-7 through 9. Actually, this information was found on pages B-5 though 7 of the ITB, which read in pertinent part as follows: EVALUATION OF BIDS Bids received are first evaluated to determine technical responsiveness, such as use of Bid Submittal Form, inclusion of required information, data, attachments, and signatures. Non- responsive bids will be withdrawn from further consideration. Non-responsive bidders will be informed promptly by certified mail. Responsive bids are presented to a bid evaluation committee for comparison and formulation of a recommendation for award. This is accomplished by a visit to each proposed property and application of the evaluation criteria. The committee's recommendation will be presented to the Department official having award authority for final evaluation and determination of a successful bidder. EVALUATION CRITERIA AWARD FACTORS The successful bidder will be that determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based upon the award factors enumerated below: Associated Fiscal Costs Rental Rental rates for basic term of lease. Evaluated using present value methodology by application of she present value discount rate of 8.74%. 2/ (Weighting: 35 minimum) Rental rates for optional renewal terms of lease. Rates proposed are within projected budgeting restraints of the Department. (Weighting: 5 minimum) Total for rental shall be not less than 40. Moving Costs: a) Cost of relocating communications network computer drop lines as determined by a site survey conducted at each proposed facility by the Department's management information office, or: (Weighting: 5 maximum) b) Cost of relocation of major statewide operational data system as determined by a site survey conducted at each proposed facility by qualified data center management. (Weighting: 6 maximum) Telephone costs as determined by a site survey conducted at each proposed facility by an engineer from the applicable deregulated vendor. (Weighting: 5 maximum) Relocation of furniture and equipment not addressed above. (Weighting: 5 maximum) LOCATION The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it, on the efficient and economical conduct of Departmental operations planned for the requested space. Proximity of facility to a preferred area, such as a courthouse or main traffic arteries. (Will not be applicable if there are no preferred areas within the bid boundaries). (Weighting: 5 maximum) Frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation near the offered space. (Weighting: 5 maximum) Proximity of offered space to the clients to be served by the Department at this facility. (Weighting: 5 maximum) Aesthetics of the building, property the building site [is] on, and of the surrounding neighborhood. (Weighting: 1 maximum) Security issues posed by building and surrounding neighborhood. (Weighting: 1 maximum) PROPERTY Susceptibility of the property's design to efficient layout and good utilization, such as ability of physical structure to house large units together and in close proximity to interdependent units. (Weighting: 15 maximum) Suitability of the building, parking area and property as a whole for future expansion. (Weighting: 5 maximum) Provision of the aggregate square footage in a single building. Proposals will be considered (but fewer points given) which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two buildings provided the buildings are immediately adjacent to or within 100 yards of each other. If in separate buildings, the structures are connected by enclosed climate controlled walkways. (Weighting: 2 maximum) Prospective bidders were instructed on page B-3 of the ITB that they had to submit their bids on the 22-page Bid Submittal Form, which comprised Section C of the ITB. The Bid Submittal Form (BSF) provided detailed information regarding the needs of the Department and the terms, conditions and requirements that prospective bidders were expected to meet. Among the requirements addressed was that the proposed space be an "existing building," meaning that it was "dry, fully enclosed, and capable of being physically measured." The BSF further indicated that a multistory building would be acceptable, provided that it met certain specified requirements. In addition, pages C-3 through 4 of the BSF informed prospective bidders that, as part of their bid submittal, they would have to provide, among other things, the following: * * * b. A scaled (1/16" or 1/8" or 1/4" 1'0") floor plan showing present configurations with measurements. The final floor plan will be described in the specifications. * * * A scaled site layout showing present location of building(s), location, configuration and number of parking spaces assigned to the Department, access and egress routes and proposed changes. This is to be drawn to scale. Final site layout will be a joint effort between Department and Lessor so as to best meet the needs of the Department. The subject of floor plans was also discussed on page C-11 of the ITB, which provided in pertinent part as follows: Final floor plans will be a joint effort of Departmental staff and the successful bidder. The successful bidder is to provide architectural services by a licensed architect to prepare renovation plans. The final floor plan is subject to Departmental determination and State Fire Marshal review and approval. 3/ Prospective bidders were issued the following advisement and warning on page B-8 of the ITB regarding their protest rights: Any person may dispute any part of the competitive bid process through the filing of a protest. To be considered, a protest must be filed in accordance with Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 10-13.11 Florida Administrative Code. Failure to file a protest within the prescribed time limits shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Prospective bidders, who did not want to file a protest, but merely desired clarification regarding a matter relating to the bidding process, were directed, on page B-3 of the ITB, to follow the following procedure: Any questions concerning an interpretation of meaning, ambiguity, or inconsistency on this project are to be received in writing by the project contact person listed on page A-1 [Steven Young) at least 5 working days prior to bid opening so that a written response may be provided to all bidders. 4/ The mandatory pre-proposal conference on the ITB was held as scheduled on April 5, 1991. Petitioner/Intervenor Schlitt, Petitioner/Intervenor Hedin, and Intervenor 1436 Building, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "`1436") appeared in person or through a representative at the conference. One other prospective bidder, Alan Taylor, was also in attendance. Among the topics discussed at the pre-proposal conference was the present value index discount rate that would be applied in evaluating proposals. The prospective bidders were advised that the rate which appeared on page C-21 of the ITB-- 7.73%--, not the 8.74% rate appearing on page B-5, would be used. Prospective bidders were also told at the pre- proposal conference that the maximum number of total points available for moving costs was not 15 or 16 as a reading of the ITB might suggest, but 21: 5 for item 1)a) (computer drop lines);6 for item 1)b) (statewide operational data system equipment); 5 for item 2 (telephones); and 5 for item 3 (furniture and other equipment). Under the ITB, as originally issued and clarified at the pre-proposal conference (hereinafter referred to as the "Original ITB"), Respondent was to pay its own moving costs, as it had consistently done in the past, without any contribution on the part of the successful bidder and it would award points to each bidder for moving costs based upon what it would cost Respondent, according to its estimates, to relocate computer drop lines, statewide operational data system equipment, telephones, and furniture and other equipment to the facility proposed by that bidder. The less the expense to the Department to relocate these items, the more points a bidder would receive. Accordingly, to the extent that he intended to offer space already occupied by Respondent, Petitioner/Intervenor Hedin had an advantage over the other prospective bidders under the Original ITB. Some time after the pre-proposal conference, David Feldman, 1436's representative, complained to Respondent about this advantage enjoyed by Hedin in the category of moving costs and inquired if anything could be done about it. Steven Gertel, the Respondent's Assistant Staff Director for Facilities Services, Kevin McAloon, the General Services Manager for Respondent's District IX, Louis Consagra, the then Office Operations Manager for General Services for District IX, and Steven Young, the Facilities Services Manager for District IX and the contact person referenced in the ITB, discussed the matter during a telephone conference call held on April 11, 1991. During their discussion, it was decided that it would be in the best interest of the Department, which was operating under severe fiscal constraints, to change the ITB to allow prospective bidders to essentially buy points by agreeing to pay all or a portion of Respondent's estimated moving costs. Such a change, it was thought, would enhance the competitiveness of the bidding process. Before making the change, however, Respondent attempted to quickly estimate what its costs would be if it had to relocate computer drop lines, statewide operational data system equipment, telephones, and furniture and other equipment to another facility in Indian River County within the geographical boundaries prescribed in the ITB. Respondent estimated that it would cost between $25,000 and $30,000 to relocate computer drop lines and statewide operational data system equipment, $35,000 to $45,000 to relocate telephones and $8,000 to $10,000 to relocate furniture and other equipment. In arriving at these estimates, Respondent relied upon agency personnel who, because of their experience, expertise and/or access to contracts with vendors and other pertinent documents, appeared to be reliable sources of information. On April 12, 1991, the day after the telephone conference call and twelve days before the scheduled bid opening, Facilities Services Manager Young, on behalf of the Department, sent by United States Certified Mail, return receipt requested, to all four prospective bidders who attended the mandatory pre- proposal conference on April 5, 1991, the following memorandum: Page C-22 of the Bid Submittal Form has been changed and is enclosed for use in the Invitation to Bid. Please call me if you have any questions on this change/addition or any information that is needed to complete your Bid Submittal on or before 3:30 p.m., April 24, 1991. The "changed" page C-22 of the ITB, which accompanied the foregoing memorandum, provided as follows with respect to moving costs: The bidder will respond to the items as stated in the Bid submittal,, Page B-6, b. Moving Costs: 1) a) b), 2), 3). Department Bidder Estimate Response 1) a) b) $25,000 to $30,000 2) $35,000 to $45,000 3) $8,000 to $10,000 Young also telephoned each of the four prospective bidders and explained to them how moving costs would be evaluated in light of this revision to the ITB. He told them that if they indicated under "Bidder Response" on page C-22 that they would be willing to pay up to $30,000 for item 1, $45,000 for item 2 and $10,000 for item 3, and in Hedin's case, provided he submitted a bid that included the 12,000 square feet of space presently occupied by Respondent, 28% of these amounts, they would capture the maximum number of points available for each of these items, and that if they indicated a willingness to contribute less than these amounts, they would be awarded points in proportion to amount of their proposed contribution. 5/ Respondent's decision to allow Hedin to earn the same amount of points as the other prospective bidders for moving costs by pledging to contribute only 28% of what his competitors had to pledge was based upon square footage considerations. If a bidder other than Hedin was awarded the lease, Respondent would have to move into more than 17,000 square feet of space. If, on the other hand, Hedin submitted a bid that included the 12,000 square feet of space presently occupied by Respondent and he was the successful bidder, Respondents would be occupying only 5,000 or so square feet of space it had not previously occupied, or approximately 28% of the square footage that it would have to move into if the lease had been awarded to another bidder. The ITB, as so revised and clarified by Respondent (hereinafter referred to as the "Revised ITB"), contemplated that the successful bidder would be obligated to pay only Respondent's actual moving costs up to the amounts pledged on page C-22 of the bidder's completed BSF. Moving costs in excess of the amounts pledged by the successful bidder would be borne by Respondent. Respondent wanted to avoid a situation where, because of Respondent's estimating errors, a successful bidder: was forced to bear a cost in connection with its bid that it did not anticipate at the time it had submitted the bid. Respondent, however, was quite confident that the estimates it had made and incorporated in the Revised ITB would not prove to be too low. 6/ All four of the prospective bidders who participated in the mandatory pre-proposal conference submitted timely bids. Each of bids was deemed to be responsive. Facility Services Manager Young then performed the calculations necessary to determine the number of points that each bidder should be awarded for associated fiscal costs, including rental costs and moving costs. This was purely an objective and non-judgmental exercise. Young performed these calculations in accordance with the methodology that had been described to all of the bidders prior to the submission of their bids. Schlitt had the lowest rental rates for the basic term of the lease, as well as for the five option years. Accordingly, he was awarded the maximum 35 points for the former and the maximum 5 points for the latter, for a total of 40 points. The scores received by the other bidders for rental costs were as follows: 1436- basic term: 34.125, and option years: 4.340; Hedin- basic term: 28.865, and option years: 3.710; and Taylor- basic term: 31.938, and option years: 4.575. Schlitt and 1436 indicated on page C-22 of their completed BSFs that they were each willing to pay up to $30,000 for the relocation of computer drop lines and statewide operational data system equipment, up to $45,000 for the relocation of telephones and up to $10,000 for the relocation of furniture and other equipment. Accordingly, they were both awarded the maximum 21 points for moving costs. Hedin indicated on page C-22 of his completed BSF that he was willing to pay up to 28% of these amounts ($8,400.00 for the relocation of computer drop lines and statewide operational data system equipment, $12,600 for the relocation of telephones and $2,800 for the relocation of furniture and other equipment). Accordingly, he too was awarded the maximum 21 points for moving costs. Taylor, who indicated on page C-22 of his completed BSF a willingness to contribute only a small fraction of the Respondent's estimated moving costs, received a total of 1.667 points for moving costs. After computing these scores 7/ Young prepared a written synopsis of all four bids that had been submitted. He gave copies of his synopsis to the four members of the bid evaluation committee, along with score sheets for them to use in their evaluation of these bids. Typed in on each score sheet were the scores the bidders had received for rental costs and moving costs. These scores were accurately reported on the score sheets except for the score that Hedin had been awarded for rental costs associated with the basic term of the lease. The score sheets erroneously indicated that Hedin had been awarded 32.375 points, rather than 28.665 points, for this item. The four members of the bid evaluation committee were: General Services Manager McAloon; Frank Mueller, District IX's chief financial officer; and Kathy Pelaez and Alfred Swanson, two HRS administrators who supervise staff headquartered in Respondent's Indian River County client service center. 8/ Young, because he was the Facilities Services Manager, was prohibited by agency practice 9/ from serving on the bid evaluation committee. The bid evaluations committee visited each of the bidder's proposed facilities before determining the amount of points to award them for the non- economic categories, i.e., location and property, set forth in the Revised ITB. The committee members visited Schlitt's, 1436's and Taylor's proposed facilities on the same day. They subsequently paid a visit to Hedin's proposed property, which consisted of the building presently occupied by Respondent, plus an addition of approximately 5,000 square feet connected to the existing building by a walkway. The delay in visiting Hedin's proposed facility was the result of a determination, later overturned, that the entire facility was not dry and measurable as required by the Revised ITB. Following their visits to Schlitt's, 1436's and Taylor's proposed facilities, the members of the bid evaluation committee met as a group and discussed each of these proposed facilities. They had a similar meeting and discussion about Hedin's proposed facility after their visit to that proposed facility. Applying the criteria set forth in the Revised ITB, the committee members agreed that the following point awards should be made for the categories of location and property: location/proximity to preferred area (evaluation criterion 2.a., 5 point maximum)- Schlitt: 3, 1436: 2, Hedin: 5, and Taylor: 1; location/public transportation (evaluation criterion 2.b., 5 point maximum)- all four bidders: 0; location/proximity to clients (evaluation criterion 2.c., 5 point maximum)- Schlitt: 3, 1436: 2, Hedin: 5, and Taylor: 1; location/aesthetics (evaluation criterion 2.d., 1 point maximum): Schlitt, 1436, and Hedin: 1, and Taylor: 0; location/security (evaluation criterion 2.e., 1 point maximum)- all bidders: 1; property/design (evaluation criterion 3.a., 15 point maximum)- Schlitt: 9, 1436: 15, Hedin: 14, and Taylor 10; property/future expansion (evaluation criterion 3.b., 5 point maximum): Schlitt: 4, 1436: 5, Hedin 3.5, and Taylor 3, and property/square footage in single building (evaluation criterion 3.c., 2 point maximum)- Schlitt, 1436, and Taylor: 2, and Hedin: 1. Each of the members of the evaluation committee then recorded these scores on their individual score sheets. Although they agreed to each award the same number of points, evaluation committee members were free to do otherwise. They were not subjects to any threats or coercion. The members of the evaluation committee made a good faith effort to fairly base their point awards on the evaluation criteria for the categories of location and property prescribed in the Revised ITB. For instance, they awarded Schlitt only nine out of a possible 15 points for property/design because of their reasonable concerns that the space he offered, which was located in a multistory building which would have other tenants in addition to the Department, would not be able to house large units together and in close proximity to interdependent units. The committee members did not have similar concerns about the space offered by 1436. Accordingly, they awarded 1436 the maximum 15 points for this category. The points awarded by the evaluation committee for location and property were added to the points the bidders had previously received for rental and moving costs to obtain a total point award for each bidder. The; results were as follows: 1436- 87.465 total points; Schlitt- 84 total points; Hedin- 83.875 total points; and Taylor- 56.18 total points. 1436's bid was therefore the "lowest and best bid," as defined on page B-1 of he Revised ITB. Consistent with the Revised ITB's pronouncement that "[t]he successful bid will be that determined to be the lowest and best," the evaluation committee recommended to the District IX Administrator that 1436 be awarded Lease No. 590:2241. General Services Manager McAloon, in his capacity as chairman of the evaluation committee, provided the District IX Administrator with a written justification for the committee's recommendation. 10/ The committee's recommendation, as well as its written justification, were adopted by the District IX Administrator, who, by letter dated October 3, 1991, to 1436, gave notice of the Department's intention to award 1436 Lease No. 590:2241. Copies of this letter were sent to all bidders. The Department's preliminary decision to award the lease to 1436 was the product of, not any fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious or unlawful conduct on the Department's part, but rather the honest exercise of the agency's discretion. After receiving their copies of the District IX Administrator's October 3, 1991, letter to 1436, Schlitt and Hedin filed protests and initiated the instant proceedings.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order awarding Lease No. 590:2241 to 1436 over the protests of Schlitt and Hedin. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of February, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Heading Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1992.
The Issue This is a bid challenge case in which the primary issue is whether the Petitioner's bid is responsive to the RFP.
Findings Of Fact Some basic background facts The Department issued Request for Proposals No. 700:0652, Office Space (the "RFP"). The RFP requested bidders to submit proposals to provide 7,750 square feet of office space (+/- 3 percent) in Broward County to be leased by the Department for a probation and parole office. Under the RFP terms the space had to be available by June 1, 1993. Proposals had to be filed with the Department by January 5, 1993. In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., and Janc, Inc., submitted bids. Pursuant to an evaluation of the bids conducted by the Department, In- Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was given a contingent award of the lease on March 31, 1993, as the vendor with the lowest price and the overall highest evaluation score. The contingent award letter of March 31, 1993, read as follows in pertinent part: It is the intent of the Department of Corrections to award the above referenced bid to In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., as the vendor with the lowest bid price and the overall highest evaluation score. The award to In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., is contingent upon: (a) obtaining the necessary zoning approval to operate a probation and parole office at the bid premises by May 6, 1993, and (b) the Department obtaining sufficient assurances from the Resolution Trust Corporation that the bid premises will not be taken over by the RTC and the Department's leasehold interest will not be affected. On May 18, 1993, the Department issued a letter awarding the subject lease to Janc, Inc., because the Department was of the view that In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., had not met the conditions of the contingent award of March 31, 1993. The award letter of May 18, 1993, read as follows, in pertinent part: This letter is to inform you that the Department of Corrections has determined that the award of the lease for the above referenced bid is hereby made to Janc, Inc. The bid from In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc. has been rejected because it has not met either of the conditions stipulated on the March 31st award letter, and the property has not been properly maintained under the existing lease agreement. Both the contingent award letter of March 31, 1993, and the award letter of May 18, 1993, contained "boiler-plate" language advising the addressee of the basic details of the written protest process. In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., filed a timely protest of the award to Janc, Inc. Facts about the zoning situation The award of the lease to In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was made contingent because the property was not properly zoned to support a probation and parole office for the Department. At the time of soliciting bids on the subject project, the Department was currently leasing the space proposed by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., and had done so for almost five years. Shortly after the deadline for the submission of bids, the Department was notified that it was in violation of the Plantation City Code because the office was not properly zoned, and the Department was subject to fines if it did not obtain proper zoning or leave the premises by June 1. The fine was at the rate of $200.00 per day. In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., did not obtain necessary zoning approval by May 6, 1993. First, the zoning approval passed by the City of Plantation limited the hours of operation of the probation office. As approved by the City of Plantation, the Department can only operate its probation office Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., plus one evening a week until 7:00 p.m. These time limits do not satisfy the contingency placed in the March 31, 1993, award because the Department cannot operate a probation and parole office within these limited hours. The Department has 14,000 probationers in Broward County under its supervision. The caseload puts a severe strain on the caseworkers making it essential that they have flexible hours to get their job done. The caseload also requires working evenings and weekends. For example, some probation officers must maintain evening hours to test offenders for drugs. Although the officers could make the offenders visit the Department's office during the day, this would jeopardize the employment status of many offenders. Therefore, the Department needs flexible evening hours to do the drug testing. One of the major functions of the probation officer is to help rehabilitate the offender. That means that the Department must do what it can to help the offender stay employed. In addition, the probation officers need evening and weekend hours to do their paperwork, including preparing weekly reporting schedules, and recording their contacts. The officers also need evening hours to receive monetary payments due from offenders, meet with offenders who must report in person into the office each month, and counsel offenders in the office. Under the prior lease with In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., the Department had operated and held evening hours at a minimum of three nights per week. This included both probation officers and offenders appearing at the office during the evenings. The RFP specifically notified bidders that there would be evening hours. Section B(14) of the RFP states: Staff of both sexes will be required to work in this facility during both daylight and evening hours. An environment in which staff can expect to be safe is essential. Section D(11) of the General Provisions of the subject RFP reads as follows: Federal, state, county, and local laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations that in any manner affect the items covered herein apply. Lack of knowledge by the bidder will in no way be a cause for relief from responsibility. The records of the City of Plantation meetings show that the May 5, 1993, vote was not final. A mandatory second reading of the zoning change took place on May 12, 1993, and the minutes were approved on May 19, 1993, and June 2, 1993, with respect to the first and second reading. Even if the zoning change with its limited hours had been sufficient to meet the terms of the contingent award, the limited zoning approval was not received before May 6, 1993; and therefore, the mandatory second reading of May 12, 1993, caused the limited zoning approval to be untimely. Finally, the limited and untimely zoning change as approved on May 5, 1993, was itself contingent on satisfying all concerns of the Landscape Architect. Facts regarding the RTC assurances The second award contingency required In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., to provide the Department with sufficient assurances from the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) that the bid premises would not be taken over by the RTC and that the Department's leasehold interest would not be affected. The property submitted by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was in litigation; the RTC as successor mortgagee, had filed or secured a Notice of Lis Pendens, an Amended Complaint, a Summary Final Foreclosure Judgment, and a Notice of Sale. The RTC has an interest in the property offered by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc. Paragraph 1(E) of the Summary Final Foreclosure Judgment provides that the Summary Final Foreclosure Judgment shall eliminate the interest of anyone that has acquired an interest since the filing of the Lis Pendens, including the Department's leasehold interest if it were to enter into a lease on the property. The property bid by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was subject to a second mortgage. The record does not reflect that the first mortgagee and the second mortgagee entered into any type of written agreement not to disturb the leasehold interest of the Department. By letter dated May 11, 1993, an attorney for the RTC responded to the Department's request for assurances. The May 11, 1993, letter included the following: Pursuant to your request of yesterday, I am writing to belatedly confirm the April 19, 1993 telephone conference had you, Robert Gellman of Real Estate Recovery, Inc., and I. This telephone conversation was had to provide the Department of Corrections (the "Department") with the assurances requested from the RTC in the Department's March 31, 1993 letter of intent to award the subject least [sic] to In Rel Acquisitions, Inc. During this discussion you expressed the concern of the Department that the RTC intended to take title to the property and would then utilize special powers and privileges to dispossess the Department. If that were to be the case, you indicated that the Department would want an assurance that it would receive 90-days' notice before it could be dispossessed. (You indicated that 90-days is how long it would take to complete the bid process that would have to precede the Department's move.) Robert Gellman indicated that he was pursing [sic] numerous resolutions to the pending litigation, some of which might involve the RTC's taking title to the property and others which might not. Mr. Gellman assured you, however, that the RTC perceived it to be in its own best interest, and in the interest of any subsequent landlord, that the Department be kept happy and its tenancy undisturbed. Mr. Gellman also explained that he could not agree to anything at the time, as the appropriate committee approval had to be secured, but that he anticipated no problem in obtaining the necessary approvals of any writing consistent with our discussions once those writings were prepared. (I believe at the time we contemplated a written lease and a written assurance letter from the appropriate RTC official.) You indicated that your concerns had been satisfied and that these assurances were sufficient to satisfy the Department. The three of us discussed that it would not make sense to begin drafting anything at that time as the issues regarding the property's zoning still had to be cleared up and our efforts might otherwise "be all for not." Accordingly, it was mutually decided that we would wait to see the outcome of the May 5, 1993 hearing on the zoning issue before proceeding further. In the interim you indicated that you would be providing us with a list of the specific items of tenant improvements that your local officials expected to have made to the property. (We received this list on May 3, 1993.) On May 5, 1993 the Plantation City Council approved In-Rel Acquisition Inc.'s, request for a rezoning of its property and for a "special use" condition by a 4-0 vote, thus effectively resolving the zoning issue. Yesterday you and I spoke on this issue and discussed the situation. I indicated that the RTC is now in a position to provide you with written assurance that it has no intention of dispossessing the Department or interfering with its lease tenancy (either under the old or the new lease), and that the Department's leasehold interest would not be affected by the RTC taking title to the property (if it ever does). I asked and you indicated that this would give you what you needed and everything would be fine. In addition, I indicated that once the lease by and between the Department and In Rel is finalized, the RTC, if it still owns the note and mortgage, would be able to approve same. In light of the foregoing your call to me this morning, indicating that the Department had decided to withdraw its award to In Rel Acquisitions, Inc. and make the award to "Viloci" (phonetic(?), the next ranked bidder. During this discussion you indicated that Viloci's legal counsel had stated that the RTC would never be able to provide the Department with the requisite assurances. It is unfair for you to make decisions based in whole or in part on any statements made by Viloci's counsel regarding what the RTC can and cannot do without giving us an opportunity to respond -- especially in light of your indications on April 19th and again yesterday that the Department was satisfied with the RTC. The record reflects that the "Notice of Sale" failed to contain language providing that the property would be sold subject to any leasehold interest, either previously or subsequently acquired.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case dismissing the Petition of In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., and awarding the subject lease to the Intervenor, Janc, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of September 1993. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3438BID The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitioner Paragraph 1: First three sentences accepted in substance. Fourth sentence rejected as constituting primarily irrelevant or subordinate details. Last sentence reject as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence to the extent it is intended to imply that the zoning change obtained was sufficient. Paragraph 2 and 3: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 4 and 5: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 6: The first two sentences are rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant and also as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as suggesting implications not warranted by the evidence. Paragraph 7: Rejected because it goes further than the evidence and suggests inferences not warranted by the evidence. Messrs. Gellman and Guerra told Mr. Ferst that they did not expect that the Department would have any problems with RTC, but the statements of Messrs. Gellman and Guerra stopped short of making any guarantees or of binding the RTC. Paragraph 8: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance, with the deletion of the words "in ignoring the foregoing." Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting a summary of a party's argument or statement of position, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 11: First sentence is accepted in substance. Second sentence is accepted as literally true, but as also substantially irrelevant because during most of the original five-year lease there was no issue about hours of operation because there was no effort at restriction of hours of operation. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 12: The first two sentences are rejected as constituting a summary of a party's argument or statement of position, rather than a proposed finding of fact. The third and fourth sentences are rejected because they go further than the evidence and suggest inferences not warranted by the evidence. As noted above, Messrs. Gellman and Guerra told Mr. Ferst that they did not expect that the Department would have any problems with RTC, but the statements of Messrs. Gellman and Guerra stopped short of making any guarantees or of binding the RTC. Paragraph 13: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 14: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as constituting argument or proposed conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 15: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 16: It is accepted that Messrs. Gellman and Guerra made statements as to what they expected the RTC's position to be, but, as noted several times above, the statements of Messrs. Gellman and Guerra stopped short of making any guarantees or of binding the RTC. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9: Accepted. Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary restatement of a party's position. Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: Rejected as repetitious. Paragraphs 15, 16 and 17: Accepted. Paragraph 18: First sentence is accepted. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 30: Accepted. Paragraph 31 and 32: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 33 and 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 35 and 36: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 37: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 38, 39, 40 and 41: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 42, 43, 44 and 45: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 46, 47, 48 and 49: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 50: Accepted. Paragraph 51: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 52: First sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Second sentence rejected as repetitious. Paragraphs 53, 54 and 55: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 56: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as constituting argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 57: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 58: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 and 64: Rejected as primarily constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings submitted by Intervenor Although there are some differences in the numerical sequence, the vast majority of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Intervenor are identical to those submitted by the Respondent. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat the rulings on all of those findings. The following rulings address the few proposed findings submitted by the Intervenor that are different from the ones submitted by the Respondent. Paragraph 11: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary restatement of a party's position. Paragraph 30: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 37: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 44: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 54: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 61: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 62, 63 and 64: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 65, 66 and 67: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael S. Riley, Esquire 200 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Steven S. Ferst, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Joseph J. Villacci, Esquire 315 Northeast Third Avenue, Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Harry K. Singletary, Jr., Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
The Issue The issue in this cause is whether costs and attorney's fees are due Petitioner, hereinafter PROCTOR, from Respondent, hereinafter HRS, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as a result of Division of Administrative Hearings Case Number 91-5963-BID, and, if so, the amount of costs and fees.
Findings Of Fact The petition for fees and costs herein is brought exclusively under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and relates back to a bid protest wherein PROCTOR and TCC #3 LTD., INC., hereafter TCC, were the only bidders on HRS lease 590.236. PROCTOR was the protestant/Petitioner and TCC was the apparent successful bidder/Intervenor in Derick Proctor v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. HRS' Invitation to Bid (ITB) for lease 590:236 required bidders to submit evidence of control of the property being offered, including the parking areas. Evidence of control could take the form of a deed for the property, an option to purchase the property, or a lease or option to lease showing a right to sublease. TCC did not submit a document labelled "deed," "option to purchase," "lease," or "option to lease" with its bid. TCC submitted as its evidence of control a contract for sale and purchase of the property with Hernando Plaza, Ltd., executed by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves to be general partners of the limited partnership. At all times material, the actual record title of the property submitted by TCC for the bid was in the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation. At the times of the bid opening, evaluation, and August 27, 1991 notice of intended award, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with an entity other than the record owner. Up to then, at least, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as being the owner of the property. The ITB did not require an abstract of title to be submitted with the bid. HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contained provisions for future disclosures from successful bidders. Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS' ITB attempted at the time to protect HRS by requiring successful bidders to post an irrevocable letter of credit to be forfeited in the event a successful bidder could not perform and for future disclosures concerning the chain of title. (See the recommended order in the underlying case). HRS accepted the contract to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza, Ltd. as TCC's required evidence of control, believing it to constitute an option to purchase. (See Findings of Fact 15-17 infra, this final order). On August 27, 1991, PROCTOR received from HRS a notice of intent to award the bid to TCC. This notice constituted the "window" for protests, if any, to be filed. PROCTOR then timely filed a notice of intent to protest and a formal written protest of the award to TCC. The filing of this protest resulted in an automatic suspension of the bid solicitation and contract award process and referral of the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.53(5)(c), Florida Statutes. This protest formed the basis of the underlying bid case, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. No later than the time of the Prehearing Order of September 23, 1991 in Case No. 91-5963BID, the law firm of Gibbs and Rudzik had made known to the hearing officer and counsel for both PROCTOR and HRS its retention as counsel for TCC. TCC moved for leave to intervene in a motion filed September 30, 1991, which was granted in an order of October 4, 1991. In a letter of October 10, 1991, counsel for PROCTOR made counsel for HRS aware of a question of whether TCC could obtain good title to the property. Counsel for PROCTOR proposed in a letter of October 14, 1991 to counsel for HRS that HRS reject both PROCTOR's and TCC's bids and rebid the lease, but this letter was primarily devoted to determining if HRS wished to interpose a new defense that PROCTOR's bid was unresponsive. In the instant fees and costs case, PROCTOR relies on its October 14, 1991 letter as the point from which HRS should have acted to avoid incurring attorney's fees and costs. After the receipt of the two letters, HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract but proceeded to formal hearing on October 30, 1991. PROCTOR and HRS share the mutual impression that had HRS accepted PROCTOR's proposal to reject both bids, HRS would have to have allowed TCC an opportunity to protest that decision. At the final hearing in Case No. 91-5963BID, evidence was offered that Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had a conditional option to purchase the property from the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. However, it was not established at the hearing that the conditions of the option had been fulfilled or that TCC or Hernando Plaza, Ltd. could otherwise gain good title to the property through a valid option. It was concluded as a matter of law in Case No. 91-5963BID, that on its face, the ITB stated that control could be evidenced merely by attachment of an "option to purchase," that the ITB stated no further requirements concerning the internal provisions of the option to purchase, and that TCC's conditional contract for purchase constituted a conditional option to purchase. The conditions of the option to purchase and the chain of title, among myriad other matters were subjects of proof at the formal hearing. The conditions of the option to purchase and various complicated real property concepts arising from recorded and unrecorded parts of the chain of title constituted the thrust of the recommended order's assessment that TCC's "control" was speculative only. It is here noted that the totality of the "chain" of title might have been unavailable even by "abstract" due to the lack of recordation of some documents. The lengthy formal hearing adduced evidence concerning the factual issue of whether or not the conditional option to purchase was between TCC and an entity which had such a sufficiently unequivocal interest in the proposed property that it could convey title to TCC in time for TCC to fulfill its obligations under its proposed lease to HRS. There is no evidence that HRS knew of these problems on August 27, 1991, when it gave notice of its intent to award the bid to TCC. Hernando Plaza, Ltd. was the entity with which TCC had contracted. At formal hearing, TCC relied on the legal concept that all interests in the property had merged in the non-title holder, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. This concept, together with recorded and unrecorded elements in the chain of title which were presented at formal hearing, were determined in the recommended order to be too "speculative" on the issue of TCC's control. However, it was also found, upon evidence submitted at formal hearing, that TCC's bid contained no other material deviations from the requirements of the ITB, that the signator of TCC's bid had sufficient status to submit the bid for the TCC corporation, and that TCC's signator could not submit the bid as an agent of the owners of the real property. TCC and its bid signator had never purported to have submitted the bid on behalf of the owners of the real property. (See the recommended order of the underlying bid case.) These issues were raised by PROCTOR and they addressed more than just the facial compliance of TCC's original bid documents which was all HRS had to consider when it made its initial decision in favor of TCC and against PROCTOR. However, the recommended order found HRS to have materially deviated in a number of ways from the bid process in its initial evaluation of PROCTOR's bid, not the least of which was determining that PROCTOR had complied with the ITB requirements for demonstrating control. All such evaluation flaws had been committed by HRS in favor of PROCTOR. Both TCC's and PROCTOR's bids were ultimately found to be unresponsive in the recommended order entered on December 20, 1991. The recommended order also found both had standing to be involved in the bid protest and formal hearing. The recommended order recommended rejecting both bids and readvertising the ITB. The Final Order of HRS entered on January 20, 1992 dismissed PROCTOR's protest on the basis that he lacked standing to protest, as his bid was unresponsive, and awarded the bid to TCC. HRS did not give PROCTOR notice that his bid was not responsive until it issued its Final Order. The Final Order of HRS was appealed to the First District Court of Appeals by PROCTOR. The First District Court of Appeals entered an order on June 22, 1992 finding PROCTOR had standing and remanding the case back to HRS for the purpose of a decision of the issue of whether TCC's bid was also unresponsive. On July 27, 1992, HRS entered its Amended Final Order determining both bids to be unresponsive and that the lease should be relet for bids. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the Amended Final Order of HRS in a per curiam opinion without discussion on October 13, 1992. HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract until after this per curiam opinion. No motion for rehearing was filed with respect to either of the First District Court of Appeals' orders entered June 22 or October 13, 1992, nor was any notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court filed. PROCTOR did file a motion for rehearing solely on the court's denial of PROCTOR's motion for appellate fees. Mandate was issued by the Clerk of the First District Court of Appeals on December 3, 1992. HRS entered an Order Directing Release of Bid Protest Cost Bond on December 18, 1992, in which HRS stated: Petitioner, Derick Proctor, has prevailed in the above styled bid protest. Petitioner's domicile and principal place of business is Vero Beach, Florida. Petitioner has one employee. Petitioner is a sole proprietorship. Petitioner's net worth does not exceed $2,000,000.00. HRS was not a nominal party in the underlying bid case. HRS did not initially challenge PROCTOR's "small business party" status in this instant fees and costs proceeding. Therefore, that allegation of the fees and costs petition is not at issue. Also, Petitioner's "small business party" status is now stipulated to exist. The parties have stipulated that the maximum statutory fee is $15,000.00 and that $15,000.00 is a reasonable fee if an award of attorney's fees is due. HRS has not protested or objected to the amount of costs claimed, $411.25, if costs are due.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, the Department of Insurance, acted illegally, arbitrarily, fraudulently, or dishonestly in rejecting all bids for lease #460:0119 and not awarding subject lease to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Insurance established a requirement to lease 5371 square feet of office space in Daytona Beach, Florida, and a "Request for Space Need" was approved by the Department of Management Services on February 11, 1998. The Department of Insurance subsequently issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for lease #460:0119 (Respondent's Exhibit 1). A non-mandatory pre-bid conference was held on June 1, 1998, in Daytona Beach and two prospective bidders, Petitioner and Nova Village Market partnership attended. The RFP provided that proposals which did not meet all mandatory requirements of the RFP would be rejected as non- responsive. The RFP provided for evaluation criteria are awards factors. The awards factors totaled 100 points with no minimum point total required. Ten of the points were allotted for moving costs defined as the costs of relocating communications, networks, furniture and other equipment. This factor gave the current landlord an automatic 10-point advantage since there would be no relocation costs. Moving costs provisions tend to discourage the presentation of bids because the bidders have to overcome an automatic 10-point advantage provided the current landlord. The RFP also provided that all proposals could be rejected, however, such "rejection shall not be arbitrary, but be based on strong justification." None of the conditions of the RFP were questioned or challenged by interested parties. Two responses were received by the Department of Insurance in response to the RFP and these were opened in Respondent's Tallahassee office on July 8, 1998, by Mr. Kip Wells of the Department. One was received from the current landlord, Nova Village Partnership, hereafter Nova, and the other from the Petitioner. The Nova proposal was deemed non-responsive. Neither Nova nor Petitioner contested the determination that Nova's proposal was non-responsive. Only one responsive proposal, the Petitioner's proposal, remained. On July 9, 1998, the Department representative, Mr. Kip Wells, called Petitioner to schedule an appointment for 9:00 a.m., on July 10, 1998, to visit and evaluate the proposed facility. No persons from the Department appeared at the scheduled appointment. At 10:45 a.m., on July 10, 1998, Kip Wells called Petitioner to say that since Petitioner's proposal was the only responsive proposal received, and that "all bids" were being rejected. Mr. Wells testified at hearing. His reason for rejecting the remaining bid was: When I saw that it was obvious the current landlord was not going to be very cooperative, I decided that one choice was not enough. If we were going to have to make a move, we needed more than one thing to choose from. So, I immediately - - since I had already set up with local people in Daytona to tell them that I was coming down to evaluate the bids, I sent them an E-mail and told them that I would not be meeting the following day to evaluate the bids. Mr. Wells decided to reissue the RFP without any moving costs criteria, and redistribute those 10 points among the other award factors. Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent to Protest and then a Formal Protest, both in a timely fashion. There is no state policy prohibiting the award of a lease to a sole bidder on a RFP. The "Leasing Policy" of the Department of Insurance states that "The Lease Administrator, with assistance from the Division employees, will establish bid or quote specifications. These specifications will include special needs for the Division(s) as well as the evaluation criteria upon which to evaluate the proposals." Neither the Department's Lease Policy (Petitioner Exhibit 3) nor the State's Real Property Leasing Manual (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) give the Lease Administrator the authority to reject or evaluate bid responses. Neither does he have a vote in the bid evaluation process. His responsibility is to coordinate the process. Randall Baker, Manager of Private Sector Leasing of the Bureau of Property Management of the Department of Management Services (hereinafter DMS), testified. The DMS prepares a manual as a guideline for user agencies to assist in the leasing of property. The DMS manual is not binding on agencies and DMS has no review oversight; however, their comments on agencies' leases are reviewed by the state auditing authorities and failure to follow the guidelines can result in audit criticism. Baker confirmed that the agency's written procedures as outlined in the RFP were consistent with the DMS guidelines. The DMS manual states as follows regarding the receipt of only one responsive proposal: When only one responsive proposal is received it may be considered and accepted providing the following conditions are documented: Adequate competition was solicited. The rate is within established rental rate guidelines. The proposal meets stated requirements. The proposal was processed as though other proposals were received. The Petitioner's bid was responsive to the RFP and the lease rate bid by the Petitioner was less than the average rate for state leases in the Daytona area and less than the amount budgeted by the Department for this lease. The lease rate by the Petitioner was reasonably priced and competitive. Although the agency failed to complete the process as envisioned, see paragraph 20 below, this was in no way the fault of Petitioner. The Department's leasing policy requires that the lowest and best response to an RFP be determined through cost analysis and evaluation by an evaluation committee. Mr. Wells did not forward Petitioner's bid to or discuss with the evaluation committee Petitioner's bid, but unilaterally rejected it. It was clear from Mr. Wells' testimony that this was his individual decision and was based upon his personal belief that it was the best thing to do.1 At hearing, the stated justification for rejecting "all bids" was that it gave the Department the opportunity to delete the requirement of moving costs from the awards factors; however, the evidence does not indicate that the moving cost provision result in non-competitive bids. The sole responsive bidder was within the local lease price range and within budget. Neither the Respondent nor DMS has established a policy prohibiting the acceptance of a sole responsive bid if there is competition solicited. The Department of Insurance has accepted a sole bid on at least one project in the past. There was no evidence that the RFP was not an open and fair competition. The evidence shows that it was properly advertised, that all conditions were known, and that all interested parties had an equal opportunity to participate. In sum, there was adequate competition in submitting the bids. Mr. Baker testified regarding the policy of DMS. The DMS policy is that if there is one responsive bidder, there has been competitive bidding. The RFP provides that the Respondent may reject all bids if it has strong justification. See paragraph 5 above. Mr. Baker also provided examples of "strong justification for rejecting proposals." His examples include facilities which are proposed outside the required geographic area, prices considerably in excess of state guidelines and agency budgets, specification changes due to modification of the agency's program requirements, and "intervening external forces." No evidence establishing a strong justification for rejecting the Petitioner's bid was presented. Without completing the process and evaluating the Petitioner's bid, the agency never considered whether the bid was in the state's best interest. However, this was not the fault of the Respondent, and the agency's failure to follow its procedures should not inure to its benefits. Further, Because there was no minimum score required on the evaluation criteria of the RFP, there is no need to evaluate Petitioner's proposal because it is the only responsive proposal. For all the reasons stated above, the rejection of Petitioner's bid was contrary to the terms of the RFP, contrary to state policy, and arbitrary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which finds that: Respondent's actions in rejecting Petitioner's responsive bid were arbitrary; The Respondent did not follow the requirements set forth in the Department of Insurance Leasing Policy, nor the Department of Management Services Real Property Leasing Manual, or the Request for Proposal itself; That no adverse interest to the State or the Department would have occurred had Petitioner's responsive bid been accepted; and therefore, Petitioner's claim shall be upheld as the lowest cost and best proposal for RFP #460:0119, and that the Department of Insurance shall award Petitioner Lease #460:0119. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1998.
Findings Of Fact State Project No. 46090-3511 (the project) is for construction of the West Bay Bridge on State Road 79 in Bay County, Florida. Competitive bids on the project were solicited in February, 1990. The bid letting on the project was held in March, 1990. The Petitioner, Fairchild, the Hardaway Company and ten other contractors bid on the project. The Hardaway Company submitted the lowest bid on the project in the amount of $9,487,258.17. Fairchild submitted the next lowest bid in the amount of $9,835,279.34. Divergent Unit Prices and Imbalances. The part of the Hardaway Company's bid relating to construction of the foundation for the approaches to the bridge (the "structural bid") is obviously below reasonable cost in several respects. The contract specifications require the use of sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid (biaxial type 2), and Class III (seal) concrete. The Hardaway Company's unit prices for these items were, respectively, one dollar per cubic yard for the sand fill, fifty cents per cubic yard for the shell fill, twenty-five cents per square yard for the reinforcement grid, and ten cents per cubic yard for the Class III seal concrete. As a result, the Hardaway Company's bid for these items is obviously significantly below reasonable cost and approximately $95,500 below what Fairchild bid for the same portion of the contract. In contrast to the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid and Class III concrete, the Hardaway Company's bid on some of the other parts of the structural bid were relatively high. The reinforcing steel for the substructure (Item 415-1-5) was bid at approximately twice reasonable cost (80 a pound versus, e.g., 42 in Fairchild's bid), resulting in $609,936.80 attributable to that part of the bid versus, e.g., $320,216.82 for Fairchild. The statistical average (the DOT's so-called "average 2") for the other serious bidders under this item also was 42 a pound. The Hardaway Company also bid obviously in excess of reasonable cost for the lump sum item of mobilization for pile installation--$600,000 versus $125,000 in Fairchild's bid and less in the bids of several of the others bidders. (The statistical average for the other serious bidders under this item was $225,000.) But the Hardaway Company bid only $60,000 for the lump sum item for removal of existing structures (versus $160,000 in Fairchild's bid) and only $30,000 for the lump sum item for removal and disposal of fender system (versus $110,000 in Fairchild's bid). The portion of the Hardaway Company's bid attributable to mobilization for the roadway work is significantly less than the Fairchild bid under this item ($200,000 versus $375,000) and partially counterbalances the excess in the part of the Hardaway bid for mobilization for the pile installation. The portion of the Hardaway Company's bid attributable to clearing and grubbing also was high, at $20,000 an acre versus a statistical average of $4,200 an acre for the other serious bidders, resulting in $216,000 for the Hardaway Company bid versus, e.g., $32,400 for the Fairchild bid and the $45,360 statistical average. DOT Review Procedures. Section 2-6 of the DOT's Standard Specifications applicable to the project provides: 2-6 Rejection of Irregular Proposals. A proposal will be subject to being considered irregular and may be rejected if it shows omissions, alterations of form, additions not called for, conditioinal or unauthorized alternate bids, or irregularities of any kind; also if the unit prices are obviously unbalanced, either in excess of or below the reasonable cost analysis values. The DOT is in the process of formulating a policy on the use of the Technical Review Committee in the bidding process. A proposed procedure has been developed, which has not yet been made final and has not yet been signed by the Secretary of the DOT, under which the Technical Review Committee would review the low bid on each contract, among other things not applicable to this case, for "any significant irregularities in unit bid prices" and for "unbalanced bidding." The DOT has not yet defined "any significant irregularities in unit bid prices" or "unbalanced bidding" for purposes of defining the event that triggers review by the Technical Review Committee. The DOT Director of the Office of Construction, Robert Buser, is of the opinion that the unit prices the Hardaway Company bid for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the Class III seal concrete are "significant irregularities in unit bid prices." On the other hand, the DOT's Preliminary Estimates Engineer, Robert Griner, who, unlike Buser, is a member of both the Technical Review Committee and its Preliminary Technical Subcommittee, and is of the opinion that the Hardaway bid for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the Class III (seal) concrete are "mathematical imbalances," not "significant irregularities in unit bid prices," which he would define as bids that omit a unit price, whose numerical values do not match words used to express the values, or that are not signed. Under Griner's approach, which was followed in this case, the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee looks at "mathematical imbalances" to see if they are "material imbalances." If the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee decides that it is not a "material imbalance," it simply reports this finding at the outset of the meeting of the Technical Review Committee, which accepts the finding and does not itself consider the matter any further. Only if the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee reports a "material imbalance" does the Technical Review Committee further consider the question. Front-end Bidding. Under the DOT contract for the project, like other items in the specifications, mobilization and land clearing and grubbing are paid in installments as the work proceeds. But, unlike the other items, all of the portion of the contract attributable to mobilization and land clearing and grubbing is paid by the time the entire project is half completed. Similarly, a contractor is paid for reinforcement steel (substructure) when it is delivered to the site. As a result, by shifting dollars in a bid to these "front-end," lump sum items, a contractor can manipulate the bid process and contract to reasonably insure himself of early payment of these inflated items regardless what may happen to the project later. In analyzing these front-end, lump sum items, Griner treated them (along with the unreasonably low bids on the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grids and C III seal concrete) as "mathematical imbalances." Following the guidance of a Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) memorandum, dated May 16, 1988, on the subject of "Bid Analysis and Unbalanced Bids," Griner analyzed the Hardaway bid to be sure it would not be susceptible to cost overruns (it was not) and to be sure the quantities were correctly estimated (they were). He also analyzed the additional cost to the DOT of paying the Hardaway Company early (by the half way point of the project) for the inflated front-end items to determine whether the "mathematical" imbalance was "material," i.e., whether "the mathematically imbalanced bid will result in the lowest ultimate cost to the Government." Based on a twelve percent interest rate, Griner calculated that the inflated front-end items would cost the DOT approximately an additional $98,000, 1/ still much less than the difference between the low Hardaway bid and any other bid. Based on this calculation, Griner concluded that the "mathematical imbalance" in the Hardaway bid was not a "material imbalance" and did not require the award of the bid to Fairchild or one of the other bidders. Griner overlooked and did not apply another portion of the method of analysis in the FHWA memorandum on "Bid Analysis and Unbalanced Bids" that states: There are numerous reasons why a bidder may want to unbalance his/her bid on a contract. One reason is to get more money at the beginning of the project. The bidder does this by overpricing the work done early in the project. This is called "front loading" the contract. The leading case in the "front loading" area is Matter of: Riverport Industries, 64 Comp. Gen. 441 (1985). Here the Comptroller General held that if the bid is front loaded, regardless if it is the lowest bid, it "should be viewed as materially unbalanced since acceptance of the bid would result in the same evils as an advance payment. An advance payment is prohibited by law." The "front loading" may also be materially unbalanced due to the cost of money that must be paid out early versus over the normal construction fo the project. Under the Hardaway Company bid, the pile mobilization, the land clearing and grubbing, and the reinforcement steel (substructure) parts of the bid are "front-ended." 2/ Under the method of analysis suggested by the FHWA memorandum, the Hardaway Company would be paid approximately $428,000 in "advance payments" under these two items if it is awarded the contract. Approximately $375,000 in pile mobilization, $183,600 in land clearing and grubbing, and $289,700 in the reinforcement steel were shifted to these front- end items from the unbalanced sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid, and Class III (seal) concrete items. These dollars The shifted dollars are estimated by taking the difference between the statistical average for these items and the Hardaway bid on them. Since roiughly half of the shifted dollars would be paid earlier than they would be paid if they were bid under the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid and Class III (seal) concrete items, the amount of "advance payment," under the FHWA analysis would be approximately $428,000. Griner did not explain why he only followed part, but not all, of the method of analysis suggested by the FHWA memorandum, other than to say he overlooked it. But he also testified that it is common practice for contractors to submit mathematically unbalanced bids, and the DOT always analyzes them the way he did in this case. Indeed, in the March, 1990, bid letting, Griner found "mathematical imbalances" in 21 of the 29 low bids but no "material imbalances." The Fairchild bid also contains "mathematical imbalances." It also "front-ends" several items. The total dollar value of the "front-ending" in the Fairchild bid (including roadway mobilization) closely approximates that found in the Hardaway bid and, under the FHWA analysis, would result in approximately the same amount of advance payment. Under Section 101-2.2 of the DOT's Standard Specifications for this project, contractors are limited to a maximum of ten percent of the total contract for mobilization. The Hardaway Company's total mobilization bid is within the maximum under the specifications. Notwithstanding the imbalances in the Hardaway bid, and the so-called "advance payments" that would result from the "front-ending" in the Hardaway bid, the Hardaway bid remains the lowest and best bid on the project, and it is the best interest of the DOT and the public to award the contract to the Hardaway Company. Even if the Hardaway Company had bid the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid, and Class III (seal) concrete items exactly as Fairchild did, Hardaway still would be low bidder. "Value Engineering" and Alleged Alternative or Contingent Bidding. Inferences reasonably could be drawn from the evidence that the Hardaway Company may intend to propose to the DOT that the approach to the bridge be re-engineered so as to eliminate the need for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the C III (seal) concrete. If the DOT accepts such a proposal, the contract between the DOT and the Hardaway Company would have to be modified. If the re-engineered project were to allow the Hardaway Company to do the job for less than its bid price, half (or, if the proposal is innovative or unique, up to 80%) of the savings would be paid to the Hardaway Company under what the DOT calls "value engineering." Under DOT procedures, "value engineering" proposals are not made or evaluated until after the original contract is signed with the successful bidder. It is not an alternative bid or a contingent bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Transportation, enter a final order dismissing the bid protest filed by W. R. Fairchild Construction Company, Ltd., and awarding State Project No. 46090-3511 to the Hardaway Company. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990.
Findings Of Fact Prior to June, 1988, HRS determined that it needed 23,871 square feet of office space to house some of its social services for indigents in Northern Escambia County. Since HRS desired more than 2,000 square feet of office space, it was required to bid lease number 590:1987 competitively. To that end, Respondent prepared an Invitation to Bid and a bid submittal package. The package contained various bid specifications, bid evaluation criteria and the numerical weight assigned to each of those criteria. Specific areas of importance to Respondent in the selection of its office space were: client safety public access, ingress and egress availability of public transportation. The above areas were important to HRS since the agency would render indigent services to approximately 1000 people a month, many of whom are handicapped or lack good mobility due to age or infirmity. The majority of Respondent's clients are served within a 10 day period during each month. A great deal of pressure is placed on the surrounding area due to the in flux of people. Additionally, many of Respondent's clients utilize public transportation since they do not own or have access to personal vehicles. Because of servicing so many people the above factors received a great deal of weight under HRS's consideration of the property it desired to lease and occupy. All of the above areas were covered by Respondent's weighted bid evaluation criteria. Additionally, in order to submit a responsive bid, a prospective lessor was required to meet one of the following qualifications at the time the bid was submitted: (a) be the owner of record of the facility and parking areas; (b) be the lessee of the space being proposed and present with the bid a copy of the lease with documentation of authorization to sublease the facility and parking areas; (c) submit documentation of an option to purchase the facility and/or parking areas; or (d) submit documentation of an option to lease the facility with authorization to, in turn, sublease. The District Administrator of HRS, Chelene Schembera, is ultimately responsible for bidding, selection and leasing of all HRS facilities within District I, including Escambia County, Florida. In order to accomplish this task Ms. Schembera appointed a bid evaluation committee to review and grade the responsive bids under the criteria established in the bid package, and to recommend to her the committee's choice of the lowest and best bid. Ms. Schembera's purpose in establishing the bid evaluation committee was to secure input from a cross section of people who had a variety of backgrounds and knowledge that would be material in evaluating the office space, in light of the uses for which it was intended and the relative public worth of the work space. Ms. Schembera appointed individuals who were familiar with the type of work to be done in the proposed space, as well as persons familiar with the bid process. On July 21, 1988, HRS received five bids on the lease. Intervenors submitted the apparent low bid which Northside consisted of one building located at the Brentwood Shopping Center in Pensacola, Florida. At the time that the Intervenors submitted their bid, they included documentation which showed that they had a contract to purchase the subject facility; they have since closed on that transaction. This bid package did not include the four acres adjacent to the Brentwood Shopping Center property and no contract to purchase or other documentation was submitted as to the four acre parcel of property. Petitioner submitted the apparent second lowest bid which consisted of one building located at Fairfield Plaza in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner's interest in Fairfield Plaza is that of a lessee under a Master Lease with rights to sublet the property. All appropriate documentation was submitted with the bid. This property was the subject of a semi-friendly foreclosure action at the time that the Petitioner's bid was submitted. Petitioner was still in possession and control of the property. Both Petitioner's and Intervenors' property were within the mandatory geographical area designated in the bid package. Both bids were responsive under the minimum bid specifications and bidder qualifications. The other three bids which were submitted by HRS are not in contention The committee members personally inspected the sites offered by the Petitioner and the Intervenors. While at the Intervenors' site, the committee's concern over the property's minimal parking (as compared to Fairfield) and limited safe public access, ingress and egress were raised. The only access to Intervenor's property was from a very busy multi-lane highway. Certain turns onto and off the property were extremely dangerous. In order to make its bid package more acceptable, Intervenors' representative orally amended the bid package to include the southerly four acres contiguous to the Brentwood property. The Inclusion of the southerly four acres would adequately increase Intervenors' parking. The amendment would also create additional and safer public ingress and egress since the four acres abutted on Murray Lane which intersects Highway 29. This amendment substantially worked to Intervenors' advantage and was a material change to the previously submitted bid. The improper amendment cannot be considered here. Following the on-site inspections, the committee members met and rated the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenors according to a Bid Synopsis evaluation sheet which they had been previously provided. The committee members' review of the Intervenors' property included the improper bid amendment. Even with the improper amendment, the unanimous recommendation of the evaluation committee was to award the lease to the Petitioner and Fairfield Plaza. The evaluation committee based its decision on the scores attributed to each property on the Bid Synopsis sheet by the individual committee members. The committee utilized all the weighted bid criteria. However, two factors were of primary importance. One was its determination that the property offered by the Intervenors presented greater problems for ingress and egress due to the congested nature the area. The other consideration was that service to Fairfield Plaza from public transportation was both more frequent and direct. The property offered by the Intervenors had less public transportation service. The stops were less frequent and a significant number of clients would be required to transfer buses to reach Brentwood when utilizing such public transportation. All bus passengers would be required to walk from the bus stop close to Brentwood and attempt at their peril to cross a very busy, dangerous and congested highway. The reasons given by the individual committee members for distinguishing and preferring one bid over another were rational and reasonable considerations and were covered by the bid evaluation criteria. Each individual member gave a rational and reasonable basis for the scoring he or she used on the Bid synopsis score sheets. The scoring was done by each member after discussion of the two buildings and without influence from the other committee members. In essence, the committee felt that Petitioner's property was the better property for the money. Importantly, every committee member came to the conclusion that Petitioner's property was the lowest and best bid. There is no statutory or rule requirement that one scoring method be preferred over another. The only requirement is that the method be rational and reasonable especially where highly subjective, but legitimate criteria are involved in the selection of a piece of property. On these facts, the individual scoring methods used by the individual committee members were not arbitrary and capricious, but were very rational and reasonably related to the relative importance the committee members gave the above factors. The District Administrator initially adopted the committee's recommendation and reported that recommendation to King Davis, the Director of General Services for HRS. The Director of General Services later informed the District Administrator that he and his staff were concerned with the fact that the recommendation was to award the lease to the second lowest bidder. The staff's review considered the improper amendment as part of the Intervenors' bid. Over a ten year period the Petitioner's rental cost was $62,381.00 more than the Intervenors'. In addition, the estimated energy consumption for the first year for the Petitioner's property was approximately $4800 more than for Intervenors. King Davis and his staff did not believe that the justifications cited in the recommendation letter would be considered crucial enough to override awarding the lease to the lowest bidder, should the agency get involved in a bid protest over the award. He and his staff did not disagree that the reasons assigned by the committee and Ms. Schembera were legitimate considerations. Their ultimate concern was that the reasons given by the committee and Ms. Schembera would not be given as great a weight by a Division of Administrative Hearings' hearing officer; and therefore, fail to withstand a potential bid challenge. But the conclusion that the lack of ingress and egress and public transportation could not outweigh the cost differences assumed that Intervenors' bid included the four acres. Without the four acres, the problems with ingress and egress, congestion and public transportation become even more important and can outweigh minor price differences in rent and energy. This is especially true when one considers the impact that the influx of at least 1000 people would have on an already congested and unsafe area. Put simply, the conclusion that the above factors can and do outweigh price and cost considerations in these facts is not an arbitrary and capricious decision, even though others may disagree with that decision. Instead of reconvening the committee after receiving the recommendation from King Davis and discussing the same with him, the District Administrator made the determination that the lease should be awarded to the Intervenors. The District Administrator, acquiesced in Mr. Davis' assessment that HRS could not succeed in a bid challenge. She did not like his advice. In fact, even at the hearing Ms. Schembera still believed Petitioner's property was the lowest and best for HRS purposes. However, through circular reasoning she also concluded that Intervenors' property was the lowest and best bid because she chose it. The agency's ability to succeed in a bid challenge which may or may not happen is not covered by any of the weighted bid evaluation criteria contained in the bid package and is not an appropriate reason to prefer one bid over another. The foregoing is particularly true when the reason given (surviving a bid protest) is based on the occurrence of a future event which may not occur. To reject a bid for a reason outside the bid criteria and one based on an unknowable future event is an arbitrary and capricious act on the part of Respondent. A court-appointed receiver was ordered to take control of the property belonging to the Petitioner on September 28, 1988, after the bid award was announced. Petitioner still retains its right of redemption of the property, and such an interest is sufficient to confer standing on Petitioner to maintain this action. Moreover, the evidence was clear that Petitioner had both the ability and wherewithal to perform the lease should it receive the bid award. Perfected ownership or control is not required. With Petitioner's apparent ability to perform, the fact of the foreclosure action and the receiver should not work against the Petitioner in this bid protest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order awarding lease number 590:1987 to Eccelston Properties, Ltd., as the lowest and best bidder. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of January, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Respondent issued an invitation to bid on March 13, 1992. Bid number SB 92-244I involved the disassembly and removal of an existing walk-in freezer and the furnishing and installation of a new walk-in freezer at Coral Sunset Elementary School. The invitations to bid provided in paragraph Y of the Special Conditions: Failure to file a specification protest within the time prescribed in Florida Statutes 120.53 3.(b) shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. (sic) Bid specifications were included in the invitations to bid issued on March 13, 1992. Twenty-three bids were solicited. There were five responses. One of the responses was submitted by Choice Restaurant Equipment, Inc. ("Choice"). Choice is a vendor for equipment manufactured by Petitioner, Nor-Lake, Inc. ("Nor-Lake"). Nor-Lake is an out-of-state corporation with manufacturer's representatives in numerous states including Florida. 4, Petitioner, CHD Marketing Group ("CHD"), is the manufacturer's representative for Nor-Lake in Florida. CHD represents no other manufacturer of the product included in the bid response. Choice is a sales agent for CHD and other manufacturer's representatives in Florida. Choice sells the products of a variety of manufacturers but is the exclusive sales agent for CHD pursuant to a verbal agency agreement. Choice timely submitted a bid for bid number SB 92-244I on April 8, 1992, prior to the bid deadline of 2:00 p.m. on the same day. The successful bidder submitted its bid by Federal Express at 4:51 p.m on April 8, 1992. Respondent's Department of Purchasing and Stores (the "Department") had stated on March 13, 1992, when the invitations to bid were issued, that bid responses must be received by the Department no later than 2:00 p.m. on April 8, 1992, at the Department's address at 3980 RCA Boulevard/Suite 8044, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, 33410-4276. Prior to April 8, 1992, the Department relocated to a new facility at 3326 Forest Hill Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida. The new address was posted at the old location and Department representatives were present at the old address to accept walk-in bids. Federal Express first attempted to deliver the successful bid at the Department's old address at 10:30 a.m. on April 8, 1992. Federal Express delivered the successful bid to the Department's new address at 4:51 p.m. At 2:00 p.m. on the same day, The Department announced that all bids were in and opened the bids that had been delivered. The successful bid and one other bid were delivered on April 8, 1992, after the public opening conducted at 2:00 p.m. on the same day. Bids were tabulated on April 9, 1992. Bid tabulations were posted on April 13, 1992, and the successful bid was announced. The successful bid was for $8,174.00. Three bids were lower than the successful bid. Choice's bid was for $7,742.56. The other two lower bids were for $8,020.00 and $6,620.00. All three lower bids were rejected as non- responsive. Choice's bid was rejected because it did not meet bid specifications for 22 gauge steel, thermostatically controlled door heaters, and reinforced steel door panels. CHD filed a Notice of Protest on April 14, 1992, and a Formal Written Protest on April 24, 1992. CHD's protest alleges that: Choice's bid was lower than that of the successful bidder; the successful bid was not timely made; the bids were not opened publicly in violation of bidding procedure requirements; and the bid specifications were arbitrary and capricious, favored one bidder, and that Choice's bid was responsive. Neither a notice of protest nor a formal written protest was submitted by Choice or Nor-Lake. Neither Choice nor Nor-Lake attended the informal protest conference conducted on April 30, 1992. On May 7, 1992, Respondent's Office of General Counsel issued its written notice of proposed agency action. The written notice recommended that the bid be awarded to the successful bidder and that CHD's protest be dismissed for lack of standing. CHD requested a formal hearing on May 14, 1992, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a hearing officer on May 15, 1992. The bid submitted by Choice was prepared by CHD but signed by the president of Choice. Neither Nor-Lake nor CHD signed a bid or were otherwise bidders of record for bid number SB 92-244I. Neither Choice, CHD, nor Nor-Lake, filed a notice of protest concerning the bid specifications within 72 hours after Choice received the notice of the project plans and specifications on March 13, 1992. The sole basis upon which CHD claims it is substantially affected is the adverse economic impact caused to it by the proposed agency action. The proposed agency action will result in lost sales from this and future transactions. CHD will lose commissions from this and future transactions. The dealer relationship between CHD and Choice will be damaged because Choice will not want to sell a freezer that is not acceptable to Respondent. The marketing strategy developed between CHD and Nor-Lake will be damaged because it is conditioned upon the award of public contracts.
The Issue The first issue to be determined is whether the BOARD can reject all bids, with or without cause. The second issue is to determine if the BOARD is required to have cause, was there a sufficient basis for the rejection of all bids in Bid NO. 3996?
Findings Of Fact On December 14, 1987, the BOARD sent invitations to bid to a list of approved vendors in Bid NO. 3996. The purpose of the invitation was to obtain the lowest responsible bid on a purchase of one hundred and fifty typewriters. The bids were to be submitted prior to January 11, 1988 at 2:00 P.M.. They were opened by the BOARD on the same day. OFFICE did not receive an invitation to bid despite its request to be placed on the approved vendor's list in November of 1987. When OFFICE learned of the outstanding invitation to bid, its representative, Mr. Richard Foss, went to the BOARD's Purchasing Department and requested a bid package. The bid documents given to OFFICE mistakenly gave January 14, 1988 at 2:00 P.M. as the deadline for the bid submission. Because of the later date given by the BOARD to OFFICE, the company's bid was received after the opening of the bids. When the results of the bidding were made known at the public bid opening, NAPLES bid was the lowest received. On January 14, 1988, after 10:42 A.M., it was discovered by the BOARD that OFFICE's bid price was lower than the price submitted by NAPLES. At this time, NAPLES bid had not yet been accepted by the BOARD, and no formal announcement had been made awarding the contract to NAPLES. During the BOARD's Purchasing Department's bid analysis, a request was made to reject all bids in Bid NO. 3996. The reason given by Purchasing for the request for rejection was that the specifications were being revised. The bids were rejected on the same date. The written reason sent to the vendors on January 14, 1988 for the bid rejection was that one vendor had been given an incorrect opening date. Attached to the written notice to the vendors was a new bid invitation for Bid NO. 4013. The BOARD explained its mistake was unfair to the one vendor. A new bid opening date was given of February 1, 1988. On January 14, 1988, in addition to the required bid documents, OFFICE submitted a letter which listed additional offerings or incentives that OFFICE would give the BOARD if OFFICE was awarded the contract. These additional purchasing incentives were: wall charts and teacher/student manuals for each typing classroom in the county. OFFICE also informed the BOARD that one of the BOARD's own service personnel was already trained in the servicing of Swintec typewriters. The bid submitted by OFFICE did not meet either the weight or the print wheel specifications as set forth in Bid NO. 3996. The specifications as written in Bid NO. 3996 were not written to eliminate all other typewriters but the Brothers 511-11. Weight specifications required were below the Brother's minimum weight, and at least two other manufacturers provide protected drop-in cassette print wheels in electronic typewriters. The Invitation to Bid contained specific provisions which encouraged the bidding of typewriters other than the Brother 511-11, and set up procedures under which other typewriters, which substantially meet the specifications, could be reviewed on their merits. NAPLES was the lowest responsible bidder for the electronic typewriter contract in the prior school year. The BOARD had rejected all bids at that time because of the decision to consider a different brand of typewriter once bids were opened. A notice of protest was filed by NAPLES, and the BOARD agreed to honor NAPLES bid and award the company the contract. The BOARD revised its bid specifications from last year prior to its solicitations for bids in Bid NO. 3996. The protected drop-in cassette print wheel and the weight requirements were two new technical specifications. During the hearing, the BOARD was unable to determine whether the weight factor or the protected drop-in cassette print wheel requirement will continue to be included in future revisions of the specifications.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the BOARD reject the bid submitted by OFFICE as it was nonconforming and sought an advantage not enjoyed by the other bidders. Reinstate the bids which were rejected in Bid NO. 3996, consider the bids, and make an award of the contract to NAPLES. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA D. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen Emens, President Naples Business Equipment and Systems, Inc. 859 4th Avenue South Naples, Florida 33940 Harry A. Blair, Esquire 2138-40 Hoople Street Ft. Myers, Florida 33901 Richard Foss, Typewriter Sales Manager 8A-Del Prado Boulevard Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Karl Engel, Superintendent Lee County Public Schools The School Board of Lee County 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901
