The Issue The ultimate issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent has committed violations of the Florida Condominium Act (Chapter 718, Florida Statutes) and, if so, whether a cease and desist order and/or civil fine should be imposed. Petitioner contends that the allegations of the Notice to Show Cause have been established and that a cease and desist order and civil fine are appropriate. The Respondent contends that to the extent any violations of the Act have been established, they are only of a technical sort, and do not justify the imposition of any sanction.
Findings Of Fact Nautico Bay Club, Inc., is the developer of the Nautico Bay Condominium, located at 6937 Bay Drive, Miami Beach, Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Samuel Weintraub was the president of Nautico Bay Club, Inc., and was primarily responsible for conducting its day-to-day business activities. The Nautico Bay Club Condominium includes 48 residential units. The first units were sold on December 1, 1980. The final closing on the 48 units occurred on December 31, 1980. The Respondent failed to call an annual meeting of the unit owners at Nautico Bay Condominium during 1981. The Respondent was having some difficulty communicating with some of the unit owners because they lived outside of the country. Nonetheless, the Respondent did not give written notice to unit owners of an annual meeting during 1981, did not post notice of an annual meeting during 1981 on the condominium property, did not send a notice of an annual meeting during 1981 by mail to each unit owner, and did not retain a post office certificate of mailing as proof of mailing of notice to unit owners. No annual meeting of unit owners was conducted during 1981. As the developer who maintained control over condominium activities during 1981, the Respondent was obliged to call and conduct an annual meeting of unit owners. The Respondent retained a private public accounting firm to prepare a financial statement for the Nautico Bay Club Condominium for the year ending December 31, 1981. The statement was completed on February 10, 1982. The Respondent remained in charge of the administration of the condominium association at that time. The Respondent made no effort to provide copies of the financial statement by mail or personal delivery to each unit owner. While some unit owners may have obtained copies of the financial statement within 60 days of December 31, 1981, most did not. At least one unit owner did not receive a copy of the financial statement until sometime in November, 1982. On or about September 17, 1982, the Respondent turned over operation of the condominium association to the Nautico Bay Club Condominium Association. The Respondent's president, Mr. Weintraub, offered to have the financial records reviewed by the independent certified public accounting firm that he had utilized in the past. The unit owners protested and asked instead that he pay to have the documents reviewed by a firm of their choosing. The Respondent did not have the financial records and statements reviewed by an independent accounting firm. He offered to have them reviewed by the firm he had utilized in the past, but the unit owners declined that offer. In the prospectus that the Respondent offered to potential unit purchasers, an estimated monthly operating budget and an estimated annual operating budget for the condominium, and an estimated monthly operating budget and an estimated annual operating budget per unit were set out. No other proposed budget was issued for 1981, nor does it appear that one was required, since the first persons who purchased units did not do so until December, 1980. No proposed annual budget of common expenses was prepared for the 1982 calendar year. Instead, the Respondent merely utilized the estimated budgets that had been set out in the prospectus. These were never, however, presented as a proposed annual budget for 1982. The Respondent did not provide as a part of its budgets for 1981 or 1982 for reserve accounts for capital expenditures and deferred maintenance. Accounts were not established to reserve funds for roof replacement, building painting, pavement resurfacing, and the like. The estimated replacement costs of such items were not a part of any budget prepared by Respondent. The funds were neither established nor funded by the Respondent. Mr. Weintraub testified that the reason the accounts were not established is that he had difficulty collecting assessments from unit owners. It does not appear, however, that the Respondent made any effort to collect assessments from unit owners, nor that the accounts were established with such funds as could have been collected.
Findings Of Fact Based on the undisputed facts included in pleadings filed in this proceeding and on the documentary evidence attached to the Association's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the following findings of fact are made: On or about April 16, 1999, Ms. Thornhill filed a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, in which she accused the Association of housing discrimination on the basis of handicap and coercion. The complaint was apparently based on the Association's attempts to make Ms. Thornhill remove a set of steps leading from the terrace of her apartment. In June 1999, the Association filed a civil lawsuit against Ms. Thornhill in the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, styled Admiral Farragut Condominium Association v. Maria Thornhill, Case No. 99-15567 CA 22. On or about September 21, 1999, Ms. Thornhill, through her attorney, filed Defendant, Maria Thornhill's Answer to Complaint. Included in the answer was a Counterclaim filed by Ms. Thornhill, through her attorney, against the Association, in which she sought injunctive relief and damages against the Association pursuant to Section 760.35(1) and (2), Florida Statutes. 1/ She asserted in the Counterclaim that she had filed a discrimination complaint against the Association with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which had been referred to the Commission and that this complaint was still pending before the Commission. Ms. Thornhill alleged in the Counterclaim that the Association had engaged in housing discrimination against her on the basis of her handicap because it had refused to accommodate her disability by giving her permission to retain the steps she had installed leading from the terrace of her apartment. Ms. Thornhill also alleged that the Association had "authorized or acquiesced in a series of actions intended as harassment and retribution" against Ms. Thornhill for having filed a housing discrimination complaint. The factual and legal bases on which Ms. Thornhill requests relief in the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission and in the Counterclaim filed in circuit court are virtually identical.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint filed by Maria T. Thornhill to enforce rights granted by the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.30 through 760.37, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2000.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Harbour Pointe of Perdido Key Condominium Association, Inc. (Respondent or Condominium Association), violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, sections through 760.37, Florida Statutes,1/ by engaging in discriminatory housing practices.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, James Henkel (Petitioner), is a full-time resident of unit 609 within Harbour Pointe of Perdido Key Condominium. Petitioner is wheel-chair bound. He is physically disabled and protected for the purposes of the Florida and Federal Fair Housing Acts. Respondent is a condominium association charged with operation of the Harbour Pointe of Perdido Key Condominium (Condominium). The Condominium was developed by Harbour Pointe Land and Finance, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability company. Respondent is the successor in interest to the developer. Respondent now manages and maintains the Condominium common areas through its board of directors. Although Respondent has made subsequent changes with regard to security gates for the pool and dock, Respondent had no role in the design or development of the Condominium. The subject entrance and exit doors have opening pressures that vary, but are usually out of compliance with applicable Florida and Federal standards for handicap access. However, despite Petitioner’s allegations, the evidence does not support a finding that any of the door closers that are out of compliance have been altered since ownership of the Condominium was transferred and Respondent became responsible for management and operation of the Condominium. At one point in time, Respondent altered the pool gate in a manner inconsistent with the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) Design Manual. Respondent, however, has since made alterations to the pool gate to make it compliant and has a pending work order for additional changes, at Respondent’s expense, designed to make the pool gate’s key pad even more accessible to Petitioner. Access to the boat slip portions of the Condominium dock is a “Limited Common Element” that has always been limited to Condominium unit owners with assigned rights to one or more dock slips. See sections 3.20, 4.1, and 8.1B of the Condominium’s Declaration of Condominium. Petitioner’s unit does not have an assigned dock slip. Petitioner, however, along with other residents without boat slips have historically had access to the dock through a gate and key pad, the combination of which was provided to all unit owners. Initially, access to the dock for Petitioner and other residents who did not own boat slips was not a problem because there was only one gate to the dock and, once through the gate, Petitioner and other residents could proceed to the end of the dock where there was ample room to turn around a wheelchair. Although not officially designated as a common area, in essence, all residents, including Petitioner, with permission of the boat owners, enjoyed access to the dock, except for the boat slip areas. Later, however, security issues arose regarding the dock. Non-residents were going around the single security gate to get on the dock. With the goal of increasing security, Respondent installed a second gate further down on the narrow walkway portion of the dock before the end. Even after that, non-residents were accessing the dock by breaking the lock on the second gate or climbing around and jumping up on the other side of the pier. Respondent repaired the gate locks on more than one occasion, and has since made additional changes to the second gate to make it more difficult to get through or around. Petitioner agrees that dock security was a problem that needed to be addressed. The problem is that Petitioner cannot get through the second gate and the width of the dock between the gates is inadequate for Petitioner to turn around his wheelchair. If the area between the gates was common area, it would not meet the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) Design Manual standards. At the time of hearing, however, the dock area between the gates was not common area, and the evidence was insufficient to show that the dock was ever common area. Specifically, after assessing the issues and receiving two legal opinions that the entire dock was a “Limited Common Element” with access limited to condominium unit owners with assigned boat slips, Respondent’s board voted to change the condominium document with an amendment for improvements that would allow access for residents without boat slips, including access that would meet the needs for wheelchair access. That amendment, however, made it clear that, until the improvements were completed, access between the first and second gates is a Limited Common Element restricted to boat slip owners. In other words, the evidence failed to show that Petitioner or any other non-boat slip owners are entitled to access to the dock during the dock improvement design and construction. While Petitioner may have a claim if the ultimate improvements do not comply with applicable FHA standards, that claim is not ripe for consideration. In sum, Petitioner failed to show that Respondent discriminated against him because of his disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2015.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent. The Respondent, Charles Polk, served as the President of Daytona Beach Community College from 1974 to 1990. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Polk resigned as President of Daytona Beach Community College in 1990. Mr. Polk's Purchase of Real Estate from Anargyros N. Xepapas. In November, 1985, Mr. Polk and his wife purchased a life estate and one-half interest in a condominium unit from Anargyros N. Xepapas. Mr. Xepapas owned the other one-half interest in the condominium unit. [Stipulated Fact.] The purchase price of the life estate and one-half interest in the condominium unit was $150,000.00. [Stipulated Fact.] The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this price was not the fair market value or that the transaction was not an arms-length transaction. Under the terms of the agreement, Mr. Polk and his wife were required to pay $30,000.00 immediately. They subsequently executed and delivered to Mr. Xepapas a note and mortgage for the remaining $120,000.00. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Polk was a mortgagor and Mr. Xepapas was a mortgagee. Under the terms of the agreement, Mr. Polk was required to pay maintenance fees of approximately $5,000.00 per year, taxes, insurance and all other expenses of the unit, which totaled approximately $14,000.00 per year. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Xepapas agreed to maintain the payments on the first mortgage. [Stipulated Fact.] Following the closing, Mr. Polk paid Mr. Xepapas an additional $60,000.00 on the mortgage, reducing the principal balance to $60,000.00. [Stipulated Fact.] A warranty deed was provided to Mr. Polk for the purchase of the property. [Stipulated Fact.] Neither the deed nor the mortgage were recorded. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Polk and his wife used the condominium as their residence. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Xepapas action in selling the condominium to Mr. Polk and his wife was a business transaction. Mr. Xepapas. Mr. Xepapas is an architect and developer who designs, builds, and sells property in the Daytona Beach area. [Stipulated Fact.] At the time Mr. Polk purchased the one-half interest in the condominium unit from Mr. Xepapas, Mr. Xepapas was the owner of the condominium building in which the unit was located. [Stipulated Fact.] In addition to being the owner of the condominium building at issue, Mr. Xepapas was the architect, developer and contractor for the condominium and for other condominium buildings in the areas. Mr. Xepapas was trying to sell the condominium units as part of his business because of cash-flow problems. [Stipulated Fact.] The condominium sales market was "soft" and Mr. Xepapas was trying to eliminate the carrying costs for unsold units. Mr. Xepapas sold a total of four condominium units pursuant to an arrangement similar to the arrangement by which he sold the condominium unit to Mr. Polk. Mr. Xepapas had made offers to sell one-half interests in condominium units to various other persons besides Mr. Polk. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Xepapas was a sole proprietor. He entered into his relationship with Mr. Polk in his capacity as a sole proprietor. Mr. Xepapas has known Mr. Polk for ten to fifteen years and considers himself a friend of Mr. Polk. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Xepapas' Business with Daytona Beach Community College. In 1987, the Board of Trustees of the Daytona Beach Community College decided to expand the College's educational facilities by obtaining a new center in the Deltona area. [Stipulated Fact.] In September, 1987, the Board of Trustees instructed staff to develop a request for proposal for the design and construction of the facility which would be leased to the College. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Polk was involved to some extent in the decision as to whether the new center should be purchased or constructed, and whether it should be acquired through a long-term lease/purchase agreement. In response to the advertisement of the request for proposal in September, 1988, Mr. Xepapas submitted a proposal. [Stipulated Fact.] There were a total of nine persons or businesses that responded to the request for proposal for the Deltona facility. Mr. Polk knew that Mr. Xepapas had picked up a bid proposal package and, therefore, believed that Mr. Xepapas would submit a proposal. Mr. Polk appointed the committee which reviewed the proposals. This committee ultimately narrowed the acceptable proposals to two, including Mr. Xepapas, and directed that those two proposers submit final proposals. In January, 1989, Mr. Xepapas, in his capacity as a sole proprietor, was the successful bidder on the contract; however, there is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Polk abused his position in order to ensure this result. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Xepapas and Mr. and Mrs. Polk were co-owners of the condominium prior to and at the time that Mr. Xepapas was awarded the Daytona Beach Community College contract. Ultimately, Mr. Xepapas was not able to fulfill his obligations under the contract with Daytona Beach Community College. Although the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Polk asserted any influence over the decision to award the contract to Mr. Xepapas, Mr. Polk was involved to some small degree in the award of the contract to Mr. Xepapas. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Polk disclosed his co-ownership of the condominium with Mr. Xepapas to the Board of Trustees of the Daytona Beach Community College, that he refused to participate in any way in the bidding process or that he attempted to take the more drastic step of severing his relationship with Mr. Xepapas while the bidding process was going on. In May, 1989, Mr. and Mrs. Polk ultimately quit claim deeded the property to Mr. Xepapas. The evidence failed to prove why. They, therefore, lost their investment in the property. Mr. Polk also resigned as President of Daytona Beach Community College as a result of the allegations concerning his relationship with Mr. Xepapas.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a Final Order and Public Report finding that the Respondent, Charles Polk, violated Section 112.313(7), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Complaint No. 89-80. It is further RECOMMENDED that Mr. Polk be subjected to public censure and reprimand. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 3-11. 3 13. 4 14-16. 5 16 and 18. 6 4, 12 and 19-20. 7 Hereby accepted. 8 3, 21, 27-28 and 30. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1-2. 2 13. 3 3, 11 and 14. 4 20. 5 16. 6 4 and 17-18. 7 5 and 8-9. 8 6-7. 9 21. 10 22. 11 24. 12 26 and hereby accepted. See 23, 27 and 30. 13 27 and 30. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 David A. Monaco, Esquire Post Office Box 15200 Daytona Beach, Florida 32015 Bonnie J. Williams Executive Director Commission on Ethics The Capitol, Room 2105 Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner, Christa Bartok, on the basis of her disability, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA).
Findings Of Fact Based on evidence offered at hearing and testimony of witnesses, as well as the facts agreed upon in the Pre-hearing Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are found: Bayou Breeze is a residential condominium association in Pensacola, Florida. Ms. Bartok was a prospective buyer of a condominium unit from its owner, a Bayou Breeze resident. The address of the unit was 300 Bayou Boulevard, Unit 106, Pensacola, Florida. Ms. Bartok is a person with a non-visible disability, which she described as anxiety, emotional distress disorder, and an autoimmune disease. Ms. Bartok was also the owner of a dog named Moni, weighing more than 40 pounds. She identified Moni as her emotional support dog. At all times material to this matter, Ms. Bartok was represented by Simone Sands, a real estate broker. The seller of Unit 106 was represented by Greg Thomas, also a realtor. The communication regarding all aspects of the sale of the property was through the two realtors. At the time of executing the contract, Bayou Breeze3 Bylaws provided, in pertinent part, Pets. Pets shall be kept or maintained in and about the condominium property only if unit owner is granted a conditional license to maintain one pet by the Association. Such a license will be granted subject to the following conditions and reservations: A. Acceptable Pets. The only pets to be maintained on condominium property shall be dogs under twenty (20) pounds when fully grown, cats and small birds. In addition, the Declaration of Condominium Paragraph XVI provided, in pertinent part, Approval of Purchasers, Lessees and Transferees No unit owner shall sell, lease or otherwise convey a unit, nor shall any sale, lease, conveyance or transfer of a unit other than by foreclosure or by devise or operation of law on account of the death of the unit owner, be effective unless the board of directors of the Association shall have approved the identity of the proposed purchaser, lessee or transferee in writing. Application of a proposed purchaser, lessee or transferee shall be in writing and on a form to be provided by the Association and shall be accompanied by two letters of recommendation. Any such application not rejected within 10 days after receipt by the Association or an officer thereof shall be deemed to have been approved. The costs for the submission of an application shall not exceed $100. … 3 The association name changed from Pensacola Executive House Condominium Association, Inc. to its current name. Right of First Refusal Should an Owner wish to sell or transfer his Unit, he shall deliver to the Association an Owner’s written notice containing a copy of the executed purchase agreement between buyer and seller, which agreement shall be executed subject to the Associations [sic] waiver of its right of first refusal and consent to the sale or transfer. The Owner shall also submit to the Association, within five (5) days from receipt of any request from the Association, any supplemental information as may be required by the Association. Ms. Bartok received the declarations and bylaws. However, a list of items to be submitted to the Association for sale of a property was provided to the owner, which included: letter of intent to sell, application for sale/transfer, two letters of recommendation, background check, and contract for sale. The list of items provided to the owner was not provided to Ms. Bartok. On June 20, 2020, Ms. Bartok executed a residential contract for purchase of Unit 106. A term that Ms. Bartok included in the contract provided, in pertinent part: “contingent upon buyer receiving HOA approval for her emotional support dog which is over condo weight restrictions but meets Fair Housing Act requirements for HOA waiver.”4 Ms. Bartok also provided a letter with her contract dated June 15, 2020, from her treating physician, Timothy Tuel, M.D., of Baptist Health Care. The letter stated: Dear Christa, I do believe you have several medical conditions that would benefit from a properly trained emotional support animal. Please contact me if you have other questions. 4 Ms. Bartok executed a counteroffer for the property on June 24, 2020, which did not change the term regarding approval of her ESA. Although, the letter does not specifically identify Ms. Bartok’s disability, it references her “medical conditions,” and that she could benefit from having an ESA. In addition to the contract and letter from Dr. Tuel, Ms. Bartok provided a completed application, two letters of recommendation, and a receipt for training for her dog.5 Ms. Bartok did not provide a completed background check because Mr. Thomas had advised Ms. Sands that the “HOA manager does it.” In addition, on June 30, 2020, in response to Ms. Sands’ text of, “good morning any reply from HOA,” Mr. Thomas indicated, “[n]o, not yet they’re doing background check.” Thus, Ms. Bartok had a reasonable belief that she could rely upon Mr. Thomas’ statement that the HOA was facilitating the background check and there was no need to provide the information at that time. Ms. Trimaur, the property manager for the Association, has managed Bayou Breeze condominiums for more than 11 years, and generally, receives all applications for sale or transfers of units at Bayou Breeze. She received the application materials Ms. Bartok submitted for the sale of Unit 106, which included the sales contract, letter from Dr. Tuel, reference letters, and the receipt for pet training sessions. Although Ms. Trimaur stated that it was difficult to read the digital copy of the letter from Dr. Tuel, she recalled that there was reference to Ms. Bartok’s “medical condition.” Ms. Trimaur also testified that Mr. Thomas told her that Ms. Bartok requested a waiver of the pet policy. Ms. Trimaur did not receive the financial or criminal background information with Ms. Bartok’s application packet. Ms. Trimaur submitted the application materials to Mr. Cross for review. She testified that she also had verbal discussions about the dog with Mr. Cross. 5 The receipt for training referenced “Beginner Training-for Moni” and was scheduled to begin on July 25, 2020. Mr. Cross, the president of the association, reviewed a copy of the application materials. He testified that Ms. Trimaur bypassed normal approval process by submitting the packet without the background checks due to COVID-19. As the Association president, Mr. Cross is required to review all application materials to determine whether the Association elects to exercise its right of first refusal. Mr. Cross testified that he reviewed the contract. However, he testified that he did not recall reading Ms. Bartok’s term that the acceptance was contingent upon approval of her emotional support dog. Mr. Cross did not state that there were pages missing or that there was anything that would prevent him reviewing the contract in its entirety. Mr. Cross testified that he reviewed the recommendation letters,6 which noted the size of Petitioner’s dog. He also spoke to Ms. Trimaur about the dog. After review of the application materials that Ms. Bartok submitted, Mr. Cross sent a letter to Anai, the owner of Unit 106, on July 2, 2021. The letter stated: Dear Anai, The association is in receipt of your request to sell your condominium unit 106 Bayou Breeze Condominiums, 300 Bayou Breeze, Pensacola, Fla. As you know there are specific requirements a potential new purchaser of a condominium must meet, according to the Bayou Breeze Declaration of Condominiums, Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws and Rules and Regulations, before they will be eligible to purchase a Condominium at the said premises. Section X of the By-Laws states the following: Pets. Pets shall be kept or maintained in and about the 6 The recommendations were not offered into evidence in this case. condominium property only if a unit owner is granted a conditional license to maintain one pet by the association. Such a license will be granted subject to the following conditions and reservations: Section A clearly states that a dog weighting [sic] 20 pounds or less that was fully grown could qualify. Section D. states that the dog must be carried in the arms when taken in and out of the building. The information that you have submitted so far is primarily the request for the Association to waive its pet restrictions in accordance to the By-Laws, section X of the Condominium Governing Laws. Unfortunately, that is something that we cannot do. Don’t get me wrong, I love dogs. I, at one time lived at Bayou Breeze but had to move because I wanted a dog. I have been the president of this association for 29 years. Over the years the association has had many requests much like your potential buyer’s request to waive our rules. We are well aware of the HUD laws as well as the American Disability Act. We have, unfortunately been to court several times on this issue. We have never waived the pet requirements. Even though we have not received all of the background information and detailed documentation that is necessary for the Association to approve a purchase of this unit, I am notifying you that the Association cannot except [sic] this application, because of the current situation that you have presented. Sincerely Charles D. Cross President, Bayou Breeze Condominium Association 300 Bayou Breeze, Pensacola, Fl. 32501 Mr. Cross acknowledged in his written position statement that Ms. Bartok submitted a request for waiver for an ESA. He testified that he did not deny the request for an ESA because it was not clear to him that the request was for an ESA. Both Mr. Cross and Ms. Trimaur testified that Ms. Bartok’s request for an ESA was not accepted because the materials provided were incomplete, i.e. that the application did not include the financial and criminal background check. Both Ms. Trimaur and Mr. Cross testified that other tenants of Bayou Breeze have been approved for ESAs. The letter from Mr. Cross to Anai is inconsistent with Mr. Cross’ testimony. First, the letter signed by Mr. Cross clearly states that he is aware of the request for a “pet waiver” and stated that he is “well aware of the HUD laws as well as the American Disability Act. … We have never waived the pet requirements.” Second, the letter states that “Even though we have not received the background information, … the Association cannot except [sic] the application, because of the current situation that you have presented.” At hearing, Mr. Cross testified that he expected to receive more information. If the application packet was incomplete and Mr. Cross expected to receive additional information, it would follow that Mr. Cross would specify in writing to Anai the items that were needed to complete the application. That did not happen in this case. The letter makes no reference that additional information could be provided or what information was necessary. Last, Mr. Cross claimed the letter to Anai was not a denial letter. However, it clearly stated that the request to waive the pet restriction was something the Association could not do and has never done, even when involving the ADA. The undersigned finds that the statements in the letter together with the term in the contract seeking a waiver and Ms. Bartok’s letter from her physician demonstrates that Respondents had notice of Ms. Bartok’s request for a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the ADA. The undersigned also finds that Respondent’s letter of July 2, 2020, was a denial of Ms. Bartok’s application for purchase of Unit 106 based on her request for a reasonable accommodation, a waiver for her ESA. Ms. Bartok testified that she believed the July 2, 2020, letter was a denial of her application. Believing she could not purchase the property, she canceled the contract on the same date. After Ms. Bartok canceled the contract, believing that the Association improperly denied her request for a “pet waiver” for her ESA, she submitted a letter dated July 8, 2020, requesting a reasonable accommodation for her disability. That letter included another letter from Dr. Tuel, to the Association, which stated, in pertinent part: Dear Housing Association: Christa Bartok is my patient and has been under my care since April 7, 2020. I am intimately familiar with her history and with the functional limitations imposed by her disability. She meets the definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Due to [intentionally omitted] illness, Christa Bartok has certain limitations regarding performing some life activities. [Intentionally omitted] can be a direct effect of a chronic illness. In order to help alleviate these difficulties, and to enhance his/her ability to live independently and to fully use and enjoy the dwelling unit you own and/or administer, I am prescribing an emotional support animal that will assist Christa Bartok in coping with his/her disability. Her dog Monroe (Moni) qualifies as an emotional support animal under the guidelines put forth by the Fair Housing Act and The American’s [sic] with Disabilities Act. … Ms. Bartok credibly testified that she submitted the letter with attachments to Mr. Cross’ email address. She submitted a second request for reconsideration of the Association’s decision on July 10, 2021. Ms. Bartok did not receive a response to her letters. Although Mr. Cross confirmed his email at the final hearing, he denied receiving Ms. Bartok’s emailed requests for reasonable accommodation. The undersigned credits Ms. Bartok’s testimony on the issue of whether the emails were sent to Mr. Cross. Ms. Bartok testified that after she canceled the contract, she purchased another home. She asserts that she incurred costs for the difference in the amount of the mortgage she has paid since the denial letter was issued, the difference in costs for HOA dues, and the loss associated with extending her rental agreement prior to purchasing her new home. Ms. Bartok did not provide any supporting documents to demonstrate her loss that she asserts she incurred as a result of Respondent’s discriminatory actions. Ultimate Findings of Fact The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Bartok established that she suffers from anxiety, emotional distress disorder, and an autoimmune disease, and therefore, she has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she is disabled within the meaning of the FHA. Ms. Bartok’s additional term included in her application for sale and the request for accommodation submitted following rejection of her application, was sufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was on notice that Ms. Bartok sought the “pet waiver” as a reasonable accommodation for her ESA. The undersigned finds the preponderance of evidence supports a finding that approving Ms. Bartok’s dog as an ESA was a reasonable accommodation that would assist Ms. Bartok by providing emotional support; and Respondents refused the requested accommodation. There is not sufficient evidence to establish that the Association has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for withholding approval of Ms. Bartok’s ESA. Therefore, Ms. Bartok established by a preponderance of evidence that Respondents discriminated against her based on her disability, by failing to approve a request for a reasonable accommodation (approving Ms. Bartok’s ESA) in violation of the FHA.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Christa N. Bartok, pro se 203 Southeast Syrcle Drive Pensacola, Florida 32507 For Respondent: Sharon D. Regan, Esquire Post Office Box 13404 Pensacola, Florida 32591
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order granting Christa Bartok’s Petition for Relief, in part, as follows: finding that Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice based on Ms. Bartok’s disability, by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation to Ms. Bartok in the form of an ESA; and (b) ordering Respondents to prohibit the practice of denying reasonable accommodations to individuals and potential buyers who request a reasonable accommodation on the basis of their disability. Ms. Bartok, having failed to prove she suffered any quantifiable damages as a result of her purchase of a different home, she is not entitled to damages or other financial relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 2021. Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Sharon D. Regan, Esquire Post Office Box 13404 Pensacola, Florida 32591 Christa N. Bartok 203 Southeast Syrcle Drive Pensacola, Florida 32507 Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue Whether Respondent, Royal Arms Villas Condominium, Inc., discriminated against Petitioners, Eric and Nora Gross, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are a married couple, living in a rental home at 209 Yorkshire Court, Naples, Florida (rental unit). Petitioners have two children and two grandchildren; however, none of these relatives live in Petitioners’ rental unit. Mr. Gross was diagnosed with stage four hodgkin’s lymphoma in 2002. Mr. Gross has been in remission since 2003. Mr. Gross was declared disabled by the Social Security Administration in 2003. Petitioners have lived in this rental unit since August 2006. A Florida residential lease agreement with the property owners, Joan and Charles Forton, was entered on August 8, 2006.3/ This lease was for a 12-month period, from September 1, 2006, through August 31, 2007. At the end of this period, the lease became a month-to-month lease and continued for years without anyone commenting on it. In 2012, Respondent inquired about a dog that was seen with Petitioners. After providing supporting documentation to Respondent, Petitioners were allowed to keep Mr. Gross’ service dog, Evie. Respondent is a Florida not-for-profit corporation. There are 62 units, and the owner of each unit owns a 1/62 individual share in the common elements. Since its inception, Respondent has, through its members (property owners), approved its articles of incorporation, bylaws, and related condominium powers, and amended its declaration of condominium in accordance with Florida law. Ms. Orrino is currently vice-president of Respondent’s Board of Directors (Board). Ms. Orrino has been on the Board since 2009 and has served in every executive position, including Board president. Ms. Orrino owns two condominiums within Respondent’s domain, but does not reside in either. In 2012 or 2013, Respondent experienced a severe financial crisis, and a new property management company was engaged. This company brought to the attention of Respondent’s Board that it had not been approving leases as required by its Declaration of Condominium.4/ As a result of this information, the Board became more pro-active in its responsibilities, and required all renters to submit a lease each year for the Board’s approval. Petitioners felt they were being singled out by Respondent to provide a new lease. The timing of Respondent’s request made it appear as if Respondent was unhappy about Petitioners keeping Evie. Petitioners then filed a grievance with HUD.5/ HUD enlisted the Commission to handle the grievance, and Mr. Burkes served as the Commission’s facilitator between Petitioners and Respondent. On October 24, 2013, Petitioners executed a Conciliation Agreement (Agreement) with Respondent and the Commission. The terms of the Agreement include: NOW, THEREFORE, it is mutually agreed between the parties as follows: Respondent agrees: To grant Complainants’ request for a reasonable accommodation to keep Eric Gross’s emotional support/service dog (known as “Evie”) in the condominium unit even though it exceeds the height and weight limits for dogs in the community. That their sole remedy for Complainants’ breach of the provisions contained in subparagraphs (a) through (g) below, in addition to the attorney’s fees and costs provision of paragraph 10 of this Agreement, shall be the removal of the Complainants’ dog. Complainants agree: That they will not permit the dog to be on common areas of the association property, except to transport the dog into or out of Complainants’ vehicle, to and from Complainants’ unit, and to take the dog through the backyard of the unit to walk it across the street off association property. That if the dog is outside of the condominium unit, they will at all times keep the dog on a leash and will at all times maintain control of the dog. That if their dog accidentally defecates on association property, they will immediately collect and dispose of the waste. That they are personally responsible and liable for any accidents or damages/injuries done by the dog and that they will indemnify and hold the Respondent harmless and defend Respondent for such claims that may or may not arise against Respondent. That they will not allow the dog to be a nuisance in the community or disrupt the peaceful enjoyment of other residents. A nuisance will specifically include, but is not limited to, loud barking and any show of aggressive behavior, including, but not limited to, aggressive barking, growling or showing of teeth regardless of whether the dog is inside or outside of the unit. That they will abide by all community rules and regulations of Respondent with which all residents are required to comply, including but not limited to submitting to the required pre-lease/lease renewal interview, and completing a lease renewal application and providing his updated information to Respondents and submitting to Respondent a newly executed lease compliant with Florida law and the Declaration of Condominium. The pre-lease/lease renewal interview will be conducted at Complainants’ unit at a time and date agreeable to the parties but not to exceed 30 days from the date of this agreement. If Complainants’ current dog “Evie” should die or otherwise cease to reside in the unit, Complainants agree to replace the dog, if at all, with a dog that is in full compliance with the association’s Declaration of Condominium or Rules and regulations in force at that time and will allow the dog to be inspected by Respondent for approval. Respondent agrees to ensure, to the best of their abilities, that their policies, performance and conduct shall continue to demonstrate a firm commitment to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Sections 760.20-37, Florida Statutes, (2012), and the Civil Rights Act of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982 and 3601 et.seq). [sic] Respondent agrees that it, its Board members, employees, agents and representatives shall continue to comply with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by The Fair Housing Act, which provides that Respondents shall not make, print or publish any notice, statement of advertisement with respect to the rental or sale of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation or discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability or familial status. Respondent also agrees to continue to comply with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by The Fair Housing Act, which prohibits Respondents from maintaining, implementing and effectuating, directly or indirectly, any policy or practice, which causes any discrimination or restriction on the bases of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability or familial status. Respondents also agree to continue to comply with Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. It is understood that this Agreement does not constitute a judgment on the part of the Commission that Respondents did nor did not violate the Fair Housing Act of 1983, as amended, Section 760.20-37, Florida Statutes (2011). The Commission does not waive its rights to process any additional complaints against the Respondent, including a complaint filed by a member of the Commission. It is understood that this Agreement does not constitute an admission on the part of the Respondent that they violated the Fair Housing Act of 1983, as amended, or Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. Complainants agree to waive and release and do hereby waive and release Respondent from any and all claims, including claims for court costs and attorney fees, against Respondent, with respect to any matters which were or might have been alleged in the complaint filed with the Commission or with the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and agree not to institute a lawsuit based on the issues alleged in this complaint under any applicable ordinance or statute in any court of appropriate jurisdiction as of the date of this Agreement. Said waiver and release are subject to Respondent’s performance of the premises and representations contained herein. The Commission agrees that it will cease processing the above-mentioned Complaint filed by Complainants and shall dismiss with prejudice said complaint based upon the terms of this Agreement. Respondent agrees to waive and release any and all claims, including claims for court costs and attorney fees, against Complainants with respect to any matters which were or might have been alleged in the complaint filed with the Commission or with the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and agree not to institute a lawsuit based on the issues alleged in these complaints under any applicable ordinance or statute in any court of appropriate jurisdiction as of the date of this Agreement. Said waiver and release are subject to Complainants’ performance of the premises and representations contained herein. The parties agree in any action to interpret or enforce this agreement the prevailing party is entitled to the recovery from the non-prevailing party its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including attorney’s fees and costs of any appeal. FURTHER, the Parties hereby agree that: This Agreement may be used as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other forum in which any of the parties allege a breach of this Agreement. Execution of this Agreement may be via facsimile, scanned copy (emailed), or copies reproduced and shall be treated as an original. This Conciliation Agreement may be executed in counterparts. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Conciliation Agreement to be duly executed on the last applicable date, the term of the agreement being from the last applicable date below for so long as any of the rights or obligations described here in continue to exist. Eric Gross and Nora Gross signed the Agreement on October 24, 2013. Ms. Orrino, as President of Respondent, signed the Agreement on September 9. The Commission’s facilitator, Mr. Burkes, signed the Agreement on October 24. The Commission’s housing manager, Regina Owens, signed the Agreement on October 30, and its executive director, Michelle Wilson, signed the Agreement on November 4. The effective date of the Agreement is November 4, the last day it was signed by a party, and the clock started running for compliance. Petitioners failed to abide by the Agreement in the following ways: Petitioners failed to submit an updated lease agreement that conformed to Respondent’s rules and regulations. Petitioners failed to submit to the required pre- lease/lease renewal interview within 30 days of signing the Agreement. Petitioners failed to complete a lease renewal application. Petitioners failed to provide updated information to Respondent. It is abundantly clear that Eric Gross and Ms. Orrino do not get along. However, that personal interaction does not excuse non-compliance with an Agreement that the parties voluntarily entered. Each party to the Agreement had obligations to perform. Respondent attempted to assist Petitioners with their compliance by extending the time in which to comply, and at one point, waving the interview requirement. Petitioners simply failed to comply with the Agreement. Petitioners failed to present any credible evidence that other residents in the community were treated differently. Mr. Gross insisted that the Agreement had sections that Petitioners did not agree to. Mr. Burkes was unable to shed any light on the Agreement or the alleged improprieties that Mr. Gross so adamantly insisted were present.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioners in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 2015.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing was whether the Appellant's application for a conditional use permit should be approved.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the matters involved herein, the City of Clearwater Planning and Zoning Board was the municipal agency responsible for the approval/disapproval of requests for conditional use permits within the Clearwater city limits. Appellant, Patrick T. Maguire, filed an application for a conditional use permit on September 26, 1989, with the Planning and Zoning Board, to operate a charter fishing boat from slip Number 9 at the Island Yacht Club Condominium Marina, located at 200 Windward Passage, Clearwater, Florida. The vessel in question is a 26 foot center console open fisherman which would be captained by one individual, and which would, at any one time, carry no more than four passengers. Appellant has agreed, however, if required as a condition precedent to granting of his permit, to carry no more than three passengers at any one time. Island Yacht Club Condominium is a commercial condominium consisting of 130 individual units, 128 of which are boat slips, and 2 of which are commercial offices. Located on the premises are 42 on site parking spaces. There are 13 city parking spaces located nearby and contiguous to the condominium's property. Overflow parking from the yacht club lot, when necessary, utilizes a vacant lot adjacent to the subject property and across from the High and Dry Marina, the club's closest neighbor. The condominium association was created in 1980 and predates the present land development code of the City of Clearwater. Business activities conducted within the confines of the condominium area include a yacht brokerage and the offices of a development corporation. The association engages in the sale and rental of the boat slips and at the present time there are approximately 11 live-aboard vessels moored at the site. Though not a current practice, there is evidence that commercial vessels have been moored and displayed at the site, and that a vessel charter operation has also been conducted there at one time. The uplands on either side of the yacht club are zoned commercial general, as is the uplands portion of the club facility. Currently in operation on the other commercial sites are a boat storage, sales, and fueling facility; a boat sales and service operation; municipal boat slips; and a large boat repair and maintenance operation (Ross Yachts). Restrictions contained in paragraph 10 of the commercial declaration of condominium pertaining to Island Yacht Club, dated January 2, 1980, prohibit live-aboards, nuisances, and immoral, improper, offensive, or unlawful uses. No advertisements or notices of any type may be erected upon the common elements. The parties agree the major objection to the approval of appellant's request for permit relates to the potential for interference with the members' ability to park near their boats. Each slip owner receives one parking sticker for use when his car is in the club's parking lot. Cars parked there without displaying the sticker are uniformly towed away. A survey was conducted for Appellant of the parking lot owned by the yacht club and the contiguous city parking referred to above, at various times between September 26, 1989, the date the permit application was filed, and October 12, 1989. Thirteen separate site visits were made on three days in September and eight days in October. On September 30 and October 1, two visits were made each day. The visit times were anywhere from 8:00 AM to 10:00 PM. At no time, on any of the visits, were more than 22 parking spaces occupied in the club lot, or more than 7 in the contiguous city parking. At 11:40 AM, October 2, 1989, only 9 club spaces were in use and none of the city spaces. Even the condominium association president, Ms. Fricke, indicated that due to the strict enforcement of the parking permit requirement, there is no longer a parking problem on site at the club. This strict enforcement could be continued even if Appellant's permit were granted. There is, however, a continuing problem with parking for patrons of the contiguous businesses and frequently, the city slots are fully occupied. Appellant understands that neither his clients nor his captain would be authorized to use club site parking unless they were furnished with his parking permit issued for slip 9. Consequently, for the most part, his captain and clients would be required to use off site parking. This, however, would be their responsibility to find, and the impact of parking problems would bear directly upon the success of Appellant's operation, not the club. Assuming the parking restrictions currently existing were to be maintained, Appellant's captain and clients could not park on the club lot, and should constitute no additional burden on parking spaces thereon. According to Keith Crawford, the City's traffic engineer, there has been a problem regarding the 13 contiguous city spaces, and who has the right to use them, going back as far as 1980. Admitting that there is currently no problem existing relating to ingress and egress to and from the club site, and to the control of the property on which the 13 city spaces are located, Mr. Crawford believes that the Appellant's charter boat operation, even limited to a captain and four clients, because of their inability to park on club property, would generate an increased need for parking in the public area which may not be available. This potential problem, while perhaps factual, appears to be of a minor nature due to the limited number of people involved. At most, limiting the number of passengers to three and assuming all would come in separate cars, the maximum additional parking need would be for only 4 spaces. Another concern of the association related to a potential increase in its liability insurance premium as a result of Appellant's conduct of a commercial enterprise from his slip which would give the public greater access to club property. Evidence presented indicates that the condominium association is already a commercial condominium and currently carries insurance coverage for commercial enterprises. A letter from the association's insurance agent indicates the club's insurance rates would not go up as a result of Appellant's commercial activity. Though in a late-filed communication from 20 owners of 31 or 128 slips at the marina there is some reference to a potential increase in insurance rates, no evidence to this effect was presented at the hearing and this allegation is rejected as unproven. Still another basis for objection to the granting of Appellant's permit, in addition to the purported parking problem, is the reluctance among several members to permit the establishment of a precedent setting commercial operation at the marina. While admitting that the marina slips may be rented by their owners to other boaters who occupy them, and that this constitutes a commercial use of the property, it is not the type of commercial use to which the owners object. Whereas, according to the terms of the declaration of condominium, leases of slots must be approved by the condominium board, no control over who Appellant's patrons might be could be exercised, and the association prefers not to open the door to future unrestricted commercialization of its slips. This concern is reasonable if not controlling. Mr. Held, the city's Harbormaster since November, 1986, is not a traffic engineer. Nonetheless, he initially recommended denial of Appellant's application based on what he considered insufficient parking in the area. Mr. Held's office is at the municipal marina which has 152 slips available. Those slips are occupied by, among others, 7 party boats carrying up to 80-90 passengers each and a crew of three; between 20 and 24 charter fishing boats carrying up to 6 passengers each; and several other commercial boats including dinner boats, (50 - 300 passengers each), and a sailing charter. The marina also houses a bait house, a gift shop, a restaurant and other commercial operations, including a fuel dock. All this is supported by approximately 287 parking spaces on site. Of these, all but 12 are metered. There are also metered spaces in the Civic Center parking lot across the street, and in a city parking lot to the west. Appellant's application was considered by the Planning and Development Department of the city's Planning and Zoning Board. In it's report to the full Board at the October 17, 1989 meeting, the Department concluded that Appellant's proposal complied with the city's conditional use standards and the general and specific standards for marinas as outlined in Section 136.025 of the City Code. It recommended that the application be approved, subject to a limitation of four passengers at any one time, and that any required occupational license be obtained within 6 months. Though the city claims the Department's recommendation was flawed, it has not clearly shown this to be the case. Notwithstanding this recommendation and the recommendation of a licensed real estate broker and appraiser who testified at the hearing that in his opinion, Appellant's use of the property was appropriate and that parking would not be a problem, the Board heard adverse comment from not only Mr. Held, but other slip owners, and upon unanimous, (6-0), vote, denied the Appellant's request. Thereafter, Appellant appealed.
The Issue Whether Respondent Versailles Plaza Condo Association, Inc., ("Respondent") failed to provide reasonable accommodations for Petitioner Marcella Zambrano's disability in violation of Florida's Fair Housing Act, and, if so, the relief that is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Marcella Zambrano ("Marcella") is a 28-year- old-female, who is mentally retarded and suffers from cerebral palsy. Marcella weighs 260 pounds, has the mental age of a two-year-old, cannot speak, has difficulty walking, and frequently falls down when she attempts to walk. Marcella attended the final hearing in a wheelchair, and she has obvious physical and cognitive impairments. Marcella requires the use of a wheelchair due to her very limited mobility. She cannot be left alone for very long, and she is unable to wheel herself in a wheelchair. Petitioner Liliana Zambrano is Marcella's mother and primary caregiver. Liliana Zambrano weighs 135 pounds, and pushes Marcella in the wheelchair. The wheelchair weighs approximately forty pounds, and it is difficult for Liliana Zambrano to transport Marcella in the wheelchair. Petitioners reside in a third-floor unit at the Versailles Plaza Condominium in Miami, Florida. Respondent is the condominium association for the condominium complex. Petitioner Liliana Zambrano has two assigned parking spots for her unit within the complex's resident parking lot. Petitioners reside in the last unit on the far-east side of the residential building in which their unit is located. There is only one entrance from the parking lot into the condominium building in which Petitioners' unit is located. The entrance to the building is located in the middle of the building. The distance from Petitioners' assigned parking spot to the entrance of the building is approximately 50 yards. The distance from the entrance of the building to Petitioners' unit is approximately another 50 yards. Thus, the total distance from the assigned resident parking spot to Petitioners' unit is approximately 100 yards. Marcella attends a day program at the Association for Retarded Citizens ("ARC") from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., three days a week. In order to get to the program, a bus arrives at the front of the condominium complex to pick her up. A gate is located at the front of the condominium complex. The bus stops to pick Marcella up just outside the gate. In order to get Marcella to the bus in the mornings, Liliana Zambrano must push her in the wheelchair from their apartment through the entrance of the building, then from the entrance of the building through the parking lot, and then from the parking lot through the front gate. Once Petitioners reach the gate, Liliana Zambrano must activate a hand-held remote-controlled device for the gate to open. When the gate opens, Liliana Zambrano must then push Marcella's wheelchair to get her out of the complex and to the bus. No ramp is located in the vicinity of the gate. This mode of transporting Marcella is repeated in the opposite direction in the afternoons when the bus returns to the complex to drop Marcella off from the ARC program. Petitioners requested that Respondent provide them a reasonable accommodation due to Marcella's handicap by re-assigning at least one of their parking spots closer to the entrance of the building. Petitioners further requested that Respondent provide them a reasonable accommodation for Marcella's handicap by allowing the ARC bus to enter the building's drive-way to drop her off in the afternoons. Respondent offered Petitioners a new parking spot outside the fenced-in condominium parking lot in an area typically reserved for visitors of the complex. In order to transport Marcella to and from the parking space proposed by Respondent as an accommodation, Liliana Zambrano would be required to push Marcella's wheelchair through a spring-loaded gate that will not open or close automatically. Moreover, Petitioners would have to negotiate two curbs, which are each five to six inches high. Furthermore, the space is in a high traffic area directly in front of a fire hydrant. As to the request regarding access for the bus, Respondent refused to allow the bus to enter the complex through the gate. The evidence adduced at the final hearing established that Marcella is a handicapped person because she has physical and mental impairments which substantially limit one or more life activities, and she has developmental disabilities. The evidence adduced at the hearing established that Respondent knew of Marcella's handicap, that reasonable accommodations were requested and are necessary to afford Petitioners an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling and facilities, and that Respondent refused to provide the reasonable accommodations for Marcella's disability by failing to assign Liliana Zambrano a designated accessible parking spot closer to the entrance of the building and by failing to allow the ARC bus to enter the complex. Respondent failed to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by FCHR requiring that Respondent: provide Petitioners with an accessible parking space closer to the entrance of the building; allow the ARC bus to enter the complex through the gate; and award Petitioners' counsel their reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in bringing this action. If there is a dispute regarding the amount of attorneys' fees and costs, remand this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the purpose of determining the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2014.
