Findings Of Fact Douglas L. Adams is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution. On August 26, 1985, he was awakened early in the morning and brought before a disciplinary hearing for an alleged violation of institutional rules and regulations. Prior to the hearing, he was advised by a correctional officer to pack up all his personal property and to bring it with him to the hearing. Mr. Adams took with him as much as he could which included his clothing and other personal effects, but he was unable to carry all he owned with him at one time. He did not ask for either help in carrying his property or a cart to carry it in prior to leaving his cell area to go to the hearing. When he arrived at the movement center where the hearing was to be held, he advised the authorities there that he did not have all his property with him. At that point, he asked for help or the use of a cart to go get the rest of his property but he was refused because no cart was there. As a result, he went to the hearing leaving some of his property in his cell area and while in the hearing, contends he was required to leave his property in the control center. This property was secured in a storage room behind the control center which, while not locked, was not available for access to other inmates unless they were accompanied by a corrections officer. When the hearing was over and Mr. Adams, who had been directed to administrative confinement requested to go back to his former cell area to get the rest of his property, his request was refused. His property was inventoried by UCI personnel at that time, but because in his opinion the inventory was not complete, Mr. Adams refused to sign the form. When he was released from administrative confinement he claims he did not get all his property back. He relates that he was told he had forfeited whatever property he had not brought to the hearing. As a result, he filed a complaint on September 16, 1985, which was subsequently denied. Petitioner has been incarcerated in 7 or 8 institutions within the Department of Corrections including Florida State Prison, River Junction Correctional Institution, Baker Correctional Institution, Polk Correctional Institution, Old Unit, the Reception and Medical Center, and DeSoto Correctional Institution. At each one of these institutions a rule similar to this one was in existence. At Baker Correctional Institution, the inmate was required to bring his mattress as well. Robert Craig has been in prison for a total of 27 years and has been incarcerated in almost every major penal institution in the State of Florida that was built prior to the last five years. At Avon Park Correctional Institution he underwent a disciplinary hearing and was told at the time to bring all his personal property with him to the hearing. While in the hearing, he was required to leave all his property outside in the hall. At Cross City Correctional Institution the guards took him to the hearing without his property, bringing his property along afterwards. In essence, at all the institutions where he was incarcerated, there was some variation of the same procedure regarding his personal property. He either had to bring it to the hearing or it was packed up prior to the hearing. At no institution was his property inventoried prior to the hearing. As a result, he has lost personal property including a calculator for which he was subsequently reimbursed by the institution. According to Mr. Craig, if the inmate does not bring his personal property with him he either is given a deficiency report or is precluded from going back to get it when the hearing is over. Sgt. Denmark has worked for approximately 8 1/2 years with the Department of Corrections, all at UCI, where he formerly worked at the movement center. One of the functions he performed there was to handle prisoners coming for a disciplinary hearing. The rule as explained to him regarding the inmates' personal property is that the inmate is required to bring all of it with him to the hearing. Once the property is brought with the inmate to the hearing, the inmate is free to either take it into the hearing with him or to leave it in the storage room in back of the movement center during the hearing. If the inmate is sentenced to disciplinary confinement as a result of the hearing, in that case, and at that point, the inmate's property is inventoried. If the inmate is not sentenced to disciplinary confinement, the property is returned to the prisoner who is returned to his area. In the instant case, Mr. Denmark heard the Petitioner tell Sgt. Howe, when he arrived at the movement center, that he had left some of his property in his cell. However, when Adams went into his hearing, he neither took his property with him nor requested that it be secured. According to Mr. Cunningham, the Chief Classification Supervisor, the Union Correctional Institution Policy, (85-52.9 B1) requires inmates to bring all their property to disciplinary hearings. It is an old policy, and the reason for it is to protect the property from theft. In a disciplinary hearing, there is a chance that an inmate might not get back to his old cell to retrieve his property after the hearing. For security reasons, institution officials prefer not to take a prisoner back to his old cell after a hearing because, at that point, he is often angry as a result of the hearing and disruptive. All Department of Corrections' institutions in the region incorporating UCI, except Florida State Prison, have a similar policy. Inquiry of corrections personnel at the agency headquarters in Tallahassee reveals that most major DOC facilities have a similar policy. There are a total of 33 other facilities which hold less than 100 inmates each. These smaller institutions do not, generally, have a similar policy and Florida State Prison has a different situation because of the different security problems. It is the needs of the institution, however, which determine the use of the policy. Mr. Cunnningham is aware of Mr. Adams' hearing and the complaint filed as a result thereof. Upon inquiry it was determined that Mr. Adams had failed to establish a loss and the complaint was denied. Mr. Cunningham does not know whether there was an investigation into the loss of the property left in the cell. It is Mr. Cunningham's understanding that if the witness cannot carry all his property at one time, normally, if the inmate asks for permission to do so, he will be allowed to go back and get the balance before the hearing. This is not in the procedure approved by DOC, however, nor in the IOP at UCI. Corrections Officer Howe is also aware of the fact that Mr. Adams had a hearing on August 26, 1985. He, in fact, was called to the movement center to escort several prisoners, including Adams, to the confinement barracks after the hearings. A part of this duty involves inventorying the prisoners property. Howe told Adams to get his property and bring it in for inventory. At this point, after the hearing Adams said he did not have all his property with him and asked to be taken back to his old cell to get the rest. Howe declined to do this and explained the security reasons for his decision to Adams. He did advise Adams, however, that he would call down to Adams' old cell area and have his property packed which, in fact, he did. It is standard practice at UCI, according to Howe, that if an inmate has a large amount of property, he can request the use of a cart or wheelbarrow which is assigned to each housing area for carrying this excess property. This cart will be returned by a runner who can also help carry the excess. To his knowledge, inmates are not denied the use of these carts. Howe declined to return Adams to his old cell area after the hearing because, at the time, Adams was belligerent and unstable and presented a security risk in his opinion and also, because Adams had previously been advised to bring all his property with him and had failed to do this even though there was a way for him to accomplish it.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner testified in his own behalf, admitting that he had failed to answer Question 13, "Have you ever been arrested?" honestly. He stated that he had been embarrassed to put down the fact that he had been arrested. He stated that he had applied for the position as an unarmed security guard with Oxford Security Services thinking that it would be a temporary position. However, since his employment he has been promoted to safety coordinator, salesman and supervisor/operations manager of the company's operations in the Jacksonville area. The applicant was first employed in June of 1979. He stated that he needed to be licensed in order to maintain his present position. The applicant explained his arrest in 1963 and in 1977. His arrest in 1963 was for larceny and arose from taking money belong to the company by which he was employed and purchasing a car with it. The court withheld adjudication and placed the applicant on probation for five years. During that time he married and left the State of Florida in violation of the terms of his probation. In 1977, the applicant was employed in Jacksonville, Florida, as a used car salesman. After a 24-hour sale-athon, the applicant began bar-hopping and ended up in a topless go-go club. His next conscious recollection was waking up in the Duval County jail, where he was advised that he was charged with lewd and lascivious conduct. He had no knowledge of the conduct which gave rise to his arrest. The Duval County court advised the applicant to enter a plea of nolo contendere and be transferred to Miami court for disposition of the applicant's offense of parole violation. The Duval County court sentenced the applicant to two days for lewd and lascivious conduct, during which time he was transferred to the Dade County courts. The charges of violating parole in Dade County were dismissed. The applicant further explained his arrest for passing a worthless bank check. The applicant stated that he had overdrawn his account unknowingly in 1971. He was arrested and paid off the overdraft, and the charge was dismissed. The applicant stated that his employer was not aware of his arrest record.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the applicant's application for a Class F, unarmed guard license be denied; however, that the applicant be afforded the opportunity to refile his application with full disclosure, and that in the absence of any other disqualifying grounds said reapplication be approved. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Wayne M. Chadwick 865 Lane Avenue, #703 Jacksonville, Florida 32205 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Teresa D. Mejico, was certified as a correctional officer by petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, on February 17, 1988, and issued certificate number 03-87-502-02. At approximately 2:45 a.m., on October 3, 1988, respondent, while employed as a correctional officer at the Broward Correctional Institute, was observed by her supervisor leaning on her desk in the officer's station at Dormitory H-4. Sitting in a chair at respondent's side was Inmate Deronda Lemmonds, who was observed holding respondent's right arm, and kissing, licking and nuzzling it, while her right hand was between respondent's legs in the area of her crotch. Respondent was immediately relieved of duty, and later that day was discharged from her employment at Broward Correctional Institute for her failure to comply with Florida Department of Corrections Rule 33-4.002(28), Florida Administrative Code. That rule provides: Employees shall maintain a professional relationship with all persons in the custody or under supervision of the Department, and their immediate family or visitors. No personal or business relationships are permitted. Marriage between employees and inmates is prohibited. That respondent was fully aware of the foregoing rule, and the standard of conduct it established, cannot be gainsaid for she acknowledged such at hearing. Notwithstanding such knowledge, however, respondent persisted in fostering the personal relationship which existed between her and Inmate Lemmonds despite denials to her superintendent that any such relationship existed and counseling from her superintendent to avoid any such relationships. Following the termination of her employment at Broward Correctional Institute, respondent maintained contact with Inmate Lemmonds through the mail and by telephone, and variously expressed her affection and love for the inmate. On one occasion, she mailed the inmate 20-25 photographs of herself, including some photographs that captured respondent in partially nude and suggestive poses. In all, the proof demonstrated that respondent was romantically involved with Inmate Lemmonds while she was employed at Broward Correctional Institute, and continued to be so involved as of the date of hearing. It further demonstrated that she was untruthful with her superintendent, failed to abide the rules of conduct for correctional officers, and neglected her duty to guard Dormitory H-4 while engaged in a liaison with an inmate under her charge.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking respondent' s certification. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of May 1990. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-6410 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Adopted in paragraph 1. 2-4. Adopted in paragraph 4. 5-9. Not material or not necessary to result reached. 10-14. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. COPIES FURNISHED: Elsa Lopez Whitehurst Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Teresa D. Mejico 7502 S.W. 5th Street North Lauderdale, Florida 33068 Jeffrey Long, Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner herein, Michael J. Hunter, was employed by the Apalachee Correctional Institution (ACI) in Sneads, Florida in November, 1979. Immediately after his employment he was given five weeks training at Raiford, Florida and served as a correctional officer at ACI from that point until July 7, 1983. The four performance reports rendered on him during the period of employment were all satisfactory or above and other than the instant case, he was subject to no disciplinary action during the entire period he worked for the Respondent. His function as a corrections officer was to maintain order in the dormitories, security for the area, and to protect inmates' safety. He worked the evening shift from 4 pm to midnight for three years and on the midnight shift from midnight to 8 am for 6 months. During the period of his employment he was instructed, and it was his understanding, that a corrections officer may touch a prisoner in the line of duty only to maintain order, to break up a fight, and to protect the safety of himself, the prisoner, or others but not to abuse a prisoner or to administer punishment. On June 3, 1983, he was instructed by his supervisor, Sgt. Hines, to proceed to the basement of the dormitory in which he was working to open up the TV room and the clothing line. When he arrived there, he found that the people assigned to operate the clothing line had not shown up yet so he went to the TV area to check on it. When he came back to the clothing room, he saw that two inmates, Wilkins and Ashbury, had broken into the room and stolen some underwear. He apprehended them and told all the prisoners in the area to go upstairs. All did except prisoner Watkins, the victim of the alleged assault in issue here who refused to go. It has been Petitioner's experience that some inmates refuse to obey the directions of anyone holding a rank less than sergeant. In any case, Petitioner was able to convince Watkins to go to the guard room upstairs and while there, Watkins and Petitioner got into a verbal dispute. Just as they were arguing, Petitioner's supervisor, Sgt. Hyatt, came into the office. At this point, Watkins jumped up and yelled at him and accused Petitioner of hitting him. Petitioner categorically denied striking Watkins. He admits telling Watkins he could have his "ass" for this but he does not believe that in the context of which that statement was used and the circumstances under which the situation took place, use of that word was necessarily inappropriate. It is Mr. Hunter's belief that a corrections officer such as he was would be ineffective and ignored if from time to time he did not use this type of language. He based this on his knowledge of the background and character of the inmates as well as their education level for the most part. According to Hunter, when Hyatt came in, Watkins jumped up and moved off to the side and yelled at Sgt. Hyatt to get Hunter "out of his face." Though Mr. Hunter denies intentionally touching Watkins, he admits it is possible that his finger may have touched Watkins' nose because at the time, they were very close. Young John Allen, another corrections officer at ACI, was on duty in the general area of this incident on the night in question. He overheard a disturbance downstairs and thereafter walked into the dormitory office. When he did, he saw 15 inmates come up from downstairs, excited, to see the duty sergeant. In response, Allen called Sgt. Hyatt who came into the room and started talking to the inmates. Just then, according to Allen, Hunter came in. At this point Hunter and Watkins started arguing. Hunter walked up to Watkins and talked to him in strong terms. Allen overheard Hunter say, "Boy, I want you bad." and put his finger in Watkins' face. During this time, the other inmates surrounding the individuals were becoming more and more excited. At this point, according to Allen, Hyatt called Hunter but Hunter did not respond. Notwithstanding Hunter's denial that he hit Watkins, Allen indicates that he saw Hunter hit Watkins with a short, quick punch to the left side of abdomen. Admittedly, this punch was not hard enough to knock Watkins down. While this was all going on, Allen heard Hyatt call to the Petitioner several times to no avail. Finally, Hyatt told Watkins to go outside and sit down. He also got Hunter to come back to the rear of the office. Once this was done, Petitioner again went out to where Watkins was sitting and again called him "Boy" and put his finger in Watkins' face. At this point, another officer came up and prevailed upon the Petitioner to leave. Allen contends that he was in the room with Hunter and Watkins at the time of the incident. Hunter contends that Allen was standing outside the room in the dormitory looking in through a wide glass window. He says that though he was at all times looking directly at Watkins, his peripheral vision is such that he was able to see Allen off to the side where he was standing. Allen contends he was approximately 6 to 8 feet away, slightly off to the side, and there were no obstructions to his view of the incident even though there were a lot of people in the room. Allen also contends that throughout this entire fracas, Watkins never jumped at Petitioner as is claimed but was trying to break away at all times. Watkins was sent for medical evaluation immediately after the incident as a part of standard procedure and it was determined that he received no injuries as a result of it. Watkins, sometime after the incident, but within a short time, came to Allen indicating his displeasure with the way Allen had handled the situation. In this conversation, Watkins indicated to Allen he did not want to see Petitioner fired on the basis of this incident. The structure of the guard force at ACI is quite similar to that of a military organization. The guards do wear uniform but do not carry weapons inside the prisoner area because of the volatile situation that can rapidly develop into a confrontational situation. While the use of bad language is not unusual, corrections officers generally have to, if at all possible, maintain their equilibrium because when an officer is upset and becomes involved in a scene, inmates also get upset. Because no weapons are carried, therefore, the officers have to be careful not to create, encourage, or maintain an explosive situation wherein they or someone else could get hurt. Within the guard structure the lowest or first level is that held by both Petitioner and Mr. Allen, corrections officer 1. Hyatt is a corrections officer 2, equivalent to the rank of sergeant, and in a lead worker position. Both CO 1 and CO 2 positions are in the same collective bargaining unit. A CO 2 has no disciplinary action authority and is not considered to be management. As such, a CO 2 can neither hire nor fire but may recommend either discipline or termination of employment. The supervisory level starts with CO 3, a grade equivalent to that of a lieutenant. This individual can approve leave, assign personnel, and effectively recommend disciplinary action which, ordinarily, is taken by the superintendent of the facility. Al Cook has been the superintendent of ACI for 9 years and as such has the authority to discipline and terminate employees in accordance with Department of Corrections rules and the appropriate statutes. After an investigation into the incident in issue here, he ultimately discharged Petitioner for striking an inmate. During his 15 years as a superintendent at one institution or another he has discharged one other corrections officer for physical abuse. Petitioner here was, he believes, however, the first. The other, a white officer, was discharged for kicking an inmate. Race was not in issue in the dispute here. Hunter and Watkins are both black. After the incident in question, Hyatt allowed Hunter to go see the lieutenant who gave him the opportunity to either go back to work or go home for the evening. Because he did not wish to work with Hyatt any more that evening, Petitioner chose to go home and report the following morning. When he did he was again told to go home, this time for several days, and return the following Tuesday. At this time he was interviewed by Colonel Jones who advised him to come back and see the superintendent on Wednesday, which he did. After waiting all day on Wednesday to see the superintendent, he was told to come back on Thursday. When he did, after waiting another hour, he was interviewed by Mr. Cook who heard his story. When he was finished, Cook indicated that he believed the other officers' stories over Hunter's and gave him the option to either resign or be fired. When Hunter refused to resign, he was discharged on July 7, 1983. Later that day he was shown the statements signed by 5 inmates and the other officers including Hyatt who said they saw him hit Watkins. These statements were not introduced into evidence at the hearing. However, Petitioner admits in his testimony that he saw them and that they exist. He also admits having come close to Watkins in an altercation which involved the use of bad language and which resulted from high feeling. Though he admits that his finger may have touched Watkins' nose, he denies punching him. However, the testimony of Mr. Allen, if believed, tends to indicate that he did. The inconsistency between the testimony of Petitioner and that of Allen as to where Allen was standing can be resolved easily in favor of Mr. Allen because, in light of the circumstances involving high feeling and the fact that Petitioner admits he saw Allen only out of the corner of his eye, it is most probably that Allen was in the room and not outside as Petitioner contends. In any case, in this specific as in the specific as to whether or not Watkins was hit by Petitioner, the resolution of the dispute if not clear from the evidence must be made on an analysis of the evidence on the basis of, inter alia, who has the most to gain or lose by telling the truth or a falsehood. In this case, it is clear that Petitioner has the most to lose by telling the truth because under the statute in question, if he did in fact unlawfully strike Watkins, he is subject to termination. Another factor to consider is the demeanor of the witnesses while on the stand. Here both Allen and Petitioner appeared to know what it was they were saying and did not appear to be rehearsed. Their testimony appeared spontaneous and was believable. In light of the above, it can be concluded, therefore, considering the nature of the altercation and the high feeling involved, that Petitioner did in fact strike Watkins.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, therefore, it is RECOMMENDED THAT the Petition of Michael Hunter, to be reinstated to his position of employment and to be awarded back and front pay, benefits, and costs and attorney's fees be denied. Recommended in Tallahassee, Florida, this 19th day of February, 1985. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Preston T. Everett, Esquire Asst. General Counsel Dept. of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Dana Baird, Esquire 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Bldg. F Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire O. Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY REMAND ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA COMMISSION OF HUMAN RELATIONS MICHAEL HUNTER, EEOC Case No. 046842030 Petitioner, FCHR Case No. 84-0316 DOAH Case No. 84-2891 vs. FCHR Order No. 86-015 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. / ORDER REMANDING PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM AN UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE Panel of Commissioners The following three Commissioners participated in the disposition of this matter: Commissioner John J. Sulik, Panel Chairperson, Commissioner Robert L. Billingslea; and Commissioner Robert R. Joyce. APPEARANCES For Petitioner Michael Hunter: Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32325 For Respondent State of Florida, Department of Corrections: Ernest L. Reddick, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Preliminary Matters Michael Hunter, Petitioner herein, filed a complaint of discrimination with this Commission pursuant to the Human Rights Act of 197, as amended, Sections 760.01-760.10, Florida Statutes (1985), alleging that State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Respondent herein, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of race (black). In accordance with the Commission's rules, the allegations of discrimination set forth in the complaint of discrimination were investigated and a report of said investigation was submitted to the Executive Director. On June 29, 1984, the Executive Director issued his Determination finding no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice occurred. On July 31, 1984, the petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. The petition was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for the conduct of a formal proceeding pursuant to Rule 22T-8.16(1). The formal proceeding was held on January 3, 1985, in Chattahoochee, Florida, before Arnold H. Pollock, DOAH Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer entered a Recommended Order in this matter on February 19, 1985. Petitioner filed exceptions to the Recommended Order. Respondent filed a response. Pursuant to notice, oral argument was originally held on April 19, 1985, at which time the parties were advised that the Commission was unable to locate the record in this proceeding. The parties ultimately produced a copy of the record 2 and the deliberation was rescheduled to February 28, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida before the aforementioned Panel of Commissioners. After oral argument was presented by counsel for the respective parties, the Panel conducted its deliberation in this matter and determined the action to be taken upon the petition. Petitioner's Exceptions and Respondent's Response Petitioner excepts to the Hearing Officer's failure to find that confrontations with inmates involving Correctional Officers Foran and Mayo were not comparable to Petitioner's confrontation. Petitioner further excepts to the Hearing Officer's failure to consider Petitioner's statistical evidence showing that 17 percent of Respondent's workforce is black, whereas 75 percent of the individuals terminated in 1982 through 1984 at Petitioner's worksite, Apalachee Correctional Institution, were black. Respondent counters by asserting that the confrontations involving Correctional Officer's Foran and Mayo were not comparable to the confrontation involving Petitioner inasmuch as Respondent's internal investigations supported the respective disciplinary actions taken. Respondent further asserts that Petitioner's statistical computations, based upon only four terminations, were meaningless. Analysis and Discussion The record reveals that the Hearing Officer limited the scope of the proceeding to incidents which had occurred at Respondent's Apalachee Correctional Institution where Petitioner was employed at the time of termination. In his findings of fact, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner was one of two correctional officers to be terminated by the superintendent of the institution for abuse to inmates. Petitioner was the first correctional officer discharged by the superintendent for such offense. The other correctional officer was white. We believe that the Hearing Officer improperly limited the evidence to incidents of like nature at Apalachee Correctional Institution. Petitioner claimed that white correctional officers had engaged in behavior similar to that with which Petitioner was terminated, but the white correctional officers were not similarly punished. If white correctional officers had been engaged in similar improper conduct known to Respondent and those correctional officers were not similarly punished, an inference is raised that Petitioner was disciplined for reasons other than improper conduct. Petitioner should have been allowed to present such evidence before the Hearing Officer because it would have tended to indicate that Respondent's reasons were pretextual. Support for this conclusion is derived from McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 972, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the black plaintiff had been accused of illegal activity against the employer. The employer cited such unlawful conduct as a legitimate, nondis- criminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The supreme Court accepted this reason, but then held that the plaintiff had to be given the opportunity to rebut the legitimate reason. Plaintiff must be afforded a fair opportunity to show that petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretext. Especially relevant to such a showing would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against petitioner of comparable seriousness to the "stall-in" were nevertheless retained or rehired. Petitioner may justifiably refuse to rehire one who is engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to members of all races. Id. at 804. In this cause, Petitioner should similarly be afforded a fair opportunity to show that Respondent's stated reason for Petitioner's termination, corporal punishment of an inmate, was a pretext. The statutory provision governing corporal punishment of inmates which had been in effect from 1957 through the date of Petitioner's termination reads: Corporal punishment prohibited; penalty. It is unlawful for any corporal punishment, any cruel or inhuman punishment, or any punishment by which the flesh of the body is broken, bruised, or lacerated to be inflicted upon any prisoner at any time. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be discharged immediately and shall not again be employed in any capacity in connection with the correctional system and shall be punished as provided by law for whatever offense he may have committed in perpetrating the act. No prisoner shall be punished because of any report or represen- tation which he may have made to any inspector. Section 944.35, Fla. Stat. (1983). Inasmuch as this statutory provision had statewide application, the discipline given for corporal punishment of inmates should have been evenhandedly applied at Respondent's various correctional institutions. Moreover, evidence of Respondent's application of this statutory provision throughout its various institutions becomes especially relevant where the terminations at Apalachee Correctional Institution reflect a proportionately greater number of blacks being terminated at the institution than whites, but where Petitioner was the first person terminated at such institution for that particular offense. Therefore, petitioner should be afforded the opportunity to present evidence that white employees violated the above-cited statutory provision but were nevertheless retained. Remand Accordingly, the panel remands this cause to the Hearing Officer for further evidentiary proceedings consistent with this Order. It is so ORDERED. DATED this 24th day of September, 1986. FOR THE FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS: BY: Commissioner Robert L. Billingslea; and Commissioner Robert R. Joyce. Commissioner John J. Sulik, Panel Chairperson, dissenting. I would limit the scope of the evidentiary inquiry to Apalachee Correctional Institution and/or its superintendent and adopt the Hearing Officer's recommendation of dismissal. FILED this 30th day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. Betsy Howard, Clerk of the Commission
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, William F. Reid, is currently and has been at all times pertinent to the issues herein, an inmate at UCI, having been committed to the custody of the DOC for an offense committed prior to July 1, 1978. At the time of filing of the Petition, he was in administrative confinement at UCI but, at the time of the hearing, had been released and was not in that status. Petitioner concedes that even during the period of his administrative confinement, he was awarded basic gain time as provided for since he was committed prior to July 1, 1978. However, due to the fact that he was unable to work while in administrative confinement, he did not receive any incentive gain time during that period. Work opportunities for inmates in administrative confinement status are extremely limited. This is because of the security and manpower problems involved in providing adequate supervision of this category of inmate during a work detail. Rule 33-3.081, Florida Administrative Code, allows the placing of an inmate in administrative confinement then disciplinary or criminal charges are pending against him and his presence in the general prison population would present a danger to himself, to others, or to the security and order of the institution. It is also authorized when an investigation is pending and the inmate's presence in the prison population might tend to interfere with that investigation. If, for medical reasons, an inmate's remaining in the prison population would create a health or safety risk, administrative confinement is also authorized. Another reason justifying administrative confinement is when the inmate is alleged to have committed misconduct and there is concern that because of that, his safety is at risk. The rule does not provide any maximum length of time for administrative confinement and the reason for this is that the investigations supporting it are of varying complexity and take differing lengths of time. Petitioner and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all of whom have been in administrative confinement in the past, all denied that they had received the required informal hearing called for under the rule. At best, they were told by the officer placing them in administrative confinement generally why this action was being taken. However, they contend they were never given any opportunity to submit anything to a senior official or a classification officer and they are of the opinion that at no time was there an emergency situation involved. The impression that the inmates have is that a corrections officer can have an inmate confined or released for any reason whether there is adequate justification or basis for the action. Clifford Towbridge has been an inmate at UCI since December, 1983. When he was placed in administrative confinement he was advised of this fact by a corrections officer who told him to pack his things and who put him in administrative confinement status without telling him why. He contends he got no hearing but was ultimately told he was being confined because a confidential informant advised that his life was in danger. Approximately two to three weeks later, he was released when he signed a paper indicating that his life was not in danger. At no time was he told who had made the allegation against him and he was not given a hearing either before confinement or before release. Curtis Mangram had an experience with administrative confinement at his prior incarceration at Belle Glade Correctional Institution. At that time he was given no hearing nor was he brought before a review board. When he left administrative confinement at Belle Glade he was assigned to UCI and remained clean until August 4, 1984 when he was placed in administrative confinement there. It appears that his name was mentioned in connection with the rape of a prisoner and he was placed in administrative confinement for several weeks pending investigation of that incident. One day after his release he was again placed in administrative confinement for possession of contraband wine. He was given no hearing prior to being placed into administrative confinement nor was he initially given a reason for this action. However, he wrote several letters to officials within the DOC to determine why this action was taken. The first response he got indicated he was being placed in for evaluation but regardless of the reason, he is sure he was not given a hearing. On neither occasion of his being placed in administrative confinement, in his opinion, was there any emergency reason for precipitous action. From first hand and from what he has seen and heard, it is his opinion that prisoners are placed in administrative confinement solely on the uncorroborated allegations of other prisoners and when this happens, there is no hearing prior to she placement nor within a timely period thereafter. As was stated previously, the witness was placed in administrative confinement on August 4 and was released on August 28. At that time he was told the reason for him having been placed in administrative confinement (the alleged rape) was resolved. The following day, August 29, he was placed back in administrative confinement and was told by a corrections officer that the action was being taken because Lt. Dixon, an investigator, wanted him back in. Later on, Officer Ward, Dixon's assistant, read him his rights and asked him some questions after which the witness was returned to administrative confinement. The witness admits that he had the wine which he subsequently found out was the basis for his second administrative confinement but he was never punished for the wine nor was he ever charged with the rape. He was in administrative confinement for a total of four months at UCI and had he been punished for the unlawful possession of the wine, it is his opinion he would have been placed in disciplinary confinement for fifteen or thirty days, a period much shorter than the entire period of his administrative confinement. Inmate Edwin Paul has been placed in administrative confinement for investigative reasons twelve or thirteen times during the two and a half years he has been an inmate at UCI. He relates that when he is placed there, the corrections officer comes up to him and tells him to pack his things but never gives him a reason for this action. The response to his inquiry is always that someone will tell him. It is his experience that at UCI, regardless of what the rule requires, no review is done and the inmate is not told anything until he files a grievance. That generally takes approximately ninety days to resolve and during this time, the inmate is in administrative confinement earning no incentive gain time. According to Paul, his requests for information as to the reason for his status are met with various answers such as "you're a menace," "none of your business," or "I don't know." It is his opinion that administrative confinement can be imposed on an inmate at the whim of a correctional officer. He contends that in all of his periods of administrative confinement either no charges were preferred against him, or he was found not guilty of the allegation that was laid, but during all that period, he has not received any gain time that he would have earned had he not been placed in administrative confinement. This has affected his status in that had he not been placed in administrative confinement, his sentence would have been up after forty months confinement. Because of his inability to earn gain time, he is not serving the fiftieth month of his period of confinement. Petitioner was placed in administrative confinement on March 17, 1985. He was not then nor has he since that time been given an informal hearing by a correctional officer, he states. He claims he was placed in administrative confinement by a corrections officer - and was not given an opportunity to sign anything regarding this action. On this occasion he was in for two and a half months. In a prior period of administrative confinement, he claims he was not told why he was there officially. Only through the information given him by a friendly corrections officer two weeks after the fact was he advised why he was incarcerated. Never has a senior corrections officer ever held a hearing with him, he states, nor has he ever been told how long the investigation on which his administrative confinement status is based will take. He has not seen any investigative report nor has he even been given any assistance in finding out the reason for his status. Even a personal interview with the superintendent of UCI has not changed this process, he says. Reid and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all contend that the implementation of the rule regarding administrative confinement creates great stress for them because of, (1) the loss of incentive gain time, (2) the inability to get appropriate exercise, and (3) the impact that the status has on the ability to receive visitors, and all agree that being afforded a hearing or being told why the administrative confinement action was being taken would tend to reduce that stress. Petitioner admitted that he does not have much of a problem with the rule except for the fact that it does not put any time limit on the length of the investigation. His complaint is primarily with the way the rule is followed by UCI. Mr. Tabah, the classification specialist at UCI, related that there is no formal board hearing when inmates are placed in administrative confinement. The inmates' case is reviewed by the chief correctional officer and this review is termed a hearing. This action, however, is itself reviewed by the classification team within 72 hours of the hearing. At the inmates' hearing, a form DC4-318 is prepared by the chief correctional officer on which the reason for the administrative confinement action is listed. The bottom half of this form is subsequently filled out by the classification team during its review as to its concurrence or non-concurrence and the team's recommendation for action. The inmate is given a copy of this review and has an opportunity to make comment thereon. Both the recommendation of the team and the comments of the inmate, if any, are referred to the superintendent. Every inmate in administrative confinement is reviewed weekly. Each inmate is usually advised of the reason for his being placed in administrative confinement either at the time or immediately thereafter. Only in emergency cases can the inmate be placed in administrative confinement without review/hearing by the chief correctional officer. In that case, the hearing is held within forty-eight hours. Review of the files on both Mangram and Towbridge reveal that, as to Towbridge, the inmate was advised by the corrections officer placing him in administrative confinement on February 13, 1985 as to the reason therefor. The chief corrections officer approved the actions of the corrections officer thereafter and the following day, the classification team reviewed the action and furnished the inmate with a copy of their recommendation. As to Mangram, the records reflect that he was placed in administrative confinement on August 18, 1984. An informal hearing was held that same day and the action was reviewed by senior corrections officer Bryant at 4:00 P.M. the same day. Mr. Mangram was retained in administrative confinement because of the belief that the safety of the institution required it. It was felt that Mangram was a potentially violent inmate who posed a clear danger to others. As to Mr. Paul, the file reflects that the two times he was in administrative confinement he was advised of the reasons and given a hearing. As to Petitioner, the record reflects that on January 24, 1985 he was placed in administrative confinement and given the reasons therefor by corrections officer Brown. The reviewing corrections officer supervisor Bryant concurred.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners and Respondent have stipulated to the following facts: The three petitioners are inmates at Union Correctional Institution, Raiford, Florida, in the custody of the Department of Corrections. All three of the petitioners have had their PPRD's established by the respondent-commission as follows: In June of 1982, Mr. Piccirillo's PPRD was established by the commission to be September 30, 1986. In January of 1982, Mr. Adams' PPRD was established by the commission to be November 11, 1991. In December of 1982, petitioner Hemming's PPRD was established by the commission to be September 29, 1993. Subsequent to the commission having established their PPRD's, all three of the petitioners have been transferred from one Florida penal institution to another state institution as follows: Mr. Piccirillo was transferred from Polk Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on August 18, 1982. Mr. Adams was transferred from Polk Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on August 18, 1932. Mr. Hemming was transferred from Avon Park Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on February 16, 1983. The petitioners were not transferred to Union Correctional Institution because of any unsatisfactory institutional conduct at their former institutions. Petitioners are currently scheduled by the commission for biennial interviews to review their established PPRD's as follows: Mr. Piccirillo is scheduled for a biennial interview in March of 1984. Mr. Adams is scheduled for a biennial interview in October of 1983. Mr. Hemming is scheduled for a biennial interview in September of 1984. The following additional findings are made from evidence presented at the hearing: The respondent-commission has not made a finding that any of the petitioner's institutional conduct has been unsatisfactory under the challenged rule nor has respondent extended their PPRD's or refused to authorize their EPRD's. In applying the challenged rule, the fact that an inmate has been transferred to a higher custody or higher level institution is only considered to be unsatisfactory institutional conduct where the commission receives documentation evidencing institutional misconduct as the basis for the transfer. Petitioners transfers from other institutions to Union Correctional Institution would not be considered unsatisfactory institutional conduct under the challenged rule because there is no documentation of institutional misconduct which led to these institutional transfers.
The Issue Whether Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l), 33-3.0083(9)(i) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, William Van Poyck, Mike Ramadanovic and Kenneth Boudreaux, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rules challenged in these cases, Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l), 33-3.0083(9)(i), and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Rules"). Petitioner Van Poyck is on death row, which is considered administrative confinement. All exercise privileges for Petitioner Van Poyck have been suspended for almost three years. Petitioner Ramadanovic at the time of the final hearing was in close management confinement. All exercise privileges for Petitioner Ramadanovic have been suspended for almost one year. Petitioner Bourdreaux at the time of the final hearing was in close management confinement. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. The Challenged Rules. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, governs exercise of inmates who have been placed in "administrative confinement". Administrative confinement is the removal of an inmate from the general inmate population for one or more specified reasons. Rule 33-3.0081(1), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (l) Exercise -- Those inmates confined on a 24-hour basis excluding showers and clinic trips may exercise in their cells. However, if confinement extends beyond a 30-day period, an exercise schedule shall be implemented to ensure a minimum of two hours per week of exercise out of doors. Such exercise periods shall be documented on the confinement records. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only when clear and compelling facts can document such exercise periods should not be granted. The superintendent or assistant superintendent may restrict exercise for an individual inmate when the inmate continues to pose a serious threat to the safety, security and order of the institution by recent demonstrations of violence, by continuing threats of physical harm, written and spoken, toward staff and other inmates; by involvement in acts which seriously interfere with the staff's daily security functions, or by actions demonstrating an extreme escape risk. Inmates shall be notified in writing of this decision and may appeal through the grievance procedure. The denial of exercise shall be for the shortest length of time to accomplish the goal of safety, security and order within the institution and shall be documented on Form DC4-814. Medical restrictions may also place limitations on the exercise periods. Recreational equipment may be available for the exercise period provided such equipment does not compromise the safety or security of the institution. Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code, governs exercise of inmates who have been placed in "close management". Close management is the "long-term single cell confinement of an inmate apart from the general inmate population, where the inmate, through his own behavior, has demonstrated an inability to live in the general population without abusing the rights and privileges of other inmates or disturbing the security, order or operation of the institution." Rule 33-3.0083(1), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: Exercise -- Those inmates confined on a 24-hour basis, excluding showers and clinic trips, may exercise in their cells. However, if confinement extends beyond a 30-day period, an exercise schedule should be implemented to ensure a minimum of 2 hours per week of exercise outside of cell. Such exercise periods will be documented on the confinement records. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only when clear and compelling facts can document such exercise periods should not be granted. Medical restrictions may also place limitations on the exercise periods. Recreational equipment may be available for the exercise period provided such equipment does not threaten the safety or security of the institution. Rule 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, governs exercise of inmates who have been placed in "disciplinary confinement". Rule 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (n) Exercise -- Those inmates confined on a twenty- four hour basis (excluding showers and clinic trips) may exercise in their cells. However, if confinement extends beyond a thirty-day period, an exercise schedule should be implemented to ensure a minimum of two hours per week of exercise outside of the cell. Such exercise periods should be documented on the confinement records. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only when clear and compelling facts show that such exercise periods should not be granted. Restrictions may also be placed on the exercise periods by medical staff. The reason for any exercise restrictions shall be documented. Period of Outdoor Exercise. The Challenged Rules all provide that inmates may exercise in their cells and that "a minimum of two hours per week of exercise outside of the cell" should be provided to inmates in administrative confinement, close management and disciplinary confinement. Unless specified otherwise, all references to "inmates" in this Final Order are to an inmate in administrative confinement, close management or disciplinary confinement. At Florida State Prison, non-death row inmates subject to the Challenged Rules are given an opportunity to attend one, two-hour exercise session a week. If an inmate misses a session for medical or attorney "call out", a holiday or inclement weather, the session is not made up. The Challenged Rules do not specifically require that missed sessions be made up. On their face, the Challenged Rules provide that two hours of exercise should be provided without indicating any exceptions. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, is mandatory: two-hours of exercise must be provided each week. The amount of time inmates are allowed to exercise is affected by the budget and staff of the Respondent. Because of lack of funds and staff, the Respondent is not able to provide more exercise time to non-death row inmates subject to the Challenged Rules. At Florida State Prison, a maximum security prison, there are thirteen wings housing inmates. Ten wings house inmates (including four housing inmates on death row) in various types of confinement status. Nine of the ten wings have a separate area, referred to as a "yard", in which inmates may exercise outdoors. There are two correctional officers on duty at each of the yards during the outdoor exercise period for non-death row inmates subject to the Challenged Rules. One sergeant also rotates between the yards. Four to five correctional officers are required to take inmates in and out of the yards. Each inmate must be strip searched, handcuffed with his hands behind his back and then escorted into the yard. Exercise Yards. The Challenged Rules do not specify the size of the area in which outdoor exercise to be provided to inmates. The Challenged Rules also do not specify the number of inmates that may be placed in an area for outdoor exercise. Yards at Florida State Prison consist of a fenced concrete slab. The yards for non-death row inmates are approximately 24' by 33', or 792 square feet. Usually 17 inmates are placed in the yard next to the inmates' wing at a time. The number of inmates in the yard on occasion may be 20 to 25. This is the exception, rather than the rule. Recreational Equipment. The Challenged Rules do not require that recreational equipment be provided to non-death row inmates. Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, provide that recreational equipment may be available for the exercise period if it does not compromise the safety or security of the institution Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code, is silent concerning recreational equipment. Recreational equipment is not provided to inmates during exercise at Florida State Prison. Inmates tend to fight over recreational equipment and to abuse it when it is provided. In light of the findings of fact, infra, concerning death row inmates, the evidence failed to prove that the failure to provide non-death row inmates with recreational equipment is arbitrary or capricious. Although there is a rational and reasonable reason for not providing recreational equipment to inmates who have proven to be a disciplinary problem (including some death row inmates) the Respondent is evidently prohibited from withholding recreational equipment for death row inmates by court decree. No such decree applies to non- death row inmates. Yard Suspension. The Challenged Rules provide that exceptions to the provision for outdoor exercise may be made "only when clear and compelling facts can document such exercise periods should not be granted." Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code. Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, contain very similar language. Rules 33-3.0083(9)(i) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, do not specify who may decide who is to be denied exercise in the yard, referred to as being placed on the "yard suspension list", or the specific reasons for placing an inmate on such a list. The various institutions are given discretion to decide who will place an inmate on the yard suspension list and the reasons for such suspensions. Rules 33-3.0083(9)(i) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, also do not specify the procedures for placing an inmate on the yard suspension list, do not require periodic review of the list, do not specify a maximum period of time an inmate may be on the list and do not specify the conditions which must be met for an inmate to be removed from the yard suspension list. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, provides who may restrict exercise, requires that there be a "serious threat to the safety, security and order of the institution by recent demonstrations of violence, by continuing threats of physical harm, written and spoken, toward staff and other inmates" and other acts, requires that inmates be notified in writing and provides that denial of exercise be for the shortest length of time possible. There is a list of inmates at Florida State Prison who have been denied yard exercise. Inmates are placed on the yard suspension list because of security problems similar to those specified in Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, caused by an inmate. The procedure for placing an inmate on the yard suspension list is as follows: The chief security officer recommends that an inmate be placed on the list. The recommendation of the chief security officer is reviewed by a team of senior correctional officers and the superintendent. The superintendent makes the final decision of whether an inmate is placed on the yard suspension list. Any inmate placed on the list is notified in writing and may appeal the decision through the grievance procedure. Chapter 33-29, Florida Administrative Code. The following procedure is followed to determine whether an inmate is removed from the yard suspension list: The list is reviewed monthly by the team of senior correctional officers that recommends the placement of an inmate on the list. If an inmate's behavior demonstrates that he has adapted to the institution and is no longer acting out in such a manner to create a security problem, a recommendation is made to the superintendent to remove the inmate's name from the list. The superintendent makes the final decision of whether an inmate's name is removed. Inmates are placed on the yard suspension list for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the goal of changing the inmate's behavior and to eliminate the threat to security caused by the inmate. Inmates on the yard suspension list are still allowed to exercise in their cells. Although cells are small and exercise is not necessarily easy in the cells, inmates may do elevated push-ups, step-ups, and jog in place. There are at any given time approximately 100 inmates at Florida State Prison on the yard suspension list. Inmates may be kept on the yard suspension list for years. Inmate Jimmy Stephens has been on the yard suspension list since February, 1990, and was previously on the yard suspension list for over fifteen years. Petitioner Van Poyck was placed on the yard suspension list upon his arrival at Florida State Prison on December 28, 1988, and remained on the list until January 7, 1992. Death Row Inmates. Inmates on death row are in administrative confinement and are, therefore, subject to Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code. Inmates on death row are provided two, two-hour exercise sessions each week. A total of four hours of exercise. If an exercise session is missed by a death-row inmate, the session is made up. The yards provided to death row inmates are larger than the yards provided to non-death row inmates. The yards for death row inmates at Florida State Prison are 71' by 69' (4,899 square feet), 80' by 64' (5,120 square feet), 62' by 91' (5,642 square feet) and 74' by 80' (5,920 square feet). Approximately 24 to 30 death row inmates are placed in the yard next to the inmates' wing at a time. Death row inmates are provided with a variety of recreational equipment. The amount of exercise time, the size of the yards and the amount of recreational equipment provided to death row inmates was agreed to in a consent decree in a federal court proceeding involving the Department of Corrections.
The Issue Whether prison inmates' television viewing privileges are a legal interest of which the Administrative Procedure Act takes cognizance?
Findings Of Fact Until the memorandum and institutional operating pro- cedure here challenged were implemented, petitioners and other inmates at Union Correctional Institution were permitted (when not required to be doing something else) to watch television in common areas between three o'clock and eleven o'clock weekday evenings, and on holidays, between eight o'clock in the morning and two or three o'clock the following morning. After somebody donated equipment for cable television at Union Correctional Institution, and after inmates, including Lionel E. Chase, had installed the cable, James D. Stephens, recreation director at Union Correctional Institution, met with six other members of a committee which included Colonel D. E. Jackson, Jim Reddish, Assistant Superintendent for Prisoners, Lieutenant Rothman (phonetic) and an inmate representative who had no say in developing policy. As a result of the meeting, a memorandum dated January 23, 1984, was addressed to the inmate population, stating: T.V. programs including sporting events beginning at 10:00 p.m. or before, shall be viewed to completion. Any program starting after 10:00 p.m. shall be terminated at 11:30 p.m., unless authorized in advance by the T.V. Policy Committee. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 3. Earlier, on January 3, 1984, Superintendent Massey signed Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure No. 83-30, "Institutional T.V. Policy" (IOP 83- 30) Petitioners' Exhibit No. 2. This document specified "selection and viewing procedures....[for] each respective housing area." With respect to every housing area in Union Correctional Institution, IOP 83-30 provides: On Monday through Friday, sets will be turned on at 3:00 P.M.; on weekends and holidays, sets will be turned on at 8:00 A.M. All t.v.'s shall be turned off exactly at 11:30 P.M. Sports programming and special events that air past the time limit shall be viewed to completion. IOP 83-30.5(D)(4). Although signed by Superintendent Massey on January 3, 1984, IOP 83-30 is dated December 30, 1983. The memorandum and IOP 83-30.5(D)(4) have been enforced against petitioners. In enforcing the new policy, correctional staff have not only turned the television sets off earlier on weekends, they have also closed the dayrooms earlier. The guards now padlock the dayroom doors when they turn off the television sets. In the past, the dayrooms remained open even after television viewing stopped, and inmates were allowed to read, paint, write letters and so forth. The inmates filed a grievance petition protesting this change in practice. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 1. Rule Rationale Before installation of the cable, inmates had a choice of two or three programs, but they now have a much wider choice, at least when the cable is in good repair. A person or persons unknown have slashed the cable some half dozen times. There are inmates who believe the guards, some of whom reportedly do not feel inmates should watch television at all, have sabotaged the cable. According to some prison officials, it is the inmates who have slashed the cables, which, they say, is an indication of how high feeling runs between the inmate faction that prefers sports programs and the faction that does not. In any event, according to respondent's witnesses, it was for fear of inmates' quarrelling in choosing among the larger number of options cable television has brought that viewing hours on weekends and holidays were shortened. This does not, of course, explain why they were lengthened on weekdays. Nor was there any evidence that the greater range of television programs has caused any dissension among the inmates. The hearing officer has had the benefit of the parties' posthearing submissions, including petitioners' proposed findings of facts, conclusions of law and final order. To the extent proposed findings of fact have not been adopted they have been deemed unsupported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, subordinate or cumulative.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jean Colden (Colder), was employed full time by Respondent, Department of Corrections (Department), as an Accountant II at Broward Correctional Institution. The evidence establishes that Colden was absent without authorized leave on three consecutive workdays, to wit: October 1-3, 1985. At no time did Colden notify the Department of her intention not to appear for work on those dates, and at hearing she offered no explanation for her absences. By certified letter dated October 4, 1985, return receipt requested, Colden was advised that her absence from work since October 1, 1985, was unauthorized and that, pursuant to Rule 22A-7.10(2), F.A.C., she was deemed to have abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service. The letter further advised Colden of her right to petition the Department of Administration for a review of the facts, and whether they constitute abandonment. Colden timely petitioned the Department of Administration for review On November 5, 1985, he Department of Administration accepted Colden's petition and requested the assignment of a Hearing Officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the final hearing.
The Issue Whether the Department of Corrections' alleged policy of forbidding phone calls between incarcerated husbands and wives, when the wives are incarcerated at Broward Women's Correctional Institution ("BWCI"), is an unpromulgated rule and therefore invalid.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented, the following facts are determined: The parties stipulate that petitioner has standing to maintain this proceeding i.e. that he is substantially affected by the challenged agency policy. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution; his wife is incarcerated at Broward Women's Correctional Institution (BWCI). Both institutions are part of the state prison system operated by the Department. In August 1983, petitioner asked for permission to telephone his wife at BWCI, but his request was denied by Department officials. Under a BWCI policy, as well as a Department policy, inmates at other institutions are not normally allowed to place telephone calls to inmates at BWCI. The departmental policy is embraced by Rule 33-3.125(1)(e) , which provides: (e) Inmates may not receive incoming telephone calls because it is disruptive to normal operating and program functions of an institution. This rule effectively prohibits inmates from placing calls to inmates at other correctional institutions. Petitioner has not shown that the Department's denial of permission was dictated by any written statement or policy other than that contained in this Department rule.
