The Issue Whether American National can litigate its entitlement to a documentary stamp tax refund pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1987)? If so, whether American National is entitled to a refund of some or all of the $5,475 it paid in recording the first modification and consolidation of notes, mortgages and assignment of leases and rents executed by American National and General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC) on July 11, 1986?
Findings Of Fact Real estate in Escambia County which petitioner American National now holds as trustee (the property) once belonged to U.S.I.F. Pensacola Corporation (USIFP). On September 1, 1969, USIFP gave Town and Country Plaza, Inc. (T & P) a note for $1,500,000 and executed a mortgage on the property in favor of T & P as security for payment of the note. A separate $300,000 note was promptly repaid. On July 5, 1973, U.S.I.F Wynnewood Corporation (USIFW), USIFP's successor in title, gave U.S.I.F. Oklahoma Corporation (USIFO) a note for $625,000, and executed a mortgage on the property in favor of USIFO as security for payment of its note. On July 8, 1982, shortly after Trust No. 0008 acquired the property, Jacksonville National Bank, as trustee, gave First National Bank of Chicago (FNBC) two notes, each secured by a separate mortgage. One note was for $767,481.98, and the other was for $2,000,000. These two notes, along with the two notes originally given to T & P and USIFO, which were both subsequently assigned to FNBC, were the subject of the July 8, 1982, consolidation, modification and extension agreement. Documentary stamp tax owing on account of these notes (the consolidated notes) was eventually paid in its entirety. All four mortgages with which the property was encumbered when petitioner American National succeeded Jacksonville National as trustee were duly recorded, intangible tax having been fully paid upon recordation. In January of 1984, FNBC assigned the consolidated notes and the mortgages securing their payment to VPCO Properties, Inc., which itself assigned them later the same month to VPPI TCH, Inc. In July of 1986, GECC, the present holder of the consolidated notes acquired the notes and became the mortagee on the mortgages securing their payment. As of July 11, 1982, when American National, as trustee of Trust No. 0008, borrowed an additional $1,150,000 from GECC, the outstanding principal balance on the consolidated notes aggregated $3,650,000. On that date, GECC and American National, as trustee, executed the so- called first modification and consolidation of notes, mortgages and assignment of leases and rents, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which recited the parties' understandings both with respect to the new borrowing and with regard to the existing indebtedness the consolidated notes reflected. In addition to signing Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, American National, as trustee, also executed and delivered to GECC a promissory note in the amount of $1,500,000. This note, which was not offered in evidence, has never been recorded, nor have documentary stamps ever been affixed to it. At GECC's insistence, American National paid a documentary stamp tax of $7,920 at the time Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 was recorded in Pensacola. Of this sum, $5,475 was paid on account of the indebtedness the consolidated notes evidenced; $1,725 was paid on account of the new borrowing; and $720 was paid because of the provisions in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, contemplating an increase in the principal amount of indebtedness. Under the agreement certain interest payments can be deferred, not to exceed $480,000, any such deferments being added to principal. The agreement provides: Notwithstanding the foregoing, so long as Borrower is making all payments on this Note when due, without giving effect to grace periods or requirements of notice, if any, and is otherwise not in default, taking into account, applicable grace periods, if any, under the Mortgage and other Security Documents Borrower shall be entitled to defer payment, in any month, of interest in excess of interest computed at the "Applicable Base Percentage Rate" (hereinafter defined) so long as the total interest deferred under this paragraph ("Deferred Interest"), including any and all Deferred Interest which has been added to the principal balance hereof, as hereinafter provided, does not exceed the lesser of ten percent (10 percent) of the outstanding principal balance hereof, excluding any and all Deferred Interest which has been added to the principal balance hereof, or $480,000. Such Deferred Interest, including any and all Deferred Interest which has been added to the principal balance hereof, shall be due and payable when and to the extent that, in any subsequent month, the Contract Index Rate is less than the "Applicable Base Percentage Rate", with the balance of such Deferred Interest being payable as provided below or on the maturity hereof, whether by lapse of time, prepayment or acceleration. The "Applicable Base Percentage Rate" shall mean the following per annum rates of interest, computed as aforesaid, for the periods indicated: Applicable Base Period Percentage Rate Date of This Note June 30, 1987 10.0 percent July 1, 1987-June 30, 1988 10.5 percent July 1, 1988-June 30, 1989 11.0 percent July 1, 1989-June 30, 1990 11.5 percent July 1, 1990-Maturity Date (hereinafter defined) 12.0 percent Unless previously paid by Borrower, the outstanding balance of Deferred Interest not previously added to principal in accordance herewith, if any, shall be added to the principal balance hereof on the first day of each calendar quarter beginning with October 1, 1986, and shall accrue interest thereafter at the Contract Index Rate provided for principal, which interest shall be payable in the same manner as is applicable to interest on the original principal balance hereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Borrower may pay Deferred Interest at any time without penalty. Of the documentary stamp tax American National paid, $720 was on account of future advances that Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 was designed to secure, in the event GECC made them.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law the Hearing Officer recommends that the office of the Comptroller and the Department of Revenue honor the claims for refund of the documentary stamp taxes in the amount of $1,027.50 and the surtax stamp taxes in the amount of $376.75, refunding these amounts to the Petitioner. DONE AND ORDERED this 12th day of September, 1978 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Maxie Broome Assist Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 G. Kristin Delano, Esquire Post Office Box 180 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731
Findings Of Fact Petitioners were desirous of having a custom built home on a lot of their choice. During the course of this endeavor they met Jack Brolsma, President of Jack Brolsma & Associates (hereinafter called Brolsma) a builder, and also learned that a particular lot owned by Yanow in which they were interested was for sale at a price of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) plus interest on mortgage. On July 17, 1977 the Greenes entered into a contract with Brolsma to construct a house on Lot 12, Plat IV, The President Country Club in West Palm Beach, Florida for one hundred thirty five thousand dollars ($135,000). Brolsma at all times here involved, was a builder of custom homes and not a land developer as that term is generally recognized. Jack Brolsma owned fifty percent of the corporation bearing his name. The contract provided that Greene would obtain a construction money mortgage and pay to Brolsma one hundred thirty five thousand dollars ($135,000) for the house and lot with the understanding that the lot would be deeded to Greene at cost to Brolsma plus a cost for de-mucking which previous testings had indicated would be required to provide a stable foundation. By Warranty Deed dated August 1, 1977 (Exhibit 10) Brolsma acquired title to Lot 12 from the Yanows. Documentary stamp taxes attached to this deed indicates that the total price was thirty one thousand nine hundred dollars ($31,900). By Warranty Deed dated August 1, 1977 (Exhibit 4) Brolsma deeded Lot 12 to the Greenes. This deed was recorded August 9, 1977. The Greenes qualified for a one hundred eight thousand dollar ($108,000) mortgage with Sun First National Bank of Delray Beach, and on August 8, 1977 executed a mortgage (Exhibit 7) and the transaction closed. Buyers and sellers closing statements are contained in Exhibit 3. At the closing on August 8, 1977 documentary stamps in the amount of four hundred five dollars ($405) and surtax of one hundred forty eight dollars and fifty cents ($148.50) was charged to buyer and affixed to deed. At closing buyers paid some twenty seven thousand five hundred dollars ($27,500) and the previous mortgage on the land was satisfied. Thereafter the construction was commenced with the mortgagee making disbursement to Brolsma per schedule (Exhibit 13). Prior to the time Lot 12 was purchased by Brolsma, Petitioners were aware of the ownership of this lot and that it was for sale for approximately thirty thousand dollars ($30,000). Since Brolsma was more familiar with acquiring land than were Petitioners he agreed to obtain the lot upon which Petitioners had contracted to have their house built.
Findings Of Fact The stipulated facts are as follow: The Petitioners are purchasers of subleasehold interests in Ocean Club III, a condominium in Indian River County, Florida. All of the Petitioners purchased their subleasehold interests from Dye and Reeves Development Company in 1973, except the Petitioner Helen Bane, who purchased her subleasehold interest from the Petitioner Richard Long in 1974. The duration of the subleases was approximately 98 years, and they were paid for with present consideration consisting of cash and mortgages. The document included as Exhibit "A", entitled Unit Sublease, represents the conveyance by which each of the Petitioners acquired his or her subleasehold. No documentary stamp taxes or surtaxes were paid on these conveyances. Prior to closing with the Petitioners, the attorney for the Dye and Reeves Development Company requested William Stanley, Chief of the Documentary Stamp Tax Bureau, Department of Revenue, to give an opinion on whether the Unit Sublease, Exhibit "A", requires documentary stamp taxes and surtaxes. Stanley, in a letter dated July 3, 1973, stated his opinion to be that no documentary stamp taxes and surtaxes were due. A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "B." On November 13, 1974, the Attorney General released an official opinion, AGO 074-350, which reversed the position earlier taken by Stanley regarding taxability of conveyances of subleasehold interests. The Department of Revenue has adopted this ruling as its own. Based upon the letter from Stanley, the Dye and Reeves Development Company assured the Petitioners that no documentary stamp taxes or surtaxes would be required on the Unit Sublease. The Petitioners had knowledge of the letter or its contents at the time they closed the transaction, but at the time of closing nevertheless requested an Indemnification Agreement, Exhibit "C" herein, in which Dye and Reeves agreed to bear the cost of documentary stamp taxes due upon the Sublease. Exhibits "A," "B," and "C" represent all the relevant documents in this litigation. The Department of Revenue has issued Proposed Notices of Assessment against the Petitioners based upon an alleged documentary stamp tax and surtax liability under the Unit Sublease. The Department of Revenue has not assessed any penalties against the Petitioners. The Petitioners are unable to recover the sums alleged to be due as to taxes and surtaxes from the Dye and Reeves Development Company because the Company has no assets. Petitioners are also barred by limitations from recovering the money from the estate of Mr. Dye, who is deceased. The Petitioners and the Department of Revenue's Tax Examiner have held an informal conference, in which the two parties were unable to resolve their differences concerning the aforementioned assessment. If the Petitioners are found to be liable for documentary stamp taxes and surtaxes, the following amounts represent the proper computation of their liability: NAME TAX SURTAX TOTAL EDWARD K. HALSEY 106.50 10.45 116.95 HELEN C. BANE 117.60 43.45 161.05 W.B. WHITAKER, et ux. 165.00 16.50 181.50 JAMES N. SKINNER 115.50 11.55 127.05 MARY GLENNAN 98.40 36.30 134.70 JOHN F. McFEATTERS, et ux. 127.50 46.75 174.25 ALLEN TOUZALIN 121.50 14.85 136.35 RICHARD LONG, et ux. 117.60 11.00 128.60 HOWARD BAIN, et ux. 103.50 7.70 111.20 JOHN MYLES DEWAR, et ux. 126.00 46.20 172.20 JOHN S. STEPHENS, et ux. 99.00 7.70 106.70 PHYLLIS T. HERMAN 103.50 10.45 113.95 CHARLES W. CHRISS, et ux. 96.00 7.15 103.15 KATHRYN LOCKWOOD, et ux. 97.50 35.75 133.25 KATHRYN LOCOD, et ux. 163.50 59.95 233.45 KATHRYN LOCKWOOD, et ux. 100.50 36.85 137.35 The sums stated above do not include any interest which may have accrued on the alleged liability. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the testimony of Howard W. Bain, a Petitioner, was offered on behalf of all of the Petitioners in this case. He testified that he purchased a unit at Ocean Club III from Dye and Reeves Development Company in early June, 1973. Prior to the closing of that purchase, he was advised by his attorney that the latter expected to be provided by the developer's attorney a letter from the Department of Revenue that would state documentary stamps were not payable on the purchase of the condominium unit. Bain would not have closed the purchase if he had had to pay documentary stamp taxes on the transaction. It was his understanding that if any taxes did become due and payable they would be paid by the developer incident to the indemnification agreement. He was unaware at the time that Dye and Reeves Development Company might go out of business in the future. (Testimony of Bain).
Recommendation That Petitioners L.L. Lockwood and Kathryn H. Lockwood, his wife; Howard H. Bain and Mary C. Bain, his wife; Richard H. Long and J. Ann Long, his wife; Edward K. Halsey; Mary Glennan; W.B. Whitaker; Allen Touzalin; and John F. McFeatters and Emily J. McFeatters, his wife, be relieved from any liability from documentary stamp tax or surtax under Chapter 201, F.S. That Petitioners Helen C. Bane, James M. Skinner, John Myles Dewar, et ux., John S. Stephens, et ux., Phillis T. Herman, and Charles W. Chriss, et ux., be held liable for the payment of documentary stamp tax, surtax, and interest thereon, pursuant to Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, in the amounts set forth in the foregoing Findings of Fact. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of December, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1976.
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case are undisputed. On April l6, 1976, petitioner Arthur J. Coyle and his wife Katie Coyle, became the sole shareholders of Sara- Wolf, Inc., a Florida Corporation, whose assets consisted of an apartment building in Miami Beach, Florida. Thereafter, the Coyles decided to transfer the corporate assets to themselves as individuals. They were advised by their attorney that, in view of the 1975 decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Florida Department of Revenue v. DeMaria, 321 So 2d 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) in a similar factual situation, no state documentary stamp tax would be due on the transaction. Therefore, relying upon that judicial decision, petitioner and his wife proceeded to execute a quit claim deed of the corporate real estate to themselves on May 13, 1976, and file the same in the public records of Dade County, Florida, on May 18, 1976, with payment of only nominal documentary stamp tax. The decision of the District Court of Appeal had been stayed by the Supreme Court on December 8, 1975. Subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in the DeMaria case on October 14, 1976, which quashed the lower court's decision, respondent issued a notice of proposed assessment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of $526.50 based on a taxable consideration of $175,500, less 30 cents tax paid, for a total tax due of $526.20 plus a like amount as a penalty, and $42.00 in interest, for a total asserted liability of $1,094.40. (Testimony of petitioner, Exhibits 1-3)
Recommendation That the proposed assessment of $1,094.40 against petitioner Arthur J. Coyle and Katie Coyle is valid and should be enforced. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of May, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Glassman, Esquire 903 Biscayne Building 19 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Edwin J. Stacker, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that petitioner's request for a refund pursuant to F.S. 215.26 be denied. Respectfully submitted and entered this 4th day of March, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE T. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald L. Lewis Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Carl R. Pennington, Jr. Pennington, Wilkinson and Sauls Post Office Box 3985 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Patricia S. Turner Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is liable for documentary stamp taxes and interest to the Respondent totaling $80,405.54, plus additional interest accruing from the date of the assessment, as reflected in the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated January 24, 2011.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding that Jorge Ramos does not owe documentary stamp taxes on the October 18, 2007, Warranty Deed and withdrawing the assessment in the amount of $80,405.54, plus interest at $11.89 per day from January 25, 2011. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June 2012.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Cerelle Paulson, holds a teaching certificate numbered 390656, authorizing the performance of substitute teaching, valid through June 30, 1985. The Respondent was employed by the Dade County School Board (DCPS) at the time of her suspension and dismissal on or about February 17, 1982. The Petitioner Dade County School Board is a local school district and government agency charged with the hiring and regulation of the practice and conduct of school teachers and other personnel in its employ, with the concomitant power to dismiss teachers and other personnel from its employ upon good cause. The Petitioner Department of Education, Education Practices Commission is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensure of teachers and with formulating, regulating and enforcing standards of practice and conduct for teachers so licensed. The Respondent applied for food stamps with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) on November 20, 1977; January 30, 1978; and March 21, 1978. The process for applying for food stamps involves two steps. First, the applicant must fill out an application; second, the applicant's application is reviewed and discussed with a food stamp eligibility worker. On each of the above dates, the Respondent was certified to receive food stamps for a prospective certification period of three months. On the food stamp application, the Respondent was required to fill out a section disclosing income and certify what income she expected to earn during the forthcoming certification period. The Respondent's food stamp applications, on the three dates involved herein, did not reveal that she listed any income from the DCPS. In fact, the Respondent did earn income through employment with the DCPS between November 28, 1977, and March 21, 1978, the period in question, as a substitute teacher. From November 28, 1977, through January 31, 1978, the Respondent was employed intermittently as a "regular" substitute. On January 31, 1978, her status was changed to that of "permanent" substitute for a period of time which terminated on March 3, 1978. From March 3, 1978, through March 21, 1978, she reverted to "regular" substitute teacher status for each day during that period that she worked for the DCPS. Respondent held a genuine belief that her income with the DCPS was irregular and that she was unable to project what her income would be in a prospective manner for each upcoming certification period, hence she did not fill in the income section on her food Stamp applications for the relevant periods. The nature of a job of "regular" substitute teacher is such that such a teacher is called either on the day of the job for which she is needed for one day's work or at the most, one day in advance. The Respondent was unable to project permanent substitute teaching income as a "permanent" substitute teacher for the period January 31, 1978 through March 3, 1978, because, upon giving a permanent substitute assignment, a person who has been a regular substitute theretofore must be transferred onto the regular payroll of DCPS, which is a process which typically involves a delay in the receipt of payment for that work for weeks or even months. It is true that the Respondent did fill in the "income section" on her food stamp application forms, but she discussed the nature of her irregular employment with her food stamp eligibility workers or case workers assigned to her applications. She was told in those instances that she should provide only projected income which she could ascertain she would be earning on a regular basis. The Respondent also showed her past "payroll stubs" to her food stamp eligibility workers, at some point during the certification period, again being told that she had to project what she would make in order to include it on her application. The Respondent was aware of her duty to report changes in income and had, in the past, demonstrated a good faith attempt to do so as evidenced by her voluntary reporting of a change in her daughter's income, in approximately March, 1977, her daughter being a member of her household, and further, by her discussion on a number of occasions with her case workers of the impossibility of being able to project any income because of her intermittent substitute teaching. She was of the belief that only regular projectable income was reportable for food stamp application purposes. It was her understanding that her eligibility workers had informed her that they did not consider the DCPS income, which was unprojectable because of its intermittent irregular character, as countable for figuring eligibility for food stamps. Jo Ann Colebrook (Petitioner's witness) interviewed the Respondent on November 28, 1977, regarding her eligibility for food stamps. This was the only occasion when Ms. Colebrook interviewed the Respondent and only with regard to the first of the three month certification periods in question. Ms. Colebrook, in espousing HRS's position that such DCPS income was reportable in figuring eligibility for food stamps, established the undisputed fact that the Respondent did not report that income, but admitted that she had no independent recollection of the conversation with the Respondent on that date and that her knowledge was based only upon her reference to records (Respondent's application and signed "rights and responsibilities" form submitted that day). She had no recollection of the specifics of the conversation with the Respondent on the only day she interviewed her. The Respondent also held a genuine belief that her DCPS income was not legally "countable" for food stamp program purposes. She had this belief because her employment with DCPS was part of a "trial work period plan" which had been authorized for her by the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation as part of a plan approved by that department to ultimately help her to procure a teacher's certificate in order to teach and support herself. This plan was designed to help her become self-sufficient and overcome a disability for which she had been receiving social security benefits for a number of years. The claimant at the time was approximately 50-years of age with two children and had been disabled since 1973 with spinal arthritis. The Department of Vocational Rehabilitation had advised her in 1972 that if she maintained sufficient grades in one quarter of college, they would enroll her in a vocational rehabilitation program. This she did, maintaining a "B" average so that, in the second quarter of college, the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation began paying tuition as well as subsidization for books, gas and meals while she attended college. During the period in question in this case, the Respondent was in the process of an administrative appeal against the Social Security Administration seeking a determination as to whether her DCPS income was rightfully countable and could serve to diminish her social security benefits. Administrative Law Judge Henry entered an Order in May, 1978, on that issue. The judge in that order found that the undertaking by the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation to further her education so as to qualify her for a teaching job indicated that a "well- thought-out plan" had been initiated by that department projecting a college course at Florida International University preparatory to receiving a teaching certificate. The Respondent finished that course, but did not have quite enough requirements to obtain a teaching certificate and so completed her education at Barry College. The judge found that the circumstances surrounding the attendance at Florida International University and at Barry College and the subsidizing of tuition and books by the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation indicated a well-reasoned plan of self-support with substitute teaching providing support and serving to supplement courses being taken in order to prepare her for a degree. The judge then decided that the Respondent had earned income from substitute teaching which should not be considered in determining countable income for purposes determining further eligibility for full social security benefits, since such earned income was needed to fulfill an approved plan for self-support and education training under Department of Vocational Rehabilitation regulations. Thus, the Respondent believed her income from substitute teaching should similarly not be counted for food stamp purposes either. She informed her food stamp eligibility workers of this belief and when the administrative law judge issued his order, provided them with a copy of it and asked for a determination from HRS. In August, 1978, after the periods at issue herein, Ron Burnstein, Food Stamp Supervisor, ultimately informed her that HRS nevertheless considered that earned income to be reportable for food stamp eligibility purposes. Mr. Burnstein also informed her in that letter of August 10, 1978, that her case for food stamp purposes would remain active and previous notification to her that her case was closed could be disregarded. Thus, at least up until August 10, 1978, the Respondent held a genuine belief (as corroborated by that letter; Respondent's late Exhibit C) that her earned income with DCPS was not countable for purposes of determining eligibility for food stamps. Thus, HRS ultimately took the position that the Respondent had been overpayed because of the hours worked for DCPS and not reported on the three subject applications. The overpayment was in the amount of $887. The Respondent learned, in 1982, that a refund would be required by HRS of the $887 and paid back the entire amount of the overpayment. Approximately four years elapsed before the Respondent was made aware that HRS demanded the overpayment refund. The Respondent never availed herself of her rights to a hearing with HRS concerning the question of overpayment, which right she was informed of on her "rights and responsibilities form," because for approximately four years after the now questioned payments, she was never aware that she had received anything to which she was not entitled. Thus, although the Respondent did not disclose her income on the application forms for the purpose of receiving food stamps, she, on a number of occasions, discussed the fact that she was working intermittently and irregularly as a substitute teacher with her welfare eligibility case workers and all were informed that she was on the substitute teacher list for the DCPS. She did not report her income because she had a genuine belief that it was unreportable as not being regular income and not projectable. She did disclose the fact of her intermittent employment on a day-to-day basis as a substitute teacher.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, Cerelle Paulson, be reinstated as an employee with the Dade County School System with the restoration of any back pay due her and that the Notice of Charges of the school board and the amended administrative complaint filed by the Department of Education, Education Practices Commission be DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Esquire 3050 Biscayne Boulevard 3000 Executive Bldg. - Suite 300 Miami, Florida 33137 J. David Holder, Esquire Post Office Box 1694 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sarah Lea Tobocman, Esquire 1782 One Biscayne Tower Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Dr. Leonard Britton, Superintendent Dade County Public Schools 1410 Northeast Second Ave. Lindsey Hopkins Building Miami, Florida 33132 The Honorable Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On or about August 15, 1979, Mead Timber Company and Scott Timber Company conveyed certain property located in Suwannee County, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), to Tommy M. Faircloth, Sam L. Rudd, and Alvin C. Futch (hereinafter referred to as the "Original Conveyance"). The warranty deed for the Original Conveyance was recorded on August 15, 1979, at Official Records Book 187, page 444, of the Public Records of Suwannee County, Florida. In connection with said Original Conveyance the closing statement therefor showed a purchase price of Two Million Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($2,400,000.00), said amount being the actual amount of the purchase and sale. In connection with the deed for said Original Conveyance, the closing statement indicated that Seven Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($7,200.00) of documentary stamp taxes were paid based upon Thirty Cents ($.30) per One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) of consideration, and said Seven Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($7,200.00) for documentary stamps was in fact paid. In connection with said Original Conveyance, a first mortgage and security agreement was given by Tommy M. Faircloth, Sam L. Rudd, and Alvin C. Futch, to the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, said mortgage dated and filed August 15, 1979, at Official Records Book 187, page 451, of the Public Records of Suwannee County, Florida (hereinafter referred to as "First Mortgage"). The mortgage secured a note with a face amount of Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00) dated August 15, 1979. The First Mortgage showed a face amount of Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00). In connection with the First Mortgage, pursuant to the loan commitment dated April 13, 1979, only One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,800,000.00) was disbursed thereunder. The parties thereto anticipated that an additional One Million Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,200,000.00) would be disbursed at some future date, subject to conditions precedent that (a) the Borrowers place all of the Property encumbered thereby into cultivation, after having first cleared and prepared same for cultivation, and (b) that the Borrowers install twenty (20) 12-inch irrigation wells which would be appropriately drilled and equipped, and (c) that the Borrowers install twenty (20) automatic center-pivot irrigation systems thereon. The aforementioned conditions precedent have not been accomplished to date. The time period during which the conditions precedent set forth in paragraph seven (7) above could be completed, and during which time period the Borrowers could require the First Mortgage lender to make the additional disbursement under the First Mortgage, has expired, and the Borrowers have no further legal right to require any additional disbursements under the First Mortgage. The Petitioner has waived any right to seek or obtain the additional One Million Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,200,000.00) from the holder of the First Mortgage. In connection with the First Mortgage for the Original Conveyance, the Borrowers paid Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) as documentary stamp taxes on the promissory note secured by the First Mortgage, and paid Six Thousand ($6,000.00) in intangible taxes. In connection with the Original Conveyance, a second mortgage was given by Tommy M. Faircloth, Sam L. Rudd and Alvin C. Futch to Mead Timber Company and Scott Timber Company in the original principal sum of Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00), said mortgage dated and filed August 15, 1979, at Official Records Book 187, page 461, of the Public Records of Suwannee County, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Mortgage"). On or about October 1, 1980, Tommy M. Faircloth, Sam L. Rudd, and Alvin C. Futch conveyed a portion of the Property to Timber River, Inc., a Florida corporation, by warranty deed which instrument was filed October 2, 1980, at Official Records Book 203, page 790, of the Public Records of Suwannee County, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Conveyance"). In connection with the deed for said Second Conveyance, only minimum documentary stamps in the amount of Forty Cents ($.40) were attached and affixed thereto. The Respondent herein has alleged that, since the Second Conveyance was subject to both the First Mortgage and the Second Mortgage, the taxable consideration should be Three Million Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($3,300,000.00)(the face amount of the two [2] mortgages combined), and therefore the documentary stamps which should have been affixed to the deed would be Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($13,200.00), leaving an additional tax due in the amount of Thirteen Thousand One Hundred Ninety-nine and Sixty One-hundredths Dollars ($13,199.60). Timber River, Inc., the grantee of the Second Conveyance, is a corporation which was wholly owned by Tommy M. Faircloth, Sam L. Rudd, and Alvin C. Futch in equal proportions at the time of the Second Conveyance. Timber River, Inc., in consideration of Tommy M. Faircloth, Sam L. Rudd, and Alvin C. Futch conveying to said corporation the property described in the deed of the Second Conveyance, issued its common stock to said individuals in equal proportions. Timber River, Inc., took the Property subject to the First Mortgage and second Mortgage, and did not assume or agree to assume either the First Mortgage or the second Mortgage. Tommy M. Faircloth, Sam L. Rudd, and Alvin C. Futch, individually, have at all times been or are presently liable to the mortgagee, Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, and are personally responsible for making all payments under said mortgage. All payments under said mortgage both prior to and subsequent to the Second Conveyance have been made by Tommy M. Faircloth, Sam L. Rudd, and Alvin C. Futch, individually.
Findings Of Fact Dunya Safford is a resident of Gadsden County, Florida. The parties have stipulated that he was admitted to the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital on December 30, 1977, in an emergency medical condition, and that the treatment performed by the hospital was of an emergency nature. The parties have further stipulated that the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital is a regional referral hospital within the meaning of 154.304(4), Florida Statutes (1977). Dunya Safford, then less than one year old, was admitted to the hospital on December 30, 1977 and discharged on January 4, 1978. Dunya is the child of David and Carrie Safford. The total bill for services rendered by the hospital was $1,816.30. The hospital submitted a bill to Gadsden County in the amount of $633.95 for the services. This latter amount is the portion of the bill which can be billed to the county of residence in accordance with the Florida Health Care Responsibility Act. Gadsden County has refused to pay the bill, contending that the patient was not indigent. The patient has not paid the bill. The patient's parents have a total of eight children. One of the children married and moved out of the household prior to the patient's hospitalization. Another of the children is Mrs. Safford's child, but not Mr. Safford's child, although Mr. Safford has taken responsibility for complete support of the child. During the six months prior to the hospitalization, Mrs. Safford had no income. Mr. Safford had approximate average weekly income of $95 in his employment as an agricultural worker. The Saffords were, during that period, food stamp recipients. They received $2,552 in food stamps, and paid $669 for them. They thus received net food stamp benefits of $2,178, or an average of $363 per month.
