The Issue This is a bid challenge case in which the primary issue is whether the Petitioner's bid is responsive to the RFP.
Findings Of Fact Some basic background facts The Department issued Request for Proposals No. 700:0652, Office Space (the "RFP"). The RFP requested bidders to submit proposals to provide 7,750 square feet of office space (+/- 3 percent) in Broward County to be leased by the Department for a probation and parole office. Under the RFP terms the space had to be available by June 1, 1993. Proposals had to be filed with the Department by January 5, 1993. In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., and Janc, Inc., submitted bids. Pursuant to an evaluation of the bids conducted by the Department, In- Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was given a contingent award of the lease on March 31, 1993, as the vendor with the lowest price and the overall highest evaluation score. The contingent award letter of March 31, 1993, read as follows in pertinent part: It is the intent of the Department of Corrections to award the above referenced bid to In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., as the vendor with the lowest bid price and the overall highest evaluation score. The award to In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., is contingent upon: (a) obtaining the necessary zoning approval to operate a probation and parole office at the bid premises by May 6, 1993, and (b) the Department obtaining sufficient assurances from the Resolution Trust Corporation that the bid premises will not be taken over by the RTC and the Department's leasehold interest will not be affected. On May 18, 1993, the Department issued a letter awarding the subject lease to Janc, Inc., because the Department was of the view that In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., had not met the conditions of the contingent award of March 31, 1993. The award letter of May 18, 1993, read as follows, in pertinent part: This letter is to inform you that the Department of Corrections has determined that the award of the lease for the above referenced bid is hereby made to Janc, Inc. The bid from In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc. has been rejected because it has not met either of the conditions stipulated on the March 31st award letter, and the property has not been properly maintained under the existing lease agreement. Both the contingent award letter of March 31, 1993, and the award letter of May 18, 1993, contained "boiler-plate" language advising the addressee of the basic details of the written protest process. In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., filed a timely protest of the award to Janc, Inc. Facts about the zoning situation The award of the lease to In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was made contingent because the property was not properly zoned to support a probation and parole office for the Department. At the time of soliciting bids on the subject project, the Department was currently leasing the space proposed by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., and had done so for almost five years. Shortly after the deadline for the submission of bids, the Department was notified that it was in violation of the Plantation City Code because the office was not properly zoned, and the Department was subject to fines if it did not obtain proper zoning or leave the premises by June 1. The fine was at the rate of $200.00 per day. In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., did not obtain necessary zoning approval by May 6, 1993. First, the zoning approval passed by the City of Plantation limited the hours of operation of the probation office. As approved by the City of Plantation, the Department can only operate its probation office Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., plus one evening a week until 7:00 p.m. These time limits do not satisfy the contingency placed in the March 31, 1993, award because the Department cannot operate a probation and parole office within these limited hours. The Department has 14,000 probationers in Broward County under its supervision. The caseload puts a severe strain on the caseworkers making it essential that they have flexible hours to get their job done. The caseload also requires working evenings and weekends. For example, some probation officers must maintain evening hours to test offenders for drugs. Although the officers could make the offenders visit the Department's office during the day, this would jeopardize the employment status of many offenders. Therefore, the Department needs flexible evening hours to do the drug testing. One of the major functions of the probation officer is to help rehabilitate the offender. That means that the Department must do what it can to help the offender stay employed. In addition, the probation officers need evening and weekend hours to do their paperwork, including preparing weekly reporting schedules, and recording their contacts. The officers also need evening hours to receive monetary payments due from offenders, meet with offenders who must report in person into the office each month, and counsel offenders in the office. Under the prior lease with In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., the Department had operated and held evening hours at a minimum of three nights per week. This included both probation officers and offenders appearing at the office during the evenings. The RFP specifically notified bidders that there would be evening hours. Section B(14) of the RFP states: Staff of both sexes will be required to work in this facility during both daylight and evening hours. An environment in which staff can expect to be safe is essential. Section D(11) of the General Provisions of the subject RFP reads as follows: Federal, state, county, and local laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations that in any manner affect the items covered herein apply. Lack of knowledge by the bidder will in no way be a cause for relief from responsibility. The records of the City of Plantation meetings show that the May 5, 1993, vote was not final. A mandatory second reading of the zoning change took place on May 12, 1993, and the minutes were approved on May 19, 1993, and June 2, 1993, with respect to the first and second reading. Even if the zoning change with its limited hours had been sufficient to meet the terms of the contingent award, the limited zoning approval was not received before May 6, 1993; and therefore, the mandatory second reading of May 12, 1993, caused the limited zoning approval to be untimely. Finally, the limited and untimely zoning change as approved on May 5, 1993, was itself contingent on satisfying all concerns of the Landscape Architect. Facts regarding the RTC assurances The second award contingency required In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., to provide the Department with sufficient assurances from the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) that the bid premises would not be taken over by the RTC and that the Department's leasehold interest would not be affected. The property submitted by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was in litigation; the RTC as successor mortgagee, had filed or secured a Notice of Lis Pendens, an Amended Complaint, a Summary Final Foreclosure Judgment, and a Notice of Sale. The RTC has an interest in the property offered by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc. Paragraph 1(E) of the Summary Final Foreclosure Judgment provides that the Summary Final Foreclosure Judgment shall eliminate the interest of anyone that has acquired an interest since the filing of the Lis Pendens, including the Department's leasehold interest if it were to enter into a lease on the property. The property bid by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was subject to a second mortgage. The record does not reflect that the first mortgagee and the second mortgagee entered into any type of written agreement not to disturb the leasehold interest of the Department. By letter dated May 11, 1993, an attorney for the RTC responded to the Department's request for assurances. The May 11, 1993, letter included the following: Pursuant to your request of yesterday, I am writing to belatedly confirm the April 19, 1993 telephone conference had you, Robert Gellman of Real Estate Recovery, Inc., and I. This telephone conversation was had to provide the Department of Corrections (the "Department") with the assurances requested from the RTC in the Department's March 31, 1993 letter of intent to award the subject least [sic] to In Rel Acquisitions, Inc. During this discussion you expressed the concern of the Department that the RTC intended to take title to the property and would then utilize special powers and privileges to dispossess the Department. If that were to be the case, you indicated that the Department would want an assurance that it would receive 90-days' notice before it could be dispossessed. (You indicated that 90-days is how long it would take to complete the bid process that would have to precede the Department's move.) Robert Gellman indicated that he was pursing [sic] numerous resolutions to the pending litigation, some of which might involve the RTC's taking title to the property and others which might not. Mr. Gellman assured you, however, that the RTC perceived it to be in its own best interest, and in the interest of any subsequent landlord, that the Department be kept happy and its tenancy undisturbed. Mr. Gellman also explained that he could not agree to anything at the time, as the appropriate committee approval had to be secured, but that he anticipated no problem in obtaining the necessary approvals of any writing consistent with our discussions once those writings were prepared. (I believe at the time we contemplated a written lease and a written assurance letter from the appropriate RTC official.) You indicated that your concerns had been satisfied and that these assurances were sufficient to satisfy the Department. The three of us discussed that it would not make sense to begin drafting anything at that time as the issues regarding the property's zoning still had to be cleared up and our efforts might otherwise "be all for not." Accordingly, it was mutually decided that we would wait to see the outcome of the May 5, 1993 hearing on the zoning issue before proceeding further. In the interim you indicated that you would be providing us with a list of the specific items of tenant improvements that your local officials expected to have made to the property. (We received this list on May 3, 1993.) On May 5, 1993 the Plantation City Council approved In-Rel Acquisition Inc.'s, request for a rezoning of its property and for a "special use" condition by a 4-0 vote, thus effectively resolving the zoning issue. Yesterday you and I spoke on this issue and discussed the situation. I indicated that the RTC is now in a position to provide you with written assurance that it has no intention of dispossessing the Department or interfering with its lease tenancy (either under the old or the new lease), and that the Department's leasehold interest would not be affected by the RTC taking title to the property (if it ever does). I asked and you indicated that this would give you what you needed and everything would be fine. In addition, I indicated that once the lease by and between the Department and In Rel is finalized, the RTC, if it still owns the note and mortgage, would be able to approve same. In light of the foregoing your call to me this morning, indicating that the Department had decided to withdraw its award to In Rel Acquisitions, Inc. and make the award to "Viloci" (phonetic(?), the next ranked bidder. During this discussion you indicated that Viloci's legal counsel had stated that the RTC would never be able to provide the Department with the requisite assurances. It is unfair for you to make decisions based in whole or in part on any statements made by Viloci's counsel regarding what the RTC can and cannot do without giving us an opportunity to respond -- especially in light of your indications on April 19th and again yesterday that the Department was satisfied with the RTC. The record reflects that the "Notice of Sale" failed to contain language providing that the property would be sold subject to any leasehold interest, either previously or subsequently acquired.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case dismissing the Petition of In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., and awarding the subject lease to the Intervenor, Janc, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of September 1993. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3438BID The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitioner Paragraph 1: First three sentences accepted in substance. Fourth sentence rejected as constituting primarily irrelevant or subordinate details. Last sentence reject as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence to the extent it is intended to imply that the zoning change obtained was sufficient. Paragraph 2 and 3: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 4 and 5: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 6: The first two sentences are rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant and also as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as suggesting implications not warranted by the evidence. Paragraph 7: Rejected because it goes further than the evidence and suggests inferences not warranted by the evidence. Messrs. Gellman and Guerra told Mr. Ferst that they did not expect that the Department would have any problems with RTC, but the statements of Messrs. Gellman and Guerra stopped short of making any guarantees or of binding the RTC. Paragraph 8: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance, with the deletion of the words "in ignoring the foregoing." Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting a summary of a party's argument or statement of position, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 11: First sentence is accepted in substance. Second sentence is accepted as literally true, but as also substantially irrelevant because during most of the original five-year lease there was no issue about hours of operation because there was no effort at restriction of hours of operation. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 12: The first two sentences are rejected as constituting a summary of a party's argument or statement of position, rather than a proposed finding of fact. The third and fourth sentences are rejected because they go further than the evidence and suggest inferences not warranted by the evidence. As noted above, Messrs. Gellman and Guerra told Mr. Ferst that they did not expect that the Department would have any problems with RTC, but the statements of Messrs. Gellman and Guerra stopped short of making any guarantees or of binding the RTC. Paragraph 13: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 14: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as constituting argument or proposed conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 15: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 16: It is accepted that Messrs. Gellman and Guerra made statements as to what they expected the RTC's position to be, but, as noted several times above, the statements of Messrs. Gellman and Guerra stopped short of making any guarantees or of binding the RTC. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9: Accepted. Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary restatement of a party's position. Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: Rejected as repetitious. Paragraphs 15, 16 and 17: Accepted. Paragraph 18: First sentence is accepted. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 30: Accepted. Paragraph 31 and 32: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 33 and 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 35 and 36: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 37: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 38, 39, 40 and 41: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 42, 43, 44 and 45: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 46, 47, 48 and 49: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 50: Accepted. Paragraph 51: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 52: First sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Second sentence rejected as repetitious. Paragraphs 53, 54 and 55: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 56: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as constituting argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 57: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 58: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 and 64: Rejected as primarily constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings submitted by Intervenor Although there are some differences in the numerical sequence, the vast majority of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Intervenor are identical to those submitted by the Respondent. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat the rulings on all of those findings. The following rulings address the few proposed findings submitted by the Intervenor that are different from the ones submitted by the Respondent. Paragraph 11: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary restatement of a party's position. Paragraph 30: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 37: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 44: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 54: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 61: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 62, 63 and 64: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 65, 66 and 67: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael S. Riley, Esquire 200 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Steven S. Ferst, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Joseph J. Villacci, Esquire 315 Northeast Third Avenue, Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Harry K. Singletary, Jr., Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
The Issue The Department of Corrections sought bids for construction of a health services building for a correctional facility. A discrepancy existed between the written specifications and the architectural drawings for the project. An addendum was issued to clarify the matter. The low bidder (Intervenor) did not acknowledge receipt of the addendum until several hours after the opening of bids. The Department accepted the Intervenor's bid. The Petitioner timely protested the action. The issue in this case is whether, in accepting the Intervenor's bid, the Department acted contrary to the requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact On July 31, 1990, the Department of Corrections (hereinafter "Department") issued an Invitation To Bid ("ITB") for PR-35-JRA, Project #90015, consisting of the construction of a Health Classification Building at the Columbia County Correctional Institution. In relevant part, the ITB requested price proposals for said construction, provided that the bid would be awarded to the responsive bidder submitting the lowest cost proposal, provided that "in the interest" of the Department, "any informality" in bids could be waived, and provided space on the bid form for acknowledgment of receipt of all addenda to the ITB. Bids were to be filed no later than 2:00 p.m. on September 11, 1990, the time scheduled for bid opening. Documents issued with the ITB included architectural drawings and written specifications for the building. The architectural firm of Jim Roberson and Associates, (hereinafter "JRA") had been employed by the Department to prepare the drawings and specifications. JRA was responsible for preparation and distribution of related addenda. Further, a JRA representative presided over the opening of bids on behalf of the Department. Following release of the ITB and supporting documents, JRA became aware of a conflict between sink faucets required by the drawings and those required by the written specifications. The specifications provided that sink faucets operated by hand levers or foot pedals were to be installed in the facility. The architectural drawings JRA indicated that sink faucets were to operate by means of "electric-eye" activators, rather than by hand levers or foot pedals. On September 10, 1990, JRA issued an addendum (identified as Addendum #2) 1/ to clarify that "electric-eye" type operators were to be included in the bids. The addendum was sent by telephone facsimile machine to all anticipated bidders. In part the addendum provides as follows: "This Addendum forms a part of the Contract Documents and modifies the original Specifications and Drawings, dated 31 July 1990, as noted below. Acknowledge receipt of this Addendum in the space provided on the Bid Form. Failure to do so may subject the Bidder to Disqualification." On September 11, 1990, the eight bids submitted in response to the ITB were opened by the JRA representative. The Intervenor, Custom Construction (hereinafter "Custom"), submitted the lowest bid at $898,898. The Petitioner, David Nixon (hereinafter "Nixon"), submitted the next lowest bid at $900,000. The bid form provided by the Department as part of the ITB materials to prospective bidders provided space for acknowledgment of addenda to the ITB documents. Upon opening the bid submitted by Custom, the JRA representative officiating at the opening noted that the Custom bid failed to acknowledge Addendum #2 in the appropriate space on the bid form. 2/ Robert L. Harris, president of Custom Construction, attended the bid opening. When the JRA representative noted the lack of acknowledgment of Addendum #2, Mr. Harris stated that he was unaware of the addendum. At hearing, Mr. Harris testified that his secretary told him that Addendum #2 was not received by his office. The JRA representative testified that his review of JRA's FAX transmission records indicated that the FAXed Addendum #2 was received by all bidders. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Addendum #2 was transmitted to and received by, all bidders. Upon leaving the bid opening, Mr. Harris immediately contacted his plumbing subcontractor, Jerry Stratyon, and discussed the situation. Approximately two hours after the bid opening, and after talking with Mr. Stratton, Mr. Harris notified JRA, in a letter transmitted by FAX machine to JRA, that his bid price did include plumbing fixtures required by Addendum #2. Mr. Harris concluded the letter, "[w]hen can we start work. I know you don't want the alternate." On October 8, 1990, JRA recommended to the Department, that the Custom bid be accepted. The letter of recommendation, in part, provides: The apparent low bidder however, did not verify receipt of Addendum No. 2 on the Bid Proposal. Our office did receive a, facsimile after the bid verifying Addendum NO. 2 receipt from the Contractor's Office." However, the actual letter from Custom to JRA states, not that Addendum #2 was received, but that it was included in the price bid by Custom's plumbing subcontractor. Both Nixon and Custom obtained plumbing bids from the same subcontractor, Jerry Stratton. The cost increase attendant to the requirements of Addendum #2 is approximately $2,400 over the plumbing fixtures indicated in the written project specifications. Mr. Stratton was aware of Addendum #2 and testified that the requirements of Addendum #2 were reflected in his price quotes to both bidders. Mr. Stratton provided the same price bid to Nixon and Custom. Mr. Stratton also provided bids to Nixon and Custom for HVAC work. Mr. Stratton was accepted as Custom's HVAC subcontractor. Nixon's bid indicates that another HVAC subcontractor will perform the cork should Nixon receive the contract. The ITB provided that bid modification or withdrawal was permitted on written or telegraphic request received from a bidder prior to the time fixed for opening. Mr. Harris did not attempt to either withdraw or modify Custom's bid prior to bid opening. No bid modification was permitted subsequent to the bid opening. The Department's policy is to waive minor irregularities when to do so would be in the best interests of the State and would not be unfair to other bidders. The evidence does not establish that Custom Construction's failure to acknowledge the addendum was purposefully designed to permit withdrawal of their bid subsequent to the public bid opening. The omission of acknowledgment of Addendum #2 provided Custom an opportunity to withdraw the bid that was not available to other bidders. Custom could have informed the Department that the bid price did not include the requirements of Addendum #2, and the bid could have been withdrawn. Custom was therefore provided with a substantial advantage or benefit not enjoyed by the other bidders. The other bidders, all of whom acknowledged receipt of Addendum #2, had no opportunity to, and would not have been permitted to, withdraw their aids. The fact that Custom did not withdraw the bid is irrelevant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a Final Order rejecting the bid submitted by Intervenor as nonresponsive and awarding the contract to the Petitioner. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Respondent HRS published ITB 590:2306 for existing rental space in the central area of Brooksville, Florida. The bid solicitation specified a bid opening time and date of 2:00 p.m. July 17, 1991. Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted sealed bids. They were the only two bidders. Neither they nor anyone else timely filed any protest of the bid specifications, and therefore the specifications are not subject to attack in this proceeding. Petitioner received a notice of intent to award the bid for lease 590:2306 to Intervenor by letter from Respondent dated August 27, 1991 and timely filed its notice of intent to protest and formal bid protest. Petitioner accordingly has standing to bring this proceeding. Intervenor is the intended awardee and as such has standing to intervene. Petitioner submitted the property located at 7348 Broad Street, Brooksville, Florida, and showed in his bid submittal form that his proposed property contained 22,500 net square feet, with future expansion of 2,100 square feet available. When Petitioner submitted his bid, it included a floor plan, site plan, and a PUR 7068 form. A PUR 7068 form is a "Public Entity Crime Certification Statement," a sworn statement under Section 287.133(a) F.S. The ITB included two separate requirements for bidders to establish that they have control over the property that they submit to HRS. HRS' purposes in requiring bidders to demonstrate control are to prevent bids based on total speculation, to establish a reasonable expectation that the bidder can meet his obligations if awarded the bid, and to establish a reasonable expectation that the property can be occupied on time. Item 1 on page 3 provides as follows: Control of property - This pertains to both the structure(s) and proposed parking areas. To submit a responsive bid, a prospective lessor must meet one of the following qualifications: a.) Be the owner of record of the facility and parking areas (submit copy of deed). b.) Be the lessee of space being proposed and present with bid, a copy of lease with documen- tation of authorization to sublease the facility and parking areas through the base lease term and all renewal option periods. c.) Submit documentation of an option to purchase the facility and/or parking areas. d.) Submit documentation of an option to lease the facility with authorization to in turn, sublease. Any lease must encompass the entire time period of the basic lease and any renewal option periods as required the state. e.) Submit form PUR. 7068 Sworn Statement of Public Entity Crimes (Attachment H). Page 12 provides, in part, as follows: In order for a bid proposal to be accepted the items 1 through 6 must be included in the bid proposal. Items 7 through 11 must be included, if applicable. [Items 11 and 13 state:] 11. Documentation showing bidder as controller of property. 13. Public Enemy [sic] Crime Certification Statement A pre-bid conference attended by Petitioner made clear that evidence of control and the PUR 7068 form were two different items. Petitioner testified that he attached the PUR 7068 form as his sole basis for evidencing control of the building and parking spaces he submitted for lease, and acknowledged that, in fact, the form did not provide any information with regard to his control of the buildings or parking spaces offered for lease. Petitioner's assertion that his name on some of his site plans, etc. constitutes evidence of control is not persuasive. Such assertion is not in line with the ITB requirements or even common sense. Petitioner Proctor owned the buildings he offered HRS in his bid submittal. Petitioner offered multiple buildings separated by parking areas and driveways. The property offered by Petitioner was to have built an awning- covered walkway between buildings but the walkway would have to be placed through the driveway area of the property. The expansion area for Petitioner's property designated in its bid submittal was composed of approximately 10 gated warehouse units which would be converted to office space. Petitioner had leased a portion of the same premises to HRS for 15 years, and HRS was still leasing that portion at the time of the bid opening. At the time of the bid opening, another portion of the property Petitioner proposed to be leased to HRS was also already rented to other tenants, including a lease to the Florida Department of Labor which was not scheduled to expire until December 31, 1991, one day prior to HRS' proposed first day of occupancy under the ITB. The space leased to the Department of Labor would require some renovation for HRS' use, at least to connect it on the interior with the rest of the building. The remainder of the second, adjacent, building to be rented under Petitioner's bid would require more extensive renovation to create office spaces to meet HRS' needs. In addition to the Department of Labor, Petitioner was also renting space in the second building to a beauty salon, a book store, an office supply store, a clothing store, and a barber at the time of bid submittal and opening and at the time of the formal hearing. These latter tenants were on month-to-month leases. In order to ensure that there would be time for necessary renovations before January 1, 1992 and further to ensure that the property would be available for occupancy on January 1, 1992, the ITB required in the following unequivocal language that all bidders file tenant acknowledgments of the bid/proposed lease with their bid submittal: Existing Tenants: If the offered space or any portion thereof (including parking areas) is at present occupied or will be covered by an active lease(s) at the stated availability date, written documentation by the tenant indicating acknowledgment of the bid and ability to vacate premises by the proposed date must be included with the bid submittal. [Emphasis added] Petitioner submitted no tenant acknowledgments from any of his tenants with his bid to HRS. Even though Petitioner failed to submit evidence of control in the form of a deed and further failed to submit the required acknowledgments from tenants occupying the premises on the bid date, HRS did not immediately disqualify Petitioner's bid as nonresponsive. Instead, HRS evaluated Petitioner's bid simultaneously with Intervenor TCC's bid. HRS relied on old leases in its files and actual knowledge that monthly rent was paid to Petitioner for its own currently leased space, and HRS ignored the absence of tenant acknowledgments with Petitioner's bid. HRS followed this course of action despite the requirement of the ITB on page 7, item 1 under EVALUATION OF BIDS which unequivocally provides: Bids received are first evaluated to determine technical responsiveness. This includes submittal on bid submittal forms, inclusion of required information, data, attachments, signatures and notarization, etc. Non responsive [sic] bids will be withdrawn from further consideration. The portion of the ITB designated, Documents Required To Be Submitted With Bid Submittal For Existing Buildings on page 12, item 4. required bidders to submit "Scale Floor Plans showing present configurations with dimensions." Page 3 of 22, Item 9.(b) further required that, as a part of the bid submittal, bidders were to provide "A scaled (1/16" or 1/8" or 1/4" = 1'0") floor plan showing present configuration with measurements." Contrary to the ITB requirement, Petitioner submitted a floor plan scaled at 1/20" = 1', which also failed to reflect the present configurations with all measurements. Petitioner's scaled floor plan submitted with his bid was prepared prior to the present addition to one building and contained a hand- drawn configuration without accurate measurements for the northwest corner of one building. The term of the lease as shown on the ITB and Bid Submittal Form was 9 and one-half years with an option to renew for 2-5 year renewal periods. At the time of the bid opening on July 17, 1991, the bid submitted by Petitioner failed to have any proposed rental rates shown for "Renewal Options: Option II years 1 through 5." HRS permitted Petitioner to correct or supplement its bid after the bid opening (same date and place) to cover this material omission. Page 6, item 4 of the ITB provided for the property owner or other bidding entity to sign the bid submission. The pertinent part states: 4. Each bid submitted shall be signed by the owner(s) corporate officers, or legal representative(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. ALL BID SUBMITTAL SIGNATURES MUST BE WITNESSED BY TWO PERSONS. [Emphasis appears in ITB] Petitioner Proctor signed his bid submittal in proper person. TCC's bid submittal was signed by Sharon K. Lane, "Executive Director," of TCC Number 3 Ltd. Inc., Intervenor herein. At all times material, TCC Number 3 Ltd. Inc. has been a Florida corporation. At the time of the bid opening, Ms. Lane was TCC's sole shareholder and "all officers." At the time of formal hearing, Ms. Lane remained the sole shareholder, but others had assumed some of the corporate offices. Her status at the time of the bid submittal was sufficient for her to bid on behalf of the TCC corporation and to execute the PUR 7068 form on that corporation's behalf. Intervenor TCC submitted the required PUR 7068 form, but TCC submitted as sole evidence of control an undated, unrecorded "Contract for Sale and Purchase" by and between Hernando Plaza Ltd. as Seller and Intervenor TCC as Buyer, for the property which Intervenor was offering for lease to HRS. The best date assignable to this document is April 29, 1991. It was executed on behalf of Hernando Plaza Ltd. by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves as general partners of the limited partnership. TCC's obligation to proceed to closing under the foregoing contract was contingent upon TCC's securing an anchor tenant. However, the contract requires TCC to take steps to secure an anchor tenant. By its terms, TCC may purchase the property with or without an anchor tenant, but the contract requires TCC, in seeking an anchor tenant, to set time limits for the lease arrangement with the proposed anchor tenant which do not necessarily accord with the timing of HRS' bid process. HRS accepted TCC's contract to purchase from Hernando Plaza Ltd., as evidence of TCC's control of the premises offered by TCC for lease, believing it to constitute an option to purchase and the necessary evidence of control as required by the ITB. (See, Finding of Fact 6, supra.) At the time of the bid opening, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with a legal entity other than the record title owner of the property, which record title owner was and is the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation (Brown Foundation). See, infra. Up to that date, at least, Hernando Plaza Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as the owner of the property. The ITB did not require that an abstract of title be submitted with the bid, and HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contains provisions for future disclosure from successful bidders. (See, ITB item 5 under Requirements for Bidders to Submit Bids.) Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS attempts to protect itself by requiring successful bidders to put up an irrevocable letter of credit for one-half of one percent of the proposed lease rental obligation over the basic lease term as a penalty in the event a successful bidder cannot perform. (See, ITB page 4, item 10.) Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s certificate from the Florida Secretary of State expired December 31, 1981. That fact was advertised and the certificate cancelled July 16, 1982. At that time, Edward M. Strawgate was listed as a general partner and Harold Brown was listed as a limited partner of Hernando Plaza Ltd. Hernando Plaza Ltd. had been administratively dissolved for failure to file its annual report. Subsequent to the time that Intervenor submitted its bid proposal, but prior to formal hearing, Hernando Plaza Ltd. was reinstated by the Florida Secretary of State. Once reinstated, the limited partnership's ability to act related back and validated its prior actions. At all times material, the record title of the property offered by Intervenor TCC for lease to HRS was owned by "Harold Brown, Lillian Brown and Muriel Kahr as Trustees of the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation." This title is derived from a recorded June 30, 1967 warranty deed from Hernando Plaza Ltd., which deed was admitted in evidence at formal hearing. The warranty deed was not attached to TCC's bid submittal. Neither TCC, the corporation, nor Sharon K. Lane, individually, held any authority as agent to submit a bid to HRS on behalf of the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. There is also in evidence a recorded December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease between the Brown Foundation and City National Bank. That Amendment to Lease also was not attached to TCC's bid submittal to evidence control of the premises TCC was offering to lease to HRS. That Amendment to Lease also recites that Hernando Plaza Ltd. leased back the subject property from the Brown Foundation by a lease dated June 30, 1967. The June 30, 1967 lease was not recorded, was not part of TCC's bid submittal, and is not in evidence. The December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease goes on to recite that Hernando Plaza Ltd. has assigned its lessee interest under the June 30, 1967 lease to City National Bank by a March 14, 1978 assignment. There is also in evidence a recorded March 14, 1978 "Assignment of Lessee's Interest in Lease from Hernando Plaza Ltd. to City National Bank." This assignment was not part of TCC's bid submittal. The December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease goes on to further recite that the Brown Foundation has "agreed to give and grant to [Hernando Plaza Ltd.] an option to purchase the property." The remainder of the December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease details the terms or conditions of the option to purchase granted by the Brown Foundation to Hernando Plaza. For instance, in order to exercise that option to purchase the subject property from the Brown Foundation, Hernando Plaza Ltd., among other requirements, would have to demonstrate that all the terms of the unrecorded June 30, 1967 lease are "in good standing." One may reasonably infer that "in good standing" would at a bare minimum mean that the rents under the lease are paid current at the time the option is exercised, but what the other terms of the lease might be are subject to pure conjecture. TCC's bid submittal did not include documentation that the June 30, 1967 lease was "in good standing." There is also in evidence a recorded June 7, 1989 Trustee's Deed (quitclaim deed of the trustee's interest) from City National Bank's successor bank/trustee to Hernando Plaza Ltd. The Trustee's Deed also was not attached to TCC's bid submittal. On the date of bid submittal/opening neither TCC, the corporation, nor Sharon K. Lane, individually, held any authority as agent to submit a bid on behalf of Hernando Plaza Ltd. or City National Bank's successor. At formal hearing, TCC submitted an October 24, 1991 written hearsay statement by Harold Brown as Trustee of the Brown Foundation to the effect that Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s December 18, 1985 option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation was "in full force and effect" and that the June 30, 1967 lease back from the Brown Foundation to Hernando Plaza Ltd. was "in full force and effect and that the lessee is in good standing thereunder." Assuming these items may be considered in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.58 (1) F.S. as supplementing or explaining direct evidence, they still do not clarify in any way what all the terms of the unrecorded 1967 lease are or that those terms will remain in good standing on the date in the future that Hernando Plaza Ltd. elects to exercise its option, if it elects to exercise its option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation so that Hernando Plaza Ltd. may, in turn, convey the property to TCC, pursuant to Hernando Plaza Ltd. and TCC's April 29, 1991 contract for sale and purchase. Oddly enough, there is further explanatory hearsay that on October 24, 1991, Harold Brown was a trustee of the Brown Foundation and that he also was the sole limited partner of Hernando Plaza Ltd., although TCC's contract with Hernando Plaza for sale and purchase previously indicated Harold Brown was one of two general partners. Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation must be exercised by Hernando Plaza Ltd. before Hernando Plaza Ltd. can honor its contract to purchase/sell to TCC. Since there is no record evidence that the June 30, 1967 lease from the Brown Foundation as lessor to Hernando Plaza Ltd. as lessee will be in good standing on whatever future date Hernando Plaza Ltd. attempts to exercise its option with the Brown Foundation, one may only speculate both as to when and if TCC will be able to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza Ltd. TCC has only an option to become owner of the subject property at some unspecified date conditioned upon Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s first successfully exercising its option from the Brown Foundation and further conditioned upon all the terms of TCC's contract with Hernando Plaza Ltd. Apparently, TCC's only recourse to enforce its contract with Hernando Plaza Ltd. is a Circuit Court action for specific performance. TCC also submitted a site plan and floor plan with its bid submittal. The ITB required that offices on outside walls must provide windows. TCC's plans did not reflect windows in two sides of the building, but given HRS' retaining the right to partially design and locate its own halls and offices during the building's renovation, TCC's failure to show windows in the two outside walls is not, in and of itself, a material, disqualifying deviation from the ITB so as to unilaterally render TCC's bid nonresponsive. HRS staff member Donald J. Cerlanek prepared a bid synopsis of each bid. This involved completing a form from the HRS leasing manual which illustrates the characteristics of each of the bids. The bid requirements included evaluation criteria and a maximum amount of points which could be awarded for each criteria item. Five HRS bid evaluation committee members executed no conflict of interest forms. These were: Thomas C. Little Jr., David Thomley, Sylvia Smoot, Harvey Whitesides, and Mary Hawks. All committee members were given copies of the bid synopsis form to use in evaluating the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Some of the committee members did not obtain or review the actual bid submissions of each of the bidders, but all of them had access to the bid submissions and read the bid synopsis forms for both Petitioner's and Intervenor's bid submittals. The bid evaluation committee members, except for Mary Hawks, made site visits to the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Ms. Hawks essentially acted only as a facilitator or conduit for the evaluations of the other four evaluators as set out infra. The four site evaluators took notes regarding each location. The four site evaluators each assigned numerical weights to each item of evaluation criteria except for the rent and renewal rent portions of the evaluation criteria. Although on their site visits some committee members visiting TCC's site may have seen a color version of an artist's rendering of what TCC's project could look like after renovation was complete, a black and white version of the same artist's rendering was attached to TCC's bid submittal to which all committee members had access, and it is found that this situation in and of itself presented no false or misleading information nor constituted any prejudice to a fair bid process/evaluation. Likewise, although some evaluators discussed expansion prospects with TCC's and/or Proctor's on-site representatives, the evidence is credible and persuasive that each evaluator who visited the sites assessed the projects' respective expansion prospects substantially upon what they saw on each site and had experienced in Proctor's existing facility. The points awarded and reasons for the recommendations of each evaluator who visited the sites were reasonably based on specific needs of HRS. These specific needs of HRS were reasonably articulated by the two evaluators who made on-site inspections and who also testified at formal hearing and were reasonably set out in writing in the written notes of the two other evaluators who did not testify. Thomas C. Little, Jr., testified that he found the Intervenor's property superior as a result of the security problems at Petitioner's locations, the closer proximity of the courthouse, hospital, and health department to Intervenor's property and the superiority of a single building offered by Intervenor versus multiple buildings offered by Petitioner. Additionally, he found the esthetics of Petitioner's buildings lacking and expansion offered by Petitioner limited and was concerned that HRS would outgrow the space due to the fact that their service area is one of the most rapidly growing in Florida. His contemporaneous notes were to the same effect. Sylvia Smoot, also a member of the evaluation committee, testified that she found Intervenor's facility superior based on its proximity to the courthouse, hospitals, and other key locations, and its flexibility of design and concentration of space in one building. She further found Petitioner's location lacking as a result of the three separate buildings, its limited expansion room, and the necessity for redirecting clients between buildings, and the difficulty for elderly and handicapped clients accessing Petitioner's building. Her contemporaneous notes were to the same effect. Evaluators Whitesides and Thomley made substantially similar contemporaneous notes justifying their scoring of the two bidders. Three of the four site evaluators met as a group following the site visits and discussed the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. All four of the site evaluators made recommendations to accept the property for lease proposed by Intervenor, but they did not all confer and jointly develop a single recommendation to the facilities manager. The points assigned by each of the four site evaluators for the properties proposed by Petitioner and Intervenor were as follows: Evaluation Committee TCC Number Member's Names Proctor's Points 3's Points Thomley 75 98 Little 78 93 Whitesides 74 95 Smoot 80 91 307 377 The rent portion of the evaluation criteria was ascertained by applying present value methodology as set forth in the HRS leasing manual to the annual rents offered by the bidders. The discount factor was 8.32 percent. The present value of Proctor's bid was $1,934,038 and the present value of TCC's bid was $2,028,316. The leasing manual is considered advisory only. It advises present values be made, a determination of the difference in amounts be calculated and a comparison of the difference be made to determine a percentage. Thereafter, the percentage is applied to the maximum amount of points allocated for rent in the evaluation criteria. The lowest present value receives the maximum number of points allocated, and, thus, Proctor was awarded 35 points. TCC received 33 points, based upon the fact that its present value of rent was close to the present value submitted by Proctor. No penalty is imposed to a bidder whose rental amounts is higher than the lowest bidder. No benefit is conferred upon the lowest cost bidder over the next lowest bidder. Mary Hawks, Manager for Administrative Services, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, received each of the individual evaluation recommendations from Thomley, Little, Whitesides and Smoot. As a result of travel restrictions placed on the HRS, the four site evaluators and Ms. Hawks, who was also a fifth committee member, did not meet as a group following the site visits although three of the four site evaluators did meet collectively following the site visits. (See Finding of Fact 43-44, supra.) The committee members could have met by telephone conference call but Mary Hawks found it unnecessary to do so because there was such a clear evaluation in favor of Intervenor based on the total composite evaluation scores of 377 for Intervenor and only 307 for Petitioner, out of a total of 400 points. She assigned no points herself but approved their recommendations and forwarded a single recommendation in favor of TCC for ultimate approval by HRS management. Mary Hawks had spoken to the evaluation committee members subsequent to the evaluation and no member had expressed any reservation regarding his/her evaluation or a need to meet to discuss anything additional regarding the bid evaluation. The HRS Intent to Award to TCC subsequently issued. The evaluation process and formula for rent evaluation are not among the more commonly used methods but were reasonable and rational and fairly applied to the bids in this case. No conflict of interest in the evaluation committee members was demonstrated by Petitioner in these proceedings.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order finding that: The bid of TCC Number 3 Ltd. is nonresponsive; The bid of Derick Proctor is nonresponsive; Declining to award the bid for Lease No. 590:2306 to either bidder. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of December, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5963BID The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Proctor's 74 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted, except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the recommended order (RO). Unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative material has not been utilized: 1-3, sentence 1 of PFOF 4, 5-6, 9, 11-12, sentence 1 of PFOF 13, sentence 1 of PFOF 16, 17-26, sentence 1 of PFOF 29, 30-33, 35-36, sentences 1 and 4 of PFOF 38, 39-41, 44-54, 56-57, 60-61, 63. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute a proposed conclusion of law (PCOL) or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: sentences 2 and 3 of PFOF 4, sentence 2 of PFOF 16, 34, 43. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 10, sentence 2 of PFOF 13, 14- 15, sentence 2 of PFOF 29, sentences 2 and 3 of PFOF 38, 55, 58. PFOF 7-8 are accepted as modified because parts are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found and other parts are mere recitations of unreconciled portions of the record and legal argument. The following PFOF are accepted in part but not utilized because parts are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found, and other parts are rejected as immaterial to the dispositive issues herein, although correctly quoted from the record: 68-73. The following PFOF are rejected as immaterial or not dispositive: 27-28, 37, 42, 59, 62, 65, 67, 74. The following PFOF are covered in preliminary material: 64, 66. HRS 21 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the RO. Material unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative has not been utilized: 1-4, 6-8, 11-12, 16-19. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute PCOL or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: 5, 9-10, 14-15, 21. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 20. PFOF 13 is accepted as modified to correctly reflect the credible record evidence as a whole. TCC Number 3 75 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the RO. Material unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative has not been utilized: 1-31, 34-38, 42- 45, 47-48, 56, 58-60, 64-69, 71-75. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute PCOL or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: 32. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 33, 40-41, 53-55, 57, 61-63, 70. The following PFOF are rejected as immaterial or as not dispositive: 39, 46, 49, 51-52. PFOF 50 is not a sentence, but the subject matter is covered in the RO as understood. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas V. Infantino, Esquire Infantino & Berman Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, FL 32790 Ralph McMurphy, Esquire HRS District 3 Legal Office 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32609 B. Gray Gibbs, Esquire Sam Power, Clerk Bette B. Lehmberg, Esquire Department of Health and Suite 800 Rehabilitative Services One 4th Street North 1323 Winewood Boulevard St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Respondent advertised for bids for work to be performed on the Statewide Regional Juvenile Detention Center located in Pasco County identified as Project Number HRS 85-300000. In response to this advertisements Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted bids on January 23, 1966. According to calculations performed by Respondent, Petitioner was low bidder and Intervenor was the next lowest bidder. The construction budget for this job is $1.5 million, and both bids are considered by Respondent to be within budget. Depending on the alternatives chosen within each bid, Petitioner's bid is lower than Intervenor's by between approximately $6,000 and $40,000. Section B-14 of the advertisement for bids requires each bidder to submit a list of the subcontractors who will perform work on the job for him and specifies that only one subcontractor shall be listed for each phase of the work. Section D of the advertisement for bids specifies the work areas for which a subcontractor must be listed and states that said list is an integral part of each bid submitted. The subcontracting areas include electrical plumbing, mechanical, roofing security control systems, food service equipment and fire protection. Petitioner's bid was rejected on February 4, 1986, because its bid failed to include a roofing subcontractor's name as required in the advertisement for bids. Petitioner does not dispute that its bid was incomplete when submitted since it failed to identify a roofing subcontractor. However, Petitioner contends this omission was a result of clerical error in typing the bide and that, in fact, it had selected Republic Roofing as its subcontractor. John Breen, Petitioner's project manager, testified that it was his intent to use Republic Roofing when he submitted the bide that he had a firm bid from Republic Roofing, and that when this omission was brought to his attention after bids were opened, he identified Republic Roofing in writing on January 24 and 29, 1986, to Brian Seufert an intern architect working for Respondent's project architect. Seufert confirms Breen's testimony through affidavit jointly filed by the parties. Seufert indicates that the project architect has no reason to believe that Petitioner could not perform the work required by the project. By affidavit jointly filed by the parties, Joyce Kleja secretary for Petitioners also supports Breen's testimony about her clerical error in omitting the roofing subcontractor when she typed the bid. Ray Scerbo, an estimator for Republic Roofing, disputes the testimony of Breen through jointly filed affidavit. Scerbo indicates it was not until a couple of days after the bid opening that he was told by Petitioner that Republic Roofing "had the job" if Petitioner was awarded the contract. This conflicts with the first written notice from Breen to Seufert dated January 24, 1986, as well as Seufert's affidavit that Petitioner told Seufert on January 24, 1986, that Republic Roofing had been selected. Scerbo is no longer employed by Republic Roofing. After considering all of the evidence, it is specifically found that Petitioner's omission of Republic Roofing from its list of subcontractors was through clerical error and that Petitioner had firmly decided to use Republic Roofing for subcontracting work prior to submission of its bid. The advertisement for bid required all subcontractors to be listed in any bid in order to allow Respondent to review prior performance and licensure of subcontractors, and also to prevent "bid shopping". Bid shopping is a practice which inflates a general contractor's bid and therefore the actual award by encouraging subcontractors to initially submit high bids to the general contractor and then negotiate a lower price with the general contractor who has received the award. The general contractor's bid remains inflated however and in this way the cost to the state is increased.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order awarding Project Number HRS 85-300000 to Intervenor. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of April 1986, at Tallahassee Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April 1986. APPENDIX (DOAH CASE NO. 86-0495B1D) Petitioner has submitted a memorandum and a Proposed Recommended Order, both of which appear to set forth proposed findings of fact in unnumbered paragraphs. For purposes of ruling thereon, the unnumbered paragraphs which appear to set forth proposed findings have been consecutively numbered. Memorandum: Introductory material and not a proposed finding of fact. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 1, 2, 3, 4, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 7. Rejected as simply a summary of testimony and evidence and not a proposed finding of fact. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 5, 6. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4, but rejected in part in Finding of Fact 2 and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Proposed Recommended Order: Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 1, 3, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2, but otherwise rejected as contrary to Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rulings on Respondent's and Intervenor's jointly filed Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. , 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 7. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis R. Long Esquire 2101 U.S. Highway 19 North Suite 201 Palm Harbor, Florida 33563 Sam Powers Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee Florida 32301 William Page; Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John P. Fons Esquire Post Office Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent was justified in cancelling the award of bid of HRS Lease No. 590:2054 to Petitioner, BOOZER, on the basis that it was nonresponsive. Whether Respondent acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally or dishonestly in issuing an award of HRS Lease No. 590:2054 to Intervenor rather than to Petitioners or some other bidder.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: HRS caused an invitation to bid to be advertised regarding Lease No. 590:2054 on January 3, 1989 and January 10, 1989. The Invitation to Bid required that all bids be received on or before 2:30 p.m. February 1, 1989, for 9,168 net rentable square feet, plus or minus 3%, of existing office space. A pre- bid meeting was scheduled for January 11, 1989. The advertisement also advise that the bid specifications could be obtained from the Orlando Regional Office of HRS, and that the State of Florida reserved the right to reject any and all bids. The material provisions of the bid specifications at issue in this proceeding are: The space be made available on September 1, 1989 or within 175 days after bid is finalized. The proposed space must be in an "existing building", which was: defined to mean "dry and capable of being physically measured to determine net rentable square footage at the time of bid submittal". The bidder provide 2 clear photographs of the exterior front of the proposed facility and 2 scaled (1/8 inch or 1/4 inch 1 foot preferred) floor plan showing present configurations with measurements that equate to the net rentable square footage (HRS Exh. 1, General Specifications Requirement No. 10(a)) Emphasis in original). Building(s) in not more than 2 locations provided the facilities are immediately adjacent to or within 100 yards of each other. Prior to the pre-bid conference, but after the initial publication of the bid invitation, representatives of NOTTUS contacted Ernie Wilson, the facilities services manager for District 7, HRS, to inquire regarding the propriety of submitting a bid for space in two buildings in which HRS presently had facilities, together with a facility that was greater than 100 yards from the existing facilities. At the time of the inquiry, NOTTUS was leasing facilities to HRS at its Lipscomb facility in Palm Bay, Florida. A portion of the square footage that NOTTUS inquired about leasing to HRS was the remaining square footage in two buildings that HRS partially occupied at that time. All of the premises submitted by NOTTUS under its bid package were located in the Woodlake PUD, which is all under single ownership. A representative from HRS advised the representative from NOTTUS that: the issue regarding the proximity of the locations would not be addressed as a bid specification, but rather, that would be a matter to be weighed by the evaluation committee in analyzing the bids. the bid proposal to be submitted would actually be for two locations as a portion of the space offered by NOTTUS was to be located in buildings in which HRS presently maintained facilities. The submittal of the bid package regarding the premises subject to occupancy by HRS, as ultimately submitted by NOTTUS, would definitely not disqualify the bid submittal. Mr. Wilson also received telephone calls from BOOZER and a third bidder making inquires regarding the bid package. The Pre-bid conference was held on January 11, 1989. No objections or questions regarding the bid specifications as to be utilization or definition of the terms "existing building" and "present configuration" were raised at that time. At no time prior to the submission of the bids were any objections or questions raised by BOOZER regarding the utilization of the term "existing building" or the term "present configuration" as those terms were defined within the bid specification. Each of the Petitioners in this action, the Intervenor, as well as two other parties, submitted bids to HRS within the time requirement set forth in the bid documents. The bids were opened at the time and place reflected in the aid documents and Invitation to Bid. Subsequent to the opening of the bids, John Stewart, who is Ernie Wilson's supervisor, and Ernie Wilson reviewed the bid packages submitted for Lease No. 590:2054 and made a determination as to which bids were responsive. As a result of that evaluation, a determination was made that all five bidders were responsive. These bidders were the Petitioner, Fred D. BOOZER, the Intervenor, Nottus, Inc. the Petitioner, Trust NB-1 Micah G. Savell and Professional Center V. Inc. These bid proposals were then submitted to the evaluation committee who viewed the property of each of the bidders on February 13, 1989. The bid documents of BOOZER contained an additional document, i.e., a site plan, which reflected that the premises subject to his bid proposal were an "existing building". The area submitted for the bid was shaded reflecting the entire square footage submitted for bid as being "in existence." The drawing further reflected the "existing building" as being the "proposed HRS building". The premises subject to the Petitioner's, BOOZER, bid were not in existence, as that term was defined in the bid specifications, in that approximately 2500 square feet had not yet been constructed. Two walls, a floor slab and a roof were not in existence. The only improvements located therein were palm trees, grass and a sidewalk. Petitioner stipulated that the area occupied by the palm trees, grass and sidewalk was in fact "not dry". The existing building at 2225 South Babcock Street that was dry at the time of the bid opening constituted approximately 6,900 square feet of premises subject to Petitioner's bid. At the time of the inspection, the Petitioner, BOOZER, was present. At no time did BOOZER indicate that the total facility bid was not in existence. The members of the evaluating committee who viewed the property for purposes of evaluating the bid were not aware of the fact that the entire premises subject to BOOZER's bid proposal was not in "Existence" and "dry". The floor plan showing the present configuration of BOOZER's facility reflected an open floor space for the area occupied by the palm trees, grass and sidewalk. The palm trees, grass and sidewalk were not reflected in the present configuration drawing. Both the floor plan and site plan were prepared by BOOZER's son with his approval. In evaluating the respective bid proposals, the evaluation committee rated the properties as follows: Fred D. BOOZER - 450 points Nottus, Inc.- 433 points Micah Savell - 384 points Trust NB-l - 360 points Professional Center V. Inc.- 357 points The location requirement found in Article D.3(b) of the bid package was taken into account. In evaluating the Nottus bid, including a zero rating from one of the evaluation committee members. As a result of the points awarded by the evaluation committee, a determination was made to award the bid to BOOZER, who was notified of this award on or about March 14, 1989 by letter dated March 14, 1989. On or about March 20, 1989, Petitioner, BOOZER, obtained a construction permit from the City of Melbourne to construct a fire wall and framing for additional shell building. This building permit was for the purpose of enclosing the area that was occupied by the palm trees, grass and sidewalk at the time of the bid proposal being submitted. Upon being awarded the bid, Petitioner, BOOZER then made a decision to commence construction to complete the premises subject to his bid proposal, and had expended $28,000 thereon through the hearing date. On or about March 29, 1989, HRS, through Ernie Wilson and Lynn Nobley, discovered the fact that approximately 2,500 square feet represented as being a part of the existing building, in fact was not existing pursuant to the bid specifications. At the time of this discovery, construction under the construction permit had not been completed. Mr. Wilson advised BOOZER at that time that he was concerned that BOOZER's bid was nonresponsive because the premises subject to the bid proposal were not in an "existing" building at the time of the bid submittal. The normal procedure for HRS in awarding a bid where the initial award is cancelled or thrown out is to award the bid to the second and next best lowest bidder. It is not the normal practice of the HRS evaluation committee to measure the applicable properties at time of evaluation to determine net rentable square footage. At the time of discovery of the foregoing status of BOOZER's building, Ernie Wilson, contacted a Nottus representative, Fred E Sutton, its President, to advise him of the possible nonresponsiveness of BOOZER's bid and requested information to determine whether Nottus, the second low bidder, still had facilities available pursuant to its bid documents and whether Nottus would agree to continue to continue to be bound by the terms thereof. Mr. Sutton advised Ernie Wilson that the facilities were still available and that Nottus would agree to abide by the terms of its bid proposal. Following the procedural steps necessary to advise the appropriate individuals within HRS of the possible nonresponsive bid by BOOZER, Ernie Wilson was advised by the Director of HRS General Services, King W. Davis, by letter dated April 2, 1989 to withdraw the award for the proposed lease 590:2054 from BOOZER because of approximately 2,500 feet of nonexisting space. He was also instructed to award same to Nottus as the second lowest bidder. On or about April 14, 1989, Ernie Wilson advised BOOZER of the Notice of Withdrawal of the award from BOOZER and award to Nottus, together with the reasons therefor, which was received by BOOZER on April 17, 1989. Petitioner, BOOZER, timely initiated these actions by filing his Notice of Intent to appeal the withdrawal of the award of bid to him and the award to Nottus, and by timely filing a formal written protest and request for formal hearing. Attachment "D" of the bid package required the submittal of a proposed plan to a division of the State Fire Marshal for review of any proposed construction or renovation to determine whether such construction or renovation complied with the uniform fire safety standards. Said plans were required to be prepared by licensed architects and engineers for certifications outlined in Attachment "D". These matters were all to be completed prior to the commencement of any revocation or alteration. Petitioner, BOOZER, commenced said improvements prior to said approval. In fact, BOOZER submitted no plans in compliance with these requirements prior to construction. Petitioner, BOOZER, is a licensed builder in the State of Florida, and has been for ten years. BOOZER further acknowledged that at the time of signing and submitting the bid proposal, he certified that he understood the terms of the bid specifications and agreed to be bound by them. TRUST NB-1 attempted to initiate an appeal of the award of the bid to Nottus by submitting a facsimile "notice of protest" to HRS predicated on the award of the bid to Nottus occurring greater than sixty (60) days following the bid opening date. TRUST NB-1 received notice of the award to Nottus on April 18, 1989 and attempted facsimile delivery on April 21, 1989. The facsimile "Written Notice of Protest" was not filed until April 25, 1989. The regular mail receipt of said Notice was received by HRS and filed on April 24, 1989. 38. The "formal written protest" was filed with HRS on May 1, 1989. 39. signature The facsimile Notice of Intent to Protest did not contain of a representative of TRUST NB-1. the original 40. Ernie Wilson is the custodian of records for bid protests for HRS, District 7, and is also the person designated in the bid documents as the contact person for the bid on Lease No. 590:2054. TRUST NB-1 was ranked number four in relation to the five bids submitted. Bidder Micah Savell, not a party to these proceedings, is the next low bidder after BOOZER and Nottus, Inc.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order: (a) Finding the bid of Petitioner, BOOZER, to be unresponsive and that the cancellation of the award by Respondent was justified. Find the bid of Intervenor, NOTTUS to be unresponsive. Find that Petitioner, TRUST NB-1, lacks standing and its protest should be dismissed. Reject all bids. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 1989. APPENDIX Proposed Findings of Fact by Petitioner, Fred O. Boozer: 1-5 Rejected. 6 and 7 Accepted as incorporated in the Recommended Order. Proposed Findings of Fact by Intervenor, Nottus, Inc. Accepted. Accepted as modified. 3-30. Accepted. 31. The first two sentences rejected as argument and not supported by the evidence. Last sentence in paragraph accepted. 32-40. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Houck, Esquire 312 South Harbor City Boulevard Suite 1 Melbourne, Florida James A. Sawyer, Esquire District 7 Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite 911 Orlando, Florida Sam Power Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services currently leases approximately 22,000 square feet of space from Nelson P. Davis. The space is contained in two separate buildings, both located at 417 Racetrack Road, Ft. Walton Beach, Florida. The Department and Davis were involved in a legal dispute involving the currently leased premises, which concluded in 1986 with the entry of judgment in Davis' favor. While some antagonism remains between the parties related to the legal action instituted by Davis, Davis has been an acceptable landlord in all other respects. The current lease expires February 1, 1989. Davis has been aware, since late February or early March of 1988, that the Department would need space in excess of the currently occupied 22,000 square feet, but was not aware of the actual additional space requirements until the issuance of the invitation to bid. In general, the Department's space requirements have increased annually. In response to the anticipated need for additional space, Davis initiated plans for design of a third Racetrack Road building that could meet the additional need, but did not construct the facility. In response to the space requirements of previous years, Davis has constructed additional space. The Department has occupied the additional space in such proportions as to avoid the competitive bidding process, however, the current need for additional space exceeds the maximum which can be leased without competitive bidding. The Department on May 11, 1988, issued an invitation to Bid for approximately 26,165 square feet of space in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida. (HO #1) In response to the invitation, Davis submitted a bid proposal. The Davis proposal, the sole proposal received by the Department, was disqualified by the Department as non-responsive. On June 23, 1988, the sole bid was opened by Joseph Pastucha, HRS District One Facilities Manager, who initially reviewed the Davis bid. Mr. Pastucha identified items of concern related to the responsiveness of the bid and then provided the information to his supervisor, who in turn provided the information to Mr. James Peters. The Department did not contact Davis for further information or to provide the opportunity to correct any defects. James Peters, HRS's District One Manager for Administrative Services has expressed on at least one occasion a desire to avoid entering into business arrangements with Nelson P. Davis. The bases for Peters' opinion is the earlier litigation between the parties. Peters was on the committee which was to have evaluated bids submitted in response to the invitation. However, Peters has stated that his personal opinion would not influence his participation in the bid solicitation process. The evidence did not indicate that Peters based his opinion regarding the Davis bid submission solely on the earlier litigation or that any other person involved in the agency's action permitted personal opinions to affect the decisional process. Davis' bid proposal included the two buildings constituting approximately 22,000 square feet located at 417 Racetrack Road which the Department currently occupies, plus a third building of approximately 4,000 square feet. The proposed square footage and lease cost were acceptable. The third building was to be either a planned, unconstructed building located at the 417 Racetrack Road location or an existing building located "7/l0ths of a mile southeast of the present HRS offices," (the off-site building). However, a memorandum attached to Davis' submission stated that he did not intend to use the off-site building for HRS purposes, (HO #2). Further, Davis had previously indicated in conversation with the HRS manager of the 417 Racetrack Road offices that he planned to utilize the off-site space otherwise. On page one of the bid submittal form Davis indicated the address of the proposed location as 417 Racetrack Road. By letter dated July 5, 1988, the Department notified Davis that his bid offering was deemed non-responsive and that the Department expected to readvertise for space in Ft. Walton Beach. The letter made no mention of any opportunity to protest the determination. The statement, "[f]ailure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes," which is required to be included in the notice of agency decision by Section 120.53(5)(a), Florida Statutes, was omitted by the Department. (HO #3) On or about July 7, 1988, Davis contacted the Department of General Services to express his dismay regarding the disqualification of his submittal. A meeting, held on or about July 19, 1988, between Davis and Department representatives, did not alter the Department's position. On or about July 25, 1988, the written notice of protest and request for hearing was filed. The Department forwarded the request to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The letter dated July 5, 1988, advising Davis that his bid was deemed non-responsive enumerated five reasons for the Department's decision. The reasons stated were: No photograph of the proposed facility was submitted as requested; No floor plan of the facility was submitted as requested; A substituted site was submitted Proposed space was not an existing building and was not measurable; Three buildings in bid proposal constitute three locations and are unacceptable. The letter was signed by Chuck Bates, DHRS Deputy District Administrator, District One. The letter was drafted by James Peters. (HO #3) Mr. Bates relied upon Peters and Pastucha to provide information sufficient to justify the disqualification of the bid, and was satisfied that the action was justified prior to signing the letter. Examination of the bid submittal package reveals that Davis failed to acknowledge by initial the requirements of page seven, but that he did, on that page, appropriately respond to questions related to proposed parking spaces being bid. The Department did not base the disqualification of the bid on the failure to acknowledge the page and did not include the failure to initial the page in the stated reasons for deeming the bid non-responsive. Paragraph 9(a) of the bid submittal form requires the submission of a clear photograph of the exterior front of the building. (HO #2) Davis submitted no photographs. Paragraph 9(b) of the bid submittal form requires the submission of a scaled floor plan showing present configurations with measurements. (HO #2) Davis submitted floor plans for the proposed-to-be-constructed building and for the off-site building, but failed to submit floor plans for the two buildings which the Department currently occupies. The bid also failed to include calculations of net rentable square footage related to the omitted floor plans. The letter to Davis stated that an additional reason for disqualification of his bid from further consideration was the submission of a substituted site, (HO #3). The "substituted site" refers to Davis' inclusion of the off-site building not identified in the bid submission other than by the statement that the building was located seven-tenths of a mile southeast of the present HRS office location. No map, street address, legal description, or other identifying information was submitted. The proposal submitted by Davis included plans to construct a third building at 417 Racetrack Road, which was rejected as not measurable. The invitation to bid states that to be considered, the space must be existing, dry and physically measurable, at the time of bid submitted. (HO #1) The proposed third building clearly fails to meet this requirement. While the Department may permit the correction of minor deficiencies, the deficiencies were adjudged by the Department to be more than minor. The proposal's inclusion of nonexisting space (Racetrack Road building #3) or in the alternative a building, the location of which can not be determined from the bid information and which the bidder apparently intends not to provide, is non- responsive to the specifications of the invitation. As to the fifth enumerated reason for disqualification of the bid (three buildings/three locations) the Department and Petitioner presented extensive testimony related to paragraph 3(b) of page 15 of the bid submittal form. Page 15 of the bid submittal form is titled "Evaluation Criteria" and contains a list of weighted factors which were to be used in the evaluation of bids. (HO #2) Paragraph 3(b) states, as one factor for consideration in evaluation, whether the bid provides for the required aggregate square footage in a single building, and continues, "[p]roposals will be considered, but fewer points given, which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two locations provided the facilities are immediately adjacent to or within yards of each other." (HO #2) The space left for the specification of maximum yardage was erroneously left uncompleted by the Department and the Department did not learn of the error until the bid was submitted. The Department's disqualification of the bid on this basis relies on the Department's assertion that the three buildings included in the Davis proposal constitute three locations and that a responsive bid may contain not more than two locations. The Department's position is that "location" and "building" are synonymous and that paragraph 3(b) of the evaluation criteria prohibits consideration of a bid submission including more than two buildings. The Department's position is rejected as arbitrary. The bid package does not state that proposals including more than two buildings will be disqualified. The sole reference to the number of buildings in a responsive bid submission is as stated and contained on the page of "Evaluation Criteria", wherein it is identified with a weighting factor of five percent of total possible points.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order dismissing Case No. 88-3868BID. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-3868BID The following constitute rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner: Accepted in part. The use of the word "required in the fourth sentence is rejected. The referenced section relates to evaluation factors, not specific requirements. Accepted. Accepted in part. The third building was proposed as either the off-site building or the planned, non-existent space. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as restatement of testimony. Other testimony indicated that Petitioner planned to use the off-site location for non-HRS purposes. Rejected, immaterial. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted as modified. Accepted in part. The use of the word "technical" is rejected. Accepted. Accepted as modified. Accepted as modified. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted as modified. Accepted as modified. Accepted as modified. The change between the two invitations to bid was to clarify the obvious confusion related to the use of terms "location" and "building" and was made not to the bid specifications but to evaluation criteria. Rejected as restatement of testimony. Rejected, conclusion of law. Accepted so far as relevant. While the Davis bid was disqualified as non-responsive, the right to reject any and all bids encompasses the disqualification of a bid as non-responsive to the specific requirements of an invitation to bid. Respondent: Rejected, conclusion of law. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Floor plan of the off-site building was submitted showing that the building is essentially a hollow, box-like structure. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, irrelevant. While the usual distance may be 100 yards, the actual bid specifications do not state such. Further the sole reference to the distance between "locations" was contained in evaluation criteria. At no time prior to the June 23, 1988 bid opening did the Department attempt to identify the preferred distance between locations. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce A. McDonald, Esquire Post Office Box 887, Suite 105 151 Mary Esther Cutoff Mary Esther, Florida 32569 Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire Acting District One Legal Counsel Post Office Box 8420 Pensacola, Florida 32505-8420 Joseph J. Pastucha 3300 North Pace Boulevard Room 109 Town & Country Plaza Pensacola, Florida 32505 Jan Kline 417 Racetrack Road Ft. Walton Beach, Florida 32548 James V. Peters Department of General Services 160 Governmental Center Fourth Floor, Room 412 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Tom Batchelor Staff Director House HRS Committee The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
Findings Of Fact State Project No. 46090-3511 (the project) is for construction of the West Bay Bridge on State Road 79 in Bay County, Florida. Competitive bids on the project were solicited in February, 1990. The bid letting on the project was held in March, 1990. The Petitioner, Fairchild, the Hardaway Company and ten other contractors bid on the project. The Hardaway Company submitted the lowest bid on the project in the amount of $9,487,258.17. Fairchild submitted the next lowest bid in the amount of $9,835,279.34. Divergent Unit Prices and Imbalances. The part of the Hardaway Company's bid relating to construction of the foundation for the approaches to the bridge (the "structural bid") is obviously below reasonable cost in several respects. The contract specifications require the use of sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid (biaxial type 2), and Class III (seal) concrete. The Hardaway Company's unit prices for these items were, respectively, one dollar per cubic yard for the sand fill, fifty cents per cubic yard for the shell fill, twenty-five cents per square yard for the reinforcement grid, and ten cents per cubic yard for the Class III seal concrete. As a result, the Hardaway Company's bid for these items is obviously significantly below reasonable cost and approximately $95,500 below what Fairchild bid for the same portion of the contract. In contrast to the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid and Class III concrete, the Hardaway Company's bid on some of the other parts of the structural bid were relatively high. The reinforcing steel for the substructure (Item 415-1-5) was bid at approximately twice reasonable cost (80 a pound versus, e.g., 42 in Fairchild's bid), resulting in $609,936.80 attributable to that part of the bid versus, e.g., $320,216.82 for Fairchild. The statistical average (the DOT's so-called "average 2") for the other serious bidders under this item also was 42 a pound. The Hardaway Company also bid obviously in excess of reasonable cost for the lump sum item of mobilization for pile installation--$600,000 versus $125,000 in Fairchild's bid and less in the bids of several of the others bidders. (The statistical average for the other serious bidders under this item was $225,000.) But the Hardaway Company bid only $60,000 for the lump sum item for removal of existing structures (versus $160,000 in Fairchild's bid) and only $30,000 for the lump sum item for removal and disposal of fender system (versus $110,000 in Fairchild's bid). The portion of the Hardaway Company's bid attributable to mobilization for the roadway work is significantly less than the Fairchild bid under this item ($200,000 versus $375,000) and partially counterbalances the excess in the part of the Hardaway bid for mobilization for the pile installation. The portion of the Hardaway Company's bid attributable to clearing and grubbing also was high, at $20,000 an acre versus a statistical average of $4,200 an acre for the other serious bidders, resulting in $216,000 for the Hardaway Company bid versus, e.g., $32,400 for the Fairchild bid and the $45,360 statistical average. DOT Review Procedures. Section 2-6 of the DOT's Standard Specifications applicable to the project provides: 2-6 Rejection of Irregular Proposals. A proposal will be subject to being considered irregular and may be rejected if it shows omissions, alterations of form, additions not called for, conditioinal or unauthorized alternate bids, or irregularities of any kind; also if the unit prices are obviously unbalanced, either in excess of or below the reasonable cost analysis values. The DOT is in the process of formulating a policy on the use of the Technical Review Committee in the bidding process. A proposed procedure has been developed, which has not yet been made final and has not yet been signed by the Secretary of the DOT, under which the Technical Review Committee would review the low bid on each contract, among other things not applicable to this case, for "any significant irregularities in unit bid prices" and for "unbalanced bidding." The DOT has not yet defined "any significant irregularities in unit bid prices" or "unbalanced bidding" for purposes of defining the event that triggers review by the Technical Review Committee. The DOT Director of the Office of Construction, Robert Buser, is of the opinion that the unit prices the Hardaway Company bid for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the Class III seal concrete are "significant irregularities in unit bid prices." On the other hand, the DOT's Preliminary Estimates Engineer, Robert Griner, who, unlike Buser, is a member of both the Technical Review Committee and its Preliminary Technical Subcommittee, and is of the opinion that the Hardaway bid for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the Class III (seal) concrete are "mathematical imbalances," not "significant irregularities in unit bid prices," which he would define as bids that omit a unit price, whose numerical values do not match words used to express the values, or that are not signed. Under Griner's approach, which was followed in this case, the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee looks at "mathematical imbalances" to see if they are "material imbalances." If the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee decides that it is not a "material imbalance," it simply reports this finding at the outset of the meeting of the Technical Review Committee, which accepts the finding and does not itself consider the matter any further. Only if the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee reports a "material imbalance" does the Technical Review Committee further consider the question. Front-end Bidding. Under the DOT contract for the project, like other items in the specifications, mobilization and land clearing and grubbing are paid in installments as the work proceeds. But, unlike the other items, all of the portion of the contract attributable to mobilization and land clearing and grubbing is paid by the time the entire project is half completed. Similarly, a contractor is paid for reinforcement steel (substructure) when it is delivered to the site. As a result, by shifting dollars in a bid to these "front-end," lump sum items, a contractor can manipulate the bid process and contract to reasonably insure himself of early payment of these inflated items regardless what may happen to the project later. In analyzing these front-end, lump sum items, Griner treated them (along with the unreasonably low bids on the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grids and C III seal concrete) as "mathematical imbalances." Following the guidance of a Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) memorandum, dated May 16, 1988, on the subject of "Bid Analysis and Unbalanced Bids," Griner analyzed the Hardaway bid to be sure it would not be susceptible to cost overruns (it was not) and to be sure the quantities were correctly estimated (they were). He also analyzed the additional cost to the DOT of paying the Hardaway Company early (by the half way point of the project) for the inflated front-end items to determine whether the "mathematical" imbalance was "material," i.e., whether "the mathematically imbalanced bid will result in the lowest ultimate cost to the Government." Based on a twelve percent interest rate, Griner calculated that the inflated front-end items would cost the DOT approximately an additional $98,000, 1/ still much less than the difference between the low Hardaway bid and any other bid. Based on this calculation, Griner concluded that the "mathematical imbalance" in the Hardaway bid was not a "material imbalance" and did not require the award of the bid to Fairchild or one of the other bidders. Griner overlooked and did not apply another portion of the method of analysis in the FHWA memorandum on "Bid Analysis and Unbalanced Bids" that states: There are numerous reasons why a bidder may want to unbalance his/her bid on a contract. One reason is to get more money at the beginning of the project. The bidder does this by overpricing the work done early in the project. This is called "front loading" the contract. The leading case in the "front loading" area is Matter of: Riverport Industries, 64 Comp. Gen. 441 (1985). Here the Comptroller General held that if the bid is front loaded, regardless if it is the lowest bid, it "should be viewed as materially unbalanced since acceptance of the bid would result in the same evils as an advance payment. An advance payment is prohibited by law." The "front loading" may also be materially unbalanced due to the cost of money that must be paid out early versus over the normal construction fo the project. Under the Hardaway Company bid, the pile mobilization, the land clearing and grubbing, and the reinforcement steel (substructure) parts of the bid are "front-ended." 2/ Under the method of analysis suggested by the FHWA memorandum, the Hardaway Company would be paid approximately $428,000 in "advance payments" under these two items if it is awarded the contract. Approximately $375,000 in pile mobilization, $183,600 in land clearing and grubbing, and $289,700 in the reinforcement steel were shifted to these front- end items from the unbalanced sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid, and Class III (seal) concrete items. These dollars The shifted dollars are estimated by taking the difference between the statistical average for these items and the Hardaway bid on them. Since roiughly half of the shifted dollars would be paid earlier than they would be paid if they were bid under the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid and Class III (seal) concrete items, the amount of "advance payment," under the FHWA analysis would be approximately $428,000. Griner did not explain why he only followed part, but not all, of the method of analysis suggested by the FHWA memorandum, other than to say he overlooked it. But he also testified that it is common practice for contractors to submit mathematically unbalanced bids, and the DOT always analyzes them the way he did in this case. Indeed, in the March, 1990, bid letting, Griner found "mathematical imbalances" in 21 of the 29 low bids but no "material imbalances." The Fairchild bid also contains "mathematical imbalances." It also "front-ends" several items. The total dollar value of the "front-ending" in the Fairchild bid (including roadway mobilization) closely approximates that found in the Hardaway bid and, under the FHWA analysis, would result in approximately the same amount of advance payment. Under Section 101-2.2 of the DOT's Standard Specifications for this project, contractors are limited to a maximum of ten percent of the total contract for mobilization. The Hardaway Company's total mobilization bid is within the maximum under the specifications. Notwithstanding the imbalances in the Hardaway bid, and the so-called "advance payments" that would result from the "front-ending" in the Hardaway bid, the Hardaway bid remains the lowest and best bid on the project, and it is the best interest of the DOT and the public to award the contract to the Hardaway Company. Even if the Hardaway Company had bid the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid, and Class III (seal) concrete items exactly as Fairchild did, Hardaway still would be low bidder. "Value Engineering" and Alleged Alternative or Contingent Bidding. Inferences reasonably could be drawn from the evidence that the Hardaway Company may intend to propose to the DOT that the approach to the bridge be re-engineered so as to eliminate the need for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the C III (seal) concrete. If the DOT accepts such a proposal, the contract between the DOT and the Hardaway Company would have to be modified. If the re-engineered project were to allow the Hardaway Company to do the job for less than its bid price, half (or, if the proposal is innovative or unique, up to 80%) of the savings would be paid to the Hardaway Company under what the DOT calls "value engineering." Under DOT procedures, "value engineering" proposals are not made or evaluated until after the original contract is signed with the successful bidder. It is not an alternative bid or a contingent bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Transportation, enter a final order dismissing the bid protest filed by W. R. Fairchild Construction Company, Ltd., and awarding State Project No. 46090-3511 to the Hardaway Company. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990.
Findings Of Fact On August 31, 1994, the Respondent received and opened bids for its Project No. HSMV 92044000, Repairs, Art Sutton Drivers' License Office, Miami, Florida (the Project). The bid specification documents (the Specifications) for the Project included requirements for a Base Bid and for specific alternate proposals with respect to three defined items of alternate work. Section 01100 of the Specifications stated that "[a]ll Alternates described in this Section are required to be reflected on the Bid Form as submitted by the bidder." Part 2 of that section provided: ALTERNATE NO. 1 A. Provide a deductive price to the base bid for the removal of existing window units and the installation of new units as indicated in plans and specification Section 08520. ALTERNATE NO. 2 A. Provide a deductive price to the base bid for the provision of communications conductors see specification Section 16400. ALTERNATE No. 3 A. Provide a deductive price to the base bid for the installation of all landscape materials as indicated on plans and as per specification Section 02960. Also included in the Specifications as Exhibit 4 was a Proposal Form. The Specifications required each bidder to submit this form in triplicate on the bidder's letterhead. With respect to alternates, the Proposal Form required: With the foregoing as a Base Bid, the following costs of alternate proposals are submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifications. Alternate No. 1 Add or Deduct $ Alternate No. 2 Add or Deduct $ Alternate No. 3 Add or Deduct $ The Respondent's architect received four bids on August 31, 1994. As recorded on the Bid Tabulation and Notice of Award Recommendation, three bidders provided specific prices for the three alternates, as well as a Base Bid. The Bid Tabulation shows that two bidders provided specific prices for the three alternates and included the alternate prices in their Base Bids. The Petitioner provided specific prices for the three alternates, but excluded the alternate prices from its Base Bid. The fourth bidder provided a specific price for only one alternate and excluded that alternate price from its Base Bid. (The fourth bidder was disqualified as non-responsive for failing to submit prices on all three alternates.) In pertinent part, the Petitioner's proposal read: With the foregoing as a Base Bid, the following costs of alternate proposals are submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifications: Alternate No. 1 Add or Deduct . . . $4,400.00 Alternate No. 2 Add or Deduct . . . $1,158.00 Alternate No. 3 Add or Deduct . . . $2,084.00 These Alternates were in addition to the Petitioner's Base bid of $204,322.00. The proposal form submitted by the Petitioner comports with Exhibit 4 to the Specifications, which was the mandatory Proposal Form. On August 31, 1994, William Phillip Austin, Peitioner's President, wrote the architect: Per our telephone conversation this date regard- ing the confusion relating to the Add/Deduct for Alternates 1, 2 and 3 for the above project, please be advised that our base bid did not include the work described in the Alternates. As stated if you want work described in Alternates 1, 2 and 3, you must add the cost to our base bid. The base bid including Alternates 1, 2 and 3 would, therefore, be $211,964.00. If we can provide additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us. The Respondent's architect completed and submitted the bid Tabulation and Notice of Award Recommendation to the Respondent in early September. The document clearly discloses the amounts of each bidder's Base Bid and Alternate proposals. Using plus (+) and minus (-) signs, the Bid Tabulation further shows each bidder's method of calculation. The record is devoid of evidence that the Respondent had any problem in evaluating the bids and identifying the lowest bidder. The Petitioner was the lowest bidder on any combination of base bid plus or minus any or all alternates. Subsequently the Petitioner received a NOTICE OF AWARD RECOMMENDATION dated October 4, 1994. The Notice informed the Petitioner that the Respondent "has recommended that the contract be awarded to your firm in the total amount of $211,964.00, accepting the Base Bid and Alternates #1, #2 & #3. The Administrator of Contracts Design and Permitting, Division of Building Construction, Department of Management Services, State of Florida will consider this recommendation." Larry R. Coleman, Construction Projects Administrator, signed the letter. The Petitioner acknowledged receipt. A representative of the second lowest bidder, Kalex Construction, then contacted the Respondent, complaining of the Award Recommendation. The grounds for the Kalex complaint are not in the record. However, on October 14, 1994, H. R. Hough, the Respondent's Contracts Administrator, sent the Petitioner a letter "to notify you of the State's decision to reject all bids on the above referenced project due to ambiguities in the specifications." Mr. Hough's reasons for the rejection are "other than those stated by the protestor," Kalex. The Respondent's Rule 60D-5.007, Florida Administrative Code, states: Determination of Successful Bidder. All projects except where competitive bidding is waived under the provisions of Rule 60D-5.008 will be publicly bid in accordance with the provisions in the project specifications bidding documents. Award of contract will be made to the responsive bidder, determined to be qualified in accordance with the provisions herein and meeting the requirements of the bidding documents, that submits the lowest valid bid for the work. The lowest bid will be determined as follows: The lowest bid will be the bid from the responsive bidder that has submitted the lowest price for the base bid or the base bid plus the additive alternates or less the deductive alternates chosen by the Agency to be included in or excluded from the proposed contract, taken in numerical order listed in the bid documents. The order of the alternates may be selected by the Agency in any sequence so long as such acceptance out of order does not alter the designation of the low bidder. Under the above-quoted rule, the Respondent compares bids beginning with the lowest "base bid." The Respondent is of the view that for this comparison to be fair and equal, all bidders must include the same scope of work in the "base bid." The Respondent does not interpret the above-quoted rule to allow deductive alternates from some bidders and additive alternates from others. (For reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law which follow, the Respondent's interpretation and application of the above-quoted rule is erroneous.) The Specifications contain some ambiguous and inconsistent language regarding whether alternates should be treated as additive or deductive. The ambiguous and inconsistent language did not provide any bidder with an advantage or a disadvantage, nor did it otherwise affect the fairness of the bidding process.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services issue a Final Order in this case awarding a contract for the subject project to the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of December 1994. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 1994. APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner Paragraph 1: This is primarily a statement of position and is addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Paragraphs 2 through 10: Accepted in substance with a few unnecessary details omitted. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent Paragraphs 1 through 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as constituting a conclusion which is not warranted by the evidence. Third sentence is accepted as an accurate statement of how Respondent has been interpreting the subject rule, but is not accepted as constituting a correct interpretation of the rule. Paragraph 8: Rejected as misleading and confusing because the "scope of work" to be performed under the contract can only be determined after the Respondent decides which alternates to include and which to exclude. Paragraph 9: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion which is not warranted by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Timothy J. Armstrong, Esquire Armstrong & Mejer Suite 1111 Douglas Centre 2600 Douglas Road Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. On October 11, 1991, DOT's District Four office let out for bid district contracts E4551 and E4554. Contract E4551 calls for the mechanical sweeping of Interstate 95 in Broward County. Contract E4554 calls for the mechanical sweeping of Interstate 95 in Palm Beach County. At a mandatory pre-bid conference, the bidders for the Contracts were provided with a packet which included a Notice to Contractors and Standard Specifications. The Notice to Contractors is a four page document which is specific to each contract. The Standard Specifications are the same for all district contracts. Both the Notice to Contractors and the Standard Specifications to the bidders required bidders to submit proof of the ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price. Bidders could satisfy this requirement by submitting a bid guarantee of 5% of the bid, submitting a notarized letter of intent from a bonding company or by providing a Certificate of Qualification issued by Respondent. The Notice to Contractors for both Contracts provided as follows: Failure to provide the following with each bid proposal will result in rejection of the contractor's bid.... District contracts of $150,000 or less require the following as proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond: A notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a performance and payment bond in the amount of your bid, should your firm be awarded the project; in lieu of a notarized letter the following may be substituted: (1) a bid guarantee of five percent (5%); or (2) a copy of the Contractor's Certificate of Qualification issued by the Department. (No emphasis added) Similarly, the first Standard Specification provides: 1.1 Bidders (contractors) A contractor shall be eligible to bid on this contract if:... (2) Proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price is provided to the District Contract Administrator with the bid proposal. As such proof all bids must be accompanied by a notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a bond in the amount of your bid, should your firm be awarded the project.... The requirement to submit proof of the ability to acquire a performance and payment bond has been imposed on the Districts by DOT Directive 375-00-001-a (hereinafter the "Directive".) This Directive was in place at all times material to this proceeding. Section 3.2.2 of the Directive provides: A contractor shall be eligible to bid if: ...Proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price is provided to the minicontract administrator with the bid proposal. As such proof all bids must be accompanied by a notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a bond in the amount of the bid, should the firm be awarded the project. A bid guaranty as specified above may substitute as proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. This applies to bids amount over or under $150,000. A copy of the Contractor's Certificate of Qualification issued by the Department may be substituted in lieu of a notarized letter for those contracts not requiring a bid bond. The bids for the Contracts were opened on October 11, 1991 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Bids were received from four bidders: CPM, SCA, Florida Sweeping, Inc. and P. F. Gomez Construction Co., Inc. In its bid proposals, SCA included executed bid bonds in an amount sufficient to cover the amount of each bid proposal. Each bid bond cost $55.00. CPM did not submit executed bid bonds with its proposals. Instead, CPM submitted letters from Mark A. Latini dated September 25, 1991. Those letters were provided on the stationery of Bonina-McCutchen-Bradshaw, Insurance and indicate that Mr. Latini is the "bond manager." The letters provide as follows: Amwest Surety Insurance Company is the surety for the above-referenced contractor and stands ready to provide the necessary performance and payment bond for the referenced bid should Certified Property Maintenance, Inc., be low and awarded the referenced contract. All bonds are subject to normal underwriting requirements at the time of the bond request.... The letters submitted by CPM with its bid proposals were not notarized and were not binding obligations to issue bonds since they were conditioned upon meeting certain unspecified underwriting requirements at the time of the bond requests. The submitted bids were reviewed by the District Four Contractual Services Office. The bids submitted by CPM were the lowest for each contract. Its bid for Contract No. E4551 was $109,343.97. Its bid for Contract No. E4554 was $30,312.63. SCA's bids for the Contracts were $139,442.14 and $44,100.00, respectively. During the initial review of the bid proposals, the Contractual Services Office rejected CPM's bids for failure to have its bonding company "letters of intent" notarized. In addition, the bid proposals submitted by Florida Sweeping, Inc. were rejected for failure to note a required addendum and the bids submitted by P. F. Gomez Construction Co., Inc. were rejected because the "proposal bond was not of proper character". On October 18, 1991, DOT posted its Notice of Intent to Award the Contracts to SCA, the only bidder for the Contracts whose proposals had not been rejected. CPM timely filed protests of the proposed awards to SCA on October 22, 1991. The protests filed by CPM argued that its bids should not have been invalidated simply because the bonding company's letters did not include notary seals. At this point, the sole basis for the disqualification of CPM's bids was the failure to have the bonding company letters notarized. Respondent contends that, except for the absence of the notary seal, the letters submitted by CPM met the requirements of the Notice to Contractor and the Standard Specifications cited above. However, those letters are equivocal and do not evidence a binding commitment to issue a bond upon award of the contract. The DOT officials admit that they do not know what "normal underwriting requirements" would or could be required by CPM's bonding company. This conditional language makes it uncertain whether CPM could obtain the necessary bond. Therefore, it is concluded that those letters do not meet the requirements of the Notice to Contractors, the Standard Specifications or the Directive. A hearing on CPM's protest was not held. CPM's president, Raymond Hanousek, who prepared CPM's bid and attended the pre-bid meeting, called DOT's District office the day the bids were opened and was informed that his company's bid was low, but was rejected because its bond commitment letter was not notarized. Mr. Hanousek spoke with Joseph Yesbeck, the District's Director of Planning and Programs. After their conversation, Mr. Yesbeck reviewed the file and met with Teresa Martin, the District's contract administrator for construction and maintenance contracts, and other members of the contracting staff. Ms. Martin explained why CPM's bid had been disqualified, and the matter was thereafter discussed with the District and Department attorneys. After reviewing the situation, Mr. Yesbeck determined that the failure to submit notarized letters should be considered a non-material deviation and the bids submitted by CPM should be accepted and considered the low responsive bids. Mr. Yesbeck concluded that the absence of the notary seal did not give any competitive advantage to CPM and that defects of this nature are routinely allowed to be cured. Therefore, he reversed the contract administrator's decision to disqualify CPM on both Contracts. The District secretary concurred in the decision reached by Mr. Yesbeck to repost the award of the Contracts. Mr. Yesbeck prepared a joint letter of reposting which removed CPM's disqualification and declared CPM to be the low bidder for both Contracts. At the time Mr. Yesbeck made his decision, he had not reviewed the Directive from the Assistant Secretary's office stating that there must be a notarized letter showing proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. Mr. Yesbeck did not review the Directive until his deposition was taken one week prior to the hearing in this case. According to Ms. Martin, the option to provide a notarized letter from a bonding company as an alternative to the posting of a 5% bid guarantee or obtaining prequalification was designed to promote participation in state contracting by small business and minority business enterprise applicants. While DOT was apparently trying to make it easier and cheaper for companies to bid by not requiring a bond to be posted, the DOT Directive and the bid documents still clearly required unconditional proof that a bid bond would be issued if the contract was awarded to the bidder. CPM was not prequalified nor did it post a bond. Thus, in order to meet the requirements of the Notice to Contractors and the Standard Specifications, CPM's only option was to submit a notarized letter showing proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. DOT was never provided with any proof that CPM had been prequalified by the bonding company for a bond and/or that a bond would unconditionally be issued if CPM was awarded the Contracts. Because the letters stated they were "subject to normal underwriting requirements at the time of the bond request", there was some possibility CPM would not be able to obtain a bond. Such a condition was not permissible under the bid doucments. The decision to accept CPM's bid was contrary to the DOT Directive, the Notice to Contractors and the bid specifications which require that a bidder demonstrate proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. Consequently, it is concluded that DOT's decision to accept the conditional, unnotarized letters submitted by CPM was arbitrary and capricious. There is some indication that other DOT Districts have, on occasion, waived the notarization requirement for the bond letter. However, it is not clear whether the language in the bid documents was the same or similar in those cases and/or whether the bond letters were conditional. In the past, whenever District Four has gotten a bid without a notarized bond letter, the bid was rejected. Apparently, there has never been a protest based on such a denial in District Four. Under Section 337.18, DOT does not need to require notarized, unconditional bond letters on contracts under $150,000. Indeed, there was a suggestion that some DOT Districts have dropped the requirement for certain contracts under $150,000. However, the bid documents in this case clearly required some proof that the bidder could acquire a performance and payment bond upon award of the Contracts. It was incumbent for all bidders to meet this requirement. It was arbitrary to delete this requirement after the bids were submitted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding the bids submitted by CPM to be non-responsive and rejecting those bids. Petitioner should enter into negotiations with SCA regarding the award of the contract. In the absence of a favorable negotiation, Petitioner should enter a Final Order rejecting all bids and opening the Contracts up for new bids. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1992.
Findings Of Fact On March 1, 1984, Respondent gave notice to qualified contractors that it would receive sealed bids for State Project No. 72000-3541, referred to as Federal-Aid Project No. M 9041(10). This project involves the installation of a computerized traffic control system for the City of Jacksonville. In response to the opportunity to bid, the Department of Transportation received four bids. Petitioner, Winko-Matic Signal Company, was among the bidders. The other bidders were Georgia Electric Company, Traffic Control Devices, Inc., and Sperry Systems Management. The bids of Traffic Control Devices and Sperry Systems were rejected based upon an error in bid tabulations on the part of Traffic Control, a mistake on the quantities page, with the Sperry rejection being based upon a bid bond problem. Traffic Control had been the apparent low bidder with a bid of $1,964,115. Winko-Matic was the second apparent low bidder with a bid of $2,279,604.70. The Department of Transportation had estimated that the total cost of the Jacksonville project would be $ 2,024,680.61. Having discarded the bid of Traffic Control Devices, the Department of Transportation telegrammed Winko-Matic on April 4, 1984, advising Winko-Matic that it was the apparent low bidder for the Jacksonville project. Subsequently, the awards committee of the Department of Transportation met on April 18, 1984, and determined to reject all bids and re-advertise the job. In the course of this meeting the awards committee was told that there were erratic bids received on contract items, pointing to some perceived confusion among the contractors as to requirements of the contract. Discussion was also held on the possibility of establishing a pre-bid conference if the project was re advertised. The awards committee then voted to reject the bids on the basis that the apparent low bidder, Winko-Matic, had submitted a bid which-was 12.6 percent over the Department's estimate, instead of being within 7 percent of the Department of Transportation's pre-bid estimate, a point above which the Department of Transportation in its non-rule policy would call to question to the acceptability of the apparent low bid. In addition to deciding to reject all bids and re-advertise, it was determined that a pre-bid conference should be scheduled at least 30 days prior to the bid-letting date. Winko-Matic was advised that the Department of Transportation's decision to reject all bids by correspondence of May 4, 1984, in which it was indicated that all bids had been rejected based upon the fact that they were too high. In response to this notice of rejection, Winko-Matic, effective May 17, 1984, filed a written notice of protest. The case was subsequently referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 20, 1984, and a final hearing date was established by Notice of Hearing of July 5, 1984. The hearing date in this cause was September 12, 1984. The Jacksonville project in question requires the utilization of what has been referred to "UTCS Enhanced" software. This software package is unique and has only been used in a limited number of locations within the country. Those locations are Los Angeles, California; San Diego, California; Broward County, Florida; and Birmingham, Alabama. Another unique feature within the project design is the use of an associated coaxial computer sys gem. Given the unique nature of this project and the fact that the Department of Transportation had never advertised for bids related to UTCS software, Department of Transportation obtained assistance from a consulting firm, Harland, Bartholomew & Associates. In fulfilling its function Harland gave estimates to include an estimate related to the projected cost of the software, Item 681-102. The Harland estimate for the overall project was $2,143,130 including a $100,000 estimate for the software system. That estimate relating to the software was subsequently adjusted by the Department of Transportation to depict a cost of $13,780. The Department of Transportation estimate was based upon information within its computer related to a system unlike the enhanced software contemplated by the plans and specifications. In other words, the stored information in the Department of Transportation computer was not the same as contemplated by the plans and specifications in the Jacksonville project. Moreover, the initial estimate of Harland was based upon the idea of an extended software system, as opposed to an enhanced software system. Winko-Matic had bid $389,500 for the software in Item 681-102. That estimate was premised upon figures obtained from JHK and Associates, the group which Winko-Matic intended to use as its subcontractor for the enhanced software portion of the project. JHK developed the software and was responsible for systems integration of the Los Angeles, California, project, one of the locations in which UTCS enhanced software has been utilized. JHK premised its estimate for the software hare upon experience in Los Angeles and an evaluation of the tasks to be performed related to the enhanced software. This included general software development activities, hardware innovation, installation costs during the period of acceptance and testing, and the preparation of data base. The JHK bid price was $339,500. Another $50,000 was added to that price related to what the Petitioner describes as its management costs for that item. By June 20, 1984, when a further meeting was held by the awards committee on the subject of the Jacksonville project, it was concluded that the estimate made by the Department of Transportation of $13,780 was not correct, on the topic of the enhanced software. A more reasonable estimate, according to the information imparted in this session, would be $200,000 for enhanced software as called for in this project, with a $100,000 amount being a reasonable estimate had they chosen to use extended software. Adjusting the initial price related to the UTCS enhanced software to reflect a corrected estimate of the Department of Transportation in its original advertised bid, that estimate becomes $2,210,900.61 and its consultant Harland's estimate becomes $2,243,130. With this adjustment, the differential in the estimate made by the Department of Transportation and the Petitioner approaches 3 percent and not the 12.6 percent originally found. The 3 percent is below the threshold of 7 percent used as the policy for determining whether a bid might be rejected as being far beyond the acceptable limits set forth in the Department of Transportation's estimate. In the aforementioned June 20, 1984, awards committee meeting, the Department of Transportation continued to hold the opinion that all bids in the Jacksonville project should be rejected and the matter re-advertised. Although the problem pertaining to the estimate of the cost of the enhanced software package had been addressed, the committee continued to feel that the prices received in the bid letting were erratic Reference was also made to revisions or modifications to the project plan which would be offered if the matter were re- advertised. It was also pointed out that the Federal Highway Administration would concur in the Department's decision to reject all bids and would accept modifications. The awards committee again voted to reject the bids. The matter was again considered by the awards committee on August 31, 1984. On that occasion, it was pointed out that the revisions contemplated by the Department of Transportation, should the matter be re-advertised, would not affect in a substantial way the cost estimate for the project with the exception of Item 680-101, the system control equipment (CPU), which would promote a lower price for the project. The committee determined in the August, 1984, meeting to reject all bids and re-advertise. While the initial notice of rejection of May 4, 1984, had suggested the basis for rejection as being the fact that Petitioner's bid far exceeded the 7 percent allowance for price above the Department of Transportation's estimate of costs, the meetings of the awards committee and the suggestion of the Respondent in the course of the final hearing in this case indicated that there were other reasons for the decision to reject. Those Were: (a) an apparent lack of clarity among bidders regarding specifications for the Jacksonville job, (b) the desire of the Respondent to revise specifications on the Jacksonville project; and (c) a lack of sufficient competition in the bids. In connection with the first of the additional reasons Respondent suggests that variations within the bid responses related to particular line items within the specifications point out a lack of clarity in the project's specifications or confusion by bidders related to those specifications. Respondent did not bring forth any of the bidders who might speak to the matter of possible confusion or misunderstanding concerning some of the bid items. By contrast, the Petitioner's president; the president of JHK & Associates and James Robinson, Harland's project manager for the Jacksonville job, did not find the specifications in the original documents to be confusing. In addition, the testimony of those individuals established the fact that bid variations related to particular line items are not extraordinary and do not establish any apparent confusion by the bidders as to the requirements of those line items. In effect, what the differentials demonstrate are variations related to the manufacture or in-house capabilities of the bidders and an effort to allocate discretionary costs in various places as to line items. Moreover, they might indicate last- minute adjustments in the bid quote prior to the opening and a possible effort by a contractor to enter into a new job market. Finally, they demonstrate offsetting which is the allocation of item prices by a contractor to maximize profits. To do this, a contractor submits high bids on items representing quantities which the contractor feels will increase after the contract is awarded and submits low bids on items representing quantities which are not likely to change. In summary, while the Department of Transportation in its presentation expressed some concern about the variations in the pricing in the bid quotations offered by the respective bidders in this project, its suspicions on the question of the possible clarity of its specifications were not confirmed and are not convincing. On the topic of revisions which the Department of Transportation would offer if the matter were re-advertised, with one exception those matters appear to be items that could be attended through change orders or supplemental agreements. They are not matters which necessarily must be addressed through a rejection of all bids and a re-advertising of the project. The lone exception to this is the possibility that the Department of Transportation may not be able to protect its proprietary rights in the enhanced software which is being developed for the project, under the terms of the present bid documents. Given that uncertainty, the Respondent would wish to re-advertise the project and make certain that its proprietary interests are protected. Finally, Respondent has alluded to the fact that the Jacksonville project should be re-advertised in view of the lack of competition in the initial letting. Only four bidders expressed an interest in this project at the time of the first letting. Of those, two bidders were found to be responsive. While this is a low number of bidders, there does not appear to be any agency practice on the part of' the Department of Transportation to the effect that this number of bidders would not be accepted. Moreover, no indication has been given that should the matter be re-advertised a greater number of bidders would express an interest than was the case in the first letting. Consequently, this reason for bid rejection is not acceptable. If Respondent did not reject the bids and re-advertise the project, Winko-Matic would be the successful bidder in the Jacksonville project.
