Findings Of Fact This matter arose from the sale of a certain apartment building in Dunedin, Florida, known as Piper's Ten. This building was owned by two foreign corporations, the principals of which are represented by a Mr. Eugene Morgan of Boston, Massachusetts. Douglas S. Kennedy, Defendant, is a registered real estate salesman whose license was registered with Lockhart Realty, Inc., of Seawalls Point, Florida, the broker for which was his then wife Trude Kennedy. The Defendant and his wife were involved in domestic difficulties which eventually lead to a divorce. When the Defendant and his wife separated sometime in late 1972, he sought out his friend and business associate, Eugene Morgan, who suggested that the Defendant move to Dunedin, Florida and reside in the model apartment at Piper's Ten. The Defendant heeded the suggestion and took on the assignment as resident manager of the Piper's Ten Apartments at a final salary of approximately $1,000 per month. According to the Defendant and Mr. Morgan, his prime responsibility was seeing that Morgan and his co-investors in the property "receive a fair shake with the local people in and around Dunedin, Florida." At the time the property was registered with a real estate broker of Dunedin, Florida, whose name is Mr. Woodrow Register, and he had an exclusive listing on the sale of Piper's Ten Apartments. The initial arrangement between Morgan and the Defendant was that the Defendant would live in the apartment rent free and he would be paid an amount to defray his expenses for the management responsibility. When the Defendant became dissatisfied with this arrangement approximately 3 weeks later, he notified Mr. Morgan that he could no longer remain in Dunedin under that arrangement. This set the stage for the new arrangement referred to above whereby the Defendant was to be paid $1,000 per month payable out of the proceeds, when and if the building was sold. According to Morgan, this arrangement was to last for at least 4 to 5 months or until such time as a purchaser was located to purchase the apartment building. During April 1973, Kelly Prior Realty of Dunedin produced a proposed purchaser for the property at the purchase price of $400,000 which was the amount set by the owners who had agreed to pay a real estate commission of 5 percent. Kelly Prior Realty prepared a proposed contract of sale and purchase and submitted it to the offices of the attorney for the seller, Raymond Argyros, who after certain modifications, submitted the contract to the sellers for their approval. At the closing in May 1973, Kelly Prior, the selling broker, received a full commission of 5 percent as agreed upon by their sellers in their open listing of the property. According to attorney Argyros, the Defendant received a check for $5,000 as agreed upon between the Defendant and Morgan and according to him, the contract erroneously referred to such payment as a commission. It is this $5,000 payment which is the matter of controversy in this hearing. According to Morgan, Defendant was hired to "see if he could get Morgan and his associates a fair shake with the local people in Dunedin respecting the management of the apartment building." Originally the two story building was primarily an office space on the lower level and approximately ten apartments on the upper level. The plan was to rent the upper level as a condominium and to lease the office space on the lower level. Morgan was unable to sell the condominiums on the upper level based on the fact that prospective purchasers did not want to buy condominiums in a building approximately 50 percent comprised of office space. With this fact, Morgan and his associates made the decision to convert the lower level to apartments as well. When this was done, the Defendant saw to it that the building was properly managed and provided feedback to Morgan in order to keep him advised at all times of the situation with the apartment building. When the building was sold, Kelly Prior Realty Company received the commission of $20,000 which represented 5 percent of the total purchase price and the Defendant received $5,000 for his efforts. In this regard, the Defendant received a check drawn in the amount of $5,000 and the check bore a notation that the amount represented a commission. When the Defendant noted this, he changed the face of the check to reflect that the amount paid was intended to be an agency fee for the sale of Piper's Ten. The Defendant played no part in the drafting of the purchase and sales agreement. After the closing, the Defendant also was given the furniture from the model apartment and he thereafter departed for Puerto Rico. Trude Kennedy, the Defendant's former wife, testified that Lockhart Realty was in no way associated with the sale of Piper's Ten. Trude Kennedy had several conversations with Mr. Morgan regarding the sales and problems which he encountered with Piper's Ten. However the basis of these statements involved other businesses which she had with Morgan regarding the sale and subdivision of other properties in and around Dunedin. Mrs. Kennedy was unaware of the amount paid to the Defendent and she made no claim for such funds when the payment was disbursed. Morgan denied that the amount in any way reflected a commission but rather was payment for the services which the Defendant rendered in the general upkeep and management of the building such that he could be fully advised at all times of the progress, if any, that the local realtors were having with the sale of the apartment building. With these facts, the undersigned is of the opinion that the $5,000 sum given to Kennedy represented the amount as per the agreement he had with Morgan. There was no evidence that he participated in any way with the sale of the building other than to advise Morgan of any efforts that the other local realtors played in locating purchasers. It was noted that the check which represented payment for these services indicated that the amount originally was a commission. However, the Defendant, when noting that the designation of a commission was included on the check, immediately advised Mr. Argyros, the seller's agent, to correct that mistake by placing a designation that the amount represented was intended to be a "seller's agent" fee. This correction was made prior to the time the check was deposited and it was done with the consent of attorney Argyros. There was no evidence that the Defendant demanded such amount as a commission for his efforts as a salesman or that he showed the property to prospective purchasers as a real estate salesman. Thus it appears that the amount paid to the Defendant was an amount given him for his services as testified to by Morgan. The amount paid also appears to correspond with the arrangement as testified to by Morgan. I therefore find that the $5,000 sum paid the Defendant represented an amount for services that he rendered, not as a real estate salesman, but rather, as a property manager of the Piper's Ten Apartment building.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Labor and Employment Security, acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in rejecting the bid of the Petitioners to lease office space to the Respondent on the ground that the proposed space was not "dry and measurable" at the time of the bid.
Findings Of Fact The bid specifications in the solicitation by the Respondent, the Department of Labor and Employment Security (DLES) for its Lease No. 540:0977 (office space in Orange County) required that proposed space be in an existing building "dry and capable of being physically measured to determine net rentable square footage at the time of bid submittal." The requirement that proposed office space in response to Lease No. 540:0977 be "dry and measurable," as described in the preceding finding, is a long-standing, standard requirement found in the bid specification form developed by the Department of Management Services (DMS) (formerly the Department of General Services (DGS)) for use by all agencies of the State of Florida. DMS' (and, formerly, DGS') long-standing interpretation of the "dry and measurable" requirement in the standard bid specification form is that the building must have a roof and walls, with windows either in place or covered over so that the building interior stays dry in adverse weather conditions. In response to the DLES solicitation for bids for its Lease No. 540:0977, the Petitioners submitted a bid for space in a former Publix strip shopping mall, formerly known as the Northgate Shopping Center, located at 5023 Edgewater Drive, in Winter Park, Florida. At the time of the bid, the mall was unoccupied and in the process of being renovated and was a designated construction site. The building had been gutted, and the glass in the front of the building had been removed. The glass could be referred to as "windows" but actually would make up the top two-thirds of the front wall of the building. As a result, without the glass, the front "wall" consisted of a three to four foot rise of concrete blocks, and the front of the building was otherwise open. There was a 12-foot, eight-inch overhang over the front "wall," but wind-blown rain could enter the building, and apparently did. (There was standing water on the floor of the gutted building. There also were missing or unsecure doors along the back wall of the building.) When Susan Early, the DLES employee in charge of the bid solicitation, received the Petitioners' bid and saw the photographs of the building required by the bid solicitation, she questioned whether the building was "dry and measurable." To help answer her question, she asked another DLES employee, who was located in the Orlando area, to go to the site, take pictures, and send a report of her findings, together with the photographs. The report and photographs indicated to Early that the building was not "dry and measurable." But, instead of relying on the information she had, she sent another, Tallahassee-based DLES employee to the site and received confirmation of her understanding as to the condition of the building. She then contacted Mary Goodman, the person at DMS who had the most experience in the area of soliciting and evaluating bids of leased office space, and who ultimately would be responsible for approving the DLES lease. Goodman advised Early that the DLES should reject the Petitioners' bid as non-responsive because it was not "dry and measurable." The DLES also rejected, as being non-responsive, the only other bid received in response to the bid solicitation. In the Final Order, The Koger Company v. Div. of Admin. Hearings, DOAH Case No. 88-3357BID, entered September 21, 1988, the Division of Administrative Hearings rejected a bid as not offering "dry and measurable" space because the building "had a roof, a slab, and walls, which comprised 50 percent of the vertical plane from the slab to the roof." The bidder's argument that the building "had a four foot overhang" and that "the overhang prevented rain from entering the building" was rejected as not being credible "given the large amount of window space which was not enclosed." The winning bid, which was upheld as being a "dry and measurable" was an abandoned bowling alley that "had walls, a slab, and portions of the exterior walls were boarded over, possibly in the location of existing windows or window openings. The roof did have a hole, which was approximately three feet in length and allowed water to leak into the building." (Citations to the record omitted.) The facts derived from the Final Order, The Koger Company v. Div. of Admin. Hearings, supra, do not in themselves prove that the DLES acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in rejecting the Petitioners' bid. Although the Petitioners' bid in this case was for a building that once had a certificate of occupancy, the Petitioners' bid in this case is more similar in other respects to the rejected bid than the successful bid in the Koger Company case. For example, like the rejected bid in the Koger Company case, the Petitioners' bid had partial exterior walls. The Petitioners proved that they also submitted a bid for the lease of office space in the Northgate Shopping Center in response to a bid solicitation by the Florida Department of Corrections (Parole and Probation Commission). The bid was evaluated, along with others, and the lease was awarded to another bidder. It can be inferred from this that the Department of Corrections made a determination that the Petitioners' bid was "dry and measurable." However, those facts alone do not prove the DLES, in this case, acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly. They only would prove that the two agencies interpreted the phrase "dry and measurable" differently. There also was evidence that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) interprets the phrase "dry and measurable" differently than DLES does. But it was not proven whether HRS would have accepted a bid for space having the characteristics of the Petitioners' bid. The Petitioners argued persuasively from the evidence presented that the requirement that bid space be "dry," as interpreted by the DMS and the DLES, can be impractical when applied to the real world of building renovations and may exclude possible good lease opportunities. Sometimes, space in a building under construction or substantial renovation can be leased at lower rates. Presumably for that reason, the Department of Corrections (Parole and Probation Commission) and HRS interpret the requirement differently. But, given the requirement that bid space be "dry," it cannot be said that the DLES acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in rejecting the Petitioners' bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Labor and Employment Security, enter a final order rejecting the bid of the Petitioners to lease office space to the Department in Winter Park, Florida, Lease Number 540:0977. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3922BID To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-3. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. It should be noted, however, that the missing "windows" in front made up approximately two-thirds of the front wall of the building. Rejected as not proven, according to the DLES interpretation of the "dry and measurable" requirement, that the bid space was "existing." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. It should again be noted that the missing "windows" in front made up approximately two-thirds of the front wall of the building. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected in part as not proven, in part as argument, and in part as irrelevant. It also should again be noted that the missing "windows" in front made up approximately two-thirds of the front wall of the building. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. In part, rejected as irrelevant and not proven. (Evidence as to the HRS manual and related facts was excluded as being irrelevant.) The rest is accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Irrelevant and unnecessary. (It was established at the hearing that the Petitioners' bid was rejected only because the bid space was not "dry"; DLES does not contend that it was not "measurable.") Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. In part, irrelevant, subordinate and unnecessary (what Mr. Taylor's definition is.) In part, cumulative. In part, rejected as argument. In part, accepted and incorporated (that the requirement that bid space be "dry," as interpreted by the DMS and the DLES, can be impractical when applied to the real world of building renovations and may exclude possible good lease opportunities.) Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. (Assuming it acts consistently from case to case, an agency's choice not to waive technicalities cannot be called "acting fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly.") Rejected as being argument and as not proven. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Except for the number of square feet, which is in error, accepted and incorporated. 2.-5. Accepted and incorporated. 6. Rejected as contrary to the findings of fact and the greater weight of the evidence that there were no walls in front. (They extended only about a third of the way up to the ceiling.) 7.-8. Accepted and incorporated. 9. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan Taylor 170 East Lake Elbert Winter Haven, Florida 33881 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle South East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Shirley Gooding, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle South East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn, Esquire Chief Legal Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle South East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Marinatown Realty, Inc., is a corporate real estate broker, holding license number 0208680 and located at 3440 Marinatown Lane, Northwest, North Fort Myers, Florida. Marinatown Realty is a wholly owned subsidiary of Seago Group, Inc., a publicly held land development and rental corporation whose president is Thomas P. Hoolihan. In late 1977, Hoolihan met L. E. Hutchinson, the complainant in this case, through another broker for whom Hutchinson at the time was employed. In December, 1977, Hoolihan and Hutchinson discussed the marketing of two condominium projects being developed by Hoolihan and reached an oral agreement whereby Hutchinson would be paid $18,000 in salary with a 1 1/2 percent commission on all sales. When the condominium units were completed and mostly sold, the parties' employment agreement was revised in late December, 1979. Under the new agreement, Hutchinson was to receive $30,000 a year salary, commissions on the remaining condominium units that had not yet closed and any commissions on outside property listings neither owned nor controlled by Seago. In return for the $30,000 guarantee, Hutchinson was to forego commissions on future properties owned or controlled by Seago Group, Inc. During the period from 1977-1978 when Hutchinson was receiving $18,000 plus a 1 1/2 percent commission, sales were handled through Lee Hutchinson Realty, Inc., which held license number 0182945. In early 1979, Marinatown Realty was incorporated to market Seago's real estate inventory, to identify and list outside properties and to act as a management agent for purposes of renting condominium units previously sold in recent projects. When Marinatown Realty was formed, the complainant became its active broker. While employed as the broker for Marinatown and receiving $30,000 a year as a salaried employee, Hutchinson held two other broker's licenses, one as L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., and another as L. E. Hutchinson. In January, 1980, Hoolihan agreed to pay a $15,000 bonus to Hutchinson in lieu of a salary increase. Since at that time sales were minimal, Hoolihan decided to pay the bonus in installments as sales occurred. Because Hutchinson left in May, 1980, he received only $10,000 of the bonus which represented moneys previously paid. On April 23, 1980, Hutchinson and Chuck Bundschu, a licensed real estate broker, negotiated and obtained a sales contract between Hancock Harbor Properties, Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Seago Group, Inc., seller, and Frank Hoffer, buyer and licensed real estate broker, in which Hoffer offered to purchase approximately 3.16 acres of unimproved acreage for $500,000. Thomas P. Hoolihan, general partner of Hancock Harbor, executed the contract on behalf of the partnership. Prior to presenting the contract to Hoolihan, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hutchinson decided on a 30 percent, 40 percent 30 percent respective co- brokerage split on the $50,000 commission due on the sale of the Hancock Harbor Property. The co-brokerage fee split was typed on the bottom of the contract submitted to Hoolihan and was signed by the three brokers. The commission due to Hutchinson was made payable to L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. On April 25, 1980, the contract with the original co-brokerage split was presented to Hoolihan who refused to agree to its co-brokerage split provision. In the presence of Hutchinson, Hoolihan informed Bundschu and Hoffer that he would not pay a commission to Hutchinson because he was a salaried employee of the Seago Group and not entitled to a commission on the sale of this property. Accordingly, the co-brokerage fee provision of the executed contract was never signed by the seller, Thomas P. Hoolihan. Instead, on April 25, 1980, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hoolihan agreed to a split of $20,000 to Hoffer and $15,000 to Bundschu in lieu of the split specified on the bottom of the contract. At the closing on July 18, 1980, which was held at Coastland Title Company, a closing statement was prepared which shows that real estate commissions were disbursed to Chuck Bundschu Realty, Inc. ($15,000), Marinatown Realty, Inc., ($15,000) and Hoffer's firm, Landco, Inc., ($20,000). The checks were written and disbursed following a conversation between an official of Coastland Title Company and Hoolihan in which Hoolihan informed the official that Hutchinson was a Seago employee and he would not agree to pay a $15,000 commission to him under such circumstances. On July 18, 1980, a check for $15,000 was issued by Coastland Title Company to Marinatown Realty, Inc. The $15,000 represented Hutchinson's share of the co-brokerage agreement. When received on July 18, 1980, by Billie Robinette, the broker for Marinatown Realty, the check was signed over by her to Seago Group, Inc., since in her opinion it did not represent commissions earned by Marinatown Realty. The oral agreement between Hutchinson and Hoolihan was to terminate at the end of April, 1980, or approximately five days after the Hoffer contract was presented. Hoolihan offered to renew the contract without a provision for a guaranteed salary because Marinatown Realty had been consistently losing money since its incorporation. On May 6, 1980, Hoolihan received a letter of resignation from Hutchinson and concluded that his offer had been rejected. In early May, 1980, Hoolihan received a call from Ms. Robinette, who had been employed as Hutchinson's secretary, regarding filling the open brokerage position at Marinatown Realty, Inc. Hoolihan discovered from Ms. Robinette that Hutchinson had paid himself 50 percent of the commissions due Marinatown Realty, Inc., for the management of condominium rentals. After examining the check stubs from Marinatown's bank account, Hoolihan took personal possession of all the books and records of the company and had the office locks changed. When he examined the books and records of the realty company, Hoolihan realized that his assumption that Hutchinson Realty, Inc., became inactive when Marinatown Realty, Inc. was formed in January, 1979, was erroneous and that Hutchinson had operated his own realty company, L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., while employed by Marinatown Realty, Inc. Although he held multiple licenses, Hutchinson denied that a conflict ever existed between his duties to Marinatown Realty, Inc., and his own company, L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. When questioned during the final hearing regarding how he decided where to list properties while he was the broker for both companies, the following exchange occurred between Hutchinson and counsel for Marinatown Realty, Inc.: Q Let me ask you, Mr. Hutchinson, how would it be decided when you were to go out and list property as to whether or not that property would be listed under Marinatown Realty or L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc.? Who would make that determination? A I would. Q Solely on your own? A I had no contract with anyone. I had nothing in writing to direct me where to place any business. Q So this would be solely your decision as to how you would list the property? Either Marinatown Realty or L. E. Hutchinson Realty? A If I secured the listing it was my dis- cretion as to where I listed the real estate. I had the choice of one of two companies. * * * Q If you were to list property in my hypo- thetical with Marinatown Realty, is it not a fact that they would receive, and being Marinatown Realty, would receive one half of the commission and you, as the broker, would receive the other half? A That was what I did. Q So it would certainly be beneficial to Seago to have you list as much property as you could with Marinatown Realty because they, in fact, owned the stock with Marinatown Realty, is that not true? A Yes, sir. Q When you would list property with L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., would you do this with the full knowledge, consent and permission of Marinatown Realty, Inc.? A Yes, sir. Q How would you say that you gave full consent when you just testified that it was solely up to you as to how you would list property? A If I solely decided, I give my consent. I don't have anybody else to answer to. (T. pp. 108-110) During the period that Hutchinson was a broker for Marinatown Realty and L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Hutchinson believed his primary duty was toward his own company as illustrated by the following exchange between counsel for Respondent and the complainant: Q It's a fair statement to say that you, as a broker for Marinatown Realty, Inc. didn't make a whole lot of money for Marinatown Realty, did you? A I didn't run the P & L statement. Q I'm asking you as being the broker. You didn't make a lot of money for Marinatown Realty, Inc., did you? A I made as much money for them as I did for the responsibility. Q Well, did L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. make a lot of money during that period of time? MR. FERNANDEZ: Objection as to relevancy, this whole line of questioning. MR. NEEL: Your Honor, it isn't. It's germaine. HEARING OFFICER: Objection overruled. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, the question? Q Did L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. make a lot of money during this period of time? A That's relative. Q In comparison to what money Marinatown Realty made? A Yes, sir, because L. E. Hutchinson Realty had a thirty thousand retainer that was coming in up until April 30th. Q From Seago? A Certainly. Q So L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. made a lot more money than Marinatown Realty, Inc., didn't they? A That's the way its supposed to work. Q And, again, it was at your sole dis- cretion as to how you would list the properties; under which principal. A Yes, but I asked for a specific con- tract and never got it. (T. pp. 124-125) The Administrative Complaint in this case was filed on July 22, 1981. The preliminary investigative report compiled by Robert Corno, DPR Investigator, was filed on September 24, 1981 and the final investigative report was filed on September 30, 1981. The following is a synopsis of the investigator's findings and recommendation: That the COMPLAINANT [Hutchinson] worked for the SUBJECT [Hoolihan] and their contractual agreement was verbal. COMPLAINANT was paid on a salary/commission basis by companies of which SUBJECT is Chief Officer. That the COMPLAINANT filed civil action suit against SUBJECT in this case and it was dismissed with prejudice. That prior investigation by the DPR re- commended that no action be taken against the SUBJECT in this case. That two weeks after this investigation was undertaken, an Administrative Com- plaint was being filed by the DPR against the SUBJECT. That the existing BROKER for MARINATOWN REALTY, INC. was not involved in this case, and that since the time of the above referenced transaction, the SUBJECT has acquired his BROKER'S license #020462 which had no effect in this case. That conflicting statements by inter- viewers, namely former and present em- ployees and other agents involved in this case revealed that there is a reasonable doubt for probable cause against the SUBJECT. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) As noted by Investigator Corno, this was the second time Marinatown Realty had been investigated in relation to this case. In both instances a recommendation that no action be taken against the Respondent was apparently made. At the final hearing on December 1, 1981, counsel for the Department saw the complete investigative report, including the investigator's recommendation of a lack of probable cause, for the first time. Count II of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Hutchinson is entitled to compensation for services rendered on the following sales contracts: Seago Group, Inc. as seller, to Michael T. and Judith Marchiando as buyers, Seago Group, Inc. as seller, to John E. and Charlotte A. Ferguson as buyers, and Seago Group, Inc. as sellers, to Kenneth J. Dawson as buyer. In regard to the first transaction, the Marchiandos were personal friends of the son-in-law of Seago's major shareholder, Mr. R. Berti. Hutchinson's role in this transaction was limited to preparing the contract and mailing it to the Marchiandos for signature. Hutchinson had no part in selling this property and never met the Marchiandos. The sale of the Ferguson's arose in a manner similar to the Marchiandos. Mr. Ferguson is the manager of a Detroit company owned by Mr. Berti. Similarly, Mr. Dawson works for Mr. Berti in Detroit as an accountant. These sales were made by Mr. Berti and Hutchinson furnished administrative assistance by completing the contracts and sending them to these individuals for signature. Under the terms of the agreement between Hoolihan and Hutchinson, a commission was not due on these properties to Hutchinson since these were not outside listings and his agreement with Hoolihan did not contemplate that commissions be paid in such situations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed against Marinatown Realty, Inc. be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Xavier J. Fernandez, Esquire NUCKOLLS JOHNSON & FERNANDEZ Suite 10, 2710 Cleveland Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901 James A. Neel, Esquire 3440 Marinatown Lane, N.W. Fort Myers, Florida 33903 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact During March 1988, the Respondent issued an Invitation to Bid by which it sought to lease 17,973 net usable square feet of office space to be located within a specified geographic area in Tampa, Florida, under a nine year lease with two additional three year option periods. This Invitation to Bid is referred to as Lease Number 590:1927. Three bids were received in response to the Invitation to Bid, and they were opened on May 13, 1988. Bids were received from the Petitioner, 8900 Centre, Ltd., and the Allen Morris Management Company. All bidders were determined to be responsive to the Invitation to Bid. Despite the fact that petitioner submitted the lowest bid, Respondent notified Petitioner by letter dated June 10, 1988, of its intent to award Lease Number 590:1927 to 8900 Centre, Ltd., as the lowest and best bidder. Petitioner has timely filed its protest seeking review of that decision. It is undisputed that Petitioner submitted the lowest bid. For the first year of the lease, Petitioner bid $7.85 per square foot, while 8900 Centre bid $7.95 per square foot. Thereafter, Petitioner proposed a yearly increase of 50 cents per square foot, reaching $11.85 per square foot in the ninth year of the lease, while 8900 Centre proposed annual increases of approximately 75 cents, reaching $14.00 per square foot in the ninth year. This equates to an actual dollar difference over the nine year term of approximately 185,000. However, using a present value methodology and a present value discount rate of 8.81 percent referred to on page 17 of the bid submittal form, the present value difference in these two bids is approximately $1,000 per month, which would result in a present value difference between Petitioner and 8900 Centre of approximately $108,000 over the nine year period. Neither the Invitation to Bid, bid specifications, nor the actual bids were offered into evidence. One page of the bid submittal form, designated as page 17 of 18, was offered and received in evidence. This portion of the bid submittal form states that the "successful bid will be that one determined to be the lowest and best." It also sets forth evaluation criteria, and assigns weights to each criteria. The evaluation criteria include associated fiscal costs (35 points), location (40 points) and facility factors (25 points) . A synopsis of bids was also offered and received in evidence showing the points awarded to each bidder by the Respondent's bid evaluation committed. Out of a possible 100 points, 8900 Centre received 95.17 points, while Petitioner received 82.25 points and the Allen Morris Management Company received 70.67 points. Petitioner asserts that the members of the evaluation committee were not qualified or knowledgeable in basic construction, design and engineering principles, and therefore could not competently evaluate the bids submitted. However, Petitioner did not offer competent substantial evidence to support this contention. Only the chairperson of the committee, Susan Jennings, was called to testify, and she appeared thoroughly knowledgeable in the bid process, the needs of the agency, the bid requirements and the representations made to the committee members by each bidder, including Petitioner, when the committee made its site visit to each location. Since the actual Invitation to Bid, bid specifications, and evidence about the other committee members were not introduced, it is not possible to know what the specific duties of the committee were, how they were to carry out their duties their qualifications and training, and whether they failed to competently carry out these duties, as alleged by Petitioner. Despite Petitioner's lower bid, Respondent awarded this lease to 8900 Centre, Ltd., based upon the evaluation committee's determination assigning 8900 Centre the highest number of evaluation points. Out of a possible 35 points for fiscal costs, Petitioner received 34 and 8900 Centre received 31.5. Thus, Petitioner's status as low bidder is reflected in the points awarded by the committee. Since neither the bid invitation or specifications were introduced, no finding can be made as to whether the difference between these two bidders comports with any instructions or directions provided by the agency to potential bidders, or whether this difference of 2.5 points on this criteria reasonably reflects and accounts for the dollar difference in these two bids. Petitioner received 34.75 points out of a possible 40 points on the general evaluation criteria "location," while 8900 Centre received the full 40 points. Within this criteria, there were three subcategories, and on the first two subcategories (central area and public transportation) there was an insignificant difference of less than one-half point between Petitioner and 8900 Centre. The major difference between these two bidders which accounts for their significant difference on the location criteria, was in the subcategory of environmental factors, in which Petitioner received 15.17 points and 8900 Centre received the full 20 points. Petitioner did not present competent substantial evidence to discredit or refute the committee's evaluation in the subcategory of environmental factors. To the contrary, the only testimony from a committee member was that of Susan Jennings, and according to her, Petitioner failed to explain the availability of individual air conditioning and heating controls, or the possibility of separate program entrances, which could be made available under its bid. Although Petitioner sought to explain at hearing that these desires of the agency could be accommodated in its bid, there is no evidence that such an explanation was provided in its bid or during the bid process when the evaluation committee visited the Petitioner's site. The committee was aware, however, that 8900 Centre would provide individual heating and air conditioning controls, as well as separate outside entrances for the three programs which would occupy the leased space. Additionally, the committee was concerned, according to Jennings, that parking areas at Petitioner's facility were more remote and removed from the building entrance than at 8900 Centre, and were somewhat obscured by trees and shrubbery, thereby presenting a potential safety concern for employees working after dark. Finally, every employee would either have a window or window access at 8900 Centre, while it was not explained that Petitioner's site would offer a similar feature. Thus, Petitioner failed to establish that the evaluation committee erred in assigning a significantly greater number of points for environmental factors to 8900 Centre than to Petitioner. The evidence reflects a reasonable basis for this difference. The other significant difference between these two bidders was in the subcategory for layout and utilization under the evaluation criteria "facility." Petitioner received 13.67 points while 8900 Centre received a full 20 points. Jennings explained that the separate outside entrances leading directly into the three programs that would occupy this space was preferred to a single reception area for all three programs. Petitioner offered the single reception area in its bid and site visit presentation, while 8900 Centre made it clear that each program would have its own entrance. Since these programs do not have a receptionist position, and none wanted to give up a secretarial position to serve as receptionist for all three programs, the committee did not consider the single reception area entrance to be desirable. Additionally, Petitioner's facility was a two-story building, while 8900 Centre is a single story facility. Jennings explained that the committee considered a ground level facility to be preferable to a two story building, particularly since the Medicaid program was to occupy the major portion of this space. The Medicaid program would have to be split up at Petitioner's facility, either in two separate buildings or on two levels of the same building, while at 8900 Centre, Medicaid could be accommodated in one, single story building, with the other two programs in a second, single story building. Finally, parking at 8900 Centre was directly next to, and outside the entrance of the building, while Petitioner offered to make assigned spaces available in a general parking area which serves its entire 100,000 square foot complex. The parking offered by Petitioner is more remote than that offered by 8900 Centre, and would be less secure at night due to a greater distance from the building entrances and the parking lot. Thus, Petitioner failed to establish that the committee erred in assigning a significantly greater number of points for layout and utilization to 8900 Centre than to Petitioner. There is a reasonable basis for this difference, according to the evidence in the record.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's protest to Lease Number 590:1927. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of December 1988. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December 1988. APPENDIX (DOAH Case Number 88-3765 BID) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted, in part, in Finding of Fact 1, but Rejected in Finding of Fact 10, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence in the record. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 3-5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4, but Rejected in 7. 6-7. Rejected in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected in Finding of Fact 10, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence in the record. Rejected in Findings of Fact 9 and 10, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 1, but otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 3-4. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 5 and 6, but otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence in the record of this case. Adopted In Findings of Fact 5, 7-10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary since the point difference in this subcategory is insignificant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 11-12. Adopted in Finding of fact 10. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael V. Giordano, Esquire 7821 North Dale Mabry Suite 100 Tampa, Florida 33614 Jack Farley, Esquire W. T. Edwards Facility 4000 West Buffalo Fifth Floor, Room 520 Tampa, Florida 33614 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Respondent provides services to the residents of Immokalee from office space which it is currently leasing from Sunburst. The lease of the present facilities expires on August 31, 1985. DHRS is in need of more office space than it currently fills in order to meet the growing demand for its services in the Immokalee area. Therefore, DHRS issued an invitation to bid, inviting interested persons to submit bids for its required office space. Three bidders responded: Badcock Furniture Corporation, Sunburst Urethane Systems, Inc., and Chuck Bundschu, Inc. Badcock Furniture Corporation is not a party to these proceedings in that it did not seek an administrative remedy under Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. The bid acquisition has been designated by DHRS as Lease No. 590:1590. DHRS formed a bid evaluation committee to evaluate the bids which were submitted. The committee, consisting of William Samford, Residential Service's Director for Development Services, Frank Last, Senior Human Services Program Manager for Economic Services, Frances H. Clendenin, Administrative Services Director, John S. Cato, General Services Manager, and Ed Gauthier, Human Services Program Administrator for the Immokalee programs, visited the three prospective bid sites and evaluated the bid proposals. Each member individually reviewed and rated the bids and recorded his or her ratings on a form entitled Evaluation Criteria (Award Factors). The individual ratings were admitted into evidence as HRS Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. After the individual review, the committee met together for purposes of reaching a consensus evaluation. Based on that consensus, the committee generated a memorandum to the Department of General Services outlining the twelve evaluation criteria used and the points awarded to each bidder. On or about March 7, 1984, DHRS published its notice of intent to award Lease No. 590:1590 to Chuck Bundschu, Inc., as the successful bidder. By stipulation, only four of the evaluation criteria are in dispute as to the points awarded to each bidder. Those criteria resulted in the following ratings: Criteria 1 - Rental rate including projected operating expenses to be paid by lessor. Out of a total rating of 30 points, Sunburst received 30 points because it had the lowest rental rate during the term of the lease and the option years. Chuck Bundschu, Inc., received 27 points based on a formula designed by the committee. Under the formula, the maximum of 30 points was awarded to the low bidder if that bid was below the rent that had been set as the area rate and the other bidders then received points based on a ratio between their bid and the low bidder. Criteria 2 - Conformance of space offered to the specific requirements contained in the invitation to bid. A total of 20 points was available to each bidder in this criteria. Sunburst received 18 points and Chuck Bundschu, Inc., received the entire 20 points. The basis for the lower point award to Sunburst was that some of the proposed office space was in a residential building and the second floor of the two-story building was being and would be used for migrant farm housing. The property of Chuck Bundschu, Inc., was totally suitable and was well located. Criteria 4 - Provision of the aggregate square footage in a single building. Proposal will be considered, but fewer points given, which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two locations provided the facilities are immediately adjacent to or within 100 yards of each other. Both Sunburst and Chuck Bundschu, Inc. would provide space in not more than two locations. However, Sunburst's buildings did not have a covered walkway connecting the buildings and the Bundschu property did. Therefore, Sunburst received 8 points and Chuck Bundschu, Inc. received the maximum 10 points. Criteria 6 - The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it, on the efficient and economical conduct of Departmental operations planned for the requested space. Sunburst received two points and Bundschu received the maximum of five points because the characteristics of the neighborhood and the actual layout of the property was more conducive to the conduct of Departmental operations. Specifically, Sunburst's property had a congested parking lot where many people gathered including some undesirable persons. These people and their activities resulted in a higher crime rate in the area. Further, migrant housing would exist on the floor above the offices that would house valuable food stamps, thereby creating a security threat. Finally, a proposed additional parking site would result in cars traveling across a walkway where clients and employees might be injured. Bundschu's property had none of these drawbacks. The memorandum from the bid evaluation committee to the Department of General Services stated the committee's findings and point award totals for the twelve criteria. That memorandum indicated that Badcock Furniture Corporation received a total of 59 points, Sunburst received 79 points and Chuck Bundschu, Inc., received 93 points. It is undisputed that a clerical error occurred in the memorandum and the totals as reported were incorrect. At hearing, testimony was given that the corrected totals should have been 91 points for Sunburst and 95 points for Chuck Bundschu, Inc. However, even these totals do not agree with simple addition of the points as they are listed separately by criteria. It is found that the correct totals for the separate points awards as stated in the memorandum is 90 points for Sunburst and 95 points for Chuck Bundschu, Inc. Despite the discrepancy in the actual point totals is reported in the memorandum, a review of the individual evaluation forms shows that each evaluator independently awarded Sunburst fewer points than Bundschu. While there was contradictory evidence regarding the actual total points awarded and the method by which the consensus was reached, the clear and convincing evidence is that Bundschu was evaluated to be the best bidder by every evaluator and the evaluators properly applied the criteria. It is undisputed that the property offered by Chuck Bundschu, Inc., is on property partially zoned "VR", and before offices could go into the building, a provisional use variance must be approved by the Board of Zoning Appeals of Collier County. The bid evaluation committee did not consider zoning in evaluating the bids because zoning was not an element specified in the invitations to bid. The invitation to bid does not require the proposed site to be compatibly zoned in order for the bid to be valid and responsive. If the contract is awarded and the successful bidder fails to make the space available as agreed, whether because of zoning or otherwise, the successful bidder shall be liable to DHRS for liquidated damages for each day that the property is unavailable. Zoning is not an element to be considered in the award of the bid.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which awards the contract for Lease No. 590:1590 to Chuck Bundschu, Inc., as having submitted the lowest and best bid proposal. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert M. Grguric, Esquire 900 Sixth Avenue South Suite 201 Naples, Florida 33940 Anthony N. DeLuccia, Esquire Post Office Box 06085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, the parties' joint stipulation of facts and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. On May 28, pursuant to approval and authorization by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and pursuant to pertinent provisions of Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code, FDOT received sealed bids, one of which was from Petitioner, in response to FDOT's public advertisement soliciting competitive bids for award of the contract for construction of a public works project known as Allapattah H.O.V. Station, a parking structure to be situated at the southeast corner of Northwest 12th Street and Northwest 36th Street in Miami, Florida, designated as FDOT Job Nos. 87270-3414, 87270-3519 and 87085- 3502, and as Federal Aid Project Nos. I-95-I(364)IV, ACIR-95-1(366)4 and M- 6155(2). Prior to solicitation of bids for the project, FDOT submitted plans, specifications and a pre-bid estimate to FHWA for review and approval. FHWA reviewed and approved the plans, specifications and pre-bid estimate for the project, and by separate written communications dated March 17 and April 17, FHWA authorized FDOT to proceed with solicitation of competitive bids for the project. Pursuant to that authorization and approval from FHA, FDOT caused its advertisement soliciting competitive bids for the Allapattah project to be published in newspapers of general circulation throughout the southeast and Atlantic coast states, and, in so doing, classified the Allapattah project as a public works project set aside and restricted to competitive bidding solely among qualified contractors certified as disadvantaged business enterprises. Before Petitioner submitted its bid, FDOT determined that Petitioner is a qualified contractor and certified it as a disadvantaged business enterprise, thus rendering Petitioner eligible to bid for award of the contract to construct the Allapattah project. When FDOT opened the bids it received for award of the contract to construct the Allapattah project on May 28, it was apparent to FDOT that Petitioner's bid of $15,193,048.40 was the lowest responsive bid, but that Petitioner's bid exceeded the pre-bid estimate of the cost to construct the Allapattah project by twenty-one and three tenths percent (21.3 percent). At the time FHWA approved the plans, specifications and pre-bid estimate for the Allapattah project, it was understood and agreed between FHWA and FDOT that if a contract to construct the project was awarded in the amount of the pre-bid estimate, which was $12,523,233,06, FHWA would fund the contract to the extent of $11,647,074.70 and FDOT would fund the contract to the extent of $876,158.36, and that FDOT would also fund the equal employment opportunity training required under the contract at an estimated cost of $200,353.26, thus bringing the total funds planned to be expended by FDOT to $1,076,511.62. FDOT follows a policy that provides for automatic award of the contract to the lowest responsible bidder if [the] bid is within seven percent (7 percent) of the pre-bid estimate of the cost to construct the project in question. If the bid submitted by the lowest responsible bidder exceeds seven percent (7 percent) of the pre-bid estimate of the cost to construct the project, FDOT follows a policy of reviewing that bid and the pre-bid estimate in an effort to account for the disparity between the bid and the pre-bid estimate and to determine whether the bid is or is not competitive. If FDOT finds that the bid is not competitive, it follows a policy of rejecting all bids and resoliciting bids for the project. If FDOT finds that the bid is competitive, it awards the contract to construct the project in question to the bidder who submitted that bid. Because Petitioner's bid was not within seven percent (7 percent) of the pre-bid estimate of the cost to construct the Allapattah project, following the opening of bids, FDOT contacted Petitioner and requested Petitioner to meet at FDOT's offices in Miami, Florida, to review Petitioner's bid. On June 4, representatives of Petitioner met with representatives of FDOT in FDOT's Miami offices, at which time FDOT requested Petitioner to provide FDOT a breakdown of the lump sum Petitioner quoted for the bid item entitled "Parking Garage" whereupon Petitioner did so. The breakdown which Petitioner presented to FDOT at that time showed each category of work involved in constructing the Parking Garage in accord with FDOT's plans and specifications for the project, and also showed the price applicable to each such category of work. Before receiving the above described breakdown, FDOT assured Petitioner that all such information would be held confidential and would not be published or disclosed to any other person. Upon receiving the above described breakdown, FDOT informed Petitioner that the information contained therein was sufficient to enable FDOT to complete its evaluation of Petitioner's bid. Before the meeting concluded, Petitioner informed FDOT that if any additional information was needed, to please let Petitioner know in which event appropriate efforts would be made to remotely provide such additional information to FDOT. On June 16, FDOT's Technical Review Committee and Contracts Award Committee met to decide what action to take respecting the bids it had received on May 28, for award of the contract to construct the Allapattah project. FDOT then decided: (a) to reject all bids, to reclassify the project from one that is set aside and restricted to bidding solely among qualified contractors certified as minority business enterprises to one that is open to competition from all qualified general contractors, and to re-solicit bids for the project, and (b) to request FHWA's concurrence therein. On June 17, Petitioner inquired of FDOT as to what action had been taken respecting award of the contract to construct the Allapattah project and was then informed that the foregoing decisions had been made. Petitioner then asked FDOT why it had decided to reject Petitioner's bid, whereupon FDOT stated that Petitioner's bid was rejected because, when compared with FDOT's pre-bid estimate of the cost of constructing Allapattah project, Petitioner's bid appeared unrealistically high and non-competitive. On June 19, Petitioner, filed with FDOT's clerk of agency proceedings a written notice of protest of FDOT's above described decisions. Such notice of protest was submitted within the required time and is in accord with applicable provisions of Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, thus stopping FDOT from taking any further action to implement its above-described decisions. In its notice of protest, Petitioner, also requested of FDOT an early opportunity to informally meet and confer respecting Petitioner's protest in an effort to amicably resolve the same on mutually acceptable terms and conditions. Notwithstanding the fact that FDOT was not to take any further action to implement its above-described decisions, by letter dated June 20, addressed to FHWA, FDOT confirmed its above-described decisions and requested FHWA to concur therewith. On June 27, FHWA expressed its concurrence with FDOT's above- described decisions. On June 30, representatives of FDOT and Petitioner met informally in FDOT's central offices in Tallahassee, Florida, at which time Petitioner presented certain information tending to show that the pre-bid estimate of the cost to construct the Allapattah project was out of date, unrealistically low and that Petitioner's bid was realistic and reasonably competitive. The meeting concluded with an understanding between the parties that FDOT would reconsider its above-described decisions and, pursuant thereto, representatives of FDOT and Petitioner would again meet in FDOT's Miami offices on July 2, to review certain documentation to be presented by Petitioner related to its bid preparation of its May 28, bid. During the July 2 meeting, FDOT asked Petitioner to provide certain additional information documenting Petitioner's preparation of its May 28 bid, whereupon Petitioner did so. As a result of the information presented by Petitioner during the June 30 meeting, FDOT realized that the pre-bid estimate of the cost to construct the Allapattah project, which was initially prepared in October, 1984, by its architectural/engineering consultant, who also designed the project, the Kaiser Transit Group, had not been updated to reflect any increase in costs attributable to inflation. Although FDOT had in February, reviewed its architectural/engineering consultant's October, 1984 estimated cost of construction and made minor adjustments thereto in the process of converting such estimate to the computerized format customarily used by its Estimates Office, FDOT did not address the impact of inflation on the estimate. Thus, following the June 30, meeting with Petitioner, FDOT decided to develop a new estimate for the project, whereupon its Estimates and Architectural Offices jointly undertook the task of considering inflationary impact. The resulting new estimate stated a cost of $14,317,608.00 to construct the project. That cost exceeded the pre-bid estimate that FDOT had used in its initial evaluation of Petitioner's bid by approximately Two Million Dollars, thus bringing Petitioner's bid within seven percent (7 percent) of FDOT's estimated cost to construct the project and causing Petitioner's bid to be subject to FDOT's automatic award criteria. On June 25, FDOT received competitive bids for award of the contract to construct another public works project known as Earlington Heights H.O.V. Station, a parking structure to be situated at Northwest 22nd Avenue and Northwest 41st Street in Miami, Florida, designated as FDOT Job Nos. 87270-3523, 87270- 3490, and 87003-3515, and as Federal Aid Project Nos. I-95-1 (352)4, ACIR-95-1(380)4 and F-030-1(33). The Earlington Heights project was also classified as a public works project set aside and restricted to competitive bidding solely among qualified contractors certified as disadvantaged business enterprises. Petitioner submitted a responsive bid in the amount of $7,449,130.04 for award of the contract to construct the Earlington Heights project, but was the second lowest bidder. The low bidder was a company known as Three-W Corporation which had previously been determined by FDOT to be a qualified contractor and had been previously certified by FOOT as a disadvantaged business enterprise eligible to bid for award of the contract to construct the Earlington Heights project. Three W Corporation's low bid for the Earlington Heights project was $7,080,000.00 and exceeded the pre-bid estimate to the cost to construct the Earlington Heights project by seventeen and three tenths percent (17.3 percent). The pre-bid estimate of the cost to construct the Earlington Heights project was initially prepared in October, 1984, by the Kaiser Transit Group, the same architectural/engineering consultant that designed and prepared the initial pre-bid estimate for the Allapattah project in October, 1984. Before soliciting bids for award of the contract to construct the Earlington Heights project, FDOT reviewed its architectural/engineering consultant's October, 1984, estimate which stated that the cost to construct the Earlington Heights project was $5,481,000.00 and increased the same approximately ten percent (10 percent) to $6,037,298.36 to reflect FDOT's estimate of the extent construction costs had increased as a result of inflation between October, 1984, and June, 1986. When FDOT and Petitioner met on June 30, FDOT was engaged in evaluating Three-W Corporation's low bid for the Earlington Heights project. FDOT then reconsidered Petitioner's low bid for the Allapattah project and found that the low bids submitted for each such project comparable in that Three-W Corporation's low bid established a cost per square foot to construct the Earlington Heights project of $ 23.02 and Petitioner's low bid established a cost per square foot to construct the Allapattah project of $22.40. Because the low bid for the Earlington Heights project also exceeded FDOT pre-bid estimate by more than seven percent (7 percent), FDOT met and conferred with representatives of Three-W Corporation to review certain information related to preparation of the bid it had submitted on June 25, for the Earlington Heights project. FDOT then decided to also develop a new estimate for the Earlington Heights project, and its Estimates and Architectural Offices did so. The resulting new estimate increased FDOT's $6,037,298.36 pre- bid estimate by approximately $1,000,000.00, thus bringing the low bid submitted by Three-W Corporation within seven percent(7 percent) of the estimated costs to construct the Earlington Heights project and causing its bid to be subject to FDOT's automatic award criteria. In successive meetings of FDOT's Technical Review Committee and Contract Awards Committee on July 16, FDOT concluded its evaluation of the low bid for the Earlington Heights project and its reconsideration of its decisions to reject all bids and re-solicit bids for the Allapattah project by deciding that FDOT's pre-bid estimates of the cost to construct both projects were out- of-date, unrealistically low, and not indicative of a reasonably competitive cost to complete either project. Three-W Corporation's bid for the Earlington Heights project and Petitioner's bid for the Allapattah project appeared realistic and indicative of reasonably competitive costs to complete each project. FDOT's decisions in the foregoing respects were confirmed in the minutes of the July 16, meetings of its Technical Review Committee and its Contract Awards Committee, and in letters dated July 18 and July 21, addressed to FHWA, wherein Respondent requested FHWA to concur in FDOT's decisions to award contracts for construction of the Earlington Heights project and the Allapattah project to Three-W Corporation and Petitioner, respectively. On July 22, FDOT was informed by FHWA that it concurred in FDOT's decision to award the contract for construction of the Earlington Heights project to Three-W Corporation, but that it did not concur in FDOT's decision to award the contract for construction of the Allapattah project to Petitioner. In so doing, FHWA stated that it did not concur in FOOT's decision to award the contract for construction of the Allapattah project because the reasons expressed in FDOT's June 30, letter to FHWA requesting it to concur in FDOT's decision to reject all bids and re-solicit bids for the project were more persuasive than the reasons given by Respondent in support of its July 21, decision to award the contract for construction of the Allapattah project to Petitioner. After receiving the July 22, letter from FHWA, FDOT informed Petitioner of what had transpired and stated that on August 18, the results of the May 28, bid opening would be formally posted and published to provide public notice that all bids submitted for award of the contract to construct the Allapattah project had been rejected and that FDOT would re-advertise the project to re-solicit bids. Petitioner then requested FDOT to ask FHWA to reconsider its July 22, decision, but FDOT refused to do so. However, FDOT then suggested that Petitioner was free to request FHWA to reconsider its July 22, decision and that if Petitioner succeeded in persuading FHWA to agree that Petitioner's bid was realistic and to agree to award Petitioner the contract for construction of the subject project, FDOT would do so. On August 18, FDOT posted its notice that all bids submitted on May 28, for award of the contract to construct the Allapattah project were rejected and that it intended to re- solicit bids. On October 1, FDOT discovered that FHWA had not received certain documentation related to FDOT's July 16 decisions to award contracts for construction of the Earlington Heights Project to Three-W Corporation and the Allapattah project to Petitioner. Accordingly, by letter dated October 1, from William F. Ventry, FDOT's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Technical Policies and Engineering Services, to P. E. Carpenter, FHWA's Division Administrator, FDOT provided such documentation to FHWA and formally requested FHWA to reconsider its decision not to concur with FDOT's decision to award the Allapattah contract to Petitioner. By letter dated October 9, from James E. St. John, FHWA's Assistant Division Administrator, to Mr. Ventry, FHWA replied to FDOT's October 1, letter stating its basis for refusing to concur with FDOT's decision to award the contract for construction of the Allapattah project to Petitioner and informed FDOT that FHWA will now deobligate the (federal) funds authorized March 17, (for construction of the project) pending your request for further Federal- aid activity on this project. Upon receiving FHWA's October 9, letter, it became apparent to FDOT that FHWA had misapprehended or overlooked certain critical facts related to FDOT's reconsideration of its decision not to award the contract for construction of the Allapattah project to Petitioner. Mr. Ventry requested Vernon E. Dixon, FDOT's Preliminary Estimates Engineer, to draft an appropriate letter to Mr. St. John, setting out the facts FHWA had apparently overlooked or misunderstood. By letter from Mr. Dixon to Mr. St. John dated October 13, FDOT presented those facts to FHWA. On October 14, Mr. Dixon met and conferred with Mr. St. John and discussed the matters addressed in the October 13, letter. At the conclusion of that meeting, Mr. St. John indicated that the information and explanation presented by Mr. Dixon had indeed caused him to finally obtain a full and complete understanding of the facts and reasoning which led FDOT to reconsider its earlier decision and to finally decide to accept Petitioner's bid and to award the contract for construction of the Allapattah project to Petitioner. Mr. St. John cautioned that he would have to consult with certain FHWA officials in Washington to determine whether FDOT's development of a new estimate of the cost to construct the Allapattah project after bids were received and opened would preclude FHWA from concurring with FDOT to award the Allapattah project to Petitioner. By letter dated October 22, from Mr. St. John to Mr. Dixon, FHWA informed FDOT that FHWA would not concur with FDOT's decision to award the Allapattah project to Petitioner, that the project is no longer authorized, and that the federal funds authorized for construction of the project have been deobligated. Although the procedure followed by FDOT in reevaluating Petitioner's bid for award of the contract to construct the Allapattah project was the same procedure it followed in evaluating the bid submitted by Three-W Corporation for award of the Earlington Heights project, FHWA refused to concur with FDOT's reconsidered decision respecting Petitioner's bid. Petitioner's bid for award of the contract to construct the Allapattah project was responsive, realistic and reasonably competitive in all material respects. Any substantial difference between the amount of Petitioner's bid and FDOT's pre-bid estimate for the Allapattah project is attributable to inflationary factors. Although FDOT has now acknowledged these facts to be true with respect to both the Allapattah project and the Earlington Heights project, FDOT has failed to implement its decision to accept Petitioner's bid and to award the contract to construct the Allapattah project to Petitioner. If FDOT had implemented its decision to accept Petitioner's bid and to award the contract to construct the Allapattah project to Petitioner, the amount of the contract would have equalled the amount of Petitioner's bid, $15,193,048.40. If FDOT implements its decision to accept Petitioner's bid and to award to Petitioner the contract to construct the Allapattah project and FDOT then obtained no more than the $11,647,074.70 in federal funds committed pre-bid by FHWA to fund construction of the Allapattah project, FDOT would have to increase its pre-bid commitment of state funds by $2,469,361.08 to provide sufficient funds to equal the amount of Petitioner's bid. If FDOT implements its decision to accept Petitioner's bid and award to Petitioner the contract for construction, and pays one hundred percent (100 percent) of the cost of construction from state funds, FDOT would have to increase its pre-bid commitment of state funds to provide sufficient funds to equal the amount of Petitioner's bid. Although Petitioner was and continues to be a qualified contractor, although Petitioner was and continues to be certified as a disadvantaged business enterprise eligible to bid for award of the contract to construct the Allapattah project, FDOT has not yet awarded that contract to Petitioner. The only reasons FD0T has stated for having not yet awarded the contract to construct the Allapattah project to Petitioner is that FHWA has not concurred with FDOT's decision to accept Petitioner's bid and to award the contract for construction of the Allapattah project to Petitioner. FDOT must have FHWA concurrence in order to receive federal funds. The federal funding participation for this project is approximately 90 percent. FHWA has deobligated federal funds for the project in question. Without federal funding, this project will probably be recycled to the bidding process as a non-set aside project. If anticipated financing is not available for one project, FDOT reviews all projects to determine if that one project warrants eliminating other projects. For those projects where federal funding constitutes such a large portion of the funding, that project reverts and competes against other projects in other funds categories because at present, State funds are consumed. This competing process will resume beginning in 1988. This prioritization process is incorporated in FDOT's 5-year plan (the plan). The plan serves not only as a work plan but also as a finance plan. The comptroller uses the plan to certify that a particular project is indeed a part of the plan and that the money has been provided for. Funds are not available if they are not provided for in the plan. If changes are to be made after the plan is published, FDOT seeks legislative concurrence with those changes and without such concurrence, the changes cannot be made.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED: The Florida Department of Transportation enter a Final Order rejecting Petitioner's bid for Job Nos. 87270-3414, 87270-3519 and 87085-3502 and readvertise said job. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of April, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1987.
The Issue The issue is whether AHG Hotels, LLC's application for a Type B site plan and deviation should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Background On September 11, 2002, the Development Review Committee (DRC) of Respondent, City of Tallahassee (City), approved a Type B site review application authorizing the construction of a Hampton Inn & Suites by Respondent, AHG Hotels, LLC (AHG). The DRC also granted AHG's request for a deviation from development standards contained in Section 10.6RR of the City's Zoning Code by allowing AHG to exceed the four-story height limitation and to add a fifth floor to the structure. Two other deviation requests by AHG were determined to be either inapplicable or exempt from Zoning Code requirements because of vesting, and thus they are not at issue here. On October 10, 2002, Petitioner, Capital City Hotels, Inc. (Petitioner), which owns and operates a Hilton Garden Inn near the proposed construction, timely filed a Petition for Formal Proceedings to contest the approval of the deviation request. On October 15, 2002, a determination of standing as to Petitioner was issued by the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission (Commission), which will issue a final order in this matter. As stipulated by the parties at hearing, the only issue is whether AHG failed to satisfy three of the seven criteria that must be met in order for the DRC to grant a deviation. Those disputed criteria are found in paragraphs (iii)-(v) of Section 23.3 of the City's Code of Ordinances (Code) and provide as follows: The deviation requested is the minimum deviation that will make possible the reasonable use of the land, building, or structure; and The strict application of the requirements of this chapter will constitute a substantial hardship to the applicant, which hardship is not self- created or imposed; and There are exceptional topographic, soil, or other environmental conditions unique to the property; The parties agree that all other criteria for the site plan and deviation have been satisfied by AHG. In addition, a related request by AHG for a technical amendment to the boundaries of the parcel will be granted by the DRC, assuming that AHG obtains a favorable ruling in this case. History of the Property The property which is the subject of this case is identified as lot of record 454 and fronts on the west side of Lonnbladh Road, lies south of Raymond Diehl Road and several hundred feet east of Thomasville Road, and is just southeast of the major intersection of Interstate 10 and Thomasville Road in Tallahassee. The zoning for the property is Commercial Parkway (CP), a mixed-use zoning district which applies to areas exhibiting an existing development pattern of office, general commercial, community facilities, and intensive automotive commercial development abutting urban area arterial roadways with high traffic volumes. Among the numerous permitted uses in that land use category are hotels and motels. The property is part of a 7.1-acre site originally owned by Kingswood Land Partners, Ltd. (Kingswood). In January 1990, Kingswood obtained from the City a minor subdivision approval, dividing the 7.1 acres into three lots of record, including lot of record 454. The three lots consisted of a 2.44-acre lot running along most of the western portion of the property with the exception of a small area on the southern end, a 1.68-acre lot on the northeast portion of the property, and a 2.98-acre lot on the southeast portion of the property (lot of record 454). In November 1990, Kingswood received from the City a verification of vested status (vested rights certificate) for the 7.1-acre site. The vested rights certificate provided that the 7.1-acre site was exempt from the consistency and concurrency provisions of the Tallahassee-Leon County Comprehensive Plan (Plan) and was vested for an 89,887 gross square foot commercial non-medical office building and a 135- unit hotel/motel. In 1991, Kingswood utilized the vesting for a 135- unit, five-story hotel and constructed what is now known as the Cabot Lodge on the 2.44-acre lot. It also constructed on part of the southeastern 2.98-acre lot a paved area with parking places. In 1992, Kingswood conveyed to Twin Action Hotels, Inc. (Twin Action) the 2.44-acre lot which included the Cabot Lodge Hotel, but not the paved parking area on the 2.98-acre lot. The same year, Kingswood also conveyed to New Horizons Unlimited, Ltd. (New Horizons) the remaining two lots, which two lots were vested for a commercial non-medical office six- story building of 89,887 gross square feet. At the time of the conveyances of the New Horizons property and the Cabot Lodge property to New Horizons and Twin Action, respectively, these parties entered into a Grants of Reciprocal Easements dated June 23, 1992, recorded in Official Records Book 1570, at page 1072 of the Public Records of Leon County, Florida. Around 1994, the Florida Department of Transportation acquired .333 acres of the northernmost lot owned by New Horizons for a project which included realigning and four-laning Raymond Diehl Road and relocating the eastbound entrance ramp to Interstate 10, immediately in front of the Cabot Lodge lot. This acquisition reduced the New Horizons 1.68-acre lot to 1.347 acres. On October 14, 1998, the City approved a vested rights transfer request submitted by New Horizons, which provided that the New Horizons property could be used for a 107-room, four-story business hotel and 59,162 gross square feet of commercial non-medical offices, instead of the vested 89,887 gross square feet of commercial non-medical offices. Since the acquisition by New Horizons of the two remaining lots, that property has remained vacant and unimproved with the exception of the westernmost portion immediately south of the Cabot Lodge building, on which is located pavement and parking spaces. The parking spaces are not legally available to Cabot Lodge for use. The property located immediately west of the Cabot Lodge 2.44-acre lot is property which is referred to as the Thomasville Road Executive Park (Executive Park) property. On an undisclosed date, this property was divided into three separate lots by a minor subdivision approval consisting of Parcel A on which was constructed the Unisys Building and parking spaces, Parcel B which is now improved with a Hilton Garden Inn owed by Petitioner, and Parcel C which remains undeveloped. In 1996, Petitioner filed its site plan application to develop Parcel B. Included in the site plan application was a request for a technical amendment to adjust the boundary lines between Parcels A and B of the Executive Park property. Like AHG has done here, Petitioner also requested a deviation to the then height limitation of 45 feet, requesting that the City allow it to build the building 50 feet high, rather than the required 45 feet. Although the property on which the Hilton Garden Inn is now located was vested for a three-story commercial office building, subject to CP zoning, the City agreed that the vesting could also be used for a hotel use consisting of four stories rather than three stories. The City granted Petitioner's request to allow it to build a four-story hotel on Parcel B. It also granted Petitioner a height deviation so that the midpoint or peak of the roof would be not higher than 50 feet. However, the top of the roof is 59 feet, 6 inches. The facility has 99 rooms. No objection was made by Cabot Lodge, Unisys, or New Horizons to Petitioner's application for approval of its site plan, the technical amendment adjustment to boundary parcels, the use of the property for a four-story hotel instead of a three-story office building, or the granting of a height deviation. In April 2002, AHG entered into a contract with New Horizons for the purchase of 2.23 acres of the southeastern property owned by New Horizons for approximately $1.5 million. The 2.23 acres is part of the 2.98-acre lot of record known as lot 454. The application On July 5, 2002, AHG filed with the DRC its site plan application to construct a 122-room, five-story hotel on the 2.98-acre lot. On the same day, it filed a Deviation from Development Standard Request asking that it be allowed to construct a five-story hotel on the parcel rather than being limited to a four-story hotel, as required by the development standards for the CP zoning district in which the property is located. New Horizons has also requested a technical amendment to the boundaries of the 1.68-acre lot and the 2.98- acre lot that would result in the 2.98-acre lot on which the hotel will be built being reduced to 2.23 acres. The DRC intends to approve that request, assuming that AHG prevails in this proceeding. AHG's site plan uses the largest footprint for construction of the hotel building that is allowed under current applicable Code restrictions relating to the amount of impervious surface allowed to be constructed on a 2.23-acre lot, as well as the required amount of green space which must be maintained. If current zoning rules and regulations are strictly applied, AHG would be unable to have more than approximately 107 rooms in the hotel, utilizing the maximum footprint and only four stories on the 2.23 acres. The only way to accommodate the construction of 122 rooms is to obtain a deviation from the current restriction of four floors and allow a fifth floor to be built. The proposed height of construction of the five- story hotel will be 53 feet, 10 inches, except for several small areas of parapet walls which will be no higher than 58 feet, 4 inches. The subject site is relatively flat, with no excessive slopes, and it has no remarkable features from an environmental standpoint. It is unique in the sense that it is flat, barren land. It does not have wetlands, pristine water bodies, or other protected conditions. Also, it has no endangered plant species requiring special protection, no patriarch trees, no protected trees, and no native forests. Should the Deviation be Approved? A deviation under Section 23.3 is an amendment to a "set requirement" in the Code, such as a setback or height restriction. Between 60 and 75 percent of all applications filed with the DRC for a site plan approval are accompanied by a request for a deviation from a development standard, which are standards prescribed for each zoning district in the Code. One such development standard for the CP District is a four- story height limitation on structures found in Section 10.6RR of the Zoning Code. The DRC is a four-person committee comprised of representatives from the City's Utility Department, Public Works Department, Growth Management Department, and Planning Department; it is charged with the responsibility of deciding whether to grant or deny a deviation request. For at least the last six years, and probably much longer, the DRC has consistently applied and interpreted the deviation standards in Section 23.3 in the same manner. Although Section 23.3 provides that "the granting of deviations from the development standards in this chapter is not favored," they are not discouraged since more than half of all applicants cannot meet development standards due to site characteristics or other factors. Rather, the intent of the provision is to prevent wholesale deviations being submitted, project after project. Requests for a deviation are always approved, when justified, in order to give both the City and the applicant more flexibility in the development process. Here, AHG's application was treated the same as any other applicant. This case represents the first occasion that an approval of a deviation has been appealed. After an application for a deviation is filed, it is forwarded to all appropriate City departments as well as members of the DRC. Each reviewing agency is requested to provide information to the DRC members on whether or not the request should be recommended for approval. In this case, no adverse comments or recommendations were made by any City Department. After reviewing the Department comments, and the justification submitted by AHG, the DRC approved the deviation. Under Section 5.1 of the Code, the City's land use administrator, Mr. Pitts, has the specific responsibility to interpret all zoning and development approval regulations, including Section 23.3, which provides the criteria for granting a deviation. That provision has an apparent inconsistency between the first two sentences: the first sentence includes a phrase that all criteria set forth thereafter must be met to approve a deviation while the second sentence appears to provide that only the conditions necessary to granting a particular deviation must be met. In resolving this apparent inconsistency, Mr. Pitts does not construe the Section as requiring that all seven criteria must be met in every case. Instead, even though all criteria are reviewed by the DRC, only those that are applicable must be satisfied. If this were not true, the DRC "would grant very few deviations as part of [its] site plan or subdivision regulation [process]," and the intent of the Section would be undermined. For example, in order to justify a deviation, the DRC does not require that an applicant show that there are exceptional topographical soil features if, as here, there are no exceptional environmental features on the property. This interpretation has been consistently followed over the years, is a reasonable and logical construction of the language, and is hereby accepted. As a part of its application, AHG submitted a narrative justifying the granting of a deviation under each of the seven criteria. To satisfy the first disputed criterion, AHG indicated in its application that "[t]his deviation is the minimum allowed to make reasonable use of the property and to compete with adjacent hotels who enjoy the same height opportunity." AHG's use of the property is consistent with adjoining developments, including the neighboring Cabot Lodge, which is five stories high and has 135 rooms, and the Hilton Garden Inn, which was originally vested for an office building, but was allowed by the DRC to construct a four-story hotel. There is no other property available to AHG at this site on which to construct a hotel. The evidence shows that New Horizons initially offered to sell AHG only 2.05 acres; when AHG advised that anything less than 2.23 acres would render the project financially unfeasible, New Horizons "very reluctantly" agreed to sell an additional .18 acres. Because New Horizons intends to build a restaurant on its remaining 2.097 acres, any further reduction in the acreage would reduce its highest and best use of the property. Thus, AHG does not have the option of purchasing more property to expand its hotel laterally, as Petitioner suggests, rather than by adding a fifth floor. In addition, AHG does not have the ability to reduce the size of its hotel rooms in order to squeeze more rooms out of a four-story structure. This is because Hampton Inn (the franchisor) will not grant a franchise for a new hotel unless the franchisee agrees to build a hotel with prototypical room sizes. The present design of the hotel meets the minimum size required. There is no evidence that there is any other minimum deviation that could be granted which would make possible the use of the property for construction of 122 rooms under the standards set forth by Hampton Inn, the franchisor. Thus, the only practical adjustment that can be made is to obtain a height deviation. Accordingly, the criterion has been satisfied. To satisfy the second disputed criterion, AHG stated in its narrative that "[t]he strict application of this requirement would place this property and proposed hotel at a competitive disadvantage by a lower number of available rooms." Through testimony of an AHG principal, it was established that in order for AHG to make reasonable use of its property, the addition of a fifth floor is necessary. The evidence shows that as a general rule, a developer can only afford to pay approximately $10,000.00 per room for land cost. In this case, based on the 2.23 acres, at a purchase price of $1,500,000.00 and a hotel with 122 rooms, the projected land cost is $12,000.00 per room. This is the maximum that can be paid for land and still make AHG's project economically feasible. The strict application of the Zoning Code will make the project financially unfeasible, which will create a substantial hardship to AHG. The hardship is not self-created or imposed. At hearing, Petitioner's representative contended that "there are some companies who would find it financially feasible" to construct a four-story hotel with fewer rooms on the same site. However, the more persuasive evidence on this issue was presented by the AHG principal and shows the contrary to be true. The evidence further shows that the granting of the deviation will result in an almost equal efficiency factor of the total square footage of building versus the total square footage of the site when comparing AHG's proposed project to the neighboring Cabot Lodge. On the other hand, strict application of the Zoning Code could result in a substantially less and disproportionate efficiency factor of AHG's property as compared to the adjoining Cabot Lodge. This is because the highest point of the proposed Hampton Inn and Suites is 58 feet, 6 inches, with the majority of the hotel being 51 feet high. The adjoining five-story, 135-room Cabot Lodge has its highest point at 55 feet, 6 inches, with the majority of the building at 46 feet high. The Hilton Garden Inn has the highest roof with its maximum height at 59 feet, 6 inches, which runs across the entire peak of the roofline. 40. To satisfy the final disputed criterion, AHG indicated in its application that "[t]he absence of any environmental features on this property, or any adjacent environmental features that might be impacted[,] help support the deviation." As noted above, the property in question is unique in the sense that it is flat, treeless, and has no remarkable environmental features. If a site is devoid of environmental features, as it is here, the DRC has consistently interpreted this provision as having no application in the deviation process. This is the same interpretation used by the DRC when it approved Petitioner's application for a height deviation in 1996 to construct the Hilton Garden Inn. Like AHG's property, Petitioner's property was also devoid of environmental features. Therefore, this criterion does not apply. Even assuming arguendo that this provision applies, the addition of a fifth story to a four-story building has no impact whatsoever on the environmental characteristics of the site. Finally, there is no evidence that the deviation request is inconsistent with the Plan, or that the deviation will have any adverse impact to the general health, safety, and welfare of the public. Indeed, as to any Plan implications that might arise through the construction of a hotel, the evidence shows that the project is wholly consistent with the purpose and intent of the CP land use category, which is to promote higher intensity and density in CP-zoned land and to discourage urban sprawl.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission enter a final order granting AHG's Type B site plan review application and its application for a deviation from the height restriction for the CP land use category. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles R. Gardner, Esquire Gardner, Wadsworth, Shelfer, Duggar & Bist, P.A. 1300 Thomaswood Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-7914 Linda R. Hurst, Esquire City Hall, Second Floor 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731 John Marshall Conrad, Esquire Ausley & McMullen Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0391 Jean Gregory, Clerk Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission City Hall 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged, in conjunction with the Land Surveying Licensing Board, with the responsibility to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to Chapter 472, 455 and 120, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent, Lars Dohm, was licensed as a land surveyor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number LS0002358. Nona Chubboy, in January 1989, was the owner of a lot described as Lot 25, Block J, Tierra Verde, Unit 1, Fourth Replat, Pinellas County, Florida, also known as 727 Columbus Drive East, Tierra Verde, Florida. Ms. Chubboy intended to build a dwelling on the lot, and secured building plans for the dwelling. She was to be her own contractor. In early 1988, she brought the building plans to the Respondent, and asked him to stake out only the lot at that time. Respondent copied the dimensions of the lot and dwelling from the building plans, and returned them to her. In early 1989, Respondent was retained to do a stakeout survey of the house and lot. Respondent requested that a site plan be prepared. Mrs. Chubboy secured it from the house designed, and delivered it to the Respondent. 6 The site plan shows a set back of 20 feet to a series of dotted lines, then a total of the length of the building from front to back of 63 feet, and footage of 37 feet to the rear of the property, which totals the exact distance of the length of the lot, 120 feet. With the site plan and the dimensions of the foundation of the building in his possession, the Respondent proceeded to stake out the foundation of the dwelling on or about January 10, 1989, and prepared a stakeout survey, thereafter. Construction began almost immediately on the project upon the completion of Respondent's stakeout. The masonry work was completed, and the framing of the home began. On or after January 23, 1989, Mrs. Chubboy was concerned the dwelling was too close to the street, and she measured the distance between the foundation and the street. She found it to be set back 20 feet and not 24 feet as intended. As prescribed by Pinellas County, the front set back in the zoning category for 727 Columbus Drive East was 20 feet. Such restriction would preclude the construction of a four foot in depth balcony supported by vertical columns as planned by Mrs. Chubboy in the setback area. Pinellas County did permit her to put in three foot deep balconies but without vertical columns. Mrs. Chubboy was required to redesign the front portions of the second floor of her home by adding beams for balcony supports, because vertical columns could not be used for support. These changes added to the cost of construction. The balconies constructed were not as functional as originally designed and resulted in their restrictive use. On or after January 23, 1989, Respondent provided Mrs. Chubboy with a signed, sealed and certified stakeout survey dated January 23, 1989, showing that the foundation was staked 20 feet from the front of the property, and further indicated that the building stakeout was 59 feet in depth. However, this is at variance with the site plan showed a total building length of 63 feet. When Respondent was confronted with the discrepancy between the actual stakeout and the site plan, he indicated that Mrs. Chubboy should have checked his work, and he was not going to do anything about the discrepancy. The stakeout survey contained the dimensions of the foundation layout, as contained in the building plans (59 feet), which were not contained in the site plan (63 feet). The as-built survey showed where the building was actually constructed, and the foundation was constructed exactly where Respondent staked the foundation. The site plan was inconsistent with the stakeout survey. The site plan clearly shows that the stakes should have been placed 20 feet from the front of the lot to a projection on the building, and the building should have a 63 foot depth from that point. The back of the lot was shown as 37 feet, which totals the length of the lot or 120 feet. The total dimensions of the building could not have been laid out from the site plan, as there is insufficient information on the site plan to give proper dimensions for the building. The dimensions of the building staked out were in accord with the dimensions on the building plan, as evidenced by the stakeout survey. The site plan does conflict with the building plan, as the site plan shows the layout of the building from front to back totals 63 feet. However, it also includes a projection which was intended to represent the second floor balconies in dotted lines. The stakeout survey indicates that the building length was 59 feet. In any event, the back of the building in the site plan is 83 feet from the front of the lot, but as it was staked, it was 79 feet. A skillful surveyor exercising ordinary prudence should have ascertained from the site plan and dimensions on the building plans that there was a 20 foot setback to a vague object. If you then examine the 63 feet shown on the site plan, and sketch out the 59 feet shown on the building plan, there is a four foot discrepancy between the 20 foot setback and where the building is supposed to start. The site plan was vague, and a skilled surveyor would have contacted his client for more specific information, and under such circumstances, should not have proceeded with the job until he had more specific information. A contractor or property owner has a right to rely on the professional ability of a surveyor to stake out the building site in accordance with the site plan or building plan. It is not the client's responsibility to check on the accuracy of the work of a professional. The purpose of a building's stakes is to mark the corners of the building in such a manner that construction can proceed from the stakes. The stakes were not to be moved. An "envelope-type" stakeout is a stakeout where the builder is free to move the building around. It is used where expert builders set their own offsets. It is not the type of stakeout required here. Such stakeouts were not for use by a person of Mrs. Chubboy's experience, nor is it indicated that Respondent was asked to do anything but stake specific corners. Respondent's assertion that the offset stakes were set so that the building could be moved is not credible. The "as-built" survey indicated that the building was placed directly where the stakes were placed by Respondent. Respondent further indicated that he was aware of the discrepancy of four feet between the building plan and the site plan, and chose to proceed with staking the house with a 20 feet set back and 59 feet in depth which added four feet to the back yard. This error by Respondent constitutes negligence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That Respondent pay an administrative fine of $1,000. That Respondent be placed on probation for one year subject to such reasonable conditions as the Board may specify. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1992. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11(in part), 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33. Rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence: paragrahs 11(in part: cost of change orders in the design of the home), 12, 13, 34. Rejected as argument: paragraph 28, 29 Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3(in part), 5. Rejected: paragraph 3(in part), 4, 6. COPIES FURNISHED: William S. Cummins, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Angel Gonzalez Executive Director Board of Professional of Land Surveyors 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Mr. Lars Dohm Apartment #611 5790 34th St. St. Petersburg, FL 33711
