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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs BRENDA W. SMITH, 15-006775PL (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Parish, Florida Dec. 01, 2015 Number: 15-006775PL Latest Update: Oct. 14, 2016

The Issue Whether Respondent, Brenda W. Smith, violated sections 475.25(1)(b) and 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2013),1/ as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute real estate licensees, pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent is licensed by Petitioner as a real estate broker in the state of Florida, license BK 534400. Respondent’s address of record with Petitioner is Post Office Box 15453, Panama City, Florida 32406. Respondent’s brokerage, Spirits Realty, Inc., is a registered for-profit corporation in the state of Florida with its principal place of business listed as 3812 Dolphin Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida 32408, and a mailing address listed as Post Office Box 15453, Panama City, Florida 32406. On May 31, 2012, Respondent, on behalf of her brokerage, Spirits Realty, Inc., entered into a property management agreement (Property Management Agreement) with Ronald W. Roberts to manage the rental of Mr. Roberts’ property located at 3803 Long John Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida 32408.3/ The term of the Property Management Agreement was for one year, beginning May 31, 2012, and provided: THIS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT is made on the 31st day of May 2012 and is effective 31 May 2012 by and between Ronald W. Roberts whose address is 3555 Walden Land, Acworth, Ga 30102, hereinafter referred to as “Owner” and SPIRITS REALTY INC., BRENDA SMITH, LICENSED REAL ESTATE BROKER, Post Office Box 15453, Panama City, Florida 32406, hereinafter referred to as “Agent”. WITNESSETH in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants herein contained, the Owner and Agent agree as follows: The Owner represents to the Agent as follows: (a) The Owner is the sole owner and holder of marketable record title to the following described property: 3803 Long John Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida 32408. The Owner hereby appoints the Agent as the sole and exclusive Agent to Lease and manage the premises known as 3803 Long John Drive. This Agreement is for 1 year beginning 31 May 2012. Agent to enter into an agreement for 1 year lease, $1000 per month rental, tenant to pay Jun/July rent in advance (non-refundable); & $1000 security deposit. The owner agrees to the following: Spirits Realty Inc. Commission of 10% of the rents collected in each calendar month (which shall be deducted from rents collected each month). Spirits Realty Inc., Hancock Bank, holds the security deposit (for liquidated damages) and advanced last months [sic] rent in Escrow. If Agent is not available, Jesse Smith, Admin, is authorized signer. 4. [sic] Owner authorizes the broker to secure tenant; and enter into a 1 year lease. Manage tenant relations collecting, give receipts, holding and disbursing rents to owner, serving notices, initiating eviction & damage actions. Agent will receive and forward $2500 check from tenant to Ron Roberts, for sale agreement of furniture and furnishings, on site. The Property Management Agreement was signed by Ronald W. Roberts and notarized in Cherokee County, Georgia, on May 31, 2012. Notably, the Property Management Agreement does not require advanced notice on the part of the Owner to terminate the Property Management Agreement. On May 31, 2012, Respondent and/or Spirits Realty Inc., ostensibly acting on behalf of Mr. Roberts, entered into a four- page residential lease agreement drafted by Respondent (Lease) with Allen Pridgen and Lori Roark (n/k/a Lori Pridgen), as tenants, for the rental of Mr. Roberts’ property located at 3803 Long John Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida 32408 (the Premises). The term of the Lease was for one year, from June 1, 2012, through June 30, 2013. Curiously, instead of naming Mr. Roberts as the lessor, the first sentence on the first page of the Lease names “Spirits Realty Inc., Brenda Smith, Lic. Real Estate Broker, Agent” as “Lessor.” The bottom of the first page of the Lease states “Page 1 of 1.” In addition, page four of the Lease submitted by Respondent as part of her Exhibit R-7 (which page was not included in the copy of the Lease submitted by Petitioner as part of Exhibit P-2) is signed by Respondent and Spirits Realty, Inc., on and below the signature line labeled “Lessor,” respectively. By comparing the signatures of the “Lessees” on the last page of the Lease (page four) with the signatures on the exhibit entitled “Security Deposit/Advance Last Months [sic] Rent Receipt” (Deposit Receipt), it is apparent that Allen and Lori Pridgen both signed page four of the Lease on May 31, 2012, as Lessees. As documented by the Deposit Receipt, on May 31, 2012, Respondent collected from Allen and Lori Pridgen a $1,000 cash security deposit, plus $1,000 as the last month’s rental payment under the Lease. The Deposit Receipt, signed by both of the Pridgens, as well as Respondent, provides that the monies collected would be held in a “non-interest bearing account Spirits Realty, Inc. Escrow” with Hancock Bank in Panama City Beach, Florida. Mr. Roberts signed a typed statement on May 31, 2012, printed on paper with a fax number, date, and time in the top margin, stating: “The four page Residential Lease on Long John Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida, is hereby agreed upon and approved by the property owner Ronald W. Roberts.” The next year, Respondent prepared a document entitled “Lease Renewal Agreement” (Lease Renewal) for renewal of the Lease for another seven months, from June 1, 2013, to January 1, 2014. The initial paragraph of the Lease Renewal listed the parties as: Lessor4/: Allen Pridgen & Lori [Pridgen] Agent: Spirits Realty Inc., Lic. Real Estate Broker The Lease Renewal kept all terms of the Lease in effect and provided that the Security Deposit and last month’s rent would continue to be held in Hancock Bank. The Lease Renewal also stated: That tenants shall pay a monthly rental of $1,000 for each month by the 1st of each month to Spirits Realty, Inc., for the Renewal Term. Tenants agree to give 60 days written notice prior to vacating property, Or give notice of intent to renew lease for up to one year. According to dates next to their signatures, the Lease Renewal was signed by Alan and Lori Pridgen on May 30, 2013; by Brenda Smith for “Spirits Realty Inc and Brenda Smith, Lic Real Estate Broker” on May 31, 2013; and by Dorothy and Ronald Roberts as “Property Owner” on June 4, 2013. In late 2013, the Roberts decided to terminate the Property Management Agreement and manage the rental of the Premises themselves. The decision to terminate the agreement was made a short time after the tenants had a problem with a water leak and a faulty water heater. Because the tenants considered the problem to be an emergency, they dealt directly with the Roberts, who, as owners, authorized the tenants to pay for the required repairs directly and take the payment off the rent. On December 1, 2013, Mr. Roberts spoke to Respondent on the telephone and advised her that the Roberts no longer wanted to use Respondent’s brokerage, Sprits Realty, Inc., for property management services and that they were going to terminate the Property Management Agreement. Ms. Roberts was present with her husband during the telephone conversation and overheard the discussions. During the conversation, Respondent told Mr. Roberts that they needed to give her at least a 60-day notice of termination, and Mr. Roberts advised Respondent that their termination of the Property Management Agreement would be effective February 1, 2014. The next day, December 2, 2013, the Roberts sent a letter by certified mail to Respondent, at her address, and to Spirits Realty, Inc., at its address. The letter was signed by both Mr. and Ms. Roberts, witnessed and notarized, and stated: Dear Mrs. Smith, Per our conversation on December 1, 2013, please accept this letter as a 60 day formal notification that we wish to terminate the contract we currently have with Spirit Realty for Property Management Services. As of 2/1/2014, we will no longer require your services in handling the property management for 3803 Long John Drive, Panama City, Florida, 32408. Please forward the security deposit that you collected from the tenant, Alan Pridgen in 2012 and are currently holding in an escrow account. You can mail it to Ronald & Dorothy Roberts at 3555 Walden Lane, Acworth, Georgia 30102. We appreciate your time and services since Mr. Pridgen began occupying the property. Although multiple attempts were made to deliver the letters, they were returned unaccepted. The Roberts made additional attempts to contact Respondent by telephone, but were unable to do so. By another letter sent by certified mail to Respondent dated January 16, 2014, Mr. and Ms. Roberts again requested in writing that Respondent forward to them the $2,000 identified in the Deposit Receipt. The letter reiterated the fact that in a telephone conversation on December 1, 2013, Respondent was advised that the Roberts were terminating the Property Management Agreement. The letter was returned unaccepted. Although the Roberts letters to Respondent dated December 1, 2013, and January 16, 2014, were returned unaccepted, Respondent’s own exhibit, a copy of a certified letter that Respondent allegedly sent to the tenants on December 11, 2013, acknowledges that Mr. Roberts called on December 1, 2013, regarding both the Lease and the Property Management Agreement. The first paragraph on the third page of Respondent’s December 11, 2013, letter to the tenants states: 1 Dec 2013 Ron Roberts called SRI [Spirits Realty, Inc.] agent saying Alan [Pridgen] paid over $900 in improvement costs having to do with the air conditioner and hot water heater - & Alan would not be paying rent due 1 Jan 2014 – SRI would not receive a management fee – triggering liquidated damages clause. Breach of lease. Lease – Agreement/relationship of landlord & tenant (real property) or lessor and lessee – specifes [sic] 10% rent compensation. Further, during her cross-examination of Ms. Roberts at the final hearing, Respondent acknowledged that she had spoken on the telephone with Mr. Roberts on December 2, 2013, and that during the conversation the subject of breaking a contract with a real estate person was discussed. While it is found that the telephone conversation occurred on December 1, 2013, as opposed to December 2, 2013, it is evident that the conversation indeed occurred. Based on the evidence, it is found that on December 1, 2013, the Roberts effectively communicated their desire to terminate the Property Management Agreement, effective February 1, 2014. Further, although the certified letters were refused, it is found that the Roberts timely asked Respondent for return of the $2,000 reflected in the Deposit Receipt. In addition to the letters that the Roberts sent to Respondent, after speaking to the Roberts, Ms. Pridgen prepared a letter, at the Roberts’ request, for her husband to send to Respondent, dated December 1, 2013, which stated: Brenda, This letter is to inform you that I no longer wish to continue my contract with you and the Roberts. I have been renting this property since June of 2012, the original contract was for one year. I agreed to rent the property for an additional 6 months which is now up. I no longer wish to continue this contract with Spirits Realty Inc. Thank you Allen D. Pridgen The letter was sent to Respondent by certified mail on December 4, 2013, but Respondent never picked it up. Shortly after her conversation with Mr. Roberts on December 1, 2013, Respondent called the police and tried to have the Pridgens evicted from the Premises. The Roberts explained over the phone to the police officer that they, not Respondent, were the owners of the Premises. The Pridgens were not evicted. Ms. Pridgen’s credible testimony explained that they did not intend to vacate the Premises, but rather planned to continue to rent it directly from the Roberts. As of the date of the final hearing, the Pridgens were still leasing the Premises from Ms. Roberts. To date, Respondent has not returned to Ms. Roberts, as owner with responsibilities over the Lease, either the $1,000 Security Deposit or the $1,000 Advanced Rent she collected from the tenants. Instead, Respondent has retained the entire $2,000 and characterizes the funds as “liquidated damages” for the Roberts’ wrongful termination of the Property Management Agreement. The Property Management Agreement has no specific requirement for the manner in which it is to be terminated. Nevertheless, Respondent transferred the $2,000 reflected in the Deposit Receipt into Spirits Realty, Inc.’s, operating account at Hancock Bank. Respondent argues that she is entitled to retain the $2,000 because Ms. Roberts did not make a timely claim upon the escrow deposit following receipt of Respondent’s expressed intent to keep the escrow monies as “liquidated damages.” Respondent bases her argument on the Roberts’ alleged breach of the Property Management Agreement. As there was no breach and the Roberts’ request for return of the escrow funds was timely made, Respondent’s belief that she is entitled to liquidated damages has no merit. Respondent also suggests that she is entitled to retain the $2,000 reflected in the Deposit Receipt because the tenants failed to give 60 days’ notice of their intent to terminate the Lease. Respondent’s suggestion is premised upon the fact that she and her brokerage are erroneously named as the “Lessor” in the Lease that Respondent drafted. Respondent’s argument evinces that she either has a misunderstanding of her role as agent for the Roberts, or intended to take advantage of her position in a manner inconsistent with her obligations under the Property Management Agreement. Although erroneously listed as the “Lessor” under the Lease, neither Respondent nor her brokerage was a proper party to the Lease. Rather, in accordance with the Property Management Agreement, Respondent and her brokerage were only authorized as agents for Mr. Roberts in dealing with the Premises. Under the circumstances, even if the tenants had breached the Lease (which they did not), Mr. Roberts and his successor in interest, Ms. Roberts, not Respondent and her brokerage, would be entitled to make a claim against the tenants as the owners and actual lessors under the Lease. Incredibly, at the final hearing, Respondent submitted into evidence a copy of a document entitled “Lease Addendum” dated May 31, 2012, which was purportedly signed by the tenants, Alan Pridgen and Lori Pridgen. The purported “Lease Addendum” provides: Lease Addendum 31 May 2012 FS 83.575, 83.595 breach, liquidated damages, and termination FS 83.595(4) Tenant statue [sic] contains two liquidated damages provisions allowing the landlord (Lessor) an opportunity to impose liquidated damages on the tenant for early termination or for failure to give notice of intent not to renew lease. Lessor, Spirits Realty Inc. will receive the $2,000 advance fees, “early termination fee”, out of escrow, if a breach of the lease occurs. X I agree as provided in the lease agreement, $2,000 security (an amount that does not exceed 2 months rent) as liquidated damages or an early termination fee if I elect to terminate the lease agreement and Lessor waives the right to seek additional rent beyond the month in which landlord takes possession. FS 83.575 Lessee is required to give 60 days notice of intent not to renew the lease or Lessor, Spirits Realty Inc will receive the $2,000 advance fees security deposits as “liquidated damages”. Spirits Realty Inc is entitled to 5% real estate fee at close. In addition, Respondent submitted into evidence a second document entitled “Lease Addendum” purportedly signed by the now-deceased Mr. Roberts. That second “Lease Addendum” provides: Lease Addendum 31 May 2012 I agree with the Lease Addendum. Spirits Realty Inc will receive the $2,000 security deposits advanced fees out of escrow if there is a breach in the lease. Spirits Realty Inc will receive 5% real estate fee when the property closes. Lessor is acting as a Transaction Broker to lease/sale property. Ms. Roberts and Lori Pridgen credibly testified during the hearing that neither they nor Mr. Roberts, prior to his death, signed a separate Lease Addendum. Ms. Pridgen testified that she would not have signed any type of document which essentially gave up any and all rights to the escrow monies. Further, Ms. Roberts explained that her late husband, Mr. Roberts, who had an understanding of real estate matters, would not have signed such a document. Moreover, the documents presented as lease addenda are suspect. The type font is remarkably different from other documents obtained on May 31, 2012, in connection with the Lease and Property Management Agreement. Further, the paper signed by Mr. Roberts on May 31, 2012, in which he agreed to the Lease, has a fax number, date, and time at the top, but the purported lease addendum does not. Finally, the signatures on the lease addenda appear to have been copied from other signatures and taped into place. While reviewing the purported lease addendum during her cross-examination by Respondent at the final hearing, Ms. Pridgen testified: Okay. First of all, this is not the –- this has never been seen in our paperwork. The whole time that we’ve been doing paperwork with you for all these years, this was never ever seen till Brande sent it up here in the paperwork she had. And besides that, the print is not the same as any of your paperwork. And also, you can tell by the signature that they have been copied and paste onto the amendment. If the – somebody will just look at them, you didn’t clean up your work under your tape before you put it right there. So you - - you needed to clean your work up when you tape something like that because we’ve done it before. You have to clean up your work, or people can tell it when you look at it. Other than evincing Respondent’s nefarious intent to justify her retention of the $2,000, the purported lease addenda are given no evidentiary value. The evidence does not justify Respondent’s retention of the $2,000. The evidence adduced at the final hearing otherwise clearly and convincingly showed that Respondent wrongfully retained the $2,000 identified in the Deposit Receipt.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, finding that Respondent violated sections 475.25(1)(b) and 475.25(1)(d)1. as charged in the Administrative Complaint, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $3,500, assessing reasonable costs pursuant to section 455.227(3)(a), and revoking Respondent’s license to practice real estate. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2016.

Florida Laws (12) 120.569120.57120.60120.6820.165455.225455.227475.021475.2583.4983.57583.59
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WE CARE LIFE SOURCE, LLC vs AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 15-003621F (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jun. 23, 2015 Number: 15-003621F Latest Update: May 04, 2016

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities (Agency), had a reasonable basis in law and fact to initially deny Petitioner's application for a license to operate a group home, or whether other circumstances were present that would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust within the meaning of section 57.111(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2015).

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency that licenses group homes pursuant to section 393.067. On June 13, 2014, Petitioner's corporate agent, Lavonda Hargrove, filed with the Agency an application for licensure to operate a group home facility in Wesley Chapel, Florida. Relevant to this dispute is a requirement by the Agency that if the applicant does not own the property on which the facility will be located, it must submit a copy of a fully-executed landlord/tenant lease agreement with the application packet. Petitioner did not own the property on which the facility would be operated and was required to comply with this requirement. The initial application packet filed with the Agency was missing a number of required items and some questions on the application were left blank. However, as found by Judge Crapps, a copy of an undated and partially signed residential lease agreement was submitted with the application. As noted below, its whereabouts are unknown. On July 29, 2014, or more than 30 days after the application was filed,1/ Myra Leitold, a Residential Program Supervisor in Tampa who reviewed the application, emailed Hargrove and informed her that the application had "to be completed in its entirety" and described areas of the application that required additional information. Leitold also attached to the email a generic checklist of 36 required documents for an initial license application, one of which was a "Landlord Agreement/Lease." While she identified some, but not all, of the items on the checklist that were missing, she did not specifically mention that a landlord agreement/lease had not been filed. In response to the email, on September 12, 2014, Hargrove submitted a second application with the supplemental information requested in Leitold's email. Because a lease agreement had already been submitted with the first application, and no mention of one was made in Leitold's email, it is reasonable to assume that this was the reason why Hargrove did not submit another copy with her second application. To make sure that her application was complete, on September 17, 2014, Hargrove emailed Leitold and stated the following: This is a follow up email to confirm your receipt of requested items for licensure of the Wesley Chapel home at 31733 Baymont Loop. Please advise if additional information is needed. Also, do you have any idea when you will be available to inspect the home? In response to Hargrove's email, Leitold promptly sent an email stating as follows: I did receive the documents forwarded last week however, have not had an opportunity to review them. I should be able to get to them in the next week or two. After her review of the second application was completed, Leitold believed it was still incomplete because there was no lease agreement in the packet. At the underlying hearing, Leitold acknowledged that it was possible the lease agreement had been filed with the initial application on June 13, 2014, but thought it unlikely the Agency had lost the document. As found by Judge Crapps, however, an agreement was filed but its whereabouts are unknown. In any event, Leitold did not advise Hargrove that her application was still incomplete. Instead, she forwarded the second application, without a lease agreement, to the Central Office in Tallahassee for final disposition. Applications are sent to Tallahassee only if they are incomplete or involve pending violations by the applicant; otherwise, action on the application is made at the local level. Incomplete applications are always denied, and Leitold knew that when the application was forwarded to Tallahassee, this would be the final disposition of the matter. After the application packet was reviewed by the Central Office in Tallahassee, with no executed lease agreement, on October 6, 2014, the Agency issued its Notice of License Application Denial for Group Home (Notice) based upon the ground that it did not include a lease agreement. (Presumably, the application satisfied all other licensing requirements.) Two Agency employees in Tallahassee who reviewed the application, Kim Walsh and Tom Rice, testified without dispute that a lease agreement is an essential part of an application, and without the document, they had no choice under the law except to deny the application. Neither Walsh nor Rice had knowledge that a partially executed and unsigned lease agreement had been submitted with the first application but was apparently lost or misplaced, or that Lietold had failed to notify Hargrove that this specific item was missing before the packet was sent to Tallahassee. On October 23, 2014, Hargrove requested a hearing to contest the decision. Although she was knew why the application was denied, in her request for a hearing, Hargrove did not indicate any specific material facts in the Notice that were in dispute. Moreover, she never indicated that a lease agreement had been filed with her initial application. According to Mr. Rice, the Agency's Program Administrator, had Hargrove disclosed this fact in her request for a hearing or brought it to the attention of Agency personnel in a timely manner, the matter could have been resolved without a hearing. A formal hearing was conducted by Judge Crapps on February 24, 2015. Just prior to the hearing, a lease agreement was provided to the Agency in the form of a proposed exhibit. Because it was not fully executed, the case was not settled, and an evidentiary hearing was conducted. At the hearing, Hargrove testified that the fully executed lease agreement was at her home. In his Recommended Order, Judge Crapps accepted Hargrove's testimony that a lease agreement had been filed with the initial application but made no finding as to what happened to the document. Even if the agreement was lost by the Tampa office, or was not fully executed, he observed that the Agency did not notify Hargrove within 30 days after the application was filed of any apparent errors or omissions, as required by section 120.60(1). For this reason, he deemed the application complete by operation of law. He also criticized the Agency for failing to specifically identify the missing lease agreement in its email sent on July 29, 2014. He recommended that the Agency reconsider the application and make a decision to approve or deny. The Agency's Final Order adopted the Recommended Order without change and approved the application.

Florida Laws (4) 120.60120.68393.06757.111
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ATLANTIC INVESTMENT OF BROWARD vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 00-000224BID (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jan. 12, 2000 Number: 00-000224BID Latest Update: May 02, 2000

The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation's intended action to reject all quotes and re-advertise Lease No. 550:0318 was illegal, arbitrary, fraudulent, or dishonest.

Findings Of Fact In October of 1999, the Department advertised for office space for use as the Toll Data Center - Audit Section, Office of Toll Operations (Toll Office) located in Broward County. The lease was clearly advertised as a negotiated lease. It was not advertised as a competitive bid lease. Under the negotiated lease process before letting any lease, the Department must submit to the Department of Management Services (DMS) a Request for Space Need (RSN) and Letter of Agency Staffing (LAS). From DMS the Department receives the authority to directly negotiate a lease for space under 5,000 square feet with prospective lessors. 1/ Consistent with procedure, the Department received approval of the RSN on October 18, 1999. Pursuant to statute, DMS has strongly suggested that prior to selection of the apparent successful lessor, the Department should obtain a minimum of three documented quotes for a lease that has not been competitively bid. The Department has consistently followed that suggestion in negotiated leases. Under special circumstances, where it is clear it is improbable that three quotes cannot be obtained, the Department may waive its requirement that three documented quotes be received. However, the agency must certify to DMS that attempts to receive the required number of documented quotes were unsuccessful and/or special circumstances exist to negotiate the lease with less than three quotes. In this case, no special circumstances exist. In an effort to obtain more than the minimum three documented quotes, the Department opted to advertise for lease space on the Internet. The Internet is utilized by the DMS, among other state agencies, to disseminate information provided in the RSN to the private sector. Additionally, the Internet site may also be used by the private sector to provide notice of space they have available for review by the agency seeking space. A total of three submittal packages were distributed for Lease No. 550:0318. Despite the Department's advertisement over the Internet, only two requests for quote submittal packages were received. Of the three quote submittal packages distributed, the Department received only one documented quote in response to the advertisement for the Toll Office. Atlantic Investment submitted a Quote Submittal Form to the Department in late October for office space in North Fort Lauderdale. Atlantic Investment became aware of the Department's advertisement for lease space from Sheldon M. Schermer, employed by Atlantic Investment as its real estate agent. Mr. Schermer learned of the Department's need for lease space from an advertisement placed on the Internet. On November 8, 1999, the Department informed Atlantic Investment via Sheldon M. Schermer, Real Estate Agent for Atlantic Investment, of the Department's intent to reject all quotes and re-advertise for Lease No. 550:0318. This decision was not arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or dishonest and well within the Department's discretion and procedures for negotiated leases. The basis for the decision was the Department's modification of the lease specifications pursuant to a recommendation by DMS to modify the lease space terms to hopefully generate more interest and more quotes. In a competitive negotiation, DMS was aware of agencies who modified leases and advertised as many as five times before three documented quotes were received. Moreover, the evidence showed that the Broward County commercial real estate market could easily generate three quotes for the space required by the Toll Office.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petitioner's protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2000.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57255.249
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. SHIRLEY HOLLAND, 78-002248 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-002248 Latest Update: May 11, 1979

Findings Of Fact Respondent Shirley Holland was registered with Petitioner as a real estate salesman in January, 1976, associated with Vern Duncklee Real Estate and Insurance, Inc., Naples, Florida. He is presently registered as a real estate broker. (Stipulation) On January 5, 1976, W. H. Ragan gave the Duncklee firm a listing to sell real property consisting of approximately one and one-quarter acres located in Collier County, Florida, for a selling price of $7,500. Respondent was the listing salesman. (Testimony of Respondent, Ragan, Duncklee, Petitioner's Exhibit 6). Respondent also was a builder who operated as Holland Investment Company. It was his practice to purchase various properties, remodel existing structures on the same, and thereafter sell them at a profit. There was a two- room shed located on the Ragan property that had no inside finishing work, electricity, or septic tank. Respondent decided to take an option on the property in order to remodel it by adding a room and to place it in a habitable condition. He broached the subject to Ragan on January 6, 1976, and Ragan told him on January 7, that he was agreeable to such a contract. On January 8, Respondent and Ragan and his wife entered into a Sales Contract and Option to Buy for $7,500. The contract provided that closing would take place within twelve months and that the seller would give possession of the property to the purchaser on January 8, 1976. This was pursuant to an accompanying rental agreement dated January 8, 1976, between the parties for a period of twelve months which provided that Respondent could exercise his option at any time within the stated twelve-month period whereby all rents paid would be applied toward the down payment on the property of $1,900 which was to be made at closing of the sale. The rental agreement further provided that if Respondent did not exercise his option within the required time, any improvements made by him on the property during that period would be considered liquidated damages of the owner. Pursuant to these agreements, Respondent made a payment of $100 at the time they were executed, which represented an initial deposit on the contracts and as rent for first month of the term. The Option Agreement also gave Respondent authority to remodel the building on the property and it further reflected that Respondent was a registered real estate salesman and would be selling the property for profit. (Testimony of Respondent, Duncklee, Petitioner's Exhibits 5, 7) On January 5, 1976, Respondent showed Harold and Ruby Stacy several houses in the area that were for sale. On January 9, Respondent went by the Stacy residence to see if they were interested in any of the houses he had shown them. They were not interested in those houses and Respondent told them of property that he had recently acquired which was the Ragan property. He showed it to Mr. Stacy that night and the next day Mrs. Stacy went with him to look at the premises. During the course of their conversations, Respondent offered to rent the property to them for $100 for the period January 10 to February 1, 1976. It was his intention to rent it to them for $125 per month commencing in February on the condition that they clean and fix up the property. They also discussed the possibility of purchase at a later date. Respondent told them that he would sell to them for $13,000 if Harold Stacy would do the remodeling work on the shed with Respondent supplying the materials. Respondent quoted a possible sales price of $14,500 if he was obliged to provide both labor and materials for renovating the shed and providing for utility services. Respondent and the Stacys entered into a rental agreement on that day for the initial period of some three weeks and Ruby Stacy gave him a check dated January 10 for $100 with a notation thereon that it was a deposit on land. Respondent explained to Mrs. Stacy that he was merely renting the property at that time and added the word "rent" at the bottom of the check. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 2) Thereafter, the Stacys proceeded to clean the premises and commence installing a ceiling in the building located on the property. They also installed a septic tank. At some undisclosed date, Ragan came to the property to obtain some of his belongings and found the Stacys there. He learned that they supposedly had purchased the property from Respondent, Ragan was of the opinion that Respondent had purported to sell the property before he had obtained the option thereon and that he had therefore defrauded the Stacys. Ragan thereupon filed a complaint against Respondent with the local Board of Realtors in latter January, 1976. About the same time, Respondent had been in the process of obtaining local permits to install the septic tank and do the other work. He discovered that the Stacys had installed a septic tank without his authorization and without obtaining a permit. He thereupon, by letter of January 21, 1976, informed the Stacys that they had done work on the property without a building permit or approval of the County Health Department and therefore was refunding the rental payment of $100. He enclosed his check in that amount, dated January 21, 1976. Although Respondent later attempted to exercise his option to purchase the property, Ragan refused to fulfill the agreement and later sold the property to the Stacys himself for $7,500. (Testimony of Respondent, R. Stacy, Ragan, Petitioner's Exhibits 3,4) Mrs. Stacy testified at the hearing that she was under the impression that she and her husband had purchased the property in question on January 10, 1976, and that the $100 payment had been a deposit for such purchase. She was under the further impression that they were to make a $2,500 down payment in February to consummate the deal. She further testified that they made the improvements on the land because of their understanding that they were going to purchase it. Mrs. Stacy had never been involved in a prior purchase of real property and is unfamiliar with contract documents and terminology. It is found that Mrs. Stacy honestly believed that she and her husband had a valid agreement to purchase the property. Her testimony that she and her husband entered into the rental arrangement in January to enable them to work on the property until they could make the down payment in February is deemed credible. (Testimony of R. Stacy) Ragan and Respondent had been involved in a prior real estate transaction and Respondent testified that Ragan had not been satisfied with that transaction, but Ragan testified to the contrary. However, Ragan talked to Respondent's broker in January, 1976, about the Stacy situation, at which time Ragan stated that he had a chance to get even with Respondent for the prior transaction and that he was going to do so. (Testimony of Respondent, Ragan, Duncklee, D. Holland)

Recommendation That the Administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph A. Doherty, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ed R. Miller, Esquire Suite 212 - 1400 Gulf Shore Boulevard Naples, Florida 33940

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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ELIZABETHAN DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 84-000614BID (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000614BID Latest Update: Sep. 05, 1984

Findings Of Fact This case concerns what is-called a "Turnkey Lease". The program was developed by the State of Florida in 1971. It encompasses a situation where by agencies seeking space for their operations may, after a specific need is determined that cannot be filled by existing adequate space, solicit competitive bids from developers for the provision of land and the construction of a building thereon sufficient to-meet the agency's needs, for lease specifically to the agency requesting it. The Bureau of Property Management within DGS was given the initial responsibility to develop the guidelines, promulgate the rules, and seek statutory authority for such a program. The Bureau's current role is to work with agencies requesting this program. The agency certifies the need to the Bureau in addition to the fact that there is no available existing space present. The Bureau then determines agency needs and gives the agency the authority to solicit the bids for the turnkey project. Once the bids are then received, evaluated, and a recommendation for an award is forwarded by the agency to DGS, DGS reviews the supporting documents required by the provision of the Florida Administrative Code and either concurs or does not concur in the recommendation. If DGS concurs, the submitting agency is notified and is permitted to then secure the lease. Once the lease has been entered into; it is then sent back to DGS for review and approval as to the conditions; and thereafter the plans and specifications for the building are also referred to DGS for review and approval as to the quality and adequacy as well as code compliance. Section 255.249 and Section 255.25, Florida Statutes, set forth the requirements for soliciting and awarding bids for lease space in an amount in excess of 2,500 square feet. This provision requires that an award of this nature be made to the lowest and best bidder, and DCS utilizes that standard in evaluating and determining whether or not it will concur with an agency's recommendation. In the instant case, DHRS advertised for bids for the construction of office space in Palatka, Florida for its District III facilities. Before seeking to solicit bids, the District III staff conducted a search for other possible existing space within a five mile radius of the downtown area and located no adequate facilities. Thereafter, a Certification of Need was processed for a solicitation of proposals and approval was granted by DGS to follow through with the solicitation. A preproposal conference was advertised and held on October 14, 1983, and after project review by those present at the conference, bid opening date was set for November 22, 1983. Thirty-two bid packages were distributed and twelve bidders submitted proposals. The public bid opening was held as scheduled at 2:00 p.m., on November 22, 1983, in Palatka, Florida by Robert E. Litza, Facilities Services Coordinator for DHRS District III. Of the bids submitted by the twelve bidders, the lowest hid was rejected because of the failure of the bidder to comply with the requirements of the bid package. Of the remaining eleven bids, the four lowest were evaluated with the understanding that additional higher bids would be evaluated if the four lowest bids were found to be unacceptable. Among the four bids considered were bids of Chuck Bundschu, Inc., Kenneth R. McGurn, one of the Intervenors (McGurn submitted five prices scheduled for his bid and of these, only one was considered); Elizabethan, Petitioner herein; and TSU. Only three bids are pertinent to the discussion here. They are #8-C (McGurn); #11 (Elizabethan); and #12 (TSU). In pertinent particulars, these bids provided as to rental costs: 8-C 11 12 1st yr $14.00/$220,808 $8.95/$ 61,916.10 S 7.16/$ 49,532.88 2nd yr 14.00/ 220,8088 8.95/ 141,159.40 7.35/ 115,924.20 3rd yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 7.62/ 120,182.64 4th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 8.08/ 127,437.76 5th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 8.33/ 131,380.76 6th vr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 8.59/ 135,481.48 7th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 8.86/ 139,739.92 8th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 9.19/ 144,944.68 9th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 9.58/ 151,095.76 10th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 10.09/ 159,139.48 Renewal Option 1st yr3.00/47,316 9.93/ 156,615.96 10.51/ 165,763.72 2nd yr3.00/47.316 9.93/ 156,615.96 10.99/ 173,334.28 3rd yr3.00/47.316 9.93/ 156,615.96 11.48/ 181,062.56 4th yr3.00/47.316 9.93/ 156,615.96 11.99/ 189,106.28 5th yr3.00/47.316 9.93/ 156,615.96 12.51/ 197,307.72 Total Basic Overall Lease 1-15 yrs $1,971,500 $2,115,430.50 $2,181,434.12 Average Sq.Ft. for 15 yrs $8.60 $9.20 $9.58 A recommendation by the evaluation committee which met at DHRS District III, that McGurn's bid be selected, was forwarded to DGS in Tallahassee through the Director of DHRS's General Services in Tallahassee on December 22, 1983. The terms of the successful bid and the reasons for its being considered lowest and best are discussed below. The successful bid for the lease in question, lease number 590:8030, upon completion of the committee's evaluation was also evaluated by Ms. Goodman in the Bureau of Property Management of DGS. She also considered the McGurn bid to be the lowest and best of the eleven non-disqualified bids. In that regard, not only Mr. McGurn's bid but all of the twelve bids received were considered and reviewed not only at the local level but at DHRS and DGS headquarters as well. In her evaluation of the proposal and the bids, Ms. Goodman considered the documentation submitted by DHRS. This included a letter of recommendation supported by a synopsis of all proposals, the advertisement for bids, and any information pertinent to the site selection process. In determining the McGurn's bid was the lowest as to cost of all the bids, Ms. Goodman compared the average rate per square foot per year for each. This did not take into con- sideration pro-ration of costs per year, but strictly the average over the fifteen year probable term of the lease (ten years basic plus five year option). According to Ms. Goodman, this same method of calculating cost has been used in every lease involving a turnkey situation and in fact in every lease since 1958 - as long as she has been with DGS. This particular method, admittedly, is not set forth in any rule promulgated by DGS. However, the agencies are instructed by DGS to advertise and bidders to bid on an average square foot basis, the basis utilized by Ms. Goodman and her staff in analyzing the bids submitted. In that regard, the request for proposals does not, itself, indicate how the calculation of lowest cost would be made by DHRS and DGS but it does tell prospective bidders what information to submit. This procedure has been followed exclusively in situations like this for may years and many of the bidders here have bid before using this same system. All bidders are considered on the same footing in an evaluation. They are notified of what information will be considered along with that of all the other bidders. Further, anyone who inquires as to the basis for evaluation will be given a straight and complete answer as to the method to be used. Petitioner contends that McGurn's bid does not conform to either the normal bidding procedure followed by contractors in this type of procurement over the past years or to the normal bidding procedures adopted by Respondent, DHRS. It urges that the questioned bid is non-responsive and front-end loaded to the detriment of DHRS. With regard to the front-end loading objection, Mr. Taylor, testifying for Petitioner, attempted to indicate by graphic evidence that Elizabethan's bid, which he claims is not front-end loaded, is cheaper to the State than that of McGurn. Due to the large rental cost of the McGurn bid in the opening years of the lease, the State would have to borrow money to make the large rental payments; the interest cost of which, when added to the $3.00 cost in the option years, raises the cost considerably and makes the bid not the lowest. Though Mr. Taylor testified to this he failed to produce any independent evidence to support it. In addition, Taylor urges, under the McGurn schedule, McGurn would recoup his entire construction debt (approximately $423.00 plus interest) in the first four years of the lease: Comparing the two bids, it appears that the State would pay McGurn approximately $494,500.00 more than it would pay Elizabethan for the same period during the first seven years of the lease. Considering this, it is Taylor's belief that McGurn's profit after the fourth year is excessive. He contends also that when, after the tenth year, McGurn's rental rate drops to $3.00 per square foot for the remaining five years which constitutes the option period of the lease, the State could not afford to leave the low figure and as a result, the ten year lease is converted to a l5 year lease which is unresponsive. Further, the $3.00 figure for the last years, which would ostensibly show a loss to McGurn, is misleading in that there would be sufficient income from the advance profit garnered in years 5 to 10, when invested, to cover the soft costs and more in these later years. Admitting that because of its involvement in other turnkey projects in Florida, Elizabethan is aware of the State policy on cost evaluation, Taylor contends that while his bid does not violate State policy, McGurn's bid does because it would be fiscally irresponsible for the State to pay so much up front. This conclusion is his opinion, however, and not supported by any independent evidence. Both expert witnesses, Respondents Scott and Perry, who testified for the Intervenor, TSU, agree that the present value of money should be considered in evaluating rental costs. Their major point of difference is in the percentage of discount rate to be applied. Dr. Perry urges that use of the 10% rate mandated by the U. S. Government in its procurements of this nature. Dr. Scott, on the other hand, considers this to be too high and urges a rate in the area of 3% be used. The significance of this is that at the lower of the range spread, McGurn's bid is lowest. At the higher end, TSU's bid is lowest. From 5.7% up to below 6%, Petitioner's bid is lowest. Whichever would be appropriate, the State has not adopted the present value of money methodology and the policy followed by the State is not to consider that methodology in analyzing costs. State policy is to use only the average rental methodology. There is, in addition, no prohibition against front- end loaded bids encompassed within this policy. By the same token, there is nothing in the bid package issued to all prospective bidders that in any way stipulates the method of computing lease costs or prohibits from loaded bids. DGS zone rates, criteria stipulating the maximum agencies can send on rent without approval by DGS, are not part of the bid package and do not constitute a factor in determining whether a bid is conforming or not. These zone rates may be waived by DGS at the time the proposed award is submitted for DGS approval. In practice, within the memory of Joseph Lambert, HRS' Administrator of Facilities Services, who administers the Department's leasing program, he cannot recall DGS ever denying a DHRS request for waiver of the maximum zone rate in any case where it was pertinent. In this case, since the lease payments at-least in the second through tenth years-of the McGurn bid exceed the zone limits, the award would have to be approved by the Governor and Cabinet in addition to DGS. It has not yet been placed on the Cabinet agenda because of the protests filed. As was stated before, there are no rules governing the evaluation of bids for leases of this nature. Oral instructions given to each agency, when applied here, reveal that the McGurn bid, as was seen above, has an average cost of $8.86 per square foot per year. TSU's bid costs $9.58 per square foot per year, and Elizabethan's bid costs $9.29 per square foot per year. These same calculations are followed on all turnkey and non- turnkey leases in the State. The reason the State uses this process instead of the present value of money methodology is that it is easy. DGS statistics indicate that at least 50% of the landlords in the approximately $32,000,000 worth of leases presently existing with the State are "Mom and Pop" landlords. These people are not normally trained lease evaluators. By using the straight average rental rate method, there are no arbitrary variables. It has always worked because people can understand it and all agencies which lease property in the State follow this procedure. In the opinion of Ms. Goodman, the costs involved in utilizing the present value of money methodology would far outweigh the paper savings to be gained, notwithstanding the testimony of Dr. Perry to the contrary. With regard to the option issue, it was the position of DGS in reviewing the proposals that the very low $3.00 lease cost per square foot in the last five years (the option period) did not make the McGurn bid unresponsive. There were no limits imposed upon the bidders except that a five year option to a ten year lease be included. Were it not there, the bid would be unresponsive. DGS would issue approval for a ten year lease with a five year option but not a fifteen year lease. Ms. Goodman cannot recall a situation in which an option was not exercised by it if the need for the space continued though there have been some instances where option costs have been renegotiated.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore; RECOMMENDED THAT DHRS License Number 590:8030 be awarded to Kenneth R. McGurn. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of September, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkwav Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood 8Oulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Morgan Staines, Esquire 2204 East Fourth Street Santa Ana, California 92705 Thomas D. Watry, Esquire 1200 Carnegie Building 133 Carnegie Way Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Steven W. Huss, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald W. Thomas, Executive Director Department of General Services 115 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary J. Anton, Esquire P.O. Box 1019 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Harden King, Agency Clerk Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 406 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (9) 106.28120.53120.54159.40216.311255.249255.25916.10924.20
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TOWNCENTRE VENTURE vs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 93-002015BID (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 08, 1993 Number: 93-002015BID Latest Update: Aug. 16, 1993

The Issue The issue in this case is whether, in making an award of a lease for office space, the Respondent acted according to the requirements of law.

Findings Of Fact In February, 1993, the Department of Labor and Employment Security ("Department") issued a Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal No. 540:0969 ("RFP") seeking to lease approximately 18,684 square feet of office space in Jacksonville, Florida, for a period of six years. The space was to house the Office of Disability Determinations ("ODD"), which processes disability claims and determines whether claimants are eligible for Social Security and Supplemental Income benefits. The office has minimal contact with the general public. The RFP provided that all bids were subject to conditions stated within the RFP. Bids not in compliance with RFP conditions were subject to rejection. RFP Article D, General Provisions, Paragraph 8 provides as follows: The Department reserves the right to reject any and all bid proposals for reasons which shall include but not be limited to the agency's budgetary constraints; waive any minor informality or technicality in bids' to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and in the best interest of the state, and if necessary, to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive proposals. A pre-bid conference was conducted by the Department on February 16, 1993. Representatives from the vendors involved in this proceeding attended the conference. Bids were opened on March 5, 1993. The Department received five responses, three of which were deemed to be responsive and which were evaluated. The remaining two responses were determined to be nonresponsive and were not evaluated. On or about March 10, 1993, based on the evaluations, the Department proposed to award the bid to Koger Properties, Inc. On or about March 17, 1993, the Department notified the vendors of the intended award. The Petitioners filed timely notices protesting the intended award. TOWNCENTRE PROPOSAL Paragraph 13 sets forth conditions to which a bidder must agree in order to be awarded a bid. Subsection "a" of the paragraph states, "[i]f successful, bidder agrees to enter into a lease agreement on the Department of General Services Standard Lease Agreement Form BCM 4054 (Attachment F - Do not complete)." The copy of the Department of General Services Standard Lease Agreement Form which was included in the RFP was a poorly reproduced copy. Article III of the Lease Agreement Form provides as follows: III HEATING, AIR CONDITIONING AND JANITOR SERVICES 1.a. The Lessor agrees to furnish to the Lessee heating and air conditioning equipment and maint(illegible) in satisfactory operating condition at all times for the leased premises during the term of the lease at the (illegible) of the Lessor. b. The Lessor agrees to maintain thermostats in the demised premises at 68 degrees Fahrenhe(illegible) the heating season and 78 degrees Fahrenheit during the cooling season; and certifies that boilers the(illegible) been calibrated to permit the most efficient operation. The Lessor agrees to furnish janitorial services and all necessary janitorial supplies for the leased (illegible) during the term of the lease at the expense of the Lessor. All services required above shall be provided during the Lessee's normal working hours, whic(illegible)marily from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday excluding state holidays. Also attached to the RFP was a copy of an addendum to the lease, also poorly reproduced. The addendum provides as follows: Article III, Paragraph III Addendum for Full Service Lease The lessor and lessee mutually agree that the described prem(illegible) leased in this lease agreement shall be available to the department (lessee) for its exclusive use twenty four (24) (illegible) per day, seven (7) days per week during the lease term. T(illegible) space to be leased by the department will be fully occupied during normal working hours from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Mo(illegible) through Friday, excluding holidays, Saturdays and Sundays, (illegible) may be fully or partially occupied during all other periods (illegible) time as necessary and required at the full discretion of th(illegible) department. Accordingly, services to be provided by the le(illegible) under the terms of the lease agreement, including electrici(illegible) other utilities, will be provided during all hours of occup(illegible) at no additional cost to the department (lessee). Although the copy of the lease agreement and addendum included in the RFP were poorly reproduced, it is clear that the addendum modifies the paragraph of the lease agreement related to provision of heating, air conditioning and janitorial services to require that HVAC services be provided throughout the premises during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. The proposal submitted by Towncentre included an "Attachment Z" which states as follows: The following represent exceptions and/or clarifications to the terms of the Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal Form ("RFP") for the referenced Lease. Except as noted herein, Bidder shall comply fully with the terms of the RFP..." Item #7 of Attachment Z states as follows: The Building in which the space is offered is serviced by central heating, ventilating and air conditioning; therefore, no separate thermostats will be provided in the space other than in the computer room. However, the required temperature standards will be maintained and satisfied. The computer room HVAC shall be available 24 hours a day. Otherwise, after-hours HVAC is billed at $80 per hour. Attachment Z also included additional exceptions to the provisions of the RFP. Contrary to the requirements set forth in the addendum attached to the lease form included in the RFP, the Towncentre proposal included additional charges for after hours uses. The Department determined that the Towncentre proposal was nonresponsive and disqualified the proposal from further consideration. Because the Towncentre proposal includes HVAC charges which are specifically prohibited under the terms of the RFP, the Towncentre proposal is nonresponsive to the RFP. Towncentre asserts that other sections of the RFP indicate that, within the leased premises, only the computer room is required to be heated or cooled on a continuous basis. Vendors had an adequate opportunity to direct questions regarding the RFP to Department officials. There is no evidence that Towncentre sought clarification from the Department related to this matter prior to submitting the bid proposal. In the notification to Towncentre that the bid had been determined to be nonresponsive to the RFP, the Department identified the other exceptions as additional reasons for the determination of nonresponsiveness. At hearing Towncentre introduced no evidence related to the remaining items included within Attachment Z. BRYAN SIMPSON JR. FOR P.V. ASSOCIATES The Simpson bid was deemed to be responsive and was evaluated. The evaluations were performed by three Department employees, Dorea Sowinski, Albert Cherry, and Tom Mahar. On March 9, 1993, the evaluators visited the physical locations of the three responsive bids. (Although the bid had been declared nonresponsive, they also visited the Towncentre site, apparently as a courtesy.) The Simpson space is located in downtown Jacksonville. After completion of the site visits, the evaluators separately and independently completed their evaluation sheets. The evaluators awarded a total of 262 points to Koger Properties and 248 points to Simpson. Page 7 of the RFP sets forth the evaluation criteria which were considered in awarding evaluation points. The RFP stated as follows: The successful bid will be the one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated below: Rental, using Present Value methodology for basic term of lease (See D, General Provisions Items 3 and 4) applying the present value discount rate of 5.6 per cent. (Weighing: 35) Conformance of and susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization and to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid. (Weighing: 20) The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the Departmental operations planned for the requested space. (Weighing: 20) Offers providing contiguous space within preferred boundaries. (Weighing 5) Frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation within one block of the offered space. (Weighing 15) Availability of adequate dining facilities within one mile of the offered space. (Weighing: 2) Proximity of offered space to the clients served by the Department at this facility. (Weighing: 3) Proximity of offered space to other Department activities as well as other public services. (Weighing: 0) TOTAL POINTS: 100 Simpson asserts that the evaluators acted improperly in awarding points in categories 3, 5, 6 and 7. Category 3 relates to the effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the Departmental operations planned for the requested space. Although Simpson asserts that category 3 is vague and ambiguous, there was no objection to the category prior to the submission of the bid responses and the announcement of the proposed lease award. Each evaluator could award up to 20 points in this category for a total of 60 available points. Koger was awarded 55 points. Simpson received 27 points. As to individual evaluators awards, Tom Mahar awarded Simpson five points, Albert Cherry awarded Simpson ten points, and Dorea Sowinski awarded Simpson 12 points. Based on the written memo dated March 10, 1993, identifying the reasons for the recommended bid award, two of the three evaluators considered the Koger space to be located in a safer area than the Simpson facility, and, at least in part, based their point awards on this factor. The two evaluators cite minimal anecdotal information in support of their opinions. The evaluators undertook no investigation related to safety issues and there are no facts to support their opinions. Their award of points for "environmental factors" is arbitrary. Category 5 relates to the frequency and availability of public transportation within one block of the offered space. Each evaluator could award up to 15 points in this category for a total of 45 available points. Both Koger and Simpson received the maximum 45 points. RFP Page Two, question 8 provides as follows: Public Transportation availability: BIDDER RESPONSE: (Check appropriate box) Taxi , Bus , Frequency of service closest bus stop . Both Koger and Simpson indicate service by taxi and bus. The Koger proposal indicates a frequency of service as "8 BUSES" and the closest bus stop as "IN FRONT OF BUILDING ON WOODCOCK DRIVE." Simpson indicates a frequency of service as "15 minutes" and the closest bus stop as "front of building." The Department asserts that the Koger level of transportation access, albeit less than that serving the Simpson site, is satisfactory and therefore entitled to an award of all points available. Simpson asserts that the greater availability of public transportation to the Simpson site should result, under the terms of the evaluation criteria, in Simpson receiving more points than the Koger site for this category. The evaluation criteria clearly requires consideration of both the frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation. Simpson asserts that in considering the transportation category, the evaluators should have reviewed local public transportation schedules. Review of such schedules establishes that the Simpson site is served more frequently by public bus transportation than is the Koger site, and further establishes that the number of bus routes directly serving the Simpson property far exceeds the routes serving the Koger site. Simpson did not include the schedules in the RFP response. The Simpson site is also located nearby the downtown public transportation transfer station at which point many, perhaps all, local bus routes connect. Simpson did not denote the location of the transfer station in the RFP response While the evaluation committee is not required to consider the bus schedules in reviewing bid proposals, the evaluation committee failed to consider the substantially greater frequency and availability of public transportation to the Simpson site relative to the Koger site, as set forth in the respective RFPs. The Department's position is contrary to the specific criteria identified in the RFP. The award of equivalent points for transportation access to both Simpson and Koger is unsupported by fact or logic and is arbitrary. Category 6 relates to the availability of adequate dining facilities within one mile of the offered space. Each evaluator could award up to two points in this category for a total of six available. Koger was awarded six points. Simpson received one point. When the evaluators rated the adequacy of dining facilities, they considered only those dining facilities which were located within two blocks of the offered space. Such is contrary to the clear terms of the RFP. The Department offered no rationale for the decision to amend the RFP criteria after submission of the proposals. The Simpson RFP response states only that there are adequate dining facilities within walking distance of the offered facility. The Koger response states that there are "three (3) sandwich shops within walking distance in the Koger center and other numerous restaurants within one (1) mile." As to individual evaluators awards, Tom Mahar awarded Simpson one point, while both Albert Cherry and Dorea Sowinski awarded Simpson zero points. Mahar's award was based on his opinion, again based on alleged safety concerns, that employees would be hesitant to walk to nearby restaurants and that driving and parking presented a problem in the downtown location. Cherry voiced a similar opinion. As to alleged safety concerns, Mahar and Cherry again based their opinions on minimal anecdotal information, supported by neither fact nor logic. Neither evaluator undertook any factual analysis of the safety issues relative to the proposed site. Their award of points for this category is arbitrary. On the other hand, Sowinski did not see any restaurants close to the Simpson site during the site visit. In excess of 40 restaurants are located within one mile of the Simpson site. The restaurants provide a variety of dining options both as to expense and fare. Sowinski's failure to observe restaurants located across the street from the Simpson site is, although difficult to understand, apparently a simple mistake on her part. Category 7 relates to the proximity of offered space to the clients served by the Department at this facility. Each evaluator could award up to three points in this category for a total of nine available. Simpson offered no evidence that the determination of points awarded for category 7 was inappropriate.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a Final Order DISMISSING the protest filed by Towncentre Venture, and WITHDRAWING the proposed award of lease contract based on the Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal No. 540:0969. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 28th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO CASES NO. 93-2015BID and 93-2106BID The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner Towncentre Venture Towncentre Venture's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 4. Rejected, second sentence is irrelevant. 5-7. Rejected, irrelevant. Taken as a whole, the RFP indicates that HVAC services are to be provided throughout the leased premises during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. The evidence fails to establish that the vendors were confused about the terms of the RFP. There were apparently no related questions addressed to Department personnel during the pre-bid conference or at any time subsequent to the conference and prior to the bid opening. 10. Rejected. Not supported by the document cited which does not identify the attachment by letter. 13. Rejected, irrelevant. The standard form lease included in the RFP was a sample document. None of the blank spaces were completed. 16. Rejected, irrelevant. The attendees at the conference were provided an opportunity to inquire as to all matters. There were apparently no questions asked related to the RFP's requirement that HVAC services be provided throughout the facility during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. 17-18, 20-21. Rejected, irrelevant. The terms of the RFP are clear. 19. Rejected, irrelevant. The terms of the addendum for full service lease clearly indicate that such HVAC services were to be provided at no additional charge, not just in the computer room, but throughout the entire leased facility. 22. Rejected. The Towncentre bid was nonresponsive to the terms of the RFP. Petitioner Bryan Simpson, Jr., for P. V. Associates P. V. Associates' proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of the evidence which establishes that the RFP was issued seeking space for the Jacksonville Office of Disability Determinations. 4, 23, 24. Rejected, unnecessary. Respondent Department of Labor and Employment Security The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 17. Rejected. The decision to award equivalent points for public transportation access fails to reflect the substantially greater access provided to the Simpson site and is arbitrary. 20-21. Rejected, not supported by greater weight of evidence which establishes no evidence that safety concerns were based on a reasonable evaluation of facts. There are no facts to support the conclusion that the Simpson location if less safe than the Koger site. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Gooding, Acting Secretary Suite 303, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Thomas M. Jenks, Esquire Pappas and Metcalf, P.A. 1 Independent Drive, Suite 3301 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Nathan D. Goldman, Esquire Marcia Maria Morales, Esquire 200 Laura Street Post Office Box 240 Jacksonville, Florida 33202 Edward Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57120.68
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. RANDALL J. CONLEY, 76-002003 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-002003 Latest Update: Aug. 24, 1992

Findings Of Fact In June, 1975 Randall J. Conley, attempting to set his son and daughter-in-law up in business, arranged for them, with his help, to purchase Roger Sparks' business known as Sparky's Pizza. By Exhibit 6 dated June 17, 1975 the owner and lessor of the premises executed, with Randall M. Conley and his wife Sandra, a Consent to Assignment whereby the lease between the lessor and Mr. Spaghetti and Roger Sparks was assigned to the younger Conley and his wife and the previous lessees were released from further liability under the five year lease they had executed on April 30, 1974. (Exhibit 10) By Collateral Assignment Note dated 6-2-75 Randall J. Conley, Randall M. Conley and Sandra Conley obligated themselves to pay the Florida Center Bank $9750 over a five-year period and pledged the equipment and fixtures in the pizza business as security therefor. In October, 1975 Sandra, who had been operating the business, left for another job preparatory to separating from her husband. The business closed on November 1, 1975 and Defendant learned that the lessees were delinquent in the rent and payments on the chattel mortgage. Thereafter he attempted to sell the business. In November, 1975 Charles Hicks, the owner of a small fast-food chain, while looking for a site for a franchisee, saw the empty Sparky's Pizza and ascertained that information on occupying the property could be obtained from Defendant. He called Defendant's office and was told the rent was $260 per month. Arrangements were made for Defendant to show him the property the same afternoon. On November 25, 1975 Defendant showed Hicks and his putative franchisee, Ronald Beasley, the property. After being assured that the rental included the equipment and fixtures they agreed to accept an assignment of the lease if the lessor agreed and to bind the transaction Hicks gave Defendant a check for $200 made payable, at the request of Defendant, to Randall J. Conley. No written agreement was executed by the parties at this time. The check stated on its face that it was a deposit on lease of building here involved. The following day Defendant called Hicks and told him that the lessor had agreed with the assignment and that he should bring a check for $7,000 to pay for the equipment, plus a check for the rent. Hicks objected to the purchase of the equipment and demanded return of his $200 deposit. Defendant refused to return the money and Hicks immediately tried to stop payment on the check. When he did so he learned that his check had been cashed by Defendant as soon as the bank opened that morning, November 26. After Hicks was unsuccessful in getting his deposit returned he reported the incident to the FREC and the complaint here under consideration was filed. Defendant contends that he was operating as the owner of the lease and not in his capacity as a broker; that the consent to assignment of the lease did not result in an assignment; that by executing the collateral installment note he was part owner of the business; that when his daughter-in-law left and the business folded he acquired the leasehold by abandonment; and that he was entitled to retain Hicks' deposit of $200 as liquidated damages. One witness called by Defendant testified that the bank's policy on chattel mortgage loans was that they would only make such loans to the owners of the business. However, he acknowledged that he did not handle the loan here involved and never saw any documents showing Randall J. Conley having an interest in the leased premises, the equipment and fixtures for which was the subject of the loan represented by Exhibit 9. Defendant had advertised the sale of the lease in the newspaper and therein indicated the assignee of the lease would be required to assume payments on the equipment. Neither Hicks nor Beasley ever saw any such advertisement.

Florida Laws (2) 475.25725.01
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