The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Fair Housing Act by failing to make reasonable accommodations for Petitioner's handicap.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Botero has a Ph.D. in engineering. Due to a medical mishap, involving the administration of anesthesia, Mr. Botero suffers from narcolepsy. His narcolepsy is controlled by medication. Narcolepsy is a medical disorder which causes Mr. Botero to have sudden and uncontrollable, though brief, attacks of deep sleep, and he becomes unintelligible and unable to move. His condition gives him a warning before an attack occurs, and he has a small window period of time, approximately five to seven minutes, of reaction time. A narcolepsy attack for him lasts approximately three to four minutes. Mr. Botero is handicapped. Even though Mr. Botero suffers from narcolepsy, he has been licensed by the State of Florida to drive a vehicle and has a handicap parking permit. If his disorder presents itself when he is operating a vehicle, the small window period of reaction time allows him to maneuver his vehicle to a safe spot and park before the narcolepsy attack occurs.1 If he is not driving, but is parked when his disorder presents itself, Mr. Botero needs additional space to exit his vehicle or for someone to remove him from his vehicle. Calusa Club was constructed in 1980 and consists of several condominium buildings. Each condominium building has a homeowner’s association and is also referred to as a community. The developer of Calusa Club assigned reserved parking spaces for each condominium unit. As a result, each condominium owner is assigned a reserved parking space. Some handicap parking spaces are reserved and some are available on a first- come, first-serve basis. Only testimony, not written documentation, was presented at hearing evidencing the assignment of reserved parking spaces. The undersigned finds this testimony credible. Calusa Club is managed by Miami Management, Inc. Miami Management does not have the authority to change the reserved parking spaces assigned to condominium units, including reserved handicapped parking spaces, or to add additional reserved parking spaces for a condominium unit. Only testimony, not written documentation, was presented at hearing evidencing the assignment of reserved parking spaces. The undersigned finds this testimony credible. In 1997, Mr. Botero purchased a condominium unit at Calusa Club, unit number E-201. Mr. Botero's condominium association is Calusa Club Condominium D North Association, Inc. His assigned reserved parking space was number 9 (Reserved Space Number 9). At that time, he informed Miami Management, through its property manager for Calusa Club, Kathie Roder,2 that he was handicapped and needed a handicapped parking space close to his community. No reserved handicapped parking spaces were located at Mr. Botero's community. Ms. Roder informed Mr. Botero that no reserved handicapped parking space was available in his community; however, she gave Mr. Botero a non-reserved parking space in his community. Based on the testimony of the Miami Management's current assistant property manager for Calusa Club, Michelle Lopez, which is found to be credible, an inference is made that the parking space given to Mr. Botero by Ms. Roder was a guest parking space. To Mr. Botero, the parking space given to him was too small dimensionally to accommodate his condition. When he opened the door on the driver's side of his vehicle, Mr. Botero was unable to open the door fully and, therefore, the parking space given to him failed to provide sufficient space dimensionally for him to exit his vehicle or for someone to remove him from his vehicle. He subsequently requested another parking space.3 Mr. Botero was given another non-reserved parking space, but he again complained that it too was too small dimensionally for the same reason as before. Based on the testimony of Ms. Lopez, which is found to be credible, an inference is made that the second parking space given to Mr. Botero by Ms. Roder was a guest parking space. After complaining a third time,4 Ms. Roder moved Mr. Botero's Reserved Space Number 9 next to the access walkway to his condominium building, which is the current space complained of. Reserved Space Number 9 measures 78 inches in width; immediately to its left is another reserved space assigned to another condominium unit; immediately to its right is the access walkway to Mr. Botero's condominium building; and immediately to the right of the access walkway is a guest parking space. The width of the Reserved Space Number 9 is the same width of the other parking spaces of his condominium building. Mr. Botero complains that Reserved Space Number 9, even though it is located next to the access walkway to his unit, is also too small dimensionally to accommodate his condition in that, if an attack occurs in the parking space and if a vehicle is in the parking space next to him, insufficient space exists for him to exit his vehicle or for someone to remove him from his vehicle. Furthermore, Mr. Botero is unable to back into Reserved Space Number 9 because he is fearful of hitting another vehicle, an object, or someone else if he has a narcolepsy attack while he is backing-up. If he could back-in, the position of his vehicle would give him sufficient space to exit his vehicle or for someone to remove him because the driver's side of his vehicle would be next to the access walkway. Moreover, Mr. Botero would back into Reserved Space Number 9 if it was larger dimensionally because he would then not be fearful of hitting another vehicle, an object, or someone else. After complaining to Ms. Roder, regarding the re- location of Reserved Space Number 9, she advised him in a letter dated May 5, 2004, among other things, that Calusa Club had provided him a reasonable accommodation and that nothing else could be done. The letter provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Please be advised that we have contacted our attorney regarding providing you with a Handicapped parking place. We are sorry to report that because our community was built in the early 1980's, we are only required to provide you with "reasonable accommodation". We have done so by moving your reserved space #9 next to your access walkway. We would not be able to place a handicapped space anywhere near that location. No evidence was presented to demonstrate that Calusa Club incurred any expense moving Reserved Space Number 9 to the guest parking space to the left of the access walkway. Therefore, an inference is drawn and a finding is made that Calusa Club incurred no expense moving Reserved Space Number 9 to the guest parking space to the left of the access walkway. No reserved handicapped parking space was or is available at Mr. Botero's community; they were and are all assigned. In order to widen Reserved Space Number 9, Miami Management would have to take away the reserved parking space assigned to the owner of another condominium unit. Ms. Lopez testified that Miami Management could not take away a reserved parking space assigned to the owner of another condominium unit. The undersigned finds her testimony to be credible. Ms. Lopez also testified that Miami Management could not "change" a reserved parking space assigned to the owner of a condominium unit. She later testified that Miami Management could not "take away" a reserved parking space assigned to the owner of a condominium unit. No documentation was presented at hearing evidencing Miami Management's lack of authority to "change" or to "take away" a reserved parking space. An inference is drawn and a finding is made that "change" and "take away" have identical meaning as used by Ms. Lopez. Mr. Botero has had narcolepsy attacks since residing at Calusa Club. His neighbors have had to remove him from his vehicle and park his vehicle in Reserved Space Number 9 for him. Around 2001, Mr. Botero deeded his condominium unit to his son, a college student. He and his son live together in the unit. Mr. Botero did not inform Calusa Club or his condominium association that he had deeded the condominium unit to his son. Mr. Botero continues to pay the maintenance and condominium association fees. Mr. Botero parks his vehicle in a guest space, while his son parks his (son's) vehicle in Reserved Space Number 9. Calusa Club learned of Mr. Botero's present arrangement with his son at hearing through Mr. Botero's testimony. Mr. Botero filed his complaint of discrimination under Florida's Fair Housing Act (Act) with the FCHR on about June 4, 2004.5
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order: Finding that Calusa Club Village, P.O.A., discriminated against Humberto Botero under Florida’s Fair Housing Act by failing and refusing to make a reasonable accommodation for his handicap; Ordering Calusa Club Village, P.O.A.,to cease the discriminatory practice; and Ordering Calusa Club Village, P.O.A., to move the reserved parking space of condominium unit number E-201 to the right of the access walkway of the condominium building. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a private yacht club located on Lots 5-11 inclusive, Block D, Bayside No. 6, Unit A, 830 South Bayway Boulevard, Clearwater, Florida. Founded some five years ago, the club provides a wide array of boating and social functions for its membership. It sits on the north side of Bayway Boulevard and is approximately 50 feet east of Clearwater Pass Avenue. The property is rectangular shaped and has dimensions of approximately 420 feet by 120 feet. The widest portion of the property fronts Clearwater Harbor to the north and Bayway Boulevard on the south. The yacht club is situated within an area currently zoned by the City as CTF-28 (high density commercial-tourist). This District provides for a complete range of motel-hotel developments with a major emphasis on tourism. The primary permitted uses and structures within the CTF-28 District are combination hotel, motel, apartment and business buildings, apartment houses, townhouse developments and restaurants. A number of special exceptions to the permitted uses are authorized within a CTF-28 District. These include, inter alia, three types of marina facilities, namely, Type A (pleasure craft docking), Type B (launching ramp site, commercial) and Type C (private marina). The City has never classified Petitioner under any of these categories. Upon obtaining a Type C classification, a property owner may engage in 12 separate uses of the property as a matter of right, and a thirteenth upon obtaining specific Board approval. These include: (a) sales and service facilities, (b) boat slips (excluding covered boat slips or dry storage unless specific Board approval is obtained), (c) boat handling equipment, (d) boat and gear storage, (e) launching facilities, (f) fuel station, (g) lockers and sanitary facilities, (h) restaurant facilities (not advertised), (i) club house, (j) motel or boatel, (k) recreational facilities (not commercial), (l) park or picnic area, and (m) automobile parking. Petitioner now engages in all permitted activities except items (a), and (j). It does not wish to engage in the latter three uses even if the application is granted. All activities presently conducted are done so in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance. On the east side of Petitioner's property is a multi-story restaurant and lounge while to the west lies a 4-story condominium complex (Bayside 17). Directly across Bayway Boulevard and to the south are two high-rise condominium complexes, one of which is still under construction. Boat docking facilities are located on the waterfront throughout the area, including that of Petitioner and adjacent property owners. The area may be generally described as a combination of high density residential and commercial buildings and structures catering to the tourist or part-time resident. The proposed reclassification is compatible with the surrounding properties and the character of the land. Its uses fit within the general scheme of zoning for a CTF-28 District, and are consistent with the Land Use Plan. The chief concern of the adjacent property owners who testified is a fear that reclassification of the property will diminish the view of the water now enjoyed across the clear space on the west side of Petitioner's property. However, since no change in the use of the property will be made by virtue of reclassification, the existing view should not be impaired.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Grove Isle, Ltd. is the developer of a 510 unit three-tower condominium project on an island now known as Grove Isle in Biscayne Bay. As part of the project Grove Isle plans to construct a ninety slip pleasure boat marina on the west side of the island. Since its inception, the project has been in litigation between the parties to this Proceeding. See Bayshore Homeowners Association, Inc., et al v. DER, DOAH Case No. 79-2186, 79-2324 and 79-2354; State ex rel. Gardner v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 295 So.2d 658 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1974); Doheny vs. Sailboat Key, Inc., 306 So.2d 616 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1974); Bayshore Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Ferre, Case No. 80-101-AP (Circuit Court, Appellate Division, Dade County, September 16, 1980). Petitioners Doheny and Filer have their residences near the site of the proposed marina. In the past they have used the waters in and around this site for fishing, boating and swimming. If the marina is constructed their use of the waters in the immediate area of the marina could be limited somewhat. While Petitioner Jaffer does not live in the immediate area of the marina, he also uses the waters of Biscayne Bay around Grove Isle for recreation. The project could have some minimal impact on his use of those waters. The protesting organizations: Bayshore Homeowners Association, Inc., Coconut Grove Civil Club, Tigertail Association, and the Tropical Audubon Society, Inc. all have members who use the waters of Biscayne Bay in the area of the project for nature study or recreation. The use of these waters by their members could be diminished in some degree if the marina is constructed. That portion of Grove Isle from which the marina will project is owned by Grove Isle Club, Inc., an entity created to operate the recreational facilities appurtenant to the Grove Isle Condominium. The Club is an integral part of the Grove Isle condominium project. Membership in the Club is mandatory for unit owners. It is the plan of Grove Isle, Ltd. that after the marina is constructed the individual wet-slips will be sold to only condominium owners. Grove Isle, Ltd. expects to realize a onetime profit from the sale of each slip. The slips would therefore not produce a periodic or reoccurring income to the developer. In the recent past, DNR has interpreted its rules relating to submerged land leases not to require a lease for the construction of a marina over submerged state lands if the marina will not generate a regular income. Evidence of this practice dates back to June 8, 1978. On March 29, 1979, Grove Isle applied to DNR for a state lease of the submerged lands over which the proposed marina would be constructed. By a letter of April 4, 1979, from Daniel S. Meisen, Administrator, Operations Section, Bureau of State Lands, the Department informed Grove Isle that a lease would not be required. The full text of the letter follows: April 4, 1979 Ms. Pat Bourguin Post, Buckley, Schub and Jernigan, Inc. 7500 Northwest 52nd Street Miami, Florida 33166 Dear Ms. Bourguin: Martin Margulies A review of the above referenced application has aided us in determining that a lease will not be required although the submerged bottom lands are state-owned. Submerged land leases are not re- quired for private docks or non-income producing facilities. Your $150.00 refund is being processed and will be forwarded to you within the next two months. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please contact Laura Lewallen of this office. Sincerely, Daniel S. Meisen Administrator Operations Section Bureau of State Lands DSM/11m cc: DER West Palm Beach Health Department The State of Florida owns the submerged lands to the west of Grove Isle over which the marina would be constructed. Beginning in the fall of 1979 and continuing through the spring of 1980, there was a string of correspondence between DNR, Mr. Doheny and Grove Isle. This was its basic pattern. Mr. Doheny would write to DNR with some information indicating in his opinion that the proposed marina would not be private in nature, that is, persons other than condominium owners might be able to use the wet-slips. In response to Mr. Doheny's letter DNR would then query Grove Isle requesting assurances that the marina would be private. At least three of these inquiries, April 26, 1979; October 26, 1979; and February 12, 1980, appear in the record. Grove Isle then responded with letters indicating in various ways that the marina would not be income producing. It is apparent from some of the correspondence that there were also oral communications among the parties. The contents of these communications do not appear in the record. Finally on March 13, 1980, Mr. Doheny wrote to DNR on behalf of the Homeowner Petitioners to express his disagreement with the Department's position previously expressed in correspondence dating back to April 4, 1979, that if the proposed marina is limited to only condominium owners and does not produce direct income then it does not require a lease. Mr. Dean on behalf of Dr. Gissendaner replied to Mr. Doheny on March 24, 1980, by reiterating the Department's consistent position on this project. The text of the letter fellow's: March 24, 1980 David A. Doheny, Esquire 1111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33131 Re: Grove Isle Marina Dear David: Dr. Gissendanner asked that I respond to your letter dated March 13, 1980 regarding Grove Isle Marina. Attached his a copy of the affidavit executed by Grove Isle, Ltd. and the subsequent letter to Grove Isle, Ltd. from the Department of Natural Resources. It is the position of the Department of Natural Resources that where a condominium marina will derive no income from the rental or lease of boat slips and furthermore, where all slips will be used exclusively by the condominium unit purchasers that the marina is not a commercial/industrial docking facility requiring a lease from the Trustees pursuant to Rule 16C-12.14, F.A.C. and Chapter 253.03, F.S. (1979). This position is based on the proposition that riparian rights attached to a single condominium unit purchaser as do riparian rights for a single family lot owner who likewise is exempt from a submerged land lease. Sincerely, Henry Dean Assistant Department Attorney Division of State Lands HD/le Enclosures cc: Elton J. Gissendanner Richard P. Ludington On May 3, 1979, the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund passed a resolution which states in pertinent part that: Where the Trustees have title, by either deed of conveyance or sovereignty pursuant to 1 and/or 2 above, and where any person has requested an environmental or other permit and where the Trustees neither by statute nor rule must give permission for the use involved in the permit, the Execu- tive Director is authorized to indicate, by letter or otherwise, said circumstances and that no action by the Trustees is necessary for the said use; . . . Subsequently Mr. Jaffer, the Homeowners and Mr. Filer filed their petitions for administrative hearings on April 2, 1980, 4/ April 9, 1980, and April 21, 1980, respectively. DNR's position concerning a lease requirement was well known to all of the Petitioners by at least January 2 and 3, 1980, the date of the final hearing on the related DER cases for the instant project. 5/
Recommendation For the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Natural Resources issue a final order dismissing the petitions in Case Nos. 80-670, 80-768, and 80-815. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 11th day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1980.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Susanne Bennington was licensed as a real estate broker and active firm member of Bennington & Associates, Inc., a corporate real estate broker; and Kathleen P. Archangeli was licensed as a real estate salesman in this firm. Susanne Bennington, while working as a broker/salesman for another real estate broker in 1979, sold Margaret S. Purvance a condominium at La Concha Condominium. She also negotiated the sale of land on which Beach Cottage Condominiums were subsequently built, and thereafter opened her own office of Bennington & Associates, Inc., the corporate respondent herein. Bennington & Associates became the sales agents for Beach Cottage Condominiums. Following the sale of the condominium to Purvance in 1979, Bennington and Purvance saw each other frequently, as Bennington owned the condominium next to the one she had sold to Purvance. When the sale of Reservations to Purchase Beach Cottage Condominiums was commenced, Bennington told Purvance about the project and that she thought it would be one of the better condominium projects on the Gulf Coast. During the summer of 1930 Purvance worked at the Bennington office for one week as a receptionist. She met the developer of Beach Cottage Condominiums and became aware of the enthusiasm displayed in the Bennington real estate office regarding this project. She also became aware that Bennington and Archangeli were sufficiently impressed with the potential of Beach Cottage Codominiums as an investment that both bought reservations and expected to make a profit before the time came to complete the transaction by going through the closing. On November 1, 1980, Purvance executed a Reservation Deposit (Exhibit 1) to reserve Unit 1109 A for purchase upon completion at a purchase price of $191,900 and gave Respondent Archangeli $5,000 to deposit in escrow. This contract provided that the $5,000 deposit would be applied to the purchase price at closing, that upon receipt of condominium documents, purchase agreements, and other papers, the buyer had fifteen (15) days to review the condominium documents and accept or the option to cancel the Reservation Agreement and get the full deposit returned. Construction on Beach Cottage Condominiums was commenced after the developer arranged his financing. Thereafter, Purvance, on August 31, 1981, executed a contract dated August 8, 1981, to purchase Condominium 1109 A in the Beach Cottage Condominiums for the total purchase price of $191,900 (Exhibit 4) and made an additional deposit of $14,190 which was to be held in escrow until closing at which time the balance of $172,7l0 was due from buyer. This contract provided the contract was voidable by buyer giving seller written notice to cancel within 15 days of signing the contract or receipt of all condominium documents. Upon cancellation all deposits were refundable to buyer. Purvance is a widow whose husband died in 1968 leaving her a home in Countryside free and clear, bank accounts, and a widow's portion of his pension from U.S. Steel Corporation. Although not wealthy by many standards, Purvance has sufficient income (approximately $1 ,800 per month) to live comfortably. The condominium she purchased at La Concha at a price of $135,000 with $80,000 down had obviously turned out to be a good investment and a tax shelter prior to the signing of the contract to purchase Condominium 1109 A, Beach Cottage Condominiums. Purvance read all of the documents she signed, employed an accountant to prepare her taxes, had purchased the La Concha condominium from information received from her attorney, saw this attorney socially and took him to an open house at Beach Cottage Condominiums, executed the contract to purchase in her broker's office where the contract was witnessed and the $14,190 check was written, was told by her broker that the condominium was not a wise investment; but now contends that she relied on the representations of the Respondents that the Beach Cottage Condominiums was a good investment, that she could double her money, that she would not have to close, but could sell her contract before closing, and that she believed the statements rather than the written contract provisions. Ms. Purvance actually believed the Beach Cottage Condominiums development was a good investment and that she was privileged to be in on this condominium project. She was fully aware of her option to cancel the contract to purchase within 15 days after she executed the contract. Before executing the contract, she discussed the purchase with her accountant and showed him the financing figures she had received. Her accountant inquired of her about taxes and advertising costs to operate the condominium as rental property. Purvance was aware in April, 1982, before the final contract was executed, that she could lease the condominium to the developer as a model for $1,500 pear month. She was also aware, before she executed the contract on August 31, 1933, that she could not qualify for conventional financing. This contract had been forwarded to Purvance in mid-July, 1982, with instructions that she had only 15 days in which to execute or reject the contract. She did not execute the contract at the end of that 15-day period but waited until August 31, 1982. To keep within this 15-day period she dated the contract August 8, 1982. In her testimony Purvance acknowledged that her purchase was motivated by the fact that she expected to make a lot of money out of her Beach Cottage condominium. When she ended up losing money, she complained to the Real Estate Commission and brought civil suit against the developer and the Respondents herein. She characterized her complaint as she lost a lost of money relying on Respondents' false representations that Beach Cottage Condominiums could be sold before closing, that she did not feel Respondents should make false promises, and that Respondents had a duty to keep a buyer away from a improvident investment. Respondents never saw a financial statement on Purvance. They only knew that she owned a home in a well-to-do neighborhood, that she had purchased a condominium at La Concha, that she had been audited by the IRS, that she was interested in acquiring another condominium, and that she appeared financially capable of purchasing the Beach Cottage condominium. Both of these Respondents purchased a Reservation to Buy a condominium at Beach Cottage Condominium, neither could qualify for financing, one executed a contract and lost her additional deposit of $15,000, one never got to the contract stage and had to wait until the unit sold before her initial deposit was refunded. Both categorically denied they ever told Purvance that she could make $20,000 in one year on the project, that either told her that she would never have to close, or that under no circumstances would she ever lose her deposit. Neither Respondent had any reason to believe that Purvance did not know what she was doing when she signed the reservation form and when she signed the contract to purchase.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, The Mills Development Group of Florida, Inc., owns a condominium project now under construction at 1660 Gulf Boulevard, Clearwater, Florida. The project is on the south end of Sand Key, a thin finger-like strip of land which runs in a north-south direction between the Gulf of Mexico and Clearwater Harbor. Gulf Boulevard is the principal road traversing the Key. The condominium project is situated on the west side of Gulf Boulevard and fronts the Gulf of Mexico. Petitioner proposes to construct a marina on the east side of Gulf Boulevard which fronts Clearwater Harbor. It will be used by the condominium residents and their guests. If the application is approved, Petitioner will construct a 683' x 6' boardwalk next to the seawall, which extends along the waterline on Clearwater Harbor. Extending outward from the boardwalk no more than 30 feet will be 20 catwalks providing slips for approximately 40 boats. Petitioner desires to build a boardwalk to have access to the deeper water which lies outward from the seawall and to avoid dredging activities. The boardwalk will also provide greater safety for the boaters. The proposed project lies within an area currently zoned by the City as District RM-28 (High Density Multi-Family Use District). This District was created to provide for high density apartment and condominium development use. Permitted uses and structures within the District include apartment houses, townhouse developments and accessory buildings, including recreational buildings and/or community meeting buildings. A number of special exceptions are authorized within a RM-28 District. These include, inter alia, a Type A Marina facility for pleasure craft docking. Accordingly, if the application is approved, the use will be consistent with the Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance. The City expressed concern that persons using the facilities may wish to park on the grassy strip which lies between Gulf Boulevard and the proposed marina which in turn will impede the traffic flow on the thoroughfare. However, adequate parking for guests and residents will be located at the condominium across the street. Further, no material change in the amount of traffic is expected to be generated by the facility. Moreover, City approval is required if Petitioner desires to provide improved parking facilities on the grassy strip in the future. Intervenor/Respondent, isle of Sand Key Condominium Association, is a condominium association located to the east of Petitioner and approximately 150 feet across the channel at the proposed marina's northern end. The Association does not object to the project itself but is concerned only with the proposed length of the boardwalk. The Association has its own marina facilities which run perpendicular with the waterway and Sand Key. If approved, the proposed boardwalk would lie directly across the waterway from the Association's facilities leaving insufficient space in the channel for expansion of its marina. The Association also contends the proposed marina, if constructed in its present design, will violate an Easement Agreement entered into in November, 1975, by the prior owner of Petitioner's property and the Association. However, this concern is beyond the scope of this proceeding.
The Issue This case concerns the issue of whether the Respondent offered condominium units for sale to the public and offered contracts for sale of those units in violation of Section 718.502(2)(a), Florida Statutes. The Respondent is charged with having offered units for sale and offered contracts prior to the time of filing the required condominium documents with the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums as required by Section 718.502 and the rules promulgated thereunder. At the formal hearing, Petitioner called as its witness Luis Stabinski, an officer and 50 percent owner of the Respondent corporation. The Petitioner also presented testimony by the deposition of Luis Stabinski, which was entered into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 1, and the deposition of Paul Scherman, which was admitted into evidence as petitioner's Exhibit 2. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 was a deposition of William Hirsch, an investigator for the Department of Business Regulation. There was an objection made to the admissibility of the deposition of Mr. Hirsch by the Respondent on the grounds that Mr. Hirsch had previously investigated a prior development in which the owners and officers of Finst Development, Inc. were involved. The undersigned Hearing Officer took that objection under advisement and after having reviewed the deposition, overrules the objection and admits Petitioner's Exhibit 3, the deposition of William Hirsch. Petitioner also offered and had admitted Petitioner's Exhibits 4 - 9. Mr. Luis Stabinski was also called as a witness by the Respondent in the Respondent's case-in-chief. Respondent did not offer any exhibits into evidence. Counsel for the Petitioner and for the Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law are not adopted herein, they were considered by the undersigned Hearing Officer and determined to be irrelevant to the issues in this cause or not supported by the evidence.
Findings Of Fact Based upon a stipulation between Petitioner and Respondent, the following facts (a) through (b) are found: The condominium development which is the subject of this action is named Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North. Twenty-eight (28) contracts, other than Petitioner's Exhibit 8, for the purchase of units in the Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North bear dates or are dated by their terms prior to September 25, 1981. The Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North contains 52 units and was developed by the Respondent, Finst Development, Inc. Finst Development, Inc., is a Florida corporation for profit and is owned in equal shares by Mr. Luis Stabinski and Mr. Richard Finvarb. Mr. Finvarb was president of the corporation and Mr. Stabinski served as vice- president and secretary. On September 25, 1981, the Respondent, Finst Development, Inc., filed the following items with the Department of Business Regulation, the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums: Condominium documents for Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North. Condominium filing statement. Condominium filing checklist. Check in the sum of $520.00, representing filing fee for the above-referenced condominium project. The Declaration of Condominium was executed by Richard Finvarb and Luis Stabinski on September 30, 1980. The Articles of Incorporation of Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium Association North, Inc., were executed by Richard Finvarb, Bell Stabinski, and Luis Stabinski on August 12, 1981. The bylaws for Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North were executed on August 12, 1981. Each of these three documents is part of the required filing which was filed on September 25, 1981. On December 9, 1981, the Respondent was notified by Petitioner that the review of the documents filed by the Respondent in connection with Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North was complete. That notice also informed Respondent that the documents were considered proper for filing purposes and the developer "may close on contracts for sale or lease for a lease period of more than five years." (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 6.) Upon the insistence of Mr. Stabinski, his law firm, Stabinski, Funt, Levine, and Vega, P.A., did all the legal work in connection with the condominium. Specifically, Mr. Paul Scherman, an associate and employee of the firm, did the legal work for the condominium. Mr. Scherman worked under the direct supervision of Mr. Stabinski. Prior to the filing of the condominium documents on September 25, 1981, the fifty-two (52) units of the condominium were offered for ale to the public. Contracts for the purchase and sale of units in the condominium were also offered to the public. Prior to filing the condominium documents on September 25, 1981, the Respondent entered into 29 contracts for the purchase and sale of units in Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North. There were no closings held on any units prior to approval of the condominium documents by the Department. During the construction and sale of units in Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North, Richard Finvarb was in charge of construction, sales, and supervision of the Finst Development, Inc. office and personnel. Luis Stabinski's involvement was as an investor. The documents filed by Respondent with the Department were prepared by Paul Scherman, an associate in Mr. Stabinski's law firm. Mr. Scherman also attended all closings on units and received copies of contracts entered into by Respondent for the sale of units in the condominium. Mr. Scherman was aware that contracts were being entered into prior to the filing of the condominium documents described in Paragraph 2 above. Luis Stabinski has been a practicing attorney for 13 years. He represents individual condominium purchasers and has been involved as an investor in three other condominium projects prior to the Indian Creek Club and Marina North Condominium. Following the initial filing of the condominium documents, the Respondent promptly responded to and made the changes and corrections required by the Department in two Notices of Deficiencies. After being provided with the required documents, all but five or six of the purchasers who had entered into contracts prior to the filing of the documents closed on their units. The five or six that did not close are presently in litigation with the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order imposing a civil penalty of $7,500 and ordering the Respondent to cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 718 or the rules promulgated thereunder. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Norman Funt, Esquire Stabinski & Funt, P.A. 757 N.W. 27th Avenue Third Floor Miami, Florida 33125 Mr. Gary Rutledge Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. E. James Kearney Director Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent is now and was at all times material here to a real estate broker licensed in the state of Florida having been issued license number 0223025. On or about November 29, 1980, Wayne Markham and his wife entered into sales contracts for the purchase of two apartments in a project known as the Beach Club of Marco Condominium (hereinafter "Beach Club"). The Markhams made monetary deposits for the purchase of two condominium units, although they placed one of those condominium units in the names of their son and daughter-in- law, the Coughlins. The deposits in the total amount of $35,960 were made into an attorney's trust account. Respondent was the president of Beach Club of Marco, Inc., the developer of that condominium. The Markhams were purchasing those units as real estate speculation; they were putting a deposit on a condominium yet to be constructed, and, when the condominium was nearing completions they would sell their contract rights to a new purchaser for a profit. This is a recognized form of real estate speculation in the condominium market. Approximately one month after signing those purchase and sale agreements, the Markhams entered into three reservation agreements signed on December 26, 1980, by Mr. Markham for three condominiums also to be built in the future at Coon Key Pass Marina, Inc. (hereinafter "Coon Key"). Thereafter, contracts for the purchase of Coon Key Units 6, 10 and 21 were executed on December 29, 1980, by Wayne and Shirley Markham. The Markhams put down a 1,000 deposit on each of those three units. On January 8, 1981, the Markhams wrote the Respondent a letter discussing their intent to "roll the Beach Club now" since "Coon Key is the place to concentrate our present available funds." Respondent sent the Markhams a series of letters and mailgrams including a letter on August 11, 1981, a mailgram dated September 22, 1981, and a certified mailing on December 7, 1981, asking for a full thirty percent of the deposit monies on Coon Key. During this period of time when the Coon Key investment was requiring more money, the Markhams entered into Assignment Agreements with a Mr. Tunney for the purchase of the two Beach Club units owned by the Markhams and the Coughlins. Pursuant to those Assignment Agreements, the Markhams and their son were to receive $56,160. During this same time period the Markhams told Respondents in response to his correspondence on behalf of Coon Keys that the Markhams would not be able to fund the Coon Key contracts until such time as they sold their Beach Club units. The assignments of the contracts by the Markhams and the Coughlins to Tunney were completed in the final days of November or the earliest days of December, 1981. Respondent was not the real estate broker involved in obtaining the assignments or with the closing on those contracts. At about the time of the closing on the assignments, Respondent contacted Mr. McMahon, the attorney in whose escrow account all the Beach Club and Coon Key monies were being held, to tell him that the Markhams wished to transfer their deposits to the Coon Key project. McMahon, the escrow agent for both projects, did not do any additional checking to determine whether the Markhams had authorized the transfer, nor did he review the Assignment Agreements to determine whether he had the authority to transfer the Markhams' deposit money. At the time of the closing on the assignments, the Markhams were completely aware that they no longer had any rights in or to the deposit money that was being held by McMahon for the Beach Club project. Respondent had never been involved in assignment transactions prior to these assignments between the Markhams and Tunney. His understanding of the transaction was that Tunney would substitute his deposit for the Markhams' money, and the escrow agent would then return the Markhams' deposit money to them. On the basis of Respondent's verbal communication with McMahon, the Markhams' deposit monies formerly attributable to the beach Club were transferred to the Coon Key account. On or about December 12, 1981, the Markhams requested copies of their Coon Key contracts. This request was made shortly after Respondent gave them full credit for all deposits on the three Coon Key units. In response to that letter Respondent sent a letter enclosing the contracts and stating that McMahon had furnished the additional deposit so as to fund the Coon Key purchases in the amount required at the start of construction. The Markhams did not respond to that letter or ask for an explanation of how they had received full deposit credit on those three units. Although Respondent subsequently approved the assignments on behalf of Beach Club, he did not realize that those contracts indicated that Tunney had repaid the Markhams their deposits so that the Beach Club deposits in escrow had become the property of Tunney and no longer belonged to the Markhams. On or about March 5, 1982, the Markhams listed their three units at Coon Key for sale with a realtor on Marco Island and made the representation that they owned those units. When the closings between Tunney and the Beach Club failed to occur, Tunney demanded the return of the $35,960 in deposits. Those monies had already been transferred by McMahon to the Coon Key Account and had been used by the partnership which was the owner and the developer of Coon Key toward a mortgage payment on the land on which Coon Key was to be constructed. Although Respondent was one of the partners in the partnership which owned Coon Keys he had no personal liability in, or responsibility for, making those mortgage payments. Tunney initiated a civil action to recover the Beach Club deposit monies. The litigation was settled with the Markhams, McMahon, and the Coon Key partnership contributing toward the settlement amount. Respondent did not contribute any money on his own behalf toward settlement of the matter. No prior or subsequent disciplinary actions have been filed against the Respondent since he became a licensed broker in Florida more than a decade ago. Further, no other civil actions have been filed against him alleging fraud in his activities as a licensed broker.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained within the Amended Administrative Complaint and dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against him. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1466 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2 and 4-16 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. The remainder of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been rejected as follows: 1 as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law; 3 as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein; and 17-19 as being contrary to the greater weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-18, 23, and 24 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. However, Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1 and 19-22 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact, but rather as constituting argument of counsel or conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 John F. Hooley Esquire VEGA, BROWN, STANLEY, MARTIN & BLACKWELL, P.A. 2660 Airport Road South Naples, Florida 33962-4899 Ms. Darlene F. Keller Acting Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Honorable Tom Gallagher Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact The upland property abutting the proposed marina is zoned CTF-28, which provides for the complete range of motel-hotel developments. Type A Marina facilities are permitted as a special exception in a CTF-28 district. The property owned by Petitioners is presently occupied by a 17-room motel (Exhibit 5) and there are 15 available parking spaces. Petitioners propose to remove the seaward 16 feet of the existing 20-year-old dock, extend the remaining portion of this dock from its present length of 62 feet to 112 feet, and construct four finger piers two feet wide by 24 feet long extending seaward from this dock so as to provide seven boat slips. As private slips this would constitute a Class A marina. Petitioners intend to convert the existing motel from sole ownership (husband and wife) to a cooperative association which will enter into long-term leases with proprietary lessees who purchase shares in the association. Specifically, the current owners will transfer title to the property to Tropical Palms Development Corporation, who in turn will transfer the property to The Bel Crest Beach Cabanas & Yacht Club, Inc., who will sell the leases (Exhibits 2 and 3). A copy of the Proprietary Lease proposed for use in this endeavor was not presented to the Board of Adjustment and Appeal on Zoning, nor was the By- Laws of The Bel Crest Beach Cabanas & Yacht Club, Inc. These documents were presented at this hearing as Exhibits 4 and 5. The Proprietary Lease (Exhibit 4) provides the dock is appurtenant to the unit and may not be conveyed, leased or subleased independent of the unit. Slips 1-7 are assigned to Units 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16 and 17, respectively (Exhibit 5). Petitioner Leonhardt testified that he would never allow the motel unit to be leased independent of the slip appurtenant to that unit. He also testified that the boat slips got little use from motel occupants. The existing dock, which is 62 feet long, contains berthing space for three or four boats, depending on the size of the boats. No evidence was presented concerning the parking problem, if any, resulting from the existing docking facilities. Respondent's primary concern and the reason this application was denied by the Board of Adjustment and Appeal on Zoning is the effect the proposed marina will have on parking on Clearwater Beach. Vehicular parking is a serious problem confronting Clearwater Beach at this time. Further aggravation of this problem will adversely affect the public interest. A special exception for a seven-slip, Class A marina was granted to the Sea Gull Motel located some 300 feet west of the Bel Crest motel less than one year ago. The Sea Gull converted to cooperative ownership in a plan similar to that proposed by Petitioners. At the Sea Gull hearing for a special exception the parking situation on Clearwater Beach was not raised. Item 40 of the Proprietary Lease (Exhibit 4) contemplates more than one person may be named as lessee and provides joint lessees have only one vote, are jointly and severally liable for lessees' obligations, etc. Nowhere does the Proprietary Lease or By-Laws of the Association specifically preclude one owner- lessee occupying the boat slip while another owner-lessee occupies the motel unit. Once converted to a cooperative, the Bel Crest will continue to operate as a motel run by the resident manager with the units owned by the shareholders in the Association. Currently, all units of the motel are owned by a single owner. The By-Laws and Proprietary Lease do not fully cover the situation regarding the boat slip when the unit appurtenant to that boat slip is rented by the usual overnight motel guest who has no use for a boat slip. The proposed slips present no hazard to navigation or interfere with the enjoyment of the waters adjacent thereto by the boating public.
The Issue This is an appeal from a resolution of the Monroe County Planning Commission ("Planning Commission") granting the application of Barry J. Mankowitz, M.D., for a variance from the off-street parking requirements of the Monroe County Code. The appeal was transferred from the Planning Commission to the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Article XIV, Monroe County Code, the Hearing Officer Appellate Article. The issue presented in the appeal is whether Resolution No. P33-97 of the Planning Commission should be affirmed, reversed, or modified.
