The Issue The issues are whether, pursuant to section 559.929(3), Florida Statutes (2019), Petitioner has been injured by the fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, financial failure, or any other violation of chapter 559, part XI, by Respondent Travbuzz, Inc. (Respondent), for prearranged travel services and, if so, the extent to which Respondent is indebted to Petitioner on account of the injury.
Findings Of Fact Respondent provides prearranged travel services for individuals or groups. Having relocated from New Jersey to Miami, Florida, evidently in 2018, Respondent has been registered at all material times with the Department as a "seller of travel" within the meaning of the Act and holds registration number ST-41461. With Respondent as the principal, the Surety issued a Sellers of Travel Surety Bond bearing bond number 10076529 in the amount of $25,000, effective from June 22, 2018, until duly cancelled (Bond). On November 12, 2019, Petitioner, a resident of San Diego, California, purchased from Respondent one ticket for himself and one ticket for his daughter on the Palace on Wheels: A Week in Wonderland Tour (POWAWIWT) with a departure date of April 1, 2020. Earnestly described by Respondent's principal as a "cruise ship on wheels," the POWAWIWT provides one week's transportation, accommodations, and meals for travelers seeking to visit several of India's cultural and historical landmarks without the inconvenience of changing hotels, finding restaurants, arranging intercity transportation, or, it seems, obtaining refunds for trips that never take place. The purchase price for two POWAWIWT tickets was $8600.40. Additionally, Petitioner purchased from Respondent a guided side trip at one location for $75. At the time of the purchase of the two POWAWIWT tickets, Respondent charged Petitioner's credit card for the required downpayment of $1911.20 for both tickets. By personal check dated January 6, 2020, Petitioner timely paid the balance due for both tickets of $6689.20. By personal check dated February 19, 2020, Petitioner paid the $75 charge for the side trip. The credit card issuer duly debited Petitioner's account and credited Respondent's account for the charged amount, and Respondent obtained the funds represented by both checks. Petitioner later disputed the credit card charges, and the credit card company debited the $1911.20 amount in dispute from Respondent's account. Although Petitioner claimed that his account had not been credited for this amount, as of the evening prior to the hearing, Respondent's credit for these charges had not been restored, so the $1911.20 still seems to be in the possession of the credit card issuer. Despite availing himself of the remedy available under the Act, Petitioner has not authorized the credit card issuer to restore to Respondent's account the credit for the $1911.20. This case is a byproduct of the emerging Covid-19 pandemic, which, as discussed below, caused RTDC to cancel Petitioner's April 1 POWAWIWT. According to Respondent, RTDC has refused to refund Petitioner's payment of $8600.40 gross or about $8000 after deducting Respondent's 7% commission.1 Although Respondent's principal deflects the blame to RTDC for its no-refund policy and to Petitioner for supposedly waffling on the relief that he sought for the cancelled trip, Respondent quietly has declined to refund its commission of approximately $600, as well as the additional $75 payment, although the failure to refund the $75 may be explained by Petitioner's failure to address this negligible amount until he prepared the Prehearing Statement in this case. 1 Respondent's principal testified that Respondent discounted the price of the April 1 POWAWIWT by reducing its standard 17% commission, which would approximate $1460, to 7%, for a 10% discount, or about $860, leaving a net commission of about $600. Respondent's factual defenses to Petitioner's refund claim include the several defenses set forth above and a new defense asserted for the first time at the hearing: Petitioner cancelled his POWAWIWT before RTDC cancelled his POWAWIWT, so Petitioner was never entitled to a refund under the terms of the Contract. This defense oddly finds more support in Petitioner's allegation that he demanded a refund before RTDC cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT than in Respondent's allegation that Petitioner did not demand a refund until the March 13 email, in which he reported that RTDC had cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT.2 Regardless, this new defense is no more supported by the facts than Respondent's previously stated defenses. Respondent's who-cancelled-first defense is based on emails and telephone calls. Petitioner's emails portray his consistent efforts to obtain a refund for the trip, but only after RTDC had cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT. The lone email of Respondent's principal serves to reveal Respondent's inability to respond meaningfully to Petitioner's efforts to protect his travel purchase and raises the possibility of bad faith on the part of Respondent's principal. On March 9, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a Times of India news article that reported that RTDC had cancelled the March POWAWIWTs, but not the April 1 POWAWIWT. This email does not seek to cancel the April 1 POWAWIWT, but expresses concern that RTDC will cancel the trip. On March 13, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a Times of India news article that reported that RTDC had cancelled the remaining POWAWIWTs through April. This email complains that RTDC had not 2 This oddity is unsurprising given the patter of each witness's testimony. Respondent's principal peppered his testimony with false apologies while, in a reassuring tone, he gently deferred and deflected blame and patiently, but mistakenly, insisted that the Contract did not require him to refund monies paid for a train trip that never took place. Petitioner frenetically rebutted each factual defense while somehow missing the salient points that he had paid for a POWAWIWT that never took place, Respondent refused to refund Petitioner's payment, and the Contract calls for a refund. Although a retired appellate attorney for the state of California, Petitioner seems to have grounded his early demands for a refund on natural law, because he appears not to have discovered one of the crucial contractual provisions, as discussed below, until he prepared the Prehearing Statement responded to Petitioner's requests for information, requests advice as to his available options, and asks for some assurance that Petitioner would not lose his payments of $8600 for the train tour plus an unspecified amount "for post trip activities" that are also unspecified. On March 15, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a news article in The Hindu that reported that another operator of train tours in India was paying refunds for cancelled trips and all tourist visas into India had been cancelled through April 15. This email implores Respondent to do the right thing and immediately refund the money paid for the cancelled trip. A few hours later, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal an India West news article that reported that India was now in a complete lockdown and the Indian government had cancelled all nondiplomatic visas. This email asks Respondent's principal to keep Petitioner informed on what RTDC was going to do and expresses hope that RTDC issues refunds. On March 19, Respondent's principal emailed Petitioner that "we are reaching some agreement with our ground operator for the train and this is what is being finalized." The statement clearly discloses no agreement, but, at best, an expectation of an agreement. The email describes the expected agreement to allow Petitioner to take a POWAWIWT during the following season from September 2020 through April 2021, but requires Petitioner to select travel dates within six days and pay whatever fare is in effect at the time of the trip. Respondent's principal never explained why Petitioner had only six days to accept an "offer" that RTDC had not yet authorized its agent to make, might not authorize within the six-day deadline, and might not ever authorize. Respondent's demand for a near-immediate acceptance of a nonexistent offer of a trip at market price was unreasonable and suggests that Respondent's principal was merely trying to induce Petitioner to make an offer in the form of an acceptance, so the principal might have greater bargaining leverage with RTDC. On March 23, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal, noting a series of unanswered emails and phone calls from Petitioner to the principal since the receipt of the March 19 "offer." Asking for clarification of the terms of the "offer," Petitioner's email concedes that it appears that Petitioner's money is lost and asks merely that Respondent show him the courtesy of calling him, confirming his fear, and providing a full explanation of what happened. Later that day, an employee of Respondent emailed Petitioner and informed him that the principal was suffering from a respiratory disorder and was unable to talk, so that future communications needed to be by email. Petitioner received no more emails from Respondent's principal, who, having returned to the United States after taking a POWAWIWT in early March, was later diagnosed with Covid. The telephone calls are undocumented. The credibility of Respondent's principal started to leave the tracks with the March 19 email of an illusory "offer" with an immediate deadline for acceptance. A month later, in responding to the disputed credit card charge, the credibility of Respondent's principal derailed completely, as he attempted to resecure the $1911.20 credit with material misrepresentations of what had taken place in an email dated April 21 to the credit card issuer. The email claims that Petitioner never cancelled the trip, so he was a "no-show"--a Kafkaesque claim that implies a duty to report for a trip that, undisclosed in the email, the sponsor had cancelled over two weeks prior to departure. The email states that, at the beginning of March, Petitioner called and said he did not feel comfortable taking the trip, but the trains were still running and "'Cancel for Fear'" was not an allowable reason for waiving a cancellation fee--perhaps true, but irrelevant. The email encloses a copy of the principal's March 19 email, states that Petitioner did not accept this "offer," and concludes that "[s]ince [Petitioner] did not cancel or inform us of the decision for travel before the travel date, the charge is valid as per the terms and conditions." The email cites a provision of the Contract addressing no-shows and, despite the absence of any mention of RTDC's cancellation of the trip due to the pandemic, adds a seemingly obscure reference to another provision of the Contract addressing acts of God, medical epidemics, quarantines, or other causes beyond Respondent's control for the cancellation of a trip. Notably, the email omits mention of the provisions of the Contract, described below, clearly calling for a refund. On balance, it is impossible to credit the testimony of Respondent's principal that, in telephone calls, Petitioner cancelled the trip before RTDC cancelled the trip or, more generally, that Petitioner could not settle on an acceptable remedy, and his indecisiveness prevented Respondent's principal from negotiating a settlement with RTDC--an assertion that, even if proved, would be irrelevant. Notwithstanding resolute attempts by Respondent's principal to misdirect attention from these unavoidable facts, Petitioner has paid for a train tour that never took place, RTDC cancelled the tour, and Petitioner never cancelled his tickets. The question is therefore whether, in its Contract, Respondent successfully transferred the risk of loss to Petitioner for a trip cancelled by the tour sponsor due to the pandemic. Analysis of this issue necessitates consideration of several provisions of the Contract that, despite its prolixity, is initially remarkable for two omissions: Respondent's Seller of Travel registration number3 and the name of RTDC as the sponsor of the POWAWIWT. Respondent claims that Petitioner caused his injury by declining to purchase travel insurance. The cover page of the Contract contains a section 3 Section 559.928(5) requires a seller of travel to include in each consumer contract the following: "[Name of seller of travel] is registered with the State of Florida as a Seller of Travel. Registration No. [X]." Even absent any mention of a statute, this disclosure provides a consumer with some means to learn of the somewhat obscure Act, the seller's statutory responsibilities, and the relief that may be available to a consumer for a seller's failure to discharge these responsibilities. Petitioner testified only that he somehow learned of the Act, but never said how. The record does not permit a finding that the omission of the statutory disclosure was purposeful, so as to conceal from the consumer the existence of the Act, or was a product of guileless ineptitude. called "Travel Insurance." This section provides an opportunity to purchase travel insurance from an entity "recommended by [Respondent]." The options are to check a box to purchase from Respondent's recommended entity or to check a box that states the traveler undertakes to obtain travel insurance independently, but this provision adds that, if travel insurance is not obtained, the consumer "absolve[s Respondent, t]he tour operator and the travel agent of all possible liabilities which may arise due to my failure to obtain adequate insurance coverage." Respondent offered no proof that its recommended travel insurance or other available travel insurance would pay for the cancellation of the April 1 POWAWIWT due to the pandemic, so Petitioner's choice not to purchase travel insurance is irrelevant. Additionally, the clear provisions of the Contract, discussed below, requiring a refund for a trip cancelled by the sponsor rebut Respondent's labored effort to apply the travel insurance provision to shift to the customer the risk of loss posed by a cancellation of the trip by the sponsor--a risk that might be better addressed by Respondent's purchase of commercial business interruption insurance. Respondent claims that the trip was cancelled by RTDC too close to the departure date to entitle Petitioner to any refund. The Contract contains a section called "Cancellation Fees." This section provides for increasing cancellation fees based on the proximity of the cancellation to the trip departure date. The Contract provides a 10% cancellation fee "if cancelled" more than 90 days prior to departure, 20% cancellation fee "if cancelled" between 89 and 35 days prior to departure, and 100% cancellation fee "if cancelled" within 34 days prior to departure. The Contract fails to specify if this provision applies to cancellations at the instance of the consumer or the trip sponsor, but the graduated fee reflects the greater value of a trip cancelled well in advance of the trip departure date, so that the trip can be resold. Obviously, a trip cancelled by a sponsor cannot be resold, so the cancellation fee provision applies only to a cancellation by a customer and does not shield Respondent from liability in this case. Lastly, Respondent relies on a section of the Contract called "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability." Provisions in this section warn that Respondent acts as an agent for a trip sponsor, such as the railroad, from which Respondent purchases the travel services. Although Respondent makes every effort to select the best providers of travel services, Respondent does not control their operations and thus CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR ANY PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR OTHER CLAIM which may occur as a result of any and/or all of the following: the wrongful, negligent or arbitrary acts or omissions on the part of the independent supplier, agent, its employees or others who are not under the direct control or supervision of [Respondent]; [or] * * * (3) loss, injury or damage to person, property or otherwise, resulting directly or indirectly from any Acts of God, dangers incident to … medical epidemics, quarantines, … delays or cancellations or alterations in itinerary due to schedule changes, or from any causes beyond [Respondent's] control. … In case of overbooking, [Respondent] will only be liable for refund [sic] the charged amount to the guest. [Respondent] shall in no event be responsible or liable for any direct, indirect, consequential, incidental, special or punitive damages arising from your interaction with any retailer/vendor, and [Respondent] expressly disclaims any responsibility or liability for any resulting loss or damage. The "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability" provisions are general disclaimers of liability for various forms of damages arising out of the acts and omissions of third parties or forces outside the control of Respondent, such as the pandemic. These provisions represent a prudent attempt to avoid liability for damages, such as the lost opportunity to visit a gravely ill relative who has since died, that may amount to many multiples of the price paid for a trip. Complementing these general provisions limiting Respondent's liability, other provisions limit Respondent's liability to the payment of a refund of the purchase price of a trip cancelled by the sponsor. The section immediately following the "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability" section is the "Reservation of Rights" section, which provides: "The company [i.e., Respondent] reserves the right to cancel any tour without notice before the tour and refund the money in full and is not responsible for any direct or indirect damages to the guest due to such action." As noted above, the Contract omits any mention of Respondent's principal, so as to Respondent in the place of its undisclosed principal; thus, a provision referring to a cancellation of the tour by Respondent includes a cancellation of the tour by Respondent's principal. As cited by Petitioner in the Prehearing Statement, the other relevant provision is in the "Prices, Rates & Fares" section and states that, if a customer cancels, any refund to which the customer is entitled, under the above-cited cancellation fee provisions, will be dependent on then-current exchange rates, but "[i]n the event that a tour is canceled through no action of the Client, the Client will receive a full refund of US$."4 This provision entitles a consumer to: 1) a refund and 2) a refund in U.S. dollars, presumably unadjusted for currency fluctuations since the payment. At the hearing, Respondent's principal tried to construe the "US$" provision as a reference to the currency to which a consumer is entitled to be paid when a consumer cancels a trip under conditions in which the customer is entitled to a refund, but this construction ignores that the cited clause applies to 4 An identical "US$" provision is found at the end of the section called "A Note About Cancellation for All Tours/Reservations." cancellations occurring through no action of the consumer and imposes on Respondent the obligation to make a "full refund" in such cases.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order directing Respondent to pay Petitioner the sum of $6689.20 within 30 days of the date of the order and, absent timely payment, directing the Surety to pay Petitioner the sum of $6689.20 from the Bond. 7 Perhaps the recommended and final orders in this case will persuade the credit card issuer to issue the credit for the $1911.20 to Petitioner, who is entitled to this disputed sum. But, if Respondent regains possession of this disputed sum and refuses to refund it to Petitioner, the Department may wish to consider suspending or revoking Respondent's certificate or referring the matter to the Miami-Dade County State Attorney's Office. See the preceding footnote. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Gil Gonzalez 8444 Mono Lake Drive San Diego, California 92119 (eServed) Benjamin C. Patton, Esquire McRae & Metcalf, P.A. 2612 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire H. Richard Bisbee, P.A. 1882 Capital Circle Northeast, Suite 206 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) W. Alan Parkinson, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Rhodes Building, R-3 2005 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6500 Tom A. Steckler, Director Division of Consumer Services Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Castelli originally applied for licensure as a physician in the state of Florida by application signed, notarized, and dated July of 1985. In conjunction with his application for licensure, Petitioner Castelli submitted a FLEX application that was signed and dated July 27, 1985. The 1985 application was accompanied by several documents, including Castelli's "Titulo" signed by him, dated September 15, 1972, and notarized by Norma Perez as a true and correct copy of the original. Petitioner Castelli was permitted by the Board of Medicine to take the December, 1985, FLEX, which Castelli did take and fail. By letter signed and dated August 30, 1986, Petitioner Castelli requested that he be allowed to re-take the FLEX examination in December of 1986. A notice dated October 15, 1986, was sent by the Board to the address provided by Castelli informing him that, among other things, he was required to complete a new application because his previous application was over one year old. Petitioner Castelli did not respond to that notification. On November 17, 1986, Petitioner Granado-Villar telephoned Respondent's employee Chandra Prine to inquire as to the status of her pending application to take the FLEX examination on December 5, 1986. Petitioner Granado-Villar was advised by Prine that her application was in order and that she should be receiving her admission card for the examination. Granado-Villar then asked Prine the status of the application of Petitioner Castelli. Prine told Granado- Villar that Castelli's application was incomplete because updated pages 2-5 had never been received and because no current ECFMG certificate was in his file. Prine further advised Granado-Villar that the deadline for applications for the December 5, 1986 FLEX examination had passed. In response to Granado-Villar's inquiries as to what could be done to help Castelli, Prine advised her that if his application file could be completed by 5:00 p.m. on November 18, 1986, Prine would discuss the matter with her supervisor and attempt to place Castelli's application on the agenda for the November 22, 1986 meeting of the Board of Medicine. Granado-Villar advised Prine that Castelli was a resident of Spain and that she would attempt to get an updated application form to Castelli by overnight mail. Prine told Granado-Villar to include copies of the receipts for overnight mail with Castelli's updated application. Petitioner Granado-Villar called Petitioner Castelli in Spain, and they decided to send the application to Castelli by commercial airlines in hopes of completing the round-trip in time to file it in the Board's office by 5:00 p.m. on November 18, 1986. During that conversation Castelli gave Granado-Villar the information she requested so that she could complete the updated application form for him. Granado-Villar typed some of the information on a photocopy of an application and subsequently filled in another portion by hand. Castelli advised Granado-Villar to write the name of Monserrat Compano, a former- stewardess for Iberia Airlines on the outside of the envelope so that the envelope might be accorded special treatment. Upon contacting Iberia Airlines, Granado-Villar discovered that there were no flights from Miami to Madrid on November 17 and that the only option was to utilize an Eastern Airlines flight from Miami to New York and then a connecting Iberia flight from New York to Madrid. Granado-Villar placed the updated application in a manila envelope bearing only the names of Monserrat Compano and Petitioner Castelli on the outside. She took the envelope to Carmen Rojas, an employee of Eastern Airlines and a friend of hers. She explained that the envelope must be placed on the Eastern flight leaving for New York at 1:00 p.m. on November 17 so that it could subsequently be placed on the Iberia flight from New York to Madrid. Rojas took the envelope to the flight crew for the Eastern flight to New York and gave it to one of the stewardesses, telling her to take the envelope and deliver it to the Iberia ticket counter at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York. Rojas gave the stewardess no instructions other than to simply leave the envelope at the Iberia ticket counter in New York. No arrangements were made by Rojas, Granado-Villar, or Castelli for getting the envelope from the Iberia ticket counter in New York to the Iberia flight to Madrid. During the morning of November 18 Petitioner Granado-Villar arranged for a delivery service to pick up an envelope from her at the hospital where she is employed and deliver it to Respondent in Tallahassee with specific directions that the envelope must be on the Piedmont Airlines flight leaving Miami for Tallahassee at 5:00 p.m. on November 18, 1986. Also on the morning of November 18 Petitioner Granado-Villar made arrangements with Erma Shockley, an employee at Miami Children's Hospital and a notary public, for Shockley to notarize Castelli's signature on his application later that day. On November 18, 1986, Petitioner Granado-Villar took to Shockley a completed application form. She told Shockley that the signature on the form was that of Petitioner Castelli and that Castelli had signed the application form on the previous day at the airport in Madrid. Although both Shockley and Granado-Villar knew that Castelli was not present, Shockley notarized the signature on Castelli's application. Further, Shockley and Granado-Villar decided that Shockley would date her notarization as having been done on November 17 in order that the date of the notarization would be consistent with the date of the signature. After the document was notarized, Petitioner Granado-Villar went to the emergency room area to await the arrival of the courier that she had previously arranged. The courier arrived within 5 to 10 minutes thereafter. Edna Evenson, a courier for Crown Courier Services, Inc., picked up an envelope containing an application for Petitioner Castelli from Petitioner Granado-Villar at Miami Children's Hospital, 6125 Southwest 31st Street in Miami on November 18, 1986. She gave Petitioner Granado-Villar a receipt for that package. Evenson subsequently delivered it to Piedmont Airlines at Miami International Airport at approximately 3:49 on November 18, 1986, for transport on Piedmont flight number 814 from Miami to Tallahassee, departing at 5:00 p.m. Piedmont's airbill, which corroborates the testimony of Evenson and the records of Crown Courier Services, Inc., shows that Piedmont received the package from Evenson for shipment on flight 814 to Tallahassee at 3:47 p.m. on November 18, 1986. On November 19, 1986, at 9:00 a.m., C. Prine signed a Sonicair receipt for a package containing Castelli's 1986 licensure application. The Sonicair shipping form contained information including the shipper's name--'D Granado-Villar"; the recipient--"Department of Professional Regulation"; the date"11/18/86"; a job number/bill of lading number "A58408"; original airport code-- "MIA" and destination airport code "THL." The spaces provided for commercial value and declared value are blank, and other than the time of receipt written by C. Prine, there is no time indicated on the Sonicair shipping form. The signature and designation "#10" for the shipper's signature and pickup agent on the Sonicair air shipping form were written by Edna Evenson, the courier for Crown Courier Services, Inc. Accompanying the application from Petitioner Castelli was a hand written letter dated 11/18/86 from Petitioner Granado-Villar. Petitioner Castelli's application bears a signature which was notarized by Erma M. Shockley in Dade County, Florida, with a date of November 17, 1986. The notarization states that the document was subscribed and sworn to before Shockley on the date of the notarization. On November 20, 1986, Petitioner Castelli was notified that he was required to make a personal appearance before the Board at its November 22, 1986 meeting in Tampa. He failed to appear. Petitioner Granado-Villar was also notified on November 20, 1986, that she was required to make a personal appearance on November 22, 1986, and she did appear. At the proceeding on November 22 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director of the Board, specified the concerns of the Board's staff regarding Petitioner Castelli's application. The staff questioned whether the application had actually been received in Spain and completed by Castelli and returned to Granado-Villar for delivery in Tallahassee in such a short timespan. It also appeared that the signature of Castelli on the application did not match his signature on previous applications and documents. The staff further questioned how the application could have been notarized in Dade County, Florida, while Castelli was in Spain. Petitioner Granado-Villar testified under oath at that proceeding that the application did make the trip from Miami to New York to Madrid to Miami to Tallahassee and that the signature on the application was that of Castelli. She admitted completing part of his application and arranging for a notary public who was very familiar with Castelli to notarize his application in Miami after she received it from Castelli who remained in Spain. Although Granado-Villar testified before the Board that Shockley was "well acquainted" with Castelli, it was established at the final hearing in this cause that Shockley and Castelli knew each other only incidentally. Some months earlier, Shockley notarized a copy of a document belonging to Castelli to be a true copy of the original, and they once passed each other in the hall at Miami Children's Hospital. Shockley had never before notarized Castelli's signature. Petitioner Granado-Villar's testimony before the Board and testimony at the final hearing is corroborated by that of Petitioner Castelli at the final hearing. According to them, on November 17, 1986 Castelli drove from Seville, Spain, to Madrid, Spain, where he found the envelope containing his application waiting for him at the Iberia ticket counter in the Madrid airport. He signed the application, placed it back in the envelope, and gave it to a passenger on Iberia flight number 965. He instructed that passenger to give the envelope to a woman whom he described (Petitioner Granado-Villar). He advised the passenger that if the woman were not there to meet her when she "cleared customs," then the passenger was to take the envelope to the Iberia ticket counter in Miami International Airport. Castelli later telephoned Granado-Villar to inform her that the application would be on Iberia flight number 956 or 965 arriving in Miami at 4:00 p.m. Granado-Villar left the hospital to go to the airport at approximately 3:30 p.m. arriving there at approximately 4:00 p.m. She went to the Iberia ticket counter where she picked up the envelope which now bore her name. She drove back to Miami Children's Hospital, parked her car, and went directly to Shockley's office arriving there between 4:20 and 4:30 p.m. She had Castelli's signature notarized. She then went to the emergency room area and waited approximately 5 to 10 minutes for Evenson to arrive. Evenson arrived at the hospital at approximately 4:40 p.m., completed the necessary paperwork, and left. The testimony recited in this finding of fact is specifically rejected as being incredible. According to flight arrival information maintained by the United States Customs Service, Iberia flight number 965 had a "block time" in Miami of 4:05 p.m. on November 18, 1986. Block time signifies the actual time that an aircraft comes to a complete halt at its arrival gate, and that time is provided to the Customs Service by the airlines as required by the United States Government. Although Petitioners presented evidence that Iberia Airlines recorded in the form of a telex its "official" block time to have been 3:55 p.m., Iberia Airlines' "official" block time is specifically rejected in favor of the block time it gave to the United States Government on the general declarations form required by law to be filed by it. It normally takes from 15 to 30 minutes for a passenger arriving on an international flight to "clear" the customs area at Miami International Airport. That time frame is extended by whatever time it takes for a passenger to disembark from an aircraft the size of an international flight and is also extended if the passenger is not an American citizen and must also go through immigration clearance. No evidence was offered as to how long it took a passenger arriving at approximately 4:00 p.m. on November 18, 1986, to clear customs. Keeping in mind the fact that it took Granado-Villar one-half an hour to drive from the hospital to the airport, it is physically impossible for Granado-Villar's and Costelli's version of the movement of that envelope containing his application to be true. Except for the testimony of Granado- Villar and Costelli there is no evidence to show that the application ever reached Castelli in Spain. Carmen Rojas only sent it to the Iberia ticket counter at Kennedy Airport in New York. Even if the application reached Castelli, it is impossible that Granado-Villar retrieved the envelope containing the application from the Iberia Airlines ticket counter at Miami International Airport at the same time that the Iberia aircraft was arriving at the gate. There is no evidence that the unknown passenger was the first person off the aircraft, that she hastened to be the first in line at customs, that she was able to clear customs without going through the immigration check point in the minimum time of 15 minutes, or that she hastened to wherever the Iberia ticket counter might be in relationship to customs in order to have left the envelope in the custody of the persons at the Iberia ticket counter in order that Granado-Villar could retrieve that envelope and be back at Miami Children's Hospital and in Shockley's office by 4:20 or 4:30 p.m. Even if it could have happened as Granado-Villar testified, Evenson could not have picked up the package at 4:40 p.m. accomplishing the one-half hour drive to the airport in order to check in the package at Piedmont in time for that package to have been placed on an airplane which left at 5:00 p.m. The application which was delivered to Piedmont Airlines for transmittal to Tallahassee by Evenson prior to the arrival in Miami of Iberia flight number 965 was not the same application as the one Granado-Villar sent to Castelli in Spain for his signature. The application which the Board received contained information regarding Castelli's medical education and surgical residency that conflicted with the application submitted by Castelli in 1985 and was incorrect. Even Castelli's height was reported to be different on those applications. In addition to containing incorrect information, the application submitted on behalf of Castelli in November of 1986 did not contain his signature and was not properly notarized. Petitioner Granado-Villar submitted a fraudulently prepared application on behalf of Castelli and attempted to perpetuate the subterfuge by her testimony before the Board and by her testimony at the final hearing in this cause. Petitioner Castelli participated fully in the submittal of his fraudulently prepared application to the Board. Even if an application had reached him in Spain for his signature at the airport in Madrid as he testified, that application was not notarized and it contained incorrect information at the time that he signed it.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that Final Orders be entered denying the applications of Petitioner Guiseppe Castelli and of Petitioner Deise C. Granado-Villar for licensure by examination as physicians in the state of Florida. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of January, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-1594 and 87-2194 Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 11, and 15 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 4-8, 10, 12, 13, 24, and 25 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 9, 14, 16, 18, 23, and 26 have been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Petitioners' proposed finding of fact numbered 17 has been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order except for the third sentence contained therein which is rejected as being contrary to the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 19, 20, and 28 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration herein. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 21 and 29 have been rejected as being subordinate. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 22 and 27 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as being either argument of counsel or mere recitations of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-34 have been adopted either in substance or verbatim in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Deborah J. Miller, Esquire One Biscayne Tower, Suite 2400 Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Allen R. Grossman, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Suite 1601, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 William O'Neil, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue for disposition is whether Barry Amos d/b/a Cloud Nine Travel violated section 559.927, F.S., by operating as a seller of travel without being registered, and if so, what remedial action is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the issues here, Barry Amos operated a business at 4312-101 Plaza Gate Lane, Jacksonville, Florida. In the latter months of 1993, Mr. Amos was interested in starting up a travel agency. He requested information from the department and was sent a registration packet with forms and a copy of the statute and rules. On December 29, 1993, Mr. Amos wrote to the department requesting an exemption from registration based on his understanding that he was entitled to such. His letter references a telephone conversation with "Melissa" at the department and states: "She informed me that since I would not be handling ticket stock or actual payments that I would not be required to register or post the surety bond with your department." (Petitioner's composite exhibit #1) Mr. Amos did not receive his exemption; instead the department sent another letter on February 10, 1994 reiterating that the law required registration unless he provided proof that he was exempt. Joseph Nicolosi is an investigator with the department's Division of Consumer Services. On July 19, 1994 he conducted what he calls an "on-site inspection" of Mr. Amos' business. He had the information on the business but did not have a proper phone number. He looked in the yellow pages and found a listing for "Cloud 9 Travel" with a telephone number. The individual who answered Mr. Nicolosi's telephone call identified himself as Barry Amos. Mr. Nicolosi asked about coming to the office to look at brochures and to plan a trip from Jacksonville to Colorado. Mr. Amos told him that his wife would meet him someplace or send him the brochures. Mr. Amos also said that he would have to figure out the cost of the trip and call him back and that payment would be made by Mr. Nicolosi to him for the trip; he, Mr. Amos, would make the arrangements. After the telephone call was terminated, Mr. Nicolosi called Mr. Amos back a few minutes later and asked if he would accept a check as payment. Mr. Amos replied that it would be better to use a credit card but he agreed that he would accept a check. Mr. Amos concedes that when he was in business as Cloud 9, he accepted personal or cashier's checks from the public for ticket purchases. He did not accept payment from the public for what he called "services", like a commission. The checks he accepted for ticket purchases were made out to Cloud 9 Travel and were used to purchase tickets for the clients. Commissions were paid to Cloud 9 from the ticket sellers. Barry Amos ceased operation as Cloud 9 Travel in January, 1995. He never registered as a seller of travel.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter its final order finding that Respondent, Barry Amos d/b/a Cloud 9 Travel, violated section 559.927, F.S., imposing an administrative fine of $250.00, requiring that Respondent continue to cease and desist until properly registered as a seller of travel and denying such registration until the administrative fine is paid. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY W. CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Jo Englander, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Mr. Barry Amos 4312-101 Plaza Gate Lane Jacksonville, Florida 32217
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are true, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the agency charged with regulating the pari-mutuel wagering industry in Florida, including persons licensed under Chapter 550, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this case, the Respondent was licensed as a cardroom employee occupational license number 1395921-1181, issued by the Petitioner. On May 20, 1998, the Respondent was working as a teller in the cardroom at Tampa Jai-Alai. The evidence establishes that on May 20, 1998, the Respondent provided wagering tickets to a patron of the facility without obtaining cash or a cash voucher in exchange for the tickets.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a Final Order revoking the cardroom employee license number 1395921-1181 of Bobbie J. Manning. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan C. Felker-Little, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Bobbie J. Manning 3007 Spillers Avenue Tampa, Florida 33619 Deborah R. Miller, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, Patricia Ritter, has filed a claim against the bond for more than $299.00 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. On March 24, 1990, petitioner received an offer by telephone to purchase travel certificates entitling the holder to a five-day, four-night vacation package to the Bahamas plus two nights lodging in both Daytona Beach and Orlando, Florida. The offer was made by Uno Gold Card, a telemarketeer located in Atlanta, Georgia, and authorized to sell Passport's travel certificates. Before agreeing to purchase the certificates, petitioner was told that she could take the cruise at one time and use the Florida portion of her trip at a later date. She was never told that some dates were not available, or that other restrictions on travel might apply. Petitioner agreed to purchase the certificates and authorized a $299.00 charge on her credit card payable to Uno Gold Card. After receiving her travel certificates, which carried the name, address, and logo of Passport International Express, a ficticious name under which Passport was then operating, petitioner decided to use the Florida portion of her trip. She filled out one of the certificates requesting September 3 and 4, 1990, as the dates on which she wanted to begin her four-night stay in Florida. This was because she and her husband were traveling to Florida that week on their vacation and it was the only time period when she could use the certificate. She sent in a $50.00 deposit with her request. On June 28, 1990, respondent returned petitioner's $50.00 deposit and advised her that she "failed to leave the required amount of days between (her) requested travel dates," and thus her reservation could not be honored. She was told to resubmit her form within 21 days. Because petitioner was unable to travel on a different date to Florida, she could not use the certificate. When she contacted Passport for a refund of her money, Passport declined to refund her money and instead told her to contact Uno Gold Card. By now, however, Uno Gold Card was no longer in business. To date, petitioner has never received a refund of her money. Had petitioner been told to begin with that there were restrictions on how and when the certificates could be used, she would not have purchased them. But for this misrepresentation on the part of Passport's agent, the transaction would not have been consummated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted, and she be paid $299.00 from the bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia Ritter 154 Midvale Road Wampum, PA 16157 Julie Johnson McCollum 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, FL 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Respondent's teacher's certificate should be suspended or revoked or other appropriate action taken for alleged violations of Chapter 231, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 6B, Florida Administrative Code, as set forth in the Petition herein. At the commencement of the hearing, Petitioner moved to amend paragraphs 1 and 2 to reflect a correct date of May 5, 1977, in lieu of the date May 5, 1978, stated therein. There being no objection, the Motion was granted and the Petitioner so amended.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Thomasena W. Owens, holds a Florida Teaching Certificate and has been employed in the Duval County Public School System at Ribault High School, Jacksonville, Florida, since 1979, as a cosmetology teacher (testimony of Respondent). On May 5, 1977, Respondent conducted a fashion show with her students at the high school auditorium for the purpose of raising funds to defray expenses of graduating students to take examinations before the State Board of Cosmetology. Prior to this time, Respondent obtained permission from school authorities to conduct the fund raising activity. Written school policy required that tickets for such events must be prenumbered consecutively by the printer and that a report of tickets sold and funds received must be prepared by the person in charge of the activity (testimony of Davis, Respondent, Petitioner's composite exhibit No. 4). On April 12, 1977, Respondent's husband, Herbert Owens, ordered the printing of 500 tickets for the sum of $15.00 in the name of Ribault High School - Cosmetology Department, at Bill Kight's Copy Center, Jacksonville, Florida. He later received the tickets from the Copy Center without paying for the same and delivered them to his wife's office at the school. The tickets were unnumbered. Prior to ordering the tickets, Respondent had not submitted a request for purchase approval to the School principal as was required under written school policies (testimony of Thrift, Harms, Davis, H. Owens, Petitioner's exhibit No. 1-2, 4,5). The ticket price for the fashion show was one dollar. Prior to the event, there was an undetermined number of advance ticket sales. The school auditorium has an audience capacity of approximately 700 persons. Tickets were sold at the door at the night of the performance by Emily James, a School clerical employee. The door was the only available entrance to the auditorium. During the course of ticket sales immediately before the performance, some four or five individuals entered the auditorium with passes. Although the auditorium was not completely full, at least 500 persons were present during the show. A short time before the performance had concluded, Mrs. James turned over the cash receipts and unsold tickets in a box to Respondent. On June 9, 1977, Respondent executed a form titled "Report of Monies Collected," which reflected that she had turned in $103.00 in cash to the School bookkeeper on May 5, 1977. It further reflected that 300 tickets had been printed and that 176 tickets were turned in on June 9th. It further showed that the cash balance due of $21.00 had been turned in by Respondent on the same date. The form was countersigned by the school bookkeeper. (Testimony of James, Feagin, Davis, Respondent's exhibit No. 1). In August, 1977, the bookkeeper for Bill Knight's Copy Center noted that the invoice for the tickets had not been paid by the high school. She called Mr. Owens for an explanation. He stated that the reason why the bill had not been paid was that only 300 tickets had been ordered and that in order to pay for the work, he needed another invoice, dated April 12, 1977, showing 300 tickets at the price of $15.00. The revised invoice was picked up by Mr. Owens. It was not until February 14, 1978, that the High School paid the bill for the tickets. (Testimony of Harms, H. Owens, Davis, Petitioner's exhibit No. 2, 6- 8). Respondent received a satisfactory job performance evaluation from the school principal in 1977, although the principal had expressed concerns to her for previous irregular business transactions. Respondent received an unsatisfactory overall evaluation in 1978, which the principal explained was due to the fact that "I wanted to register with Ms. Owens my objections to the fund raising business . . . and I chose this method to do that." Although the principal stated that Respondent expressed positive qualities of demonstration and enthusiasm in her classes, she was concerned about her ability to impart knowledge to students. (Testimony of Davis, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3). Both Respondent and her husband testified at the hearing. Respondent disclaimed any knowledge of the ticket purchase and attributed all events concerning the transaction to her husband. However, when she was interview by Petitioner's security investigator in August, 1978, she told him that she had ordered the tickets and that her husband had picked them up. She also stated to him that, after discovering that she had been billed for 500 tickets even though she had ordered only 300, she went to the printers the next day and obtained a corrected invoice. In a subsequent interview about a week later, Respondent told the investigator that the corrected invoice had been mailed to her and that her husband had paid for the tickets and picked them up. At the hearing, Respondent testified that her husband had ordered that tickets because she was "busy." Although she had told the investigator that there had been advance ticket sales, at the hearing Respondent testified that she could not remember if there had been such sales. Her testimony indicated that students had counted the tickets before the performance and placed them in stacks of 25 each and that there were only 300 tickets. She further testified that Mrs. James had handed her a locked bag containing the door ticket sale receipts and unsold tickets, had placed the bag in the truck of Respondent's care, and that Respondent turned the money over to the bookkeeper the next day without knowing what was in the bag. She denied keeping any of the sales receipts or any wrong doing. She admitted that she was aware of school procedures to be followed in purchasing materials, but said that the principal an bookkeeper had authorized her to purchase the tickets. Her husband testified that he had ordered 300 tickets from the printer and picked them up when they were ready, but did not pay for them at that time. He admitted having the conversation with the printer's bookkeeper and requesting a revised invoice to reflect that only 300 tickets had been printed and delivered. He testified that he told his wife that he had paid for the tickets because he did not want her to have any "foul-ups" with the principal in regard to the bill being paid. He further testified that he viewed the crowd attending the fashion show and that there were approximately 200 spectators present. In view of the inconsistencies and conflicts of the above testimony of Respondent and Mr. Owens between themselves and with the testimony of other witnesses, the demeanor of all witnesses, and the circumstances surrounding the transaction in question, the testimony of Respondent and her husband as summarized above in pertinent respects, is not deemed credible. Based on the foregoing findings, it is further found that Respondent failed to properly account either for funds received for the sale of 200 tickets, or otherwise to satisfactorily account for the disposition of 200 missing tickets.
Recommendation That Respondent's teaching certificate be revoked for a period of three (3) years, pursuant to Section 231.28, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of August, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: David Holder, Esquire 110 North Magnolia Tallahassee, Florida Kenneth Vickers, Esquire 437 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 1979.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, Drewes R. Rogge, has filed a claim against the bond in the amount of $1060.00 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. In July 1990, petitioner purchased a travel certificate from Raka Concepts, a telemarketeer authorized by Passport to sell travel certificates on its behalf. Raca Concepts filed for bankruptcy shortly after the transaction occurred, but a Passport representative assured petitioner that it would honor all travel promised by its agent. The certificate, which cost $399.00, entitled the holder and a companion to lodging for four nights in the Bahamas, two nights in Orlando, and two nights in Daytona Beach. Also, the certificate included transportation to and from the Bahamas by a cruise line. After paying for meals on the ship, taxes and additional charges for his children, petitioner's total cost was $634.00. In his claim, however, petitioner has requested a refund of $1,060.00, which includes the cost of upgrades to better accommodations, extra meals, a "VIP package," taxi fares, and a tip. The derivation of this amount is found in petitioner's exhibit 1 received in evidence. All transportion and lodging arrangements were booked by Passport. During the trip, petitioner experienced numerous difficulties, which are described in detail in exhibit 1. Among other problems, he says the cruise ship was overcrowded and dirty, and the original accommodations in Freeport did not meet his expectations (i. e., they were unsafe) causing him to upgrade to better accommodations at a price higher than was represented by Passport's agent. The total cost of the hotel upgrade was $164.85. Also, he was not notified that his scheduled transportation via cruise line from Freeport to Fort Lauderdale was cancelled at the last minute causing him to spend an extra night in the Bahamas. The cruise line, however, paid for his additional night's lodging. When the cruise line returned the following day it sailed to Miami rather than Fort Lauderdale. Petitioner was then taken by bus to Fort Lauderdale at no charge. Finally, before the trip began, petitioner discovered that he was booked into a hotel in Haines City rather than Orlando. After petitioner lodged a protest, Passport agreed to change his accommodations to Orlando. Mainly because of these problems, petitioner has asked for a refund of virtually all of the money spent on the package. Except for the mispresentation regarding the quality of the originally assigned accommodations in Freeport and the price of the upgraded accommodations, which cost petitioner an extra $164.85, there was no showing that Passport was guilty of misrepresentation in its handling of this transaction or otherwise failed to substantially perform the contracted services. Therefore, petitioner should be reimbursed $164.85.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted in part and he be paid $164.85 from the bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Drewes R. Rogge 5804 Chesterfield Drive Chester, Virginia 23831 Michael J. Panaggio 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1985). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1985), and bonded by Respondent Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Travelers was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was filed timely in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. From November 5, 1987, through June 10, 1988, Respondent purchased from Petitioner 71 dozen squash, 375 dozen collard greens, 247 dozen mustard greens and 147 dozen turnip greens for a total price of $7,386.00. All produce was delivered between November 5, 1987 and June 10, 1988. No payments have been made by Respondent for the above produce. Respondent has not denied receiving the produce nor did Respondent complain about the produce's quality or condition upon delivery. Respondent owes $7,386.00 to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $7,386.00. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Travelers be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1985) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: C. L. Norman Route 2, Box 2160 Starke, Florida 32091 David Norman Norman's Country Market, Inc. 515 Northwest 23rd Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32069 Traveler Indemnity Company Attention Breet A. Ragland 988 Woodcock Road Suite 102 Orlando, Florida 32803 Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mallory Horne, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr. Attorney at Law Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue At issue is whether respondent committed the offense alleged in the petitioner's "notice of intent to impose administrative fine and to issue cease and desist order" and, if so, what administrative action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, is a state agency charged, inter alia, with administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 559, Part XI, Florida Statutes, regulating "sellers of travel." Here, petitioner has charged that respondent had operated as a "seller of travel" without being registered as required by Section 559.927(2), Florida Statutes. The only proof offered to support such contention at hearing was a written inspection report prepared by James Kelly, an inspector employed by petitioner. 1/ That report recited that Mr. Kelly performed an inspection of respondent's premises on November 4, 1994, that he met with Denise Arencibia (who was later identified as respondent's vice president), and that the following events transpired: Went in undercover and asked about weekend cruises. Denise gave me a brochure for the Seaward & gave me prices at $329 per person. She can make all arrangements. They will accept a cashier's check payable to Escape Travel Services. Mr. Kelly did not, however, appear at hearing or otherwise offer testimony in this case. Consequently, for the reasons discussed in the conclusions of law, there is no competent proof of record to support a finding that respondent operated as a "seller of travel" on the date of Mr. Kelly's inspection as contended by petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered dismissing the charges against respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September 1995.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 112.3148(3), Florida Statutes, by committing the acts alleged in the Order Finding Probable Cause and, if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, John Pollet (Pollet), served continuously as Mayor of Kissimmee from November 1, 1991, until he was suspended in 1995. As Mayor, Pollet was a voting member of the City Commission and signed contracts the city entered. At all times relevant to the instant case, George Geletko was employed as the Municipal Marketing Manager with Waste Management, Inc. Mr. Geletko's primary responsibility was to make sure that contracts between Waste Management, Inc., and its municipal customers were properly administered. Waste Management, Inc., had a contract with the City of Kissimmee to provide waste disposal services that was scheduled to expire in 1994. However, on September 6, 1994, the City of Kissimmee renewed its contract with Waste Management, Inc. Mr. Geletko was responsible for administering Waste Management's contract with the City of Kissimmee and was the contact person between Waste Management, Inc., and the City of Kissimmee. As the Municipal Marketing Manager for Waste Management, Inc., Mr. Geletko sought to influence or encourage the Kissimmee City Commission and Pollet to do business with his company. In order to accomplish this, Mr. Geletko, in his position with Waste Management, Inc., took actions that directly or indirectly furthered or communicated his intention to influence or encourage the Kissimmee City Commission and Pollet to do business with Waste Management, Inc. In the spring of 1994, during a telephone conversation, Pollet asked Mr. Geletko if Waste Management, Inc., had any tickets to an Orlando Magic basketball game. Mr. Geletko did not respond directly to Pollet's inquiry, but stated that "whatever we did, we would have to be in compliance with all ordinances and the State Code of Ethics." Pollet told Mr. Geletko that he would get back with him. However, no further inquiry regarding Orlando Magic tickets was made by Pollet to Mr. Geletko. At the time Pollet asked about Orlando Magic basketball tickets, he believed Mr. Geletko had taken former City Commissioner Richard Herring to a Magic game at some point prior to his inquiry. Pollet testified that the inquiry regarding Orlando Magic basketball tickets was made based on personal political considerations involving former City Commissioner Herring, who was sometimes an ally and sometimes a foe of Respondent in matters relating to City politics. However, Pollet gave no such explanation to Mr. Geletko during their conversation involving Orlando Magic basketball tickets. Based on Pollet's inquiry, Mr. Geletko felt that Pollet was asking him for tickets to the Orlando Magic game. Mr. Geletko, as a representative of Waste Management, Inc., gave gifts, including golf games and meals, to Pollet both before and after Respondent asked him about the Orlando Magic Tickets. Pollet's approach to Mr. Geletko was a solicitation for tickets. At all times relevant to the instant case, Charles Voss was a vice president with Camp, Dresser, and McKee, an environmental engineering firm. Camp, Dresser, and McKee had two contracts with the City of Kissimmee to provide engineering services. The City of Kissimmee and Camp, Dresser, and McKee entered into one such contract on November 2, 1993. Mr. Voss was responsible for marketing Camp, Dresser, and McKee's services to the City of Kissimmee. Mr. Voss sought to influence or encourage the Kissimmee City Commission and Pollet to do business with Camp, Dresser and McKee. To this end, Mr. Voss took actions that directly or indirectly furthered or communicated his intentions to influence or encourage the Kissimmee City Commission and Pollet to do business with Camp, Dresser, and McKee. In March 1993, Pollet called Mr. Voss and asked him if Camp, Dresser, and McKee had any tickets to the Nestle Invitational Golf Tournament. Mr. Voss told Pollet that his firm did not have tickets to the 1993 Nestle Invitational Golf Tournament. Based on Respondent's question, Mr. Voss thought Respondent was asking him for tickets to the golf tournament. Pollet testified that he asked about the passes because he wanted to know if Mr. Voss was going to attend the tournament. According to his testimony, Pollet thought that if Mr. Voss were going to the golf tournament, they could meet there. Notwithstanding his testimony, Pollet never asked Mr. Voss whether he was going to the tournament. In both 1994 and 1995, Pollet accepted passes to the Nestle Invitational Golf Tournament as gifts from Mr. Voss and Camp, Dresser, and McKee. Mr. Voss gave these golf tournament passes to Pollet because Pollet expressed an interest in the tournament in 1993. Pollet did not pay for the golf tournament passes he received from Mr. Voss in 1994 and 1995. Mr. Voss, as a representative of Camp, Dresser, and McKee, had given Pollet various gifts in the past. Except for partial payment for certain tickets, Pollet has never paid for any of these gifts. Respondent's approach to Mr. Voss was a solicitation for tickets to the 1993 Nestle Invitational Golf Tournament. Respondent admits he has accepted gifts from both Waste Management, Inc., and Camp, Dresser, and McKee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that Respondent, John Pollet, violated Section 112.3148(3), Florida Statutes; imposing a civil penalty of $1,000.00 per violation; and issuing a public censure and reprimand. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of November, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CARLOYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-647 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric S. Scott, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mark Herron, Esquire 216 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, General Counsel 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Kerrie J. Stillman Complaint Coordinator Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
