The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed insurance agent, committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a licensing and regulatory agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility and duty to enforce the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, which consists of Chapters 624-632, 634, 635, 641, 642, 648, and 651, Florida Statutes. See Section 624.307(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent has been continuously licensed in the State of Florida as a life insurance agent (a 2-16 license) and a general license agent (a 2-20 license) since March 1974, and continuously as a RPCJUA insurance agent (a 00-17 license) since March 1993. On November 4, 1996, Respondent was charged with possession of cocaine in violation of Section 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes. This charge, filed in Palm Beach County Circuit Court and assigned Case Number 96-12206 CFA02, is a third degree felony. On May 14, 1997, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of cocaine, which was accepted. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Respondent was placed on probation for a period of 18 months. The terms and conditions of Respondent's probation included working at a lawful occupation, intensive drug and alcohol evaluation, successful completion of any recommended treatment, payment of a fine in the amount of $250.00 and court costs in the amount of $461.00, performance of 100 hours of community service, random testing for the use of alcohol and drugs, six months' suspension of driver's license, and DUI school. Respondent successfully completed his probation on November 13, 1998. Respondent continued to work as an insurance agent during the term of his probation. Respondent voluntarily reported the incident to State Farm shortly after its occurrence. As a result, State Farm placed Respondent on probation and conducted a series of random alcohol and drug tests, which Respondent satisfactorily completed. Section 626.621(11), Florida Statutes, provides that the following constitutes grounds for the discretionary discipline of an agent's licensure: (11) Failure to inform the department in writing within 30 days after pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being convicted or found guilty of, any felony or a crime punishable by imprisonment of 1 year or more under the law of the United States or of any state thereof, or under the law of any other country without regard to whether a judgment of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of the case. Respondent failed to report to Petitioner within 30 days of doing so that he entered a plea of nolo contendere to a third degree felony charge of possession of cocaine in Case Number 96-12206 CFA02 on May 14, 1997. On or about March 18, 1998, Respondent applied for licensure as a Variable Annuity Insurance Agent (a 2-19 license). That application contained Question 18, which provides as follows and to which Respondent answered "yes": Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not a judgment of conviction has been entered. As a result of his answer to Question 18, Petitioner started an investigation, with which Respondent fully cooperated. As a result of that investigation, Petitioner learned the details of Respondent's plea in the criminal proceeding. Respondent testified, credibly, that he did not timely report the entry of his plea in the criminal proceeding because he did not know he was required to do so. 1/ Respondent has continuously worked as an insurance agent licensed by Petitioner in the State of Florida since March 1974. Respondent has been continuously appointed by State Farm and has built up a successful insurance business. This proceeding is the first disciplinary proceeding brought against Respondent's insurance licenses. There have been no other complaints filed by anyone in this state against Respondent's insurance licenses. Respondent's insurance licenses have not been previously disciplined in the State of Florida. The testimony of Respondent's witnesses established that he enjoys a good reputation for honesty, trustworthiness, truthfulness, and integrity in his community. He has engaged in charitable works, including work with the food bank, the Guardian Ad Litem Program, and Brazilian Indians. Respondent's witnesses also established that they had been pleased with their business dealings with Respondent, and that he has the ability and trustworthiness to successfully engage in the business of insurance. Respondent testified that State Farm will terminate his appointment as an agent if his license is suspended. Respondent testified that he will lose his business and his employees will lose their employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 626.621(8), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and guilty of violating Section 626.621(11), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint. It is further recommended that Respondent's licensure as an insurance agent be suspended for two months for the violation of Count I and for three months for the violation of Count II, to run concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2000.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner's application for examination as a bail bondsman (limited surety agent) should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witness and his demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings: On October 24, 1989, Petitioner submitted his application for examination as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). In preparation to sit for the limited surety agent's examination, Petitioner completed a community services course and received a surety agent's certificate from Hillsborough Community College on April 23, 1989. Additionally, Petitioner completed the bail and bail bonds insurance independent study course offered by the Division of Continuing Education, the Department of Independent Study by correspondence of the University of Florida and was awarded a certificate of satisfactory completion on November 14, 1989. Question 8 of the application for examination as completed by Petitioner contained the following question: "Have you ever been charged with or convicted or pleaded guilty or no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude, , a felony , or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the law of any state, territory, or country, whether or not a judgement or conviction has been entered ? If yes, give date(s): What was the crime? Where and when were you charged? Did you plead guilty or nolo contendere? Were you convicted? Was adjudication withheld? Please provide a brief description of the nature of the offense charged. If there has been more than one such felony charge, provide an explanation as to each charge on an attachment. Certified copies of the information or indictment and final adjudication for each charge is required. Petitioner responded to Question 8 by indicating that he had not been charged with, or convicted or pled guilty or no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude; that he had been so charged with committing a felony; that the crime was one which was punishable by imprisonment for one year or more and he gave the dates of September 27, 1980, June 23, 1986 and October 23, 1987. Respondent replied to subsection (a) of question 8 by indicating that the crime was worthless checks/aggravated assault. Respondent's reply to subsection (b), question 8, was that he was charged in Tampa, Florida indicating the dates of September 27, 1984, June 23, 1986, and October 23, 1986. Respondent filed a negative response to subsections (c), (d), and (e) of question 8 and his reply to subsection (f) was that he was living in an apartment, that the manager would not repair anything and he put a stop payment on the check and they filed charges. By letter dated April 25, 1990, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for examination as a bail bondsman (limited surety agent) because he failed to divulge that he was charged on or about February 5, 1988, with three counts of worthless checks (Case Numbers 88-2363C, 88-2364C, and 88-4164A). On or about March 1, 1989, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the above-referred worthless check charges. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that he failed to divulge the above-referred worthless check charges. However, Petitioner maintains that the subject charges were misdemeanors and did not amount to a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore did not need to be divulged. Petitioner's understanding comes from the training that he received in the independent study by correspondence of the bail and bail bond insurance correspondence training from the University of Florida. Moral turpitude, as defined in the course material submitted by Petitioner, is as follows: "Baseness, vileness, or dishonesty of a high degree. (44 So.2d 802). Demonstrating depravity in the private and social duties which a person owes to society. The term has been used in connection with such common crimes as bribery and larceny." Petitioner was married in 1980 and was divorced during late 1987. During this period, Petitioner and his former wife had a joint banking account and they continued that banking arrangement while they were separated during mid to late 1987 while dissolution proceedings were ongoing between them. Unbeknownst to Petitioner, his former wife "emptied" his checking account and when Petitioner wrote the checks for which he was criminally charged and is the subject of his examination denial, the checks were returned to the payees for insufficient funds. When the checks were returned, Petitioner did not know that they were returned until weeks later after three of the payees who were given the worthless checks had filed charges with the state attorney's office. During the interim, Petitioner picked up the checks and paid a service fee to the payees for the returned checks. For each of the worthless check charges, adjudication was withheld and Petitioner, after presenting proof of restitution, was ordered to pay $35.00 in court costs and a 5% surcharge to a criminal justice trust fund. Petitioner was required to divulge the worthless check charges that he failed to disclose to Respondent in response to subsection (b) of question 8.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner shall be authorized to sit for the examination as a limited surety agent upon submitting an addendum to his application for examination divulging the above worthless checks charges and the dispositions thereof with the appropriate fee. Upon successful passage of the examination and submission of the appropriate fee and license application, the Department shall issue Petitioner's license as a limited surety agent. Upon licensure as a limited surety agent, Petitioner shall be placed on probation pursuant to Section 648.53, Florida Statutes, for a period of six (6) months effective on the date that his first license is obtained. As a condition of probation, Petitioner shall strictly adhere to all provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes and rules of the Department of Insurance and Treasurer. If during the period of probation, the Department has good cause to believe that Petitioner has violated the terms or conditions of his probation, it shall suspend or revoke the license and eligibility for licensure of Petitioner. 2/ DONE and ENTERED this day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 1990.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a limited surety agent pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was an agent of American Banker's Insurance Company with authority to write surety bonds and/or bail bonds. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was doing business as, or on behalf of, a bail bond business known as A Aachen Express Bail and/or A Aachen Bail Out, 521 South Andrews Avenue, Suite 2, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On January 13, 1999, Respondent entered into an agreement with BellSouth Advertising and Publishing Corporation that resulted in an advertisement for A Aachen Express Bail in the April 2000 Greater Fort Lauderdale BellSouth Yellow Pages. The subject advertisement contained the following: "GUARANTEED LOWEST RATES!" Underneath that statement, in smaller lettering, was the following: "ALLOWED BY LAW."1 There is only one approved bail bond rate in the State of Florida. The only bail bond rate that has been approved by Petitioner is ten percent (10%) for state bonds and fifteen percent (15%) on Federal bonds, with a minimum premium of fifty dollars. Respondent, as well as all other bail bond agents in Florida may only charge a consumer those approved rates. In addition to the foregoing bond rates, bail bond agents are authorized to impose against consumers certain incidental charges pursuant to Section 648.44(1)(i), Florida Statutes.2 It was Respondent's policy to charge ten percent (10%) for state bonds and fifteen percent (15%) on Federal bonds, with a minimum premium of fifty dollars. It was Respondent's policy not to impose any other charges against consumers, including the incidental charges authorized by Section 648.44(1)(i), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that finds Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of Sections 648.44(6)(b) and 626.954(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and imposes against her an administrative fine in the amount of $100. It is further recommended that the other violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Insurance was the government agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of insurance agents and the regulation of the practice of the insurance profession in this state. Respondent, Alan Chappuis, was licensed in Florida as a life insurance agent, health insurance agent, general lines agent, and a life, health and variable annuity contracts salesman. Erna Swan, an 84 year old twice widowed lady, and the individual to whom Respondent sold the annuity policies in question, was unable, at the time of the hearing, to recall the names of either of her former husbands or when they passed away. She recalls that both husbands worked in insurance and that she has lived in the Pinellas County area for a long time, but cannot recall for how long. Mrs. Swan lives alone and can cook for herself and bathe and dress herself, but does not know how much her current income is or the source of that income. She was able to recognize Respondent as her insurance agent of several years standing, but cannot recall whether she ever purchased anything from him, and she does not know what Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company is. She does not know what an annuity is or whether she ever wanted to buy one from the Respondent. By the same token, she cannot recall if he ever tried to sell her an annuity. Mrs. Swan has known Nadine Hopkins, a close friend, for about 10 years. She also recognizes Mr. Wells and Mr. Tipton, her attorney and stock broker respectively, but does not know what they do. Mrs. Swan maintains a room in her condominium apartment which she uses for an office where, before she was placed under the guardianship of Ms. Hopkins, she paid her bills and kept her business records, such as they were. She recalls that she had a brokerage account with Merrill Lynch but cannot remember what it was for or what type of securities were in it. She is familiar with Bayridge Baptist Church, of which she is a member, and she recognizes that she has given money to the church over the years. Mrs. Swan's driver's license was cancelled several years ago because, according to Ms. Hopkins, she felt she could not take the test required to renew it. Mrs. Swan does not recall this though she remembers she used to own a car. She cannot remember what kind it was. Mrs. Swan's apartment is paid for. There are no mortgage payments. She claims she still writes checks for her monthly bills by herself, but also notes that Ms. Hopkins does it. More likely it is the latter. She still answers her phone, answers her mail, and reads the newspaper. She is, however, obviously incompetent to testify to the nature of an annuity, and it is quite clear that at this time she would be unable to understand the provisions of an annuity contract and the difference between an annuity contract and an investment portfolio in another product. Mr. Tipton, formerly a stock broker with Merrill Lynch, first met Mrs. Swan in the early 1960's through a family member who worked at the family insurance agency. At that time Mrs. Swan and her husband had purchased the agency from his family, and in the years following the Swans stayed as friends of Mr. Tipton. Mr. Tipton became an investment advisor in 1981 to Mr. Swan who passed away sometime in either 1985 or 1986. He started buying U.S. Government bonds and thereafter moved to tax free investments. When Mr. Swan passed away, Mrs. Swan became the owner of the account. During 1992 and 1993, Mr. Tipton would see Mrs. Swan once or twice a month. At that time, toward the end of 1993, it was clear to him that her memory appeared to be slipping. She would not remember things they had talked about and was unable to participate fully in the decisions made on her investments. At the end of 1993, Mrs. Swan's portfolio with Merrill Lynch was valued at approximately $360,000, plus a money market balance of $18,000. The account statement for October, 1993 reflected she had 5 municipal bonds valued at $80,000, tax free bond funds valued at $273,620, and approximately $18,000 in money market funds. Her estimated annual income from the bonds was approximately $6,631, or approximately $520.00 per month. Her tax free bond funds income returned approximately $1,200 per month, and her Nuveen Fund, approximately $50.00 per month, giving her a grand total of approximately $1,800 per month investment income in addition to her Social Security monthly payment of somewhat in excess of $650. On December 20, 1993, Mr. Tipton, as a representative of Merrill Lynch, received a letter moving Mrs. Swan's account to another brokerage firm, located in Texas, but with a local representative. At that time, Mr. Tipton tried to stop the transfer by contacting his main office, but was advised that by the time he had received the letter, the transfer had been completed. Mr. Tipton wanted to stop the transfer because when he called Mrs. Swan to inquire about it, she indicated to him that she did not want her account moved. Several weeks later, Mrs. Swan called Mr. Tipton to find out where her Merrill Lynch monthly account statement was. She did not recall at that time that her Merrill Lynch account had been closed and the securities therein transferred to the Texas brokerage concern. Because of this call, sometime in early January, 1994, Mr. Tipton called Mr. Wells, Mrs. Swan's attorney, and set up a meeting for the three of them. There were approximately three meetings of the three of them between January and March, 1994. The substance of their discussions was the fact that the broker to whom the Merrill Lynch account had been transferred had liquidated her entire account and used the proceeds thereof to pay for the annuities sold to Mrs. Swan by Mr. Chappuis and his associate, Mr. Mednick. According to Mr. Tipton, up until this time, Mrs. Swan had never indicated any dissatisfaction with the interest and income she was earning on her Merrill Lynch brokerage account. Mr. Tipton absolutely denies there was any churning of her account to garner more commissions. The only transfer was a sale at a premium in February, 1993 of bonds of the Jacksonville Electric Authority to create more capital for investment to provide greater income. The brokerage account owned by Mrs. Swan was not insured against loss of principal though many of the particular funds in which much of the money was invested were, however, individually insured. In 1990, Mrs. Swan's account, which had been in her name individually, was transferred to a trust account of which she was the beneficiary for life, with the provision that at her death, the funds therein would be distributed to various religious organizations and a few friends. Mrs. Swan had no family heirs. No commission was earned by Mr. Tipton on the transfer, though he did receive a commission on both the above-mentioned sale of the Jacksonville Electric bonds and the purchase of a tax free bond fund with the proceeds. Her brokerage account permitted her to write checks on the funds in the money fund. Mr. Tipton claims he never engaged in a transaction regarding Mrs. Swan's account without first talking to her about it. In his opinion, whenever he did make a change she appeared alert and aware enough to participate effectively. The last major transaction was the 1990 bond sale, however. Mrs. Hopkins and Mrs. Swan attend the same church. In late 1993 or early 1994, Respondent's business card was always on Mrs. Swan's refrigerator. At no time did she ever speak disparagingly of him to Mrs. Hopkins, or complain about any insurance product he sold her. Mrs. Hopkins was not Mrs. Swan's guardian at that time and Mrs. Swan was paying her own bills, however not effectively. She was late getting them out and complained it was becoming difficult for her to type out the checks. According to Mrs. Hopking, Mrs. Swan was not extravagant in her spending. She did not take cruises, go to expensive restaurants or buy a lot of clothes. Mrs. Swan, in Ms. Hopkins' opinion, lived comfortably. She was generous in the terms of her charitable contributions. Since being appointed Mrs. Swan's guardian, Mrs. Hopkins had seen her financial records and she knows that Mrs. Swan donated a lot of money to various churches and religious organizations. Mrs. Swan received many requests for donations and indicated that as long as she had the money to give she would do so. In later years, however, as Mrs. Hopkins recalls, it became a physical and mental burden for Mrs. Swan to write the checks, and she frequently commented on this. Mr. Wells is Mrs. Swan's attorney, specializing in estate and trust planning. He met Mrs. Swan through a friend in 1990 and began to serve as her estate planner. In the spring of 1994 Mr. Wells met with Mr. Tipton and Mrs. Swan regarding the Respondent's sale of her security portfolio and the purchase of the two annuities in issue here with the proceeds. At that time Mrs. Swan seemed to have no knowledge of the transaction. As a result, he called Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company to get some information on what needed to be done in order to bring about a recision of the policies, but before any action was taken, the entire matter was turned over to Mr. Keirnan, another attorney, who does trial work. As a result of Keirnan's efforts, approximately two weeks before the hearing, Mr. Wells, on behalf of Mrs. Swan, received a check in the amount of approximately $372,000 from Guarantee Trust and Life Insurance Company as full reimbursement of the premiums paid for the two annuities in issue. From the time the annuities were issued in December, 1993 and January, 1994, Mrs. Swan had only her Social Security check to live on. She also received a check from Guarantee for $5,000, at her request, at the time the policies were issued as the balance in her brokerage account over the amount required as premiums for the annuities. She received nothing from her annuities which, as set up, did not call for the payment of any monthly income. As a result, Mr. Wells felt it necessary to borrow between $15,000 and $20,000 at 8 percent for Mrs. Swan from other trusts he managed to provide funds for Mrs. Swan to live on. From the documents which Mr. Tipton and Mrs. Swan brought to him in March, 1994, Wells could determine that the two annuities were purchased for her but she, at that time, did not seem to know anything about them. Though the annuities offered several options to permit period withdrawal of principal and interest, none had been selected by Mrs. Swan and as they then existed, she would draw no income from them until she was 100 years of age. When Mr. Tipton and Mrs. Swan came to Mr. Wells' office and brought the paperwork showing she had sold her securities to buy the annuities, Mr. Wells called Respondent to find out what had happened to Mrs. Swan's money. About the same time, he drafted a letter to Respondent at Mrs. Swan's request in which she requested Respondent not contact her any more. This letter was written because Mrs. Swan had said Respondent had "pestered" her at home and upset her on some occasions before the letter was written. Guarantee's manager of Government Relations and Compliance, Mr. Krevitzky, identified the two policies issued to Mrs. Swan. According to Mr. Krevitzky, an annuity is a savings vehicle which holds funds over a period at interest with provision for single or periodic pay out. Interest on both annuities in issue here was guaranteed at a rate of 4.5 percent per year or higher. The first year, the policies earned only the guaranteed 4.5 percent interest, and the income was credited to the policy from January, 1994 until the policies were surrendered as a part of the litigation settlement on March 25, 1995. At that point, since it was considered that the policies were rescinded and therefore void ab initio, the interest earned was forfeited and not paid. Only the premiums paid in were refunded in total. The commission paid to the Respondent and his associate, Mr. Mednick, was paid out of company funds and not Mrs. Swan's funds. The annuity contracts sold by the Respondent to Mrs. Swan had options for five different pay-outs, some of which would have returned income to her during the pendency of the contract. However, none of these was selected by Mrs. Swan and there was no evidence to indicate that Respondent ever explained any of them to her. As they existed as of the date they were cancelled, and at all time up until then, Mrs. Swan would receive no income until the annuity matured at her age 100. This is an unreasonable situation for an individual of Mrs. Swan's age and situation. Mr. Krevitzky contends that the potential pay out options could have provided Mrs. Swan with a substantial income equal to or exceeding the income she was received from her securities portfolio. Most of these options would have included a partial return of principal, however, whereas the income from the prior held portfolio was interest only with her principal remaining intact. One option provided an income for a guaranteed period which, in some circumstances, could have resulted in her receiving more than the amount paid in for the contract. The ultimate fact remains, however, that at the time of sale, and at all times thereafter, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Chappuis was directed to stay away from Mrs. Swan, he had failed to assist her in the selection of any income option and she was receiving no current income at all from the annuities. In each of the two years prior to the purchase, for 1992 and 1993, she had regular tax free investment income of between $26,000 and $27,000, in addition to the capital gains of approximately $23,000 from the sale of the bonds in 1992. It matters not that she needed little to live on or donated a great portion of her income to charity. This decision was hers to make. By the same token, it matters not that no request for income was made, during the pendency of the annuities, by or on behalf of Mrs. Swan. Annuities have several benefits over other types of investments, according to Mr. Krevitzky. One is the tax deferment provision for interest earned on the annuity. Another is the fact that, subject to local law, the principal of the annuity is not subject to garnishment. A third is the guaranteed return of principal at the end of the annuity which permits older annuitants to provide for their heirs while maintaining income during their lifetimes. Many senior citizens look to the safety of their investment rather than the taxability of the interest. Therefore, in selling annuities to seniors, the agents stress these factors and the no-probate consideration. David W. Johnson has been an independent contractor with Respondent's broker, Professional Systems Associates, since 1989 and is the annuity manager for the firm. Mr. Johnson indicates that there has been an increase in the annuity business with seniors in 1993 - 1994. Funds for the purchase of the annuities usually comes from bank certificates of deposit, but sometimes, like in the instant case, the funds come from a brokerage account. In his experience, seniors choose annuities over certificates of deposit and brokerage accounts. According to Mr. Johnson, if Mrs. Swan had wanted to stop the transfer from her account she could have done so up until the transaction was completed, even after the securities had been liquidated and the funds sent to Guarantee. This is so, he claims even though Mrs. Swan gave authority to make the transfer in the documentation accompanying her application for the annuities. Mr. Johnson indicated it takes about two weeks after the receipt of the premium before Guarantee issues the annuity contract and at any time before issue, the transaction could be cancelled and the money returned. Even after issue, there is a "free look" period during which the contract may be cancelled without penalty. Though the contract may be cancelled and the premium returned, the former securities are still liquidated and the brokerage account closed. According to Mr. Johnson, there was nothing in the paperwork regarding these annuities which he saw which would raise any flag for consideration. He did not feel it necessary to call Mrs. Swan to see if she really wanted the policy and he never received a call from her or anybody else regarding it. Mr. Chappuis' partner in this sale was Scott Mednick who has been a licensed insurance agent since 1984 and who is an independent contractor with the same agency. Mr. Mednick was solicited to accompany Mr. Chappuis to Mrs. Swan's home in December, 1994 because of his expertise in the annuity field. Respondent had described Mrs. Swan to him as a long time customer. Respondent claimed that Mrs. Swan had indicated she was concerned about her brokerage account and he wanted to show her some product, annuities, she might be interested in. Mr. Mednick has known Respondent for eleven years and knows him to be a top producer. Respondent's reputation is that he is cheap and close with the dollar. Nonetheless, Mr. Mednick claims he was not surprised that Respondent was willing to share the commission on this sale in order to be sure the client got the proper product. Mrs. Swan let Mr. Mednick examine her monthly statement from Merrill Lynch. It appeared to Mr. Mednick that the account had not grown over the years. This is not surprising in that the portfolio was made up solely of tax free bond funds, tax free municipal bonds and tax free money marts, the volatility of and fluctuation in price of which is minimal. Mr. Mednick cannot now recall if Mrs. Swan indicated she knew about her stocks. However, he relates that he and the Respondent suggested she look into annuities as an alternative which Respondent explained to her. In addition, he claims they provided her with a lot of written material. Based on Mrs. Swan's action, words and attitudes expressed, Mr. Mednick believed she completely understood what was explained to her and wanted to make the change. It was his belief she seemed to understand she would pay no commission on the purchase; that she would have a guaranteed income that she could not outlive; that the annuity avoided the volatility of the stock market; and it was not attachable by creditors. As structured and sold to Mrs. Swan, however, she was to get no income at all from this product until she reached the age of 100/. Mr. Mednick asserts that at no time did he feel that Respondent had less than the best interests of Mrs. Swan at heart and he can recall no time when Respondent lied to Mrs. Swan. All representations made by either Respondent or Mednick allegedly came from the brochures left with her. Mednick indicates that during their conversation, Mrs. Swan did not seem concerned about getting her principal out of the investment. She was most concerned about her desire to leave the principal to the church. Mednick claims that at the time of the sale, the two agents asked Mrs. Swan if she wanted her interest paid quarterly but she said to let it accrue. This representation, in light of the other evidence, is not credible. Taken together, Mednick's testimony does nothing to detract from Respondent's sale of this product, inappropriate as it was for this client, to Mrs. Swan. Mr. Mednick's credentials are somewhat suspect, and his credibility poor, however. By his own admission, he has been administratively fined by the Department on two occasions based on allegations of misconduct. He denies any misconduct, however, claiming he accepted punishment only as an alternative to a prolonged contest of the allegations. The allegations herein were referred to an investigator of the Department to look into. As is the custom of the Department, he did not interview the Respondent but merely sought to gather facts concerning each allegation to be sent to the Department offices in Tallahassee where the analysis and determination of misconduct is made. By the same token, he did not call or speak with Mrs. Swan, Mr. Mednick, or anyone at Professional Systems. He spoke with Mr. Tipton, Mr. Wells, Mrs. Hopkins and with Mr. Keirnan a couple of times.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the insurance licenses and the eligibility for licensure of the Respondent herein, Alan Chappuis, be suspended for nine months. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. 22. & 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. 24. - 27 Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Respondent's post hearing submittal was entitled "Respondent's Final Argument." However, because it makes specific Findings of Fact, the submittal will be treated as though it were Proposed Findings of Fact which will be ruled upon herein. First sentence accepted. Balance rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. & 3. Accepted that Mr. Krevitzky testified and that there was nothing in the contract which would cause Respondent to misrepresent. The product may well be a worthy product for someone in a different financial position than Ms. Swan, and the issue is whether Respondent fully explained the implications and ramifications of the contracts to her. Rejected as a misconception of the nature of the witness' testimony. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted as a summary of the witness' testimony. First and second sentences accepted. Balance rejected as an unwarranted conclusion drawn from the evidence. Accepted but irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Alan Chappuis, Pro se P. O. Box 86126 Madiera Beach, Florida 33738 The Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation for profit located at 1933 Commonwealth Lane, Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. At all times pertinent to this case Petitioner has operated a business in Florida. Respondent is a Florida state agency. Its duties include the administration of Community Development Block Grants in Florida, (hereinafter referred to as CDBG). Petitioner requested Respondent to reimburse money related to administrative services which Petitioner provided to Okaloosa County, Florida related to a CDBG. The petition for those monies was filed in February, 1993. The request for reimbursement was in the amount of $43,274.92. Respondent denied that request. In turn, by opportunity provided by Respondent, Petitioner sought an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to challenge Respondent's preliminary agency decision denying the request for reimbursement. The case was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings to assign a hearing officer to conduct a formal hearing to resolve the dispute between Petitioner and Respondent. The administrative proceeding concerning the reimbursement claim was considered in the case Clark, Roumelis & Associates, Inc., v. State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs, Respondent, DOAH Case No. 93-1306. At the time Petitioner initiated the action to seek reimbursement and was afforded the point of entry to contest the preliminary action denying the reimbursement request, Petitioner employed no more than twenty-five (25) full- time employees and had a net worth of not more than $2 million dollars. Following a formal hearing a recommended order was entered by the undersigned which recommended that Petitioner be paid $43,274.92. The recommended order was entered on September 29, 1993. In turn, Respondent's final order dated December 28, 1993 denied the petition for reimbursement. Petitioner took an appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, Case No. 94-0151. In an Opinion filed February 16, 1995, the First District Court of Appeal decided in favor of Petitioner by reversing Respondent's final order and remanding the case. Respondent sought rehearing and rehearing on en banc which was denied on March 24, 1995 by the First District Court of Appeal. Respondent sought further review before the Florida Supreme Court, Case No. 85,581, which denied that review by not accepting jurisdiction. That decision by the Florida Supreme Court was made on September 6, 1995. On September 13, 1995, Petitioner filed a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Through that action Petitioner sought the reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs associated with DOAH Case No. 93-1306 and the appeals that followed the December 28, 1993 final order denying the reimbursement. Contrary to the requirements set forth in Section 60Q-2.035(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code, Respondent did not file a response to the petition within twenty (20) days of the filing of the petition seeking reimbursement attorney's fees and costs. Neither party has sought an evidentiary hearing for the Division of Administrative Hearings to consider Petitioner's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs. Therefore this case has proceeded without an evidentiary hearing. Rule 60Q-2.035(7), Florida Administrative Code. In that setting Respondent is deemed to have waived its opportunity to contest whether the attorney's fees and costs claimed are unreasonable; whether Petitioner is not a prevailing small business party in DOAH Case No. 93-1306; whether Respondent's actions in denying Petitioner's claim for monetary reimbursement related to administrative services provided to Okaloosa County, Florida in the CDBG was a decision which was substantially justified in law and fact; whether circumstances exist which would make the award of attorney's fees and costs unjust and to present the defense that the Respondent was only a nominal party in DOAH Case No. 93-1306. See Rule 60Q-2.035(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Consistent with Rule 60Q-2.035(7), Florida Administrative Code the following additional facts are found for or against the award of attorney's fees and costs, based upon the pleadings and supporting documents in the files and records in the Division of Administrative Hearings: Petitioner is a small business party and a prevailing small business party in the matters considered in DOAH Case No. 93-1306 and the court appeals that followed. Petitioner's attorney has submitted an affidavit claiming, "In the administrative proceedings of this action, 140.8 hours were expended to the date of Respondent's Final Order of December 28, 1993. Total Fees: $21,120.00." Petitioner's attorney has submitted an affidavit claiming, "In the administrative proceedings of this action, $2,141.78 in costs were incurred to the date of Respondent's Final Order of December 28, 1993." Petitioner's attorney has submitted an affidavit claiming, "In the appellate proceedings in this action (First District Court of Appeal Case No. 94-0151 in Florida Supreme Court, Case No. 85,581), 79.0 hours were expended and $310.66 in costs were incurred to the date of the Supreme Court's denial of September 6, 1995. Total Fees: $13,258.00. Total Costs: $310.66." The affidavits submitted by Petitioner concerning the claim for attorney's fees and costs incurred to the date of Respondent's final order of December 28, 1993, failed to adequately " . . . reveal the nature and extent of the services rendered by the attorney as well as the costs incurred in preparations, motions, [and] hearings . . . in the proceeding" by "itemizing" the claim. Section 57.111(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes. By contrast, the attorney's affidavit filed for attorney's fees and costs in the appellate proceedings was adequate to identify services rendered by the attorney and costs incurred related to appeals in the proceeding. Section 57.111(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes. The amount of attorney's fees and costs for appellate proceedings is within the $15,000.00 cap for recovery of attorney's fees and costs as set forth in Section 57.111(4)(d)2., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Judy Louise Robinson is currently licensed by the Florida Department of Insurance as a general lines agent, a health agent, and a dental health agent and has been so licensed since November 21, 1984. At all times material, Respondent engaged in the business of insurance as Fleming Island Insurer. At all times material, Respondent maintained two business bank accounts in the name of Fleming Island Insurer: Account No. 1740043215 at Barnett Bank in Orange Park and Account No. 11630004614 at First Union Bank, Park Avenue Office. First Union Bank is currently First Performance Bank. All funds received by Respondent from or on behalf of consumers, representing premiums for insurance policies, were trust funds received in a fiduciary capacity and were to be accounted for and paid over to an insurer, insured, or other persons entitled thereto in the applicable regular course of business. Respondent solicited and procured an application for a workers' compensation insurance policy from Linda Smith on September 13, 1989, to be issued by CIGNA. Respondent quoted Ms. Smith an annual workers' compensation premium of two thousand six hundred four dollars and forty cents ($2,604.40). Linda Smith issued her check payable to Fleming Island Insurer in the amount quoted by Respondent on September 13, 1989, as premium payment for the CIGNA workers' compensation insurance coverage. On September 14, 1989, Respondent endorsed and deposited Linda Smith's $2,604.40 check into Fleming Island Insurer's business bank account No. 1740043215 at Barnett Bank, Orange Park, Florida. On September 17, 1989, Respondent forwarded her check in the amount of two thousand six hundred eighty nine dollars and forty cents ($2,689.40) to NCCI ATLANTIC for issuance of a workers' compensation policy with CIGNA for Linda Smith, Inc. The difference between the amount paid to Respondent by Linda Smith ($2,604.40) and the amount paid by Respondent to CIGNA via NCCI ATLANTIC ($2,689.40) amounts to $85.00 advanced by Respondent because she misquoted the premium amount to Linda Smith. On September 17, 1989, Respondent notified Linda Smith that another $85.00 was due. Linda Smith never paid this amount to Respondent. On September 19, 1989, CIGNA issued a workers' compensation policy for Linda Smith, Inc. Respondent's check was thereafter returned to CIGNA due to insufficient funds. On or about October 20, 1989, CIGNA notified Respondent that her agency check had been returned as unpayable and requested substitute payment within ten days to avoid interruption in Linda Smith, Inc.'s workers' compensation insurance coverage. Respondent asserted that she was injured in an automobile accident on October 1, 1989 and could not work through July of 1990 due to chronic dislocation of her right arm, but she also asserted that she never closed her insurance business and operated it out of her home. Respondent's home is the address at which CIGNA notified her on October 20, 1989 concerning Ms. Smith's policy. Respondent failed to timely submit substitute payment to CIGNA, and as a result, Linda Smith, Inc.'s policy was cancelled January 1, 1990. On January 4, 1990, Linda Smith forwarded her own check in the full amount of $2,689.40 directly to CIGNA and her policy was reinstated. Respondent did not begin to repay Linda Smith the $2,604.40 proceeds of Linda Smith's prior check paid to Respondent until May 1991. At formal hearing, Respondent maintained that she was never notified that Linda Smith paid for the policy a second time. Even if such a protestation were to be believed, it does not excuse Respondent's failure to account to either Linda Smith or CIGNA for the $2,604.40, which Respondent retained. Respondent also testified that Barnett Bank's failure to immediately make available to Respondent the funds from Linda Smith's check, which cleared, resulted in Barnett Bank reporting to CIGNA that there were insufficient funds to cover Respondent's check to CIGNA. From this testimony, it may be inferred that Respondent knew or should have known that she owed someone this money well before May 1991. On November 11, 1989, Lewis T. Morrison paid the Traveler's Insurance Company six thousand forty-three dollars ($6,043.00) as a renewal payment on a workers' compensation policy for Morrison's Concrete Finishers for the policy period December 30, 1988 through December 30, 1989. At the conclusion of the 1988-1989 policy period, Traveler's Insurance Company conducted an audit of Morrison's Concrete Finishers' account. This is a standard auditing and premium adjustment procedure for workers' compensation insurance policies. It is based on the insured's payroll and is common practice in the industry. This audit revealed that Morrison's Concrete Finishers was due a return premium of two thousand one hundred fifty-three dollars and eighty- seven cents ($2,153.87) from the insurer. On March 30, 1990, Traveler's Insurance Company issued its check for $2,153.87 payable to Fleming Island Insurer. This check represented the return premium due Morrison's Concrete Finishers from Traveler's Insurance Company. On April 6, 1990, Respondent endorsed and deposited Traveler's Insurance Company's return premium check into the Fleming Island Insurer's business bank account No. 11630004614 at First Union Bank. The standard industry procedure thereafter would have been for Respondent to pay two thousand two hundred forty-eight dollars ($2,248.00) via a Fleming Island Insurer check to Morrison's Concrete Finishers as a total returned premium payment comprised of $2,153.87 return gross premium from Traveler's Insurance Company and $94.13 representing her own unearned agent's commission. When Respondent did not issue him a check, Lewis T. Morrison sought out Respondent at her home where he requested payment of his full refund. In response, Respondent stated that she would attempt to pay him as soon as she could, that she was having medical and financial problems, and that the delay was a normal business practice. Respondent testified that on or about April 19, 1990, in an attempt to induce Mr. Morrison to renew Morrison's Concrete Finishers' workers' compensation policy through Fleming Island Insurer, she offered him a "credit" of the full $2,248.00 owed him. Pursuant to this offer of credit, Respondent intended to pay Traveler's Insurance Company or another insurance company for Morrison's Concrete Finisher's next year's premium in installments from Fleming Island Insurer's account. This "credit" represented the return premium Respondent had already received from Traveler's Insurance Company on behalf of Morrison's Concrete Finishers for 1988-1989 which she had already deposited into Fleming Island Insurer's business account. Whether or not Mr. Morrison formally declined Respondent's credit proposal is not clear, but it is clear that he did not affirmatively accept the credit proposal and that he declined to re-insure for 1989-1990 through Respondent agent or Traveler's Insurance Company. Respondent still failed to pay the return premium and commission which she legitimately owed to Morrison's Concrete Finishers. On June 28, 1990, the Traveler's Insurance Company issued a check directly to Mr. Morrison for the full amount of $2,248.00. Respondent did not begin repaying Traveler's Insurance Company concerning Mr. Morrison's premium until after intervention by the Petitioner agency. At formal hearing, Respondent offered several reasons for her failure to refund the money legitimately due Mr. Morrison. Her first reason was that the district insurance commissioner's office told her to try to "work it out" using the credit method outlined above and by the time she realized this method was unacceptable to Mr. Morrison, he had already been paid by Traveler's Insurance Company. However, Respondent presented no evidence to substantiate the bold, self-serving assertion that agency personnel encouraged her to proceed as she did. Respondent also testified that she did not know immediately that Traveler's Insurance Company had reimbursed Mr. Morrison directly. However, it is clear she knew of this payment well before she began to pay back Traveler's, and since Mr. Morrison did not reinsure through her or Traveler's she should have immediately known the "credit" arrangement was unacceptable to him. Respondent further testified that she did not want to repay Mr. Morrison until a claim on his policy was resolved. However, there is competent credible record evidence that the Traveler's Insurance Company 1988-1989 workers' compensation policy premium refund was governed solely by an audit based on payroll. Mr. Morrison's policy premium or refund consequently was not governed by "loss experience rating", and the refund of premium would not be affected by a claim, open or closed. Thus, the foregoing reasons given by Respondent for not refunding Mr. Morrison's money are contradictory or not credible on their face. They also are not credible because Respondent admitted to Mr. Morrison in the conversation at her home (see Finding of Fact 24) that she was having trouble paying him because of medical and financial difficulties. Further, they are not credible because Respondent testified credibly at formal hearing that she would have paid Mr. Morrison but for her bank account being wiped out by a fraudulent check given her by an unnamed third party. On August 10, 1992, Respondent was charged by Information with two counts of grand theft. See, Section 812.014(2)(c) F.S. The allegations in the Information charged Respondent with theft of insurance premiums from Linda Smith and Lewis T. Morrison, and arose out of the same facts as found herein. On December 17, 1992, Respondent entered a nolo contendere plea to only the first count of grand theft as to matters involving Linda Smith and the other count was "null prossed." Respondent secured a negotiated sentence on the first count. "Grand theft" is a felony punishable by imprisonment by one year or more. Adjudication was withheld pending satisfactory completion of probation, including community service and payment of restitution and court costs. Respondent has been complying with her probation, including restitution payments.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violations of Sections 626.561(1), 626.611(7), (9), (10), and (13); 626.621(2) and (6) F.S. under Count I, violations of Sections 626.561(1), 626.611(7), (9), (10), and (13), and 626.621(2) and (6) under Count II, and violations of Sections 626.611(14) and 626.621(8) F.S. under Count III, finding Respondent not guilty of all other charges under each count, and revoking Respondent's several insurance licenses. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 92-2060 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: As modified to more correctly reflect the whole of the record evidence and avoid unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative material, all of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted. Respondent's PFOF: Sentence 1 is accepted as a paraphrased allegation of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint. Sentence 2 is covered in Findings of Fact 4-18. Sentence 3 is accepted but subordinate and to dispositive. Sentence 4 is apparently Respondent's admission that she owed $2,604.40 to Linda Smith and paid her $500.00 of it. Accepted to that extent but not dispositive in that full payment was not made timely. Sentence 1 is accepted as a paraphrased allegation of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint but not dispositive. Sentence 2 is accepted but immaterial. Sentence 3 is rejected as argument and not dispositive. As stated, the proposal also is not supported by the record. Sentence 4 It is accepted that Mr. Morrison admitted he had a claim. However, the record does not support a finding that he requested Respondent to contact Traveler's Ins. Co. about it. Even if he had, that is subordinate and not dispositive of the ultimate material issues. Sentence 5 is rejected as not supported by the credible record evidence. Covered in Findings of Fact 23-28. Sentence 6 is rejected as not supported by the record and as argument. Sentence 7 Accepted. Sentence 8 Accepted. The "Descriptive Narrative" is accepted through page 4, but not dispositive. Beginning with the words "In summary" on page 5, the remainder of the proposal is not supported by the record in this cause which closed April 16. 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Division of Legal Services Department of Insurance and Treasurer 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Judy Louise Robinson 4336 Shadowood Lane Orange Park, FL 32073-7726 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the administrative agency charged with responsibility for administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Mortgage Refunds Research and Consulting ("Mortgage"), is a Florida corporation that is wholely owned by Respondent, Richard Vidair. Respondent has sole responsibility for the direction, control, operation, and management of Mortgage. Respondent is not licensed as a private investigator and Mortgage is not a licensed private investigative agency. Respondent is considered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to be a third party tracer. Respondent and his agency locate persons who may be owed refunds for mortgage insurance premiums. From sometime in August, 1990, through May 2, 1991, Respondent contacted individuals who may be owed mortgage insurance refunds by the federal government. Respondent solicited a fee contingent upon actual receipt of the mortgage refund from the federal government. Respondent obtained from the United States government a list of persons owed mortgage refunds. Such lists are available to anyone for a nominal processing fee. Respondent determined the whereabouts of persons named on the list. Respondent either telephoned or mailed a letter to the person named on the list and informed that person of the service offered by Respondent. Respondent included in the letter sent to the person a finder's fee agreement to be signed by the person on the list. Once the contract was signed and returned to Respondent, Respondent provided the person on the list with additional documents to be filled out for the purpose of filing a claim with the federal government. Government refunds were mailed directly to the person on the list. The terms of the finder's fee agreement required the person on the list to pay Respondent's fee within three days of the date the person received his or her money from the government. The agreement further provided that if Respondent's fee was not paid within 30 days, Respondent was entitled to a fee equal to 50 percent of the government refund. Finally, the agreement provided that all collection and legal expenses incurred by Respondent in collecting the finder's fee must be paid by the other party. Respondent received a letter in March, 1991, from the Division of Licensing notifying Respondent that his activities required licensure. After conferring with his attorney, Respondent terminated his activities in Florida but continued his activities outside the state. On October 14, 1987, an attorney for the Division of Licensing issued an internal legal opinion to then Division Director Dave Register. The opinion concluded that persons who engage in the business of locating individuals to whom mortgage insurance premium refunds are due from the federal government are not required to be licensed pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. On October 30, 1987, Ken Rouse, General Counsel, Department of State, issued a legal opinion which rescinded the prior internal opinion and concluded that such activities must be licensed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 1C-3.122(1), imposing an administrative fine of $500 pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 1C-3.113(1)(a)2, imposing an administrative fine of $150 pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 1C- 3.113(1)(b)2, and ordering Respondent to cease all investigative activities until Respondent is properly licensed in accordance with Chapter 493. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23 day of January 1992. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23th day of January 1992.
The Issue Should Respondent's license as a bail bond agent in the State of Florida be disciplined for the alleged violation of certain provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida vested with the statutory authority to administer the disciplinary provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. Respondent, at all times relevant to this proceeding, was licensed as a bail bond agent in the State of Florida and subject to the provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. Respondent, at all times relevant to this proceeding, was employed by Alliance Bail Bonds (Alliance), which was owned by Linda Jones. There was a verbal employment agreement between Alliance and Respondent, which provided for, among other things, Respondent's salary. However, the verbal employment agreement did not require that Respondent write bail bonds exclusively for Alliance. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Alliance's office was located in Respondent's home in Titusville, Brevard County, Florida, which had a separate entrance and separate telephone for Alliance. Alliance's files, both active and inactive, were also housed in this office. On March 30, 2000, a person identifying himself as Johnny Lamb contacted Respondent by telephone concerning a bail bond for an individual known as Bernard J. Dougherty who was being held in the Brevard County, Florida, jail. The bond amount was $8,500.00. Since Dougherty was not a resident of the State of Florida, Respondent wanted Lamb to put up the full amount of the bond as collateral. However, Lamb advised Respondent that he did not have enough cash to put up the full amount of the bond. Therefore, Respondent and Lamb eventually agreed on $7,000.00 cash as collateral. Additionally, Respondent advised Lamb that the premium for writing the bail bond would be $850.00 (10 percent of the bond amount). Later that same day, Lamb came to Respondent's office to complete the paperwork and put up the necessary funds for the collateral and bond premium. Lamb paid Respondent the collateral and bond premium in cash (U.S. currency, 20's, 50's, and 100's). Respondent prepared a Collateral Receipt and Informational Notice (Collateral Receipt), which was signed by Lamb. The Collateral Receipt indicated that Lamb had deposited the $7,000.00 collateral with Respondent and had executed an Indemnity Agreement and Promissory Note. Lamb also executed a Bail Application. Respondent gave Lamb the white copy of the Collateral Receipt for his records. The goldenrod copy of the Collateral Receipt was also given to Lamb to be delivered to Dougherty at the jail. The yellow copy and pink copy of the Collateral Receipt were retained by Respondent for Alliance's record. Lamb also paid Respondent $850.00 in cash (U.S. Currency) for the bail bond premium for which Respondent gave Lamb a receipt (number 20454) indicating that Lamb had paid the bail bond premium in the amount of $850.00. After completing the bond transaction with Lamb, Respondent prepared a file in Dougherty's name, which included the copies of the Collateral Receipt, Promissory Note, Indemnity Agreement, Bail Application, and a copy of the receipt for the bail bond premium. After preparing the file, Respondent prepared two Powers of Attorney (Powers), one in the amount of $5,000.00 and one in the amount of $3,500.00, and proceeded to the Brevard County jail to interview Dougherty. Upon arriving at the Brevard County jail, Respondent was advised that in addition to the Brevard County charges, there was an outstanding warrant for Dougherty from Volusia County and a hold for a parole violation in the State of Pennsylvania. Lamb was not present at the Brevard County jail at this time. Therefore, Respondent advised Dougherty of the Volusia County warrant and the hold from Pennsylvania. Respondent further advised Dougherty that although he could post bond for the Brevard County charges, Dougherty would not be released because of the Volusia County warrant and the hold for parole violation in Pennsylvania. Dougherty advised Respondent that he did not want to post bond. Whereupon, Respondent attempted to contact Lamb using the telephone numbers furnished Respondent by Lamb but was unsuccessful in locating Lamb. On March 31, 2000, Respondent called the Brevard County jail and had Lamb paged. Upon being advised that Lamb was present in the Brevard County jail, Respondent asked that they instruct Lamb to call Respondent at his office. Lamb called Respondent at his office and was advised of the situation concerning Dougherty. Respondent also advised Lamb that he was on his way to the jail and would bring Lamb's money with him. Upon arriving at the Brevard County jail, Respondent explained the circumstances regarding the posting of bail for Dougherty and proceeded to return Lamb's money. Lamb did not have the copies of the Collateral Receipt with him that had been given to Lamb on March 30, 2000. Therefore, Respondent took his copy of the Collateral Receipt and documented the return of the $7,000.00 collateral and the $850.00 premium fee. Lamb signed the documentation on the Collateral Receipt showing the return of the $7,000.00 collateral and the $850.00 premium fee. Respondent then placed all of the documents, including the Collateral Receipt with the documentation showing the return of the $7,000.00 collateral and the $850.00 bond premium, in Dougherty's file with Dougherty's name highlighted in blue for filing. Afterwards, Respondent voided the Powers by writing "Void" across the front of the Powers and had them sent to Linda Jones by UPS. Subsequently, the Powers were forwarded by Linda Jones to Charles A. Parish, Agent for Continental Heritage Insurance Co., on whom the Powers were written. On March 31, 2000, Respondent returned the $7,000.00 collateral plus the $850.00 bond premium fee to Lamb, notwithstanding the testimony of Lamb to the contrary, which lacks credibility. Respondent did not at any time present any of the paperwork for posting Dougherty's bond, including the Powers, to the Brevard County jail personnel. Since Alliance's Brevard County files were being kept at Respondent's office in Titusville, Florida, Respondent did not forward Dougherty's file to Linda Jones. However, as a caution, Respondent advised Linda Jones by telephone of what had occurred in regards to Dougherty, notwithstanding Linda Jones' testimony to the contrary, which lacks credibility. Sometime in January 2001, Linda Jones came into Respondent's office in Titusville, Florida, and removed all of Alliance's Brevard County files, both active and inactive, that were in the possession of Respondent. The Alliance files removed by Linda Jones included Dougherty's inactive file with the documentation concerning the return of the $7,000.00 collateral and the $850.00 bail bond premium, notwithstanding Linda Jones' testimony to the contrary, which lacks credibility. By letter dated May 10, 2001, after talking to William Travis and Linda Jones, Lamb filed a complaint with the Department alleging that Respondent had failed to return the $7,000.00 collateral and this proceeding ensued.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Respondent, Michael Scott Kelly, not guilty of violating Subsections 648.442(1) and (3); and 648.45(2)(d),(e),(g),(h), (j), and (n), and (3)(a),(c),(d), and (e), Florida Statutes, and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Michael Scott Kelly. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Steven G. Casanova, Esquire 100 Rialto Place, Suite 510 Melbourne, Florida 32935
