Findings Of Fact On January 7, 1980, Dowden Funeral Home, Respondent, obtained a building permit from Highlands County (Exhibit 4), to construct a wooden sign along U.S. 17 near Sebring, Florida; and thereafter constructed a 20-foot by 14- foot sign along U.S. 17, 0.25 mile northeast of U.S. 27. The location is just outside the city limits of Sebring, Florida, and U.S. 17 is a federal-aid primary highway. Respondent's sign is located approximately 200 feet from a Barnett Bank sign which was permitted and erected in 1977 (Exhibit 6). Respondent's witness contends that when he obtained the building permit and inquired if additional permits were needed to erect this sign, he was told no by the county building officials.
Findings Of Fact Pensacola Outdoor Advertising, applied for state sign permits by applications dated November 29, 1984, for a location on the south side of I-10, 1.3 miles east of SR 87, outside city limits, in Santa Rosa County, Florida, for signs facing east and west. These applications were received in the Department's District Office on December 3, 1984. The Department denied the permit applications by Memorandum of Returned Application dated December 18, 1984, because the sign site was in an area with unpermittable zoning pursuant to Section 479.11, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, who operates Pensacola Outdoor Advertising, contends that his proposed sign site is within 800 feet of a business activity, and that there are three businesses in the area: Clark's Surplus and Recycling, Clark's Flea Market, and Mr. George Atkinson's commercial warehouse. The Petitioner made no on-ground measurements, but used an aerial map and a ruler to make his distance determination. He had not conducted any business with Mr. Clark and did not know of any commercial sales Mr. Clark had made. The Petitioner considered the material located on the Clark premises to be recycling items, but he admits that the average person would consider it junk, and ". . . it would be difficult to tell specifically . . ." that there are two separate and distinct business activities at Mr. Clark's location. The third nearby business is a building owned by a Mr. Atkinson, located on the north side of I-10, across the highway from the Clark property. The Petitioner has not done any business with Mr. Atkinson and does not know what is actually in the building. He has driven by and observed people at the building, but does not know what they were doing. Phillip N. Brown, the Department's Outdoor Advertising Inspector, did a field inspection of the proposed sign site and found it to be in an area without any county zoning. The sketch attached to the Petitioner's applications shows 1,500 feet between the proposed site and a permitted sign on the south side of I-10. The permits for this sign are currently valid and held by Bill Salter Outdoor Advertising. The Petitioner's permit applications state that there is a distance of 1,500 plus feet to the nearest existing sign. The area where the proposed site is located has several single family trailers located near the interstate right-of-way with nothing else there. It is difficult to see the area due to vegetation. The area where the Salter sign is located is also difficult to see because of vegetation, but a junkyard is visible, on which is material consisting of junk and junk vehicles, bud there is no indication that any other business activity is being conducted there. A fence runs around the west side of the junkyard, and the Salter sign is inside this fence. When the inspector found the alleged business activity to be more than 800 feet from the Petitioner's proposed site, he requested a survey of the area. John E. Ferguson, Location Surveyor, Department of Transportation, made a survey of the Petitioner's proposed sign site on the south side of I-10. There is a fence on the west side of the junkyard with junk cars to the east of it. There is a metal sign inside the fence area. From this survey it is established that the distance between the outer limits of the junkyard fence and the proposed sign site is 1,201 feet.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the applications of C. R. Findley, d/b/a Pensacola Outdoor Advertising, for permits to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the south side of I-10, 1.3 miles east of SR 87, in Santa Rosa County, Florida, be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 3rd day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Officer Hearings Hearings WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 3rd day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Mr. C. R. Findley Pensacola Outdoor Advertising P. O. Box 344 Pensacola, Florida 3259 Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Hayd6n Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner at a time pertinent to this proceeding purchased an injection molding machine in Cincinnati, Ohio, and moved that machine to Florida. No sales tax was paid on that machine in Ohio. Schedule B of Respondent's Exhibit 1, a Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment dated June 22, 1978, shows a tax, penalty and interest owed with regard to the injection molding machine of $862.50. The proposed tax, penalty and interest set forth in Schedules A of Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2 relate to the rental of portable advertising signs at times pertinent to this proceeding. The evidence establishes that during the time pertinent to this proceeding the Petitioner, Carl Glass d/b/a Osceola Forge, was in the business of renting portable trailer advertising signs. For this he charged a $150.00 flat fee. His fee included labor, transportation to the site, setup, and leveling. The fee also included general maintenance to keep the sign in operating condition during the period of rental, including the replacement of lights, flashers and other ancillary equipment. The fee further included obtaining necessary permits. Also included in the fee were two changes of the logo on the sign each month, including the letters. All of these services together required an operator to take the sign to the site, set it up, maintain it periodically as needed, and to change the logo twice a month. The renter did not have any responsibility with regard to the sign. The renter did not take physical control of the sign. Control of the sign remained with Petitioner. In Schedule B of Respondent's Exhibit 2 there is a tax, penalty and interest totaling $143.76. This tax, penalty and interest is for "other purchases" made by Petitioner. There is no evidence to establish what these "other purchases" were or that a sales tax was not paid or that they were items subject to a sale or use tax.
The Issue As to DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 and 14-4927, the issues are whether the billboards identified in the notices of violation are located on the premises of Respondent's business and, thus, exempt from licensure; and, if not, whether the billboards are eligible for licensure pursuant to section 479.07, Florida Statutes, or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, Florida Statutes. With respect to DOAH Case No. 14-4928, the issue is whether Respondent engaged in, or benefitted from, the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation.
Findings Of Fact I. DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 & 14-4927 The Parties The Respondent in these proceedings is I-10 Pecan House, Inc. ("Pecan House"), an entity currently owned and managed by Olan Q. Nobles. As discussed in greater detail below, Pecan House is a small country store that has conducted business in Jefferson County, Florida, for nearly 40 years. The Department is the state agency responsible, inter alia, for the regulation of outdoor advertising signs located within 600 feet of, and visible from, interstate highways. The Events In or around 1976, Erma Jean Walker (Mr. Nobles' sister) and her husband, Lyman Walker, III, purchased three tracts of land that are relevant to this proceeding. The first such parcel, upon which the Walkers quickly constructed an open- air market, comprises one acre and is located on State Road 257, immediately north of the intersection of that roadway and I-10. The second relevant parcel, .18 acres in size and located a short distance to the southeast of the first tract, is situated adjacent to the westbound lanes of I-10. Upon their acquisition of this parcel, the Walkers constructed a billboard that advertised the open-air market and the related business activities conducted on the third parcel. The third parcel, which is roughly 2.3 acres in size and likewise adjoins the westbound lanes of I-10, is located less than 1000 feet to the east of the second tract. It is upon this tract that, in mid-to-late 1976, the Walkers built a concrete structure to be used for the purpose of manufacturing candy and jelly——products the Walkers offered for sale at the nearby open-air market. By the end of 1976, the Walkers also constructed (upon the third parcel) a billboard advertising the open-air market and jelly/candy manufacture. Although the billboards referenced above were visible from I-10 and located within 600 feet of the roadway——and, thus, within the Department's "controlled area"——the Walkers did not apply for outdoor advertising permits. This is because, as the Department concedes, the billboards were exempt from licensure from 1976 until the mid-1990s (or perhaps later, as Mr. Nobles asserts) under the "on premises" exemption set forth in section 479.16, Florida Statutes. Under the definition of "premises" in effect during that period, the land upon which a sign was located did not need to be contiguous to the advertised business in order for the exemption to apply. For reasons that will soon be apparent, it is necessary to inject a third billboard into this discussion: in 1993, the Walkers constructed on the third tract of land a "double-stack" billboard, which is situated less than 200 feet and 1000 feet, respectively, from the signs erected in 1976 upon the third and second tracts. Although the double-stack billboard would have ostensibly satisfied the on-premises exemption, the Walkers nevertheless applied for——and were granted——an outdoor advertising permit. For all that appears, the Department has never initiated any proceedings to revoke the permit, which remains valid to this day. In 1995, Mrs. Walker transferred control of Pecan House to Mr. Nobles, who until that time had assisted the Walkers on an as-needed basis. Soon thereafter, Mr. Nobles upgraded the open-air market (on the first parcel) to a secure building and, of particular relevance here, ceased all manufacturing activities at the concrete building (on the third parcel). At or around that time, the Legislature amended the definition of "premises" to include a contiguity requirement.3/ This is significant, for the second and third parcels——the locations of the two billboards at issue herein——are not contiguous to the first parcel but, rather, are separated by a tract in which neither the Walkers nor Mr. Nobles holds a leasehold or ownership interest. Further, there is no recorded easement connecting Mr. Nobles' three parcels. Thus, although the two billboards constructed in 1976 lost their on-premises status in the mid-1990s, this fact apparently went unnoticed by the Department for roughly 13 years. Then, in March of 2008, the Department issued notices of violation in connection with both billboards. Among other things, the notices alleged that "outdoor advertising permit[s] [were] required, but ha[d] not been issued" for the billboards, which Mr. Nobles was instructed to remove within 30 days. A short time thereafter, an inspector or other agent of the Department conducted, in Mr. Nobles' presence, an examination of the 1976 billboards and Pecan House's business operations. At the conclusion of her inspection, the Department employee erroneously opined that, in fact, there was "no problem"4/ with the billboards in question, which Mr. Nobles reasonably took to mean that the signs continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption and, thus, were exempt from licensure. The reasonableness of this understanding was bolstered by the fact that, subsequent to the inspection, Mr. Nobles heard nothing more from the Department concerning the March 2008 notices of violation.5/ More than four years later, on December 17, 2012, the Department issued new notices of violation in connection with the 1976 billboards: notice 1352, relating to the billboard constructed upon the third parcel, which presently reads "Exit Now" and bears a Shell gasoline logo (hereinafter "Exit Now"); and notice 1487, relating to the billboard erected upon the second parcel, which presently reads "Welcome to Big O's / We Appreciate Your Business" (hereinafter "Big O's"). The parties thereafter engaged in settlement negotiations, in the course of which Mr. Nobles' counsel struggled mightily to convince the Department that the billboards continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption. When the Department rejected this argument, Mr. Nobles applied for an outdoor advertising permit for each billboard. The applications were ultimately denied, prompting the Department to refer the matters to DOAH for further proceedings. Based upon the evidence adduced at final hearing, it is evident that the billboards in question no longer meet the on-premises exemption and, thus, are subject to removal unless the signs meet either the current statutory requirements for a permit or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, which authorizes licensure if the billboards satisfy earlier statutory criteria and certain other conditions. Eligibility for Licensure – "Exit Now" Beginning first with the "Exit Now" billboard, the record makes pellucid that the current statutory requirements for licensure cannot be satisfied. Among other things, the sign is located a mere 190 feet from the permitted, double-stack billboard erected in 1993, a distance far less than the minimum spacing requirement of 1500 feet. See § 479.07(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. As for the potential applicability of the grandfather provision to the "Exit Now" billboard, it is critical to observe that the Department's delay of nearly five years (March of 2008 through December of 2012) in pursuing removal has placed Mr. Nobles at a significant disadvantage. In particular, had the Department moved forward in 2008——instead of inexplicably abandoning the action, which, along with the statements of its inspector, led Mr. Nobles to believe, incorrectly, that no permit was required——Mr. Nobles likely would have applied for a permit,6/ which the Department would have evaluated pursuant to the version of the grandfather provision in effect at that time. This is significant, for the 2008 codification of the grandfather provision, which remained unchanged until July 1, 2014, did not preclude licensure in situations where a billboard had previously enjoyed on-premises status or some other recognized exemption from the permitting requirement. Further, the pre-July 1, 2014, grandfather provision was quite favorable in that it allowed a potential licensee to demonstrate that the billboard would have met the criteria for licensure in effect "[a]t any time during the period in which the sign has been erected." § 479.105(1)(e)2., Fla. Stat. (2013)(emphasis added). The current version of the grandfather provision is quite a different animal. For one thing, grandfather status can only be granted if the billboard at issue "has never been exempt" from permitting. § 479.105(1)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). For another thing, the current grandfather provision looks not at "any" time in which the sign has been erected but, rather, at the criteria in effect during the initial seven years in which the sign was subject to the Department's jurisdiction. § 479.105(1)(c)2.b., Fla. Stat. (2014). As Mr. Nobles readily acknowledges, his effort to obtain a permit for the "Exit Now" billboard is a nonstarter under the 2014 version of the grandfather provision, whose plain language prohibits the issuance of a permit where, as here, the sign was previously exempt from licensure. This does not end the matter, however, for the undersigned finds that the Department's unjustified delay in pursuing removal——along with its agent's erroneous statement that the billboard was legal, upon which Mr. Nobles relied——requires that the "Exit Now" application be evaluated under the version of the grandfather provision that was in effect from 2008 until July 1, 2014. Pursuant to the pre-2014 codification of section 479.105, "grandfathering" was authorized if the owner could demonstrate: 1) that the sign in question had been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for at least seven years; 2) that, at any time during the period in which the sign has been erected, the sign would have satisfied the criteria established in chapter 479 for issuance of a permit; 3) that the Department did not file a notice of violation or take other action to remove the sign during the initial seven-year period in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location; and 4) that the sign is not located on a state right-of-way and is not a safety hazard. § 479.105(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2013). Upon such a showing, the Department was authorized to treat the sign as conforming or nonconforming and issue a permit. Turing to the merits, the first prong is easily satisfied, as the "Exit Now" sign has been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for 39 years, far longer than the seven-year period the statute requires. The third prong is also met, for the record makes clear that the Department took no action to pursue removal during the initial seven-year period, i.e., 1976 through 1983, in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained. In addition, the Department stipulates that the sign neither poses a safety hazard nor is located upon a state right-of-way, thereby satisfying the fourth prong.7/ This leaves only the second prong, which asks if the sign would have met the criteria for licensure at any time after it was erected. The selection of any time period subsequent to 1993 would surely doom the application, as the sign would be unable to satisfy the minimum spacing requirement due to its close physical proximity to the double-stack billboard——which, as noted previously, was issued a permit in 1993 and remains licensed. Prior to 1993, however, there does not appear to be any spacing conflict that would preclude licensure in this instance.8/ With the spacing concern resolved (and the relevant period of inquiry narrowed to "any" time between 1976 and 1993), the undersigned turns to the only other criterion for licensure that appears to be in dispute: section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the issuance of a permit only if the sign is located in "commercial-zoned and industrial-zoned areas or commercial-unzoned or industrial-unzoned areas." Unfortunately, this issue cannot be resolved on the instant record, for there is a dearth of persuasive evidence concerning the zoning designation of the third parcel (the location of the "Exit Now" sign) during the critical period of inquiry. Indeed, the record contains only the Department's speculative assumption that, because the area is presently unzoned, it therefore must have been unzoned at all times in the past.9/ Further, even accepting the Department's assumption at face value, it is impossible to determine whether the business activities conducted on the parcel from 1976 until the mid- 1990s——namely, the manufacture of candy and jelly and the sale of pecans——would satisfy the use test at any time between 1976 and 1993.10/ Under ordinary circumstances, such an absence of evidence would necessitate an adverse result for the permit applicant. Owing, however, to the unusual history and posture of this case, as well as the undersigned's conclusion that the pre-2014 grandfather provision should govern, it is recommended that the Department reevaluate Mr. Nobles' application to determine if the third parcel could have satisfied the requirements of 479.111(2) at any point between 1976 and 1993. Eligibility for Licensure – "Big O's" The undersigned turns next to the "Big O's" sign, which, like the "Exit Now" billboard, is unable to satisfy current licensing criteria due, among other reasons, to its close proximity to the double-stack billboard.11/ Further, as with the "Exit Now" billboard, the fact that the "Big O's" sign was previously exempt from licensure (owing to its on-premises status from 1976 through the mid-1990s) renders it ineligible for licensure under the 2014 codification of the grandfather provision. However, in sharp contrast to the "Exit Now" billboard, the "Big O's" sign is positioned within 500 feet of an interstate exit ramp, thereby constituting a safety hazard. This distinction is fatal to Mr. Nobles, as every codification of the grandfather provision from the mid-90s (when the sign lost its on-premises status) onward has prohibited the licensure of billboards that present a safety issue. The short of it, then, is that the sign was no more eligible for licensure in the past than it is today, which obviates the need for any further analysis under the pre-2014 version of the grandfather provision. For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Nobles has failed to prove that the "Big O's" sign is exempt from licensure by virtue of the "on-premises" exception. Further, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that, due to safety concerns, the sign would not have been eligible for licensure at any point in time. Accordingly, the undersigned is constrained to recommend the sign's removal pursuant to section 479.105. II. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 As noted earlier in this Order, DOAH Case No. 14-4928 involves an allegation that Mr. Nobles engaged in——or benefitted from——the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation. The relevant facts are recounted below. On January 21, 2013, Mr. Nobles executed a lease agreement with Michael McDougal, who owns a parcel of land adjacent to the eastbound lanes of I-10, approximately .6 miles from County Road 257. In relevant part, the terms of the lease authorized Mr. Nobles to place on the property a pickup truck, attached to which was a billboard that advertised the I-10 Pecan House. Shortly thereafter, in late January 2013, Mr. Nobles relocated the truck to a position on Mr. McDougal's property a short distance to the south of the fence line that separates the parcel from the Department's right-of-way. But trouble soon followed: in late February or early March, the Department received several reports of unusual vegetation removal in the general area of Mr. Nobles' truck sign. In response, the Department requested one of its contractors, Metric Engineering, Inc. ("Metric"), to conduct a field inspection of the area. The inspection was performed on or about March 12, 2013, by Bill Armstrong, a certified arborist employed by Metric. During the course of his inspection, Mr. Armstrong observed, first, an area that the Department had previously cleared to facilitate the installation of a new fence, which had yet to be installed. This particular area, which ran along the length of the fence line and had been cleared within the preceding six months, had a width (as measured from the fence toward the roadway) of approximately 12 feet. Immediately beyond this 12-foot zone, however, Mr. Armstrong noticed evidence of other activity that had occurred much more recently. Specifically, Mr. Armstrong observed, on the side of the fence immediately opposite Mr. Nobles' truck, an area 120 feet in length (parallel to the fence line) and approximately 25 feet in width that had been cleared of vegetation. Within this 120 by 25 foot area, Mr. Armstrong discovered 30 tree stumps, which, upon close examination, exhibited signs of having been recently cut. Such indications included the presence of sawdust; the fact that the stumps were bright in color and relatively clean; and the observation of fresh debris at both ends of the swath. These findings were recorded in a report dated March 25, 2013, which Metric promptly forwarded to Morris Pigott, the Department's Project Manager of Vegetation and Resource Management. Several weeks later, Mr. Pigott conducted his own site visit, during which he examined the particular area that had concerned Mr. Armstrong. Consistent with the findings contained in Metric's report, Mr. Pigott observed, within the 120 by 25 foot area, numerous, freshly-cut tree stumps. Mr. Pigott further concluded, quite reasonably, that this activity had not been performed by the Department or one of its contractors, for the stumps had not been cut to ground level, the vegetation immediately to the east and west of the area was "very dense," and the area had not been "grubbed."12/ (As explained during the final hearing, "grubbing" involves the removal of the top six inches of surface material, an action designed to prevent regrowth.) To cinch matters, Mr. Pigott observed that the selective clearing of the 120 by 25 foot area had enhanced the visibility of Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard for eastbound traffic. Thereafter, on April 14, 2013, Mr. Pigott cited Mr. Nobles for violating section 479.106(7), which provides that any person who engages in or benefits from the unauthorized removal of vegetation shall be subject to an administrative penalty. Mr. Pigott further notified Mr. Nobles that, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.057, the Department intended to assess mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25. Mr. Nobles promptly denied any and all involvement in the removal, claiming that a road crew had cleared the vegetation two years earlier. In response, Mr. Pigott contacted Mr. Armstrong, disclosed Mr. Nobles' explanation, and asked that a follow-up inspection be performed. Mr. Armstrong conducted his second inspection on August 8, 2013. At that time, Mr. Armstrong observed that Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard was still present, and that the stumps within the 120 by 25 foot area had sprouted and grown to a height of two to three feet. Samples of the sprouts were collected, which Mr. Armstrong later examined for evidence of internodes——i.e., rings that denote growth, with one ring forming during each growing season. Due to the absence of internodes, Mr. Armstrong concluded that the stumps were in their first growing season, thereby eliminating any possibility that the vegetation had been cleared several years earlier.13/ Finding that the evidence proves clearly and convincingly that Mr. Nobles benefitted from the unauthorized vegetation removal, the undersigned turns finally to the question of mitigation. As noted above, the Department seeks mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25, a figure derived from Mr. Armstrong's use of the formula referenced in rule 14-10.057. It is at this juncture that the Department's case falters. Although Mr. Armstrong offered credible testimony concerning the number and species of trees (water oaks, Florida maples, and the like) that were removed from the area, the record evidence regarding their market value consists entirely of hearsay. Indeed, the Department called no witness who possessed any firsthand knowledge as to the market value of the trees; instead, it presented only the testimony of Mr. Armstrong, who explained that he had telephoned three nurseries, obtained price quotes over the phone, averaged the three figures, and plugged the averages into the formula. To be clear, the undersigned has no quarrel with either the formula or Mr. Armstrong's initial reliance upon the price quotes. The problem is that, in the absence of a stipulation from Mr. Nobles concerning the amount of mitigation, the Department was obligated to adduce at least some non-hearsay evidence of the market values——the starting point of the calculations. Inasmuch as the record is devoid of such evidence, the Department's request for mitigation must be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: DOAH Case No. 14-4926 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding that the billboard identified in Notice of Violation 1487 ("Big O's") is illegal and subject to removal pursuant to section 479.105, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. DOAH Case No. 14-4927 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation take no further action on Notice of Violation 1352 until such time that it reevaluates (under the pre-July 1, 2014, codification of section 479.105) the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. If the application is granted, the Department should enter a final order dismissing Notice of Violation 1352. In the event, however, the application is once again denied, the Department should afford Respondent a point of entry into the administrative process. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 479.106, Florida Statutes, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00 DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2015.
Findings Of Fact A letter of denial from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services upon the application of Petitioner, Bob Walker Trailer Park, for a trailer park permit filed by Bob Walker for the Bob Walker Trailer Park, a/k/a the Cherry Pocket Fish Camp was introduced into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2 and stated in part: "1. That the Petitioner had not complied with Section 10D-26.05 F.A.C. which requires that a permit application should be on forms furnished by the Division of Health and should be submitted through the local health depart- ment. The Petitioner was in violation of Section 10D-26.07(3)(a) F.A.C. because the minimum square footage requirement of 2,400 square feet for each independent mobile home space is not being met at his trailer park. The Petitioner was in violation of Section 10D-26.08 F.A.C. in that he is not providing at his trailer park an accessible, adequate, safe and potable supply of water. Further, the water provided the residents of the trailer park is not in compliance with Section 17-22 F.A.C. in that the plan submitted by the Petitioner does not show or specify chlorination equipment as required by Section 17-22.11(2) F.A.C. because the well at the trailer park is in prohibited proximity to a septic tank for which the Peti- tioner has never received a permit as required by Chapter 10D-6 F.A.C. The water supply plan submitted by the Petitioner cam not be approved by the local health unit of the Department because the Petitioner has not indicated the physical and chemical parameters of the water as required by Section 17.22.03(7), (9), (11) F.A.C. The Petitioner was in violation of Section 10D-26.09 F.A.C. because he does not have at his trailer park an adequate and safe method of sewage collection, treatment and disposal in compliance with Chapter 17-6 F.A.C. or 10D-6 F.A.C. The septic tanks installed at the Petitioner's trailer park were installed in violation of 10D-6 F.A.C. without any permits having been secured. The Petitioner is required to have a central sewage system installed and in operation in his trailer park before a trailer park permit can be granted. Section 10-6.21(9) F.A.C. provides that total waste flow from any one establishment, whether a single structure or group of structures except residences shall be centrally collected for treatment and disposal in compliance with Chapter 17-6 F.A.C. when the established daily flow exceeds 2,000 gallons." Petitioner acknowledges the accuracy of the facts contained in the letter but contends: that the required forms were not sent him; that his trailer park had been in operation for a long period of time and he had always intended to comply with the numerous permits and regulations and felt that he had so complied; that the requirements of the Respondent particularly as to a central sewage system is unnecessary and confiscatory in effect. Respondent contends: that it had no alternative but to issue a letter of denial; that it followed the requirements of Chapter 381 and 514, Florida Statutes; and that the rules promulgated under those statutes and cited in its letter of denial are the requirements of the statutes and the rules, and it has no alternative but to enforce those provisions. Petitioner's proposed order was considered in the preparation of this order including the references to the current numbering of the applicable rules.
Recommendation Deny the application without prejudice to Petitioner to complete a study and arrive at a settlement satisfactory to the Respondent. Allow the Petitioner sixty (60) days from date hereof to re-submit an application for a trailer park permit. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Dell McPherson, Esquire Department of HRS Post Office Box 20007 St. Petersburg, Florida 33742 Andrew R. Reilly, Esquire Post Office Box 2039 Haines City, Florida 33844
Findings Of Fact Outdoor Display is a licensed outdoor advertiser holding License No. 18191 from Polk County. The two signs which are referenced in the charges are located on U.S. 92 respectively 2.59 miles and 2.67 miles west of U.S. 27. These signs were inspected in 1975 and the first sign bore 1971 permit issued to Outdoor Display. The signs each had a value of more than $100. Both signs belonged to Outdoor Display, and neither sign bore a current permit. Boger receives application from Outdoor Display as the outdoor advertising administrator but had not received any application with regard to these two signs prior to the hearing.
The Issue Whether the sign of Petitioner is in violation of the Florida Statutes, Outdoor Advertising Law, Chapter 479 and particularly Chapter 479.07 for having erected this sign in violation of the zoning regulations and without a permit from the Department of Transportation.
Findings Of Fact An alleged violation notice was sent to Peterson Outdoor Advertising Corporation, Petitioner, by the Respondent, Department of Transportation, on July 27, 1977. The notice indicated that the sign owned by Petitioner located 300 feet north of 5-227, U.S. Highway 301 in Bradford County, Florida, with a blank copy was in violation of Ch. 479, Florida Statutes, Rule 14-10-05 (1)(a), Not zone for conforming sign - sign erected in a zoned agricultural area. Ch. 479.07(1) Florida Statutes, Rule 14-10.04 Sign erected without first [sic] obtaining a permit. A violation notice was received by Michael S. Nelson, lease representative for the Respondent, and a letter was sent to the District Administrator for Outdoor Advertising, Florida Department of Transportation, acknowledging receipt of the violation notice and requesting the Department of Transportation to set the cause for hearing. This administrative hearing is the result of such request. The Peterson Outdoor Advertising Corporation made an application for permit for a sign to be located at the location the subject sign now stands. The application for a permit was not approved for the stated reason that the requested location was in a zoned open rural area and outdoor advertising could not be permitted in such a location. Petitioner was so notified. Nevertheless a sign was erected by Petitioner and Respondent's inspectors found said sign at the location with no copy on it at the first inspection. Subsequent to that inspection, the sign was finished by Petitioner to advertise McDonalds, with the large golden "M", further stating: "Campers/ Buses 3 Miles Ahead on the Right, Open at 7:00 for Breakfast." The sign was erected without a permit in a zoned open rural area in Bradford County. The sign is approximately 15 feet off the right of way of Highway 301 in open rural country at least 3 miles from any industrial or commercial areas. Petitioner contends that he applied for a permit to erect the sign at the subject location but that his application was denied. Regardless, he erected the sign and has been endeavoring to have the rural area rezoned. Respondent, Department of Transportation, contends that the erection of the subject sign is in violation of the law inasmuch as it is the duty of the Department of Transportation to grant a permit before a sign is erected. Respondent further contends that the area in which the sign is located is in open rural country and the proposed sign location, even if it were rezoned to allow outdoor advertising, could not be permitted by the Department inasmuch as such rezoning would be "spot zoning" and contrary to the requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, Title 1 of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 and Title 23, U.S. Code and contrary to the concept of "effective control" by the Florida Department of Transportation which has the duty to control outdoor advertising for the State of Florida. In response to a request to the Bradford County Zoning Commission, the following letter was received: Pursuant to our conversation on November 7, relating to the zoning classification of the C. M. Ritch property located approximately 2 miles South of Starke on Hwy. 301, the property is zoned Open Rural and under Bradford County Zoning Ordinances does allow outdoor advertising signs. The area in which the sign was erected is the area indicated in the letter. The Petitioner intentionally erected its sign in the open rural area of Bradford County and continues to allow it to stand although the Bradford County Zoning Ordinances show that no outdoor advertising is to be allowed.
Recommendation Remove the sign of Respondent for intentionally erecting a sign in an unzoned rural area without a permit from the Department of Transportation. Invoke the penalties provided in Section 479.18, Florida Statutes, for both the Petitioner and for the McDonald Corporation whose goods and services are advertised. Section 479.13, Penalties, provides: Any person, violating any provision of this chapter whether as principal, agent or employee for which violation no other penalty is prescribed, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in Section 775.083: and such person shall be guilty of a separate offense for each month during any portion of which any violation off this chapter is committed, continued or permitted. The existence of any advertising copy on any outdoor advertising structure or outdoor advertising sign or advertisement outside incorporated towns and cities shall constitute prima facie evidence that the said outdoor advertising sign or advertisement was constructed, erected, operated, used, maintained or displayed with the consent and approval and under the authority of the person whose goods or services are advertised thereon. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Rick Hurst, Administrator Outdoor Advertising Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Michael S. Nelson Lease Representative Peterson Outdoor Advertising Corp. P. O. Box 301 Ocala, Florida 32670 L. M. Gaines, Director Bradford County Zoning Commission P. O. Drawer B Starke, Florida 32091 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION IN RE: PETERSON OUTDOOR ADVERTISING NOT EFFECTIVE UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE FOR JUDICIAL Petitioner, REVIEW AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED vs. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Respondent. / CASE NO. 77-1432T
Findings Of Fact Mr. Claude R. Finley is the sole owner of Pensacola Outdoor Advertising. He purchased property on April 17, 1984, having a sign structure with four faces located thereon. This sign structure was owned by the Lamar Company. The Department had issued for permits to the Lamar Company for the four faces of this sign. Mr. Finley was aware that this sign was permitted by the Department to Lamar when he purchased this property. Mr. Finley applied for sign permits at this approximate location by application dated April 15, 1984. The Department denied the application because of sign permit numbers AD809-8, A15824-10, A1585-10 and 6821-10 held by the Lamar Company, and because no preliminary approval letter from Escambia County had been obtained. A second application for permits was sent to the Department on June 12, 1984, which was also returned unapproved by letter dated June 18, 1984, because of the existing permits that had been issued to Lamar. Mr. Finley attempted on numerous occasions to work out a lease with Lamar for the subject location, but he was not successful. By letter dated June 12, 1984, Mr. Finley notified the Lamar Company that it had 15 days to remove the sign structure from his property. Mr. Hollis Wood, General Manager of the Lamar Company, responded by letter dated June 22, 1984, that he would remove the sign structure on June 30, and cancel its permit tags after the expiration of its lease for the sign site. Mr. Finley rode by the location on I-10, on June 30th, about 3:00 p.m. He did not stop, but he observed no sign there. He could tell by the bent trees that some work had been done in the area. The previous time Mr. Finley had been by the site, earlier in the week, the sign was standing. By letter dated June 13, 1924, Mr. Finley advised the Department that he was the owner of the property where the Lamar Company held permits, and he advised he was cancelling the permits for signs on his property. By letter dated June 19, 1984, the Department informed the Lamar Company that it had received information that the Lamar Company no longer had the permission of the property owner to maintain the sign at the location where the permits were issued, and that the permits would be invalidated by the Department unless evidence was provided to refute the information, or a hearing requested within 30 days to challenge this cancellation action. Mr. Wood, by letter dated June 29, 1984, requested an administrative hearing. Later Charles W. Lamar III, by letter dated July 20, 1984, withdrew the request for an administrative hearing, advising that the sign structure in question had been removed, and that a cancellation affidavit and the permit tags were being returned to the Department. The first application for sign permits on the south side of I-10, 2.2 miles east of SR 297, for signs facing east and west, submitted by the Petitioner, was denied because of the four existing permits held by the Lamar Company at this location, and because no preliminary approval from Escambia County for erecting billboards that had been obtained. The county's preliminary approval is part of the application process for locations in Escambia County. The Lamar Company's sign permits remained outstanding until after July 1, 1984, when the new spacing requirements of the 1984 amendment to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, became effective. There are two permitted sign locations approximately 1,000 feet to the east and to the west of the subject site. These permits are held by Bill Salter Outdoor Advertising. The Petitioner's second permit application was denied because the permits held by the Lamar Company were not cancelled until July when the new spacing law became effective requiring 1,500 feet between signs on I-10, resulting in a spacing conflict with the two Bill Slater locations approximately 1,000 feet to the east and west of the proposed site. The Department's procedure for revoking permits allows a party holding a permit to cancel it by submitting an affidavit and returning the tags, stating the reason for cancellation in the affidavit. Until permits are revoked or cancelled by the Department, they remain valid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order finding that the application of Pensacola Outdoor Advertising for sign permits at a location on the south side of I-10, 2.2 miles east of S.R. 297, facing east and west, in Escambia County, Florida, be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of December, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Holley, Esquire Post Office Box 268 Chipley, Florida 32428 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064
Findings Of Fact The remaining alleged non-conforming sign on Exhibit 2 is located within the city limits of Lakeland, Florida at Lake Parker Drive and Main Street. Petitioner acknowledged that if the sign was erected prior to 1972 and meets the requirements of the city of Lake land it is permittable. This sign was purchased by Respondent some two years ago from Outdoor Media who had obtained a permit for the sign on 3 January 1972. The sign was erected shortly thereafter. Accordingly the sign is permittable in its present location. The two signs on Exhibit 1 present a different situation. These signs were purchased by Respondent from Lawrence Company approximately one year ago and the signs were up when Lawrence was purchased. These two signs are located on US 92, 9.50 and 9.60 miles west of US 17. US 92 is a federal-aid primary highway. The zoning in the area is Rural Conservation, however, the owner of the property has applied for and obtained concept approval for a Planned Urban Development (PUD) project. Applications submitted by Lawrence to DOT for a permit to erect these signs (Exhibits 3 and 4) showed the property on which the signs were to be erected to be zoned Commercial or Industrial. A telephone call to the county zoning section by the DOT approving officer confirmed that the zoning was Commercial and a permit was issued. Actually the owner of the property had submitted a PUD application which received concept approval for a country store, boat rental and sales, and other businesses to cater to the users of Saddle Creek Park (Exhibit 7). Extensions of this concept approval have been granted by Polk County through January 24, 1979. Concept approval does not change the zoning or authorize any construction on the property inconsistent with the original zoning. Application for a zoning change to that requested in the application for which concept approval was granted is necessary before the County can or will change the zoning. Such application will be treated as all other applications for zoning changes and the fact that concept approval has been granted does not assure the application for zoning change will be approved. Accordingly the signs shown on Exhibit 1 to be in violation are erected on property presently zoned Rural Conservation and the property was so zoned when the signs were erected.
The Issue Whether the outdoor advertising signs in question are in violation of the applicable statutes and regulations and whether their permits should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent applied to the Petitioner for outdoor advertising permits at a location on the west side of State Road 263, 674 feet north of U.S. Highway 90, with signs facing north and south. Prior to making application with the Petitioner, Mr. Mooshie contacted the Tallahassee Leon County Department and was advised that the site was located within county jurisdiction. Mr. Mooshie applied for and received a permit from Leon County whereby the county asserted jurisdiction over the area in question. The site in question is within the city limits of Tallahassee and was in the city limits of Tallahassee at the time Mr. Mooshie applied for the permit. The permit applications submitted by the Respondent indicated that the sign site was not inside the city limits. State Permit Tag Numbers BB 729-35 and BB 730-35 were issued on July 22, 1990 for the site in question. The Respondent applied to the City of Tallahassee for a city permit for the subject site on July 11, 1990 and was advised that a permit could not be issued because a city permit had been issued to Lamar Advertising for a location 600 feet north on the same street on June 21, 1990. The Petitioner issued an outdoor advertising permit to Lamar Advertising for the site for which the city had issued a building permit prior to the final hearing in this case. The City of Tallahassee sign ordinance requires 2,000 feet spacing between billboards on the same side of the street. No sign structure has been erected at the site in question.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that State Permit Tag Numbers BB 729-35 and BB 730-35 be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Esq. Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 John S. Mooshie Wakoa, Inc. Post Office Box 12335 Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Thornton J. Williams, Esq. General Counsel 605 Suwannee Street 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
