Findings Of Fact The Respondent was, at the time of the hearing and at all times material to this proceeding, registered with the Real Estate Commission as a real estate broker. During the period of the transactions involved in this proceeding the Respondent was operating and registered as an active broker and President of Fortiner Realty Company, which was a corporate real estate broker registered with the Commission. In Count One of the Complaint, the Respondent is charged with failing to maintain a security deposit in his trust account in connection with a real estate transaction involving Phillip E. Andrews and Betsy K. Andrews, as sellers, and Joseph T. Lyons and Marion C. Lyons, as purchasers. In Count Two of the Complaint the Respondent is charged with converting the deposit in the Andrews-Lyons transaction to his own use. During March, 1976, Claude I. Allen was employed at the Respondent's real estate office as a salesman. Allen negotiated a transaction between the Andrewses and the Lyonses. On March 17, 1976, the Lyonses made an offer to purchase the Andrews property and submitted a $1,000.00 deposit to Allen. On March 18, 1976 the $1,000.00 was deposited in the Respondent's trust account at the Palmer Bank of Ft. Myers. On March 22, 1976 the Andrewses accepted the offer and the Lyonses provided an additional $2,000.00 deposit to Allen. On that same date the $2,000.00 was deposited in the Respondent's trust account. The transaction closed on May 11, 1976. It was a smooth transaction. On May 110, 1976 $3,000.00 was withdrawn from the Respondent's trust account as a part of the transaction. During the entire time from March 17 through May 11, 1976, the monies deposited by the Lyonses remained on deposit in the Respondent's trust account. There is no evidence to support a finding either that the Respondent failed to maintain the $4,000.00 in the trust account, or that he converted any part of the deposit for his own use. In Count Three of the Complaint the Respondent is charged with failing to maintain a deposit in his trust account in connection with real estate transactions between Mac-Nel Ltd. and M & N Ltd. as sellers, and Stanley G. Courtney, as purchaser. In Count Four the Respondent is charged with converting all or part of the security deposit to his own use. The Respondent was one of several partners in Mac-Nel Ltd. and M & N Ltd. On august 28, 1976, Stanley G. Courtney entered into separate contracts to purchase all of the property owned by the two partnerships. Through six separate checks Courtney made a deposit of $13,500.00 to the Respondent to be placed in the Respondent's trust account. The evidence is unclear as to when or in what manner the deposit was placed in the trust account, or whether all of it was in fact placed in the trust account. The bank records reflect that $17,600.00 was placed in the Respondent's trust account on August 30, 1976, and it is possible that the Courtney checks formed a part of that deposit. During August and September, 1976, the Respondent's financial condition became grave. He had apparently defaulter on several notes to the Palmer Bank in which he had his trust account. The bank sued on the notes, and put a hold on the Respondent's accounts. In order to allow the Courtney transactions to close, the Respondent was able to withdraw allow a portion of the deposits made by Courtney form his trust account. He transferred his interest in the property to a Mr. Blankenship, so that Mr. Blankenship could close the transaction unfettered by the Respondent's financial plight. After he withdrew the money from his trust account, and forwarded it to Blankenship, the Respondent took no further part in the Courtney transaction either as a party to the transaction or as a broker. The closing of the transaction was delayed due in part to the Respondent's bankruptcy, however, it did close on October 29, 1976. Courtney was credited with the full amount that he had deposited with the Respondent. It is clear that the Respondent did not maintain all of the monies deposited by Courtney in the trust account. His reason for failing to do that was to permit the transaction to close even though the Respondent had gone bankrupt. The evidence would not support a finding that the Respondent converted any portion of the Courtney deposit to his own use. In Count Five of the Complaint the Respondent is charged with failing to maintain a deposit in his trust account in connection with a transaction involving Charles and Margaret Lathrop as sellers, and William and Jeannette Whitacre as purchasers. In Count Six the Respondent is charged with converting all or part of the deposit in that transaction to his own use. On or about June 29, 1976, the Whitacres entered into a contract to purchase property from the Lathrops. The transaction was negotiated by Mary E. Bishop, a saleswoman who was employed by the Respondent in his real estate company. The Whitacres delivered a $6,500.00 check to Mrs. Bishop as a deposit on the transaction. The bank records received into evidence do not clearly reveal when or in what manner the Whitacre's deposit was placed in the Respondent's trust account. The bank statements do show a $7,000.00 deposit made into the Respondent's trust account at the Palmer Bank of Ft. Myers on July 1, 1976, and it is possible that the Whitacre's check was a part of that deposit. Bank records from other trust accounts maintained by the Respondent such as that at the Cape Coral Bank do not reveal any deposit that could have been the Whitacre's check. The Lathrop/Whitacre transaction closed successfully on August 18, 1976, and the Whitacres were credited with the $6,500.00 that they had submitted to the Respondent's firm. It is apparent from the bank records that $6,500.00 was not on deposit at all times in the Respondent's trust account between July 1 and August 18, 1976. During most of that period the Respondent's balance in his trust account was less than $6,500.00. No evidence was offered from which it could be concluded that the Respondent made any specific use of the money deposited by the Whitacres. It is apparent, however, that the money was not used as intended, i.e., it was not maintained in the Respondent's trust account. In Count Seven of the Complaint the Respondent is charged with fraud, misrepresentation, and dishonest dealing in connection with his handling of the business of a partnership known as 27 Oaks Ltd. The Respondent was the general partner in 27 Oaks Ltd. He was responsible for carrying on the business of the partnership for the benefit of eight limited partners. The partnership owned property which it was seeking to develop and sell in small parcels. On November 19, 1975, a mortgage payment in the amount of $21,300.00 was due from the partnership. In accordance with the partnership agreement, the Respondent solicited funds from the limited partners so that the mortgage payment could be made by letter dated October 15, 1975. The evidence does not reveal whether the Respondent received sufficient contributions from the limited partners to pay the mortgage payment. The evidence reveals only that he received $9,997.00 from the limited partners in response to his solicitation. The Respondent did not make the mortgage payment when it was due, but instead received a ninety-day extension. The new date was February 19. The principal payment on the mortgage was not made on that date, but instead, the Respondent made payments on the interest due. Ultimately the payment was made in a manner satisfactory to the mortgagee by early June, 1976. The Real Estate Commission has charged that the Respondent received funds sufficient to make the mortgage payment in November, 1975, but that he applied the money to some other purpose. This contention is not supported by the evidence. The evidence does not reveal that the Respondent received sufficient money to make the mortgage payment. The bank records reveal that there was sufficient money in the 27 Oaks Ltd account to make the mortgage payment in November, and that the Respondent withdrew most of that money. The evidence does not establish that the Respondent improperly withdrew the money, or that the Respondent improperly withdrew the money, or that he put it to any but a valid partnership purpose. The Commission has also contended that the Respondent failed to maintain the monies he received from the limited partners in a trust account. Nothing in the partnership agreement requires that such monies be kept in a trust account, and the Respondent's failure to do so could not, therefore, constitute fraud or misrepresentation. Even if the contract were construed arguably to require that funds be placed in a trust account, certainly there are equally valid arguments that is does not. In Count Eight of the Complaint the Respondent is charged with fraud, misrepresentation, and dishonest dealing in connection with his handling of the affairs of a Florida limited partnership know as Randag Properties Ltd. During 1976 the Respondent was the sole general partner of Randag Properties Ltd. The partnership owned property which it was seeking to develop into apartments. The Respondent was responsible for carrying on the partnership business. The property consisted of more than 40 acres on a river and a navigable canal. Part of the property was a small appendage which contributed little to the development potential of the property. In order to raise money to prepare the property for development, the Respondent sold the appendage to an ajoining property owner. That transaction closed on or about May 28, 1976. The Respondent had contributed more than $30,000 of his own money to the partnership in order to prepare the property for development. These expenditures included attorneys fees that he had incurred; a boundary survey, a high tide location survey, and a topographical survey; fees to the Florida Secretary of State's office; real estate taxes; land clearing expenses; and various miscellaneous expenditures. The Respondent had also made an advance to one of the limited partners. The Respondent applied most of the proceeds from the sale of the appendage to compensate himself for the expenditures that he had incurred. The Respondent had a disagreement with one of the limited partners, Mr. Swartz, as to whether the proceeds of the sale should be applied to compensate the limited partners for their initial investment or the Respondent for his expenditures. The Respondent's applying the proceeds to compensate himself does not appear to be contrary to the partnership agreement and it does appear that he had validly incurred expenses on behalf of the partnership to which he was entitled to be compensated. The Respondent ultimately resigned as the general partner on October 12, 1976, in order to save the partnership from the consequences of his bankruptcy, and was replaced by Swartz. Early in October, 1976, the Respondent issued a promissory note to the partnership, but there was no showing that this promissory note was the consequence of any fraud, but rather that it was for the purpose of placing the partnership in a favorable position in relation to the Respondent's bankruptcy. The Respondent ended up losing money through his participation in the partnership while the limited partners ended by making a substantial profit. All of the limited partners were advised of the sale of the appendage either prior to the sale or shortly after. There is no requirement in the partnership agreement that they be advised in advance of the sale, or that they assent to it. The Respondent is charged in Count Nine of the Complaint with fraud, misrepresentation, and dishonest dealing in connection with a business transaction that he had with William K. Gamble and Dorothy V. Gamble. The allegations in essence are that the Respondent received loans from the Gambles, and that he pledged certain property as security for the loans. He was required under the terms of the promissory notes and the collateral assignment that accompanied them to provide other adequate security in the event that he sold any of the property that served as collateral for the loans. It is alleged that the Respondent sold the property, did not advise the Gambles, and did not substitute any other property as security for the promissory notes. The only testimony offered to establish that the property that served as collateral was sold was the testimony of Mrs. Dorothy V. Gamble. Mrs. Gamble had no direct knowledge that the property was in fact sold. It is apparent from the evidence that the Respondent has defaulted on the promissory notes. In Count Ten of the Complaint it is alleged that the Respondent failed to maintain a deposit in his trust account in connection with a real estate transaction involving Herbert J. Haase and Katherine M. Haase, as trustees, the sellers, and Loyal H. Tingley as purchaser. In Count Eleven it is alleged that the Respondent converted all or part of the deposit to his own use. On or about August 6, 1976, Tingley entered into a contract to purchase property from the Haases. Herbert Haase was a real estate salesman employed in the Respondent's real estate firm, and he held title to the subject property in trust. The Respondent was the actual owner. Tom Carpenter, another salesman employed in the Respondent's firm, was the sales man in the transaction. Tingley delivered a $5,000 check to Carpenter as a deposit on the transaction. Another real estate broker, a Mr. Himmelrick, had negotiated mortgage modifications in connection with the sale. He and the mortgage bank insisted that the deposit be placed in Himmelrick's trust account. Accordingly, the Respondent deposited the $5,000 check from Tingley into his trust account, and delivered a $5,000 check from his trust account to Himmelrick. Carpenter advised Tingley that Himmelrick and the bank insisted upon having the $5,000 deposited in Himmelrick's trust account prior to the time that the check was forwarded from the Respondent's trust account to Himmelrick. Tingley consented to that arrangement. While it is true that the Respondent did not keep the $5,000 deposit in his trust account, his failure to do so was with the consent of the purchaser, and resulted only in the deposit being placed in the trust account of a participating realtor. The evidence would not sustain a finding that the Respondent converted any part of the deposit to his own use. In Count Twelve of the Complaint it is alleged that the Respondent issued over 22 checks drawn on his trust account wherein said checks were not honored for payment for the reason of insufficient funds; that the Respondent placed funds in his trust account that did not come from valid trust account sources; and that the Respondent caused his account to have a negative closing balance on May 13, 1876. The evidence would not sustain any finding that the Respondent issued checks which were not honored for payment. It is apparent from the bank records that several checks issued by the Respondent drawn on his trust account were not covered by the balance in the trust account. Bank records indicated a "OC" next to such withdrawals on the ledger sheets. The bank witnesses testified, however, that frequently such entries are honored by the bank and are not returned due to the insufficient funds. The evidence would not sustain a finding that the Respondent placed money in his trust account that came from sources there were not proper for placing in a trust account. Nothing in the bank records offered into evidence demonstrates which deposits may not have been valid trust account deposits. The deposit slips merely show the payor of the checks. The bank records do reveal that the Respondent's trust account balance in the Palmer Bank of Ft. Myers on May 13, 1976 was a negative balance of $732.60. On September 29, 1978, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered its final order finding the Respondent guilty of a of a violation of the Real Estate License Law. The Respondent's registration as a real estate broker was suspended for a period of ninety days. The Real Estate Commission Case Number was Progress Docket Number 3130. All of the events involved in the instant proceeding occurred prior to the time that the final order was entered in Case Number 3130 and indeed prior to the time that the Complaint was issued in Case Number 3130. The Respondent has enjoyed a very good reputation in his community for fair dealing, truthfulness and competence. None of the acts which the Respondent committed that led to the instant proceedings show that the Respondent has engaged in a course of conduct or in practices which demonstrate that he is so incompetent, negligent, dishonest and untruthful that the money, property, transactions and rights of others may not safely be entrusted to him. The Administrative Complaint in Case Number 3130 before the Florida Real Estate Commission was issued on January 14, 1977. In included twenty-seven counts. All of the allegations related to the Respondent's dealings with various real estate salesman, and his alleged failure to share real estate commissions with the salesmen. In connection with the transactions involved, it was asserted in several counts that the Respondent failed to place deposits properly in his trust account. None of the charges in the first administrative complaint are grounded upon the facts alleged in the instant Administrative Complaint. The facts involved in the instant proceeding did, however, all occur at about the same time as the facts alleged in the first complaint, and all occurred prior to the date that the Administrative Complaint was filed in Case Number 3130. New facts came to the attention of the Commission due in part to comments made to one of the present real estate commissioners by a Ft. Myers resident. With diligent inquiry it is possible that the Commission could have discovered the facts which have resulted in the instant proceeding and included them as additional counts in the complaint in Case Number 3130. It has not, however, been shown that the Commission had reason to believe that it should make such diligent search and inquiry. B
Findings Of Fact On December 30, 1993, the Department received an application to organize a proposed new trust company to be located in Miami, Dade County, Florida, and to be called Columbus Trust Company (Columbus). Four individuals to be associated with Columbus are foreign nationals: Arturo Vinueza and Mario Yepes are proposed board of directors members; and Catalina Landes and Pedro Ycaza are major stockholders of Columbus. All other directors and stockholders of Columbus are citizens of the United States. They are: Charles C. Hardwick, III, Michael Hollihan, and Timothy S. Reed. All of the individuals listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 attended the public hearing. Mr. Vinueza is the proposed chief executive officer for Columbus. He is a graduate of the University of Miami and has more than thirteen years of banking and trust experience. Mr. Vinueza has served as manager or managing director of Citibank, N.A., Quito, Ecuador; Banco Popular International, Nassau; The Jersey Private Bank and Trust, Nassau; and Banco Popular del Ecuador, Miami Agency. Charles C. Hardwick, III, a proposed director, is a graduate of the University of Colorado, College of Law. He has more than twelve years of experience in international finance. Timothy S. Reed, a proposed director, is a graduate of Dartmouth College, and is a career banker, having retired from Citibank, N.A., New York, after more than thirty years of continuous service. He has served as general manager of Banco Popular del Ecuador, Miami Agency, for the past three years. Michael Hollihan, a proposed director who will serve as chief investment officer, has a degree in economics from the University of Wisconsin. He has completed graduate course work in economics at the University of South Carolina, and has been engaged in the business of international trade, finance and investments for more than twenty years. Mr. Hollihan was previously employed by Banco Central del Ecuador. For the past four years he has served as President of JPBT Advisors, Inc. in Miami. Mario Yepes, a proposed director, also has a degree in economics and was a teacher at the university of Colombia. He worked for a number of years for Bank of America, both in Miami and in Venezuela. Catalina Echevaria Landes, a major stockholder, is a business woman and interior designer. She has her own business located in Miami. Pedro Ycaza, a major stockholder, has a degree in business from a university in Ecuador. He worked for various banks in Ecuador for a number of years before joining Banco Popular in 1986. The Applicants seek to organize Columbus to provide trust services and investment management services to individuals having business or personal interests in the Miami area, and to JPBT Advisors, Inc. JPBT Advisors, Inc. advises certain mutual funds specializing in international investments. The Applicants propose to expand such services gradually to include private banking and investment management services to international investors residing or doing business in Miami and Dade County, Florida. The existing business of JPBT Advisors, Inc., which has annual revenues of approximately $3 million, will contribute to the income of Columbus during its initial period of operations as the bank develops its personal trust and investment management business. The proposed board of directors consists of individuals having many years of banking and business experience in the areas of international finance and asset management. Both Mr. Vinueza, the proposed chief executive officer, and Mr. Reed, a proposed outside director, have had direct experience as officers of financial institutions within the past three years and are presently employed in such capacities. The initial capital for Columbus will be $2 million. The initial capitalization of Columbus is adequate in relation to is proposed business activities. The corporate name of Columbus is reserved with the Department of State. Columbus will have suitable quarters in the Barnett Bank building located at 701 Brickell Avenue, Miami. Columbus' application was prepared by Richard Hunt, a financial consultant, who has been engaged in the business of providing such consulting services to organizing financial institutions for more than 25 years. The economic study and demographic analysis of the market for fiduciary services in Dade County, prepared by Mr. Hunt, concluded that the organization of Columbus will serve the convenience and advantage of its expected clients. The local conditions in Miami are favorable to Columbus' business plan. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO REPORT OF PUBLIC HEARING, CASE NO. 94-6306 All proposed findings of fact were submitted by stipulation of the Department and Columbus. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Robert F. Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry Hooper, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol-Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Rod Jones Shutts and Bowen 20 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1000 Orlando, Florida 32801 Albert T. Gimbel Chief Banking Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Jeffrey D. Jones Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE DIVISION OF BANKING IN RE: Application for Authority to Organize a State Chartered Trust Administrative Proceeding Company to be located at Number: 3328-B-11/94 701 Brickell Avenue, Miami, DOAH Case Number: 94-6306 Dade County, Florida (Columbus Trust Company) / FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER Having considered the facts and information contained in the application for authority to organize and operate Columbus Trust Company (Applicant), 1 have determined that the Applicant has met all six (6) statutory criteria set forth in Section 658.21, Florida Statutes, or can meet those criteria by complying with specific conditions. Accordingly, the application is approved, subject to the conditions specified herein.
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Sections 475.25(1)(b), (d), (e), and (k), Florida Statutes, 1/ by committing the acts alleged in two administrative complaints; and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact 1. Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate broker under license number 0377781. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a broker at Wilson Realty International, 1059 Aurora Road, Melbourne, Florida 32935. The Myrie Transaction On July 22, 1993, Respondent negotiated a property management agreement with Harold E. and Bernia L. Myrie (the "Myries") who are residents of New York. Pursuant to the property management agreement, Respondent agreed to manage a rental house owned by the Myries and located in Florida (the "Myrie property"). On August 20, 1993, Respondent negotiated a lease agreement for the Myrie property with Mr. Eric A. Bogle and Ms. Jearlene Davis, as tenants. The tenants paid Respondent $2,590.60 in rental payments for the period August 20 through November 18, 1993. Respondent failed to deposit the rental payments into her escrow account. On November 19, 1993, Respondent issued check number 1501 to the Myries in the amount of $562.50. Respondent represented to the Myries that $562.50 was the net amount due them. The Myries deposited check number 1501. However, the check was returned for insufficient funds. Respondent replaced check number 1501 with another check for $562.50. There were sufficient funds to cover the second check. On December 29, 1993, the Myries cancelled their property management agreement with Respondent. They demanded the balance of $2,028.10. Respondent claimed that $562.50 was the total amount Respondent owed the Myries. Respondent represented that she had incurred expenses for repairs and maintenance to the Myrie property. Respondent never provided an accounting of either the rental proceeds received from the tenants or the alleged expenses for repairs and maintenance. 2/ Respondent failed to produce documents Petitioner needed to conduct an audit of her escrow account. Respondent failed to produce deposit receipts for rent and cancelled checks and written receipts for expenses incurred by Respondent. After Respondent failed to comply with two requests to produce the records Petitioner needed to conduct an audit, Petitioner subpoenaed Respondent's records on August 1, 1994. 3/ Respondent agreed to produce her records for review and audit on August 12, 1994. However, Respondent failed to keep her appointment and never produced the documents subpoenaed by Petitioner. 4/ Respondent misappropriated $2,028.10 paid to her by the tenants and converted those funds to Respondent's personal use. The tenants paid those funds to Respondent in trust for the Myries. The Myries authorized Respondent to collect those funds in trust and to remit the funds to them. Respondent breached the trust of both parties in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of escrow funds for personal purposes. Respondent engaged in false pretenses to justify her misappropriation and conversion of the escrow funds. Respondent's failure to account for escrow funds paid to her in the Myrie transaction and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's account is culpable negligence. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent in the Myrie transaction constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver rental trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.012(1). 5/ Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 2. The Timoll Transaction In June, 1993, Respondent negotiated a property management agreement with Lawrence and Sheila Timoll (the "Timolls") who were residents of New York. Pursuant to the property management agreement, Respondent agreed to manage a rental house owned by the Timolls and located in Florida. (the "Timoll property"). On July 14, 1993, Respondent procured tenants for the Timoll property. William and Sambri Dulmage (the "Dulmages") executed a one year lease. Pursuant to the terms of the lease, the Dulmages agreed to pay a security deposit of $625 and rent at the monthly rate of $600. Respondent received $4,800 from the Dulmages as payment of rent, a security deposit, and expenses associated with the Timoll property. Respondent never delivered any part of the $4,800 to the Timolls. Respondent represented to the Timolls that they were not entitled to any of the $4,800 because the Dulmages had vacated the property and stopped paying rent. Respondent also represented that she had incurred expenses for repairs and maintenance to the Timoll property. 6/ The Dulmages in fact occupied the Timoll property for the duration of the lease and timely paid all amounts in accordance with the terms of the lease. The Timolls knew that the Dulmages were complying with the lease and arranged for the rent to be paid directly to the Timolls in February, 1994. With three minor exceptions, 7/ Respondent did not incur expenses for maintenance and repairs to the Timoll property. 8/ From July 14, 1993, through February 22, 1994, the Timolls made repeated demands for Respondent to deliver the rent and security deposit, and to account for the expenses allegedly incurred by Respondent. Respondent produced property accounting forms describing expenses for maintenance and repairs to the Timoll property. With three minor exceptions, the accounting forms provided by Respondent contained fabricated expenses for maintenance and repairs. 9/ Respondent misappropriated $4,419.45 10/ paid to her by the Dulmages and converted those funds to Respondent's personal use. Those funds were paid to Respondent in trust for the Timolls. The Timolls authorized Respondent to collect those funds in trust and to remit the funds to them. Respondent breached the trust of both parties in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of escrow funds for personal purposes. Respondent engaged in false pretenses to justify her misappropriation and conversion of escrow funds. Respondent's failure to account for the escrow funds paid to her in the Timoll transaction and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's account constitutes culpable negligence. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent in the Timoll transaction constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver rental trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Rule 61J2- 14.012(1). Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 3. The Veil Transaction On November 29, 1993, Respondent entered into a short term lease agreement between Respondent, as the landlord, and Herman J. and Joyce Veil (the "Veils") as tenants (the "Veil transaction"). The Veils lived out of state. They paid Respondent a deposit of $1,919.36 to secure the seasonal rental of Unit 511, Ocean Walk Condominiums ("unit 511"). On March 1, 1994, the Veils traveled to Melbourne and discovered that unit 511 was not available. Respondent never provided the Veils with a rental unit of any kind. The Veils demanded the return of their deposit. On March 11, 1994, Respondent issued check number 1127 in the amount of $1,394.01. Respondent represented to the Veils that $1,394.01 was the total amount due. Respondent deducted $525.35 for motel charges allegedly incurred by Respondent to provide the Veils with temporary lodging for 11 days while Respondent attempted to procure an alternate rental for the Veils. The deduction of $525.35 was not authorized by the Veils. The Veils did not agree to pay for their own motel room. In addition, the motel charges deducted by Respondent included charges for two nights paid by the Veils. After Respondent issued check number 1127 for $1,394.01, Respondent ordered the bank to stop payment on the check. The bank erroneously cashed the check and subsequently requested the Veils to return the proceeds. The Veils refused. Respondent misappropriated $525.35 paid to her by the Veils and converted those escrow funds to Respondent's personal use. Those funds were paid to Respondent in trust for the Veils' seasonal condominium. Respondent breached that trust in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of escrow funds belonging to the Veils. Respondent engaged in false pretenses to justify her misappropriation and conversion of the escrow funds. Respondent's failure to account for escrow funds paid to her in the Veil transaction and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's accounts constitutes culpable negligence. When all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Veil transaction are considered, Respondent's attempt to stop payment of her check to the Veils constitutes dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver rental trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Rule 61J2-14.012(1). Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 4. The Sella Transaction On February 14, 1994, Respondent procured a construction contract between Militano Construction, Inc. (the "seller"), and Mr. Lino Sella, (the "buyer"). The buyer lived in Italy and required an interpreter for his negotiations with Respondent. On February 14, 1994, the buyer entrusted Respondent with an escrow deposit of $12,250. The buyer authorized Respondent to administer funds entrusted to her because the buyer was in Italy. 11/ On February 15, 1994, Respondent cashed the check for the escrow deposit. Respondent obtained a cashier's check for $12,250 made payable to "Wilson Realty." Respondent then endorsed the cashier's check for her personal use. 12/ In July, 1994, the buyer authorized Respondent to release the escrow deposit to the seller upon issuance of a certificate of occupancy ("CO") by the City of Indian Harbour Beach, Florida (the "city"). The city issued the CO on September 1, 1994. After the city issued the CO, the seller repeatedly made verbal demands for Respondent to deliver the escrow deposit. On September 9, 1994, the seller wrote a letter to Respondent demanding the escrow deposit. On September 13, 1994, the buyer physically inspected the house, found that it was acceptable, and again authorized disbursement of the escrow deposit. The seller again demanded the escrow deposit. Respondent never delivered the escrow deposit. Respondent never accounted for the deposit to the seller, the buyer, or Petitioner. The seller was unable to pay approximately $9,000 to subcontractors used to construct the buyer's house. The subcontractors recorded mechanics' liens against the Sella property and precluded the seller from delivering good and sufficient title to the buyer. The seller's failure to provide the buyer with good and sufficient title precluded the seller from satisfying its obligations under the terms of the contract with the buyer and caused the seller to breach the contract. The buyer incurred legal expenses in an attempt to quiet title to his house. The seller incurred legal expenses in an attempt to recover the escrow deposit from Respondent. Respondent misappropriated a $12,250 escrow deposit in the Sella transaction and converted that escrow deposit for personal use. The escrow deposit was given to Respondent in trust. Respondent breached that trust in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of the escrow deposit in the Sella transaction. Respondent's failure to account for the escrow deposit and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's escrow account constitutes culpable negligence. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent in the Sella transaction constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Rule 61J2-14.012(1). Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 5. The Stanley Transaction In March, 1994, Respondent procured a construction contract between Atlantic Construction, Inc. (the "seller"), and Trevor and Carol Stanley (the "buyers") who are residents of New York. The buyers entrusted Respondent with an escrow deposit of $7,800. The buyers were unable to qualify for a mortgage and terminated the agreement in accordance with the terms of the construction contract. The buyers agreed to forfeit $500 of the escrow deposit to Respondent as real estate commission. On July 12, 1994, the buyers demanded that Respondent return $7,300 of their escrow deposit. Respondent claimed the entire $7,800 escrow deposit and neither delivered the $7,300 agreed to by the buyers nor accounted for any of the escrow deposit. Petitioner was unable to audit Respondent's escrow account. The bank where the escrow account was maintained closed the account because the account was overdrawn. The bank charged off $3,483.45 in overdrawn funds. Respondent misappropriated a $7,300 escrow deposit in the Stanley transaction and converted the escrow deposit to Respondent's personal use. Those funds were given to Respondent in trust. Respondent breached that trust in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of escrow funds in the Stanley transaction. Respondent's failure to account for the escrow deposit and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's account constitutes culpable negligence. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent in the Stanley transaction constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Rule 61J2-14.012(1). Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 6. Respondent's Conduct Respondent evidenced a gross disregard for the rights and property of others, applicable laws, and the legal process. 13/ Respondent's conduct demonstrated culpable intent to commit the offenses for which she is charged. Respondent has made no attempt at restitution to any of the five clients she harmed, and has made no attempt to pay the overdraws charged off by the bank. Respondent has made no attempt to pay the Sella subcontractors or otherwise remove any cloud on the title to the Sella property. Respondent ignored valid subpoenas issued by Petitioner. Respondent engaged in dilatory acts and misrepresentations. Respondent delayed this proceeding through repeated false pretenses that she was represented by counsel who was unable to appear for previously scheduled formal hearings. Respondent participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose. There was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact in Respondent's defense. Respondent's defense was baseless and a sham. It was no more than a stonewall defense presented for the purpose of delay. Respondent failed to show any of the facts asserted in her defense. She called no witnesses and submitted no material exhibits for admission in evidence. Respondent's cross examination of Petitioner's witnesses nominally attempted to create issues but failed to produce any competent and substantial evidence to support those issues. Respondent repeatedly attempted to establish issues either by unsworn representations or by arguing with witnesses during cross examination. Respondent's sworn testimony at the formal hearing was not credible and was unpersuasive. No competent and substantial evidence supported her testimony. Any evidence that Respondent adduced during her testimony, her cross examination of other witnesses, and in her exhibits was immaterial. Respondent's conduct in this proceeding constituted a reckless waste of quasi-judicial resources as well as a waste of the time and money of Petitioner and its witnesses. Many of those witnesses had already lost time and money as a result of Respondent's conduct before this proceeding began.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b), (d)1., (e), and (k); and Rule 61J2- 14.012(1); revoking Respondent's real estate license; and imposing a fine of $20,000. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November 1995.
The Issue The issue is whether Mr. Powell should be disciplined for irregularities in the handling of an escrow deposit by a real estate firm for which he was the qualifying broker.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Willie Powell, was at all relevant times a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0070494. Mr. Powell was the sole qualifying broker of Future Investments & Development II Co., Inc., trading as ERA Thompkins and Saunders Realty Company (hereafter, T & S), 2734 N.W. 183rd Street, Suite 206, Miami, Florida 33056. On or about November 12, 1990, Guillermo Castillo, a licensed real estate broker for Emerald Enterprises, Inc., received a listing agreement from Horace B. Miller to sell residential property (a duplex) owned by Miller located at 2331 N.W. 103rd Street, Miami, Florida. The property was listed with the Multiple Listing Service. On or about February 27 or 28, 1991, Mr. Castillo received a telephone call from Willie J. Thompkins of T & S saying he wanted to show the Miller property to a prospective buyer. On or about February 28, 1991, Mr. Castillo received through the mail slot at his office a written offer from George R. Howell of Dorchester, Massachusetts, to buy the Miller property, with a business card of Jerry Saunders of T & S. On or about March 6, 1991, Guillermo Castillo met with Horace Miller to review the Howell offer. At Miller's request, Castillo made some changes to the contract to reflect that Miller was selling the duplex in "as is" condition. Miller signed the contract and initialed the changes, and Mr. Castillo signed the contract on behalf of Emerald Enterprises, and called Willie J. Thompkins to tell him the contract had been signed. The next day, Mr. Castillo went to the office of T & S and dropped off the contract for the buyer to consider the seller's changes. A day or two later, a representative of T & S telephoned Guillermo Castillo and told Mr. Castillo that the buyer had accepted the seller's changes to the contract; Mr. Castillo then notified Miller. Mr. Castillo later received from T & S the signed contract with Mr. Miller's changes initialed by Mr. Howell. The contract was also signed by Mr. Thompkins of T & S. The contract called for a $1,000 deposit to be held in escrow by T & S (Exhibit 5, Paragraph IIa). Guillermo Castillo contacted T & S to check on the progress of the sale. He learned that J.P. Mortgage was handling the buyer's mortgage loan application. Castillo contacted J.P. Mortgage and was told that the loan was proceeding normally. After the contractual closing date of April 29, 1991, had passed without the closing taking place, Castillo contracted J.P. Mortgage again, but was told that they were no longer processing the loan. Castillo requested that J.P. Mortgage send him a letter to that effect, and he received a letter dated May 2, 1991, stating that J.P. Mortgage was withdrawing as the lender because the buyer failed to return the mortgage loan application. Castillo informed Horace Miller of the situation and Miller instructed Castillo to write to T & S making a claim to the buyer's deposit under the contract of sale. On May 4, 1991, Castillo sent a letter to T & S claiming the deposit for the seller. Paragraph Q of the contract provided for the seller to retain the buyer's deposit as liquidated damages if the buyer failed to perform the contract. On or about May 9, 1991, Guillermo Castillo received from Mr. Thompkins, the manger of T & S, a letter dated May 1, 1991, but postmarked May 6, 1991, ". . . requesting that the . . . file be cancelled" due to ". . . communication problems with . . . Mr. Howell," and citing unsuccessful attempts to contact Howell by telephone and by mail. When Castillo received that letter he contacted T & S to point out the seriousness of the matter and to press for forfeiture of the buyer's deposit. On May 9, 1991, Castillo received a telefax from Mr. Thompkins of T & S stating that the Howell deposit check had been returned for insufficient funds and attaching a copy of the returned check. Prior to his receipt of this telefax, Castillo had not taken any independent steps to verify whether T & S had actually received the Howell deposit. He had relied on the contract, which had been executed by a licensed salesman and believed he did not require further verification that the escrow deposit had been made. Neither Mr. Castillo nor Mr. Miller dealt with the Respondent, Mr. Powell, at any time concerning the sale of the Miller property. T & S received George Howell's $1,000 deposit in the form of a check on March 4, 1991, drawn on a Massachusetts bank and deposited it in its account with First Union National Bank which was used as the escrow account, account number 15462242336, on March 5, 1991. The check was charged back to the account twice, on March 11, 1991, and on March 26, 1991. Mr. Powell was a signatory on that escrow account. After Guillermo Castillo received the May 9, 1991, telefax, he notified Horace Miller. Mr. Miller had not taken any steps on his own to verify whether T & S had received the deposit because he had confidence in his broker to let him know right away if there were any problems with the sale. By May 9, 1991, Horace Miller had already incurred expenses preparing the property for closing, and had lost rent by terminating a tenancy in the property. Because the transaction never closed, Mr. Miller sustained financial damage, some of which he might have avoided if he had been notified earlier of the buyer's dishonored escrow deposit check. On or about May 28, 1991, Miller filed a complaint with the Department of Professional Regulation, which Sidney Miller investigated. He found that the person introduced to him during his investigation at T & S as Willie Powell was not actually the Respondent. In March 1991, Mr. Powell had not seen the bank statements for the T & S escrow account for several months, and had not signed the written monthly escrow account reconciliation statement for the month of October 1990 or for any subsequent month. Mr. Powell was serving as the qualifying broker of T & S for a salary of $75 per month and no commissions. He was not active in the management of the firm. He would come to the office of T & S approximately three days per week to check files and sign listing agreements, and he would call in to see if there were any problems, messages or documents to sign. He essentially loaned his brokers' license to those who operated T & S as an accommodation because he had known the Thompkins family for 25 years. Mr. Powell argues in his proposed order that "the adequacy of [Mr. Powell's] monthly reconciliations were impeded by frauds perpetrated upon him by persons at [T & S]" (PRO at page 9, paragraph 5). It is obvious that there were problems at T & S, since a person there misrepresented himself to the Department's investigator as Mr. Powell. The full extent of the misconduct there is unclear. There is no proof in this record that salespersons at T & S had fabricated escrow account statements for Mr. Powell. Had Mr. Powell proven that he performed monthly reconciliations with what turned out to be falsified records of T & S, his argument might be well taken. The record, unfortunately, shows that no reconciliations were done. Had Mr. Powell done them, the problem here should have been uncovered.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued finding Willie Powell guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, finding him not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, and taking the following disciplinary action against him: Issuance of a reprimand. Imposition of an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000 to be paid within 30 days of the date of the final order adopting the recommended order. Placement of the license of Mr. Powell on probation for a period of one year beginning on the date of the final order and providing that during that period he shall provide satisfactory evidence to the Florida Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, Legal Section, Hurston Building, North Tower, Suite N-308, 400 West Robinson Street, Orlando, Florida 32801-1772, of having completion a 30-hour postlicensure education course in real estate brokerage management, in addition to any other education required of him to remain current and active as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, and that he be required to submit to the Commission during that year his monthly trust account reconciliations. Cf. Rule 21V-24.002(3)(i), Florida Administrative Code, on penalties for violation of Rule 21V-14.012(2), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of July 1992. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of July 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-0192 Rulings on Findings proposed by the Commission: Adopted in Findings 1 and 2. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Findings 7 and 8. Adopted in Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 12. Adopted in Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 11. Adopted in Finding 15. Rulings on Findings proposed by Mr. Powell: Adopted in Finding 1 with the exception of the license number. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 4. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Finding 6. Generally adopted in Finding 6. Implicit in Finding 10. Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Findings 7 and 8. Adopted in Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 10. Rejected as subordinate to Finding 10. Adopted in Finding 13. Rejected as unnecessary, the reconciliation was not one done shortly following the month of March reconciling the account for March 1991. It was done during the investigation conducted by Mr. Miller and took place between approximately June 20 and July 10, 1991. Adopted in Finding 15. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 14. Rejected as unnecessary, or subordinate to Finding 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore R. Gay, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Suite N-607 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33128 Harold M. Braxton, Esquire Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether an administrative fine should be imposed against Respondent for alleged violation of Sections 400.102(1)(b) and 400.162, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the letter of Joseph D. Dowless, Jr., dated March 16, 1978. Representatives of Respondent Sweeting Nursing Home did not appear at the hearing and therefore the matter proceeded as uncontested pursuant to Rule 28- 5.25(5), Florida Administrative Code. At the commencement of the hearing, the Hearing Officer inquired of Petitioner's counsel as to the accuracy of the charge of a violation of Section 400.102(1)(b), F.S., which involves misappropriation or conversion of the property of a resident of a nursing home facility, Petitioner's counsel announced that it wished to proceed under Section 400.102(1)(c) as a violation of provisions of Chapter 400 rather than on a conversion theory. In view of the fact that such an amendment involves an allegation of lesser severity than that originally alleged in the notice of charges and was fairly encompassed within such letter, the Hearing Officer permitted the amendment.
Findings Of Fact Sweeting Nursing Home, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, is a facility licensed by Petitioner under Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. As a result of an audit of the facility for the year ending March 31, 1976, Petitioner's hospital consultant with its Office of Licensure and Certification visited Petitioner's premises on March 10, 1978, to see if certain deficiencies existing in the patient trust fund, as indicated in the audit, had been corrected. The audit deficiencies were failure to reconcile patient trust fund account balances with the general ledger account balance on a regular basis, improper documentation to support fund receipts and disbursements, failure to reconcile patient trust fund account liability and patient trust fund cards, transfer of patient trust fund cards to the patient's file upon the patient's departure from the home, and inclusion of old balances in the liability account due to patients who are no longer at the facility. Petitioner's consultant found that inadequate records existed to properly audit the accounts and determined that the deficiencies cited in the audit had not been corrected. On the occasion of his visit, Respondent's administrator, Mrs. Marie Camacho, admitted that she was in violation of pertinent regulations regarding handling of patient trust funds and that such funds were frequently used to meet payroll expenses due to the fact that the home did not receive other regular funds from state sources on a timely basis. She stated, however, that trust fund monies were always returned to the trust fund account when the facility received Medicare or Medicaid payments. Petitioner's consultant also inquired as to the availability of bank statements of the trust fund accounts and was told that such records were at an accounting firm in Miami, Florida. No attempt was made, however, by the consultant to contact the accounting firm. (Testimony of Hanson) Patient trust funds are derived from monies received by patients from governmental or private sources for personal expenses. In the case of Medicaid, patients receive $25.00 a month from their social security checks for this purpose. Deposits and withdrawals from these accounts are recorded on individual patient ledger cards. Normally, disbursements are made from a petty case account with a monthly withdrawal from the patient's trust fund bank account to equal the amount withdrawn within the period. Although there is a lag time of approximately three months from the time a patient is admitted in the nursing home until the government commences monthly payments for care, the nursing home is expected to be sufficiently solvent to meet its expenses pending receipt of such monies. (Testimony of Hanson)
Recommendation That an administrative fine of $1,000 should be imposed against Respondent Sweeting Nursing Home for violation of Sections 400.162(4) and (5), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of July, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Harold L. Braynon District X Legal Counsel Department of HRS 800 West Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Sweeting Nursing Home 2137 N.W. 4th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Steven W. Huss Staff Attorney Central Operations Services Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Philip H. Bergman Stephen W. Crair 9000 Southwest 87th Court Miami, Florida 33176
Findings Of Fact Respondent Multicare Corporation is a Delaware corporation having its principal place of business in Pinellas County, Florida. It operates the William and Mary Nursing Hotel, New Fern Restorium, and Lakeview Nursing Home. In early August, 1977, Jack Fullerton, a hospital consultant with petitioner's Office of Licensure and Certification, visited the William and Mary Nursing Hotel to conduct an annual survey concerning the facility's compliance with pertinent law concerning patient trust fund accounts. He was informed at that time by a representative of the William and Mary Nursing Hotel that all such records were maintained at the corporate offices of respondent located at the New Fern Restorium. Accordingly, on August 19 he visited such offices to review available records. He was informed by respondent's head bookkeeper at that time that patient trust funds of all three nursing homes were maintained in one bank account of the corporation in the St. Petersburg Bank and Trust Company. In the course of his visit, Fullerton reviewed the bank statements for the period January through July, 1977. Although he asked to see the check register for the account, respondent's representative declined to make it available to him and he did not press the matter. He was also provided with monthly reports of patient trust fund balances for each patient. Although there were individual ledger cards showing daily expenditures for each patient, Fullerton did not make an in depth review of each such account to determine the daily balance for each patient. Indeed, he termed his inspection a "cursory review" of respondent's accounting procedures. Based on his examination of the above mentioned records, he noted that at various times during a particular month, the bank account balance reflected a lesser sum than that credited to patient trust accounts at the beginning of each month. For example, in January, 1977, the total patient trust accounts amount to $17,373.06, but in reviewing the bank statement, the balance shown on January 24 was only $18.10. Fullerton therefore surmised that patient trust funds had been used during the course of the month to meet corporate operating expenses. Based on this assumption, he rendered a report to his superiors on August 25, 1977, wherein he recommended that if his findings were considered sufficiently evident of an improper practice in violation of subsection 400.162(5), Florida Statutes, consideration should be given to imposing a fine against the respondent. However, he acknowledged in his report that he had compared monthly with daily balances and stated "to be specific, a complete audit would be indicated." Fullerton did not find any instance where a patient had been denied or deprived of the use of trust funds. Fullerton also found no irregularities in respondent's accounting and bookkeeping procedures. There is no prohibition against the commingling of trust fund monies and corporate funds in one bank account. (Testimony of Fullerton, Petitioner's exhibit 1) The responsible official of respondent corporation testified that expenditures from patient trust funds are posted on a quarterly basis, while deposits to such funds are posted monthly. Therefore, the records utilized by petitioner's auditor in determining the alleged impropriety did not reflect amounts spent daily by the patients for incidental expenditures after the monthly entries had been reflected in the books of the corporation. He further testified that the amounts posted also included monies advanced for private patients which were not in the nature of trust funds received for Medicaid patients. Further, there is up to a 90 day delay in receipt of Medicaid payments which often requires respondent to finance patient trust fund accounts out of its own resources until such federal funds are received. Although the official conceded that patient trust funds are merged into the corporate bank account which is also used for operating expenses, the firm maintains continuing lines of credit and other resources to insure that the amount represented by such trust funds is always available to it. (Testimony of Mosher)
Recommendation That the charges against respondent Multicare Corporation be dismissed. Done and Entered this 10th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara D. McPherson, Esquire District V Attorney Department of HRS Post Office Box 5046 Clearwater, Florida 33518 John Dew, Esquire Post Office Box 28 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Respondent's licenses as a real estate broker should be disciplined because of the matters set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations of misconduct in the Administrative Complaint, the Petitioner, Division of Real Estate, was the state agency charged with the responsibility for the licensing and regulation of the real estate profession in this state. The Respondent, Richard L. Bohner, was licensed as a real estate broker in Florida operating, with his wife, Kirsten, Bohner Real Estate, located at 205 E. Osceola Street in Stuart, Florida. On October 1, 1989, Mr. Bohner as owner/lessor, entered into separate rental agreements with Trudy Dohm and Thelma Reynolds, with Bohner Real Estate identified as agent, for the lease for 12 months each of apartments number 105 and 204, respectively, at 1674 S.E. St. Lucie Blvd. in Stuart, Florida, for a monthly rental of $350.00 each. Each lease provided for the placement of a security deposit and last month's rental in advance; those sums, according to the terms of the lease, to be held by the agent, Bohner Real Estate, in a non- interest bearing escrow account at the Florida National Bank in Stuart. In actuality, the sums above-mentioned were, in each case, deposited into an account at the First National Bank and Trust Company in Stuart. This account, number 8000030400, was held in the name of Richard L. Bohner or Kirsten L. Bohner, Trust account. This account was an interest bearing account and, over the time in question, also received several large deposits of funds by or on behalf of the Respondent, Richard L. Bohner which were his personal funds and not funds received as a part of or in conjunction with his activities as a real estate broker or those of Bohner Real Estate. For the most part, the funds placed in that account were Bohner's personal funds and security deposits and last month's rent on apartments in the building owned as a personal investment by Mr. and Mrs. Bohner. On February 20, 1990, Sharon Thayer, an investigator for the Department, in the normal course of business, went to the Respondent's real estate office, unannounced as was her prerogative, and asked to speak with Mr. Bohner. He was not present at the time and she asked Mrs. Bohner, who was present, to produce the Respondent's books for the brokerage's escrow account, which she did. In the course of their conversation, Mrs. Bohner identified herself as being in partnership with the Respondent and admitted to assisting him in the maintenance of the escrow account. When Ms. Thayer asked for the backup documents for the escrow account, these were produced. Ms. Bohner also provided Ms. Thayer with copies of the bank account she maintained. On inquiry, Mrs. Bohner said the deposits thereon were, in the main, representative of rental and security deposits from tenants on leases which Bohner Real Estate managed. Ms. Thayer asked about the large deposits made on May 3, June 7, and July 7, 1989. These were for $104,542.50, $50,000.00, and $4.600.00 respectively. In response, Mrs. Bohner indicated these were personal monies which came from personal sources and funds which had been put in that account because that's where they would get the most interest. They were not escrow funds related to the real estate brokerage. Ms. Thayer made an appointment to return to the brokerage office on February 23, 1990 to speak with Respondent. When she did so, Mr. Bohner accounted for the trust liability of $6,885.00 which existed on that date. This sum was verified with the bank by phone. The trust account had an overage of somewhat more than $881.00 which Respondent explained as accrued interest not removed from the account. Mr. Bohner admitted at hearing that he earned interest on the security and rental deposits he held in that account and used that earned interest to offset the low rentals he charged his tenants. He asserted, and there was no evidence to rebut this assertion, that the only security and rental deposits placed in that account were from tenants in the apartment building he and his wife owned personally. Neither he nor Bohner Real Estate managed or served as rental agent for any rental properties owned by others. It is so found. Ms. Thayer pointed out, and it is accepted as fact, that a broker is required to reconcile his trust account on a monthly basis and file a monthly reconciliation form which accounts for overages and shortages. Respondent admits he had not completed or filed these reconciliations because neither he nor Bohner Real Estate has a trust or escrow account into which client funds are deposited. He manages no property from which rents would be collected other than his own, and when he takes a deposit on a sale or transfer, a separate trust account is opened for that particular transaction with any interest earned going to the buyer. Petitioner showed, through the testimony of Ms. Casale, the bank records custodian, that the largest deposit in issue, that one in excess of $100,000.00, was the result of the maturity of a certificate of deposit that was transferred to the account in question. Respondent did not endorse the check for deposit or sign any deposit document. He submitted a letter from the bank chairman to support his thesis that he was not a party to the transfer, but the letter, admitted over objection by counsel for Petitioner, indicates the deposit was made by the bank's investment counselor who handled the transaction consistent with telephone instructions given her by the Respondent. This is a collateral matter, however. When Ms. Thayer completed her audit, she prepared and filed a report on which she indicated, inter alia, that the office met inspection standards and that the property management escrow/trust account was satisfactory. She noted an overage of $889.31 in the account and that it was an interest bearing account although the leases state it would be non-interest bearing. No deadline was given for the correction of this item. Mrs. Bohner admits that when she gave the apartment security escrow account to Ms. Thayer at her request and described it as a trust account, she was not thinking. In fact, and it is so found, neither Respondent nor Bohner Real Estate have a trust account for the business and have not had one for several years. She reiterates Mr. Bohner's assertion that the only money usually kept in the account referenced by Ms. Casale and referred to by Ms. Thayer, is money received as security deposits and last month's rental from tenants in their own building. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case dismissing all allegations of misconduct by Respondents as outlined in the Administrative Complaint filed herein. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 1st day of April, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence accepted and incorporated herein,. Balance is not Finding of Fact but lore legal conclusion. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENTS: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore Gay, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 401 NW Second Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Richard L. Bohner Bohner Teal Estate 205 East Osceola Street Stuart, Florida 34994 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 - 1900
The Issue Whether Petitioner is qualified for licensure as a real estate salesperson.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is fifty-two years of age. He became licensed as a real estate salesperson in the State of Florida in 1981, after returning to the state (where he was born and raised) from New Jersey. The following year he obtained a license that allowed him to operate as a real estate broker in Florida. In or about 1984, Petitioner formed Landmark Realty, Inc. (Landmark), which operated in Broward County, Florida, as a Century 21 franchise. On or about June 29, 1989, in DPR Case Nos. 0163964 and 0164128, the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, issued an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner and Landmark containing the following allegations: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0344112 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker c/o Landmark Realty, Inc., 1860 N. Pine Island Road, Plantation, Florida 33322. Respondent Landmark Realty, Inc., is now and was at all times material hereto a corporation licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0239155 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was at the address of 1860 N. Pine Island Road, Plantation, Florida 33322. COUNT I The Department of Professional Regulation conducted a routine office inspection/escrow account audit of Respondents' escrow accounts between June 15, 1989 and June 16, 1989. Respondents' escrow account number 55322000377 is held at First Union National Bank of Florida. Respondents' escrow account number 55322000377 had a balance of $1,368.36 on June 16, 1989. The pending sales files revealed that the escrow monies balance should have been $65,250 on June 16, 1989. The escrow account had a shortage of $63,881.64. . . . Respondent Caprio claims he transferred $80,700 from Respondents' escrow account number 55322000377 to the Keys & Keys trust account number 0304301543 on the advice of counsel. . . . Kathy Clements, Operations Officer for County National Bank of South Florida furnished a written letter that the Keys & Keys trust account number 0304301543, had a current balance of $101,901.43 on June 20, 1989. . . . The Respondents failed to furnish any validated documents detailing the dates and amounts of deposits into the aforementioned Keys & Keys trust account from the aforementioned Respondents' escrow account. The Respondents' escrow account number 55322000377 is a commercial money market investment account with the interest going to Landmark Realty, Inc., without the consent or prior knowledge of all parties. . . . The Respondents failed to timely notify the Florida Real Estate Commission of conflicting demands on the earnest money deposit on the contract, dated July 17, 1988, between David B. Perry, as seller, and Earle A. and Yvonne M. Levy, as buyers. The buyers entrusted an earnest money deposit of $1,000 with the Respondents on or about July 17, 1988, and an additional earnest money deposit of $20,000 was entrusted to the Respondents on or about August 22, 1988. The Respondents received a demand letter f[rom] the buyers on December 13, 1988 and a demand letter from the seller's attorney on February 21, 1989. . . . On or about April 19, 1989, the Respondents received or should have received a total earnest money deposit of $4,000 from Perry Silver, as buyer, and Charles Hennessey, as seller. The audit revealed no proof that the additional deposit of $2,000 as required by the contract dated April 19, 1989 was received by the Respondents. . . . The Respondents failed to timely notify the Florida Real Estate Commission of conflicting demands on the earnest money deposit on the contract, dated May 31, 1989, between C. McCanes and J. Steele, as sellers, and Jacqueline W. Mayers, as buyer. The buyer entrusted an earnest money deposit of $1,000 with the Respondents on or about May 31, 1989. The additional deposit of $4,000 as called for in the contract was never received by the Respondents. On June 1, 1989, the buyers made a demand on the earnest money deposit and on June 6, 1989 the seller made a demand for the earnest money deposit. . . . The Respondents, on or about May 16, 1989, did unlawfully disburse check number 0963 from the Respondents' escrow account number 55322000377 to the Respondents' operating account to cover office expenses. The Administrative Complaint further alleged that, "[b]ased upon the foregoing," Petitioner and Landmark were guilty of "fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes"; "having failed to account and deliver a deposit in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes"; "having failed to maintain trust funds in [their] real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof was properly authorized in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes"; and "having failed to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission upon receiving conflicting demands or having a good faith doubt as to who is entitled to an earnest money deposit according to Rule 21V-10.032, Florida Administrative Code and therefore in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes." Petitioner had never before had a complaint filed against him. On December 21, 1989, the Florida Real Estate Commission issued a Final Order in DPR Case Nos. 0163964 and 0164128 finding Petitioner guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and revoking his license, notwithstanding his unblemished disciplinary record. The Final Order read, in pertinent part, as follows: On December 5, 1989, the Florida Real Estate Commission heard this case to issue a Final Order. On or about June 29, 1989, an Administrative Complaint was filed against Respondents. The Respondents admitted the allegations of fact. . . . The Respondents were properly served with the Notice of Hearing, appeared and presented matters in mitigation. Based upon the allegations of fact and upon the information provided to the Commission at its meeting of December 5, 1989, the Commission finds the Respondents guilty of violating s.475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(d), 475.25(1)(e), and 475(1)(k), Florida Statutes, and Rule 21V-10.032, Florida Administrative Code, as charged in the Administrative Complaint. Therefore, the Commission ORDERS that the license of Respondent Philip Caprio be revoked. The Commission further ORDERS that Respondent Landmark Realty Inc. be reprimanded and that said Respondent pay an administrative fine of $1000.00 within 30 days of the date of this Order. Petitioner did not appeal the Final Order. Following the issuance of the Final Order, reimbursement was made to the victims of the violations of which Petitioner and Landmark had been found guilty. The loss of Petitioner's real estate license has adversely affected his ability to make a living and support his family. Petitioner is married to Teresa Caprio. He and Teresa have a twenty-five year old disabled daughter, who requires assistance in performing the normal activities of daily living. Before the revocation of Petitioner's license, the Caprios' daughter lived at home with them. Teresa was able to stay at home and care full-time for her daughter. After Petitioner's license was revoked, however, she no longer was able to do so, inasmuch as she needed to work outside the home to supplement the family income. The Caprios therefore had to place their daughter in a group home. Although Petitioner has not been able to earn nearly as much as he did when he had his real estate license, he has been gainfully employed since the revocation of his license. From 1989 to 1995, he worked for Potamkin Toyota (Potamkin), an automobile dealership. He started as a salesman at Potamkin. After approximately six months at the dealership, he was promoted to customer relations manager/weekend sales manager. He left the employ of Potamkin in 1995, following a change in management at the dealership. Petitioner is now, and has been since July of 1995, employed by Central Florida Investments, Inc., d/b/a Westgate Miami Beach (Westgate), a seller of timeshare plans. He currently is a salaried employee occupying the position of finance manager, a position to which he was promoted after his first six months with the company. He will be unable to advance further in the company if he does not obtain a Florida real estate license. In his position as finance manager, Petitioner takes deposits made by purchasers and prospective purchasers2 and delivers them to Westgate's contract office, which is approximately 20 feet from his office. Using hidden security cameras, Westgate management closely monitors the workplace activities of Petitioner and his coworkers. Petitioner has performed his job duties in a manner that has impressed Westgate management. He has proven to be a competent, reliable, responsible, honest, and trustworthy employee.3 Petitioner is involved in community activities. He and his wife volunteer their time to operate the Rainbow Foundation, a non-profit organization that they formed two years ago to promote the growth of residential facilities for the developmentally disabled in the South Florida area. It appears that since the revocation of his real estate license, Petitioner has rehabilitated himself and that therefore it is not likely that his relicensure would endanger the public.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding that Petitioner is qualified to practice as a real estate salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of September, 1997.
The Issue Whether the Respondents' Florida real estate licenses should be disciplined based upon the following charges, as alleged in the administrative complaint: COUNTS I and II: Whether Respondent Richard Michael Regazzi ("Regazzi") is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. COUNT III: Whether Respondent Regazzi is guilty of failure to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof was properly authorized in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. COUNT IV: Whether Respondent Atlantic Rentals Realty, Inc. is guilty of failure to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof was properly authorized in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. COUNT V: Whether Respondent Regazzi is guilty of failure to prepare the required written monthly escrow statement- reconciliations in violation of Rule 61J2-14.012(2) and (3), Florida Administrative Code, and therefore in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. COUNT VI: Whether Respondent Atlantic Rentals, Inc. is guilty of failure to prepare the required written monthly escrow statement-reconciliations in violation of Rule 61J2-14.012(2) and (3), Florida Administrative Code, and therefore in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. COUNT VII: Whether Respondent Regazzi is guilty of having been found guilty for a third time of misconduct that warrants his suspension or has been found guilty of a course of conduct or practices which shows that he is so incompetent, negligent, dishonest, or untruthful that the money, property, transactions, and rights of investors, or those with whom he may sustain a confidential relation, may not safely be entrusted to him in violation of Section 475.25(1)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaint pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Regazzi is, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed Florida real estate broker. License number 0273453 was issued in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker in care of Atlantic Rentals, Inc., 6811 North Atlantic Avenue, No. B, Cape Canaveral, Florida. Respondent Atlantic Rentals, Inc. is, and was at all times material hereto, a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker having been issued license number 0273444 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was at the address of 6811 North Atlantic Avenue, No. B, Cape Canaveral, Florida. At all times material hereto, Respondent Regazzi was licensed and operating as the qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Atlantic Rentals, Inc. On January 28, 1997, Petitioner's Investigator Maria Ventura ("Investigator Ventura") conducted an audit of Respondents' escrow account #3601612291, maintained at NationsBank and titled Atlantic Rentals, Inc., Multi Unit escrow Account (escrow account). On January 28, 1997, Respondents had a reconciled bank balance of $46,166.93. As of January 28, 1997, Investigator Ventura determined that Respondents had a total trust liability of $84,586.77. By comparing Respondents' reconciled bank balance with Respondents' trust liability, it was determined that Respondents had a shortage of $38,419.84 in their escrow account. In addition, Respondents were not performing monthly reconciliations of their escrow account. On January 28, 1997, Respondent Regazzi prepared a monthly reconciliation statement (reconciliation statement) for December 1996, and provided it to Petitioner on the same day. Respondent Regazzi's reconciliation statement indicated that there was shortage of $28,885.36 in the escrow account. Respondent Regazzi's reconciliation statement is not signed, and does not indicate what month was being reconciled. The statement indicates that the reconciled bank balance and trust liability agree when, in fact, the reconciliation statement indicates a shortage of $28,885.36. Respondent Regazzi's explanation of how the funds were removed from the escrow account by a third party is not credible. Even if this account were credible, it does not lessen Respondent Regazzi's culpability. On April 21, 1992, the Florida Real Estate Commission ("FREC") issued a final order whereby Respondent Regazzi was found guilty of misconduct and was fined $200, and placed on probation for one year with a requirement to complete and provide satisfactory evidence to the Department of having completed an approved 30-hour broker management course. Respondent successfully completed the terms of probation. On November 12, 1996, the FREC issued a final order whereby Respondent Regazzi was fined $250 for misconduct and Respondent Atlantic Rentals, Inc. was reprimanded.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Regazzi be found guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b), (e), (k), and (o), Florida Statutes (1995), as charged in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent Atlantic Rentals, Inc. be found guilty of having violated Sections 475.25(1)(b), (k), and (e), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint. That Respondents Regazzi's real estate license be revoked and that he be ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $38,419.84, plus interest. That Respondent Atlantic Rentals, Inc.'s corporate brokerage registration be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of December, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard Michael Regazzi, pro se Atlantic Rentals, Inc. 6811-B North Atlantic Avenue Cape Canaveral, Florida 32920 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is perhaps the first cemetery in Florida to sell "opening and closing" of graves on a "pre-need basis." Joseph M. Erlich, deputy director of respondent's division of finance, learned that petitioner was making such sales in the spring of 1978. At that time, as head of the section in respondent's office regulating cemeteries, Mr. Ehrlich instructed field personnel in respondent's Tampa, Miami and Pensacola offices to find out how much it cost cemeteries in their areas to open and close graves. Intentionally excluded from this survey were cemeteries in the Jacksonville and Tallahassee areas, where soil conditions make digging graves more difficult than in most other areas of the state. This inquiry yielded oral advice from persons connected with twelve of the 171 cemeteries regulated by respondent; of the twelve cost figures, which ranged from $35.00 to $125.00, the two highest were discarded. The ten remaining figures were averaged. Petitioner's cost was not among those averaged. This computation yielded a number between 70 and 75, which was rounded down to $70.00. The parties stipulated that the figures reported by these twelve cemeteries accurately reflected their individual costs for opening and closing graves, with one exception. Donald Farr, executive vice president of Hillsborough Memorial Gardens, originally reported a cost of $75.00, whereas the true cost, as subsequently determined by more rigorous cost accounting, amounted to $59.57. Using the lower figure for Hillsborough Memorial Gardens, the average of the ten lowest figures is still between 70 and 75. On July 1 of every year petitioner has been in operation, respondent has published a "Merchandise Trust Fund Departmental Cost List." Each such list provided that "[a]ll items not listed but sold on a pre-need basis will be assessed at the invoice price plus 10%." Joint exhibit No.1. On the 1978 and 1979 lists appeared the item "pre-need opening and closing $77.00." Joint exhibit No. 1. On no previous list was there any mention of "pre-need opening and closing." Every list contained cost figures for, inter alia, a great variety of bronze grave markers. Opening and closing graves on petitioner's grounds does not differ significantly from opening and closing graves at other cemeteries. The process ordinarily begins with a telephone call from a funeral home. In addition to answering the call, a secretary spends time filling out forms, checking records and notifying the supervisor where the grave is to be dug. Men use a backhoe to dig the grave. A truck brings a vault to the site where a lowering device deposits it in the grave. A tent, artificial grass and chairs are set up. Afterwards these things are removed and the grave is closed. Petitioner's cost for opening and closing a grave, including labor, insurance, gas, maintenance and depreciation of machinery and equipment comes to $37.72. Petitioner charges $125.00 for the opening and closing of a grave on a "pre-need" basis, which is substantially less than what petitioner and other cemeteries charge for the same service on an "at need" basis. Petitioner has put no money in its merchandise trust fund on account of its sales of grave openings and closings on a "pre-need" basis.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent's use of $77.00 for each contract for the future opening and closing of a grave, in calculating the deficit in petitioner's merchandise trust fund, be upheld. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Forst, Esquire 3201 Griffin Road Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Franklyn J. Wollett, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE DIVISION OF FINANCE SHARON GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 79-918 OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER, Respondent. /
